La eliminazione dei serbi dalla Croazia / 2

(english)

1. Family of murdered Croatian war crimes witness seeks
damages

2. TRANSCRIPT OF FRANJO TUDJMAN'S MILITARY STAFF MEETING SHORTLY AFTER
OPERATION STORM


=== 1 ===


http://www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/dv/Qwarcrimes-croatia.RHix_DyT.html

Family of murdered Croatian war crimes witness seeks
damages

(2003)

ZAGREB, May 29 (AFP) - The family of a Croatian man
who was murdered after testifying in war crimes cases
linked to killings of ethnic Serbs in Croatia in 1991,
has filed for damages from the state, national radio
reported Thursday.
The wife and the son of Milan Levar filed the suit at
a Zagreb court seeking almost one million kuna in
damages (133,000 euros, 157,000 dollars), accusing the
state of not doing enough to prevent his killing.
He was killed "in a terrorist act which the state
should have prevented," the two claim.
Levar, a witness for the UN war crimes tribunal, was
killed in August 2000 whan a device planted in front
of his house in the central town of Gospic exploded.
Noone has been charged over the killing.
Levar's family are seeking compensation for emotional
distress.
Levar hit the headlines in Croatia in 1997 when he
voluntarily travelled to The Hague-based UN tribunal
to testify over atrocities committed by Croatian
forces against Serb civilians in the Gospic region at
the outbreak of the 1991-95 Serbo-Croatian war.
He made allegations in the local press accusing
high-ranking Croatian officers of organising the
systematic killing of ethnic Serbs in the area.
One of them, retired general Mirko Norac, was
sentenced earlier this year by a local court to 12
years in jail for the executions of at least 50 ethnic
Serb civilians in the Gospic region in 1991.
At the time of Levar's killing, the UN tribunal said
that it had offered him protective measures after
questioning him on alleged Croatian war crimes, but
that he had voiced a wish to remain in Croatia.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1998 requested the Croatian
government provide protection for Levar.
He had warned police that he had been receiving
threats, and in previous incidents a bomb was thrown
at his house and a mine mine planted under his car.


=== 2 ===


TRANSCRIPT OF FRANJO TUDJMAN'S MILITARY STAFF MEETING SHORTLY AFTER
OPERATION STORM

These transcripts contain some significant material. Focus on the
actual transcript, and ignore Feral Tribune's propaganda commentary
about the "Serb occupation" of the Krajina.

Feral Tribune (Croatia) / Translated by TOL - July 17, 2003

---

http://www.tol.cz/look/wire/
article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=10&NrIssue=733&NrSection=1&NrArti
cle=10051

Historical Transcript: Tudjman on Ethnic Cleansing

Feral Tribune publishes transcripts of former Croatian President Franjo
Tudjman's secret staff meeting, held shortly after Croatian forces
retook control of Serb-occupied territory in 1995.

CROATIAN PRESIDENT FRANJO TUDJMAN: The demographic problem should be
solved militarily.

"One should proceed with the consideration that a military command
could be a most effective means for solving the internal needs of the
state. Considering the situation we face with the liberation of
occupied territories, the demographic situation, it is necessary for
military command precisely to become one of the most efficient
components of our state policies in solving the demographic situation
of Croatia. We have to consolidate Croatianhood in Istria and populate
certain parts. … We didn’t accidentally create the Croatian Republic of
Herzeg-Bosna [a Croatian wartime self-proclaimed entity in Bosnia] and
the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) [the Croat militia in Bosnia].

"We have, as you see, despite everything, despite all the
circumstances, created an admired army. Therefore, we will solve that
too."

It was with these historical words that Tudjman addressed the members
of his military establishment on 23 August 1995, after they gathered
that morning in the presidential palace at Pantovcak. Tudjman’s words
were recorded in a transcript that--together with hundreds of other
records of the Pantovcak sessions … --has long been in the possession
of the prosecutors of The Hague [International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia]. Early this week, [the transcripts] reached the
Feral Tribune’s editorial office.

“We will solve that too” referred, in fact, to the violent
state-sponsored Croatization of territory that was, until the beginning
of August of that year, part of the so-called Republic of Srpska
Krajina [the self proclaimed Croatian Serb entity]. “We will solve that
too” was the code for the beginning of a broad campaign to cement the
results of ethnic cleansing that the Croatian authorities--with the
unselfish assistance of Krajina and Belgrade chiefs--realized through
Operation Oluja [Storm]. After military action, it was necessary to
radically change the ethnic picture of the liberated and “cleansed”
area.

Consequently, on 23 August 1995, at 10 a.m., Tudjman’s defense heads,
represented by Defense Minister Gojko Susak, Chief of Staff General
Zvonimir Cervenko, Major-General Vinko Vrbanac, Rear Admiral Davor
Domazet Loso, Colonel-General Josip Lucic, Colonel-General Imra Agotic,
Colonel-General Petar Stipetic, Admiral Sveto Letica, and Admiral
Davorin Kajic, assembled. The central role at the meeting, however,
wasn’t intended for any of the soldiers, but civilian Jure Radic,
former reconstruction and development minister and the supreme
commander’s main operator in the sophisticated question of ethnic
engineering. The settling of the deserted Krajina and the definite
“consolidation of Croatianhood” in the until-then “un-Croatian” regions
were the main topics of the session in Pantovcak.

We remind our readers that the transcript from the presidential palace
discussed here appeared 18 days after the end of Oluja. The atmosphere
is no longer particularly euphoric, but noticeably solemn and, above
all, worklike. It was necessary to think of a model that would bring
into action Tudjman’s instructions, addressed in a short dialogue with
Jure Radic, a dialogue that could function as the motto of the session.

“Vojnic,” said Radic, “had 76 Croats, and 7,600 Serbs.” Tudjman
responds: “Ok, now it’s going to be different.” [Vojnic is a town in
central Croatia.]

Supreme commander Tudjman intended to carry out his plan with the help
of the new territorial organization of Croatian armed forces. At the
very beginning of the meeting he stated the following: “Considering a
military-administrative command, or what we would consider division in
operational zones as we have addressed them up until now, as well as
the distribution of military units, one consequently needs to consider
the geopolitical stance and strategic interests of the country, taking
into account foreseen and possible enemies, today and in the future.
However, one should also proceed with the consideration that a military
command could be a most effective means for solving the internal needs
of the state. We, however, don’t have the need, the special need, to
solve consolidation of the existing order as it is the case in other
countries, but we have it, for example, in the Istria region. But
considering the situation we face with the liberation of occupied
territories, the demographic situation, it is necessary for military
command precisely to become one of the most efficient components of our
state politics in solving the current crucial problem, namely the
demographic situation of Croatia.

"Therefore, I called the vice president of the government and the
reconstruction and development minister, Dr. Radic, to this meeting, in
order to present, for the start of this debate, the current demographic
situation, because the distribution of authority, regions, brigades of
others, educational facilities, etc., can be a very beneficial and
effective way of solving the situation where we need to consolidate
Croatianhood as in Istria, and on the other hand to do it as soon as
possible--nowadays it is not about changing the makeup as much as about
populating certain towns, certain regions. If you establish towns,
greater authorities, educational facilities, etc., it means that tens
and hundreds of people will come to establish a family there and at
once we have a different situation, life, etc.”

Jure Radic then took the stand to share his ideas for “consolidating
Croationhood.”

JURE RADIC: Indeed, to be concise, I think it is well known to all of
us that after the liberation of Croatia, the main problem in Croatia is
the Croat. Simply, there are fewer and fewer Croats every day for a
couple of reasons. One of the reasons is exile, as many were moved out
of Croatia in the past because of political and economic reasons. The
other reason has to do with the fact that in the past 40 years, fewer
and fewer people are returning to Croatia every year. From 1953 until
today, the number of those born in Croatia has declined by half. In
1953, … there were 98,000 births, and last year, only 48,000, thus half
the number. This is certainly something that we in the army will
experience in a little while, when those who can carry a gun will be
fewer and fewer. We have black holes on the Croatian soil, where no
Croats live. This of course is a consequence of devised greater-Serbia
politics that intended, through the preparation of this aggression, to
create deserted regions, and when we look at today’s picture of
Croatia, we are counting on the premature return of all people to their
homes, something difficult to expect when many have gotten accustomed
to the surroundings of their exile …

"In this order of range, the critical area is the area that attempts a
division of Croatia’s narrowest part in half, a division that those
plotting in Belgrade and other places wanted to accomplish. Thus, from
our point of view, the area that gets first priority for population
consists of the former counties of Vrginmost, Vojnic, and part of the
Karlovac county. Thus, the region of Petrova Gora and the surrounding
mountains. Before the war, … 4,259 Croats and 26,298 Serbs lived in
these three counties. Thus, [it is] a completely empty region, and the
national priority No.1 is to populate that region with Croats and
create as much of a balance as possible. I think that we have to focus
on economic propulsion in towns that exist there, and these are
Vrginmost, Vojnic, and some larger villages such as Veljun, Krnjak,
etc."

TUDJMAN: We don’t have time for that. You present the situation, we’ll
make decisions afterward."

RADIC: That’s the critical point. Equally critical is the area
underneath, the Slunj area, where Croats have to return. This area is
also pretty empty, but fortunately, there weren’t any Serbs or there
were few. Thus, of equal concern from our point of view is this
red-blue area [pointing at a map] at the narrowest part of Croatia,
where Croatia was completely split. The next priority, ranging third,
depends on whether we will consider the regions in Herzeg-Bosna, or
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or not. It can be placed in order of importance
in regards to Croatia. If the liberated areas of Livno, Glamoc, Kupres,
Grahovo, and Drvar ever become populated by Croats, then the region of
Knin becomes less important." [Livno, Glamoc, Kupres, Grahovo, and
Drvar are Serb-populated towns in western Bosnia taken by the Croatian
Army in the aftermath of Operation Oluja].

TUDJMAN: If it ever happens."

RADIC: That’s why the decision is up to you whether it will happen or
not. If not, an equal third priority is everything in the former
counties of Donji Lapac and Knin. These are two split communities that
stretch along the Croatian border, with almost no Croats. In Knin there
were, for example, 1,660 Croats, in Srb 29, in Doljane none, and in
Donji Lapac 14."

TUDJMAN: Do you know how many there were after World War II,
approximately?

RADIC: In Knin, 60 percent of the population was Croatian after World
War II. I have the data but not with me right now.

TUDJMAN: What, 60 percent?

RADIC: Yes, 60 percent of Croats only in the city of Knin. … Knin was
small then. Thus, this entire region of Donji Lapac and Knin is a key
border region entirely devoid of Croats. I don’t know--I think it is
interesting that the ethnically purest community in Croatia was the
county of Donji Lapac, with over 99 percent Serbs. There is not one
county in Croatia that has over 98 percent Croats, according to a
prewar census from 1991, not one. There are in Herzegovina, four of
them …"

TUDJMAN: There aren’t any in Zagorje either."

At this point we will take a short break to note Radic's joy that in
the county of Slunj, there "weren't any Serbs," consequently to
establish that Tudjman and company were cold-bloodedly handling the
distribution of people in another country [Livno, Glamoc, Kupres,
Grahovo, and Drvar are in Bosnia and Herzegovina], and to notice that
the regions to be populated with Croats precisely overlap with the
regions dehumanized during Oluja. Dehumanization entailed hundreds of
liquidations of Serbian civilians, the departure of 200,000 people
considered unwanted by the [ruling] HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] for
having the wrong names and surnames, the looting and burning of 15,000
to 20,000 Serb houses. … The goal of the listed activities was clear
and clearly stated: Krajina should never again be Serbian by majority.
Now we give the stage back to Tudjman …

TUDJMAN: Regarding the headquarters in the listed regions, operatively
and strategically speaking it is not normal that a fifth division is in
Osijek, Djakovo, and Pozega. Thus, primarily operatively, [I consider]
Karlovac and Petrinja. Here, due to political reasons, I would rather
go to Pazin than … you understand. Here I think that Knin is
indisputable, considering that we have school facilities in Knin, a
system more extensive than needed for civil schools in 50 years. Thus,
should we make use of that for the headquarters for the … does that
mean we should then have a high school?"

GOJKO SUSAK: There is enough space to bring in a guard brigade,
headquarters, and a school. We don’t have to invest anything, Mr.
President, all three will fit there."

TUDJMAN: I agree that we should make use of it and thus make Knin
Croatian fairly quickly. But I want to see what we will do with Gospic.
We also have to give Gospic some military institutions …"

CROATIAN ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL ZVONIMIR CERVENKO: Here, Mr.
President, we have a proposition for the operative distribution of
commands, it is item No. 2, so allow the general to present what we
think …"

TUDJMAN: I’m not sure whether Ploce, Metkovic, Neum would be the best,
but we can’t [consider that] for now." [Ploce and Metkovic are Croatian
towns on the Adriatic coast, while Neum is part of the Bosnian
Federation, also on the coast.]

SUSAK: No, no, … the headquarters should be on the other side of Neum,
not in Neum."

RADIC: If so, yes, precisely the other side."

TUDJMAN: Where?"

SUSAK: South of Neum."

TUDJMAN: Maybe Ston."

And it was, naturally, Ston, but the most important is the recognition
that Tudjman had intensively thought about making Knin “Croatian fairly
quickly,” and that in August 1995 he still thought … that it was
impossible to install military headquarters in Neum as the furthest
region of southern Croatia. The headquarters for the military regions
(six regions of the Croatian armed forces where units, constituting
operational and administrative command) were finally established in
Pazin, Knin, Karlovac, Varazdin, Dakovo, and Ston, while Knin,
Karlovac, and Pazin were chosen to stabilize Croatianhood in those
regions after decades of instability. Knin and Karlovac were also
chosen in order to have more Catholic flesh transported from somewhere
(most probably Bosnia) to the regions--a guarantee for making Serbs
second-grade citizens and actively obstructing their return. The
following two dialogues from the shorthand report bear witness to that
very well …

GENERAL MAJOR VINKO VRBANAC: By liberating, Mr. President, this third
part of the occupied area of the Republic of Croatia, the present
conditions show, as you said in the introduction, that a change in
population needs to occur by military means."

TUDJMAN: We have the fortunate situation that the liberation demands a
distribution of military units that would simultaneously solve the
demographical [aspect]."

RADIC: Vojnic and Vrginmost are the most critical counties. In one of
those counties one should have at least some …"

TUDJMAN: Not only one, but both. If not a whole unit, at least a
company should be placed there, without a compromise, please. Let‘s
move on."

And then the grand finale of the Pantovcak session happens. Near the
very end, Tudjman addresses his favorite topic, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and complains to his chief assistants about the world idiots [leaders]
that didn’t recognize the genius of his Bosnian adventures.

TUDJMAN: Maybe someone was watching when in the last pre-electoral
speech in 1990 I somewhat undiplomatically said that the borders of the
Croatian ‘pretzel’ were untenable,” says the commander, “but this
doesn’t mean that we accidentally created the Croatian Republic of
Herzeg-Bosna and the HVO, and are now conducting those operations
there. It is true that never in Croatian history have Croatian soldiers
controlled more territory than now, but it's clear that in a formally
administrative sense we can't yet organize differently than we have
proposed. You know, in this formation, after creating such an army and
politically succeeding in demoralizing Serbianhood and its army, if
there were any international circumstances and wisdom, if they had let
us, if they had told me, ‘we won’t allow Yugoslav air traffic, rockets
provided by Russians, etc. to engage against Croatia,’ we could have
said today, after [operations] Ljeto (Summer) and Oluja, we could have
borders that would fit Croatia, and the rest of the world as well. But
considering that there is no such wisdom, we have to discuss things
under these circumstances, and ignore what we have accomplished in
terms of Croatian interests and the Croatian state.”

And this is how Tudjman spoke in August of 1995.

This transcript--together with hundreds of others located at The
Hague--testifies to the fact that the former Croatian authorities
carefully planned, prepared, and carried out the ethnic cleansing of
Krajina Serbs. From the forged leaflets distributed in Krajina before
Operation Oluja, asking Serbs to flee, to post-Oluja days when from
Knin to Dvor na Uni mass murders and burnings of houses took place, to
later weeks and months when the ethnically cleansed regions were
sometimes successfully populated with Croatian settlers brought
together by poverty. They were assigned Serbian houses spared by the
flames and the dynamite, in order to exclude the possibility of a
return of the unwanted. And that wasn't the only method used to stop
their return.

Finally, it is unclear why individuals from the current Croatian
government, who sent kilograms upon kilograms of Tudjman's transcripts
to The Hague, are today fanatically defending Ante Gotovina [suspected
war criminal indicted by the ICTY], claiming that no ethnic cleansing
took place in Krajina. It would be better if they spoke to, let's say,
Jure Radic, about that issue.

---
Translated by Mirna Skrbic.

The news items posted on TOL Wire have been edited by TOL staff with
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