http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/politika072105.htm
Serbian commentary questions NATO's motives for signing troop transit
accord
BBC Monitoring Europe (Political) - July 27, 2005, Wednesday
Text of commentary by Dragoslav Rancic entitled "Strategic gain or
loss" published by the Serbian newspaper Politika on 21 July
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's visit to Belgrade has resulted in the signing
of the "Agreement on Ground Lines of Communication for NATO Forces
Through the Territory of Serbia-Montenegro". That clumsily titled
agreement constitutes our government's consent to henceforth allow
NATO to use roads and rail lines on our soil for the transport of its
troops to destinations of its choosing, in keeping with its own
intentions, plans and objectives.
It was not our guest, but rather Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk
Draskovic, the signer of the document, who provided journalists with
an interpretation of the importance of the Agreement to NATO. He said
that "the Agreement will allow NATO forces, including Kfor [Kosovo
Force], to react anywhere in the region where human rights, people and
peace are threatened, as needed. And in the event of any attempts to
repeat the events of 17 March [2004] in Kosovo-Metohija, this
agreement will greatly facilitate a rapid and energetic reaction by
NATO forces."
Since it is believed that NATO forces aiming to preserve peace and
human rights "anywhere in the region" will henceforth travel on our
roads and rail lines mostly with regard to Kosovo-Metohija, that
implies the assumption - even the conviction - that the agreement
brings us an important strategic gain. As far as we can tell, however,
there is no mention of Kosovo anywhere in the agreement.
In order to determine what exactly the agreement means for NATO and
what it means for us, it is necessary to explain the nature of the
document itself. Is the agreement on the transport of foreign troops
(with no time limits) through a sovereign country that is not a member
of the same alliance as those troops a technical issue or a political
one? There is no easy answer to that question, since the text of the
document was not made public for unknown reasons, even though that
should have been done.
If it is a technical issue, that means that the chief diplomat was in
fact authorized to take the action that he did. However, we are not
aware of any institution of government having decided to reduce our
relations with NATO, which are of prime political importance, to the
technical level and having informed the public of that decision. Nor
are we aware of any public debate in the highest legislative and
executive bodies of government about this agreement, which goes
straight to the heart of the state union's sovereignty.
It is clear that the agreement is a political issue, not a technical
one, and that there can be no third option. In our people's minds,
however this is a very sensitive political issue. To recall, in 1999
in Rambouillet, the United States sought what NATO has now gotten,
albeit partially, and so when its ultimatum was rejected it led to the
aggression against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], after
which foreign troops occupied Kosovo-Metohija.
If we were previously asked to allow NATO to cross Serbia in order to
"impose order" on Kosovo-Metohija and thus be spared bombardment, it
is unclear what danger today makes it necessary to ask us for the same
thing that we were asked for in Rambouillet (although, to be fair,
without public threats). NATO has been "imposing order" on
Kosovo-Metohija for six years now, amid praise from the major Western
powers, but now it is suddenly fearful of renewed tension, and so
preparations are again under way to apply stronger force in
Kosovo-Metohija, and through the territory of SCG [Serbia-Montenegro]
instead of from Macedonia and Albania.
Before travelling to Belgrade, de Hoop Scheffer met in Brussels with
Jessen-Petersen. As usual, the head of Kfor said that "Kfor is doing
an extraordinary job" in maintaining security and that this is "the
basis for further progress in the political process". According to
him, there is no need to reinforce the NATO troops. But Scheffer said
that "the situation in Kosovo is fragile" and that "tension is on the
rise".
These assessments are contradictory, whereby Scheffer's is more in
keeping with our anxieties. It follows from that that the agreement on
NATO troop transit through our territory is beneficial to us because
it makes it possible to curb any new Albanian unrest and to better
protect Serbs in Kosovo, in keeping with Vuk Draskovic's
interpretation.
However, the magnanimity of NATO's motives is dubious for at least
three reasons. First, the existing NATO forces are in Kosovo-Metohija
in order to prevent unrest, not to allow it to flare up and only later
extinguish it with reinforcements. Second, there are certain reasons
why NATO wants, as it did before Rambouillet, when it was not present
in Kosovo-Metohija, to be able to move about freely in
Serbia-Montenegro, although at this point another reason is being
cited for that. Third, since stronger alliance forces are mentioned as
a possible means of assisting the "political process" - which could
result in independence for Kosovo-Metohija - from NATO's perspective
the instigators of tension are not necessarily limited to Albanians in
Kosovo-Metohija, but could also be Serbs intent on preventing the
secession of their southern province.
Serbs remain criminals and potential enemies in NATO's eyes. The US
Congress says that they are guilty of genocide, and in Brussels they
have been accused of intolerance and human rights violations, in
Vojvodina for example. Recently British members of parliament asked
NATO to send troops to Serbia, whether the Serbs like it or not. Now
there is no need to do that by force.
The signing of the Agreement is a political mistake on our part. The
proposal should have been considered after we become partners, within
the framework of a Council for Cooperation with NATO, which Scheffer
is proposing as a way of institutionalizing relations, so that the
alliance would also have certain obligations towards us and so that we
could stipulate that, say, any transit of foreign troops across our
soil must first be approved by the SCG Assembly.
As things stand, foreign armies have a continuous "green light" for
transit across our soil, even though they are neither our partners nor
our allies. They have no obligation to be friendly either. Instead of
emphasizing that unfortunately there is still no mutual trust between
SCG and NATO and that time is needed to gradually establish it, it
appears that we have gullibly slipped into a camouflaged protectorate
that is even being denied membership in an unimportant organization
like the Partnership for Peace, like a baby deprived of its rattle.
This protectorate will perhaps have the heaviest European
concentration of foreign troops, ready for any sort of intervention,
but unlike the other protectorates in our vicinity, it will not also
enjoy the protection of the UN Security Council.
SOURCE: Politika, Belgrade, in Serbian 21 Jul 05
© Copyright 2005 British Broadcasting Corporation
Posted for Fair Use only.
Serbian commentary questions NATO's motives for signing troop transit
accord
BBC Monitoring Europe (Political) - July 27, 2005, Wednesday
Text of commentary by Dragoslav Rancic entitled "Strategic gain or
loss" published by the Serbian newspaper Politika on 21 July
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer's visit to Belgrade has resulted in the signing
of the "Agreement on Ground Lines of Communication for NATO Forces
Through the Territory of Serbia-Montenegro". That clumsily titled
agreement constitutes our government's consent to henceforth allow
NATO to use roads and rail lines on our soil for the transport of its
troops to destinations of its choosing, in keeping with its own
intentions, plans and objectives.
It was not our guest, but rather Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk
Draskovic, the signer of the document, who provided journalists with
an interpretation of the importance of the Agreement to NATO. He said
that "the Agreement will allow NATO forces, including Kfor [Kosovo
Force], to react anywhere in the region where human rights, people and
peace are threatened, as needed. And in the event of any attempts to
repeat the events of 17 March [2004] in Kosovo-Metohija, this
agreement will greatly facilitate a rapid and energetic reaction by
NATO forces."
Since it is believed that NATO forces aiming to preserve peace and
human rights "anywhere in the region" will henceforth travel on our
roads and rail lines mostly with regard to Kosovo-Metohija, that
implies the assumption - even the conviction - that the agreement
brings us an important strategic gain. As far as we can tell, however,
there is no mention of Kosovo anywhere in the agreement.
In order to determine what exactly the agreement means for NATO and
what it means for us, it is necessary to explain the nature of the
document itself. Is the agreement on the transport of foreign troops
(with no time limits) through a sovereign country that is not a member
of the same alliance as those troops a technical issue or a political
one? There is no easy answer to that question, since the text of the
document was not made public for unknown reasons, even though that
should have been done.
If it is a technical issue, that means that the chief diplomat was in
fact authorized to take the action that he did. However, we are not
aware of any institution of government having decided to reduce our
relations with NATO, which are of prime political importance, to the
technical level and having informed the public of that decision. Nor
are we aware of any public debate in the highest legislative and
executive bodies of government about this agreement, which goes
straight to the heart of the state union's sovereignty.
It is clear that the agreement is a political issue, not a technical
one, and that there can be no third option. In our people's minds,
however this is a very sensitive political issue. To recall, in 1999
in Rambouillet, the United States sought what NATO has now gotten,
albeit partially, and so when its ultimatum was rejected it led to the
aggression against the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], after
which foreign troops occupied Kosovo-Metohija.
If we were previously asked to allow NATO to cross Serbia in order to
"impose order" on Kosovo-Metohija and thus be spared bombardment, it
is unclear what danger today makes it necessary to ask us for the same
thing that we were asked for in Rambouillet (although, to be fair,
without public threats). NATO has been "imposing order" on
Kosovo-Metohija for six years now, amid praise from the major Western
powers, but now it is suddenly fearful of renewed tension, and so
preparations are again under way to apply stronger force in
Kosovo-Metohija, and through the territory of SCG [Serbia-Montenegro]
instead of from Macedonia and Albania.
Before travelling to Belgrade, de Hoop Scheffer met in Brussels with
Jessen-Petersen. As usual, the head of Kfor said that "Kfor is doing
an extraordinary job" in maintaining security and that this is "the
basis for further progress in the political process". According to
him, there is no need to reinforce the NATO troops. But Scheffer said
that "the situation in Kosovo is fragile" and that "tension is on the
rise".
These assessments are contradictory, whereby Scheffer's is more in
keeping with our anxieties. It follows from that that the agreement on
NATO troop transit through our territory is beneficial to us because
it makes it possible to curb any new Albanian unrest and to better
protect Serbs in Kosovo, in keeping with Vuk Draskovic's
interpretation.
However, the magnanimity of NATO's motives is dubious for at least
three reasons. First, the existing NATO forces are in Kosovo-Metohija
in order to prevent unrest, not to allow it to flare up and only later
extinguish it with reinforcements. Second, there are certain reasons
why NATO wants, as it did before Rambouillet, when it was not present
in Kosovo-Metohija, to be able to move about freely in
Serbia-Montenegro, although at this point another reason is being
cited for that. Third, since stronger alliance forces are mentioned as
a possible means of assisting the "political process" - which could
result in independence for Kosovo-Metohija - from NATO's perspective
the instigators of tension are not necessarily limited to Albanians in
Kosovo-Metohija, but could also be Serbs intent on preventing the
secession of their southern province.
Serbs remain criminals and potential enemies in NATO's eyes. The US
Congress says that they are guilty of genocide, and in Brussels they
have been accused of intolerance and human rights violations, in
Vojvodina for example. Recently British members of parliament asked
NATO to send troops to Serbia, whether the Serbs like it or not. Now
there is no need to do that by force.
The signing of the Agreement is a political mistake on our part. The
proposal should have been considered after we become partners, within
the framework of a Council for Cooperation with NATO, which Scheffer
is proposing as a way of institutionalizing relations, so that the
alliance would also have certain obligations towards us and so that we
could stipulate that, say, any transit of foreign troops across our
soil must first be approved by the SCG Assembly.
As things stand, foreign armies have a continuous "green light" for
transit across our soil, even though they are neither our partners nor
our allies. They have no obligation to be friendly either. Instead of
emphasizing that unfortunately there is still no mutual trust between
SCG and NATO and that time is needed to gradually establish it, it
appears that we have gullibly slipped into a camouflaged protectorate
that is even being denied membership in an unimportant organization
like the Partnership for Peace, like a baby deprived of its rattle.
This protectorate will perhaps have the heaviest European
concentration of foreign troops, ready for any sort of intervention,
but unlike the other protectorates in our vicinity, it will not also
enjoy the protection of the UN Security Council.
SOURCE: Politika, Belgrade, in Serbian 21 Jul 05
© Copyright 2005 British Broadcasting Corporation
Posted for Fair Use only.