(La politica occidentale sul Kosovo, preannunciando l'ennesimo riconoscimento del separatismo etnico secondo la logica del "divide et impera"', sta causando nervosismo nel nord e nel sud del Caucaso, dove crescono innumerevoli e contrastanti le rivendicazioni nazionalitarie...)


West's Kosovo Policy To Lead To Wars In Caucasus, too


1) Russia, U.S. clash at U.N. over Georgian region 
By Patrick Worsnip - Reuters - April 10, 2007

2) Granting Kosovo Independence to Become Precedent for Separatism: Russian Speaker
K. Ramazanova - Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan) - July 20, 2007

3) Having suffered a defeat in resolution of Kosovo Conflict, 
UNO got down to other conflicts of post-Soviet area 
PanArmenian.net - July 28, 2007

4) Armenian President does not rule out new war with Azerbaijan 
Azeri Press Agency - July 12, 2007

5) The Coming Independence of Kosovo and the Steps Russia Should Take
Andrei Areshev - Strategic Cultural Foundation (Russia) - September 24, 2007



=== 1 ===

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N10445886.htm

Reuters - April 10, 2007

Russia, U.S. clash at U.N. over Georgian region

By Patrick Worsnip


UNITED NATIONS - Russia and the United States clashed
sharply over Georgia's breakaway region of Abkhazia on
Tuesday as the United Nations Security Council debated
renewing a U.N. mission in the Caucasus state.

Russia's U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin told reporters
the United States had made a "serious diplomatic and
political mistake" in refusing to allow Abkhazia's
"foreign minister" to come to New York.

U.S. officials denied they had turned down a formal
visa request by the minister, and U.S. ambassador
Alejandro Wolff accused Churkin of a "mischievous
effort" to create "false analogies" between Abkhazia
and Serbia's troubled Kosovo region.

Abkhazia, on the Black Sea, broke away from Georgia in
1993 after the Soviet Union collapsed, when
separatists, backed by mercenaries and arms from
Russia's northern Caucasus region, drove out Tbilisi's
troops.

Moscow, which has frayed relations with Georgia, props
up the region by paying pensions, issuing Russian
passports and allowing cross-border traffic.

A U.N. military and police observer mission in
Georgia, currently 142-strong, has monitored the
situation since 1993. Its current six-month mandate
will expire on Friday.

Abkhazia is not officially recognized by any country
or international body, but Churkin took issue with
Washington's decision not to let the Abkhaz minister,
Sergei Shamba, come to the United States to address
the Security Council.

"This is clearly a fact of violating the spirit of the
obligation of the host country," Churkin said. "We
think it was a rather serious diplomatic and political
mistake." The Security Council, he said, should listen
to both sides.

"As I mentioned in the Council meeting today, can you
imagine what would be the situation ... if in the case
of the Kosovo conflict, all those years the
international community were listening only to the
Serb side?"

"MISCHIEVOUS EFFORT"

Kosovo has been under U.N. administration since 1999,
when NATO bombing drove out Serb forces. A U.N. plan,
backed by the West but opposed by Russia's ally
Serbia, proposes independence.

In a statement distributed by Russian officials,
Shamba himself attacked the Security Council for
failing to consult both sides, "which makes us think
that the UN has not become an equidistant party."

But Wolff told reporters that of a six-nation group of
"friends of Georgia" - Russia, the United States,
Britain, France, Germany and Slovakia - only Russia
thought the time was ripe for Shamba to attend the
United Nations.

"We've heard ambassador Churkin today, as he has done
previously, raise false analogies with Kosovo, in a
mischievous effort to complicate that discussion," he
said.

U.S. embassy spokesman Richard Grenell contended the
United States had not turned down a visa request by
Shamba. Diplomats said Shamba had made no official
visa application after receiving word that he would
not be welcome.

The Security Council adjourned without a decision on
the U.N. mission, known as UNOMIG. A report on
Abkhazia earlier this month by Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon said a helicopter attack on March 11 on
Georgian-controlled territory bordering Abkhazia had
been a "major setback" to peace efforts.

Russia's air force denied Georgian charges that the
helicopters were Russian. Churkin said Moscow believed
Georgia's armed presence in the area involved, the
upper Kodori valley, "exceeds the limits of the
reasonable."

Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, appearing
later at an exhibit of photographs of the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, said his country had only
police in the area, which he said was its right. 


=== 2 ===

http://news.trendaz.com/cgi-bin/readnews2.pl?newsId=960129&lang=EN

Trend News Agency (Azerbaijan) - July 20, 2007

Granting Kosovo Independence to Become Precedent for Separatism: Russian Speaker

K. Ramazanova


Azerbaijan, Baku - The Head of the Russian State Duma
believes that the current variant of the draft
resolution, envisaging granting Kosovo independence,
can be a precedent for separatist regimes in many
countries worldwide.

”The draft resolution on the future status of Kosovo
might be a precedent and light a fuse of separatism in
many countries worldwide, including Abkhazia,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Spain,
the UK and many African countries,” Boris Gryzlov, the
chairman of the State Duma, declared during
discussions regarding Montenegro.

He announced that Russia will use its right of veto
against the resolution, which is not supported by
Belgrade and Pristina.

Earlier the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated
that granting Kosovo independence cannot be a
precedent for separatist movements in other countries,
including Azerbaijan and Georgia.
...


=== 3 ===

http://www.panarmenian.net/details/eng/?nid=787

PanArmenian.net - July 28, 2007

Having suffered a defeat in resolution of Kosovo
Conflict, UNO got down to other conflicts of
post-Soviet area

[Synopsis: The West exploits the UN to
'internationalize' local disputes when it's to its
advantage to do so, and arrogantly acts outside the UN
when that is advantangeous. Planned actions in
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh. South Ossetia,
Transdniester and later Kaliningrad, the Kurile
Islands, etc. are examples of the first. The NATO
states are now pressed to 'resolve' the above issues
before formalizing their recognition of Kosovo
secession for fear of establishing a precedent.]


If the Security Council takes any decision, the
conflict zones [in the former Soviet Union] will by
all means have “blue helmets” arriving there, which
will have a most negative impact on the situation of
the region; the very Kosovo is the most evident proof
of the above-mentioned fact.

-[E]verything is still ahead both for the world
community and UNO, which managed to prove in a short
time that it is just a political tool in the hands of
great powers.

Having suffered a defeat in resolution of the Kosovo
conflict, UNO [the UN] decided to get down to other
conflicts, including those which exist in the
post-Soviet area.

Presently the UN Security Council has the situation of
the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone under its
consideration.

As it is stated in the report on the state of affairs
in the region, which was handed in to the Security
Council by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,
Abkhazia and Georgia “Failed to justify the hopes of
resuming a dialogue. This brought no stability in the
situation of the confrontation zone.”

In the opinion of Ban Ki-moon, because of the absence
of direct dialogue between Tbilisi and Sokhumi
[Abkhazia] there is “distrust and suspicion which may
make the situation even much tenser.”

The Resolution adopted unanimously by the Security
Council called on both parties to resume the dialogue
and fully keep to the agreement about a ceasefire,
force-free process and returning the refugees reached
earlier. The Secretary General mentioned with regret
that the parties interpret this document differently.

Meanwhile it is well known in UNO that in the conflict
zone there is the Conciliatory Commission made up of
representatives from RF [Russian Federation], Georgia
and Abkhazia, which also seeks a conflict resolution.

However, no commission or no any other international
organization may help the problem which has existed
for 15 years already.

It is natural that Georgia, as well as GUAM countries
in general (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova)
would love to have the resolution of conflicts of
their territory reach the UN, to once and for all
“bury” the last hope that they will ever be regulated.

This refers to both Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh.

In this regard it should be reminded that two
questions having direct connection with the Karabakh
conflict have been put on the agenda of the 61st
Session of the UN General Assembly.

One of the questions was proposed by Azerbaijan, the
second one - by [all the] GUAM countries.

However neither of them has yet been discussed at the
61st Session, and according to the General Assembly
Order they will be discussed at the next session.

“An issue is included in the agenda if there is a
corresponding decision made by the General Assembly,”
said the acting press-secretary of RA Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Vladimir Karapetyan.

According to him, Azerbaijan's wish to lead the issue
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict regulation out of the
framework of the present negotiations has a negative
impact on the whole process.

“The given step speaks of the absence of political
will in Azerbaijan for positive regulation of the
conflict,” he mentioned in his comment on Baku's will
of putting the issue of Karabakh conflict regulation
on the agenda of UN General Assembly's Session.

Georgia and Azerbaijan appeal to UN, being well aware
of the fact that if the Security Council takes any
decision, the conflict zone will by all means have
“blue helmets” arriving there, which will have a most
negative impact on the situation of the region; the
very Kosovo is the most evident proof of the above
mentioned fact.
....
On the whole according to the OSCE and Conciliatory
Commission statements no progress is registered in the
process of conflict regulation.
....
[T]o what extent this [Kosovo's] independence will
become the key for regulation of the conflicts in CIS
is not clear.

In any case a 15-20 year-period is not long for the
resolution of such conflicts.

The Arab- sraeli conflict began in 1948 and exists up
to the present in spite of the declaration of
independence by Palestine.

So everything is still ahead both for the world
community and UNO, which managed to prove in a short
time that it is just a political tool in the hands of
great powers.


=== 4 ===

http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=30517

Azeri Press Agency - July 12, 2007

Armenian President does not rule out new war with Azerbaijan


The cause of unsuccessful negotiations on the
settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is the
fact that Azerbaijan is unwilling to accept reality
and mistakenly thinks that the opposite process is
possible, whereas it is senseless to turn back the
wheel of history.

"The people who gained independence, will not refuse
from that,” Armenian President Robert Kocharian stated
in an interview to SPIEGEL ONLINE.

Drawing a parallel between Kosovo and the Nagorno
Karabakh conflicts he said, “We do not want to [make]
analogies, but undoubtedly the Karabakh people have
the same right to independence as do the Albanians of
Kosovo.

"Moreover, they protected their right alone without
interference by the international community. As to the
assistance from Armenia, Armenian people fought during
the war. Do you really think that Albania has not
provided assistance to the Albanians of Kosovo?

"There are a lot of correlations here and I see
Armenia and Karabakh’s future as an asymmetric
confederation,” Kocharian said.

He did not rule out a new war with Azerbaijan.

“Though I doubt that Azerbaijan’s military budget is
bigger than our state budget, I would warn against
judging about the correlation of forces from both
sides only by figures.

"You must take into account the fact that the soldier
who defends his homeland has another motivation than
the one who acts on a foreign territory.

"We do not have any intention to launch military
operations. But in case of a prepared aggression we
will make decisions, to which we will be obliged by
the military situation of the time and which will meet
our security interests.

"Our offers on the settlement of the conflict are
connected with the recognition of the republic and
security guarantees. They suppose the presence of
peacekeepers. It must be an international peacekeeping
contingent,” Armenian President underscored. 


=== 5 ===

http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=974

Strategic Cultural Foundation (Russia) - September 24, 2007

The Coming Independence of Kosovo and the Steps Russia Should Take

Andrei Areshev


The negotiations on the future status of Kosovo
continue, but there seems to be no hope to break the
stalemate to which the politics of the West have led
to in the Balkans. 

Local elections in Kosovo are scheduled for November
17, and the Albanian leaders are open about their
intention to declare independence unilaterally in the
aftermath of the event, by December 10, 2007. 

Following the talks in London with the representatives
of the troika of envoys, Kosovo "prime minister" Agim
Ceku said he made it clear that the Kosovo Albanians
had won independence, and that the latter was not what
they demanded, but actually a starting point. 

At the same time, even the Western media describe the
situation in the province as one of total misery. 

Unemployment among the local population is at the
level of 40% to 50%, making people turn to subsistence
agriculture or smuggling to survive (1). 

Certainly, neither official Belgrade nor the Serb
people will agree to the forming of a gangster enclave
in the historically important Serbian region.

Besides, such an enclave is likely to create problems
for the south of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. 

Nor is the Serbian leadership going to accept the
partition of Kosovo – Belgrade insists that a broad
autonomy of the province within Serbia as prescribed
by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is the only
option. 

The quagmire makes EU authorities initiate intense
activity, though there are no indications that they
might yield any results whatsoever. 

More consultations will possibly take place during the
session of the UN General Assembly, but it is hard to
believe that they will be fruitful. 

A unilateral recognition of Kosovo will irreversibly
undermine the authority of international organizations
such as the UN Security Council - it will transpire
that the resolutions of the latter respectable
institution serve as distracting maneuvers, and that
nobody planned to comply with them from the start. 

In this context, the serious question is what will be
Moscow's position if Kosovo declares independence
unilaterally and is recognized by a number of
countries? 

The answer is that the only logical step for Russia
would be a full recognition of the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Premises for this move are
available. This would be exactly what Russia can and
must do from the standpoint of its own national
interests. 

For a long time, the Russian leadership has been
overly cautious about the option of recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ignored the political
and legal arguments made in favor of the step. 

This approach is explained both by the chaos of the
Russian foreign politics of the 1990es that in some
aspects lingers on, and by the attempts to reach a
compromise with Georgia and the US (2). 

It is already clear, however, that the US understands
compromise solely as the readiness of others to agree.
For example, by the time of the next NATO Summit in
Bucharest in 2008, Georgia will be ready to implement
its plan of joining the bloc. 

Its full integration into NATO will thus become a
matter of the not-so-distant future. 

The de facto failure of the talks on the joint use of
the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan is another illustration
of the tendency. 

It is questionable whether the US visit to Gabala,
with its predictable outcome, was worth the
consequences for the relations between Russia and Iran
and for Russia's standing in the Muslim world. If we
really needed to hear another "no" from the US, we got
what we wanted. 

Russian foreign politics can be serious only in the
case that they are guided by the country's national
interests. 

No other guidelines are appropriate. This indisputable
truth can be derived from V. Putin's speech in Munich
and from Moscow's subsequent military-political
decisions (the withdrawal from the Conventional Forces
in Europe treaty, etc.). 

We believe that the political course Russia adheres to
will be reflected in its relations with the
self-determined Republics (which are de facto new
independent states) on the territory of the former
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. 

Election campaigns have already started in Georgia. 

They can have unpredictable consequences for the
Caucasus region. 

The fact that most of the competition will unfold
between the hawk M. Saakashvili and the even more
irresponsible Irakli Okruashvili is not the only
problem. 

Finding themselves in a rush situation, with so little
time remaining till the anticipated unilateral
proclamation of independence by Kosovo, the Georgian
leaders are quite likely to launch "a small victorious
war" by which they can hope to strengthen their
domestic positions. 

Saakashvili generously dispensed promises to return
the insurgent Republics to Georgia during his first
term in office. 

His electorate is highly susceptible to such pledges. 

Now, Saakashvili’s second term is nearing the end. A
wave of arrests of local officials, formally under the
pretext of financial abuse charges, began in Gori, a
location in close proximity to South Ossetia. 

One of the versions of the developments is that the
individuals arrested had strong ties with the former
defense minister Okruashvili. 

There is no guarantee that the anti-corruption
campaign will not get transformed into a military
offensive against South Ossetia. One should keep in
mind that the invasion of Abkhazia in August 1992 was
carried out under the pretext of "protecting
transportation routes." 

The so-called "peace march" to Tskinvali ended up as
another failed provocation planned by the Georgian
authorities. 

The technology of such marches was put to practice in
Ajaria in 2004, when secret service operatives mixed
with the march of residents of other Georgian regions,
penetrated into the Republic's territory, and
neutralized Ajaria's defense officials (3). 

In that case bloodshed did not follow because the
people of Ajaria were Georgians as well. 

In Ossetia, a tragic scenario is likely. A build-up of
the Georgian armed forces from 60,000 to 90,000
servicemen (including reservists) is planned to take
place by the end of the year. There is no doubt as to
whom this impressive force will be used against. 

On September 20, Georgian saboteurs attacked
Abkhazia's army base. The incident ended with
fatalities. As long as Moscow's position remains
indefinite, provocations from the Georgian side will
continue with increasing frequency. Sooner or later,
they will evolve into a full-scale aggression against
the self-determined Republics. The consequences of the
military escalation can be severe. 

So far, Moscow's politics in the Caucasus have often
been inconsequential and largely driven by inertia. 

Moscow's granting an official recognition to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia would restrain the hawks in Georgia
and thus tilt the geopolitical balance in the Caucasus
in Russia's favor, which would help to ensure peace in
the southern regions of Russia as well. 

If the Georgian leadership's present course continues,
the recent escalation of the terrorist activity in
Ingushetia will look like a minor problem, especially
since the Georgian legislation envisions unparalleled
conditions for hosting US armed forces in the country
neighboring Russia. It is as if one day China would
deploy its military infrastructure in Mexico, some 20
miles from Rio Grande. 

Statements by the Russian Foreign Ministry are not
enough to depart entirely from the logic of
geopolitical retreat. 

This applies to Russia's politics with respect to the
Caucasus as well. The Kremlin itself must advance its
position. It should also be realized that the
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be
meaningless verbiage unless it is backed by a range of
practical measures including those of the military
character. 

We keep hearing that Russia will face severe
consequences in case it takes this diplomatic step. 

The secret hope of those who say so is that when
Russia gets a new President in 2008, the country's
foreign politics will revert to the condition in which
it used to be in the epoch of President Yeltsin and
Foreign Minister Kozyrev. 

They hope that all they have to do is wait for the
2008 elections in Russia. 

In reality, no serious consequences (the uproar in the
media of several countries notwithstanding) would be
entailed by Russia's official recognition of the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

The anti-Russian rhetoric in the Western media will
persist under any scenario (it has become an
indispensable part of the US and European political
culture), especially now that Brussels has in fact
declared a war on Gazprom. 

The answer to the question about the steps Moscow
should take after the West ignores the positions of
Russia and Serbia and recognizes the criminal Albanian
regime in Kosovo as "an independent country" is clear:
Russia must finally recognize the new independent
states which have existed on the territory of the
former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic for over 15
years. 



2  Another pertinent factor is the influence of the
Georgian lobby. Over the past several years, it has
lost some of its positions. 

3  M. Perevozkina. Georgia: Rebooting. Profil, ¹ 34,
September 17, 2007