http://www.ansa.it/balcani/croazia/20011207022732070110.html
CROAZIA: GOVERNO TUDJMAN ORCHESTRO' PULIZIA ETNICA, GIORNALE
(ANSA-AFP) - NEW YORK, 7 DIC - Il governo croato guidato dall'allora
presidente Franjo Tudjman ha orchestrato nel 1993 operazioni di pulizia
etnica contro i serbi di Croazia. Lo scrive il mensile
americano 'Harper's Magazine' citando documenti croati. Il giornale
pubblica estratti di un documento di 50 pagine che definisce le minute
di una riunione, del settembre 1993, del Consiglio croato di difesa e
sicurezza. Questo documento ''costituisce la prima prova proveniente da
fonte ufficiale che il governo nazionalista dell'ex presidente Tudjman
e' stato implicato nel progetto di cacciare i serbi'', scrive 'Harper's
Magazine'. ''Questa campagna di pulizia etnica - prosegue il giornale -
ha comportato la morte di civili disarmati, l'esecuzione di prigionieri
di guerra, l'esodo forzato di serbi e la distruzione di villaggi
serbi''. Cio' e' provato, scrive ancora il giornale, dai dialoghi
riportati nelle minute tra Tudjman, il suo primo minsitro Nikica
Valentic e il capo di stato maggiore Jank Bobetko. (ANSA-AFP) TF
07/12/2001 02:27
=*=
> http://www.harpers.com
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, December 2001, pp. 20-22 READINGS
Planning Croatia's Final Solution
From minutes of the September 12 and September 19,
1993, meetings of the Council for Defense and National
Security of the Republic of Croatia.
That year, Croat forces murdered up to 400 Serb civilians
in the town of Gospic; in 1995 almost 600,000 Serbs were
driven from the Krajina region. This transcript is the
first proof that President Franjo Tudjman planned and
directed ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. The
minutes were obtained by Chris Hedges of the New York Times.
Tudjman died in December 1999.
SEPTEMBER 12, 1993
PRESIDENT FRANJO TUDJMAN: Gentlemen, it seems that
during the last few days we have had a great military
success with the Gospic operation. At the moment when the
whole world is recommending - those from the friendly
countries as well as the others - that we pursue
extreme caution and political flexibility, we nevertheless
let ourselves be drawn, both by the Serbs' provocations as
well as by our own decision, into a situation that,
momentarily, no matter how we interpret it, we have
commenced an attack, which they have survived, and, given
our own preparations, that cannot be hidden. Croatia can
be held to a charge that it is preparing a war with the
Serbs in Croatia.
I must admit, that this is my responsibility, as I have
permitted the Gospic operation. When General Bobetko came
to me with the proposal I took into account the Serb
provocations - small provocations; for example, their
entrance into the Velebit Range, where they killed
some three special policemen, cutting off an ear of one,
then the placing of mines at Pakrac, thereby creating a
certain political climate both in the public and the
parliament - so I accepted the proposal that we are
going into this operation, although I was not informed,
as I later found out, about all the elements. For example,
I knew that Divoselo is Serb, but I did not know that
all of these villages, which we conquered, were Serb.
In that way, too, considering that we were carrying on
the negotiations about a cease-fire, we brought ourselves
into a situation that we can justify only with difficulty,
that at a moment when we were discussing a cease-fire we
turned to a war operation. The members of the international
community followed what is happening and why it is
happening. And then we gave them a little bit of different
material. Do not think that what General Bobetko is
proposing, that we prepare two attacks, that they do not
observe this and they do not have the exact information.
And then, in addition, in our statements we brought
ourselves into a very unfortunate situation.
General Bobetko, I told you that after this operation
it should be explained that they attacked first - that
is, in the Velebit - and that they did what they did,
etc. I said that one has to go before the TV cameras and
show the captured tanks.
GEN. JANKO BOBETKO: That will be this evening.
PRESIDENT: Therefore, we have to attempt to put our
actions in harmony with international policy in order
to regain sovereignty over the whole territory
with international support and in a peaceful way. Of
course, I am not an illusionist to think that we
shall succeed in this, but then we should not
make our tasks more difficult. We have to get ready.
PRIME MINISTER NIKICA VALENTIC: Mr. President, I have
to say a word. President, with the Serbs in Croatia we
shall not solve the problem. The only question is when
is the time to solve it in another way.
PRESIDENT: Yes, I know that.
VALENTIC: Therefore, and this is something of which I
want to convince you, as a man who spent his whole life
down there [in the Gospic area], the Serbs do not accept
any political solution. I think that all we need to do is
to prepare better and hit them from several sides. Thank
you.
PRESIDENT: Prime Minister Valentic, with the Serbs in
Croatia, those who are now leading Knin and Baranja,
no. But that is just a small group, and they still
depend on Belgrade. And the problem is, will the
international community force Belgrade to stop supplying
them?
The moment when Serbia is forced to do this, then we
are going to solve the question of Serbs in Croatia.
Then that miserable group of some 10 to 20 percent will
leave Croatia and then we shall solve that.
And it is clear that we shall not be able to solve it.
But should we begin only with that premise, then that
means war, which the world will not permit. That is not
the only focal point, only the question of national
minorities in Croatia. Such problems exist throughout
the world, in the Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East,
etc. The international community is oriented toward the
resolution of these questions in a peaceful way - for
example, as the relations between the Arabs and Israel
are being resolved - and that directs us to follow that
path, not by war; whereas in our country there is a
growing understanding that Croatia must resolve the
problem by war, contrary to international norms, meaning
by ethnically cleansing the Serbs from Croatia. That is
happening in practice because we cannot hide that they
have the information that in Slavonia, western Slavonia,
some thirty Serb villages disappeared from the face of
the earth, and that now these three, four Serb villages
were eradicated. This creates a certain picture of
Croatia on which we cannot build our political status
or economic relations with the world. Understand that.
VALENTIC: That is not the issue, President, but this
awaits us in a year again. It is only the question of
timing. This awaits us.
PRESIDENT: Yes, if it awaits us then it means that we
have to prepare also politically, that we have to
prepare ourselves better militarily, and then
we also have to prepare so that after our future
operation they will no longer be able to hit Zagreb.
VALENTIC: President, as you know, there are many
mixed marriages in Gospic; several civilians and old
ladies are in Senj, where there is a certain
concentration camp, and that is where we should take
those that we captured at Citluk and Pocitelj. We
should place them there in an acceptable way and
then show them off and say a few things. Because I
know this for sure - because they asked me to intervene,
a granddaughter of one of these is married to my cousin
- that in Senj there is a concentration area where you
have these refugees from Citluk, Divoselo, and
Pocitelj. Then we show them that we do it in this fashion.
PRESIDENT: That would be very good, very good.
VALENTIC: And then when we display them, we pretty
them up, wash them, etc.
SEPTEMBER 19, 1993
PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, I open this meeting of the
Council for Defense and National Security with the
agenda: the development of the situation concerning
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat-Serb relations. In
addition, these UNPROFOR people [U.N. peacekeepers]
and others tell us that we did not have to leave the
cleanest clearance behind us after we retreated.
MATE GRANIC [Foreign Minister]: That is the last news,
the main news of the last twenty-four hours on the
SKY News and CNN.
BOBETKO: We turned over fifty-two, so it was said,
usable Serb bodies, and the rest were removed. There
are some fifty, sixty, in the forest, because it is
more difficult to collect them in the forest. But it
could happen that they [UNPROFOR] entered a little bit
too fast. However, that was cleansed, absolutely. They
cannot find anything over there, at least I think so.
PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, to conclude, I have another
obligation. Three things: no military actions from
our side now and no provocations; prepare to
swallow, because now things are being solved in the
United Nations and it is important to know whether
the Croats are for a peaceful solution or not.
Therefore, continue the conversations with Serbs on
all levels. That is one thing. Second, Mate [Granic],
in Bosnia and Herzegovina under all circumstances carry
through the agreements [with the Bosnians], particularly
everything that we did there - concentration camps,
etc., etc.
- - - - -
[John R. MacArthur, President and Publisher of
Harper's Magazine, is the author of "Censorship and
Propaganda" in the Gulf War, New York: Hill and
Wang, 1992.]
-------------------------------------
Note: During this period of Tudjman's meetings of Sept
12 and 19, 1993, Croatian forces attacked Canadian
peacekeepers in a UN-protected area, the Medak Pocket.
Medak is south of Gospic and near Pocitelj, mentioned in
the transcript of the meetings.
This battle is described in the following sources:
The Ottawa Citizen, Canada, Monday, October 7, 1996,
pp. 6-7 "Canada's Secret Battle"
By DAVID PUGLIESE, CITIZEN Defence Writer
-------------------
After the Ottawa Citizen broke the story, other
newspapers in Canada printed the full story or a
shorter version. The following excerpt is from the
Toronto Star summary of the battle:
The Toronto Star, Tuesday, October 15, 1996, p. A1,13
"Honor for our troops in Canada's secret battle"
OTTAWA (CP) - In 1993, Canadian soldiers fought their
biggest battle since the Korean War. The action pitted
Canadian personnel and French troops under Canadian
command against the war-hardened Croatian army in a
tiny corner of the former Yugoslavia. When the shooting
stopped, there were four Canadian and seven French
soldiers wounded. Croatian media put their army's
casualties at 27 dead or wounded. But until now few
Canadians outside of the military knew of the engagement
or the performance of their troops. It is Canada's
secret battle....
On Sept. 9, 1993, the Croatian army had attacked near
the town of Medak in the Krajina, an area controlled by
Serbs in eastern Croatia. More than 2,500 Croatian troops,
backed by tanks, had advanced into a 35-square-kilometre
area known as the Medak Pocket. After several days of
heavy fighting with the Serbs, the Croats had agreed
to a UN-brokered ceasefire that required them to pull
back to their original lines.
Calvin and French Gen. Jean Cot., head of the U.N.
mission, had agreed that the Patricias would establish
a buffer zone between Serb and Croatian armies. Cot told
Calvin the UN had a credibility problem and needed a
successful mission in Yugoslavia. No more would UN
troops pull back each time the Croats or Serbs attacked.
It was now time to enforce the peace.
Calvin and his men had already endured a 24-hour
Croatian artillery and mortar barrage, and some
Canadians were still shaken. In Medak, where
Canadians manned an observation post, 525 bombs had
landed, and four of Calvin's soldiers had been wounded.
About noon on Sept. 15, 250 Canadian troops and 500
French soldiers under Calvin's command started to move
in between the Serb and Croat front lines.
They were supported by another 375 Canadian soldiers,
including engineers, medics and anti-tank teams. More
than half the Canadians were reservists.
The Serbs watched as the UN troops advanced but did
nothing. The Croats opened fire.
Sgt. Rod Dearing's men of 8 Platoon, Charlie Company,
were digging in around the village of Sitlik when the
Croats attacked.
"The whole place just lit up," said Dearing, a native
of Armstrong, B.C.
"They started firing at us with everything - 20-millimetre
cannon, mortars, machine guns, everything. It was crazy."
The Canadians scrambled into their trenches and returned
fire. During a second attack, the platoon spotted the
Croats. Flashes from their machineguns could be seen
from a hedgerow and trees 150 metres away. After a fierce
firefight, the shooting on the Croatian side died down.
Dearing and his troops weren't the only Canadians
fighting back. Twenty separate gun battles would be
fought that day and night with the Croats.
At 9 a.m. the following morning [Sept. 16], French
troops who were in the rear started moving forward.
Backed by armored vehicles, they moved up past
the Canadians and toward the Croatian positions. By
then the Croats were falling back. Later that morning,
the Canadians heard small-arms fire and explosions,
and saw smoke rising from Serb villages behind the
Croatian lines. The Croats were killing Serb civilians.
An armored platoon started toward the burning villages
but was stopped for 90 minutes by a heavily armed
Croatian unit which apparently wanted to delay
the Canadians, to enable their ethnic cleansing units
to finish their killing and looting. "That was the
hardest thing - to sit there and watch that and be
essentially helpless to do anything," recalled Calvin,
who had moved up to the barricade.
Calvin didn't have the firepower to match the Croats,
but he did have another weapon: A European television
crew and several Serb journalists were with the column.
Calvin gave an impromptu news conference in the middle
of the road, telling reporters the Croats were killing
civilians just on the other side of the barricade. The
Croatian commander, worried about his country's image,
opened the roadblock and let the Canadians pass.
When they finally reached the villages, the Canadians
found 16 bodies of civilian victims. Every single
building in the Medak Pocket, 312 houses and
barns, had been destroyed. More than 130 large farm
animals had been slaughtered. Scattered on the ground
were hundreds of pairs of surgical gloves. It appeared
that more people had been murdered and the Croats wore
the gloves when piling bodies into trucks for removal
from the area.
Days later, the Croats turned over 50 bodies.
------------------------
Another source is Tested Mettle, by Scott Taylor and
Brian Nolan (Ottawa:
Esprit de Corps Books, 1998), Chapter Eight, "Medak Pocket."
Cedric Thornberry, Deputy Head of UNPROFOR in the
former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1994, also described the
Croatian war crimes in the Medak Pocket in
"Saving the War Crimes Tribunal," Foreign Policy, Fall
1996.
----------------
CROAZIA: GOVERNO TUDJMAN ORCHESTRO' PULIZIA ETNICA, GIORNALE
(ANSA-AFP) - NEW YORK, 7 DIC - Il governo croato guidato dall'allora
presidente Franjo Tudjman ha orchestrato nel 1993 operazioni di pulizia
etnica contro i serbi di Croazia. Lo scrive il mensile
americano 'Harper's Magazine' citando documenti croati. Il giornale
pubblica estratti di un documento di 50 pagine che definisce le minute
di una riunione, del settembre 1993, del Consiglio croato di difesa e
sicurezza. Questo documento ''costituisce la prima prova proveniente da
fonte ufficiale che il governo nazionalista dell'ex presidente Tudjman
e' stato implicato nel progetto di cacciare i serbi'', scrive 'Harper's
Magazine'. ''Questa campagna di pulizia etnica - prosegue il giornale -
ha comportato la morte di civili disarmati, l'esecuzione di prigionieri
di guerra, l'esodo forzato di serbi e la distruzione di villaggi
serbi''. Cio' e' provato, scrive ancora il giornale, dai dialoghi
riportati nelle minute tra Tudjman, il suo primo minsitro Nikica
Valentic e il capo di stato maggiore Jank Bobetko. (ANSA-AFP) TF
07/12/2001 02:27
=*=
> http://www.harpers.com
HARPER'S MAGAZINE, December 2001, pp. 20-22 READINGS
Planning Croatia's Final Solution
From minutes of the September 12 and September 19,
1993, meetings of the Council for Defense and National
Security of the Republic of Croatia.
That year, Croat forces murdered up to 400 Serb civilians
in the town of Gospic; in 1995 almost 600,000 Serbs were
driven from the Krajina region. This transcript is the
first proof that President Franjo Tudjman planned and
directed ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. The
minutes were obtained by Chris Hedges of the New York Times.
Tudjman died in December 1999.
SEPTEMBER 12, 1993
PRESIDENT FRANJO TUDJMAN: Gentlemen, it seems that
during the last few days we have had a great military
success with the Gospic operation. At the moment when the
whole world is recommending - those from the friendly
countries as well as the others - that we pursue
extreme caution and political flexibility, we nevertheless
let ourselves be drawn, both by the Serbs' provocations as
well as by our own decision, into a situation that,
momentarily, no matter how we interpret it, we have
commenced an attack, which they have survived, and, given
our own preparations, that cannot be hidden. Croatia can
be held to a charge that it is preparing a war with the
Serbs in Croatia.
I must admit, that this is my responsibility, as I have
permitted the Gospic operation. When General Bobetko came
to me with the proposal I took into account the Serb
provocations - small provocations; for example, their
entrance into the Velebit Range, where they killed
some three special policemen, cutting off an ear of one,
then the placing of mines at Pakrac, thereby creating a
certain political climate both in the public and the
parliament - so I accepted the proposal that we are
going into this operation, although I was not informed,
as I later found out, about all the elements. For example,
I knew that Divoselo is Serb, but I did not know that
all of these villages, which we conquered, were Serb.
In that way, too, considering that we were carrying on
the negotiations about a cease-fire, we brought ourselves
into a situation that we can justify only with difficulty,
that at a moment when we were discussing a cease-fire we
turned to a war operation. The members of the international
community followed what is happening and why it is
happening. And then we gave them a little bit of different
material. Do not think that what General Bobetko is
proposing, that we prepare two attacks, that they do not
observe this and they do not have the exact information.
And then, in addition, in our statements we brought
ourselves into a very unfortunate situation.
General Bobetko, I told you that after this operation
it should be explained that they attacked first - that
is, in the Velebit - and that they did what they did,
etc. I said that one has to go before the TV cameras and
show the captured tanks.
GEN. JANKO BOBETKO: That will be this evening.
PRESIDENT: Therefore, we have to attempt to put our
actions in harmony with international policy in order
to regain sovereignty over the whole territory
with international support and in a peaceful way. Of
course, I am not an illusionist to think that we
shall succeed in this, but then we should not
make our tasks more difficult. We have to get ready.
PRIME MINISTER NIKICA VALENTIC: Mr. President, I have
to say a word. President, with the Serbs in Croatia we
shall not solve the problem. The only question is when
is the time to solve it in another way.
PRESIDENT: Yes, I know that.
VALENTIC: Therefore, and this is something of which I
want to convince you, as a man who spent his whole life
down there [in the Gospic area], the Serbs do not accept
any political solution. I think that all we need to do is
to prepare better and hit them from several sides. Thank
you.
PRESIDENT: Prime Minister Valentic, with the Serbs in
Croatia, those who are now leading Knin and Baranja,
no. But that is just a small group, and they still
depend on Belgrade. And the problem is, will the
international community force Belgrade to stop supplying
them?
The moment when Serbia is forced to do this, then we
are going to solve the question of Serbs in Croatia.
Then that miserable group of some 10 to 20 percent will
leave Croatia and then we shall solve that.
And it is clear that we shall not be able to solve it.
But should we begin only with that premise, then that
means war, which the world will not permit. That is not
the only focal point, only the question of national
minorities in Croatia. Such problems exist throughout
the world, in the Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East,
etc. The international community is oriented toward the
resolution of these questions in a peaceful way - for
example, as the relations between the Arabs and Israel
are being resolved - and that directs us to follow that
path, not by war; whereas in our country there is a
growing understanding that Croatia must resolve the
problem by war, contrary to international norms, meaning
by ethnically cleansing the Serbs from Croatia. That is
happening in practice because we cannot hide that they
have the information that in Slavonia, western Slavonia,
some thirty Serb villages disappeared from the face of
the earth, and that now these three, four Serb villages
were eradicated. This creates a certain picture of
Croatia on which we cannot build our political status
or economic relations with the world. Understand that.
VALENTIC: That is not the issue, President, but this
awaits us in a year again. It is only the question of
timing. This awaits us.
PRESIDENT: Yes, if it awaits us then it means that we
have to prepare also politically, that we have to
prepare ourselves better militarily, and then
we also have to prepare so that after our future
operation they will no longer be able to hit Zagreb.
VALENTIC: President, as you know, there are many
mixed marriages in Gospic; several civilians and old
ladies are in Senj, where there is a certain
concentration camp, and that is where we should take
those that we captured at Citluk and Pocitelj. We
should place them there in an acceptable way and
then show them off and say a few things. Because I
know this for sure - because they asked me to intervene,
a granddaughter of one of these is married to my cousin
- that in Senj there is a concentration area where you
have these refugees from Citluk, Divoselo, and
Pocitelj. Then we show them that we do it in this fashion.
PRESIDENT: That would be very good, very good.
VALENTIC: And then when we display them, we pretty
them up, wash them, etc.
SEPTEMBER 19, 1993
PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, I open this meeting of the
Council for Defense and National Security with the
agenda: the development of the situation concerning
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croat-Serb relations. In
addition, these UNPROFOR people [U.N. peacekeepers]
and others tell us that we did not have to leave the
cleanest clearance behind us after we retreated.
MATE GRANIC [Foreign Minister]: That is the last news,
the main news of the last twenty-four hours on the
SKY News and CNN.
BOBETKO: We turned over fifty-two, so it was said,
usable Serb bodies, and the rest were removed. There
are some fifty, sixty, in the forest, because it is
more difficult to collect them in the forest. But it
could happen that they [UNPROFOR] entered a little bit
too fast. However, that was cleansed, absolutely. They
cannot find anything over there, at least I think so.
PRESIDENT: Gentlemen, to conclude, I have another
obligation. Three things: no military actions from
our side now and no provocations; prepare to
swallow, because now things are being solved in the
United Nations and it is important to know whether
the Croats are for a peaceful solution or not.
Therefore, continue the conversations with Serbs on
all levels. That is one thing. Second, Mate [Granic],
in Bosnia and Herzegovina under all circumstances carry
through the agreements [with the Bosnians], particularly
everything that we did there - concentration camps,
etc., etc.
- - - - -
[John R. MacArthur, President and Publisher of
Harper's Magazine, is the author of "Censorship and
Propaganda" in the Gulf War, New York: Hill and
Wang, 1992.]
-------------------------------------
Note: During this period of Tudjman's meetings of Sept
12 and 19, 1993, Croatian forces attacked Canadian
peacekeepers in a UN-protected area, the Medak Pocket.
Medak is south of Gospic and near Pocitelj, mentioned in
the transcript of the meetings.
This battle is described in the following sources:
The Ottawa Citizen, Canada, Monday, October 7, 1996,
pp. 6-7 "Canada's Secret Battle"
By DAVID PUGLIESE, CITIZEN Defence Writer
-------------------
After the Ottawa Citizen broke the story, other
newspapers in Canada printed the full story or a
shorter version. The following excerpt is from the
Toronto Star summary of the battle:
The Toronto Star, Tuesday, October 15, 1996, p. A1,13
"Honor for our troops in Canada's secret battle"
OTTAWA (CP) - In 1993, Canadian soldiers fought their
biggest battle since the Korean War. The action pitted
Canadian personnel and French troops under Canadian
command against the war-hardened Croatian army in a
tiny corner of the former Yugoslavia. When the shooting
stopped, there were four Canadian and seven French
soldiers wounded. Croatian media put their army's
casualties at 27 dead or wounded. But until now few
Canadians outside of the military knew of the engagement
or the performance of their troops. It is Canada's
secret battle....
On Sept. 9, 1993, the Croatian army had attacked near
the town of Medak in the Krajina, an area controlled by
Serbs in eastern Croatia. More than 2,500 Croatian troops,
backed by tanks, had advanced into a 35-square-kilometre
area known as the Medak Pocket. After several days of
heavy fighting with the Serbs, the Croats had agreed
to a UN-brokered ceasefire that required them to pull
back to their original lines.
Calvin and French Gen. Jean Cot., head of the U.N.
mission, had agreed that the Patricias would establish
a buffer zone between Serb and Croatian armies. Cot told
Calvin the UN had a credibility problem and needed a
successful mission in Yugoslavia. No more would UN
troops pull back each time the Croats or Serbs attacked.
It was now time to enforce the peace.
Calvin and his men had already endured a 24-hour
Croatian artillery and mortar barrage, and some
Canadians were still shaken. In Medak, where
Canadians manned an observation post, 525 bombs had
landed, and four of Calvin's soldiers had been wounded.
About noon on Sept. 15, 250 Canadian troops and 500
French soldiers under Calvin's command started to move
in between the Serb and Croat front lines.
They were supported by another 375 Canadian soldiers,
including engineers, medics and anti-tank teams. More
than half the Canadians were reservists.
The Serbs watched as the UN troops advanced but did
nothing. The Croats opened fire.
Sgt. Rod Dearing's men of 8 Platoon, Charlie Company,
were digging in around the village of Sitlik when the
Croats attacked.
"The whole place just lit up," said Dearing, a native
of Armstrong, B.C.
"They started firing at us with everything - 20-millimetre
cannon, mortars, machine guns, everything. It was crazy."
The Canadians scrambled into their trenches and returned
fire. During a second attack, the platoon spotted the
Croats. Flashes from their machineguns could be seen
from a hedgerow and trees 150 metres away. After a fierce
firefight, the shooting on the Croatian side died down.
Dearing and his troops weren't the only Canadians
fighting back. Twenty separate gun battles would be
fought that day and night with the Croats.
At 9 a.m. the following morning [Sept. 16], French
troops who were in the rear started moving forward.
Backed by armored vehicles, they moved up past
the Canadians and toward the Croatian positions. By
then the Croats were falling back. Later that morning,
the Canadians heard small-arms fire and explosions,
and saw smoke rising from Serb villages behind the
Croatian lines. The Croats were killing Serb civilians.
An armored platoon started toward the burning villages
but was stopped for 90 minutes by a heavily armed
Croatian unit which apparently wanted to delay
the Canadians, to enable their ethnic cleansing units
to finish their killing and looting. "That was the
hardest thing - to sit there and watch that and be
essentially helpless to do anything," recalled Calvin,
who had moved up to the barricade.
Calvin didn't have the firepower to match the Croats,
but he did have another weapon: A European television
crew and several Serb journalists were with the column.
Calvin gave an impromptu news conference in the middle
of the road, telling reporters the Croats were killing
civilians just on the other side of the barricade. The
Croatian commander, worried about his country's image,
opened the roadblock and let the Canadians pass.
When they finally reached the villages, the Canadians
found 16 bodies of civilian victims. Every single
building in the Medak Pocket, 312 houses and
barns, had been destroyed. More than 130 large farm
animals had been slaughtered. Scattered on the ground
were hundreds of pairs of surgical gloves. It appeared
that more people had been murdered and the Croats wore
the gloves when piling bodies into trucks for removal
from the area.
Days later, the Croats turned over 50 bodies.
------------------------
Another source is Tested Mettle, by Scott Taylor and
Brian Nolan (Ottawa:
Esprit de Corps Books, 1998), Chapter Eight, "Medak Pocket."
Cedric Thornberry, Deputy Head of UNPROFOR in the
former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1994, also described the
Croatian war crimes in the Medak Pocket in
"Saving the War Crimes Tribunal," Foreign Policy, Fall
1996.
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