* Il documentario della BBC e gli articoli dell'"Observer" e del "Sunday
Times" rivelano la strategia della tensione della NATO per il Kosovo
("Il Manifesto", "World Socialist Web Site"
* Un'altra conquista dell'amministrazione UCKFOR: boom della
prostituzione in Kosmet (Nezavisne Novine, 16/2/2000)
* La KFOR premia i narcotrafficanti UCK (Original sources 29/3/2000)
* Il mito della repressione antialbanese (The New Republic)
=====================================================================
IL DOCUMENTARIO DELLA BBC...
"Il Manifesto" del 24/3/2000:
BBC-CANALE 5
E la Nato sferrò il suo moral combat
- GIUSEPPE MASCOLI - LONDRA
I eri sera è andato in onda su Canale 5 un documentario della Bbc sulla
guerra del Kossovo, titolo
originale "Moral combat". Parafrasando un altro videogioco lo si sarebbe
potuto chiamare missione
indicibile. Il documentario spiega come l'intervento della Nato in
Jugoslavia è stato provocato
dall'amministrazione americana, con qualche resistenza francese, e
qualche screzio con i cugini
inglesi, fra l'indifferenza degli altri paesi Nato. Il primo passo
americano è la manipolazione del
Kossovo Verification Mission (Kvm), un anno prima dell'intervento Nato.
Quel che doveva essere
un organismo autonomo di controllo per gli accordi internazionali in
Kossovo è controllato dagli
americani. A capo del Kvm viene messo William Walker, uomo del
dipartimento di stato. A
giudizio del capitano Roland Keith, anche egli parte del Kvm, Walker ha
per obiettivo la
demonizzazione dei serbi e di Milososevic e appoggia l'Uck al quale, in
barba a quanto stipulato in
sede Onu, viene progressivamente consegnato il Kossovo. Dal voluto
fallimento della missione
Kvm si arriva a Rambouillet. Il documentario della Bbc spiega subito che
gli americani, anche qui,
arrivano con una agenda segreta. Il sottosegretario alla difesa Rubin
non ha difficoltà a raccontare
che l'obiettivo è quello di fare un documento accettato dalla
delegazione kossovaro-albanese e
rifiutato dai serbi così da spianare la via all'intervento militare.
Iniziano i bombardamenti, sorge qualche divergenza fra i paesi della
alleanza e fra alcuni dei
protagonisti sul teatro di guerra. Lo scontro più plateale è fra il
generale Jackson e il capo supremo
delle forze Nato, il generale Clark. Il britannico Jackson sfodera una
flemma devastante contro un
generale Clark che vuole inviarlo con le sue truppe contro i Russi
arrivati all'aeroporto di Pristina.
Il generale Jackson disubbidisce: "Non mi sembrava il caso di scatenare
la terza guerra mondiale".
Ancora peggio vanno le cose fra americani e francesi. Dice Short, il
generale Usa capo della
aviazione Nato: i francesi hanno creato enorme sconquasso. Iniziano, a
suo giudizio, impedendogli
di bombardare il ponte a Belgrado dove si riuniscono folti gruppi di
cittadini per protestare contro i
bombardamenti. Cosa che invece per gli americani andava fatta: "gli
avrebbe dato un bel colpo
demoralizzante", dice Short. Dopo che obiettivi civili vengono
ripetutamente colpiti i francesi
impongono un supervisore che vaglia le operazioni americane e frustra
ulteriormente il generale
Short. In linea di massima, il capo dell'aeronautica ce l'ha su con la
pantomima della guerra
umanitaria. Colpire obiettivi militari dagli aerei è difficile, colpire
i mezzi usati in Kossovo da
Milosevic è impossibile. Su questo sono d'accordo sia il generale Short
che il generale serbo
Pavkovic. E' inevitabile quindi spostare il raggio d'azione
dall'esercito serbo in Kossovo alle
strutture civili in Serbia.
Alla fine, conclude il documentario, la guerra "non fu fatta per
questioni morali, né per il Kossovo.
Ma per salvare la Nato".
---
"Il manifesto" del 18 Marzo 2000
KOSOVO/ITALIA INTERROGAZIONE AL GOVERNO SULLE IMPRESE NATO
La Cia preparò il terreno, e le bombe piovvero
I senatori chiedono ragione di azioni passate e presenti Kosovo
- FRANCESCA LONGO -
Q uali iniziative intende intraprendere la Nato - anche in seguito alla
decisione italiana di rafforzare il proprio contingente - per
controllare
le frontiere del Kosovo, onde evitare infiltrazioni e far fronte
all'aumento degli attacchi contro le poche famiglie serbe rimaste? E
quali
iniziative intende intraprendere il governo italiano onde evitare che
forze
supportate dalle Nazioni unite si prestino ad attività criminali? Come
riportare i componenti del Corpo di protezione del Kosovo al loro
mandato,
al fine del ripristino della legalità, gravemente minacciata? E ancora:
s'è
chiesto il governo quale sia la posizione dell'Amministrazione Usa nei
riguardi degli attuali rischi, legati all'estremismo albanese, segnalati
recentemente anche dall'inviato del Dipartimento di stato James Rubin? E
per finire: il governo italiano è a conoscenza di un impegno,
antecedente
gli attacchi Nato dell'anno scorso, dei servizi americani
nell'addestramento dell'Uck - impegno che ha favorito l'evoluzione verso
l'intervento armato, a danno dei tentativi di arrivare a una soluzione
pacifica del conflitto - e della distorsione dei compiti dell'Osce?
A tutte queste domande, poste in un'interrogazione a risposta orale che
ha
come primi firmatari i senatori diessini Fulvio Camerini e Tana de
Zulueta
(cui si sono associati altri otto senatori), dovrà rispondere il
ministro
degli Esteri. I senatori in questione hanno ricostruito, partendo da
notizie fornite dal Sunday Times e dall'Observer il 12 marzo scorso,
un'altra inquietante pagina del conflitto in Kosovo.
Agenti dei servizi segreti americani hanno ammesso di aver contribuito
all'addestramento dell'Uck, prima dei bombardamenti Nato, mentre
americani
implicati nell'attività della Cia hanno dichiarato, in un documentario
della Bbc2, di aver operato clandestinamente. Agenti del Central
Intelligence Service - nel '98 e '99 in Kosovo col compito di monitorare
la
zona per il cessate il fuoco - avevano stabilito legami con l'Uck,
fornendo
anche manuali americani di addestramento militare e consigli sul campo.
L'Osce, abbandonando ilKosovo una settimana prima dell'inizio dei raid
aerei, consegnò segretamente all'Uck molti dei telefoni satellitari e i
sistemi di posizionamento globale, al fine di permettere i contatti dei
capi guerriglia con la Nato e Washington. Inoltre, diplomatici europei
dell'Organizzazione per la sicurezza e cooperazione sostengono che la
stessa è stata tradita dalla politica americana che aveva reso i raid
aerei
inevitabili.
Come se ciò non bastasse, le esportazioni di fucili, finanziate dalla
diaspora albanese, provenivano dagli Usa, in base a una legge federale
che
ne permetteva l'esportazione a "circoli della caccia".
Un capitolo a sé riguarda poi il rapporto confidenziale delle Nazioni
unite
al segretario generale Kofi Annan, nel quale il Corpo di protezione del
Kosovo (Kpc) - forza di protezione civile di 5.000 uomini finanziata
dalle
Nazioni unite - viene accusato di "attività criminali, uccisioni,
maltrattamenti e torture, attività illegali, abuso di autorità,
intimidazioni, rottura della neutralità politica e eccitamento
all'odio".
Molti dei membri del Kpc pare provenissero dalle file dell'Uck, e alcuni
di
loro avrebbero realizzato un vero e proprio racket con richiesta di
"contributi" per la "protezione" di negozianti, uomini d'affari, ecc.
Così
come è pure probabile che il Kpc abbia creato un vero e proprio racket
per
la gestione della prostituzione. Per inciso, il Kpc non è forza di
polizia
ma i suoi membri si comportano come se fossero al di sopra delle leggi.
Una denuncia coraggiosa, questa dei senatori, che attende e merita, a
tempi
brevi, un'altrettanto coraggiosa risposta.
---
WSWS : News & Analysis : Europe : The Balkans
British documentary substantiates US-KLA collusion in provoking
war
with Serbia
Related Sunday Times article alleges CIA role
By Chris Marsden
16 March 2000
Use this version to print
On Sunday, March 12, Britain's BBC2 television channel ran a
documentary by Alan Little entitled "Moral Combat: NATO At War". The
program
contained damning evidence of how the Clinton administration set out to
create a pretext for declaring war against the Milosevic regime in
Serbia by
sponsoring the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), then pressed
this
decision on its European allies. The revelations in the documentary were
reinforced by an accompanying article in the Sunday Times.
Little conducted frank interviews with leading players in the
Kosovo
conflict, the most pertinent being those with US Secretary of State
Madeline
Albright, Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin, US Envoy Richard
Holbrooke, William Walker, head of the UN Verification Mission, and KLA
leader Hashim Thaci. These were supplemented by many others.
The documentary set out to explain how "a shared enmity towards
Milosevic" made "allies of a shadowy band of guerrillas and the most
powerful nations on earth".
Ever since the Bosnian war of 1995, the KLA, seeking to capitalise
on
popular resentment among Kosovan Albanians against the regime in
Belgrade,
had pursued a strategy of destabilising the Serbian province of Kosovo
by
acts of terrorism, in the hope that the US and NATO would intervene.
They
ambushed Serb patrols and killed policemen.
"Any armed action we undertook would bring retaliation against
civilians," KLA leader Thaci explained. "We knew we were endangering a
great
number of civilian lives." The benefits of this strategy were made plain
by
Dug Gorani, a Kosovo Albanian negotiator not tied to the KLA: "The more
civilians were killed, the chances of international intervention became
bigger, and the KLA of course realised that. There was this foreign
diplomat
who once told me, 'Look, unless you pass the quota of five thousand
deaths
you'll never have anybody permanently present in Kosovo from foreign
diplomacy.'"
Albright was receptive to the KLA's strategy because the US was
anxious to stage a military conflict with Serbia. Her series of
interviews
began chillingly with the words: "I believed in the ultimate power, the
goodness of the power of the allies and led by the United States." The
KLA's
campaign of provocations was seized upon as the vehicle through which
the
use of this power could be sanctioned.
A March 5, 1998 attack by the Serbian army on the home in Prekaz
of a
leading KLA commander, Adem Jashari, in which 53 people died, became the
occasion for a meeting of the Contact group of NATO powers four days
later.
Albright pushed for a tough anti-Serbian response. "I thought it behoved
me
to say to my colleagues that we could not repeat the kinds of mistakes
that
had happened over Bosnia, where there was a lot of talk and no action,"
she
told Little.
NATO threatened Belgrade with a military response for the first
time.
"The ambitions of the KLA, and the intentions of the NATO allies, were
converging," Little commented. He then showed how a subsequent public
meeting between US Envoy Richard Holbrooke and KLA personnel at Junik
angered Belgrade and gave encouragement to the Albanian separatists.
General
Nebojsa Pavkovic, the commander of the Yugoslav army in Kosovo, states,
"When the official ambassador of another country arrives here, ignores
state
officials, but holds a meeting with the Albanian terrorists, then it's
quite
clear they are getting support."
Lirak Cejal, a KLA soldier, went further, "I knew that since then,
that the USA, NATO, will put us in their hands. They were looking for
the
head of the KLA, and when they found it they will have it in their hand,
and
then they will control the KLA."
By October 1998 NATO had succeeded in imposing a cease-fire
agreement,
partly by threat of force and partly because of Serbia's success in
routing
the KLA. A cease-fire monitoring force [the Kosovo Verification Mission]
was
sent into the province under the auspices of the Organisation for
Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and headed by William Walker.
The interview with Cejal is the only reference to US control of
the
KLA in Little's documentary, and then it is only anecdotal. It seems
that
the BBC for its own reasons chose to back-pedal on this issue, given the
article in the Sunday Times that ran the same day Little's documentary
was
aired.
Times journalists Tom Walker and Aidan Laverty wrote: "Several
Americans who were directly involved in CIA activities or close to them
have
spoken to the makers of Moral Combat, a documentary to be broadcast on
BBC2
tonight, and to The Sunday Times about their clandestine roles 'in
giving
covert assistance to the KLA' before NATO began its bombing campaign in
Kosovo."
The Sunday Times explained that the anonymous sources "admitted
they
helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army". They add that CIA officers
were
"cease-fire monitors in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, developing ties with
the
KLA and giving American military training manuals and field advice on
fighting the Yugoslav army and Serbian police."
The Times article continued: "When the Organisation for Security
and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which co-ordinated the monitoring, left
Kosovo a week before airstrikes began a year ago, many of its satellite
telephones and global positioning systems were secretly handed to the
KLA,
ensuring that guerrilla commanders could stay in touch with NATO and
Washington. Several KLA leaders had the mobile phone number of General
Wesley Clark, the NATO commander."
The article goes on to cite unnamed "European diplomats then
working
for the OSCE" who "claim it was betrayed by an American policy that made
air
strikes inevitable." They cite a European envoy accusing OSCE head of
mission Walker of running a CIA operation: "The American agenda
consisted of
their diplomatic observers, aka the CIA, operating on completely
different
terms to the rest of Europe and the OSCE."
Walker was the American ambassador to El Salvador when the US was
helping to suppress leftist rebels there and is widely suspected of
being a
CIA operative. He denies this, but admitted to the Sunday Times that the
CIA
was almost certainly involved in the countdown to air strikes:
"Overnight we
went from having a handful of people to 130 or more. Could the agency
have
put them in at that point? Sure they could. It's their job."
The newspaper cites the more candid comments of its CIA sources:
"It
was a CIA front, gathering intelligence on the KLA's arms and
leadership,"
one says. "I'd tell them [the KLA] which hill to avoid, which wood to go
behind, that sort of thing," said another.
To back up these claims, the Sunday Times notes that Shaban Shala,
a
KLA commander now active in the campaign to destabilise ethnic Albanian
areas in Serbia, claims to have met British, American and Swiss agents
in
northern Albania in 1996.
Little's BBC documentary makes no such explicit suggestion of CIA
backing for the KLA, but it does put flesh on the bones of how the
cease-fire became the occasion for strengthening the separatists' grip
on
Kosovo. He explains that wherever the Serbs withdrew their forces in
compliance with the agreement, the KLA moved in. KLA military leader
Agim
Ceku says, "The cease-fire was very useful for us, it helped us to get
organised, to consolidate and grow." Nothing was done to prevent this,
despite Serbian protests.
Little explains that the BBC has obtained confidential minutes of
the
North Atlantic Council or NAC, NATO's governing body, which state that
the
KLA was "the main initiator of the violence" and that privately Walker
called its actions a "deliberate campaign of provocation". It was this
covert backing for the KLA by the US which provoked Serbia into ending
its
cease-fire and sending the army back into Kosovo.
The next major turn of events leading up to NATO's war against
Serbia
was the alleged massacre of ethnic Albanians at Racek on January 15,
1999.
To this day, the issue of whether Serbian forces killed civilians in
revenge
attacks at Racek is hotly contested by Belgrade, which claims that the
KLA
staged the alleged massacre, using corpses from earlier fighting.
It is certainly the case that when the Serb forces pulled out
after
announcing the killing of 15 KLA personnel, international monitors who
entered the village reported nothing unusual. It was not until the
following
morning, after the KLA had retaken control of the village, that Walker
made
a visit and announced that a massacre by the Serbian police and the
Yugoslav
army had occurred. Little confirms that Walker had contacted both
Holbrooke
and General Clarke before making his announcement.
Racek was to prove the final pretext for a declaration of war, but
first Washington had to make sure that the European powers, which, aside
from Britain, were still pushing for a diplomatic solution, would come
on
board. Talks were convened at Rambouillet, France backed by the threat
of
war.
Little explains: "The Europeans, some reluctant converts to the
threat
of force, earnestly pressed for an agreement both the Serbs and the
Albanians could accept. But the Americans were more sceptical. They had
come
to Rambouillet with an alternative outcome in mind."
Both Albright and Rubin are extraordinarily candid about what they
set
out to accomplish at Rambouillet. They presented an ultimatum that the
Serbian government could not possibly accept, because it demanded a NATO
occupation of not just Kosovo, but unrestricted access to the whole of
Serbia. As Serbian General Pavcovic comments: "They would have unlimited
rights of movement and deployment, little short of occupation. Nobody
could
accept it."
This was the US's intention. Albright told the BBC: "If the Serbs
would not agree [to the Rambouillet ultimatum], and the Albanians would
agree, then there was a very clear cause for using force." Rubin added,
"Obviously, publicly, we had to make clear we were seeking an agreement,
but
privately we knew the chances of the Serbs agreeing were quite small."
KLA leader Thaci was the only problem, because he was demanding
the
inclusion of a referendum on independence. So Albright was despatched on
St.
Valentines Day to take charge of winning him over. Veton Suroi, a
political
rival of the KLA involved in the talks, gives a candid description of
Albright's message to Thaci: "She was saying, you sign, the Serbs don't
sign, we bomb. You sign, the Serbs sign, you have NATO in. So it's up to
you."
After three weeks of discussions, Thaci finally agreed to sign the
Rambouillet Accord. The path was cleared for the US to begin an open war
against Serbia, a war that had been prepared with the aid of CIA dirty
tricks and political manoeuvring with terrorist forces.
See Also:
KLA provocations in Mitrovica and southwest Serbia
[10 March 2000]
After the Slaughter: Political Lessons of the Balkan War
[14 June 1999]
Why is NATO at war with Yugoslavia?
World power, oil and gold
[24 May 1999]
=====================================================================
IL BOOM DELLA PROSTITUZIONE
------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
To: Dekani-25484
Date sent: Sun, 20 Feb 2000 3:55 PM
Subject: NN (BL) Flourishing of world's oldest profession
From: Snezana Lazovic
Nezavisne Novine, Banja Luka, Republika Srpska
Issue 203, February 16, 2000
With the arrival of the "peacekeepers" in Kosovo many institutions have
begun to transform into classic bordellos. The cafes and bars which were
first in securing "their" girls were quickly joined by many private
houses
THE FLOURISHING OF THE WORLD'S OLDEST PROFESSION IN
KOSOVO
By Joco NIKOLIN
In Kosmet there is too much of everything that is bad: violence, running
wild, inefficacy of the peacekeepers, and various forms of crime - from
drugs to prostitution.
All appeals to date that this evil stop have fallen through and how long
things will remain like this is unknown. No one wants to get involved in
prognoses of this kind because law and order disappeared a long time
ago,
and it appears that there is no real wish on the part of the forces
responsible for peace and order to contain the rapists and rape.
What is flourishing the most, probably because of the scent of the
approaching spring, is prostitution. There are more and more girls for
entertainment, as well as places in which they "work". Some come of
their
own free will; others are forced to do so. Some are locals, Albanian
women, while others are from abroad, mainly from the Eastern bloc
countries: from the Ukraine, Moldavia, Romania, Bulgaria...
The inventory is world-class, from novices under the age of majority to
ladies with extensive experience in the world's oldest profession. Under
the "red lanterns" the competition is increasing, and the pimps are
turning over more and more money. Because the price of half an hour of
"entertainment" has risen to approximately 100 marks.
The main customers are, of course, soldiers from the peacekeeping forces
of the United Nations who arrived in Kosmet in the middle of last year.
The ladies of the evening followed them here like seagulls following
ships
at sea. To lighten their leisure hours and their nostalgia for their
homeland.
"Here one can earn good money," declared Katarina, a 22 year-old Ukraine
woman.
She also confided to the reporter that she came to Kosmet, where she had
never been before, from Bulgaria. In the meanwhile she worked in
Macedonia
for a short while.
Her friend, and slightly older countrywoman, Ljudmila, was, she says,
sold
five times during her illustrious career. She arrived in Kosmet from
Istanbul.
The price of girls varies but it is generally between four and five
thousand marks. The Czech agency CTK recently published that, besides
Albanian criminals, some Serbs are participating in this business. "This
is one domain in which the Serbs and Albanians are working together,"
claims a person with good knowledge of the situation.
The girls generally arrive as strippers or dancers and later "change
professions".
The arrival of the "peacekeepers" last July changed much in the life of
Kosmet and its residents.
"Then, very quickly, many institutions began to transform into classic
bordellos. The cafes and bars which were first in securing "their" girls
were quickly joined by many private houses. And it has not stopped,"
stated an officer from the Italian military contingent.
He also claims that crime and prostitution have become most rampant in
the
south of Kosovo which borders on Macedonia and Albania. Many prostitutes
have come from "the land of the eagles" and there is a large number of
pimps there, as well, who have international reputations. These are
employers who, besides Kosmet, send girls to the European West. This
was
recently confirmed by the Brussels press which claimed that in their
country there are already several hundred Albanian prostitutes.
In the prostitution business there are few rules but one is strictly
followed: the lion's share of the income goes to the pimps. Always more
than half. The girls are satisfied if they are left with 40 percent of
the
amount paid for "service".
"The white slave trade" is not abating. Most probably it will continue
because this problem is not a priority for us," says Roma Batacaraja
(sp?)
from UNMIK, in charge of woman's issues.
According to Yugoslav law prostitution is forbidden. However, because
anarchy rules in Kosmet, there is no one to put out the "red lanterns".
Their light, in itself, is the symbol of a state of chaos which has
lasted
for years.
A few days ago Italian soldiers freed twelve girls from one house near
the
airport of Slatina. They were kept as sex slaves, and their main clients
were "peacekeepers". The majority of the ladies were from Eastern Europe
and arrived in Kosmet from another destination, that is, they were
"guests" in two other European countries before arriving here.
It is clear that an international division of approximately 50,000
soldiers wearing the insignia of the world organization is very
attractive to the prostitutes. In Pristina, Urosevac, Gnjilane and other
cities there can be shortages of everything except "girls for just one
night". When some leave, others take their place. And so on in a circle.
The soldiers pay, because their wallets are so deep that it is
unimaginable for the local Albanians and the remaining, rare Serbs. That
is where the price of 100 marks and more for less than an hour of
"relaxation" at one of the bordellos comes from.
The chief of the UN mission for migration in Pristina, who freed the
above-mentioned prostitutes, says that they are terrified of revenge by
their respective pimps. These "employers" are even threatening members
of
the mission because of what they have done. Their messages are more than
clear: no one is allowed to get involved in their business.
"The Times", at the same time, discovered that the most frequent guests
of
the bordellos are Americans and Italians whose rules of service are more
liberal than those in effect for Russians and the British. It is
interesting that deals are achieved very easily and that there is no
fear
of AIDS or sexually transmitted diseased. Evidently, these do exist.
Many foreign reporters, writing on this matters, recorded that the
prostitutes in Kosmet have "no medical protection" unlike their
colleagues in the West.
The Albanian pimps in Kosmet are wholeheartedly assisted in procuring
"fresh meat" by their countrymen from western Macedonia and Albania. A
large number of "ladies of the evening" arrived from these areas to
Kosmet
for lower prices than those outside the Balkan region.
For all "imported" girls the rule is that first they must be paid off,
and
then they begin to take some of the money for themselves. How long the
pay
off period is going to last is never known in advance. Everything is in
the hands of the pimps and various criminal gangs.
Translated by Snezana Lazovic (February 20, 2000)
==============================================================
IL PREMIO DELLA KFOR PER GLI ALLEATI NARCOTRAFFICANTI:
LE MINIERE DI TREPCA
KFOR Gives Kosovo's "Glittering Prize" to KLA Drug
Dealers
"Most Valuable Piece of Real Estate in Balkans" Now
Under KLA Direction
by: Mary Mostert, Analyst, Original Sources,
(www.originalsources.com)
March 29, 2000
On February 24th my analysis was subtitled: "The
Battle of Mitrovica is Not About Visiting Cousins -
its About the Trepca Mine." (See:
http://www.originalsources.com/OS2-00MQC/2-24-2000.1.html)
Somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 ethnic Albanians
had marched for miles through the snow to attempt to
get across the bridge in to Mitrovica, which was being
guarded by French peacekeepers. The marchers told
gullible Western journalists that "all they wanted"
was to "be able to visit their cousins on the other
side of the river."
Over the weekend the real issue of Kosovo finally
emerged in a press release from KFOR headquarters in
Pristina, Kosovo which was entitled: Mining Industry -
A Great Asset For Kosovo, written by Maj. Kristian
Kahrs.
The e-mail to me and other members of the media said:
"Dear friends of KFOR Online We can now offer an
article from the Stari Trg Mine just east of
Mitrovica. KFOR Polish soldiers gave 500 uniforms and
safety equipment to the mine, and the mine has a great
potential. According to mine director Mr. Burhan
Kavaja, they can exploit 16 million metric tons of
zinc, lead and silver, and there are enough metals to
have work for 20 years. Read more on KFOR Online,
http://kforonline.com."
Only one month ago I asked in my analysis of the
conflict at the Mitrovica bridge "How come none of
these reports are mentioning another minor little fact
concerning Mitrovica - the Trepca Mine? The mine is
owned by the Serbs and a Greek mining firm,
Mytilinaios SA who signed a contract with Serbian
agency of foreign trade in 1998 to invest $519 Billion
in the mine."
Now, all the sudden, KFOR is claiming some kind of
"humanitarian" giveaway program to "help" the mine?
What's going on? In February I quoted from an article
written by Chris Hedges in the New York Times in July
1998 entitled: "Kosovo War's Glittering Prize Rests
Underground" in which he pointed out that the real
issue in Kosovo was control of the mine. In that
article Hedges quotes "Burhan Kavaja, an Albanian, who
was the former director of the Stari Tng mine, who was
dismissed and imprisoned after the first strike.
...This conflict will only end now with our
independence."
And just who is it that KFOR is giving the free
miner's helmets to? Is it the director put in place by
the owner of both the mine, the Belgrade government,
Novak Bjelic, who Hedges interviewed? It wasn't. It
was no other than the Albanian, Burhan Kavaja, the
former director of the Stari Tng Mine who led the
illegal efforts to seize control of the mine by force.
Hedges wrote, "The ethnic Albanian miners, who made up
75 percent of the 23,000 employees, shut down the
mines and organized a 30-mile-long protest march to
Pristina. They carried photos of the late communist
leader, Josip Broz Tito, and Yugoslav flags adorned
with the communist red star." What the miners wanted
was not only independence, but control of the most
valuable piece of real estate in Kosovo - the Trepca
Mines - the only thing in the area that Adolf Hitler
wanted.
"When the Nazis seized this corner of the Balkans in
1941, they handed over the hovels in Pristina, the
provincial capital, to the Italian fascists," Hedges
observed. "But they kept the British-built Trepca
mines for the Reich, shipping out wagonloads of
minerals for weapons and producing the batteries that
powered the U-boats. Submarine batteries, along with
ammunition, are still produced in the Trepca mines.
The mining history reaches back to the Romans, who
hacked out silver from the quarries."
Before their destruction under KFOR "protection"
Kosovo was covered with ancient Serbia Orthodox Church
monasteries and religious sites. Some of those now
destroyed Churches were built in the 13th and 14th
centuries. Kosovo is the cradle of the Serb culture.
Even throughout 500 years of Ottoman Turk occupation,
the Serbs were a majority in Kosovo.
The "real worth of Kosovo", Hedges said, are the mines
- especially the which contains the minerals needed to
wage war - even back in the time of the Romans. "The
fighting between the rebels of the Kosovo Liberation
Army, with their intoxicating visions of an
independent state, and the 50,000 Serbian soldiers and
special policemen. ...There is over 30 percent lead
and zinc in the ore," said Novak Bjelic, the mine's
beefy director. "The war in Kosovo is about the mines,
nothing else. This is Serbia's Kuwait -- the heart of
Kosovo. We export to France, Switzerland, Greece,
Sweden, the Czech Republic, Russia and Belgium. "We
export to a firm in New York, but I would prefer not
to name it. And in addition to all this Kosovo has 17
billion tons of coal reserves. Naturally, the
Albanians want all this for themselves."
The Trepca mining complex "the most valuable piece of
real estate in the Balkans," is worth billions of
dollars. "The Stari Tng mine, with its warehouses, is
ringed with smelting plants, 17 metal treatment sites,
freight yards, railroad lines, a power plant and the
country's largest battery plant.
"In the last three years we have mined 2,538,124 tons
of lead and zinc crude ore," Novak Bjelic, 58, the
Serb director of the mine in July 1998 told Hedges,
"and produced 286,502 tons of concentrated lead and
zinc and 139,789 tons of pure lead, zinc, cadmium,
silver and gold."
The battle for control of that silver and gold, lead,
zinc, and cadminum, began in the late 1980s with a
series of hunger strikes in which the Albanian miners
occupied the mines. The mine protests led to general
strikes throughout Kosovo, making Trepca the nerve
center of the resistance movement. Serbian special
policemen eventually seized the mine, carrying
weakened miners out on stretchers. The Albanians'
drive to seize the mines, declare independence to
create a "greater Albania" of course would switch the
proceeds of the mines from the government of
Yugoslavia to the Albanians under the KLA, which
controls much of the heroin trade in Europe. Milosevic
declared a state of emergency and the ethnic Albanian
miners were replaced with Poles, Czechs and Serbs. In
1998 there were 15,000 mine workers, about 15% of whom
were of Albanian origin.
Less than a year after Hedges wrote that, US Bombers
began to wreak havoc on both Kosovo and Belgrade,
supposedly to "stop" a "genocide" of Albanians. The
bombing raids, under the direction of Bill Clinton,
drove out half the Albanian population and sixty
percent of the Serb population of Kosovo.
After the bombing stopped, thousands of forensic
experts from several countries searched for the "mass
graves" the KLA kept telling the world contained "up
to 100,000" Albanians slaughtered by the Serbs. Only
about 2108 bodies were found, some of them Serbs,
others prisoners in a prison bombed by NATO and NO
proof of ANY genocide.
Throughout the world the word is getting out. We were
lied to. The KLA, which was listed as a terrorist
group by the U.S. State Department in 1998 and known
to Interpol as the major supplier of illegal drugs and
prostitutes in Europe, is now in control of Kosovo,
anarchy reigns, just as it does in Northern Albanian
under the clan warlords, and KFOR has reinstalled the
Albanian manager of the Stari Tng mine who tried to
deliver the mine to the KLA in 1998.
Contacts in Yugoslavia told me, via e-mail, when
Clinton ordered the bombing, that the bombing was
really all about control of Kosovo mineral assets. I
didn't print that in 1999. I couldn't believe at that
time that America would be a party to such a thing.
The KFOR e-mail and their report on the Stari Tng mine
on the Internet is irrefutable proof that the Serbs
were right.
Will Belgrade stand by and do nothing as the Serbs of
Mitrovica are driven out so the Albanians can have
total control over mineral resources the Serbs need to
survive? Thirty-four percent of the coal used to heat
Belgrade comes from the same region of Kosovo. Will
they stand by, with their intact army, and do nothing
as a seizure of assets comparable, in the words of the
Serb director of the mine, to Iraq's seizure of
Kuwait's life blood - their oil wells, takes place?
Will the Russians and the Chinese, who are friends of
the Serbs, allow those assets to be controlled by the
KLA drug dealers as the region deteriorates into
anarchy?
And, will the candidates for the U.S. Presidency
continue to pretend that nothing is happening as
America implements such a glaring piece of
imperialism? Will the next U.S. leader and the
American people really continue to be content with
spending billions of American dollars to shore up the
KLA and its drive to create a Greater Albania and
secure its near monopoly of heroin sales in Europe?
Time will tell.
To comment: mmostert@...
===================================================================
IL MITO DELLA REPRESSIONE ANTIALBANESE
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a38da8bc025fa.htm
The Myth of Albanian Repression in 1990s Kosovo
Foreign Affairs Opinion Keywords: KOSOVO; YUGOSLAVIA; SERBIA; KLA
Source: Columbia University
Published: March 23, 2000 Author: Max Sinclair
Posted on 03/23/2000 13:25:20 PST by Gael
The Myth of Albanian Repression
One by one, the myths about Kosovo have been falling. The notion that
Yugoslavs were engaged in genocide against Albanians was debunked by the
absence of corpses in anything close to the numbers claimed by the NATO
countries as justification for their air assault. The idea that the KLA
was
merely seeking redress of political grievances has died along with the
hundreds of post-"peace" victims of the KLA. And, the romantic fiction
that
the war would lead to a multiethnic paradise was debunked by "Kosova's"
incarnation as a mono-ethnic state. In their anniversary reviews of the
war's commencement, even NATO and its compliant press have recognized
these
truths.
However, one lie remains unrebutted, and is repeated to this day. That
is
the assertion that in 1989, after Slobodan Milosevic "revoked" Kosovo's
autonomy, the Albanian population was fired from jobs and otherwise
discriminated against. Various sources, including the Washington Post,
Human
Rights Watch, and NATO's gauleiter Bernard Kouchner, use the word
"apartheid" to describe the Yugoslav-Albanian relationship. Various news
stories reporting the return of Albanians -- doctors, teachers, miners
-- to
previous places of employment invariably stated, without any
documentation
whatever, that these workers had previously been fired solely because
they
were Albanian.
The truth is otherwise. Albanians were not fired after the modification
(not
revocation) of autonomy because of their ethnicity, as NATO and its
media
acolytes claim. In fact, the modification of autonomy resulted in a
massive
refusal on the part of many Albanians to continue working, particularly
in
the state-owned enterprises that characterize socialist Yugoslavia. They
similarly refused to attend the state schools -- no, they weren't
expelled,
as they claim -- and boycotted the political process by refusing to
exercise
their right to suffrage. For example, the Trepca miners occupied the
mines
in a form of sit-down strike, and subsequently were discharged, not
because
they were Albanian but because they refused to work. This was the same
treatment afforded by Ronald Reagan to the illegally striking air
traffic
controllers.
This self-defeating work boycott was not a campaign of non-violent civil
disobedience. Those Albanians who refused to participate in the boycott
were
the subject of violent reprisals. The KLA's initial list of victims
included
numerous Albanians employed by the Yugoslav federal or Serbian republic
governments. Those in municipal government positions, like Malic Saholi
and
Ramiz Ljeka, or located in isolated rural areas, particularly forestry
workers such as Sadi Morina, Faik Belopolja, Fazil Hassani, and Sejdi
Mujha,
were common targets. The fact that these Albanians were employed by the
state belies the claim of mass firings for ethnic reasons; the fact that
they were killed by the KLA proves that common ethnicity was no bar to
the
KLA's intimidation campaign.
The KLA's victims were not limited to state employees, however.
Albanians
who maintained political loyalty to Yugoslavia, like Zen Durmisi, were
murdered for their political views, as were those such as Ali Raci who
worked at private Yugoslav-owned companies. Even entrepreneurs who
traded
with Yugoslavs were executed after the KLA's ascendancy. As reported by
the
Albanian Daily News, "Kosovo's Secret Deals" (March 3, 2000):
"Throughout
the years of political crisis, Serb middlemen provided their Albanian
business partners with everything from petrol to flour and milk. Their
partnership became very lucrative and close. When war broke out, many
Albanian traders were either killed or forced to flee by the Kosovo
Liberation Army who regarded them as traitors." The bottom line:
cooperating
with Yugoslavs could be fatal. No wonder so many Albanians joined the
job
boycott, when the alternative was death.
In short, the extremist KLA's zeal to establish a minority-free province
led
to withdrawal from civil society, including mass refusal to work, and to
the
violent intimidation of fellow citizens into joining this boycott. If
there
was apartheid in Kosovo, it was self-imposed by the KLA.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
Times" rivelano la strategia della tensione della NATO per il Kosovo
("Il Manifesto", "World Socialist Web Site"
* Un'altra conquista dell'amministrazione UCKFOR: boom della
prostituzione in Kosmet (Nezavisne Novine, 16/2/2000)
* La KFOR premia i narcotrafficanti UCK (Original sources 29/3/2000)
* Il mito della repressione antialbanese (The New Republic)
=====================================================================
IL DOCUMENTARIO DELLA BBC...
"Il Manifesto" del 24/3/2000:
BBC-CANALE 5
E la Nato sferrò il suo moral combat
- GIUSEPPE MASCOLI - LONDRA
I eri sera è andato in onda su Canale 5 un documentario della Bbc sulla
guerra del Kossovo, titolo
originale "Moral combat". Parafrasando un altro videogioco lo si sarebbe
potuto chiamare missione
indicibile. Il documentario spiega come l'intervento della Nato in
Jugoslavia è stato provocato
dall'amministrazione americana, con qualche resistenza francese, e
qualche screzio con i cugini
inglesi, fra l'indifferenza degli altri paesi Nato. Il primo passo
americano è la manipolazione del
Kossovo Verification Mission (Kvm), un anno prima dell'intervento Nato.
Quel che doveva essere
un organismo autonomo di controllo per gli accordi internazionali in
Kossovo è controllato dagli
americani. A capo del Kvm viene messo William Walker, uomo del
dipartimento di stato. A
giudizio del capitano Roland Keith, anche egli parte del Kvm, Walker ha
per obiettivo la
demonizzazione dei serbi e di Milososevic e appoggia l'Uck al quale, in
barba a quanto stipulato in
sede Onu, viene progressivamente consegnato il Kossovo. Dal voluto
fallimento della missione
Kvm si arriva a Rambouillet. Il documentario della Bbc spiega subito che
gli americani, anche qui,
arrivano con una agenda segreta. Il sottosegretario alla difesa Rubin
non ha difficoltà a raccontare
che l'obiettivo è quello di fare un documento accettato dalla
delegazione kossovaro-albanese e
rifiutato dai serbi così da spianare la via all'intervento militare.
Iniziano i bombardamenti, sorge qualche divergenza fra i paesi della
alleanza e fra alcuni dei
protagonisti sul teatro di guerra. Lo scontro più plateale è fra il
generale Jackson e il capo supremo
delle forze Nato, il generale Clark. Il britannico Jackson sfodera una
flemma devastante contro un
generale Clark che vuole inviarlo con le sue truppe contro i Russi
arrivati all'aeroporto di Pristina.
Il generale Jackson disubbidisce: "Non mi sembrava il caso di scatenare
la terza guerra mondiale".
Ancora peggio vanno le cose fra americani e francesi. Dice Short, il
generale Usa capo della
aviazione Nato: i francesi hanno creato enorme sconquasso. Iniziano, a
suo giudizio, impedendogli
di bombardare il ponte a Belgrado dove si riuniscono folti gruppi di
cittadini per protestare contro i
bombardamenti. Cosa che invece per gli americani andava fatta: "gli
avrebbe dato un bel colpo
demoralizzante", dice Short. Dopo che obiettivi civili vengono
ripetutamente colpiti i francesi
impongono un supervisore che vaglia le operazioni americane e frustra
ulteriormente il generale
Short. In linea di massima, il capo dell'aeronautica ce l'ha su con la
pantomima della guerra
umanitaria. Colpire obiettivi militari dagli aerei è difficile, colpire
i mezzi usati in Kossovo da
Milosevic è impossibile. Su questo sono d'accordo sia il generale Short
che il generale serbo
Pavkovic. E' inevitabile quindi spostare il raggio d'azione
dall'esercito serbo in Kossovo alle
strutture civili in Serbia.
Alla fine, conclude il documentario, la guerra "non fu fatta per
questioni morali, né per il Kossovo.
Ma per salvare la Nato".
---
"Il manifesto" del 18 Marzo 2000
KOSOVO/ITALIA INTERROGAZIONE AL GOVERNO SULLE IMPRESE NATO
La Cia preparò il terreno, e le bombe piovvero
I senatori chiedono ragione di azioni passate e presenti Kosovo
- FRANCESCA LONGO -
Q uali iniziative intende intraprendere la Nato - anche in seguito alla
decisione italiana di rafforzare il proprio contingente - per
controllare
le frontiere del Kosovo, onde evitare infiltrazioni e far fronte
all'aumento degli attacchi contro le poche famiglie serbe rimaste? E
quali
iniziative intende intraprendere il governo italiano onde evitare che
forze
supportate dalle Nazioni unite si prestino ad attività criminali? Come
riportare i componenti del Corpo di protezione del Kosovo al loro
mandato,
al fine del ripristino della legalità, gravemente minacciata? E ancora:
s'è
chiesto il governo quale sia la posizione dell'Amministrazione Usa nei
riguardi degli attuali rischi, legati all'estremismo albanese, segnalati
recentemente anche dall'inviato del Dipartimento di stato James Rubin? E
per finire: il governo italiano è a conoscenza di un impegno,
antecedente
gli attacchi Nato dell'anno scorso, dei servizi americani
nell'addestramento dell'Uck - impegno che ha favorito l'evoluzione verso
l'intervento armato, a danno dei tentativi di arrivare a una soluzione
pacifica del conflitto - e della distorsione dei compiti dell'Osce?
A tutte queste domande, poste in un'interrogazione a risposta orale che
ha
come primi firmatari i senatori diessini Fulvio Camerini e Tana de
Zulueta
(cui si sono associati altri otto senatori), dovrà rispondere il
ministro
degli Esteri. I senatori in questione hanno ricostruito, partendo da
notizie fornite dal Sunday Times e dall'Observer il 12 marzo scorso,
un'altra inquietante pagina del conflitto in Kosovo.
Agenti dei servizi segreti americani hanno ammesso di aver contribuito
all'addestramento dell'Uck, prima dei bombardamenti Nato, mentre
americani
implicati nell'attività della Cia hanno dichiarato, in un documentario
della Bbc2, di aver operato clandestinamente. Agenti del Central
Intelligence Service - nel '98 e '99 in Kosovo col compito di monitorare
la
zona per il cessate il fuoco - avevano stabilito legami con l'Uck,
fornendo
anche manuali americani di addestramento militare e consigli sul campo.
L'Osce, abbandonando ilKosovo una settimana prima dell'inizio dei raid
aerei, consegnò segretamente all'Uck molti dei telefoni satellitari e i
sistemi di posizionamento globale, al fine di permettere i contatti dei
capi guerriglia con la Nato e Washington. Inoltre, diplomatici europei
dell'Organizzazione per la sicurezza e cooperazione sostengono che la
stessa è stata tradita dalla politica americana che aveva reso i raid
aerei
inevitabili.
Come se ciò non bastasse, le esportazioni di fucili, finanziate dalla
diaspora albanese, provenivano dagli Usa, in base a una legge federale
che
ne permetteva l'esportazione a "circoli della caccia".
Un capitolo a sé riguarda poi il rapporto confidenziale delle Nazioni
unite
al segretario generale Kofi Annan, nel quale il Corpo di protezione del
Kosovo (Kpc) - forza di protezione civile di 5.000 uomini finanziata
dalle
Nazioni unite - viene accusato di "attività criminali, uccisioni,
maltrattamenti e torture, attività illegali, abuso di autorità,
intimidazioni, rottura della neutralità politica e eccitamento
all'odio".
Molti dei membri del Kpc pare provenissero dalle file dell'Uck, e alcuni
di
loro avrebbero realizzato un vero e proprio racket con richiesta di
"contributi" per la "protezione" di negozianti, uomini d'affari, ecc.
Così
come è pure probabile che il Kpc abbia creato un vero e proprio racket
per
la gestione della prostituzione. Per inciso, il Kpc non è forza di
polizia
ma i suoi membri si comportano come se fossero al di sopra delle leggi.
Una denuncia coraggiosa, questa dei senatori, che attende e merita, a
tempi
brevi, un'altrettanto coraggiosa risposta.
---
WSWS : News & Analysis : Europe : The Balkans
British documentary substantiates US-KLA collusion in provoking
war
with Serbia
Related Sunday Times article alleges CIA role
By Chris Marsden
16 March 2000
Use this version to print
On Sunday, March 12, Britain's BBC2 television channel ran a
documentary by Alan Little entitled "Moral Combat: NATO At War". The
program
contained damning evidence of how the Clinton administration set out to
create a pretext for declaring war against the Milosevic regime in
Serbia by
sponsoring the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), then pressed
this
decision on its European allies. The revelations in the documentary were
reinforced by an accompanying article in the Sunday Times.
Little conducted frank interviews with leading players in the
Kosovo
conflict, the most pertinent being those with US Secretary of State
Madeline
Albright, Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin, US Envoy Richard
Holbrooke, William Walker, head of the UN Verification Mission, and KLA
leader Hashim Thaci. These were supplemented by many others.
The documentary set out to explain how "a shared enmity towards
Milosevic" made "allies of a shadowy band of guerrillas and the most
powerful nations on earth".
Ever since the Bosnian war of 1995, the KLA, seeking to capitalise
on
popular resentment among Kosovan Albanians against the regime in
Belgrade,
had pursued a strategy of destabilising the Serbian province of Kosovo
by
acts of terrorism, in the hope that the US and NATO would intervene.
They
ambushed Serb patrols and killed policemen.
"Any armed action we undertook would bring retaliation against
civilians," KLA leader Thaci explained. "We knew we were endangering a
great
number of civilian lives." The benefits of this strategy were made plain
by
Dug Gorani, a Kosovo Albanian negotiator not tied to the KLA: "The more
civilians were killed, the chances of international intervention became
bigger, and the KLA of course realised that. There was this foreign
diplomat
who once told me, 'Look, unless you pass the quota of five thousand
deaths
you'll never have anybody permanently present in Kosovo from foreign
diplomacy.'"
Albright was receptive to the KLA's strategy because the US was
anxious to stage a military conflict with Serbia. Her series of
interviews
began chillingly with the words: "I believed in the ultimate power, the
goodness of the power of the allies and led by the United States." The
KLA's
campaign of provocations was seized upon as the vehicle through which
the
use of this power could be sanctioned.
A March 5, 1998 attack by the Serbian army on the home in Prekaz
of a
leading KLA commander, Adem Jashari, in which 53 people died, became the
occasion for a meeting of the Contact group of NATO powers four days
later.
Albright pushed for a tough anti-Serbian response. "I thought it behoved
me
to say to my colleagues that we could not repeat the kinds of mistakes
that
had happened over Bosnia, where there was a lot of talk and no action,"
she
told Little.
NATO threatened Belgrade with a military response for the first
time.
"The ambitions of the KLA, and the intentions of the NATO allies, were
converging," Little commented. He then showed how a subsequent public
meeting between US Envoy Richard Holbrooke and KLA personnel at Junik
angered Belgrade and gave encouragement to the Albanian separatists.
General
Nebojsa Pavkovic, the commander of the Yugoslav army in Kosovo, states,
"When the official ambassador of another country arrives here, ignores
state
officials, but holds a meeting with the Albanian terrorists, then it's
quite
clear they are getting support."
Lirak Cejal, a KLA soldier, went further, "I knew that since then,
that the USA, NATO, will put us in their hands. They were looking for
the
head of the KLA, and when they found it they will have it in their hand,
and
then they will control the KLA."
By October 1998 NATO had succeeded in imposing a cease-fire
agreement,
partly by threat of force and partly because of Serbia's success in
routing
the KLA. A cease-fire monitoring force [the Kosovo Verification Mission]
was
sent into the province under the auspices of the Organisation for
Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and headed by William Walker.
The interview with Cejal is the only reference to US control of
the
KLA in Little's documentary, and then it is only anecdotal. It seems
that
the BBC for its own reasons chose to back-pedal on this issue, given the
article in the Sunday Times that ran the same day Little's documentary
was
aired.
Times journalists Tom Walker and Aidan Laverty wrote: "Several
Americans who were directly involved in CIA activities or close to them
have
spoken to the makers of Moral Combat, a documentary to be broadcast on
BBC2
tonight, and to The Sunday Times about their clandestine roles 'in
giving
covert assistance to the KLA' before NATO began its bombing campaign in
Kosovo."
The Sunday Times explained that the anonymous sources "admitted
they
helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army". They add that CIA officers
were
"cease-fire monitors in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, developing ties with
the
KLA and giving American military training manuals and field advice on
fighting the Yugoslav army and Serbian police."
The Times article continued: "When the Organisation for Security
and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which co-ordinated the monitoring, left
Kosovo a week before airstrikes began a year ago, many of its satellite
telephones and global positioning systems were secretly handed to the
KLA,
ensuring that guerrilla commanders could stay in touch with NATO and
Washington. Several KLA leaders had the mobile phone number of General
Wesley Clark, the NATO commander."
The article goes on to cite unnamed "European diplomats then
working
for the OSCE" who "claim it was betrayed by an American policy that made
air
strikes inevitable." They cite a European envoy accusing OSCE head of
mission Walker of running a CIA operation: "The American agenda
consisted of
their diplomatic observers, aka the CIA, operating on completely
different
terms to the rest of Europe and the OSCE."
Walker was the American ambassador to El Salvador when the US was
helping to suppress leftist rebels there and is widely suspected of
being a
CIA operative. He denies this, but admitted to the Sunday Times that the
CIA
was almost certainly involved in the countdown to air strikes:
"Overnight we
went from having a handful of people to 130 or more. Could the agency
have
put them in at that point? Sure they could. It's their job."
The newspaper cites the more candid comments of its CIA sources:
"It
was a CIA front, gathering intelligence on the KLA's arms and
leadership,"
one says. "I'd tell them [the KLA] which hill to avoid, which wood to go
behind, that sort of thing," said another.
To back up these claims, the Sunday Times notes that Shaban Shala,
a
KLA commander now active in the campaign to destabilise ethnic Albanian
areas in Serbia, claims to have met British, American and Swiss agents
in
northern Albania in 1996.
Little's BBC documentary makes no such explicit suggestion of CIA
backing for the KLA, but it does put flesh on the bones of how the
cease-fire became the occasion for strengthening the separatists' grip
on
Kosovo. He explains that wherever the Serbs withdrew their forces in
compliance with the agreement, the KLA moved in. KLA military leader
Agim
Ceku says, "The cease-fire was very useful for us, it helped us to get
organised, to consolidate and grow." Nothing was done to prevent this,
despite Serbian protests.
Little explains that the BBC has obtained confidential minutes of
the
North Atlantic Council or NAC, NATO's governing body, which state that
the
KLA was "the main initiator of the violence" and that privately Walker
called its actions a "deliberate campaign of provocation". It was this
covert backing for the KLA by the US which provoked Serbia into ending
its
cease-fire and sending the army back into Kosovo.
The next major turn of events leading up to NATO's war against
Serbia
was the alleged massacre of ethnic Albanians at Racek on January 15,
1999.
To this day, the issue of whether Serbian forces killed civilians in
revenge
attacks at Racek is hotly contested by Belgrade, which claims that the
KLA
staged the alleged massacre, using corpses from earlier fighting.
It is certainly the case that when the Serb forces pulled out
after
announcing the killing of 15 KLA personnel, international monitors who
entered the village reported nothing unusual. It was not until the
following
morning, after the KLA had retaken control of the village, that Walker
made
a visit and announced that a massacre by the Serbian police and the
Yugoslav
army had occurred. Little confirms that Walker had contacted both
Holbrooke
and General Clarke before making his announcement.
Racek was to prove the final pretext for a declaration of war, but
first Washington had to make sure that the European powers, which, aside
from Britain, were still pushing for a diplomatic solution, would come
on
board. Talks were convened at Rambouillet, France backed by the threat
of
war.
Little explains: "The Europeans, some reluctant converts to the
threat
of force, earnestly pressed for an agreement both the Serbs and the
Albanians could accept. But the Americans were more sceptical. They had
come
to Rambouillet with an alternative outcome in mind."
Both Albright and Rubin are extraordinarily candid about what they
set
out to accomplish at Rambouillet. They presented an ultimatum that the
Serbian government could not possibly accept, because it demanded a NATO
occupation of not just Kosovo, but unrestricted access to the whole of
Serbia. As Serbian General Pavcovic comments: "They would have unlimited
rights of movement and deployment, little short of occupation. Nobody
could
accept it."
This was the US's intention. Albright told the BBC: "If the Serbs
would not agree [to the Rambouillet ultimatum], and the Albanians would
agree, then there was a very clear cause for using force." Rubin added,
"Obviously, publicly, we had to make clear we were seeking an agreement,
but
privately we knew the chances of the Serbs agreeing were quite small."
KLA leader Thaci was the only problem, because he was demanding
the
inclusion of a referendum on independence. So Albright was despatched on
St.
Valentines Day to take charge of winning him over. Veton Suroi, a
political
rival of the KLA involved in the talks, gives a candid description of
Albright's message to Thaci: "She was saying, you sign, the Serbs don't
sign, we bomb. You sign, the Serbs sign, you have NATO in. So it's up to
you."
After three weeks of discussions, Thaci finally agreed to sign the
Rambouillet Accord. The path was cleared for the US to begin an open war
against Serbia, a war that had been prepared with the aid of CIA dirty
tricks and political manoeuvring with terrorist forces.
See Also:
KLA provocations in Mitrovica and southwest Serbia
[10 March 2000]
After the Slaughter: Political Lessons of the Balkan War
[14 June 1999]
Why is NATO at war with Yugoslavia?
World power, oil and gold
[24 May 1999]
=====================================================================
IL BOOM DELLA PROSTITUZIONE
------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
To: Dekani-25484
Date sent: Sun, 20 Feb 2000 3:55 PM
Subject: NN (BL) Flourishing of world's oldest profession
From: Snezana Lazovic
Nezavisne Novine, Banja Luka, Republika Srpska
Issue 203, February 16, 2000
With the arrival of the "peacekeepers" in Kosovo many institutions have
begun to transform into classic bordellos. The cafes and bars which were
first in securing "their" girls were quickly joined by many private
houses
THE FLOURISHING OF THE WORLD'S OLDEST PROFESSION IN
KOSOVO
By Joco NIKOLIN
In Kosmet there is too much of everything that is bad: violence, running
wild, inefficacy of the peacekeepers, and various forms of crime - from
drugs to prostitution.
All appeals to date that this evil stop have fallen through and how long
things will remain like this is unknown. No one wants to get involved in
prognoses of this kind because law and order disappeared a long time
ago,
and it appears that there is no real wish on the part of the forces
responsible for peace and order to contain the rapists and rape.
What is flourishing the most, probably because of the scent of the
approaching spring, is prostitution. There are more and more girls for
entertainment, as well as places in which they "work". Some come of
their
own free will; others are forced to do so. Some are locals, Albanian
women, while others are from abroad, mainly from the Eastern bloc
countries: from the Ukraine, Moldavia, Romania, Bulgaria...
The inventory is world-class, from novices under the age of majority to
ladies with extensive experience in the world's oldest profession. Under
the "red lanterns" the competition is increasing, and the pimps are
turning over more and more money. Because the price of half an hour of
"entertainment" has risen to approximately 100 marks.
The main customers are, of course, soldiers from the peacekeeping forces
of the United Nations who arrived in Kosmet in the middle of last year.
The ladies of the evening followed them here like seagulls following
ships
at sea. To lighten their leisure hours and their nostalgia for their
homeland.
"Here one can earn good money," declared Katarina, a 22 year-old Ukraine
woman.
She also confided to the reporter that she came to Kosmet, where she had
never been before, from Bulgaria. In the meanwhile she worked in
Macedonia
for a short while.
Her friend, and slightly older countrywoman, Ljudmila, was, she says,
sold
five times during her illustrious career. She arrived in Kosmet from
Istanbul.
The price of girls varies but it is generally between four and five
thousand marks. The Czech agency CTK recently published that, besides
Albanian criminals, some Serbs are participating in this business. "This
is one domain in which the Serbs and Albanians are working together,"
claims a person with good knowledge of the situation.
The girls generally arrive as strippers or dancers and later "change
professions".
The arrival of the "peacekeepers" last July changed much in the life of
Kosmet and its residents.
"Then, very quickly, many institutions began to transform into classic
bordellos. The cafes and bars which were first in securing "their" girls
were quickly joined by many private houses. And it has not stopped,"
stated an officer from the Italian military contingent.
He also claims that crime and prostitution have become most rampant in
the
south of Kosovo which borders on Macedonia and Albania. Many prostitutes
have come from "the land of the eagles" and there is a large number of
pimps there, as well, who have international reputations. These are
employers who, besides Kosmet, send girls to the European West. This
was
recently confirmed by the Brussels press which claimed that in their
country there are already several hundred Albanian prostitutes.
In the prostitution business there are few rules but one is strictly
followed: the lion's share of the income goes to the pimps. Always more
than half. The girls are satisfied if they are left with 40 percent of
the
amount paid for "service".
"The white slave trade" is not abating. Most probably it will continue
because this problem is not a priority for us," says Roma Batacaraja
(sp?)
from UNMIK, in charge of woman's issues.
According to Yugoslav law prostitution is forbidden. However, because
anarchy rules in Kosmet, there is no one to put out the "red lanterns".
Their light, in itself, is the symbol of a state of chaos which has
lasted
for years.
A few days ago Italian soldiers freed twelve girls from one house near
the
airport of Slatina. They were kept as sex slaves, and their main clients
were "peacekeepers". The majority of the ladies were from Eastern Europe
and arrived in Kosmet from another destination, that is, they were
"guests" in two other European countries before arriving here.
It is clear that an international division of approximately 50,000
soldiers wearing the insignia of the world organization is very
attractive to the prostitutes. In Pristina, Urosevac, Gnjilane and other
cities there can be shortages of everything except "girls for just one
night". When some leave, others take their place. And so on in a circle.
The soldiers pay, because their wallets are so deep that it is
unimaginable for the local Albanians and the remaining, rare Serbs. That
is where the price of 100 marks and more for less than an hour of
"relaxation" at one of the bordellos comes from.
The chief of the UN mission for migration in Pristina, who freed the
above-mentioned prostitutes, says that they are terrified of revenge by
their respective pimps. These "employers" are even threatening members
of
the mission because of what they have done. Their messages are more than
clear: no one is allowed to get involved in their business.
"The Times", at the same time, discovered that the most frequent guests
of
the bordellos are Americans and Italians whose rules of service are more
liberal than those in effect for Russians and the British. It is
interesting that deals are achieved very easily and that there is no
fear
of AIDS or sexually transmitted diseased. Evidently, these do exist.
Many foreign reporters, writing on this matters, recorded that the
prostitutes in Kosmet have "no medical protection" unlike their
colleagues in the West.
The Albanian pimps in Kosmet are wholeheartedly assisted in procuring
"fresh meat" by their countrymen from western Macedonia and Albania. A
large number of "ladies of the evening" arrived from these areas to
Kosmet
for lower prices than those outside the Balkan region.
For all "imported" girls the rule is that first they must be paid off,
and
then they begin to take some of the money for themselves. How long the
pay
off period is going to last is never known in advance. Everything is in
the hands of the pimps and various criminal gangs.
Translated by Snezana Lazovic (February 20, 2000)
==============================================================
IL PREMIO DELLA KFOR PER GLI ALLEATI NARCOTRAFFICANTI:
LE MINIERE DI TREPCA
KFOR Gives Kosovo's "Glittering Prize" to KLA Drug
Dealers
"Most Valuable Piece of Real Estate in Balkans" Now
Under KLA Direction
by: Mary Mostert, Analyst, Original Sources,
(www.originalsources.com)
March 29, 2000
On February 24th my analysis was subtitled: "The
Battle of Mitrovica is Not About Visiting Cousins -
its About the Trepca Mine." (See:
http://www.originalsources.com/OS2-00MQC/2-24-2000.1.html)
Somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 ethnic Albanians
had marched for miles through the snow to attempt to
get across the bridge in to Mitrovica, which was being
guarded by French peacekeepers. The marchers told
gullible Western journalists that "all they wanted"
was to "be able to visit their cousins on the other
side of the river."
Over the weekend the real issue of Kosovo finally
emerged in a press release from KFOR headquarters in
Pristina, Kosovo which was entitled: Mining Industry -
A Great Asset For Kosovo, written by Maj. Kristian
Kahrs.
The e-mail to me and other members of the media said:
"Dear friends of KFOR Online We can now offer an
article from the Stari Trg Mine just east of
Mitrovica. KFOR Polish soldiers gave 500 uniforms and
safety equipment to the mine, and the mine has a great
potential. According to mine director Mr. Burhan
Kavaja, they can exploit 16 million metric tons of
zinc, lead and silver, and there are enough metals to
have work for 20 years. Read more on KFOR Online,
http://kforonline.com."
Only one month ago I asked in my analysis of the
conflict at the Mitrovica bridge "How come none of
these reports are mentioning another minor little fact
concerning Mitrovica - the Trepca Mine? The mine is
owned by the Serbs and a Greek mining firm,
Mytilinaios SA who signed a contract with Serbian
agency of foreign trade in 1998 to invest $519 Billion
in the mine."
Now, all the sudden, KFOR is claiming some kind of
"humanitarian" giveaway program to "help" the mine?
What's going on? In February I quoted from an article
written by Chris Hedges in the New York Times in July
1998 entitled: "Kosovo War's Glittering Prize Rests
Underground" in which he pointed out that the real
issue in Kosovo was control of the mine. In that
article Hedges quotes "Burhan Kavaja, an Albanian, who
was the former director of the Stari Tng mine, who was
dismissed and imprisoned after the first strike.
...This conflict will only end now with our
independence."
And just who is it that KFOR is giving the free
miner's helmets to? Is it the director put in place by
the owner of both the mine, the Belgrade government,
Novak Bjelic, who Hedges interviewed? It wasn't. It
was no other than the Albanian, Burhan Kavaja, the
former director of the Stari Tng Mine who led the
illegal efforts to seize control of the mine by force.
Hedges wrote, "The ethnic Albanian miners, who made up
75 percent of the 23,000 employees, shut down the
mines and organized a 30-mile-long protest march to
Pristina. They carried photos of the late communist
leader, Josip Broz Tito, and Yugoslav flags adorned
with the communist red star." What the miners wanted
was not only independence, but control of the most
valuable piece of real estate in Kosovo - the Trepca
Mines - the only thing in the area that Adolf Hitler
wanted.
"When the Nazis seized this corner of the Balkans in
1941, they handed over the hovels in Pristina, the
provincial capital, to the Italian fascists," Hedges
observed. "But they kept the British-built Trepca
mines for the Reich, shipping out wagonloads of
minerals for weapons and producing the batteries that
powered the U-boats. Submarine batteries, along with
ammunition, are still produced in the Trepca mines.
The mining history reaches back to the Romans, who
hacked out silver from the quarries."
Before their destruction under KFOR "protection"
Kosovo was covered with ancient Serbia Orthodox Church
monasteries and religious sites. Some of those now
destroyed Churches were built in the 13th and 14th
centuries. Kosovo is the cradle of the Serb culture.
Even throughout 500 years of Ottoman Turk occupation,
the Serbs were a majority in Kosovo.
The "real worth of Kosovo", Hedges said, are the mines
- especially the which contains the minerals needed to
wage war - even back in the time of the Romans. "The
fighting between the rebels of the Kosovo Liberation
Army, with their intoxicating visions of an
independent state, and the 50,000 Serbian soldiers and
special policemen. ...There is over 30 percent lead
and zinc in the ore," said Novak Bjelic, the mine's
beefy director. "The war in Kosovo is about the mines,
nothing else. This is Serbia's Kuwait -- the heart of
Kosovo. We export to France, Switzerland, Greece,
Sweden, the Czech Republic, Russia and Belgium. "We
export to a firm in New York, but I would prefer not
to name it. And in addition to all this Kosovo has 17
billion tons of coal reserves. Naturally, the
Albanians want all this for themselves."
The Trepca mining complex "the most valuable piece of
real estate in the Balkans," is worth billions of
dollars. "The Stari Tng mine, with its warehouses, is
ringed with smelting plants, 17 metal treatment sites,
freight yards, railroad lines, a power plant and the
country's largest battery plant.
"In the last three years we have mined 2,538,124 tons
of lead and zinc crude ore," Novak Bjelic, 58, the
Serb director of the mine in July 1998 told Hedges,
"and produced 286,502 tons of concentrated lead and
zinc and 139,789 tons of pure lead, zinc, cadmium,
silver and gold."
The battle for control of that silver and gold, lead,
zinc, and cadminum, began in the late 1980s with a
series of hunger strikes in which the Albanian miners
occupied the mines. The mine protests led to general
strikes throughout Kosovo, making Trepca the nerve
center of the resistance movement. Serbian special
policemen eventually seized the mine, carrying
weakened miners out on stretchers. The Albanians'
drive to seize the mines, declare independence to
create a "greater Albania" of course would switch the
proceeds of the mines from the government of
Yugoslavia to the Albanians under the KLA, which
controls much of the heroin trade in Europe. Milosevic
declared a state of emergency and the ethnic Albanian
miners were replaced with Poles, Czechs and Serbs. In
1998 there were 15,000 mine workers, about 15% of whom
were of Albanian origin.
Less than a year after Hedges wrote that, US Bombers
began to wreak havoc on both Kosovo and Belgrade,
supposedly to "stop" a "genocide" of Albanians. The
bombing raids, under the direction of Bill Clinton,
drove out half the Albanian population and sixty
percent of the Serb population of Kosovo.
After the bombing stopped, thousands of forensic
experts from several countries searched for the "mass
graves" the KLA kept telling the world contained "up
to 100,000" Albanians slaughtered by the Serbs. Only
about 2108 bodies were found, some of them Serbs,
others prisoners in a prison bombed by NATO and NO
proof of ANY genocide.
Throughout the world the word is getting out. We were
lied to. The KLA, which was listed as a terrorist
group by the U.S. State Department in 1998 and known
to Interpol as the major supplier of illegal drugs and
prostitutes in Europe, is now in control of Kosovo,
anarchy reigns, just as it does in Northern Albanian
under the clan warlords, and KFOR has reinstalled the
Albanian manager of the Stari Tng mine who tried to
deliver the mine to the KLA in 1998.
Contacts in Yugoslavia told me, via e-mail, when
Clinton ordered the bombing, that the bombing was
really all about control of Kosovo mineral assets. I
didn't print that in 1999. I couldn't believe at that
time that America would be a party to such a thing.
The KFOR e-mail and their report on the Stari Tng mine
on the Internet is irrefutable proof that the Serbs
were right.
Will Belgrade stand by and do nothing as the Serbs of
Mitrovica are driven out so the Albanians can have
total control over mineral resources the Serbs need to
survive? Thirty-four percent of the coal used to heat
Belgrade comes from the same region of Kosovo. Will
they stand by, with their intact army, and do nothing
as a seizure of assets comparable, in the words of the
Serb director of the mine, to Iraq's seizure of
Kuwait's life blood - their oil wells, takes place?
Will the Russians and the Chinese, who are friends of
the Serbs, allow those assets to be controlled by the
KLA drug dealers as the region deteriorates into
anarchy?
And, will the candidates for the U.S. Presidency
continue to pretend that nothing is happening as
America implements such a glaring piece of
imperialism? Will the next U.S. leader and the
American people really continue to be content with
spending billions of American dollars to shore up the
KLA and its drive to create a Greater Albania and
secure its near monopoly of heroin sales in Europe?
Time will tell.
To comment: mmostert@...
===================================================================
IL MITO DELLA REPRESSIONE ANTIALBANESE
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a38da8bc025fa.htm
The Myth of Albanian Repression in 1990s Kosovo
Foreign Affairs Opinion Keywords: KOSOVO; YUGOSLAVIA; SERBIA; KLA
Source: Columbia University
Published: March 23, 2000 Author: Max Sinclair
Posted on 03/23/2000 13:25:20 PST by Gael
The Myth of Albanian Repression
One by one, the myths about Kosovo have been falling. The notion that
Yugoslavs were engaged in genocide against Albanians was debunked by the
absence of corpses in anything close to the numbers claimed by the NATO
countries as justification for their air assault. The idea that the KLA
was
merely seeking redress of political grievances has died along with the
hundreds of post-"peace" victims of the KLA. And, the romantic fiction
that
the war would lead to a multiethnic paradise was debunked by "Kosova's"
incarnation as a mono-ethnic state. In their anniversary reviews of the
war's commencement, even NATO and its compliant press have recognized
these
truths.
However, one lie remains unrebutted, and is repeated to this day. That
is
the assertion that in 1989, after Slobodan Milosevic "revoked" Kosovo's
autonomy, the Albanian population was fired from jobs and otherwise
discriminated against. Various sources, including the Washington Post,
Human
Rights Watch, and NATO's gauleiter Bernard Kouchner, use the word
"apartheid" to describe the Yugoslav-Albanian relationship. Various news
stories reporting the return of Albanians -- doctors, teachers, miners
-- to
previous places of employment invariably stated, without any
documentation
whatever, that these workers had previously been fired solely because
they
were Albanian.
The truth is otherwise. Albanians were not fired after the modification
(not
revocation) of autonomy because of their ethnicity, as NATO and its
media
acolytes claim. In fact, the modification of autonomy resulted in a
massive
refusal on the part of many Albanians to continue working, particularly
in
the state-owned enterprises that characterize socialist Yugoslavia. They
similarly refused to attend the state schools -- no, they weren't
expelled,
as they claim -- and boycotted the political process by refusing to
exercise
their right to suffrage. For example, the Trepca miners occupied the
mines
in a form of sit-down strike, and subsequently were discharged, not
because
they were Albanian but because they refused to work. This was the same
treatment afforded by Ronald Reagan to the illegally striking air
traffic
controllers.
This self-defeating work boycott was not a campaign of non-violent civil
disobedience. Those Albanians who refused to participate in the boycott
were
the subject of violent reprisals. The KLA's initial list of victims
included
numerous Albanians employed by the Yugoslav federal or Serbian republic
governments. Those in municipal government positions, like Malic Saholi
and
Ramiz Ljeka, or located in isolated rural areas, particularly forestry
workers such as Sadi Morina, Faik Belopolja, Fazil Hassani, and Sejdi
Mujha,
were common targets. The fact that these Albanians were employed by the
state belies the claim of mass firings for ethnic reasons; the fact that
they were killed by the KLA proves that common ethnicity was no bar to
the
KLA's intimidation campaign.
The KLA's victims were not limited to state employees, however.
Albanians
who maintained political loyalty to Yugoslavia, like Zen Durmisi, were
murdered for their political views, as were those such as Ali Raci who
worked at private Yugoslav-owned companies. Even entrepreneurs who
traded
with Yugoslavs were executed after the KLA's ascendancy. As reported by
the
Albanian Daily News, "Kosovo's Secret Deals" (March 3, 2000):
"Throughout
the years of political crisis, Serb middlemen provided their Albanian
business partners with everything from petrol to flour and milk. Their
partnership became very lucrative and close. When war broke out, many
Albanian traders were either killed or forced to flee by the Kosovo
Liberation Army who regarded them as traitors." The bottom line:
cooperating
with Yugoslavs could be fatal. No wonder so many Albanians joined the
job
boycott, when the alternative was death.
In short, the extremist KLA's zeal to establish a minority-free province
led
to withdrawal from civil society, including mass refusal to work, and to
the
violent intimidation of fellow citizens into joining this boycott. If
there
was apartheid in Kosovo, it was self-imposed by the KLA.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------