George Soros' agenda for the Balkans
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NOTA:
In un articolo pubblicato sull'ultimo numero del Financial Times
George Soros *spiega* all'Unione Europea - in vista del summit di
Salonicco - che cosa si deve fare e che cosa non si deve fare per il
futuro dei Balcani. La ricetta di Soros - tutta espressa a forza di
benevoli condizionali tipo: "EU should... could... ought to...",
eccetera - prevede come primo punto l'"indipendenza" del
Kosovo-Metohija e la dissoluzione della fittizia "Unione" di Serbia e
Montenegro.
Il ruolo di Soros nello squartamento della Jugoslavia, attraverso il
finanziamento di gruppi ed iniziative "ad hoc", e' abbastanza noto. Un
portavoce dell'"Open Society Institute" di Soros spiegava alla
belgradese "TV Novosti" il 21 gennaio 1998: "Tra i giornali aiutiamo
NIN, Danas, Nasa Borba, Vreme, Vranjske Novine, Borske Novine [serbi],
Monitor, Vjesnik [montenegrini], Nezavisnu Svetlost, Porodicni krug in
ungherese, Tibiskus in rumeno, Koha Ditore e Zeri in albanese, poi
Radio B-92; allo Studio B abbiamo consegnato l'installazione per la
grafica, poi l'Associazione dei media indipendenti ANEM, il giornale
dei profughi Odgovor... in tutto una 50 - ina di media". Ed era il
1998 - figuriamoci oggi.
Come "astro" della finanza internazionale e dei rispettivi scandali,
Soros si e' reso celebre per una serie di manovre speculative, tra cui
quella del "mercoledi nero" delle borse europee (settembre 1992) che,
oltre a procurargli enormi guadagni, causo' il forzoso sganciamento di
una serie di valute dal sistema dell'ECU. Recentemente questo signore
e' stato condannato in Francia a pagare più di due milioni di euro
perché ritenuto colpevole di insider trading nel 1988, quando seppe
anticipatamente dell'acquisto della banca francese, Société Générale.
L'affare legato alla Société Générale sconvolse la vita politica
francese e fu un segnale preoccupante dei fenomeni di corruzione nel
periodo di governo del presidente Mitterrand (cfr. "il manifesto", 21
Dicembre 2002).
Ciononostante, il signor Soros e' stato visto dalla sinistra europea
post-Ottantanove come una specie di generoso filantropo, portatore di
una visione problematica e progressista di quel turbocapitalismo di
cui lui stesso e' "grande capo". Sperticate lodi alla sua idea
iperliberista di "societa' aperta" ("aperta" innanzitutto ai suoi
capitali) sono venute dagli ambienti movimentisti e libertari. I
rappresentanti delle sue organizzazioni, attive nei paesi "in
transizione" e soprattutto in Serbia, sono stati regolarmente invitati
alle iniziative organizzate da settori delle "ONG" vicine al
centrosinistra e ad alcuni "centri sociali" in Italia.
Italo Slavo
---
George Soros' agenda for the Balkans:
First kill the Serbia-Montenegro "Union"; then let's see.
---
A chance for soft power in the Balkans
Financial Times, 2002-05-23
George Soros
Yet the Balkans are a vital part of Europe. The US has made
clear its intention to diminish its involvement in the region, so
the European Union must take the lead. In the past, the EU has
responded to negative developments; now it must articulate a
positive vision.
Fighting in the Balkans has subsided but future peace is far
from assured. Kosovo remains unresolved; the union between
Serbia and Montenegro is tenuous at best; the Ohrid agreement
between Macedonia's Slavic majority and Albanian minority is
under attack from defeated politicians who are now trying to
divide the country; and the Dayton peace agreement, which
ended the fighting in Bosnia, is far too complicated.
The EU summit on June 21 in Thessaloniki offers an ideal
opportunity to carve out a meaningful agenda for the Balkans.
The summit bridges the presidencies of Greece and Italy, both
of which have a critical interest in the region. Thereafter, the
EU will be too preoccupied with its own constitutional
problems and the accession of 10 new members to have time to
deal with the Balkans in a coherent fashion.
The EU has so far tried to defer the problem of Kosovo by
preserving a non-existent status quo. That was why a new
union between Serbia and Montenegro was imposed. These
policies have retarded recovery. The EU should now spell out
how to resolve the outstanding issues to remove obstacles to
democratic development.
It should endorse eventual independence for Kosovo, subject to
safeguards for Serbian and other minorities. The United
Nations should transfer power to the Kosovars with the clear
aim of preparing Kosovo for independence. The union between
Serbia and Montenegro should remain, but the EU should not
oppose its dissolution when the three-year term expires. Bosnia
and Herzegovina should be encouraged to revise the Dayton
constitution that created a state too expensive and inefficient to
function.
After these modifications, the EU conference should reaffirm
the territorial integrity of all political units in south-east
Europe within existing borders. This would help allay fears -
particularly for Macedonia - that Kosovo independence means
the further fracturing of Balkan states. It would also be helpful
if the EU finally settled the controversy over the name
Macedonia.
The EU will then need to rethink its main policy instruments:
stabilisation and association agreements with individual
countries; a network of bilateral, free-trade agreements; and
financial assistance through the European Commission's Cards
programme. These are working, but should be supplemented.
The stabilisation agreements have helped to create a framework
for co-operation with the EU, but the process has been too slow
to have much impact. An optimistic timescale for EU
membership is 2007 for Croatia, 2010 for Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia and Albania, and perhaps 2015 for Bosnia and
Kosovo. The EU should provide a roadmap for membership.
Otherwise, the countries of the region will lose motivation to
persist with painful but necessary reforms.
The stability pact countries - the five western Balkan states,
Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova - have signed 21 bilateral free
trade agreements. The EU has extended trade preferences to the
five western Balkan countries, but that does not create a free
trade zone within the region because the various bilateral
agreements require different certificates of origin for imported
goods. The EU should take the lead in harmonising customs
procedures and upgrading them to an acceptable level.
The Cards programme was front-loaded and declines until the
EU budget cycle ends in 2006. Future funding is uncertain, and
threatens a serious economic crisis for Bosnia and Kosovo. As
part of its roadmap, the EU should offer new forms of
assistance. The unspent portion of the pre-accession funds for
new members could be redirected to the western Balkans.
Because of their budgetary difficulties, Germany and other
member states are likely to resist these proposals. As a result,
prospects for a coherent Balkan policy at the Thessaloniki
summit could be lost. That would be a pity. The EU ought to
show that it can foster democratic development in south-east
Europe. This would pose an attractive alternative to building
democracy by military force.
The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management and
founder of the Open Society Institute
(source: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/917258/posts )
---
---
NOTA:
In un articolo pubblicato sull'ultimo numero del Financial Times
George Soros *spiega* all'Unione Europea - in vista del summit di
Salonicco - che cosa si deve fare e che cosa non si deve fare per il
futuro dei Balcani. La ricetta di Soros - tutta espressa a forza di
benevoli condizionali tipo: "EU should... could... ought to...",
eccetera - prevede come primo punto l'"indipendenza" del
Kosovo-Metohija e la dissoluzione della fittizia "Unione" di Serbia e
Montenegro.
Il ruolo di Soros nello squartamento della Jugoslavia, attraverso il
finanziamento di gruppi ed iniziative "ad hoc", e' abbastanza noto. Un
portavoce dell'"Open Society Institute" di Soros spiegava alla
belgradese "TV Novosti" il 21 gennaio 1998: "Tra i giornali aiutiamo
NIN, Danas, Nasa Borba, Vreme, Vranjske Novine, Borske Novine [serbi],
Monitor, Vjesnik [montenegrini], Nezavisnu Svetlost, Porodicni krug in
ungherese, Tibiskus in rumeno, Koha Ditore e Zeri in albanese, poi
Radio B-92; allo Studio B abbiamo consegnato l'installazione per la
grafica, poi l'Associazione dei media indipendenti ANEM, il giornale
dei profughi Odgovor... in tutto una 50 - ina di media". Ed era il
1998 - figuriamoci oggi.
Come "astro" della finanza internazionale e dei rispettivi scandali,
Soros si e' reso celebre per una serie di manovre speculative, tra cui
quella del "mercoledi nero" delle borse europee (settembre 1992) che,
oltre a procurargli enormi guadagni, causo' il forzoso sganciamento di
una serie di valute dal sistema dell'ECU. Recentemente questo signore
e' stato condannato in Francia a pagare più di due milioni di euro
perché ritenuto colpevole di insider trading nel 1988, quando seppe
anticipatamente dell'acquisto della banca francese, Société Générale.
L'affare legato alla Société Générale sconvolse la vita politica
francese e fu un segnale preoccupante dei fenomeni di corruzione nel
periodo di governo del presidente Mitterrand (cfr. "il manifesto", 21
Dicembre 2002).
Ciononostante, il signor Soros e' stato visto dalla sinistra europea
post-Ottantanove come una specie di generoso filantropo, portatore di
una visione problematica e progressista di quel turbocapitalismo di
cui lui stesso e' "grande capo". Sperticate lodi alla sua idea
iperliberista di "societa' aperta" ("aperta" innanzitutto ai suoi
capitali) sono venute dagli ambienti movimentisti e libertari. I
rappresentanti delle sue organizzazioni, attive nei paesi "in
transizione" e soprattutto in Serbia, sono stati regolarmente invitati
alle iniziative organizzate da settori delle "ONG" vicine al
centrosinistra e ad alcuni "centri sociali" in Italia.
Italo Slavo
---
George Soros' agenda for the Balkans:
First kill the Serbia-Montenegro "Union"; then let's see.
---
A chance for soft power in the Balkans
Financial Times, 2002-05-23
George Soros
Yet the Balkans are a vital part of Europe. The US has made
clear its intention to diminish its involvement in the region, so
the European Union must take the lead. In the past, the EU has
responded to negative developments; now it must articulate a
positive vision.
Fighting in the Balkans has subsided but future peace is far
from assured. Kosovo remains unresolved; the union between
Serbia and Montenegro is tenuous at best; the Ohrid agreement
between Macedonia's Slavic majority and Albanian minority is
under attack from defeated politicians who are now trying to
divide the country; and the Dayton peace agreement, which
ended the fighting in Bosnia, is far too complicated.
The EU summit on June 21 in Thessaloniki offers an ideal
opportunity to carve out a meaningful agenda for the Balkans.
The summit bridges the presidencies of Greece and Italy, both
of which have a critical interest in the region. Thereafter, the
EU will be too preoccupied with its own constitutional
problems and the accession of 10 new members to have time to
deal with the Balkans in a coherent fashion.
The EU has so far tried to defer the problem of Kosovo by
preserving a non-existent status quo. That was why a new
union between Serbia and Montenegro was imposed. These
policies have retarded recovery. The EU should now spell out
how to resolve the outstanding issues to remove obstacles to
democratic development.
It should endorse eventual independence for Kosovo, subject to
safeguards for Serbian and other minorities. The United
Nations should transfer power to the Kosovars with the clear
aim of preparing Kosovo for independence. The union between
Serbia and Montenegro should remain, but the EU should not
oppose its dissolution when the three-year term expires. Bosnia
and Herzegovina should be encouraged to revise the Dayton
constitution that created a state too expensive and inefficient to
function.
After these modifications, the EU conference should reaffirm
the territorial integrity of all political units in south-east
Europe within existing borders. This would help allay fears -
particularly for Macedonia - that Kosovo independence means
the further fracturing of Balkan states. It would also be helpful
if the EU finally settled the controversy over the name
Macedonia.
The EU will then need to rethink its main policy instruments:
stabilisation and association agreements with individual
countries; a network of bilateral, free-trade agreements; and
financial assistance through the European Commission's Cards
programme. These are working, but should be supplemented.
The stabilisation agreements have helped to create a framework
for co-operation with the EU, but the process has been too slow
to have much impact. An optimistic timescale for EU
membership is 2007 for Croatia, 2010 for Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia and Albania, and perhaps 2015 for Bosnia and
Kosovo. The EU should provide a roadmap for membership.
Otherwise, the countries of the region will lose motivation to
persist with painful but necessary reforms.
The stability pact countries - the five western Balkan states,
Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova - have signed 21 bilateral free
trade agreements. The EU has extended trade preferences to the
five western Balkan countries, but that does not create a free
trade zone within the region because the various bilateral
agreements require different certificates of origin for imported
goods. The EU should take the lead in harmonising customs
procedures and upgrading them to an acceptable level.
The Cards programme was front-loaded and declines until the
EU budget cycle ends in 2006. Future funding is uncertain, and
threatens a serious economic crisis for Bosnia and Kosovo. As
part of its roadmap, the EU should offer new forms of
assistance. The unspent portion of the pre-accession funds for
new members could be redirected to the western Balkans.
Because of their budgetary difficulties, Germany and other
member states are likely to resist these proposals. As a result,
prospects for a coherent Balkan policy at the Thessaloniki
summit could be lost. That would be a pity. The EU ought to
show that it can foster democratic development in south-east
Europe. This would pose an attractive alternative to building
democracy by military force.
The writer is chairman of Soros Fund Management and
founder of the Open Society Institute
(source: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/917258/posts )
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