Il terrorismo "buono" (english / italiano)
1: MUJAHEDDIN A ZENICA E DINTORNI
A. 7th Bosnian Muslim Brigade, based in Zenica - the international
Islamic mercenary force known as the mujahedeen
+ interesting LINKS
B. Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists (Los
Angeles Times)
NOTA:
Sul quotidiano Vecernji List di Zagabria del 3/8/2003 e' scritto che i
due attentatori che con il Boeing si sono schiantati contro il
Pentagono l'11 Settembre, nel 1995 combattevano in Bosnia-Erzegovina. I
loro nomi sarebbero Khalid Al-Mihdhar e Nawaf Al-Hasmir.
Non sappiamo se questi due personaggi si siano veramente schiantati sul
Pentagono. Quello che invece e' assodato e' che militanti islamisti di
svariata provenienza hanno combattuto in Bosnia, al fianco di
Izetbegovic, Clinton ed Adriano Sofri, come e' ben spiegato nei due
articoli che seguono. (IS)
=== A ===
http://www.balkanpeace.org/temp/tmp13.html
7th Bosnian Muslim Brigade, based in Zenica - the international Islamic
mercenary force known as the mujahedeen
(photo)
Alija Izetbegovic with members of 7th Brigade
"... The first and foremost of such conclusions is surely the one on
the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be no
peace or coexistence between the "Islamic faith" and non- Islamic
societies and political institutions. ... Islam clearly excludes the
right and possibility of activity of any strange ideology on its own
turf. Therefore, there is no question of any laicistic principles, and
the state should be an expression and should support the moral concepts
of the religion. ..." page 22 "The Islamic Declaration" book ("Islamska
deklaracija"), written by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian Muslim leader.
In preparing the ground for the conflicts between Bosnian Cristians
(Croats and Serbs) and Bosnian Muslims, residents of different Arab
countries who in the B&H had recognized the elements and challenge of
“a holy war” - jihad. Coming from different Arab countries, most of
them were from Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Afghanistan, and
bringing with them experience from a war from some of the Islamic
trouble spots.
Mujahedin, or «holy warriors», is a generic term for Muslim volunteers
fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Many Mujahedin originate from Muslim
countries outside the former Yugoslavia. It was reported that the
Mujahedin began arriving in BiH as early as June 1992. (Tom Post & Joel
Brand, «Help from the Holy Warriors», Newsweek, 5 October 1992, at 52).
Reports on the number of Mujahedin forces operating in BiH vary, but it
is unlikely that the Mujahedin forces have made a significant military
contribution to the BiH Government's war effort (Christopher Lockwood,
«Muslim Nations Offer Troops», Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1993, at 14.
According to Lockwood, Muslim nations depended on Western logistical
support to deliver troops to BiH. He concludes that the same logistical
troubles which kept the Muslim troops promised in July of 1993 from
joining UN forces in the UN declared «safe havens» also limited the
number of Muslim volunteers in the BiH armed forces. He states that the
number of Mujahedin in BiH never exceeded three or four hundred. See
also Mohamed Sid-Ahmad, «Muslim World Between Two Fires», War Report,
January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 63744. However, the Belgrade Daily,
Vecernje Novosti, reported that as many as 30,000 Mujahedin were
operating in BiH. «Other Reports in Brief: Muslims from Abroad Settling
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade Daily Claims», BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts, 19 September 1992. )
The Mujahedin forces came from several Muslim states and many of them
were veterans of the Afghan war. (Andrew Hogg, «Arabs Join in Bosnia
Battle», Sunday Times, 30 August 1992)
Reports submitted to the Commission of Experts alleged that the
Mujahedin have been responsible for the mutilation and killing of
civilians, rape, looting, the destruction of property, and the
expulsion of non-Muslim populations. The deputy commander of the BiH
Army, Colonel Stjepan Siber, has said, «it was a mistake to let them
[the Mujahedin] here . . . They commit most of the atrocities and work
against the interests of the Muslim people. They have been killing,
looting and stealing.» Andrew Hogg, «Terror Trail of the Mujahedin»,
Sunday Times, 27 June 1993.
Several reports indicate that the Mujahedin were placed under the
command of the BiH Army.(See «Some 400 Mujahedin Volunteers Fighting
with Bosnian Muslims», Agence France Presse, 22 September 1992; Andrew
Hogg, «Arabs Join in Bosnia Battle», Sunday Times, 30 August 1992; see
also Charles McLoed, ECMM, «Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in Vitez,
Busovaca and Zenica», April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20178- 20546, at
20207; Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4 October
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435; US Department of State,
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62648, 62724, 62730, and 62756)
The Mujahedin forces were closely associated with the 5th Corps, the
6th and 7th Zenica Brigades, the 7th Travnik Brigade, and the 45th
Muslim Brigade which belongs to the 6th Corps in Konjic of the Army of
BiH (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at
62648; see also Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4
October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435; «Continuing Clashes
in Northwestern Enclave Reported from Both Sides», BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts, 14 December 1993.)
They also allegedly fought alongside the Muslim Police, the Krajiska
Brigade from Travnik, units of Kosovo Muslims, Albanian soldiers, and
paramilitary groups such as the «Green Legion» and the «Black
Swans».(Charles McLoed, ECMM, Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in Vitez,
Busovaca and Zenica, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20178-20546, at 20207;
Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4 October 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435; US Department of State, 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62648, 62724, 62730, and 62756.)
Reports also indicate that the Mujahedin had the support of President
Izetbegovic and his government. *57 This was demonstrated in the Bihac
pocket, where the Mujahedin joined BiH forces loyal to Izetbegovic.
Together, these forces battled separatist forces who entered into a
separate peace treaty with Bosnian Serbs («Continuing Clashes in
Northwestern Enclave Reported form Both Sides», BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts, 14 December 1993)
In Zenica, between 31 August and 2 September 1992, 250 Mujahedin troops
allegedly come to BiH from Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran. These
troops worked alongside the Green Legion and HOS paramilitary groups
stationed in Zenica. The Mujahedin allegedly also operated a camp at
Arnauti.(Charles McLeod, ECMM, Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in
Vitez, Buscovaca and Zenica, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29043-29131, at
29064; Biljaja Plavsic, Republic of Serbia Presidency, To Serbs All
Over the World, 30 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48072- 48093, at
48081)
It was reported that a unit of the Mujahedin, called the «Guerilla»,
participated in the 16 April 1993 attack on Vitez and attempted to
exchange 10 HVO hostages for foreign prisoners held in HVO prisons. (US
Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62629; see
also Charles McLeod, ECMM, Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in Vitez,
Busovaca and Zenica, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29043-29131, at 29072
(attack on Vitez).
The Croatian Ministry of Defence is reported to have provided
information about an event occurring in June 1993 -- a joint
BiH/Mujahedin unit reportedly attacked Travnik, allegedly forcing 4,000
Croatian civilians and military personnel out of the town. (US
Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62650. Media
reports however claim that Croats left Travnik voluntarily. The
incident was investigated by an organization, which reported that the
forceful eviction did not take place)
The Mujahedin allegedly fought alongside the 6th Muslim Brigade from
Zenica and the Krajiska Brigade from Travnik. Witnesses stated that
they saw Mujahedin operating in small patrols ahead of the approaching
BiH troops.
According to HVO intelligence, Mujahedin forces arrived in Travnik
sometime before June 1993 and came from Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Iran. The Mujahedin trained at a camp at Mehurici, where they were
allegedly financed and equipped by a man named Abdulah, the owner of
the «Palma» video store in Travnik. Once in town, the Mujahedin were
linked to the Seventh Brigade of the BiH Army, and were reportedly
assembled into units of 10 to 15 men, and moved about on regular
patrols. The Mujahedin created tension in Travnik in the days prior to
the attack on 3 June. One witness stated that the Mujahedin directed
their actions towards the HVO personnel in town. They allegedly
demonstrated, shouted slogans and fired their rifles in the air.
Mujahedin allegedly participated in the attack on Maljine in Novi
Travnik on 8 June 1993, killing 20 to 30 HVO members and transporting
Croatian women and children to the training centre at
Mehurici.(Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 1, 9 August
1993)
In Konjic, the Mujahedin were part of a 100 member force stationed at
Liscioi and led by Haso Hakalovic. The unit was assembled in February
1993 and included some Kosovo Muslims and members of the Black Swans
from the Igman mountain region. (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI
Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62756)
Allegedly, Mujahedin troops killed and expelled villagers, and looted
and burned homes, when they moved against the Jablanica- Konjic area.
The Mujahedin troops and members of the Black Swans reportedly
conducted occasional raids without members of BiH forces. (at IHRLI
Doc. No. 62752 and 62756. The village of Vrci was attacked on 25 May,
and the village of Radesine was attacked on 10 June. See also Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, 17
November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 52399-52435, at 52405 (alleging that the
Mujahedin were involved in attacks at Kopjari on 21 October, Doljani on
27 and 28 June, and Maljane on 8 June). UN Special Rapporteur
Mazowiecki claims that corpses of Mujahedin victims displayed evidence
of protracted cruelty and mutilation. )
Reportedly, the Mujahedin volunteers arrived in Konjic in small groups.
It was reported that they were from Afghanistan and that they claimed
to be students. They were allegedly armed with Hekleri automatic
weapons and former JNA equipment. Some Mujahedin were reportedly former
students with no military experience.
Mujahedin forces were present in Mostar since early June 1993. They
were reportedly stationed in the Santica neighbourhood on the
Muslim/HVO front, where they manned bunkers, usually in groups of six
or seven, armed with 7.62 millimetre semi-automatic weapons,
machine-guns, and Zolja anti-tank weapons. They were billeted in a
building they shared with the Muslim military police on the east bank
of the Neretva River. The Mujahedin forces apparently left Mostar on 15
August. (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at
62742 and 62677. For more details on the location of the Neretva living
quarters, see Id. at 62739)
FRY reported that the Mujahedin began operations near Teslic in July
and August of 1992. Troops from Saudi Arabia allegedly killed three
Serbian Territorial Defence members and placed the victims' severed
heads on poles near the «Tesanj turret». (Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Second Report Submitted to the Commission of Experts, 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 28401-29019, at 28533)
Beheadings of Serbs by Mujahedin forces have also been reported in
other areas.
The Mujahedin were also alleged to be part of the forces that invaded
the village of Trusina near Foca on 15 April 1993. According to the
report, attackers wore white ribbons on their arms and fought beside
Albanian Muslim troops. Twenty-two civilians reportedly died in the
attack. (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at
62648; Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4 October
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435)
The Mujahedin allegedly performed crude circumcisions upon Serbian
police forces, who were later treated by an American surgeon at the
Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo. (Letter dated 7 December 1992 from the
Deputy Representative of the US to U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/24918, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3160-3177, at 3173; Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Second Report Submitted to the Commission of
Experts, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28401-29019, at 28566)
(photo)
This photograph was seized from Saudi Arabian fighters captured in Crni
Vrh near Teslic, Bosnia. A Muslim solder displays the severed head of
Blagoje Blagojevic, a Serb from the village of Jasenovo near Teslic.
(photo)
The severed heads of three Serbs (identified as Blagoje Blagojevic,
Nenad Petkovic, and Brana Djuric) beheaded by Muslim fighters. This
picture was seized from Saudi Arabian solders captured near Teslic in
Bosnia.
LINKS:
7th Brigade, loyal Islamic force
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/timbeat4.htm
Director of the U.S. Congress' Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional warfare: "Some Call It Peace"
http://members.tripod.com/Balkania/resources/geostrategy/
bodansky_peace/bp_part1.html
7th Muslim "Liberation" Brigade
http://www.wargamer.com/sp/military/bih/armija/foreign.asp
Washington Post - Iranians Form Terror Force in Bosnia
http://impact.users.netlink.co.uk/namir/sreport.htm
Bosnia losing the pluralistic character
http://www.bosnet.org/archive/bosnet.w3archive/9501/msg00252.html
No future for Muslims in Europe unless they have a state of their own
http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/bosnia_/mus.txt
US Senate Document; Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn
Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base
http://www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/1997/iran.htm
A BOSNIAN VILLAGE'S TERRORIST
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Aktuelno/BIVSE/BiH/wpost11032000_e.html
The Second Coming of Alija Izetbegovic
http://www.balkanpeace.org/our/our05.shtml
Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Part I-Buyer Beware
http://reagan.com/HotTopics.main/HotMike/document-12.11.2000.3.html
Army suspects munitions manufactured for Bosnian army
http://archive.nandotimes.com/newsroom/nt/0204yugfff.html
Similarity - The 13th Waffen-Gebirgs Division der SS Handschar
http://www.wssob.com/013divhnd.html
Jihad - the "Holly War"
http://blaskic.croat.net/jihad.htm
=== B ===
The Los Angeles Times
October 7, 2001
Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists
By CRAIG PYES, JOSH MEYER and WILLIAM C. REMPEL , Times Staff Writers
ZENICA, Bosnia-Herzegovina -- Hundreds of foreign Islamic extremists
who became Bosnian citizens after battling Serbian and Croatian forces
present a potential terrorist threat to Europe and the United States,
according to a classified U.S. State Department report and interviews
with international military and intelligence sources.
The extremists include hard-core terrorists, some with ties to Osama
bin Laden, protected by militant elements of the former Sarajevo
government. Bosnia-Herzegovina is "a staging area and safe haven" for
terrorists, said a former senior State Department official.
The secret report, prepared late last year for the Clinton
administration, warned of problem passport-holders in Bosnia in numbers
that "shocked everyone," the former official said. The White House
leaned on Bosnia and its then-president, Alija Izetbegovic, to do
something about the matter, "but nothing happened," he said.
Although no evidence connects any Bosnian group to the suicide
hijacking attacks of Sept. 11 blamed on Bin Laden, U.S. and European
officials are increasingly concerned about the scope and reach of Bin
Laden networks in the West and the proximity of Bosnia-based terrorists
to the heart of Europe.
A number of the extremists "would travel with impunity and conduct,
plan and stage terrorist acts with impunity while hiding behind their
Bosnian passports," the former official said.
In several instances, terrorists with links to Bosnia have launched
actions against Western targets:
* An Algerian with Bosnian citizenship, described by a U.S. official as
"a junior Osama bin Laden," tried to help smuggle explosives in 1998 to
an Egyptian terrorist group plotting to destroy U.S. military
installations in Germany. The shipment included military C-4 plastic
explosives and blasting caps, the former U.S. official said. The CIA
intercepted the shipment, foiling the attack.
* Another North African with Bosnian citizenship belonged to a
terrorist cell in Montreal that conspired in the failed millennium plot
to bomb Los Angeles International Airport.
* One of Bin Laden's top lieutenants--a Palestinian linked to major
terrorist plots in Jordan, France and the United States--had operatives
in Bosnia and was issued a Bosnian passport, according to U.S.
officials.
After the foiled plot against American bases in Germany, the U.S.
suspended without public explanation a military aid program to Bosnia
in 1999 in an attempt to force the deportation of the Algerian leader
of the group, Abdelkader Mokhtari, also known as Abu el Maali.
Finally, after the U.S. went a step further and threatened to stop all
economic aid, Izetbegovic agreed to deport El Maali. But the Algerian
was back in Bosnia within a year. Two months ago, he was reported to be
moving in and out of the country freely. He is now thought to be in
Afghanistan with the leadership of Bin Laden's Al Qaeda group,
according to a senior official for the NATO-led peacekeeping force,
SFOR, in Bosnia.
President Clinton's secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, personally
appealed to Izetbegovic to oust suspected terrorists or rescind their
Bosnian passports.
The effort by top State Department aides continued through the last
days of the administration. "It wasn't just one meeting, it was 10 to
12, with orders directly from the White House," said a former State
Department official.
Izetbegovic declined the appeals, several sources said, apparently out
of loyalty to the fighters who had come to his country's rescue. The
president argued that many had married Bosnian women, had taken up
farming and were legal citizens.
"The point we kept making to Izetbegovic was that if the day comes we
find out that these people are connected to some terrible terrorist
incident, that's the day the entire U.S.-Bosnia relationship will
change from friends to adversaries," the former State Department
official said.
Senior U.S. and SFOR officials believe that some hard-line members of
Izetbegovic's political party gave direct support, through their
control of the Foreign Ministry and local passport operations, to
foreign Islamic extremists with ties to Bin Laden.
Although Izetbegovic stepped down in October 2000, many hard-liners
remain in Bosnia's bureaucracy, and they are suspected of operating
their own rogue intelligence service that protects Islamic extremists,
military and intelligence sources said.
Last week, Bosnia's new interior minister, citing "trustworthy
intelligence sources," said scores of Bin Laden associates may be
trying to flee Afghanistan ahead of anticipated U.S. military reprisals
for the Sept. 11 attacks, seeking refuge among militant sympathizers in
Bosnia. The minister, Mohammed Besic, vowed to intercept any who try to
enter the country.
U.S. and SFOR officials acknowledge that the new coalition government
in Sarajevo has become much more responsive to fighting terrorism. A
senior State Department official lauded Sarajevo this year for "working
with the international community" in trying to clamp down on suspected
terrorists.
Since Sept. 11, Bosnia has launched an audit of passports and mounted a
more intensive crackdown on naturalized citizens who are wanted by
foreign law enforcement agencies. After years of inaction, several
international fugitives have been arrested this year and extradited.
Western Interests in Balkans May Be at Risk
Bosnia has a large Muslim population, most of whom do not practice a
strict form of Islam.
A senior State Department official cautioned that "a lot of people's
interests are served by hyping the terrorism problem in the Balkans,"
referring to anti-Muslim sentiment among other ethnic groups there.
But, he added, "that is not to say there are not bad people who would
exploit the weaknesses in the government and the lax security and use
[Bosnia] as a place to hide."
To date, Western interests in the Balkans have not been terrorist
targets. However, a senior peacekeeping official in Bosnia said local
police report that "there are plans to attack the Western interests
here in Bosnia after any future retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan. We
don't have anything to confirm it."
Bosnia has traditionally served as "an R&R [rest and recreation]
destination" for members of Bin Laden's organization and other
extremists, according to U.S. officials and the peacekeeping force.
"They come to Bosnia to chill out, because so many other places are too
hot for them," said a former State Department official active in
counter-terrorism.
They also use Bosnian passports to travel worldwide without drawing the
kind of scrutiny that those who hold Middle Eastern or North African
documents might attract, officials said. Bosnian passports are
particularly valuable for ease of travel to other Muslim countries
where no visa requirement is imposed on Bosnians.
Under the Izetbegovic government, the immigration system was so
unregulated that Bin Laden allies "would get boxes of blank passports
and just print them up themselves," the former State Department
official said.
A military official said that "for the right amount of money, you can
get a Bosnian passport even though it's the first time you've stepped
foot into Bosnia."
Among those who Western intelligence sources say was granted Bosnian
citizenship and passports was Abu Zubeida, one of Bin Laden's top
lieutenants. Zubeida, a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip, was in charge
of contacts with other Islamic terrorist networks and controlled
admissions to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. He arranged
training for unsuccessful millennium bomb plots in Canada and Jordan
and a recently foiled suicide attack on the U.S. Embassy in Paris,
according to court records and investigative reports.
Zubeida also asked LAX bomb plot figure Ahmed Ressam to get blank
Canadian passports that would allow other terrorists to infiltrate the
United States, according to testimony from Ressam, who was convicted in
the bomb plot and is cooperating with investigators.
Another terrorist with Bosnian credentials is Karim Said Atmani, a
Moroccan who was Ressam's roommate in Montreal and who was in the group
that plotted to bomb LAX, according to testimony. The Bosnian
government arrested him in April, and Atmani was extradited to France,
where he awaits sentencing on terrorism charges.
Beginning in 1992, as many as 4,000 volunteers from throughout North
Africa, the Middle East and Europe came to Bosnia to fight Serbian and
Croatian nationalists on behalf of fellow Muslims. They are known as
the moujahedeen. A military analyst called them "pretty good fighters
and certainly ruthless."
"I think the Muslims wouldn't have survived without this" help, Richard
Holbrooke, the United States' former chief Balkans peace negotiator,
said in a recent interview. At the time, U.N. peacekeepers were proving
ineffective at protecting Bosnian civilians, and an arms embargo
diminished Bosnia's fighting capabilities.
But Holbrooke called the arrival of the moujahedeen "a pact with the
devil" from which Bosnia still is recovering.
The foreign moujahedeen units were disbanded and required to leave the
Balkans under the terms of the 1995 Dayton, Ohio, peace accord. But
many stayed--about 400, according to official Bosnian estimates.
Although the State Department report suggested that the number could be
higher, a senior SFOR official said allied military intelligence
estimated that no more than 200 foreign-born militants actually live in
Bosnia, of which closer to 30 represent a hard-core group with direct
links to terrorism.
"These are the bad guys--the ones you have to worry about," the
official said.
But he also said that "hundreds of other" Islamic extremists with and
without Bosnian passports "come in and out" and that Bosnia remains a
center for Al Qaeda recruiting and logistics support.
Bin Laden Reportedly Financed Recruits
A U.S. counter-terrorism official confirmed that "several hundred"
former moujahedeen remain in Bosnia. "Are they a threat? Absolutely.
Are we all over them? Absolutely," he said.
The fighters were organized as an all-moujahedeen unit called El
Moujahed. It was headquartered in Zenica in an abandoned hillside
factory, a compound with a hospital and prayer hall.
Bin Laden financed small convoys of recruits from the Arab world
through his businesses in Sudan, according to Mideast intelligence
reports. Other support and recruits for El Moujahed came, at least in
part, through Islamic organizations in Milan, Italy, and Istanbul,
Turkey, that European investigators later linked to trafficking in
passports and weapons for terrorists.
A series of national security and criminal investigations across Europe
have since identified the El Moujahed unit in court filings as the
"common cradle" from which an international terrorist network grew and
ultimately stretched from the Middle East to Canada.
Abu el Maali, its leader during the Bosnian war, remains an enigmatic
figure, charismatic and popular within the moujahedeen but barely known
outside. He briefly appeared in a propaganda video on El Moujahed
during the war, but his face was digitally removed before distribution.
French court documents say El Maali now is the leader of terrorist
cells in Bosnia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Court testimony, confidential police records and interviews with
European intelligence officials show how El Maali marshaled recruits
from the West and Muslim countries to assemble the infrastructure of
what would become a terrorist organization.
Two French converts to Islam, both in their mid-20s, were among the
early volunteers for El Maali's ranks in the Bosnian war. Christophe
Caze, a medical school dropout, and Lionel Dumont joined El Moujahed to
provide humanitarian services. But once assigned to the moujahedeen
unit in Zenica, they immediately "plunged into violence," an associate
told French police.
A French judicial official said their eventual passage to terrorism was
strongly influenced by El Maali, with whom they became close. El Maali
"exerted a lot of influence on the fighters . . . which led them to
commit these violent actions under the cover of Islam," the magistrate
said.
The converts emerged as leaders, rendering impassioned exhortations to
younger volunteers to defend Islam "by all means," according to court
records. They also began setting up a clandestine network in France,
creating multiple identities, encoding phone lists and recruiting
followers they could call into action later. Court records say that
Caze, working as a medic, recruited future terrorists among the wounded
he treated.
At the war's end, U.S. officials focused on state-sponsored terrorism
and worried about getting Iranian fighters back to Iran. Less clear
were the implications of loosely allied extremist groups and
individuals.
Looking back, peace negotiator Holbrooke blamed imprecise and "sloppy
intelligence" for failing to distinguish which Muslim groups posed a
threat to the United States. It turned out that Iranian fighters went
home. Many of El Maali's trained warriors did not.
Spasm of Violence Hits Northern France
In Bosnia, most of the violence stopped with the peace accord in 1995.
But in January 1996, it broke out again--on the streets of northern
France.
A puzzling crime wave swept the area around Roubaix, a gritty,
Muslim-majority town near the Belgian border. Small groups of men began
holding up stores and drivers. They brandished machine guns and wore
hoods and carnival masks. Two people were killed.
On March 28, just before a Group of 7 summit of leading industrial
nations that would bring top ministers to Lille, police discovered a
stolen car abandoned in front of the police station. It was parked
askew. And it contained a bomb packed into three gas cylinders rigged
to devastate everything within 600 feet. It was disarmed.
The next night, a special tactical squad surrounded a house at 59 Rue
Henri Carette in Roubaix that had been linked to the booby-trapped car.
Police fired thousands of rounds into the building. The house erupted
in flames because of munitions inside, police said later. Four charred
bodies were recovered.
Two men fled the barrage and inferno. At a police roadblock just inside
Belgium, another furious gun battle erupted. One of the men was killed,
and his accomplice was wounded.
In the getaway car, police found rocket launchers, automatic weapons,
large amounts of ammunition and grenades. They also recovered an
electronic organizer containing coded telephone contacts, nearly a
dozen of them in Bosnia. The dead ringleader was identified as
Christophe Caze, the young medic who went to fight in Bosnia.
French authorities, confused about the motives for the spasm of gang
violence, considered it a new phenomenon, calling it "gangster
terrorism." Their investigation uncovered what may have been the first
terrorism cell exported from Bosnia.
After an investigation of the surviving associate, Caze's electronic
organizer and other evidence recovered by French police, the robbery
gang was identified as nine militants who attended a local mosque. Most
of them had undergone military training at the El Moujahed compound in
Bosnia.
The armed robberies were a radical form of fund-raising by Caze and his
associates to benefit their "Muslim brothers in Algeria." Their
high-powered weapons were smuggled home from the Bosnian war.
Caze's organizer was described by one official as "the address book of
the professional terrorist." It contained phone contacts in England,
Italy, France and Canada, as well as direct lines to El Maali's Zenica
headquarters. It led French authorities to trace travels and phone
records and to set up electronic surveillance.
French counter-terrorism officials soon realized they had stumbled upon
more than a band of gangsters. Five years before the sophisticated
terrorist assault on the U.S., the French were starting to uncover
loosely linked violent networks spreading into several countries, all
tied together by a common thread: Bosnia.
One of the phone numbers in the dead terrorist's organizer led to a
suspect in Canada: Fateh Kamel, 41, who ran a small trinkets shop in
Montreal.
French authorities say Canada rejected their initial request to
investigate Kamel, calling the dapper Algerian "just a businessman."
But Kamel also was a confidant of El Maali. He spoke frequently to the
Bosnia moujahedeen chief over his wife's cell phone. Kamel had gone to
Bosnia early in the war, suffered a shrapnel wound in one leg and been
treated at the El Moujahed hospital by Caze, the young medic.
Kamel first came to the attention of European intelligence officials in
1994, when Italian agents tracking suspected terrorists stumbled upon
him recruiting fighters in Milan for El Maali's brigade.
After the Dayton accord, French police say, Kamel became deeply
involved in terrorist logistics. He was "the principal activist of an
international network determined to plan assassinations and to procure
arms and passports for terrorist acts all over the world," according to
a French court document.
In 1996, an Italian surveillance team recorded Kamel discussing a
terrorist attack and taped him declaring: "I do not fear death . . .
because the jihad is the jihad, and to kill is easy for me."
During the same period, Kamel assisted other North African extremists
relocating to Canada, exploiting the country's lax immigration laws and
Quebec's eagerness for French-speaking immigrants such as Algerians.
According to French investigators, Kamel was the leader of a terrorist
cell in Montreal. Other members included Ressam, Atmani and a third
roommate, Mustafa Labsi.
Like Kamel, Atmani had served in Bosnia and was close to El Maali. A
U.S. law enforcement official described Atmani as a "crazy warrior with
a nose so broken and twisted that he could sniff around corners."
Later, authorities believe, the three roommates went to Afghanistan
together to train for a terrorist attack on the United States. They
returned to the West after learning that their target would be Los
Angeles International Airport. The conspiracy was interrupted when
Atmani was deported from Canada to Bosnia.
When Ressam, traveling alone, was captured at the border with
explosives in his rental car, U.S. officials tried to track down his
former roommate Atmani. Authorities had information that he was
traveling between Sarajevo and Istanbul, but Bosnian officials denied
even that Atmani had been deported there. Investigators later learned
that Atmani had been issued a new Bosnian passport six months earlier.
Atmani was part of the hard-core terrorist group noted in the secret
State Department report. He remained beyond the reach of international
extradition until this year, when he was arrested and turned over to
France by Bosnia's new coalition government. He awaits sentencing on
terrorism charges.
Kamel, the alleged ringleader of the group, was arrested in Jordan and
was extradited to France, where he is in prison on a terrorism
conviction. Ressam and Labsi also have been jailed. All of the members
of the former Montreal cell have been convicted of being operatives in
a terrorist network that originated in Bosnia.
James Steinberg, deputy national security advisor in the Clinton
administration, said that although the U.S. works closely with
countries in the Balkans to deal with "the problem of these cells," the
very nature of secret terrorist organizations confounds those efforts.
"It's one thing to [arrest] the people you know [are terrorists], but
then the others . . . bury themselves even deeper," he said.
1: MUJAHEDDIN A ZENICA E DINTORNI
A. 7th Bosnian Muslim Brigade, based in Zenica - the international
Islamic mercenary force known as the mujahedeen
+ interesting LINKS
B. Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists (Los
Angeles Times)
NOTA:
Sul quotidiano Vecernji List di Zagabria del 3/8/2003 e' scritto che i
due attentatori che con il Boeing si sono schiantati contro il
Pentagono l'11 Settembre, nel 1995 combattevano in Bosnia-Erzegovina. I
loro nomi sarebbero Khalid Al-Mihdhar e Nawaf Al-Hasmir.
Non sappiamo se questi due personaggi si siano veramente schiantati sul
Pentagono. Quello che invece e' assodato e' che militanti islamisti di
svariata provenienza hanno combattuto in Bosnia, al fianco di
Izetbegovic, Clinton ed Adriano Sofri, come e' ben spiegato nei due
articoli che seguono. (IS)
=== A ===
http://www.balkanpeace.org/temp/tmp13.html
7th Bosnian Muslim Brigade, based in Zenica - the international Islamic
mercenary force known as the mujahedeen
(photo)
Alija Izetbegovic with members of 7th Brigade
"... The first and foremost of such conclusions is surely the one on
the incompatibility of Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be no
peace or coexistence between the "Islamic faith" and non- Islamic
societies and political institutions. ... Islam clearly excludes the
right and possibility of activity of any strange ideology on its own
turf. Therefore, there is no question of any laicistic principles, and
the state should be an expression and should support the moral concepts
of the religion. ..." page 22 "The Islamic Declaration" book ("Islamska
deklaracija"), written by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnian Muslim leader.
In preparing the ground for the conflicts between Bosnian Cristians
(Croats and Serbs) and Bosnian Muslims, residents of different Arab
countries who in the B&H had recognized the elements and challenge of
“a holy war” - jihad. Coming from different Arab countries, most of
them were from Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Afghanistan, and
bringing with them experience from a war from some of the Islamic
trouble spots.
Mujahedin, or «holy warriors», is a generic term for Muslim volunteers
fighting in the former Yugoslavia. Many Mujahedin originate from Muslim
countries outside the former Yugoslavia. It was reported that the
Mujahedin began arriving in BiH as early as June 1992. (Tom Post & Joel
Brand, «Help from the Holy Warriors», Newsweek, 5 October 1992, at 52).
Reports on the number of Mujahedin forces operating in BiH vary, but it
is unlikely that the Mujahedin forces have made a significant military
contribution to the BiH Government's war effort (Christopher Lockwood,
«Muslim Nations Offer Troops», Daily Telegraph, 14 July 1993, at 14.
According to Lockwood, Muslim nations depended on Western logistical
support to deliver troops to BiH. He concludes that the same logistical
troubles which kept the Muslim troops promised in July of 1993 from
joining UN forces in the UN declared «safe havens» also limited the
number of Muslim volunteers in the BiH armed forces. He states that the
number of Mujahedin in BiH never exceeded three or four hundred. See
also Mohamed Sid-Ahmad, «Muslim World Between Two Fires», War Report,
January 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 63744. However, the Belgrade Daily,
Vecernje Novosti, reported that as many as 30,000 Mujahedin were
operating in BiH. «Other Reports in Brief: Muslims from Abroad Settling
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belgrade Daily Claims», BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts, 19 September 1992. )
The Mujahedin forces came from several Muslim states and many of them
were veterans of the Afghan war. (Andrew Hogg, «Arabs Join in Bosnia
Battle», Sunday Times, 30 August 1992)
Reports submitted to the Commission of Experts alleged that the
Mujahedin have been responsible for the mutilation and killing of
civilians, rape, looting, the destruction of property, and the
expulsion of non-Muslim populations. The deputy commander of the BiH
Army, Colonel Stjepan Siber, has said, «it was a mistake to let them
[the Mujahedin] here . . . They commit most of the atrocities and work
against the interests of the Muslim people. They have been killing,
looting and stealing.» Andrew Hogg, «Terror Trail of the Mujahedin»,
Sunday Times, 27 June 1993.
Several reports indicate that the Mujahedin were placed under the
command of the BiH Army.(See «Some 400 Mujahedin Volunteers Fighting
with Bosnian Muslims», Agence France Presse, 22 September 1992; Andrew
Hogg, «Arabs Join in Bosnia Battle», Sunday Times, 30 August 1992; see
also Charles McLoed, ECMM, «Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in Vitez,
Busovaca and Zenica», April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20178- 20546, at
20207; Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4 October
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435; US Department of State,
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62648, 62724, 62730, and 62756)
The Mujahedin forces were closely associated with the 5th Corps, the
6th and 7th Zenica Brigades, the 7th Travnik Brigade, and the 45th
Muslim Brigade which belongs to the 6th Corps in Konjic of the Army of
BiH (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at
62648; see also Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4
October 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435; «Continuing Clashes
in Northwestern Enclave Reported from Both Sides», BBC, Summary of
World Broadcasts, 14 December 1993.)
They also allegedly fought alongside the Muslim Police, the Krajiska
Brigade from Travnik, units of Kosovo Muslims, Albanian soldiers, and
paramilitary groups such as the «Green Legion» and the «Black
Swans».(Charles McLoed, ECMM, Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in Vitez,
Busovaca and Zenica, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 20178-20546, at 20207;
Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4 October 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435; US Department of State, 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62648, 62724, 62730, and 62756.)
Reports also indicate that the Mujahedin had the support of President
Izetbegovic and his government. *57 This was demonstrated in the Bihac
pocket, where the Mujahedin joined BiH forces loyal to Izetbegovic.
Together, these forces battled separatist forces who entered into a
separate peace treaty with Bosnian Serbs («Continuing Clashes in
Northwestern Enclave Reported form Both Sides», BBC, Summary of World
Broadcasts, 14 December 1993)
In Zenica, between 31 August and 2 September 1992, 250 Mujahedin troops
allegedly come to BiH from Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran. These
troops worked alongside the Green Legion and HOS paramilitary groups
stationed in Zenica. The Mujahedin allegedly also operated a camp at
Arnauti.(Charles McLeod, ECMM, Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in
Vitez, Buscovaca and Zenica, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29043-29131, at
29064; Biljaja Plavsic, Republic of Serbia Presidency, To Serbs All
Over the World, 30 September 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 48072- 48093, at
48081)
It was reported that a unit of the Mujahedin, called the «Guerilla»,
participated in the 16 April 1993 attack on Vitez and attempted to
exchange 10 HVO hostages for foreign prisoners held in HVO prisons. (US
Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62629; see
also Charles McLeod, ECMM, Report on Inter-Ethnic Violence in Vitez,
Busovaca and Zenica, April 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 29043-29131, at 29072
(attack on Vitez).
The Croatian Ministry of Defence is reported to have provided
information about an event occurring in June 1993 -- a joint
BiH/Mujahedin unit reportedly attacked Travnik, allegedly forcing 4,000
Croatian civilians and military personnel out of the town. (US
Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62650. Media
reports however claim that Croats left Travnik voluntarily. The
incident was investigated by an organization, which reported that the
forceful eviction did not take place)
The Mujahedin allegedly fought alongside the 6th Muslim Brigade from
Zenica and the Krajiska Brigade from Travnik. Witnesses stated that
they saw Mujahedin operating in small patrols ahead of the approaching
BiH troops.
According to HVO intelligence, Mujahedin forces arrived in Travnik
sometime before June 1993 and came from Algeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Iran. The Mujahedin trained at a camp at Mehurici, where they were
allegedly financed and equipped by a man named Abdulah, the owner of
the «Palma» video store in Travnik. Once in town, the Mujahedin were
linked to the Seventh Brigade of the BiH Army, and were reportedly
assembled into units of 10 to 15 men, and moved about on regular
patrols. The Mujahedin created tension in Travnik in the days prior to
the attack on 3 June. One witness stated that the Mujahedin directed
their actions towards the HVO personnel in town. They allegedly
demonstrated, shouted slogans and fired their rifles in the air.
Mujahedin allegedly participated in the attack on Maljine in Novi
Travnik on 8 June 1993, killing 20 to 30 HVO members and transporting
Croatian women and children to the training centre at
Mehurici.(Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 1, 9 August
1993)
In Konjic, the Mujahedin were part of a 100 member force stationed at
Liscioi and led by Haso Hakalovic. The unit was assembled in February
1993 and included some Kosovo Muslims and members of the Black Swans
from the Igman mountain region. (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI
Doc. No. 62612-62877, at 62756)
Allegedly, Mujahedin troops killed and expelled villagers, and looted
and burned homes, when they moved against the Jablanica- Konjic area.
The Mujahedin troops and members of the Black Swans reportedly
conducted occasional raids without members of BiH forces. (at IHRLI
Doc. No. 62752 and 62756. The village of Vrci was attacked on 25 May,
and the village of Radesine was attacked on 10 June. See also Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Fifth Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/47, 17
November 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 52399-52435, at 52405 (alleging that the
Mujahedin were involved in attacks at Kopjari on 21 October, Doljani on
27 and 28 June, and Maljane on 8 June). UN Special Rapporteur
Mazowiecki claims that corpses of Mujahedin victims displayed evidence
of protracted cruelty and mutilation. )
Reportedly, the Mujahedin volunteers arrived in Konjic in small groups.
It was reported that they were from Afghanistan and that they claimed
to be students. They were allegedly armed with Hekleri automatic
weapons and former JNA equipment. Some Mujahedin were reportedly former
students with no military experience.
Mujahedin forces were present in Mostar since early June 1993. They
were reportedly stationed in the Santica neighbourhood on the
Muslim/HVO front, where they manned bunkers, usually in groups of six
or seven, armed with 7.62 millimetre semi-automatic weapons,
machine-guns, and Zolja anti-tank weapons. They were billeted in a
building they shared with the Muslim military police on the east bank
of the Neretva River. The Mujahedin forces apparently left Mostar on 15
August. (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at
62742 and 62677. For more details on the location of the Neretva living
quarters, see Id. at 62739)
FRY reported that the Mujahedin began operations near Teslic in July
and August of 1992. Troops from Saudi Arabia allegedly killed three
Serbian Territorial Defence members and placed the victims' severed
heads on poles near the «Tesanj turret». (Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Second Report Submitted to the Commission of Experts, 1993,
IHRLI Doc. No. 28401-29019, at 28533)
Beheadings of Serbs by Mujahedin forces have also been reported in
other areas.
The Mujahedin were also alleged to be part of the forces that invaded
the village of Trusina near Foca on 15 April 1993. According to the
report, attackers wore white ribbons on their arms and fought beside
Albanian Muslim troops. Twenty-two civilians reportedly died in the
attack. (US Department of State, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 62612-62877, at
62648; Croatian Information Centre, Weekly Bulletin, No. 9, 4 October
1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 36434-36438, at 36435)
The Mujahedin allegedly performed crude circumcisions upon Serbian
police forces, who were later treated by an American surgeon at the
Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo. (Letter dated 7 December 1992 from the
Deputy Representative of the US to U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/24918, 8 December 1992, IHRLI Doc. No. 3160-3177, at 3173; Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Second Report Submitted to the Commission of
Experts, 1993, IHRLI Doc. No. 28401-29019, at 28566)
(photo)
This photograph was seized from Saudi Arabian fighters captured in Crni
Vrh near Teslic, Bosnia. A Muslim solder displays the severed head of
Blagoje Blagojevic, a Serb from the village of Jasenovo near Teslic.
(photo)
The severed heads of three Serbs (identified as Blagoje Blagojevic,
Nenad Petkovic, and Brana Djuric) beheaded by Muslim fighters. This
picture was seized from Saudi Arabian solders captured near Teslic in
Bosnia.
LINKS:
7th Brigade, loyal Islamic force
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/timbeat4.htm
Director of the U.S. Congress' Task Force on Terrorism and
Unconventional warfare: "Some Call It Peace"
http://members.tripod.com/Balkania/resources/geostrategy/
bodansky_peace/bp_part1.html
7th Muslim "Liberation" Brigade
http://www.wargamer.com/sp/military/bih/armija/foreign.asp
Washington Post - Iranians Form Terror Force in Bosnia
http://impact.users.netlink.co.uk/namir/sreport.htm
Bosnia losing the pluralistic character
http://www.bosnet.org/archive/bosnet.w3archive/9501/msg00252.html
No future for Muslims in Europe unless they have a state of their own
http://www.amber.ucsf.edu/homes/ross/public_html/bosnia_/mus.txt
US Senate Document; Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn
Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base
http://www.senate.gov/~rpc/releases/1997/iran.htm
A BOSNIAN VILLAGE'S TERRORIST
http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Aktuelno/BIVSE/BiH/wpost11032000_e.html
The Second Coming of Alija Izetbegovic
http://www.balkanpeace.org/our/our05.shtml
Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Part I-Buyer Beware
http://reagan.com/HotTopics.main/HotMike/document-12.11.2000.3.html
Army suspects munitions manufactured for Bosnian army
http://archive.nandotimes.com/newsroom/nt/0204yugfff.html
Similarity - The 13th Waffen-Gebirgs Division der SS Handschar
http://www.wssob.com/013divhnd.html
Jihad - the "Holly War"
http://blaskic.croat.net/jihad.htm
=== B ===
The Los Angeles Times
October 7, 2001
Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists
By CRAIG PYES, JOSH MEYER and WILLIAM C. REMPEL , Times Staff Writers
ZENICA, Bosnia-Herzegovina -- Hundreds of foreign Islamic extremists
who became Bosnian citizens after battling Serbian and Croatian forces
present a potential terrorist threat to Europe and the United States,
according to a classified U.S. State Department report and interviews
with international military and intelligence sources.
The extremists include hard-core terrorists, some with ties to Osama
bin Laden, protected by militant elements of the former Sarajevo
government. Bosnia-Herzegovina is "a staging area and safe haven" for
terrorists, said a former senior State Department official.
The secret report, prepared late last year for the Clinton
administration, warned of problem passport-holders in Bosnia in numbers
that "shocked everyone," the former official said. The White House
leaned on Bosnia and its then-president, Alija Izetbegovic, to do
something about the matter, "but nothing happened," he said.
Although no evidence connects any Bosnian group to the suicide
hijacking attacks of Sept. 11 blamed on Bin Laden, U.S. and European
officials are increasingly concerned about the scope and reach of Bin
Laden networks in the West and the proximity of Bosnia-based terrorists
to the heart of Europe.
A number of the extremists "would travel with impunity and conduct,
plan and stage terrorist acts with impunity while hiding behind their
Bosnian passports," the former official said.
In several instances, terrorists with links to Bosnia have launched
actions against Western targets:
* An Algerian with Bosnian citizenship, described by a U.S. official as
"a junior Osama bin Laden," tried to help smuggle explosives in 1998 to
an Egyptian terrorist group plotting to destroy U.S. military
installations in Germany. The shipment included military C-4 plastic
explosives and blasting caps, the former U.S. official said. The CIA
intercepted the shipment, foiling the attack.
* Another North African with Bosnian citizenship belonged to a
terrorist cell in Montreal that conspired in the failed millennium plot
to bomb Los Angeles International Airport.
* One of Bin Laden's top lieutenants--a Palestinian linked to major
terrorist plots in Jordan, France and the United States--had operatives
in Bosnia and was issued a Bosnian passport, according to U.S.
officials.
After the foiled plot against American bases in Germany, the U.S.
suspended without public explanation a military aid program to Bosnia
in 1999 in an attempt to force the deportation of the Algerian leader
of the group, Abdelkader Mokhtari, also known as Abu el Maali.
Finally, after the U.S. went a step further and threatened to stop all
economic aid, Izetbegovic agreed to deport El Maali. But the Algerian
was back in Bosnia within a year. Two months ago, he was reported to be
moving in and out of the country freely. He is now thought to be in
Afghanistan with the leadership of Bin Laden's Al Qaeda group,
according to a senior official for the NATO-led peacekeeping force,
SFOR, in Bosnia.
President Clinton's secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, personally
appealed to Izetbegovic to oust suspected terrorists or rescind their
Bosnian passports.
The effort by top State Department aides continued through the last
days of the administration. "It wasn't just one meeting, it was 10 to
12, with orders directly from the White House," said a former State
Department official.
Izetbegovic declined the appeals, several sources said, apparently out
of loyalty to the fighters who had come to his country's rescue. The
president argued that many had married Bosnian women, had taken up
farming and were legal citizens.
"The point we kept making to Izetbegovic was that if the day comes we
find out that these people are connected to some terrible terrorist
incident, that's the day the entire U.S.-Bosnia relationship will
change from friends to adversaries," the former State Department
official said.
Senior U.S. and SFOR officials believe that some hard-line members of
Izetbegovic's political party gave direct support, through their
control of the Foreign Ministry and local passport operations, to
foreign Islamic extremists with ties to Bin Laden.
Although Izetbegovic stepped down in October 2000, many hard-liners
remain in Bosnia's bureaucracy, and they are suspected of operating
their own rogue intelligence service that protects Islamic extremists,
military and intelligence sources said.
Last week, Bosnia's new interior minister, citing "trustworthy
intelligence sources," said scores of Bin Laden associates may be
trying to flee Afghanistan ahead of anticipated U.S. military reprisals
for the Sept. 11 attacks, seeking refuge among militant sympathizers in
Bosnia. The minister, Mohammed Besic, vowed to intercept any who try to
enter the country.
U.S. and SFOR officials acknowledge that the new coalition government
in Sarajevo has become much more responsive to fighting terrorism. A
senior State Department official lauded Sarajevo this year for "working
with the international community" in trying to clamp down on suspected
terrorists.
Since Sept. 11, Bosnia has launched an audit of passports and mounted a
more intensive crackdown on naturalized citizens who are wanted by
foreign law enforcement agencies. After years of inaction, several
international fugitives have been arrested this year and extradited.
Western Interests in Balkans May Be at Risk
Bosnia has a large Muslim population, most of whom do not practice a
strict form of Islam.
A senior State Department official cautioned that "a lot of people's
interests are served by hyping the terrorism problem in the Balkans,"
referring to anti-Muslim sentiment among other ethnic groups there.
But, he added, "that is not to say there are not bad people who would
exploit the weaknesses in the government and the lax security and use
[Bosnia] as a place to hide."
To date, Western interests in the Balkans have not been terrorist
targets. However, a senior peacekeeping official in Bosnia said local
police report that "there are plans to attack the Western interests
here in Bosnia after any future retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan. We
don't have anything to confirm it."
Bosnia has traditionally served as "an R&R [rest and recreation]
destination" for members of Bin Laden's organization and other
extremists, according to U.S. officials and the peacekeeping force.
"They come to Bosnia to chill out, because so many other places are too
hot for them," said a former State Department official active in
counter-terrorism.
They also use Bosnian passports to travel worldwide without drawing the
kind of scrutiny that those who hold Middle Eastern or North African
documents might attract, officials said. Bosnian passports are
particularly valuable for ease of travel to other Muslim countries
where no visa requirement is imposed on Bosnians.
Under the Izetbegovic government, the immigration system was so
unregulated that Bin Laden allies "would get boxes of blank passports
and just print them up themselves," the former State Department
official said.
A military official said that "for the right amount of money, you can
get a Bosnian passport even though it's the first time you've stepped
foot into Bosnia."
Among those who Western intelligence sources say was granted Bosnian
citizenship and passports was Abu Zubeida, one of Bin Laden's top
lieutenants. Zubeida, a Palestinian from the Gaza Strip, was in charge
of contacts with other Islamic terrorist networks and controlled
admissions to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. He arranged
training for unsuccessful millennium bomb plots in Canada and Jordan
and a recently foiled suicide attack on the U.S. Embassy in Paris,
according to court records and investigative reports.
Zubeida also asked LAX bomb plot figure Ahmed Ressam to get blank
Canadian passports that would allow other terrorists to infiltrate the
United States, according to testimony from Ressam, who was convicted in
the bomb plot and is cooperating with investigators.
Another terrorist with Bosnian credentials is Karim Said Atmani, a
Moroccan who was Ressam's roommate in Montreal and who was in the group
that plotted to bomb LAX, according to testimony. The Bosnian
government arrested him in April, and Atmani was extradited to France,
where he awaits sentencing on terrorism charges.
Beginning in 1992, as many as 4,000 volunteers from throughout North
Africa, the Middle East and Europe came to Bosnia to fight Serbian and
Croatian nationalists on behalf of fellow Muslims. They are known as
the moujahedeen. A military analyst called them "pretty good fighters
and certainly ruthless."
"I think the Muslims wouldn't have survived without this" help, Richard
Holbrooke, the United States' former chief Balkans peace negotiator,
said in a recent interview. At the time, U.N. peacekeepers were proving
ineffective at protecting Bosnian civilians, and an arms embargo
diminished Bosnia's fighting capabilities.
But Holbrooke called the arrival of the moujahedeen "a pact with the
devil" from which Bosnia still is recovering.
The foreign moujahedeen units were disbanded and required to leave the
Balkans under the terms of the 1995 Dayton, Ohio, peace accord. But
many stayed--about 400, according to official Bosnian estimates.
Although the State Department report suggested that the number could be
higher, a senior SFOR official said allied military intelligence
estimated that no more than 200 foreign-born militants actually live in
Bosnia, of which closer to 30 represent a hard-core group with direct
links to terrorism.
"These are the bad guys--the ones you have to worry about," the
official said.
But he also said that "hundreds of other" Islamic extremists with and
without Bosnian passports "come in and out" and that Bosnia remains a
center for Al Qaeda recruiting and logistics support.
Bin Laden Reportedly Financed Recruits
A U.S. counter-terrorism official confirmed that "several hundred"
former moujahedeen remain in Bosnia. "Are they a threat? Absolutely.
Are we all over them? Absolutely," he said.
The fighters were organized as an all-moujahedeen unit called El
Moujahed. It was headquartered in Zenica in an abandoned hillside
factory, a compound with a hospital and prayer hall.
Bin Laden financed small convoys of recruits from the Arab world
through his businesses in Sudan, according to Mideast intelligence
reports. Other support and recruits for El Moujahed came, at least in
part, through Islamic organizations in Milan, Italy, and Istanbul,
Turkey, that European investigators later linked to trafficking in
passports and weapons for terrorists.
A series of national security and criminal investigations across Europe
have since identified the El Moujahed unit in court filings as the
"common cradle" from which an international terrorist network grew and
ultimately stretched from the Middle East to Canada.
Abu el Maali, its leader during the Bosnian war, remains an enigmatic
figure, charismatic and popular within the moujahedeen but barely known
outside. He briefly appeared in a propaganda video on El Moujahed
during the war, but his face was digitally removed before distribution.
French court documents say El Maali now is the leader of terrorist
cells in Bosnia, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Court testimony, confidential police records and interviews with
European intelligence officials show how El Maali marshaled recruits
from the West and Muslim countries to assemble the infrastructure of
what would become a terrorist organization.
Two French converts to Islam, both in their mid-20s, were among the
early volunteers for El Maali's ranks in the Bosnian war. Christophe
Caze, a medical school dropout, and Lionel Dumont joined El Moujahed to
provide humanitarian services. But once assigned to the moujahedeen
unit in Zenica, they immediately "plunged into violence," an associate
told French police.
A French judicial official said their eventual passage to terrorism was
strongly influenced by El Maali, with whom they became close. El Maali
"exerted a lot of influence on the fighters . . . which led them to
commit these violent actions under the cover of Islam," the magistrate
said.
The converts emerged as leaders, rendering impassioned exhortations to
younger volunteers to defend Islam "by all means," according to court
records. They also began setting up a clandestine network in France,
creating multiple identities, encoding phone lists and recruiting
followers they could call into action later. Court records say that
Caze, working as a medic, recruited future terrorists among the wounded
he treated.
At the war's end, U.S. officials focused on state-sponsored terrorism
and worried about getting Iranian fighters back to Iran. Less clear
were the implications of loosely allied extremist groups and
individuals.
Looking back, peace negotiator Holbrooke blamed imprecise and "sloppy
intelligence" for failing to distinguish which Muslim groups posed a
threat to the United States. It turned out that Iranian fighters went
home. Many of El Maali's trained warriors did not.
Spasm of Violence Hits Northern France
In Bosnia, most of the violence stopped with the peace accord in 1995.
But in January 1996, it broke out again--on the streets of northern
France.
A puzzling crime wave swept the area around Roubaix, a gritty,
Muslim-majority town near the Belgian border. Small groups of men began
holding up stores and drivers. They brandished machine guns and wore
hoods and carnival masks. Two people were killed.
On March 28, just before a Group of 7 summit of leading industrial
nations that would bring top ministers to Lille, police discovered a
stolen car abandoned in front of the police station. It was parked
askew. And it contained a bomb packed into three gas cylinders rigged
to devastate everything within 600 feet. It was disarmed.
The next night, a special tactical squad surrounded a house at 59 Rue
Henri Carette in Roubaix that had been linked to the booby-trapped car.
Police fired thousands of rounds into the building. The house erupted
in flames because of munitions inside, police said later. Four charred
bodies were recovered.
Two men fled the barrage and inferno. At a police roadblock just inside
Belgium, another furious gun battle erupted. One of the men was killed,
and his accomplice was wounded.
In the getaway car, police found rocket launchers, automatic weapons,
large amounts of ammunition and grenades. They also recovered an
electronic organizer containing coded telephone contacts, nearly a
dozen of them in Bosnia. The dead ringleader was identified as
Christophe Caze, the young medic who went to fight in Bosnia.
French authorities, confused about the motives for the spasm of gang
violence, considered it a new phenomenon, calling it "gangster
terrorism." Their investigation uncovered what may have been the first
terrorism cell exported from Bosnia.
After an investigation of the surviving associate, Caze's electronic
organizer and other evidence recovered by French police, the robbery
gang was identified as nine militants who attended a local mosque. Most
of them had undergone military training at the El Moujahed compound in
Bosnia.
The armed robberies were a radical form of fund-raising by Caze and his
associates to benefit their "Muslim brothers in Algeria." Their
high-powered weapons were smuggled home from the Bosnian war.
Caze's organizer was described by one official as "the address book of
the professional terrorist." It contained phone contacts in England,
Italy, France and Canada, as well as direct lines to El Maali's Zenica
headquarters. It led French authorities to trace travels and phone
records and to set up electronic surveillance.
French counter-terrorism officials soon realized they had stumbled upon
more than a band of gangsters. Five years before the sophisticated
terrorist assault on the U.S., the French were starting to uncover
loosely linked violent networks spreading into several countries, all
tied together by a common thread: Bosnia.
One of the phone numbers in the dead terrorist's organizer led to a
suspect in Canada: Fateh Kamel, 41, who ran a small trinkets shop in
Montreal.
French authorities say Canada rejected their initial request to
investigate Kamel, calling the dapper Algerian "just a businessman."
But Kamel also was a confidant of El Maali. He spoke frequently to the
Bosnia moujahedeen chief over his wife's cell phone. Kamel had gone to
Bosnia early in the war, suffered a shrapnel wound in one leg and been
treated at the El Moujahed hospital by Caze, the young medic.
Kamel first came to the attention of European intelligence officials in
1994, when Italian agents tracking suspected terrorists stumbled upon
him recruiting fighters in Milan for El Maali's brigade.
After the Dayton accord, French police say, Kamel became deeply
involved in terrorist logistics. He was "the principal activist of an
international network determined to plan assassinations and to procure
arms and passports for terrorist acts all over the world," according to
a French court document.
In 1996, an Italian surveillance team recorded Kamel discussing a
terrorist attack and taped him declaring: "I do not fear death . . .
because the jihad is the jihad, and to kill is easy for me."
During the same period, Kamel assisted other North African extremists
relocating to Canada, exploiting the country's lax immigration laws and
Quebec's eagerness for French-speaking immigrants such as Algerians.
According to French investigators, Kamel was the leader of a terrorist
cell in Montreal. Other members included Ressam, Atmani and a third
roommate, Mustafa Labsi.
Like Kamel, Atmani had served in Bosnia and was close to El Maali. A
U.S. law enforcement official described Atmani as a "crazy warrior with
a nose so broken and twisted that he could sniff around corners."
Later, authorities believe, the three roommates went to Afghanistan
together to train for a terrorist attack on the United States. They
returned to the West after learning that their target would be Los
Angeles International Airport. The conspiracy was interrupted when
Atmani was deported from Canada to Bosnia.
When Ressam, traveling alone, was captured at the border with
explosives in his rental car, U.S. officials tried to track down his
former roommate Atmani. Authorities had information that he was
traveling between Sarajevo and Istanbul, but Bosnian officials denied
even that Atmani had been deported there. Investigators later learned
that Atmani had been issued a new Bosnian passport six months earlier.
Atmani was part of the hard-core terrorist group noted in the secret
State Department report. He remained beyond the reach of international
extradition until this year, when he was arrested and turned over to
France by Bosnia's new coalition government. He awaits sentencing on
terrorism charges.
Kamel, the alleged ringleader of the group, was arrested in Jordan and
was extradited to France, where he is in prison on a terrorism
conviction. Ressam and Labsi also have been jailed. All of the members
of the former Montreal cell have been convicted of being operatives in
a terrorist network that originated in Bosnia.
James Steinberg, deputy national security advisor in the Clinton
administration, said that although the U.S. works closely with
countries in the Balkans to deal with "the problem of these cells," the
very nature of secret terrorist organizations confounds those efforts.
"It's one thing to [arrest] the people you know [are terrorists], but
then the others . . . bury themselves even deeper," he said.