On Russia and the Kosovo issue
1. From Kosovo to Iraq
(by Vladimir Radyuhin, The Hindu, 18/08/2003)
2. Russian General: 1999 Pristina Raid 'Prevented Genocide Of Kosovo's
Non-Albanians
(Novosti, June 11, 2003)
=== 1 ===
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/
print.pl?file=2003081800911000.htm&date=2003/08/18/&prd=th&
Date:18/08/2003
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2003/08/18/stories/2003081800911000.htm
Opinion - Leader Page Articles
From Kosovo to Iraq
By Vladimir Radyuhin
Any international security mission for Iraq will be under U.S. command.
This would set the stage for a replay of the Kosovo scenario.
RUSSIA IS not likely to send its peacekeepers to Iraq even though
Foreign Ministry officials have not ruled out the option if the United
Nations Security Council supports a multinational force for Iraq.
Russia has just pulled out of a similar arrangement in the Balkans
wishing it had never joined in, in the first place.
The quiet withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Kosovo was in stark
contrast to their triumphant arrival in the region in June 1999 after
the 78-day NATO bombing war against Yugoslavia. Russia stunned the West
when about 200 of its paratroopers undertook a daring 600-km raid from
Bosnia across Yugoslavia and into Kosovo, stealing a march on NATO. The
local Serb population gave a rousing welcome to Russian troops as
liberators and protectors against Albanian militants. However, Moscow's
plan to fly in reinforcements from Russia even as the NATO command
mulled over the shocking news that the Russians had occupied the
strategic Pristina airport fell through when East European countries
closed their airspace to Russian transport aircraft on the request of
NATO, which they craved to join.
In the end, the Pristina raid proved little more than a damage control
exercise by the whimsical Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, to camouflage
his abrupt turnaround from staunch support for Yugoslavia to blatant
sell-out when he persuaded the Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to
accept a Western ultimatum and agree to a NATO occupation of Kosovo.
Russia voted for the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which
mandated an international peace force for Kosovo, KFOR. The resolution
called for "the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of
international civil and security presences." The text of the resolution
did not say clearly under whose command the peacekeepers would be
deployed, but an annexe appended to the resolution mentioned rather
evasively that the security force should include a "substantial NATO
participation" and be "under unified command and control."
This ambiguous wording deprived Russian diplomats of any bargaining
power to press Moscow's demand for its peacekeepers to serve under
Russian command in a separate sector of Kosovo populated predominantly
by Serbs to prevent their ethnic cleansing by Albanian militants. A
Russian force of 3,600 paratroopers, vastly outnumbered by NATO troops,
was split between the American, French and German sectors under NATO
command.
Resolution 1244 tasked the international security force with
"demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo
Albanian groups" and "establishing a secure environment in which
refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety." Neither
demand has been enforced. The KLA became Kosovo police and Serbs
terrorised by Albanians continued to flee Kosovo.
Contrary to the U.N. Security Council demand that Kosovo "enjoy
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," the
region has gained de facto independence from Belgrade.
Russia's withdrawal from KFOR was precipitated by the U.S.-led war
against Iraq, which Moscow strongly opposed. As soon as the
U.S.-British forces attacked Iraq, the Russian President, Vladimir
Putin, began talks with NATO on the Kosovo pullout. As Russian
paratroopers packed up, television showed painful pictures of Kosovo
Serbs complaining that the "Russian brothers" had betrayed them by
leaving them alone to face Albanian violence.
However, Mr. Putin, who is striving to reassert Russia's influence in
global politics, could not afford to share responsibility with the U.S.
for further dismembering what remained of former Yugoslavia and seeing
Kosovo turn into a hotbed of terrorism and drug trafficking in the
heart of Europe. Nor could Mr. Putin, who has been arguing for a
stronger U.N. role in international affairs, be seen as conniving in
the flouting of the Security Council resolution on Kosovo.
History may now repeat itself in Iraq. As things stand today, there is
no chance that the U.S. would be prepared to let the U.N. take over
control of peacekeeping in Iraq. The U.S.-drafted resolution calls for
a timid "U.N. Assistance Mission." Even if the U.S. agrees at some
stage for a broader U.N. mandate, any international security mission
for Iraq will be under U.S. command. This would set the stage for a
replay of the Kosovo scenario.
When Russia's partners in the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent
States — Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan — scramble to jump on the
American bandwagon in Iraq, their motive is to win U.S. favour and
patronage.
Russia is a different case. By pulling out from Kosovo, Mr. Putin has
sent a clear signal that Russia will no longer pull chestnuts from the
fire for others.
© Copyright 2000 - 2003 The Hindu
=== 2 ===
Da: Rick Rozoff
Data: Gio 12 Giu 2003 09:31:08 Europe/Rome
Oggetto: [yugoslaviainfo] Russian General: 1999 Pristina Raid
'Prevented Genocide Of Kosovo's Non-Albanians
http://en.rian.ru/rian/
index.cfm?prd_id=160&msg_id=3267393&startrow=21&date=2003-06-
11&do_alert=0
Russian Information Agency (Novosti)
June 11, 2003
GENERAL IVASHOV: DECISION TO DEPLOY RUSSIAN AIRBORNE BATTALION IN
KOSOVO WAS CORRECT
-That decision did not allow to "distort the essence
of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and confirmed
the sovereignty of Russia's foreign policy and its
non-subordination to the U.S. and NATO. The deployment
helped the Serbian nation and prevented genocide of
Kosovo's non-Albanians," Ivashov said.
-"It was a brilliant raid, performed despite the
fierce pressure from Washington and Brussels [NATO
headquarters]. Russia's powerful military-political
potential was demonstrated, and not on the Balkans
alone. Unfortunately, this potential was not properly
used and, what's more, devaluated - Russia is leaving
the Balkans itself," Ivashov noted.
MOSCOW, June 11th, 2003 /from a RIA Novosti
correspondent/ -- The decision to deploy a Russian
airborne battalion in Kosovo in 1999 was correct, said
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, a former top official
of the Russian Defence Ministry.
That decision did not allow to "distort the essence of
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and confirmed the
sovereignty of Russia's foreign policy and its
non-subordination to the U.S. and NATO. The deployment
helped the Serbian nation and prevented genocide of
Kosovo's non-Albanians," Ivashov said.
What was called "Russia's Pristina raid" was carried
out on June 11-12 from Bosnia, where a Russian
airborne battalion was deployed as part of
international peacemaking forces. "It was a brilliant
raid, performed despite the fierce pressure from
Washington and Brussels [NATO headquarters]. Russia's
powerful military-political potential was
demonstrated, and not on the Balkans alone.
Unfortunately, this potential was not properly used
and, what's more, devaluated - Russia is leaving the
Balkans itself," Ivashov noted.
Ivashov stressed that the battalion had been deployed
"in line with the international law and the UN SC
resolution". The operation was sanctioned by the then
Russian President Boris Yeltsin. "His decision, based
on reports of the ministers of defence and foreign
affairs, envisaged the deployment of a Russian
peacekeeping contingent simultaneously with NATO
troops if NATO refused to recognise Russia as an equal
partner in the Kosovo settlement," Ivashov stressed.
The deployment was carried out on an agreement with
Yugoslavia's political leadership. The then Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic ordered the defence
ministry and other ministries to provide assistance to
the Russian soldiers and co-operate with the Russian
contingent's command.
According to Ivashov, the final decision to deploy
troops was taken "after the disruption of negotiations
with the Americans who were trying to impose on Russia
discriminating terms of participation in the
peacekeeping operation in the Balkans." "Russia was
proposed to take part in the operation 'with two
battalions within the mobile reserve of General
Jackson, the KFOR commander, and Russia naturally
rejected such form of participation," the general
said.
The battalion was assigned the mission of seizing the
Slatina airdrome, Kosovo's key object. The order to
advance was received on June 11, 1999. The battalion
reached the airdrome on June 12 early in the morning.
1. From Kosovo to Iraq
(by Vladimir Radyuhin, The Hindu, 18/08/2003)
2. Russian General: 1999 Pristina Raid 'Prevented Genocide Of Kosovo's
Non-Albanians
(Novosti, June 11, 2003)
=== 1 ===
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/
print.pl?file=2003081800911000.htm&date=2003/08/18/&prd=th&
Date:18/08/2003
URL: http://www.thehindu.com/2003/08/18/stories/2003081800911000.htm
Opinion - Leader Page Articles
From Kosovo to Iraq
By Vladimir Radyuhin
Any international security mission for Iraq will be under U.S. command.
This would set the stage for a replay of the Kosovo scenario.
RUSSIA IS not likely to send its peacekeepers to Iraq even though
Foreign Ministry officials have not ruled out the option if the United
Nations Security Council supports a multinational force for Iraq.
Russia has just pulled out of a similar arrangement in the Balkans
wishing it had never joined in, in the first place.
The quiet withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Kosovo was in stark
contrast to their triumphant arrival in the region in June 1999 after
the 78-day NATO bombing war against Yugoslavia. Russia stunned the West
when about 200 of its paratroopers undertook a daring 600-km raid from
Bosnia across Yugoslavia and into Kosovo, stealing a march on NATO. The
local Serb population gave a rousing welcome to Russian troops as
liberators and protectors against Albanian militants. However, Moscow's
plan to fly in reinforcements from Russia even as the NATO command
mulled over the shocking news that the Russians had occupied the
strategic Pristina airport fell through when East European countries
closed their airspace to Russian transport aircraft on the request of
NATO, which they craved to join.
In the end, the Pristina raid proved little more than a damage control
exercise by the whimsical Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin, to camouflage
his abrupt turnaround from staunch support for Yugoslavia to blatant
sell-out when he persuaded the Yugoslav leader, Slobodan Milosevic, to
accept a Western ultimatum and agree to a NATO occupation of Kosovo.
Russia voted for the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which
mandated an international peace force for Kosovo, KFOR. The resolution
called for "the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of
international civil and security presences." The text of the resolution
did not say clearly under whose command the peacekeepers would be
deployed, but an annexe appended to the resolution mentioned rather
evasively that the security force should include a "substantial NATO
participation" and be "under unified command and control."
This ambiguous wording deprived Russian diplomats of any bargaining
power to press Moscow's demand for its peacekeepers to serve under
Russian command in a separate sector of Kosovo populated predominantly
by Serbs to prevent their ethnic cleansing by Albanian militants. A
Russian force of 3,600 paratroopers, vastly outnumbered by NATO troops,
was split between the American, French and German sectors under NATO
command.
Resolution 1244 tasked the international security force with
"demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo
Albanian groups" and "establishing a secure environment in which
refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety." Neither
demand has been enforced. The KLA became Kosovo police and Serbs
terrorised by Albanians continued to flee Kosovo.
Contrary to the U.N. Security Council demand that Kosovo "enjoy
substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," the
region has gained de facto independence from Belgrade.
Russia's withdrawal from KFOR was precipitated by the U.S.-led war
against Iraq, which Moscow strongly opposed. As soon as the
U.S.-British forces attacked Iraq, the Russian President, Vladimir
Putin, began talks with NATO on the Kosovo pullout. As Russian
paratroopers packed up, television showed painful pictures of Kosovo
Serbs complaining that the "Russian brothers" had betrayed them by
leaving them alone to face Albanian violence.
However, Mr. Putin, who is striving to reassert Russia's influence in
global politics, could not afford to share responsibility with the U.S.
for further dismembering what remained of former Yugoslavia and seeing
Kosovo turn into a hotbed of terrorism and drug trafficking in the
heart of Europe. Nor could Mr. Putin, who has been arguing for a
stronger U.N. role in international affairs, be seen as conniving in
the flouting of the Security Council resolution on Kosovo.
History may now repeat itself in Iraq. As things stand today, there is
no chance that the U.S. would be prepared to let the U.N. take over
control of peacekeeping in Iraq. The U.S.-drafted resolution calls for
a timid "U.N. Assistance Mission." Even if the U.S. agrees at some
stage for a broader U.N. mandate, any international security mission
for Iraq will be under U.S. command. This would set the stage for a
replay of the Kosovo scenario.
When Russia's partners in the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent
States — Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan — scramble to jump on the
American bandwagon in Iraq, their motive is to win U.S. favour and
patronage.
Russia is a different case. By pulling out from Kosovo, Mr. Putin has
sent a clear signal that Russia will no longer pull chestnuts from the
fire for others.
© Copyright 2000 - 2003 The Hindu
=== 2 ===
Da: Rick Rozoff
Data: Gio 12 Giu 2003 09:31:08 Europe/Rome
Oggetto: [yugoslaviainfo] Russian General: 1999 Pristina Raid
'Prevented Genocide Of Kosovo's Non-Albanians
http://en.rian.ru/rian/
index.cfm?prd_id=160&msg_id=3267393&startrow=21&date=2003-06-
11&do_alert=0
Russian Information Agency (Novosti)
June 11, 2003
GENERAL IVASHOV: DECISION TO DEPLOY RUSSIAN AIRBORNE BATTALION IN
KOSOVO WAS CORRECT
-That decision did not allow to "distort the essence
of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and confirmed
the sovereignty of Russia's foreign policy and its
non-subordination to the U.S. and NATO. The deployment
helped the Serbian nation and prevented genocide of
Kosovo's non-Albanians," Ivashov said.
-"It was a brilliant raid, performed despite the
fierce pressure from Washington and Brussels [NATO
headquarters]. Russia's powerful military-political
potential was demonstrated, and not on the Balkans
alone. Unfortunately, this potential was not properly
used and, what's more, devaluated - Russia is leaving
the Balkans itself," Ivashov noted.
MOSCOW, June 11th, 2003 /from a RIA Novosti
correspondent/ -- The decision to deploy a Russian
airborne battalion in Kosovo in 1999 was correct, said
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, a former top official
of the Russian Defence Ministry.
That decision did not allow to "distort the essence of
UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and confirmed the
sovereignty of Russia's foreign policy and its
non-subordination to the U.S. and NATO. The deployment
helped the Serbian nation and prevented genocide of
Kosovo's non-Albanians," Ivashov said.
What was called "Russia's Pristina raid" was carried
out on June 11-12 from Bosnia, where a Russian
airborne battalion was deployed as part of
international peacemaking forces. "It was a brilliant
raid, performed despite the fierce pressure from
Washington and Brussels [NATO headquarters]. Russia's
powerful military-political potential was
demonstrated, and not on the Balkans alone.
Unfortunately, this potential was not properly used
and, what's more, devaluated - Russia is leaving the
Balkans itself," Ivashov noted.
Ivashov stressed that the battalion had been deployed
"in line with the international law and the UN SC
resolution". The operation was sanctioned by the then
Russian President Boris Yeltsin. "His decision, based
on reports of the ministers of defence and foreign
affairs, envisaged the deployment of a Russian
peacekeeping contingent simultaneously with NATO
troops if NATO refused to recognise Russia as an equal
partner in the Kosovo settlement," Ivashov stressed.
The deployment was carried out on an agreement with
Yugoslavia's political leadership. The then Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic ordered the defence
ministry and other ministries to provide assistance to
the Russian soldiers and co-operate with the Russian
contingent's command.
According to Ivashov, the final decision to deploy
troops was taken "after the disruption of negotiations
with the Americans who were trying to impose on Russia
discriminating terms of participation in the
peacekeeping operation in the Balkans." "Russia was
proposed to take part in the operation 'with two
battalions within the mobile reserve of General
Jackson, the KFOR commander, and Russia naturally
rejected such form of participation," the general
said.
The battalion was assigned the mission of seizing the
Slatina airdrome, Kosovo's key object. The order to
advance was received on June 11, 1999. The battalion
reached the airdrome on June 12 early in the morning.