[ Visto l'approssimarsi delle elezioni presidenziali statunitensi,
Diana Johnstone ci invita a riflettere su di una questione volentieri
dimenticata: la politica di guerra dei Democratici e' -
qualitativamente e/o quantitativamente - diversa da quella dei
Repubblicani? Oppure ad ispirare la "logica del bombardamento
preventivo" sono sempre le stesse ragioni strutturali e la stessa
delirante convinzione di avere ogni diritto sulla vita e sulla morte
di interi paesi e popoli? Non sono domande solo retoriche: mentre
Kerry promette che non ritirera' le truppe di occupazione dall'Iraq,
in caso di vittoria, la lobby pan-albanese sostiene la campagna
elettorale dei Democratici. Il Kosovo colonia degli USA, governato
dalle mafie che trafficano in droghe, armi ed esseri umani e ridotto a
lager nazista per i serbi e le altre minoranze, e' infatti un prodotto
genuino delle politiche di Clinton e Tenet.
Un articolo importante, questo della Johnstone, di quelli che i
commentatori della sinistra italiana non scriverebbero mai... ]
http://www.counterpunch.org/johnstone06242004.html
June 24, 2004
Clinton, Kerry and Kosovo
The Lie of a "Good War"
By DIANE JOHNSTONE
For U.S. politicians, if all wars are good, some are better than
others. Democrats prefer Clinton wars and Republicans prefer Bush
wars. But in the end, they almost unanimously come together to support
all wars. The differences concern the choice of official rationale..
To suggest subtle criticism of the Republican war against Iraq, while
making it clear that they are by no means opposed to war as such, the
2004 Democratic election campaigners can be expected to glorify the
Kosovo war. The prominence of General Wesley Clark in the Democratic
camp makes that quite clear.
John Kerry's foreign policy adviser Will Marshall of the Progressive
Policy Institute, author of "Democratic Realism: the Third Way",
points to the exemplary nature of the 1999 "<U.S.-led> intervention in
Kosovo". It was "a policy consciously based on a mix of moral values
and security interests with the parallel goals of halting a
humanitarian tragedy and ensuring NATO's credibility as an effective
force for regional stability".
The "humanitarian" rationale sounds better than the "weapons of mass
destruction" or the "links to Al Qaeda" which never existed. But then,
the "genocide"from which the NATO war allegedly saved the Albanians of
Kosovo never existed either.
But while the WMD deception has been exposed, the founding lie behind
the Kosovo war is still widely believed. It effectively distracts from
the very existence of the what Marshall calls the "parallel goal"of
strengthening NATO. Aside from the crippling material damage inflicted
on the targeted country, the Kosovo lie has caused even more
irreparable damage to relations between the Serb and Albanian
inhabitants of Kosovo.
The situation in that small province of multiethnic Serbia was the
result of a long and complex history of conflict, frequently
encouraged and exploited by outside powers, notably by the support to
Albanian nationalism by the Axis powers in World War II. Each
community accused the other of plotting "ethnic cleansing" and even
"genocide". But there were reasonable people on both sides willing to
work out a compromise solution. The constructive role of outsiders
would have been to calm the paranoid tendencies in bothcommunities and
support constructive initiatives. Indeed, the Kosovo problem could
have been easily managed, and eventually solved, had the Great Powers
so desired. But as in the past, the Great Powers exploited and
aggravated the ethnic conflicts for their own purposes. In total
ignorance of the complex history of the region, sheeplike politicians
and media echoed and amplified the most extreme nationalist Albanian
propaganda. This provided NATO with its pretext to demonstrate
"credibility". The Great Powers have in effect told the Albanians that
all their worst accusations against the Serbs were true. Even
Albanians know who know better (such as Veton Surroi) are intimidated
and silenced by the racist nationalists backed by the United States.
The result is disastrous. Empowered by their official status as unique
victims of Serb iniquity, the Albanians of Kosovo -- and especially
the youth, raised on a decade of nationalist myth -- can give free
rein to their cultivated hatred of the Serbs. Armed Albanian
nationalists proceeded to drive the Serbian and gypsy populations out
of the province. Those remaining do not dare venture out of their
ghettos. Albanians willing to live with the Serbs risk being murdered.
Ever since the NATO-led force (KFOR) marched into Kosovo in June 1999,
violent persecution of Serbs and Roma has been regularly described as
"revenge" -- which in the Albanian tradition is considered the summit
of virtuous conduct. Describing the murder of elderly women in their
homes or children at play as acts of "revenge" is a way of excusing or
even approving the violence.
Last March 17, following the false accusation that Serbs were
responsible for the accidental drowning of three Albanian children,
organized mobs of Albanians, including many teenagers, rampaged
through Kosovo destroying 35 Serbian Orthodox Christian churches and
monasteries, some of them artistic gems dating from the fourteenth
century. Well over a hundred churches had already been attacked with
fire and explosives in the past five years. The objective is quite
clearly to erase all historic trace of centuries of Serb presence, the
better to assert their claim to an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo.
The self-satisfaction of the "international community" was severely
shaken by the March violence. The occasional KFOR units that tried to
protect Serb sites found themselves in armed clashes with Albanian
mobs. In the wake of the rampages, Finnish politician Harri Holkeri
resigned two months before expiration of his one-year renewable
mandate as head of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) supposed to
administer the province. He was the fourth to get out of the job as
fast as he could. Apparently on the verge of a nervous breakdown,
Holkeri lamented to a press conference that UNMIK has no intelligence
service of its own, and had received no prior hint of the March
pogroms. In short, the mass of international administrators, military
occupation forces and non-governmental agencies have no idea what is
going on in the province they are theoretically running. Indicating
his awareness that the only role left for UNMIK was that of scapegoat,
Holkeri warned of "difficult days ahead". That is a safe prediction.
Trouble ahead
On June 11, the former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army leader
Hashim Thaci, the protege of Madeleine Albright and her press officer
James Rubin, denounced UNMIK as a "complete failure" and announced
that, if he wins Kosovo's forthcoming elections in October, he will
implement his "vision of Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state".
The circumstances suggest that not only Thaci, but any newly elected
Kosovo may do the same. Proclamation of Kosovo's independence on the
eve of U.S. presidential elections could be shrewd timing. With Iraq
exploding, American leaders need to maintain the myth of the "success"
in Kosovo. Getting into open conflict with the Albanians could be
politically disastrous.
At the same time, many Europeans saw the anti-Serb pogroms in March as
evidence that Kosovo has a long way to go to reach the "standards" of
democratic human rights and ethnic harmony which UNMIK is mandated to
achieve before any final decision on the province's status.
There are serious reasons not to give in to the Albanian demand for an
"independent and sovereign Kosovo".
1. Legality.
First of all, there is the minor question of legality: minor, inasmuch
as the NATO powers have ignored it from the start. The war itself was
totally devoid of any legitimate basis in international law. It was
officially concluded in June 1999 by a peace accord incorporated into
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which, among other things,
obliged the occupying powers to :
-- "ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all
inhabitants of Kosovo" -- which logically should mean "all", and not
solely the Albanians;
-- "ensure the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons"
-- by which the U.S. negotiators probably meant the Albanians who had
fled during the bombing, but since they promptly returned on their
own, without difficulty, this stipulation in reality refers to Serbs,
Rom and other non-Albanians forced to flee;
-- establish an interim political framework "taking full account of
[...]the principles of sovereignty and integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia" -- which amounts to recognition that Kosovo
remains part of a larger political entity made up of Serbia and
Montenegro;
-- permit the return of an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian
personnel, including border control police and customs agents;
-- effect the maintenance of civil law and order and the protection of
human rights.
In reality, once the United States got its big military foot in the
door, Resolution 1244 was scarcely worth the paper it was written on.
The United States had other priorities:
-- First, in record time, the Pentagon built an enormous military
base, "Camp Bondsteel", on a thousand areas of illegally expropriated
farmland strategically located near trans-Balkan transit routes, on
the approaches to the Middle East and Caspian Sea oil transport.
-- The other obvious U.S. priority was to preserve the clandestine
wartime alliance with the "Kosovo Liberation Army", not only against
the Serbs, but also, implicitly, against any European allies which
might seek influence in post-conquest Kosovo. After a sham
"disarmament" disposing of a few obsolete light arms, the KLA was
renamed the "Kosovo Protection Force" and put on the U.N. payroll.
Certain of its officers proceeded to mount armed actions to extend
"greater Albania" to neighboring Macedonia and parts of Southern
Serbia next to Kosovo. These operations were launched from the
American sector, next to Camp Bondsteel.
-- As for the internal organization of Kosovo itself, the U.S.
priority is, as usual, privatization of the economy. Privatization in
practice starts with dismantling whatever government services existed,
on the theory that without government interference, private initiative
will flourish.
In a very special sense, this has indeed proved to be the case.
Kosovo, already a transit area for the largest amount of heroin
smuggled from Turkey to Western Europe, has rapidly become the center
of a new trade in women sex slaves. The Albanian mafia is by far the
biggest operator in these trades. The "internationals" who have come
to "civilize" the province provide a thriving local market for
prostitutes. If they ever go home, the Albanian mafia can count on the
networks it has developed throughout Western Europe to keep business going
2. The economy.
In socialist Yugoslavia, Kosovo was by far the poorest area in
Yugoslavia, with the highest rate of chronic unemployment. It still
is. But then, it benefited from injection of the largest amount of
development funds from the rest of the country. Although the sentiment
that their poverty was a result of exploitation contributed to the
rise of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, the fact is that Kosovo was
always heavily subsidized by the rest of Yugoslavia, and as a result
was considerably more developed than neighboring Albania.
Since the NATO occupation, Kosovo lives off other sources of income,
mainly the flourishing drugs and sex trades. The "international
community" has contributed a patchwork of social services (from UNMIK
police to NGO counselos) that provide a temporary substitute for the
expulsion of the local branches of the Serbian government. Camp
Bondsteel provides the largest number of legitimate jobs to Albanians,
and may continue to do so even after the demand for chauffeurs and
interpreters dries up as the NGOs go home. Saudi Arabia can be counted
on to finance mosque construction. But with a per capita income of
about $30 per month, it is hard to see where an "independent Kosovo"
could scrape up the tax base to pay for a government, especially since
so much of the real income is illicit, outside the reach of tax
collectors.
Kosovo is only an extreme case of the "transition" from socialism to
the free market, as imposed on Eastern Europe by the "international
community". The State and its services were removed by NATO military
force, whereas elsewhere the demolition process has been more gradual
and less dramatic, the result of pressures from the IMF, the World
Bank and the European Union. The mass of unemployed young men have
little prospect of earning a living other than by getting in on the
crime business. It is hard to see what can prevent "independent
Kosovo" from being an uncontrollable crime center.
At the end of World War II, in order to defeat the Fascists and combat
the Communists, U.S. intelligence services cynically brought the Mafia
back to Sicily. The parallel with Kosovo does not go beyond that. For
unlike Kosovo, Sicily is an essentially rich island, with a
diversified economy and numerous centuries-old sophisticated urban
centers where large sectors of a highly educated population have
courageously resisted the corruption and violence of the mafia. This
aspect of Sicilian society is insufficiently appreciated abroad, where
it is more "romantic" to glorify the gangsters. In comparison, Kosovo
Albanian society simply does not possess such material or cultural
resources for resisting the power of the new mafias that, while
feeding on certain clan traditions, are above all a product of
neoliberal globalism.
3. Human rights.
The protection of "human rights" was the pretext for the 1999 war. In
terms of everyday human relations, the situation is far worse than
before. This is not widely recognized for two reasons. One, since the
"international community" rather than Milosevic is in charge, media
interest in Kosovo has virtually evaporated. Second, the victims of
persecution and harassment, the children whose school buses are
stoned, the old people who are beaten and whose houses are set on
fire, the farmers who do not dare go out to cultivate their fields,
the hundreds of thousands of refugees from "ethnic cleansing" ... are
Serbs. Or sometimes gypsies. Western media early on identified "the
Serbs" as the enemies of "multi-ethnic society" and the perpetrators
of "ethnic cleansing". The curious result seems to be that the absence
of Serbs is understood as the best guarantee of a multi-ethnic
society. This, at any rate, is the logic of the attitude taken by the
international community in regard to the Ibar valley region of Kosovo
north of Mitrovica.
That area, which forms a sort of point reaching into central Serbia,
is the largest remaining part of Kosovo where Serbs retain a
traditional majority sufficient to defend themselves from Albanian
intimidation. When, as happens from time to time, Albanian militants
from the ethnically purified region south of the Ibar attempt to cross
the river, they are stopped by Serb guards. In this situation,
"international community" spokesmen almost invariably take the line
that Serb extremists are standing in the way of "multi-ethnic" Kosovo.
The fact is deliberately overlooked that, while a certain number of
Albanians are still living in Serb-controlled northern Mitrovica, all
Serbs and Rom have been driven out of southern Mitrovica, and that if
the Albanian activists were granted free access to the north, the
probable result would be further ethnic cleansing of what remains of
the Serb population.
For some in the "international community", that would be an ideal
solution. Once all non-Albanians have been driven out, the
professional humanitarians can declare that Kosovo is "multi-ethnic",
and there will be nobody left there to dispute this triumphant assertion.
The overriding concern of the West now is to get out of the Kosovo
mess in a way that will allow it to continue to celebrate the Kosovo
war as a great humanitarian success. Having left the Balkans in a
shambles, the human rights warriors can go on to other victories. The
only thing to stop them might be a belated recognition of the truth.
Diane Johnstone is the author of Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, Nato, and
Western Delusions published by Monthly Review Press.
Diana Johnstone ci invita a riflettere su di una questione volentieri
dimenticata: la politica di guerra dei Democratici e' -
qualitativamente e/o quantitativamente - diversa da quella dei
Repubblicani? Oppure ad ispirare la "logica del bombardamento
preventivo" sono sempre le stesse ragioni strutturali e la stessa
delirante convinzione di avere ogni diritto sulla vita e sulla morte
di interi paesi e popoli? Non sono domande solo retoriche: mentre
Kerry promette che non ritirera' le truppe di occupazione dall'Iraq,
in caso di vittoria, la lobby pan-albanese sostiene la campagna
elettorale dei Democratici. Il Kosovo colonia degli USA, governato
dalle mafie che trafficano in droghe, armi ed esseri umani e ridotto a
lager nazista per i serbi e le altre minoranze, e' infatti un prodotto
genuino delle politiche di Clinton e Tenet.
Un articolo importante, questo della Johnstone, di quelli che i
commentatori della sinistra italiana non scriverebbero mai... ]
http://www.counterpunch.org/johnstone06242004.html
June 24, 2004
Clinton, Kerry and Kosovo
The Lie of a "Good War"
By DIANE JOHNSTONE
For U.S. politicians, if all wars are good, some are better than
others. Democrats prefer Clinton wars and Republicans prefer Bush
wars. But in the end, they almost unanimously come together to support
all wars. The differences concern the choice of official rationale..
To suggest subtle criticism of the Republican war against Iraq, while
making it clear that they are by no means opposed to war as such, the
2004 Democratic election campaigners can be expected to glorify the
Kosovo war. The prominence of General Wesley Clark in the Democratic
camp makes that quite clear.
John Kerry's foreign policy adviser Will Marshall of the Progressive
Policy Institute, author of "Democratic Realism: the Third Way",
points to the exemplary nature of the 1999 "<U.S.-led> intervention in
Kosovo". It was "a policy consciously based on a mix of moral values
and security interests with the parallel goals of halting a
humanitarian tragedy and ensuring NATO's credibility as an effective
force for regional stability".
The "humanitarian" rationale sounds better than the "weapons of mass
destruction" or the "links to Al Qaeda" which never existed. But then,
the "genocide"from which the NATO war allegedly saved the Albanians of
Kosovo never existed either.
But while the WMD deception has been exposed, the founding lie behind
the Kosovo war is still widely believed. It effectively distracts from
the very existence of the what Marshall calls the "parallel goal"of
strengthening NATO. Aside from the crippling material damage inflicted
on the targeted country, the Kosovo lie has caused even more
irreparable damage to relations between the Serb and Albanian
inhabitants of Kosovo.
The situation in that small province of multiethnic Serbia was the
result of a long and complex history of conflict, frequently
encouraged and exploited by outside powers, notably by the support to
Albanian nationalism by the Axis powers in World War II. Each
community accused the other of plotting "ethnic cleansing" and even
"genocide". But there were reasonable people on both sides willing to
work out a compromise solution. The constructive role of outsiders
would have been to calm the paranoid tendencies in bothcommunities and
support constructive initiatives. Indeed, the Kosovo problem could
have been easily managed, and eventually solved, had the Great Powers
so desired. But as in the past, the Great Powers exploited and
aggravated the ethnic conflicts for their own purposes. In total
ignorance of the complex history of the region, sheeplike politicians
and media echoed and amplified the most extreme nationalist Albanian
propaganda. This provided NATO with its pretext to demonstrate
"credibility". The Great Powers have in effect told the Albanians that
all their worst accusations against the Serbs were true. Even
Albanians know who know better (such as Veton Surroi) are intimidated
and silenced by the racist nationalists backed by the United States.
The result is disastrous. Empowered by their official status as unique
victims of Serb iniquity, the Albanians of Kosovo -- and especially
the youth, raised on a decade of nationalist myth -- can give free
rein to their cultivated hatred of the Serbs. Armed Albanian
nationalists proceeded to drive the Serbian and gypsy populations out
of the province. Those remaining do not dare venture out of their
ghettos. Albanians willing to live with the Serbs risk being murdered.
Ever since the NATO-led force (KFOR) marched into Kosovo in June 1999,
violent persecution of Serbs and Roma has been regularly described as
"revenge" -- which in the Albanian tradition is considered the summit
of virtuous conduct. Describing the murder of elderly women in their
homes or children at play as acts of "revenge" is a way of excusing or
even approving the violence.
Last March 17, following the false accusation that Serbs were
responsible for the accidental drowning of three Albanian children,
organized mobs of Albanians, including many teenagers, rampaged
through Kosovo destroying 35 Serbian Orthodox Christian churches and
monasteries, some of them artistic gems dating from the fourteenth
century. Well over a hundred churches had already been attacked with
fire and explosives in the past five years. The objective is quite
clearly to erase all historic trace of centuries of Serb presence, the
better to assert their claim to an ethnically pure Albanian Kosovo.
The self-satisfaction of the "international community" was severely
shaken by the March violence. The occasional KFOR units that tried to
protect Serb sites found themselves in armed clashes with Albanian
mobs. In the wake of the rampages, Finnish politician Harri Holkeri
resigned two months before expiration of his one-year renewable
mandate as head of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) supposed to
administer the province. He was the fourth to get out of the job as
fast as he could. Apparently on the verge of a nervous breakdown,
Holkeri lamented to a press conference that UNMIK has no intelligence
service of its own, and had received no prior hint of the March
pogroms. In short, the mass of international administrators, military
occupation forces and non-governmental agencies have no idea what is
going on in the province they are theoretically running. Indicating
his awareness that the only role left for UNMIK was that of scapegoat,
Holkeri warned of "difficult days ahead". That is a safe prediction.
Trouble ahead
On June 11, the former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army leader
Hashim Thaci, the protege of Madeleine Albright and her press officer
James Rubin, denounced UNMIK as a "complete failure" and announced
that, if he wins Kosovo's forthcoming elections in October, he will
implement his "vision of Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state".
The circumstances suggest that not only Thaci, but any newly elected
Kosovo may do the same. Proclamation of Kosovo's independence on the
eve of U.S. presidential elections could be shrewd timing. With Iraq
exploding, American leaders need to maintain the myth of the "success"
in Kosovo. Getting into open conflict with the Albanians could be
politically disastrous.
At the same time, many Europeans saw the anti-Serb pogroms in March as
evidence that Kosovo has a long way to go to reach the "standards" of
democratic human rights and ethnic harmony which UNMIK is mandated to
achieve before any final decision on the province's status.
There are serious reasons not to give in to the Albanian demand for an
"independent and sovereign Kosovo".
1. Legality.
First of all, there is the minor question of legality: minor, inasmuch
as the NATO powers have ignored it from the start. The war itself was
totally devoid of any legitimate basis in international law. It was
officially concluded in June 1999 by a peace accord incorporated into
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which, among other things,
obliged the occupying powers to :
-- "ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all
inhabitants of Kosovo" -- which logically should mean "all", and not
solely the Albanians;
-- "ensure the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons"
-- by which the U.S. negotiators probably meant the Albanians who had
fled during the bombing, but since they promptly returned on their
own, without difficulty, this stipulation in reality refers to Serbs,
Rom and other non-Albanians forced to flee;
-- establish an interim political framework "taking full account of
[...]the principles of sovereignty and integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia" -- which amounts to recognition that Kosovo
remains part of a larger political entity made up of Serbia and
Montenegro;
-- permit the return of an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian
personnel, including border control police and customs agents;
-- effect the maintenance of civil law and order and the protection of
human rights.
In reality, once the United States got its big military foot in the
door, Resolution 1244 was scarcely worth the paper it was written on.
The United States had other priorities:
-- First, in record time, the Pentagon built an enormous military
base, "Camp Bondsteel", on a thousand areas of illegally expropriated
farmland strategically located near trans-Balkan transit routes, on
the approaches to the Middle East and Caspian Sea oil transport.
-- The other obvious U.S. priority was to preserve the clandestine
wartime alliance with the "Kosovo Liberation Army", not only against
the Serbs, but also, implicitly, against any European allies which
might seek influence in post-conquest Kosovo. After a sham
"disarmament" disposing of a few obsolete light arms, the KLA was
renamed the "Kosovo Protection Force" and put on the U.N. payroll.
Certain of its officers proceeded to mount armed actions to extend
"greater Albania" to neighboring Macedonia and parts of Southern
Serbia next to Kosovo. These operations were launched from the
American sector, next to Camp Bondsteel.
-- As for the internal organization of Kosovo itself, the U.S.
priority is, as usual, privatization of the economy. Privatization in
practice starts with dismantling whatever government services existed,
on the theory that without government interference, private initiative
will flourish.
In a very special sense, this has indeed proved to be the case.
Kosovo, already a transit area for the largest amount of heroin
smuggled from Turkey to Western Europe, has rapidly become the center
of a new trade in women sex slaves. The Albanian mafia is by far the
biggest operator in these trades. The "internationals" who have come
to "civilize" the province provide a thriving local market for
prostitutes. If they ever go home, the Albanian mafia can count on the
networks it has developed throughout Western Europe to keep business going
2. The economy.
In socialist Yugoslavia, Kosovo was by far the poorest area in
Yugoslavia, with the highest rate of chronic unemployment. It still
is. But then, it benefited from injection of the largest amount of
development funds from the rest of the country. Although the sentiment
that their poverty was a result of exploitation contributed to the
rise of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, the fact is that Kosovo was
always heavily subsidized by the rest of Yugoslavia, and as a result
was considerably more developed than neighboring Albania.
Since the NATO occupation, Kosovo lives off other sources of income,
mainly the flourishing drugs and sex trades. The "international
community" has contributed a patchwork of social services (from UNMIK
police to NGO counselos) that provide a temporary substitute for the
expulsion of the local branches of the Serbian government. Camp
Bondsteel provides the largest number of legitimate jobs to Albanians,
and may continue to do so even after the demand for chauffeurs and
interpreters dries up as the NGOs go home. Saudi Arabia can be counted
on to finance mosque construction. But with a per capita income of
about $30 per month, it is hard to see where an "independent Kosovo"
could scrape up the tax base to pay for a government, especially since
so much of the real income is illicit, outside the reach of tax
collectors.
Kosovo is only an extreme case of the "transition" from socialism to
the free market, as imposed on Eastern Europe by the "international
community". The State and its services were removed by NATO military
force, whereas elsewhere the demolition process has been more gradual
and less dramatic, the result of pressures from the IMF, the World
Bank and the European Union. The mass of unemployed young men have
little prospect of earning a living other than by getting in on the
crime business. It is hard to see what can prevent "independent
Kosovo" from being an uncontrollable crime center.
At the end of World War II, in order to defeat the Fascists and combat
the Communists, U.S. intelligence services cynically brought the Mafia
back to Sicily. The parallel with Kosovo does not go beyond that. For
unlike Kosovo, Sicily is an essentially rich island, with a
diversified economy and numerous centuries-old sophisticated urban
centers where large sectors of a highly educated population have
courageously resisted the corruption and violence of the mafia. This
aspect of Sicilian society is insufficiently appreciated abroad, where
it is more "romantic" to glorify the gangsters. In comparison, Kosovo
Albanian society simply does not possess such material or cultural
resources for resisting the power of the new mafias that, while
feeding on certain clan traditions, are above all a product of
neoliberal globalism.
3. Human rights.
The protection of "human rights" was the pretext for the 1999 war. In
terms of everyday human relations, the situation is far worse than
before. This is not widely recognized for two reasons. One, since the
"international community" rather than Milosevic is in charge, media
interest in Kosovo has virtually evaporated. Second, the victims of
persecution and harassment, the children whose school buses are
stoned, the old people who are beaten and whose houses are set on
fire, the farmers who do not dare go out to cultivate their fields,
the hundreds of thousands of refugees from "ethnic cleansing" ... are
Serbs. Or sometimes gypsies. Western media early on identified "the
Serbs" as the enemies of "multi-ethnic society" and the perpetrators
of "ethnic cleansing". The curious result seems to be that the absence
of Serbs is understood as the best guarantee of a multi-ethnic
society. This, at any rate, is the logic of the attitude taken by the
international community in regard to the Ibar valley region of Kosovo
north of Mitrovica.
That area, which forms a sort of point reaching into central Serbia,
is the largest remaining part of Kosovo where Serbs retain a
traditional majority sufficient to defend themselves from Albanian
intimidation. When, as happens from time to time, Albanian militants
from the ethnically purified region south of the Ibar attempt to cross
the river, they are stopped by Serb guards. In this situation,
"international community" spokesmen almost invariably take the line
that Serb extremists are standing in the way of "multi-ethnic" Kosovo.
The fact is deliberately overlooked that, while a certain number of
Albanians are still living in Serb-controlled northern Mitrovica, all
Serbs and Rom have been driven out of southern Mitrovica, and that if
the Albanian activists were granted free access to the north, the
probable result would be further ethnic cleansing of what remains of
the Serb population.
For some in the "international community", that would be an ideal
solution. Once all non-Albanians have been driven out, the
professional humanitarians can declare that Kosovo is "multi-ethnic",
and there will be nobody left there to dispute this triumphant assertion.
The overriding concern of the West now is to get out of the Kosovo
mess in a way that will allow it to continue to celebrate the Kosovo
war as a great humanitarian success. Having left the Balkans in a
shambles, the human rights warriors can go on to other victories. The
only thing to stop them might be a belated recognition of the truth.
Diane Johnstone is the author of Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, Nato, and
Western Delusions published by Monthly Review Press.