The Economist April 1st-7th, 2000
The next Balkan War
It could still be avoided with a relatively small amount of money, so
long
as it is spent wisely and soon
LOST in their cyber-dreams in Lisbon, the European Union's leaders must
have felt pleasantly far from the mess in the Balkans. They did, it is
true, offer some reassuring generalities about fast-track procedures for
effective assistance and so on in their conclusions; and EU panjandrums
and officials from a host of governments and international institutions
were taking stock of the Balkan imbroglio again in Brussels a few days
later. But there is little evidence that the Union's leaders are ready
to
devote the necessary attention to an issue that should be high on the
agenda of any European political summit right now: the avoidance of
another war in the Balkans, which remains all too real a possibility.
In case the summiteers have forgotten, the most dramatic event in Europe
last year was not, alas, the launch of some bold economic experiment but
the outbreak of the continent's most intensive war for half a
century-and
its conclusion on terms that offered no guarantee against a recurrence.
Since the end of the war over Kosovo last June, the West's adversary
Slobodan Milosevic has tightened his grip on power, at least in his
native
Serbia, and raised the rhetorical temperature. He is a man who thrives
on
wars, even though they invariably leave him king of an ever-smaller
castle, and several signs suggest that his next war could be fought over
Montenegro, the last remaining republic with which Serbia is linked in
the
shrunken Yugoslav federation.
Heading for the last bust-up
Montenegro is hardly a model democracy, neither is its president, Milo
Djukanovic, a model citizen. But he is pro-western and no friend of Mr
Milosevic. Indeed, he has been trying to put some distance between his
small republic and Serbia, and the West would rightly like to see him
succeed, so long as his efforts do not precipitate a bloody rupture.
That, however, is just what Mr Milosevic might welcome. As an indicted
war criminal, in charge of a country under sanctions, Mr Milosevic may
well calculate that he has nothing to lose by testing transatlantic
solidarity once again and drawing Russia's new administration, as well
as
NATO, into an international crisis. As the experience of the past
decade
makes plain, European governments cannot keep the peace in the Balkans
without taking America into account. In the continent's potential
killing
fields, moreover, there is a natural division of labour whereby
America's
might serves as a strategic deterrent, while artfully applied economic
assistance from EU governments keeps local antagonisms from boiling
over.
In sensitive spots like Macedonia, Kosovo and, above all, Montenegro,
the
swift dispatch of relatively small sums of financial assistance could
well
make the difference between peace and war. Many European politicians
understand this perfectly well, but their collective response to the
need
has shown up many of the EU's worst features: introversion, lack of
urgency and an obsession with arcane technicalities.
In the Balkans no less than in cyberspace, the EU is always capable of
conjuring up lofty visions. At this week's conference in Brussels on
economic development in south-eastern Europe, there was much talk-some
of
it sensible-about the need for bridges, roads, railway links and the
like
to create inter-dependence. There was also a realisation that
Montenegro's pro-western government needs aid over the next few weeks if
it is to fend off economic warfare from Serbia and maintain some
credibility at home: Mr Djukanovic says Mr Milosevic is trying to
promote
a coup against him, using Yugoslav troops garrisoned in Montenegro.
There
was a realisation, too, that spending money wisely in the Balkans is not
quite the same as spending it freely: if the aim is to keep Mr
Djukanovic
in power, it must go to pay the pensions of deserving Montenegrins
(including the Serb-minded) and so on, not to finance
cigarette-smuggling
by corrupt members of the regime. But did all that add up to action?
In Lisbon, the heads of government urged the "competent
institutions"-including, presumably, their own finance ministers-to
"make
necessary decisions"
to help Montenegro. But if those decisions continue to be held up by
technicalities and buck-passing between different parts of the EU's
decision-making structure, they may come too late to bolster the
Montenegrin government against a takeover bid by Mr Milosevic-and hence
too late to avert another war in the Balkans. If Europe's minds are
indeed genuinely concentrated on high, no time should be wasted in
taking
action lower down.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
The next Balkan War
It could still be avoided with a relatively small amount of money, so
long
as it is spent wisely and soon
LOST in their cyber-dreams in Lisbon, the European Union's leaders must
have felt pleasantly far from the mess in the Balkans. They did, it is
true, offer some reassuring generalities about fast-track procedures for
effective assistance and so on in their conclusions; and EU panjandrums
and officials from a host of governments and international institutions
were taking stock of the Balkan imbroglio again in Brussels a few days
later. But there is little evidence that the Union's leaders are ready
to
devote the necessary attention to an issue that should be high on the
agenda of any European political summit right now: the avoidance of
another war in the Balkans, which remains all too real a possibility.
In case the summiteers have forgotten, the most dramatic event in Europe
last year was not, alas, the launch of some bold economic experiment but
the outbreak of the continent's most intensive war for half a
century-and
its conclusion on terms that offered no guarantee against a recurrence.
Since the end of the war over Kosovo last June, the West's adversary
Slobodan Milosevic has tightened his grip on power, at least in his
native
Serbia, and raised the rhetorical temperature. He is a man who thrives
on
wars, even though they invariably leave him king of an ever-smaller
castle, and several signs suggest that his next war could be fought over
Montenegro, the last remaining republic with which Serbia is linked in
the
shrunken Yugoslav federation.
Heading for the last bust-up
Montenegro is hardly a model democracy, neither is its president, Milo
Djukanovic, a model citizen. But he is pro-western and no friend of Mr
Milosevic. Indeed, he has been trying to put some distance between his
small republic and Serbia, and the West would rightly like to see him
succeed, so long as his efforts do not precipitate a bloody rupture.
That, however, is just what Mr Milosevic might welcome. As an indicted
war criminal, in charge of a country under sanctions, Mr Milosevic may
well calculate that he has nothing to lose by testing transatlantic
solidarity once again and drawing Russia's new administration, as well
as
NATO, into an international crisis. As the experience of the past
decade
makes plain, European governments cannot keep the peace in the Balkans
without taking America into account. In the continent's potential
killing
fields, moreover, there is a natural division of labour whereby
America's
might serves as a strategic deterrent, while artfully applied economic
assistance from EU governments keeps local antagonisms from boiling
over.
In sensitive spots like Macedonia, Kosovo and, above all, Montenegro,
the
swift dispatch of relatively small sums of financial assistance could
well
make the difference between peace and war. Many European politicians
understand this perfectly well, but their collective response to the
need
has shown up many of the EU's worst features: introversion, lack of
urgency and an obsession with arcane technicalities.
In the Balkans no less than in cyberspace, the EU is always capable of
conjuring up lofty visions. At this week's conference in Brussels on
economic development in south-eastern Europe, there was much talk-some
of
it sensible-about the need for bridges, roads, railway links and the
like
to create inter-dependence. There was also a realisation that
Montenegro's pro-western government needs aid over the next few weeks if
it is to fend off economic warfare from Serbia and maintain some
credibility at home: Mr Djukanovic says Mr Milosevic is trying to
promote
a coup against him, using Yugoslav troops garrisoned in Montenegro.
There
was a realisation, too, that spending money wisely in the Balkans is not
quite the same as spending it freely: if the aim is to keep Mr
Djukanovic
in power, it must go to pay the pensions of deserving Montenegrins
(including the Serb-minded) and so on, not to finance
cigarette-smuggling
by corrupt members of the regime. But did all that add up to action?
In Lisbon, the heads of government urged the "competent
institutions"-including, presumably, their own finance ministers-to
"make
necessary decisions"
to help Montenegro. But if those decisions continue to be held up by
technicalities and buck-passing between different parts of the EU's
decision-making structure, they may come too late to bolster the
Montenegrin government against a takeover bid by Mr Milosevic-and hence
too late to avert another war in the Balkans. If Europe's minds are
indeed genuinely concentrated on high, no time should be wasted in
taking
action lower down.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------