http://english.mn.ru/english/issue.php?2007-6-7

Moscow News
February 16, 2007

Three Arguments Against Kosovo Independence
By Yevgeny Primakov, member of the Russian Academy of
Sciences


-[T]he U.S. State Department put the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA), which was using force to drive the Serbs
out of Kosovo, on a list of terrorist organizations.
But starting in 1998, the situation began to turn
around. There is no need to mention the rest of the
story - it is well known.
Its main distinguishing feature was that it was not
diplomacy, not politics, but NATO that had become the
principal player on the Yugoslav scene.
-[One] option is to use the Ahtisaari plan as a basis
for a U.N. Security Council resolution. This line of
action is favored by the U.S.
It is acting in haste, apparently without assessing
the possible fallout of this haste. But if it is
drafted by the U.S. and other Western countries, I
believe that Russia should veto a resolution
recognizing Kosovo's independence.

A story published in [MN #5] offered an in-depth
analysis of a plan for Kosovo presented by Martti
Ahtisaari, special envoy of the U.N. secretary general
and former president of Finland.

The document, drawn up on the basis of Ahtisaari's
numerous trips to Belgrade and Pristina, as well as a
number of meetings with statesmen from different
countries, skirts the issue of Kosovo's independence.

At the same time, however, it provides essential
trappings of a sovereign state - the emblem, the flag,
the anthem, as well as an issue of special importance,
the right to join international organizations -
including the U.N., the EU and NATO.

Serbia took a sharply negative view of the plan.

The position of Kosovo's Albanians, however, is not so
negative because the U.S. and some West European
politicians are telling Pristina that the proposal
will lead to Kosovo's formal separation from Serbia
and that the province will eventually become an
independent state.

This status, they say, is a foregone conclusion: the
plan is a bona fide road map to independence, but it
cannot be granted right away. Amid such statements,
demonstrations in Pristina against the plan resemble a
means of pressuring the Serbs and the world community
as a whole to embrace the plan - or else.

What is to be done in this situation, given the
extremely complex nature of the problem at hand and
its obvious implications for other conflicts in
various parts of the world, not to mention global
relations?

There are several factors that need to be taken into
account if a compromise solution is to be achieved.

Kosovo and Metohia are considered to be the Serbs'
native and ancestral land, a land where their
civilization, culture and identity evolved.

The Serbian Constitution, recently adopted in a
nationwide referendum, calls Kosovo an inalienable
part of Serbia. Kosovo's formal secession from Serbia
- not a compromise solution acceptable to the Serbian
side - will sharply strengthen the positions of the
country's radical forces.

The Albanians have also lived in Kosovo for centuries.
As a result of the standoff between the Serbs and
Albanians in Kosovo, not least with the use of force,
ethnic Albanians account for 90 percent of the
province's population.

Under Josip Broz Tito, Kosovo had an autonomy status
as part of Yugoslavia. Following the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, Kosovo's Albanians created their own
parliament (Skupstina) that in 1990 passed a law on
the province's independence.

That did not lead, however, to its breakaway from
Serbia; rather a de facto diarchy was established in
Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova, elected "president" of Kosovo,
adhered to a moderate position, specifically during
negotiations with Belgrade.

There was a handful of advocates for Kosovo's
independent status outside the province.

In 1996, as Russian foreign minister, I met with the
Albanian foreign minister at a U.N. General Assembly
session in New York.

He told me that his country (even his country - Ye.P.)
only saw a solution to the Kosovo problem within the
borders of Yugoslavia.

A similar position was recorded in a number of
documents adopted by the Contact Group, comprising
Russia, the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and France.

The Group's first statement on Kosovo was adopted on
September 24, 1997 with my participation. The
resolution was based on the assumption that the Kosovo
problem was Yugoslavia's internal affair.

We subsequently revisited the Kosovo issue on numerous
occasions, but the general consensus was that Kosovo
is not an independent state entity.

The debate between myself and former U.S. Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright proceeded along the following
lines: "Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia" (Albright) and
"Kosovo is part of Serbia" (myself).

Whatever the case, both the U.S. and Russia considered
Kosovo to be a "part" of another state.

Furthermore, the U.S. State Department put the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA), which was using force to drive
the Serbs out of Kosovo, on a list of terrorist
organizations.

But starting in 1998, the situation began to turn
around. There is no need to mention the rest of the
story - it is well known.

Its main distinguishing feature was that it was not
diplomacy, not politics, but NATO that had become the
principal player on the Yugoslav scene.

The situation did not change when the United Nations
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
formally took over, creating "provisional
self-government" and conducting [parliamentary]
elections that were boycotted by the Serb population.

Nor did anything change for the better when
international military and police forces were brought
into Kosovo - a total of 16,500 servicemen from NATO
member countries.

Today, the Serbs have become second-rate citizens,
exposed to constant pressure from Kosovo Albanians who
are determined to evict even the tiny number of Serbs
that remain in the province.

What now? There are two scenarios.

One is to treat the Ahtisaari plan as a basis for
serious negotiations between the parties involved,
even if this requires considerable time.

It may be recalled that the Cyprus and Irish problems
has been debated for decades.

This is not to suggest that the Kosovo crisis should
be allowed to drag on. But is a forcible settlement,
infringing on the interests of the Serbs, really the
best method of maintaining stability in the region?

Jumping the gun can be as dangerous as marking time.

The second option is to use the Ahtisaari plan as a
basis for a U.N. Security Council resolution. This
line of action is favored by the U.S.

It is acting in haste, apparently without assessing
the possible fallout of this haste. But if it is
drafted by the U.S. and other Western countries, I
believe that Russia should veto a resolution
recognizing Kosovo's independence. The U.S. must
understand Russia's motives.

I would like to mention three.

First, granting Kosovo independence could reopen
interethnic armed conflicts in the post-Soviet area
that required so much effort to extinguish - between
Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Moldova and Transdnestr.

According to Condoleezza Rice, she often told her
Russian interlocutors that Kosovo "may not be a
precedent."

But can this proposition be used as a policy basis?

I do not think so. Kosovo's secession from Serbia is a
special case: The attempt is being made to separate an
autonomous republic from a state with internationally
recognized borders.

But the secession of an autonomous republic from a
state must be approved by the state's entire
population. I am afraid that Kosovo's secession from
Serbia will fuel separatism in Europe, among other
regions.

Second, granting Kosovo independence could affect the
state structure of the Balkans, which is

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