From:   francesco

Date: November 28, 2007 11:59:04 PM GMT+01:00

To:   scienzaepace @ liste.comodino.org

carissim*

vi invio questo testo, che sta circolando per adesioni all'interno della comunita' scientifica, con il quale si vuole esprimere la posizione di esperti e scienziati di diverse discipline sull'uso di armi all'uranio impoverito, in visto dell'imminente votazione dell'assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite, prevista per i primi di dicembre.

La risoluzione e' stata un po' "azzoppata" e ridotta di forza nella votazione del Primo Comitato, ma rappresenta comunque un passo significativo nel lungo e complicato percorso per mettere al bando questo tipo di armi.

Qualora vogliate aderire, vi prego di segnalarlo a

Katsumi Furitsu

f-katsumi @ titan.ocn.ne.jp

grazie

francesco

---

On November the 1st, the resolution entitled 'Effects of the use of armaments 

and ammunitions containing depleted uranium' was passed at the UN First 

Committee by an overwhelming majority. The resolution was drafted by the 

Movement of Non-Aligned States and submitted by Indonesia. We, the scientists 

who have been concerned about the harmful effects of depleted uranium (DU) 

weapons, welcome this resolution. 

The resolution was adopted, because the majority of the UN member states 

took 'into consideration the potential harmful effects of the use of 

armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium on human health and the 

environment' (Preparatory Paragraph: PP 4); 'convinced that as humankind is 

more aware of the need to take immediate measures to protect the environment, 

any event that could jeopardize such efforts requires urgent attention to 

implement the required measures' (PP 3). It was also 'guided by the purposes 

and principles enshrined in the Charter of the UN and the rules of 

Humanitarian International Law' (PP 1) and showed the determination 'to carry 

forward negotiations on arms regulation and disarmament' (PP 2) on the issue 

of DU weapons.

We are convinced that, and expect that, this resolution will be the first step 

to place the issue of DU weapons on the disarmament agenda, following the 

issues of Landmines and Cluster Munitions, and the beginning of a serious 

discussion about the deleterious nature of DU weapons and a possible ban, 

among the member nations of the UN.

We really respect and appreciate the effort of the leading countries on behalf 

of this resolution. We also appreciate the support from all the countries 

that voted for the resolution. We request and believe that these supportive 

countries will vote for the resolution again at the Plenary Session in 

December.

We strongly request the countries that abstained from the voting, to seriously 

reconsider the international meaning of the resolution stated in the PPs and 

to vote in support of it at the Plenary Session, based on the independent 

political will of each country.

There is mounting scientific research, including the studies reported in the 

most recently peer-reviewed papers, which clearly indicate 'the potential 

harmful effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted 

uranium on human health and the environment'. We think that the previous 

reports from governmental bodies and international organizations have not yet 

fully reflected and referenced these scientific studies. They mainly focus on 

the radiological toxicity to the lung and the chemical toxicity to the 

kidneys. It is not right to vote against the resolution based on those 

previous reports, without considering these omissions.

The countries, which voted against the resolution, should seriously consider 

such circumstances, take account of the multilateralism and dialogue with 

many other countries which are concerned about the effect of these weapons 

and at least come to the table for discussion on the issue. Therefore, we 

strongly request these countries to change their previous stance and vote for 

supporting the resolution at the coming Plenary Session.

We, the scientists who have been working as specialists in different 

scientific fields including medicine, chemistry, biology, physics, 

environmental science and epidemiology, have been deeply concerned about the 

potentially harmful effects on the environment and human health, which might 

be caused by the radioactive and chemical toxicity of DU following the use of 

DU weapons. 

DU is 'nuclear waste' produced from the enrichment process and is mostly made 

up of the alpha emitting isotope Uranium 238 and is depleted in the 

fissionable isotope Uranium 235, compared to concentrated natural uranium 

(NU). DU is somewhat less radioactive than NU, yet has about 60% of the 

radioactivity of concentrated NU (NU in nature is a thousand times less 

concentrated).  DU is mostly an alpha emitter, a very damaging type of 

radioactivity inside the body. DU and NU are identical in terms of the 

chemical toxicity, which is also a source of potential damage to the body. 

With regard to DU's radioactivity, it is well known that concentrated DU is 

one of the radioactive materials, which is strictly controlled by laws in 

most of the countries of the world.

Uranium's high density gives DU shells increased range and penetrative power. 

This density, combined with uranium's pyrophoric nature, results in a 

high-energy kinetic weapon that can punch and burn through armour plating. 

Striking a hard target, DU munitions create extremely 

high temperatures of more than 3000oC. The uranium immediately burns and 

vaporizes into an aerosol, which is easily diffused in the environment, while 

the shell is penetrating the target. The uranium particles formed by this 

heat are unlike forms of naturally formed uranium in terms of their size (10 

to 100 times smaller).  These extremely small particle sizes are known to be 

much more toxic and more rapidly absorbed from the lungs than larger 

(micron-sized) particles. 

Aerosolized DU dust can easily spread over the battlefield, and can be 

re-suspended by winds especially where the climate is dry, spreading over 

civilian areas, sometimes even crossing international borders. Therefore, not 

only military personnel but also civilians, including children who are very 

sensitive to such a toxic substance, might inhale the fine DU particles and 

internalize them in their bodies. It was also recognized that DU weapons were 

actually used even in highly populated residential areas. The contamination 

continues even after the cessation of hostilities. DU particles will remain 

in the environment and will retain their radiation for decades and centuries 

if not longer. Taking these aspects of DU weapons into account, we consider 

that DU weapons are illegal under binding international humanitarian, human 

rights and environmental law and is one of the inhumane weapons 

of 'indiscriminate destruction'.

Uranium is a radioactive element naturally distributed in the environment. 

However, we repeat that the very fine particles of DU created at the 

extremely high temperatures that result from the impact of a DU shell on a 

tank are micron- and nano-sized and can travel in the body once inhaled. They 

have no analogue in history. In addition, the high temperatures at impact 

sublimate the metals in the tank around the penetrating holes and in the 

shell casing, adding tiny particles of these metals and their oxides to the 

aerosol which can be internalized if inhaled, like the uranium, and which are 

toxic to the body. We have been facing an entirely new type of contamination 

to humans and the environment through these weapons. 

It is true that we do not as yet understand the full impact of fine particles 

of DU oxide on the human body. However, there is considerable amount of basic 

scientific evidence from both animal and cellular studies (including studies 

of human lung cells) that suggest deleterious effects on human health from 

inhaled DU particles through both radiological action and chemical toxicity. 

These data clearly indicate that the internalized uranium (both soluble 

component and insoluble particles) has genotoxic effect (carcinogenic, 

mutagenic), for it affects directly and/or indirectly the DNA, which codes 

the genetic information of the cell. It has also been pointed out that the 

internalized uranium might affect the intracellular organelles and/or enzyme 

proteins and damage some of the repairing mechanisms of the cells. These 

harmful effects are possibly produced in the various tissues and organs of a 

body, including damaging effects on the immune and nervous systems. If 

genotoxic effects are produced in the germ line cells, it might lead to 

trans-generational effects. A teratogenic effect to the fetus was detected in 

the animal studies exposed to DU during the gestation period and a number of 

Gulf War veterans were found to have DU in their semen. We should also 

consider a possible synergistic effect of radio-toxicity and 

chemical-toxicity.

We think it critical to immediately launch a full-dress, long-lasting and 

independent environmental monitoring as well as health and medical research 

on possibly exposed populations, both military and civilian, in the areas 

where the DU weapons have been used. We should also pay serious attention to 

the contamination and possible harmful health effects through the 

manufacturing of DU weapons, for a recent study clearly indicates that the 

workers of the DU weapons producing factory as well as residents living 

nearby were contaminated by DU. However, we should also note that it may take 

many years, even decades, before we get statistically significant results on 

affected populations from epidemiological studies. 

In the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which was adapted at 

the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) in Rio 

de Janeiro, they stated: 'In order to protect the environment, the 

precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 

capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 

of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 

cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation; Principle 15.' 

This 'precautionary principle' has been confirmed repeatedly in the UN. It is 

also recognized widely in the international community as one of the most 

important principles concerning the international as well as the domestic 

policies for environmental and public health protection. It is also a 

valuable and logical principle for us, scientists, when we take 

responsibility for our society. The issue of DU weapons should be also 

discussed seriously based on the 'precautionary principle' among the UN 

member countries.

Considering the basic scientific evidence we already have, it is not right to 

continue using DU weapons making the excuse that 'no definitive conclusions 

had been reached' in the present limited risk assessments of the health and 

environmental impact of DU. We request all the UN member countries to discuss 

seriously what concrete measures are needed, including the immediate 

clearance of contaminated remnants, to protect the environment and the public 

health of contaminated populations following the use of DU weapons. We 

request the member nations of the UN to refrain from using DU weapons, unless 

they are proved to be completely safe. The burden of proof is on the users. 

Furthermore, we hope very much that the international community will go 

forward to ban DU weapons, one of the inhumane weapons of 'indiscriminate 

destruction'.

References:

Keith Baverstock,"Presentation to the Defence Committee of the Belgian House 

of Representatives, 20 November 2006", 

http://www.bandepleteduranium.org/en/docs/15.pdf .

Rosalie Bertell, "Depleted Uranium: All the Questions about DU and Gulf War 

Syndrome are not yet Answered", International Journal of Health Services 36

(3), 503-520, 2006.

Wayne Briner and Jennifer Murray, "Effects of short-term and long-term 

depleted uranium exposure on open-field behavior and brain lipid oxidation in 

rats", Neurotoxicology and Teratology 27, 135-144, 2005.

Virginia Coryell and Diane Stearns, "Molecular analysis of s hprt mutations 

generated in Chinese hamster ovary EM9 cells by uranyl acetate, by hydrogen 

peroxide, and spontaneously", Molecular Carcinogenesis 45(1), 60-72, 2006.

Wendy J. Hartsock et al, "Uranyl Acetate as a Direct Inhibitor of DNA-Binding 

Proteins", Chem. Res. Toxicol. 20, 784-789, 2007.

Arjun Makhijani et al., "Science for the Vulnerable: Setting Radiation and 

Multiple Exposure Environmental Health Standards to Protect Those Most at 

Risk", Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER), October 19, 

2006. (http://www.ieer.org)

Melissa A. McDiarmid et al, "Health Effects of Depleted Uranium on Exposed 

Gulf War Veterans", Environmental Research Section A 82, 168-180, 2002 (p. 

172 on DU in semen of Gulf War veterans).

J.L. Domingo, Reproductive and developmental toxicity of natural and depleted 

uranium: a review, Reproductive Toxicology 15, pp. 603-609, 2001.

Alexandra C. Miller (editor), Depleted Uranium: Properties, Uses, and Health 

Consequences, Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007. See 

Chapter 1 by David McClain and A.C. Miller and Chapter 4 by Wayne Briner 

(Neurotoxicology of depleted uranium in Adult and Developing Rodents), as 

well as other chapters.

A.C. Miller et al., "Observation of Radiation-Specific Damage in Human Cells 

Exposed to Depleted Uranium: Dicentric Frequency and Neoplastic 

Transformation as Endpoints", Radiation Protection Dosimetry 99, 275-278, 

2002.

Marjorie Monleau et al. "Genotoxic and Inflammatory Effects of Depleted 

Uranium Particles Inhaled by Rats", Toxicological Sciences 89(1), 287-295, 

2006.

Randall R. Parrish et al., "Depleted uranium contamination by inhalation 

exposure and its detection after approximately 20 years: implications for 

human health assessment", Science of the Total Environment, 2007 October 30 

[E-pub ahead off print]

Adaikkappan Periyakarupan et al, "Uranium induces oxidative stress in lung 

epithelial cells", Arch. Toxicol. 8(16) 2007.

Diane M. Stearns et al., "Uranyl acetate induces hprt mutations and 

uranium-DNA adducts in Chinese hamster ovary EM9 cells", Mutagenesis 20(6), 

417-423, 2005.

Bin Wan et al. "In Vitro Immune Toxicity of Depleted Uranium: Effects on 

Murine Macrophages, CD+T Cells, and Gene Expression Profiles", Environmental 

Health Perspectives 114(1), 85-91, 2006.

Sandra S. Wise et al, "Particulate Depleted Uranium Is Cytotoxic and 

Clastogenic to Human Lung Cells", Chem. Res. Toxicol. 20(5), 815-820, 2007.

Chazel, V. et al, Characterisation anddissolution of depleted uranium aerosols 

produced during impacts of kinetic energy penetrators against a tank. Radiat. 

Prot. Dosim. 105, 163-166, 2003.

Cooper, J.R. et al. "The behaviour of uranium-233 oxide and uranyl-233 nitrate 

in rats." Intl. J. Radiat. Biol. 41(4), 421-433, 1982.

Wilson, H.B. et al. "Relation of particle size of uranium dioxide dust to 

toxicity following ingalation by animals: II." Archives of Industrial Hygiene 

and Occupational Medicine 6(2), 93-104, 1952.

Wilson, H.B. et al. "Relation of particle size of U3O8 dust to toxicity 

following inhalation in animals." Arch. of Indust. Health 11, 11-16, 1955.

Stradling, G.N. et al. "The metabolism of ceramic and nonceramic forms of 

uranium dioxide after deposition in the rat lung." Human Toxicol. 7, 133-139, 

1988.

(Originally drafted by Katsumi Furitsu M.D. Ph.D. and Gretel Munroe. Nov. 20. 2007)