(Una ampia rassegna della rete transnazionale delle "rivoluzioni colorate", gestite dall'imperialismo per ricolonizzare i paesi sovrani, è fornita in “Orange Networks From Belgrade to Bishkek”, saggio pubblicato recentemente a San Pietroburgo...)
Strategic Culture Foundation
May 19, 2008
How Orange Networks Work.
On “Orange Networks From Belgrade to Bishkek”
Andrei Areshev
We have seen well-organized mobs - allegedly acting in
the name of “protesters” - occupy parliament buildings
in Belgrade and Tbilisi, paralyze Minsk and Budapest,
launch noisy campaigns in the streets of Kyiv, and
riot in downtown Bishkek and Yerevan.
The events have taken place sufficiently long ago to
realize that the color revolutions have not led
Serbia, Ukraine, and Georgia to prosperity.
They did transform the political landscape in the
post-Soviet space though, and the consequences they
have for neighboring countries, especially for Russia,
such as the drift in Ukraine's foreign politics which
followed the developments of 2004, can prove
long-lasting and dire.
The phenomenon of “color revolutions” has been
examined by Russian political science in a number of
point studies, particularly those which dealt with the
2004 events in Ukraine.
However, until recently, there was no broad study of
the of the “non-violent” coup d’état technology.
“Orange Networks From Belgrade to Bishkek”, a
collection of essays prepared by the Historical
Perspective Foundation and published in Saint
Petersburg by Alateya Press in 2008, is intended to
fill the gap.
Altogether, the essays comprise a detailed
investigation of the technologies employed in the
“color revolutions” first in Serbia in 2000 and later
in several FSU [Former Soviet Union] Republics.
The political dynamics in the post-Soviet space (the
essays were written by an international team of
authors) leaves no doubt as to the timeliness of the
studies.
The collection was in press in March, 2008 when the
crisis erupted in Armenia – in many respects the
tragic events in the country can be regarded as a
failed “color” coup – and entailed fatalities.
Efforts to similarly destabilize other countries,
particularly Belarus, are being made continuously, and
developments like the Andijan unrest in Uzbekistan and
the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan cannot be ruled
out.
The forces which organized the upheaval in Bishkek in
2005 failed to take into account the specific features
of the local situation, and their initial objectives
largely remained unaccomplished.
Most importantly, they failed to push Kyrgyzstan out
of the orbit of political and military cooperation
with Moscow (as discussed in the essay by A.Sh.
Niyazi).
Another theme touched upon in “Orange Networks From
Belgrade to Bishkek” is the Cedar Revolution in
Lebanon and a number of other crises of the same
origin.
Student protests in Iran in 2003 could also be
considered in this context, but the authors mainly
focused on the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine,
Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and on
Russia.
The range of political and social circumstances
responsible for the radicalization of public protests
is well-known.
The most significant destabilizing factor in the
post-Soviet Republics is the course of radically
liberal economic reforms, which were adopted in the
early 1990s largely under the influence of Western
advisers.
The ideological vacuum, the dominance of petit
bourgeois philosophy in public life, a catastrophic
social stratification, mass poverty plaguing entire
social strata, the disorganization of key
administrative institutions (a phenomenon oftentimes
erroneously regarded as limited to corruption), the de
facto loss of a significant part of sovereignty by
Republics all tend to ignite public discontent and a
longing for change and justice, and to fuel the desire
to see immediate transformations and to shape history
“right here and right now”.
The younger generation which is also the most
politically active part of the population in any
country is particularly affected by the atmosphere.
Definitely, the situation is well-understood by
Western consultants seeking to manipulate the
population's protests so as to achieve their own
objectives.
Color revolution strategies and scenarios are
generated by various Western think tanks.
Their genesis and operations are analyzed by the
president of the Historical Perspective Foundation
N.A. Narochnitskaya.
The ideological doctrines formulated in think tanks
are imposed on sovereign republics regardless of their
actual national interests.
Organizations such as the Carnegie Foundation, the
Heritage Foundation, the Brookings Institution and
others teach local elites to view local politics
through the prism of “global thinking”, but the
efforts of the US think tanks are aimed exclusively at
promoting the interests of the US.
In addition to making inroads into local elites, the
main task performed by the US think tanks
internationally is to export ideological concepts and
myths which the organizers of color revolutions plant
in the minds of the populations of the targeted
countries.
In his essay, J. Laughland, a British political
scientist and writer, examines the key theoretical
provisions and the field practice of overthrowing the
legitimate authority in various countries.
He marshals an impressive array of factual data to
prove that the color revolutions are a new coup d’état
technique developed by US think tanks in cooperation
with the CIA.
Though revolutions of the kind – the ones in Serbia,
Lebanon, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia, and the
failed one in Uzbekistan – are routinely portrayed as
the results of public protests, Laughland argues that
in reality the developments were carefully planned
operations in many cases including disinformation via
mass media, and that the operations were funded and
carried out by transnational networks serving as
instruments of the Western influence.
The range of pertinent activities spans covert
operations, threats to resort to military intervention
or even a direct use of military force, smear
campaigns, secret political leverage, bribing
journalists, public disinformation, and the use of
other methods not excluding political assassinations.
For example, reconnaissance and target identification
were a part of the actual mission carried out by
agents of the CIA and other Western intelligence
agencies in the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission in
1998.
Irina Lebedeva, a US-based journalist and translator,
focuses on the role played by “angered youths” in
protest movements at least for the last 40 years.
Already in 1967, prominent social scientist Fred Emery
of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations argued
that by the late 1990s specific models of behavior
typical for younger people would possibly be used to
destabilize sovereign countries.
From this standpoint, the progress in communications
technology opens extensive opportunities. Global
media, cell phones, mass SMS messaging, blogs, and web
sites are convenient tools for real-time guiding of a
youth mob and for ascribing great political
significance to any event, no matter how real or
imaginary. The potential of propaganda under the
current conditions was exemplified by the developments
around the Racak village in Kosovo.
In 2000, Serbia became the starting point of a wave of
color revolutions.
The authors of the essays in “Orange Networks From
Belgrade to Bishkek” see the NATO attack on Yugoslavia
and the October, 2000 unrest in Serbia as links in the
chain of events organized not only to overthrow the
political regime in Belgrade but also to induce an
irreversible partition of the country.
In his essay, Belgrade-based political scientist and
historian Petr Ilchenkov supplies unique information
concerning the preparations for the protests which led
to the ouster of S. Milosevic.
Serbia was the proving ground for many of the
techniques which were subsequently refined and
employed in later color revolutions.
The techniques include the creation of mass opposition
movements and parties, the extensive application of
communication technologies to mobilize mass public
support, the pouring of large funds into spreading
protest movement logotypes, acts of individual terror
against authority figures, the formation of armed
support groups backing the protests presented as
“non-violent” by mass media, etc. Notably, the
revolution in Serbia did not translate into the
country's prosperity, and most of its activists
dropped out of politics after having played their
roles.
Lawyer S.B. Mirzoev describes in detail the activities
of Western NGO's during the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine.
The facts he presents show that the US and Canada, as
well as international organizations, both public and
governmental, were directly involved in the crisis of
the Ukrainian sovereignty.
A key role in the power seizure in the country was
played by the mechanisms of the “international
legitimization” of the candidate supported by the
West.
The activity of a large number of Western-funded
Ukrainian organizations was synchronized with that of
their Western peers.
For example, an institute led by V. Yuschenko's
political ally and future Ukrainian Defense Minister
A. Gritsenko gave Yuschenko an 11% lead on the basis
of its exit polls in the immediate wake of the
second-round run-off. The figure has never been
confirmed, and the same is true of Yuschenko's alleged
15% lead in the illegitimate third round.
Nevertheless, the 11% became a street campaign slogan
already on November 21, that is, before the ballots
were actually counted.
Dr. A.B. Krylov, a historian from the Institute for
the World Economy and International Relations of the
Russian Academy of Science, convincingly disproves the
official version of the Rose Revolution in Georgia.
According to this version, the Revolution resulted
from mass protests provoked by the official election
results which were perceived as grossly rigged in
favor of the political regime.
Following the Rose Revolution, Tbilisi's politics lost
the last signs of independence and ability to maintain
balance between various centers of power.
The dynamics of the developments around Abkhazia and
South Ossetia shows that the radically pro-US course
adopted by Georgia can have extremely negative
consequences. Saakashvili's popularity is dwindling,
and, like his Ukrainian colleague, he has to turn to
his foreign patrons for legitimization and stirs a
nationalist hysteria by groundlessly portraying Russia
as an enemy of Georgia.
In an essay entitled “Orange Technologies in Armenia,”
A. Areshev from the Strategic Culture Foundation
addresses the developments in the country in
2004-2007.
Though the essay does not cover the events in Armenia
in February and March, 2008, many of the negative
tendencies in the Republic which stemmed from the
implementation of an extremely liberal economic model
were already evident at that time.
The discontent due to these tendencies made it
possible for the opposition to openly proclaim
breaking up the country's statehood machine as its
goal.
The atmosphere in Armenia – aggressive rallies which
continued for days, the instigation of political
divisions in the army and law enforcement agencies,
the incitement of hostility towards people from a
particular region – combined the most repulsive
aspects of the scenar
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