<<Socialist roots will not be pulled out in Serbia>>
Interview with Professor Mihailo Markovic
Philosopher and both member and left wing critic of SPS
(by International Leninist Current - http://www.leninist-current.org)
---
What were the reasons for the 5th of October?
In order to explain the 5th of October one must take into account both
external and internal factors. The external factors are the growing
pressure
of NATO and the West coming after a whole decade of financial and trade
sanctions, of military intervention, of a almost complete blockade of
Yugoslavia. But one has to take into account also the internal weakness
of
the Socialist party. In the first place this is the growing corruption
especially in the last few years which is valid both for SPS and its
coalition partner JUL. Of cause the corruption has much to do with the
external blockade because it was necessary to buy certain goods,
materials
and energy by all means and that developed a group of very rich
individuals
who collaborated with the government, bribing the authorities on the
borders
and making huge money. These businessmen has a considerable influence on
the
ruling politicians and to some extent they were even within their
families
for example the sons of these politicians. The second factor is that
since
the collation partner of the Socialists was JUL, people realised a total
discrepancy between what JUL stood for and a leftist rhetoric and on the
other hand an authoritarian behaviour of the leaders and enormous
corruption
of those functionaries of JUL. So people disliked JUL more and more and
they
did not have mass support. So JUL never went to elections alone but
always
in coalition with SPS so that it was not even visible how weak JUL was.
On
the other hand owning to Milosevic they got a lion share in the
government
and in the institutions. The third weakness was the increasingly
authoritarian character of the leadership in the Socialist Party. The
last
two congresses, the 3rd and the 4th were simply manifestations and
elections
of lists which were entirely pre-prepared. There was less and less
debate.
There were people who wanted to discussed and who were removed from
their
function or even expelled. This became worse and worse. The forth
important
factor was something which the enemies of Socialists emphasised all the
time
but what they would not except. At the end they had to see that there
was
something in that criticism: Milosevic’s way leading the defence of the
country, that he would be very brave and resolute in the beginning and
then
suddenly would collapse and give in not only making concessions but
completely capitulating. That happened to some extend already in the
past
when for example the Croats took the Serb Kraijna they simple attacked
and
there was no attempt to defence. Then again in Bosnia with the Dayton
agreement: Sarajevo, Brcko, Gorazde were given up. There were sudden
concession that maybe were not necessary. Again after a certain period
of
courageous, brave and resolute defence suddenly the moment would come
when
the defence would collapse. We had explanations in those past cases that
with a defence too many people would die or in the case of Dayton the
Republika Srpska (RS) was already too exhausted that it was necessary to
save what was possible to save because there was the danger that Banja
Luka,
Priedor and other places would be taken. But then the last case was
Kosovo
that was a surprise to everybody. We defended our positions very bravely
reflecting an enormously high morale of the people during this period.
During the bombardment people would gather in the centre of the city and
they would sing patriotic song. That was very impressive. And then when
Artisari and Tschernomyrdin came and they threatened Milosevic that
Serbia
would be completely levelled down. Although we knew that there were a
lot of
troubles within NATO, that where were a lot a disagreements between
Americans and Europeans and different views clashing with each other
Milosevic suddenly capitulated and first made a deal with Artisari and
Tschernomyrdin and then later there was the agreement of Kumanovo and
our
forces completely left Kosovo which meant surrendering the people of
Kosovo
to enormous hardships and sacrifices. This already many people could not
accept. They began to think that there was something in the personality
of
Milosevic to have those sudden changes from very brave and courageous
attitude to a capitulation. Although only maybe only in ten more days
NATO
would have to finish that operation. But indeed in those ten days they
could
have killed a lot of people and could have destroyed a lot of our
economy.
Of course even at that moment some people would understand this. But
suddenly on the 5th of October most people would not understand what
really
happened. Did he again give up or was it a betrayal of the army and the
police? According to the information we have it seems that after the
elections of 25th of September when the first results arrived it was a
great disappointment that Milosevic had ten percent less than Kostunica
and
on the other hand that we lost the local elections everywhere. In that
moment most people advised him, even the most loyal supporters, to give
up
the presidential elections and to recognise the victory of Kostunica
because
that would have left the federal assembly and government and also the
republican assembly and government dominated by the Socialists. So it
would
be only to loose this single position of the president, a position that
according to our constitution does not have too much power. The idea was
to
defend the other institutions, the Federal assembly and government and
the
republican assembly and government. But suddenly to everybody’s surprise
he
said he would go to the second round. Yet he had ten percent less and of
cause in the second round everybody would be against him. SPO,
Mihailovic’s
people would vote against him and many Radicals too because before the
elections the relations between the Radicals and the Socialists were
heading
towards a break. The Radicals were again speaking of how wise Draza
Mihailovic’s, the Chetniks’ policy were in WWII. Seselj attacked the
Socialist government. But Milosevic insisted that he would fight. At
that
point the army and the police did not want to follow him. They realised
that
were will be a big clash and that the opposition was united for the
first
time. They were compelled by the Americans to unite. They never would
have
reached that grade of unity by themselves. Facing a huge wave of
dissatisfaction all over Serbia that would come to Belgrade the army and
the
police did not follow his order. You see how stubborn he was!
What did you propose to Milosevic in order to change the directions of
the
events?
I did not see him, I did not talk to him. But he proposed a committee
for
the preparation of the extraordinary congress inviting me together with
about thirty people. I joined the commission and I immediately expressed
my
views saying that in the documents of the congress there should firstly
be a
part analysing the main causes of the 5th of October, secondly I
proposed
ideas how to reform the party and how to start again, concerning the
renewal
of the cadres and the return to the original Socialist principles and
some
kind of morale renewal by simply telling ourselves the full truth about
what
really happened and basing our new policy on that truth. And then there
was
a third section about new prospects of the Socialist party where there
was a
part explaining that the Socialist idea is still internationally
attractive,
then explaining this tradition in Serbia beginning with Svetozar
Markovic up
to now and finally I spoke about how inevitably DOS will make a number
of
moves that will alienate people from them, how they must begin with a
shock
therapy which they are obliged to apply. And how we see already the
beginning of that therapy which is the so-called liberalisation of the
prices that immediately went up a lot. The standard of living of people
deteriorated greatly and people practically experienced that the changes
were not to the better but to the worse and very many people voted
against
the Socialist party and for DOS because they could not endure hardships
any
more. They wanted changes to the better immediately. That is way they
decided to try voting for the opposition hoping that maybe there will be
those changes. People would have endured those hardships if they would
be
for all but unfortunately owning to the policy of that time they had to
starve and to suffer while seeing how other live in luxury. Under such
condition people were not ready to go on enduring such hardships.
In that section I said also that the phrase “opening society” meant
among
other things a shock therapy and that foreign would enter, that many
socially own enterprises would be sold off cheaply and they would be
closed
down as we saw it in many other Eastern European countries. Because the
interest of foreign capital is not to develop our economy but simply to
gain
markets and to impose their goods to be imported. They will offer
credits
for imports of foreign goods and we should build depths as it happened
in
other Eastern European countries including those which allegedly are
successful for example Poland, the Czech republic and Hungary that
within a
short period of time have more than one hundred million dollars of
depth, so
that already now they have to pay one third of their total national
income
just for covering the interests. That would even grow so that those
countries have lost their future and that they will stay in a colonial
status. Also Serbia would become simply a colony.
This was very well accepted in that committee and people spoke up who
expressed the same ideas like Radko Markovic. My original text more or
less
survived although there were attempts by the members of the executive
committee to soften and blur in some way the criticism. The explanation
given was that Milosevic would not be a candidate for the presidency and
that would enormously help us. But on the other had we should not make
him
angry because then he would reverse this position and we would make him
angry if we express criticism. So we should have a document without
criticism or with as little as possible criticism. But since the initial
text expressed very sharp criticism enough criticism remained even if it
was
a little bit softened. Those members of the executive committee, Mimic,
Milotinovic and Andjelkovic brought the text to him for approval. But he
still was very angry. He said this “is terrible, as if a reserve
headquarter
of DOS made this. This cannot be taken into account. I will see for a
different text!” We do not even know who prepared the current text,
which
did not contain any criticism. I sharply criticised the new text and
immediately asked for a vote on the two different proposals. Milotinovic
,
who was presiding, did not hear that proposal and even when that was
repeated by several other members of the committee he just did not react
as
he obviously had an order to not allow any change. When I left and they
accepted the next text with twenty votes against ten. I even was no more
permitted to the congress.
As the author of the still valid party programme of the SPS you were
advocating the equality of a forms of property. What do you mean by this
and
what does it mean for the future of Yugoslavia?
Earlier, before the reform of 1988/89, there were two committees one for
the
reform of the political system and one for the economic system. In the
committee for economic reforms (in which there were several members of
the
Serbian Academy of Science that earlier was totally rejected but with
Milosevic it was changed) there was the idea that each enterprise must
be
responsible for its own economic success. It should not depend on the
constant aid by the state. It should be able to feed its workers and
should
be successful on the market. Certainly there will be some enterprises
that
offer basic services for the population from whose we would cover the
expenses. The reform of the political system contained the recognition
of
political rights of the people and pluralism which later was translated
into
a multi-partite system coming into existence by 1990.
We had state property and something very specific which did not exist in
other socialist countries: most of the economy was social property,
which
meant that workers would be responsible for the property that they
created
by themselves. Workers in those enterprises had the right to participate
both in decision making and in sharing the gains. Then there is
cooperative
property, which is different to social property and finally there is
private
property. It was recognised that people who have saving should not only
just
spend it but should invest it into production. That would increase the
employment. At that time there were maybe 15% of the economy such kind
of
private property later it became maybe 30%. The idea was that all these
forms of property co-exist, that they have equal status. In the socially
owned enterprises, even if it was organised in a society of share
holders,
the workers’ collective that owns a certain percentage of the capital
would
have the right to participate in managing according to their share. The
idea
was that social property would, however, prevail. In 1995 when I left
the
Socialist party there were some steps towards privatisation but still
there
were obstacles. The law on transformation of property included a very
important clause that the workers’ collective must agree to
privatisation.
In many enterprises the workers objected that plans and the process did
not
even start. In this period not very much was really privatised so that
even
now private property is still less of the half.
Regarding the coalition with the Radical Party a lot of criticism was
raised
against the SPS. Do you think that this coalition was necessary to
preserve
the unity of the country or do you regard it as an mistake?
The parties can be classified according to two principles, one is the
one
between right and left and the second is that between the patriotic
parties
and those who are ready to collaborate with NATO and the so-called
international organisations. If you take these criteria together you get
four combinations. First there are those on the left who are patriotic
like
the Socialist party. Then you have right wing patriots like the Radicals
and
also Kostunica. SPO is not really patriotic although they claim it to
be.
Then you have the non-patriot globalist left for example JUL. In fact
JUL is
not really left but they claim it. And then there is DOS which is
non-patriotic, globalist and right wing. So the Radicals are clearly
right
wing but on the other hand they are enemies of NATO and the sanctions
and
one must admit their consistency. They are hated by the entire world and
Europe for that.
The Socialist won the election in 1990 very convincingly but later they
got
only more than 30% percent. So we had to enter coalition governments.
First
it was with New Democracy which is also a rightist party, then with
Drascovic’ SPO who agreed from time to time and finally 1996 the
Radicals
became our coalition partner. They were not only very loud patriots but
they
also had a social demagogy. They hide their right wing intention for the
future and they speak also in favour of grater social equality and
measures
for the poor. So they could win many Socialists who were disappointed
with
the SPS who did not criticise and react against certain phenomena. But
in
other moments they express their true right wing opinions for example
when
they say that they are for total and obligatory privatisation including
also
the media. They simply do not see the clash with their patriotism.
Because
if you sell all the media some would be bought by foreign capital and
that
would not serve the patriotic interest.
Only before these last elections the Radicals became extremely disloyal
because they fought that they could win the elections and that their
moment
had come. They hoped to get all the votes of SPO and Chetniks as
Draskovic
seemed to have lost a big portion of his supporters. That’s way they
turned
from SPS is such a ugly way.
You have been criticising openly the Dayton agreement. Now many people
compare Dayton to Kumanovo. Do you believe that the national defence
could
have been carried on and the de-facto loss of Kosovo avoided?
When you compare Dayton with the Lisbon agreement of March 1992 before
the
war, which would have avoided the war if the Muslims had not withdrawn
from
it, you see that the latter was even more unfavourable. It had foreseen
that
Bosnia Herzegovina would become an independent country outside of
Yugoslavia, that the three peoples Croats, Serbs and Muslims should be
equal
in rights and that the state would be organised as an association of
cantons
and the people who was majority in one canton would prevail in that
canton.
According to that the Serbs would not have any unified territory while
Dayton at least gave a unified territory for the Serb which could then,
in
the future, unite with Serbia. Although Dayton meant that three terrible
concessions Sarajevo, Brcko and Gorazde it is considered by some leaders
of
the RS still as one of the better agreements for the Serbs. Furthermore
Dayton came when the RS was very exhausted and started loosing the war.
Everything to the West of Brcko as in danger to be lost. So even if one
is
critical of Dayton it can not just be considered a complete loss or
failure.
The Kumanovo agreement was very unfavourable because it meant the total
withdrawal from Kosovo. Yes, it evolves to the recognition what Kosovo
is
part of Yugoslavia but not of Serbia. And this is just de-jure and not
de-facto. It came in a moment when NATO did not have many choices.
Clearly
within a short period of time the war had to be over. So in my opinion
it
was better to endure another ten days rather than to sign. But I cannot
be
sure of that because I it depends whether NATO and the Americans were
able
to continue the destruction of the country. In ten days they would have
destroyed a lot, like the hydro-electrical plants which had not been
attacked so far. It seems to me that the majority of people who had been
so
resolute in the defence of the country already began to be exhausted by
that
time.
How the relation between Kostunica and Djindjic will develop as it is
obvious that on one hand DOS could only win thanks to the nationalist
rhetoric of Kostunica while the strong man in DOS is Djindjic who is
also
the agent of the West?
According to the classification I gave you they clearly belong to a
different political sector. It is true that Kostunica was the only
person
who was able to win the elections for the opposition. This was a very
clever
move be the Americans. He was imposed by them as a leader of the
opposition
because the others never would have accepted him. He is known as an
honest
person. His attitude was described as being Serbian nationalist, he
consistently opposed the aggression of NATO and the bombardments, he
already
before said that the Hague tribunal is not a legal institution and he
never
will extradite Milosevic. So all in all that is very different to what
Djindjic keeps saying and from the very beginning there is a conflict
between them which became public already in the first few days after
October
5th when Djindjic nominated a friend of him to be the head of the
customs
and Kostunica denied this and finally the man of Djindjic had to go.
There
are many other similar examples like for example on the next prime
minister,
on the governor of the national bank or on the minister of foreign
affairs.
Often Kostunica prevails but sometimes also Djindjic wins.
If think that there will be a continued conflict between thee two
people.
Djindjic is well excepted in Europe and not especially favoured by the
Americans – they think he is a German man as he was educated in Germany.
But
on the other hand Americans have great reservations for Kostunica and it
is
no seldom act that in the American press they call him a Serbian
nationalist, critical to the American policy and not willing to
cooperate
completely with the Hague tribunal – he keeps saying that this is no
priority for him. My impression immediately after the 5th of October was
that he will not long be tolerated by the Americans, maybe only a couple
of
months. He himself says that he will not stay longer that about a years
in
order to implement changes.
Let is put us in following way: There has not been a full fletched
counter-revolution like in Russia but we see a kind of equilibrium. In
order
to hold back Djindjic Kostunica is obliged to rely on the partial
support of
the remaining SPS forces. He is playing the role of an arbiter between
SPS
on one side and the pro-Western forces on the other side.
Well, there is less than an equilibrium. We hoped that there will be an
equilibrium because there was a coalition of Serbian and Montenegro
Socialists so it looked like as we had won the federal elections. But
then
Montenegro’s Socialists, made a deal with DOS. So we were out of the
federal
government whereas in the Serbian assembly we controlled the government.
Then Milutinovic, the president of the republic, made a deal with DOS.
Probably they blackmailed him knowing something about the origins of his
wealth. They allowed him to stay in the presidency of the republic for
the
time being and what he did for them was that he dissolved the assembly
and
called for new elections on December 23rd and not next year.
Although not much foreign aid will have arrived by this time and the
beginning of the shock therapy is already now very difficult for the
people,
and although DOS will loose many votes the elections still come too
early
for us.
Do you think that the army, that has got a big reputation because it
bravely
defended the country, has passed completely to the enemy or there are
still
positions of patriotic and left forces inside the army?
Sure! There were many patriots in the army and it was educated in a
socialist spirit. How much of that remained is another question.
Konstunica
did not permit the changes in the army that Djindjic and others
demanded. He
insisted that no changes would be applied in the army and the police.
The
heart of the army still might be on the left but we do not know what
happened to Pavkovic who was enormously popular. He was promoted by
Milosevic but he did not do nothing on the 5th of October. He said that
he
tried. We do not know how much he could do but clearly he wanted to
survive
and he is loyal to Kostunica.
Do you thing that Yugoslavia and the SPS will be changed to elements of
the
New World Order like the other Eastern European countries and their
formerly
ruling parties or will an antagonistic element remain?
Clearly an antagonistic element will remain. People are not ready to
forget
what NATO did to us and they dislike the idea of the New World Order. In
this sense interesting is the reaction of Kostunica to the attempts of
the
US to normalise the relations. Madeleine Albright wanted to meet
Kostunica
at any cost but he did not agree and tried to postpone it as long as
possible. Kostinica’s behaviour is OK now, of course with some
exceptions. I
saw his speech yesterday in Zabreb: no sense of revenge, no word of
criticism against Milosevic. On the other hand he criticised the West,
both
the Americans and the Europeans.
If he would survive you could suppose that he would evolve as one who
gets
support by the Socialists. Unfortunately his record is that he always
was
right wing and in fact his strength in contrast to all other
oppositionists
is that he always was the same, a liberal bourgeois.
Regarding the perspective of the left and anti-imperialist forces what
is
you advice to them after it was proved that the SPS could not be
reshaped in
this spirit?
The SPS will reshape in a not too distant future. I do not believe that
Milosevic will be permitted to continue to be the leader of that party.
With
his departure things will chance. He is a charismatic leader. The day
before
yesterday half of the congress was against him and then, yesterday,
somehow
he was able to win again full support. A problem is that you can take
him
only together with his wife who is immensely unpopular and even hated.
So
his future is limited. But the socialist idea will not be abandoned like
in
some other countries. Here it has deep roots. Millions actively
supported
the liberation war and even before it had a great history.
Belgrade, October 26th 2000
---
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http://www.ecircle.it/ad218188/www.ecircle.it
Interview with Professor Mihailo Markovic
Philosopher and both member and left wing critic of SPS
(by International Leninist Current - http://www.leninist-current.org)
---
What were the reasons for the 5th of October?
In order to explain the 5th of October one must take into account both
external and internal factors. The external factors are the growing
pressure
of NATO and the West coming after a whole decade of financial and trade
sanctions, of military intervention, of a almost complete blockade of
Yugoslavia. But one has to take into account also the internal weakness
of
the Socialist party. In the first place this is the growing corruption
especially in the last few years which is valid both for SPS and its
coalition partner JUL. Of cause the corruption has much to do with the
external blockade because it was necessary to buy certain goods,
materials
and energy by all means and that developed a group of very rich
individuals
who collaborated with the government, bribing the authorities on the
borders
and making huge money. These businessmen has a considerable influence on
the
ruling politicians and to some extent they were even within their
families
for example the sons of these politicians. The second factor is that
since
the collation partner of the Socialists was JUL, people realised a total
discrepancy between what JUL stood for and a leftist rhetoric and on the
other hand an authoritarian behaviour of the leaders and enormous
corruption
of those functionaries of JUL. So people disliked JUL more and more and
they
did not have mass support. So JUL never went to elections alone but
always
in coalition with SPS so that it was not even visible how weak JUL was.
On
the other hand owning to Milosevic they got a lion share in the
government
and in the institutions. The third weakness was the increasingly
authoritarian character of the leadership in the Socialist Party. The
last
two congresses, the 3rd and the 4th were simply manifestations and
elections
of lists which were entirely pre-prepared. There was less and less
debate.
There were people who wanted to discussed and who were removed from
their
function or even expelled. This became worse and worse. The forth
important
factor was something which the enemies of Socialists emphasised all the
time
but what they would not except. At the end they had to see that there
was
something in that criticism: Milosevic’s way leading the defence of the
country, that he would be very brave and resolute in the beginning and
then
suddenly would collapse and give in not only making concessions but
completely capitulating. That happened to some extend already in the
past
when for example the Croats took the Serb Kraijna they simple attacked
and
there was no attempt to defence. Then again in Bosnia with the Dayton
agreement: Sarajevo, Brcko, Gorazde were given up. There were sudden
concession that maybe were not necessary. Again after a certain period
of
courageous, brave and resolute defence suddenly the moment would come
when
the defence would collapse. We had explanations in those past cases that
with a defence too many people would die or in the case of Dayton the
Republika Srpska (RS) was already too exhausted that it was necessary to
save what was possible to save because there was the danger that Banja
Luka,
Priedor and other places would be taken. But then the last case was
Kosovo
that was a surprise to everybody. We defended our positions very bravely
reflecting an enormously high morale of the people during this period.
During the bombardment people would gather in the centre of the city and
they would sing patriotic song. That was very impressive. And then when
Artisari and Tschernomyrdin came and they threatened Milosevic that
Serbia
would be completely levelled down. Although we knew that there were a
lot of
troubles within NATO, that where were a lot a disagreements between
Americans and Europeans and different views clashing with each other
Milosevic suddenly capitulated and first made a deal with Artisari and
Tschernomyrdin and then later there was the agreement of Kumanovo and
our
forces completely left Kosovo which meant surrendering the people of
Kosovo
to enormous hardships and sacrifices. This already many people could not
accept. They began to think that there was something in the personality
of
Milosevic to have those sudden changes from very brave and courageous
attitude to a capitulation. Although only maybe only in ten more days
NATO
would have to finish that operation. But indeed in those ten days they
could
have killed a lot of people and could have destroyed a lot of our
economy.
Of course even at that moment some people would understand this. But
suddenly on the 5th of October most people would not understand what
really
happened. Did he again give up or was it a betrayal of the army and the
police? According to the information we have it seems that after the
elections of 25th of September when the first results arrived it was a
great disappointment that Milosevic had ten percent less than Kostunica
and
on the other hand that we lost the local elections everywhere. In that
moment most people advised him, even the most loyal supporters, to give
up
the presidential elections and to recognise the victory of Kostunica
because
that would have left the federal assembly and government and also the
republican assembly and government dominated by the Socialists. So it
would
be only to loose this single position of the president, a position that
according to our constitution does not have too much power. The idea was
to
defend the other institutions, the Federal assembly and government and
the
republican assembly and government. But suddenly to everybody’s surprise
he
said he would go to the second round. Yet he had ten percent less and of
cause in the second round everybody would be against him. SPO,
Mihailovic’s
people would vote against him and many Radicals too because before the
elections the relations between the Radicals and the Socialists were
heading
towards a break. The Radicals were again speaking of how wise Draza
Mihailovic’s, the Chetniks’ policy were in WWII. Seselj attacked the
Socialist government. But Milosevic insisted that he would fight. At
that
point the army and the police did not want to follow him. They realised
that
were will be a big clash and that the opposition was united for the
first
time. They were compelled by the Americans to unite. They never would
have
reached that grade of unity by themselves. Facing a huge wave of
dissatisfaction all over Serbia that would come to Belgrade the army and
the
police did not follow his order. You see how stubborn he was!
What did you propose to Milosevic in order to change the directions of
the
events?
I did not see him, I did not talk to him. But he proposed a committee
for
the preparation of the extraordinary congress inviting me together with
about thirty people. I joined the commission and I immediately expressed
my
views saying that in the documents of the congress there should firstly
be a
part analysing the main causes of the 5th of October, secondly I
proposed
ideas how to reform the party and how to start again, concerning the
renewal
of the cadres and the return to the original Socialist principles and
some
kind of morale renewal by simply telling ourselves the full truth about
what
really happened and basing our new policy on that truth. And then there
was
a third section about new prospects of the Socialist party where there
was a
part explaining that the Socialist idea is still internationally
attractive,
then explaining this tradition in Serbia beginning with Svetozar
Markovic up
to now and finally I spoke about how inevitably DOS will make a number
of
moves that will alienate people from them, how they must begin with a
shock
therapy which they are obliged to apply. And how we see already the
beginning of that therapy which is the so-called liberalisation of the
prices that immediately went up a lot. The standard of living of people
deteriorated greatly and people practically experienced that the changes
were not to the better but to the worse and very many people voted
against
the Socialist party and for DOS because they could not endure hardships
any
more. They wanted changes to the better immediately. That is way they
decided to try voting for the opposition hoping that maybe there will be
those changes. People would have endured those hardships if they would
be
for all but unfortunately owning to the policy of that time they had to
starve and to suffer while seeing how other live in luxury. Under such
condition people were not ready to go on enduring such hardships.
In that section I said also that the phrase “opening society” meant
among
other things a shock therapy and that foreign would enter, that many
socially own enterprises would be sold off cheaply and they would be
closed
down as we saw it in many other Eastern European countries. Because the
interest of foreign capital is not to develop our economy but simply to
gain
markets and to impose their goods to be imported. They will offer
credits
for imports of foreign goods and we should build depths as it happened
in
other Eastern European countries including those which allegedly are
successful for example Poland, the Czech republic and Hungary that
within a
short period of time have more than one hundred million dollars of
depth, so
that already now they have to pay one third of their total national
income
just for covering the interests. That would even grow so that those
countries have lost their future and that they will stay in a colonial
status. Also Serbia would become simply a colony.
This was very well accepted in that committee and people spoke up who
expressed the same ideas like Radko Markovic. My original text more or
less
survived although there were attempts by the members of the executive
committee to soften and blur in some way the criticism. The explanation
given was that Milosevic would not be a candidate for the presidency and
that would enormously help us. But on the other had we should not make
him
angry because then he would reverse this position and we would make him
angry if we express criticism. So we should have a document without
criticism or with as little as possible criticism. But since the initial
text expressed very sharp criticism enough criticism remained even if it
was
a little bit softened. Those members of the executive committee, Mimic,
Milotinovic and Andjelkovic brought the text to him for approval. But he
still was very angry. He said this “is terrible, as if a reserve
headquarter
of DOS made this. This cannot be taken into account. I will see for a
different text!” We do not even know who prepared the current text,
which
did not contain any criticism. I sharply criticised the new text and
immediately asked for a vote on the two different proposals. Milotinovic
,
who was presiding, did not hear that proposal and even when that was
repeated by several other members of the committee he just did not react
as
he obviously had an order to not allow any change. When I left and they
accepted the next text with twenty votes against ten. I even was no more
permitted to the congress.
As the author of the still valid party programme of the SPS you were
advocating the equality of a forms of property. What do you mean by this
and
what does it mean for the future of Yugoslavia?
Earlier, before the reform of 1988/89, there were two committees one for
the
reform of the political system and one for the economic system. In the
committee for economic reforms (in which there were several members of
the
Serbian Academy of Science that earlier was totally rejected but with
Milosevic it was changed) there was the idea that each enterprise must
be
responsible for its own economic success. It should not depend on the
constant aid by the state. It should be able to feed its workers and
should
be successful on the market. Certainly there will be some enterprises
that
offer basic services for the population from whose we would cover the
expenses. The reform of the political system contained the recognition
of
political rights of the people and pluralism which later was translated
into
a multi-partite system coming into existence by 1990.
We had state property and something very specific which did not exist in
other socialist countries: most of the economy was social property,
which
meant that workers would be responsible for the property that they
created
by themselves. Workers in those enterprises had the right to participate
both in decision making and in sharing the gains. Then there is
cooperative
property, which is different to social property and finally there is
private
property. It was recognised that people who have saving should not only
just
spend it but should invest it into production. That would increase the
employment. At that time there were maybe 15% of the economy such kind
of
private property later it became maybe 30%. The idea was that all these
forms of property co-exist, that they have equal status. In the socially
owned enterprises, even if it was organised in a society of share
holders,
the workers’ collective that owns a certain percentage of the capital
would
have the right to participate in managing according to their share. The
idea
was that social property would, however, prevail. In 1995 when I left
the
Socialist party there were some steps towards privatisation but still
there
were obstacles. The law on transformation of property included a very
important clause that the workers’ collective must agree to
privatisation.
In many enterprises the workers objected that plans and the process did
not
even start. In this period not very much was really privatised so that
even
now private property is still less of the half.
Regarding the coalition with the Radical Party a lot of criticism was
raised
against the SPS. Do you think that this coalition was necessary to
preserve
the unity of the country or do you regard it as an mistake?
The parties can be classified according to two principles, one is the
one
between right and left and the second is that between the patriotic
parties
and those who are ready to collaborate with NATO and the so-called
international organisations. If you take these criteria together you get
four combinations. First there are those on the left who are patriotic
like
the Socialist party. Then you have right wing patriots like the Radicals
and
also Kostunica. SPO is not really patriotic although they claim it to
be.
Then you have the non-patriot globalist left for example JUL. In fact
JUL is
not really left but they claim it. And then there is DOS which is
non-patriotic, globalist and right wing. So the Radicals are clearly
right
wing but on the other hand they are enemies of NATO and the sanctions
and
one must admit their consistency. They are hated by the entire world and
Europe for that.
The Socialist won the election in 1990 very convincingly but later they
got
only more than 30% percent. So we had to enter coalition governments.
First
it was with New Democracy which is also a rightist party, then with
Drascovic’ SPO who agreed from time to time and finally 1996 the
Radicals
became our coalition partner. They were not only very loud patriots but
they
also had a social demagogy. They hide their right wing intention for the
future and they speak also in favour of grater social equality and
measures
for the poor. So they could win many Socialists who were disappointed
with
the SPS who did not criticise and react against certain phenomena. But
in
other moments they express their true right wing opinions for example
when
they say that they are for total and obligatory privatisation including
also
the media. They simply do not see the clash with their patriotism.
Because
if you sell all the media some would be bought by foreign capital and
that
would not serve the patriotic interest.
Only before these last elections the Radicals became extremely disloyal
because they fought that they could win the elections and that their
moment
had come. They hoped to get all the votes of SPO and Chetniks as
Draskovic
seemed to have lost a big portion of his supporters. That’s way they
turned
from SPS is such a ugly way.
You have been criticising openly the Dayton agreement. Now many people
compare Dayton to Kumanovo. Do you believe that the national defence
could
have been carried on and the de-facto loss of Kosovo avoided?
When you compare Dayton with the Lisbon agreement of March 1992 before
the
war, which would have avoided the war if the Muslims had not withdrawn
from
it, you see that the latter was even more unfavourable. It had foreseen
that
Bosnia Herzegovina would become an independent country outside of
Yugoslavia, that the three peoples Croats, Serbs and Muslims should be
equal
in rights and that the state would be organised as an association of
cantons
and the people who was majority in one canton would prevail in that
canton.
According to that the Serbs would not have any unified territory while
Dayton at least gave a unified territory for the Serb which could then,
in
the future, unite with Serbia. Although Dayton meant that three terrible
concessions Sarajevo, Brcko and Gorazde it is considered by some leaders
of
the RS still as one of the better agreements for the Serbs. Furthermore
Dayton came when the RS was very exhausted and started loosing the war.
Everything to the West of Brcko as in danger to be lost. So even if one
is
critical of Dayton it can not just be considered a complete loss or
failure.
The Kumanovo agreement was very unfavourable because it meant the total
withdrawal from Kosovo. Yes, it evolves to the recognition what Kosovo
is
part of Yugoslavia but not of Serbia. And this is just de-jure and not
de-facto. It came in a moment when NATO did not have many choices.
Clearly
within a short period of time the war had to be over. So in my opinion
it
was better to endure another ten days rather than to sign. But I cannot
be
sure of that because I it depends whether NATO and the Americans were
able
to continue the destruction of the country. In ten days they would have
destroyed a lot, like the hydro-electrical plants which had not been
attacked so far. It seems to me that the majority of people who had been
so
resolute in the defence of the country already began to be exhausted by
that
time.
How the relation between Kostunica and Djindjic will develop as it is
obvious that on one hand DOS could only win thanks to the nationalist
rhetoric of Kostunica while the strong man in DOS is Djindjic who is
also
the agent of the West?
According to the classification I gave you they clearly belong to a
different political sector. It is true that Kostunica was the only
person
who was able to win the elections for the opposition. This was a very
clever
move be the Americans. He was imposed by them as a leader of the
opposition
because the others never would have accepted him. He is known as an
honest
person. His attitude was described as being Serbian nationalist, he
consistently opposed the aggression of NATO and the bombardments, he
already
before said that the Hague tribunal is not a legal institution and he
never
will extradite Milosevic. So all in all that is very different to what
Djindjic keeps saying and from the very beginning there is a conflict
between them which became public already in the first few days after
October
5th when Djindjic nominated a friend of him to be the head of the
customs
and Kostunica denied this and finally the man of Djindjic had to go.
There
are many other similar examples like for example on the next prime
minister,
on the governor of the national bank or on the minister of foreign
affairs.
Often Kostunica prevails but sometimes also Djindjic wins.
If think that there will be a continued conflict between thee two
people.
Djindjic is well excepted in Europe and not especially favoured by the
Americans – they think he is a German man as he was educated in Germany.
But
on the other hand Americans have great reservations for Kostunica and it
is
no seldom act that in the American press they call him a Serbian
nationalist, critical to the American policy and not willing to
cooperate
completely with the Hague tribunal – he keeps saying that this is no
priority for him. My impression immediately after the 5th of October was
that he will not long be tolerated by the Americans, maybe only a couple
of
months. He himself says that he will not stay longer that about a years
in
order to implement changes.
Let is put us in following way: There has not been a full fletched
counter-revolution like in Russia but we see a kind of equilibrium. In
order
to hold back Djindjic Kostunica is obliged to rely on the partial
support of
the remaining SPS forces. He is playing the role of an arbiter between
SPS
on one side and the pro-Western forces on the other side.
Well, there is less than an equilibrium. We hoped that there will be an
equilibrium because there was a coalition of Serbian and Montenegro
Socialists so it looked like as we had won the federal elections. But
then
Montenegro’s Socialists, made a deal with DOS. So we were out of the
federal
government whereas in the Serbian assembly we controlled the government.
Then Milutinovic, the president of the republic, made a deal with DOS.
Probably they blackmailed him knowing something about the origins of his
wealth. They allowed him to stay in the presidency of the republic for
the
time being and what he did for them was that he dissolved the assembly
and
called for new elections on December 23rd and not next year.
Although not much foreign aid will have arrived by this time and the
beginning of the shock therapy is already now very difficult for the
people,
and although DOS will loose many votes the elections still come too
early
for us.
Do you think that the army, that has got a big reputation because it
bravely
defended the country, has passed completely to the enemy or there are
still
positions of patriotic and left forces inside the army?
Sure! There were many patriots in the army and it was educated in a
socialist spirit. How much of that remained is another question.
Konstunica
did not permit the changes in the army that Djindjic and others
demanded. He
insisted that no changes would be applied in the army and the police.
The
heart of the army still might be on the left but we do not know what
happened to Pavkovic who was enormously popular. He was promoted by
Milosevic but he did not do nothing on the 5th of October. He said that
he
tried. We do not know how much he could do but clearly he wanted to
survive
and he is loyal to Kostunica.
Do you thing that Yugoslavia and the SPS will be changed to elements of
the
New World Order like the other Eastern European countries and their
formerly
ruling parties or will an antagonistic element remain?
Clearly an antagonistic element will remain. People are not ready to
forget
what NATO did to us and they dislike the idea of the New World Order. In
this sense interesting is the reaction of Kostunica to the attempts of
the
US to normalise the relations. Madeleine Albright wanted to meet
Kostunica
at any cost but he did not agree and tried to postpone it as long as
possible. Kostinica’s behaviour is OK now, of course with some
exceptions. I
saw his speech yesterday in Zabreb: no sense of revenge, no word of
criticism against Milosevic. On the other hand he criticised the West,
both
the Americans and the Europeans.
If he would survive you could suppose that he would evolve as one who
gets
support by the Socialists. Unfortunately his record is that he always
was
right wing and in fact his strength in contrast to all other
oppositionists
is that he always was the same, a liberal bourgeois.
Regarding the perspective of the left and anti-imperialist forces what
is
you advice to them after it was proved that the SPS could not be
reshaped in
this spirit?
The SPS will reshape in a not too distant future. I do not believe that
Milosevic will be permitted to continue to be the leader of that party.
With
his departure things will chance. He is a charismatic leader. The day
before
yesterday half of the congress was against him and then, yesterday,
somehow
he was able to win again full support. A problem is that you can take
him
only together with his wife who is immensely unpopular and even hated.
So
his future is limited. But the socialist idea will not be abandoned like
in
some other countries. Here it has deep roots. Millions actively
supported
the liberation war and even before it had a great history.
Belgrade, October 26th 2000
---
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