(Analisti russi commentano la sfacciataggine occidentale nei confronti dei Balcani: 

# in Kosovo si canta vittoria per "elezioni locali" alle quali la popolazione, anche albanofona, ha partecipato lo scorso 15/11 con ben scarsa affluenza - e per noi italiani è assolutamente da stigmatizzare il trionfalismo espresso da giornalisti e funzionariato delle cosiddette ONG "cooperanti", diventate mera "longa manus" delle politiche nostrane di assoggettamento imperiale/coloniale. Ma dagli ambienti diplomatici le pressioni che arrivano nei confronti di Belgrado non si limitano nemmeno più a chiedere il riconoscimento della secessione su base razziale della provincia serba: si preme oramai anche per obiettivi geopolitici ulteriori, quali lo "sganciamento" della Serbia dalla Russia e l'abbandono di progetti energetici invisi agli USA quali Southstream [vedi: http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/5955 , http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/6455 ]

# a Berlino si tengono celebrazioni per il ventennale della annessione della DDR alla Repubblica Federale, con scarsissima partecipazione e ancor meno entusiasmo popolare. Nella "narrazione ufficiale" di quei fatti e degli eventi successivi si omette sempre di menzionare la principale conseguenza della "riunificazione tedesca", e cioè la GUERRA. Infatti è stata innanzitutto la diplomazia tedesca a provocare le dichiarazioni di "indipendenza" slovena e croata ed il conseguente scoppio della guerra civile antijugoslava. Ed il Nuovo Ordine Europeo realizzato con i fatti dell'89 minaccia anche altri Stati e confini del vecchio continente. Sull'argomento è bene rinfrescarsi la memoria: https://www.cnj.it/CHICOMEPERCHE/sfrj_03.htm [a cura di Italo Slavo])

SOURCE: Stop NATO

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20091117/156876507.html

Russian Information Agency Novosti - November 17, 2009

Elections in Kosovo a turning point

Dmitry Babich

-EU officials are the ones forcing the Serbian government to accept several very unpleasant decisions - recognition of the municipal elections in Kosovo, dissociation from Russia and pullout of joint energy projects with Russia.
-As for democratic values in the EU policy with regard to Serbia, they are hard to believe in, given the EU officials' open sympathies with the Albanian militants of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Incidentally, the supporters of two KLA leaders, former "prime minister" Ramush Haradinaj and his successor Hashim Thaci, caused a violent clash in one of the Albanian enclaves.
-It is worth reminding here that Haradinaj was allowed to leave the Hague occasionally "to rule" Kosovo during his trial, while Thaci was eventually cleared by the Hague Tribunal of all charges of genocide of Serbs.


MOSCOW: The November 15 municipal elections in Kosovo can be seen as a turning point in the region's history.

This was the first vote since Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in February 2008, still unrecognized by Russia and a number of other countries. Moreover, these elections were also the first to be held by local authorities alone, without any help from the UN Mission in Kosovo or the OSCE, which virtually ran the place for a long time.

The elections took part with a fairly large turnout of local Serbs at the polls. This by no means eliminates the totally unfair situation in Kosovo, which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pointed out during his recent visit to Belgrade. When a breakaway region - a self-declared independent state - is given the green light to international recognition by none other than the United States and the EU, this region knows it is as good as being recognized by the whole international community. But this also creates a dangerous precedent.

Last Sunday's vote did not have to approve Kosovo's independence. The voters had to decide whether it will be further run by Kosovo Albanians alone or local Serbs will preserve some political influence at least on the local level, by having seats on city halls.

With regard to the national level, the Serbs' chances are close to zero. With the Albanian and Serb populations ratio of over 10 to 1 (120,000 Serbs out of the nearly 2 million Kosovo population), the Serbs in parliament have practically no possibility of setting up a party which would have at least some minor influence.

At the November 17, 2007 parliamentary elections, the seats were split between Albanian parties. However, the situation is slightly different at the municipal level - Serbs have a majority in five city governments out of 38.

Two of them are in the north of Kosovo, adjacent to the Serbian border: They have been living virtually independently of the Albanian Kosovo for a while now. They did not even hold elections last Sunday. The remaining three - Gracanica, Klokot, and Ranilug - are "Serb enclaves" in the center and south of Kosovo. Their population had to make a choice: either skip the voting and see hostile Albanians as their city council members and the city mayor, or take part in the illegitimate elections. According to reports, the majority of the local Serbs did go to the polls.

Incidentally, most of the pressure on Serbia to finally choose the lesser of two evils comes from the European Union - which Serbia is so keen to join. EU officials are the ones forcing the Serbian government to accept several very unpleasant decisions - recognition of the municipal elections in Kosovo, dissociation from Russia and pullout of joint energy projects with Russia. They are using the good old stick and carrot policy, the stick (the tight visa policy) being very real, while the carrot (the much-desired EU membership) a far-fetched and remote possibility.

Ever the most ardent EU supporter in Serbia, or in Russia for that matter, cannot claim that the EU is pursuing some abstract humanistic or democratic goals. Due to its tight visa policy, 70% of young Serbs (who, incidentally, were too young to take part in the ethnic wars during the breakup of Yugoslavia), have never been to any of the EU countries.

According to a survey, the repeated delays of the much-craved EU accession have led to a drop in the number of EU-enthusiasts in Serbia from 72% in 2007 to 63% by the end of 2008. These data are quoted by Pavel Kandel, a research associate of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in the collection of articles "Crisis in Kosovo and International Security." These figures reflect "the Serbs' last hope pinned on Moscow and their outrage at Brussels' anti-Serb policies," he comments.

As for democratic values in the EU policy with regard to Serbia, they are hard to believe in, given the EU officials' open sympathies with the Albanian militants of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Incidentally, the supporters of two KLA leaders, former "prime minister" Ramush Haradinaj and his successor Hashim Thaci, caused a violent clash in one of the Albanian enclaves.

It is worth reminding here that Haradinaj was allowed to leave the Hague occasionally "to rule" Kosovo during his trial, while Thaci was eventually cleared by the Hague Tribunal of all charges of genocide of Serbs.

All the above gives Russia more tools to pressure Belgrade. True, the Serbs were disappointed by Boris Yeltsin's Russia, which promised them support in 1999 and then proposed they give in. But today, EU and NATO officials are in fact doing what Russia would have failed to do even if it had supplied the Serbs with the S-300 anti-aircraft weapons they were asking for in 1999.

Russia can regain influence in the Balkans not because it is so good, but because European bureaucrats have proved far worse.

=== 2 ===

http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2584

Strategic Culture Foundation - November 16, 2009

Balkan Shadow of Berlin Celebration

Pyotr Iskenderov

-Berlin's influence prevailed, and German advisers managed to convince their Croatian protégées to act resolutely. On May 19, 1991 the Croatian administration held a referendum with over 94% of those who went to the polling booths opting for immediate secession....Soon Sarajevo followed suit, massive fighting swept across the Balkans, NATO got the desired pretext for intervention, and Germany emerged as the key force in the new European geopolitical architecture. 
Praising German unification, we should not forget how the fall of the Berlin Wall cast a shadow over other countries and their peoples.


The celebration of the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall is over. Several high-ranking foreign visitors, many of whom had nothing to do with the historical development at the time it took place, spoke about the enormous importance of German unification and the symbolic significance of the event which put the final dot in the history of the Cold War. 

The truth, however, is that there are parts of Europe where the fall of the Berlin Wall is not regarded as a totally positive change since immediately upon the alleged completion of the bloodless Cold War Europe had to face a proliferation of real armed conflicts. 

The widely held view is that the 1989 German unification opened the era of the demise of totalitarian regimes across the continent and ultimately made the creation of a united Europe possible. 

Numerous private conversations with the residents of the Balkans actually led me to a different conclusion. The disintegration of Yugoslavia — a process that cost thousands of lives - commenced only a year after the demolition of the Berlin Wall. Notably, unified and extremely powerful Germany was one of its drivers. 

Germany was behind the urgent declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, as well as behind their snap recognition by the international community regardless of the fact that the latter clearly lacked a viable model of coexistence for its Serbian and Croatian populations. Besides, the origin of the ethnic conflict that erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the spring of 1992 can only be grasped if the activity of outside forces is taken into account. 

Why did Germany, a country just rebuilt after the traumatic partition imposed on it after World War II, take the active role in the Balkan geopolitical overhaul? Napoleon used to say that every nation's politics stems from its geography. The concept applies perfectly to the late 1980s—early 1990s situation in Europe on the whole and in the Balkans in particular. 

It should be realized that following the collapse of the eastern bloc and the unification of the two Germanies, Berlin saw itself as the strongest player in Europe and actively sought European leadership over which it traditionally competed with France. 

US military bases that Germany continued to host in the framework of its international obligations after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces presented the main obstacle in the way of the country's aspirations. 

There were indications that Germany hoped to have the problem resolved by shifting the bases to the Balkans, where their existence could be based not on Soviet-era international agreements but on a NATO mandate, and where Germany could be guaranteed a place among the key players. 

What was needed to make the plan materialize was a serious pretext for the Balkan expansion, and a process including the break-up of Yugoslavia and the emergence of several protracted ethnic conflicts spread over its former territory conveniently provided one. 

The implementation of the scenario began in Slovenia and Croatia, where, due to historic reasons, the German influence was deeply rooted. Already in the 1980s the German intelligence service had strong positions in Slovenia and especially in Croatia as various émigré nationalist and extremist groups it sponsored gradually made inroads into the administrations. 

German advisers and NGO envoys flocked to Croatia in large numbers in 1989-1990. It was due to their activity that eventually the republic became the scene of the first armed clashes in the former Yugoslavia, which scared even the no less active US representatives. 

In May, 1990 Croatia's First President Franjo Tudman introduced a new constitution (put together largely under German advisers' supervision) via the parliament dominated by pro-independence forces. 

It proclaimed that Croatia was a national state of the Croats and other peoples inhabiting it rather than, as formulated previously, a state of the Croatian and Serbian peoples as well as of others inhabiting it. 

The legal subtlety automatically left Serbs who used to be a state-forming nation in the position of a minority. Discontented with the downgrade, Serbs launched a referendum of their own in August 1990, during which, however, their response was limited to asserting their right to sovereignty and autonomy within Croatia. Secession was not on the agenda, but the Croatian government nevertheless resorted to force to prevent the referendum from taking place, and the moment marked the onset of the armed conflict in the republic. 

Serbs of Croatia offered a political solution even after the incident. On September 30, 1990 the Serbian National Council proclaimed the autonomy of the Serbian people on the ethnic and historical territories they inhabited within Croatia as a member of Yugoslavia, but Zagreb's course agreed with German advisers remained unchanged. 

The new Croatian constitution entered into force on December 22, and the very next day neighboring Slovenia called an independence referendum during which 94% of the ballots were cast in favor of separation from Yugoslavia. 

Interestingly, over the weeks preceding the enactment of Tudman's constitution Washington kept calling the Croatian leaders to exercise restraint and to avoid steps prone with an armed escalation. 

Still, Berlin's influence prevailed, and German advisers managed to convince their Croatian protégées to act resolutely. On May 19, 1991 the Croatian administration held a referendum with over 94% of those who went to the polling booths opting for immediate secession. The Serbs of Croatia did not attend, and Germany, assisted by the Vatican, promptly ensured the European recognition of the two new independent countries. Soon Sarajevo followed suit, massive fighting swept across the Balkans, NATO got the desired pretext for intervention, and Germany emerged as the key force in the new European geopolitical architecture. 

Praising German unification, we should not forget how the fall of the Berlin Wall cast a shadow over other countries and their peoples.