17/3/2004-2010: Sixth Anniversary Of Kosovo Pogroms
1) Six years since March violence in Kosovo (B92)
2) Six years as of March pogrom against Serbs in Kosovo (Tanjug)
3) The perils and repercussions of Kosovo's independence (Daily Star)
An Interview to Serbia’s defense counsel in the International Court of Justice case about Kosovo's "independence", Marcelo Kohen
Source: Stop NATO - http://groups.yahoo.com/group/stopnato
Blog site: http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/
Blog site: http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/
=== 1 ===
B92 - March 17, 2010
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=== 2 ===
http://bsanna-news.ukrinform.ua/newsitem.php?id=12598&lang=en
Tanjug News Agency - March 17, 2010
Six years as of March pogrom against Serbs in Kosovo
BELGRADE: Today marks six years since a major ethnic Albanian pogrom against Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija, when Serb property, monuments of culture and sanctuaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church were destroyed, and when more than 4,000 people were displaced.
It was the second great pogrom the ethnic Albanians committed after NATO's 1999 air raids, when the province came under the UN administration. More than a quarter million Serbs, Roma people and other non-Albanians were expelled in June 1999, before the very eyes of international forces.
During the March 17, 2004 violence, which is known as 'the Crystal Night in Kosovo,' 19 persons were killed - eight Serbs and 11 Albanians, whereas two more Serbs are believed to have gone missing.
The number of expelled Serbs reached 4,012, six towns and nine villages were ethnically cleansed, and 935 Serb houses and 10 public facilities, such as schools, healthcare centers and post offices, were razed, burnt or severely damaged.
The special target of ethnic Albanian violence was also the cultural and architectural heritage of the Serb people, and as a result 35 churches, including 18 monuments of culture, were demolished, burnt or severely damaged.
The motive for the pogrom was found in the campaign of the Albanian-media claiming that local Serbs chased six ethnic Albanian boys with dogs into the Ibar River in the village of Cabar near Zubin Potok and thus made three of them drown.
The investigation of the UNMIK police determined that the Albanian accusations were false and spokesperson of the international police Neridz Sing stated that the Albanian boys who survived the tragedy were under great pressure exerted by Albanian journalists and politicians to accuse Serbs from the nearby village of the incident.
The Albanian terror continued on March 18 when the Serbs were expelled from Kosovo polje, Obilic, Plemetina near Vucitrn and Svinjare near Kosovska Mitrovica, while in the village of Bijelo Polje near Pec all 28 houses of the returnees and a parish home were burnt down.
Representatives of the international community evaluated at the time that the ethnically-based violence against the Serbs in Kosovo had been planned in advance and well orchestrated, but it turned out that more than 20,000 members of international forces were not ready, or did not want to stop or prevent the pogrom.
According to the data from the Serbian intelligence sources, the threads of the March pogrom were pulled by Ramush Haradinaj, one of the commanders of the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), while Samedin Dzezairi, also known as Commander Hodza, an Islamic terrorist who arrived at Kosovo to establish a branch of the Army of Allah Hezbollah, had the key role in Prizren , Urosevac and Orahovac.
Tanjug News Agency - March 17, 2010
Six years as of March pogrom against Serbs in Kosovo
BELGRADE: Today marks six years since a major ethnic Albanian pogrom against Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija, when Serb property, monuments of culture and sanctuaries of the Serbian Orthodox Church were destroyed, and when more than 4,000 people were displaced.
It was the second great pogrom the ethnic Albanians committed after NATO's 1999 air raids, when the province came under the UN administration. More than a quarter million Serbs, Roma people and other non-Albanians were expelled in June 1999, before the very eyes of international forces.
During the March 17, 2004 violence, which is known as 'the Crystal Night in Kosovo,' 19 persons were killed - eight Serbs and 11 Albanians, whereas two more Serbs are believed to have gone missing.
The number of expelled Serbs reached 4,012, six towns and nine villages were ethnically cleansed, and 935 Serb houses and 10 public facilities, such as schools, healthcare centers and post offices, were razed, burnt or severely damaged.
The special target of ethnic Albanian violence was also the cultural and architectural heritage of the Serb people, and as a result 35 churches, including 18 monuments of culture, were demolished, burnt or severely damaged.
The motive for the pogrom was found in the campaign of the Albanian-media claiming that local Serbs chased six ethnic Albanian boys with dogs into the Ibar River in the village of Cabar near Zubin Potok and thus made three of them drown.
The investigation of the UNMIK police determined that the Albanian accusations were false and spokesperson of the international police Neridz Sing stated that the Albanian boys who survived the tragedy were under great pressure exerted by Albanian journalists and politicians to accuse Serbs from the nearby village of the incident.
The Albanian terror continued on March 18 when the Serbs were expelled from Kosovo polje, Obilic, Plemetina near Vucitrn and Svinjare near Kosovska Mitrovica, while in the village of Bijelo Polje near Pec all 28 houses of the returnees and a parish home were burnt down.
Representatives of the international community evaluated at the time that the ethnically-based violence against the Serbs in Kosovo had been planned in advance and well orchestrated, but it turned out that more than 20,000 members of international forces were not ready, or did not want to stop or prevent the pogrom.
According to the data from the Serbian intelligence sources, the threads of the March pogrom were pulled by Ramush Haradinaj, one of the commanders of the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), while Samedin Dzezairi, also known as Commander Hodza, an Islamic terrorist who arrived at Kosovo to establish a branch of the Army of Allah Hezbollah, had the key role in Prizren , Urosevac and Orahovac.
=== 3 ===
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=30&article_id=112092
Daily Star (Lebanon) - February 25, 2010
The perils and repercussions of Kosovo's independence
Daily Star (Lebanon) - February 25, 2010
The perils and repercussions of Kosovo's independence
By Sebastien Malo
BEIRUT: Thousands of Kosovans took to the streets last week to celebrate their territory’s second anniversary of independence. But two years after Kosovo stunned the world by unilaterally declaring its autonomy from Serbia, the country’s sovereignty remains as contentious as ever. So much so that the world’s foremost legal body, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), was tasked to determine the legality of the move by the UN General Assembly in 2008. Since then, a carrousel of interested nations has paraded in front of judges at the ICJ to defend their opposing positions. Some, like the US, argue that Kosovo’s claim to independence in 2008 was justified under international law, but their vocal opponents – Russia, Iran, and many more – maintain just the opposite.
In an exclusive interview with The Daily Star, Serbia’s defense counsel in the court case, Marcelo Kohen, argues that beyond the question of Kosovo’s independence, it is often the plain national interest of states combating secessionist movements – from China to Iran – which is keeping many governments on their toes as they wait for the court’s verdict, expected to fall this spring.
Q: Can you detail Serbia’s position and arguments in this case?
A: The Serbian position is twofold. With regard to general international law, the unilateral declaration of independence is not in conformity with the principle of territorial integrity of states, and cannot be justified on the basis of the principle of self-determination because the Kosovo Albanians are not entitled to external self-determination. The second aspect is Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, which established an international regime for the territory, including the respect of [its] integrity.
Q: And what is the position of Kosovo on the case?
A: Essentially the position of the authors of the declaration of independence is that international law does not prohibit declarations of independence, that the creation of states is a matter of fact and not a matter of law, and that the Security Council Resolution 1244 is neutral with regard to the final status of Kosovo. So according to them, this allows the Kosovo population to declare their independence. A position I obviously consider untenable.
Q: The ruling of the ICJ on Kosovo’s independence will be a non-binding one. What is the value of such a ruling if states are not obligated to respect it?
A: Judgments by the court are binding. In contentious cases, the court has the possibility to decide and its decisions are binding to the parties. Advisory procedures are different. But nevertheless they have a very strong influence on the subject the court deals with.
You have some states considering that the declaration is illegal, you have other states pretending that international law regulates secession. So what the court will say will bring an end to the legal discussion. Moreover, you also have concrete consequences. You have some pressure by the United States in order to obtain more recognition, and if the court says that the unilateral declaration is illegal, it will create a deterrent effect [over states who mull recognizing Kosovo’s independence]. On the contrary, if the Court says it is in conformity with international law, then this will open the way for more recognitions. So many states are waiting for what the Court will say.
Q: And what are possible implications for other secessionist movements in the world?
A: What the international court will say with regard to Kosovo will be equally applicable to other situations in which states are facing secessionist attempts.
The most important case and comparable one is the situation in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, because the Russians are using the same arguments the United States and some Western Europeans countries use to justify Kosovo’s independence.
Q: Do the positions states defended when consulted by the ICJ not simply reflect their predictable national interest and own context, rather than a disinterested opinion on rules of international law on state sovereignty?
A: Obviously if states feel that their interest is at stake, they will participate in the [advisory] procedure. In this case, you have states like Spain, China, even Iran, which participated against the declaration of independence.
It is easy to imagine what their reasons are: in Iran, obviously, you have the Kurdish attempts of independence; in Spain you have the Basques and Catalonia; Taiwan and Tibet in China.
Q: Does that position not undermine the status of international law as a normative framework that defends the rights of people regardless of state interest?
MK: No, I don’t think so. It’s quite normal to have states thinking in different ways, interpreting norms in different ways, and in other cases obviously trying to manipulate the law.
This is easier to perceive at the international level. In my view, many states are perfectly aware that the declaration of independence is illegal, but they try to justify their political positions using legal arguments. That’s quite normal in international relations.
You will never find a state accepting that it has acted contrary to international law. What is essential here – as it was the case with the construction of the wall in occupied Palestinian territory – is that there will be the most authoritative voice stating what is the right interpretation of the rules at stake.
BEIRUT: Thousands of Kosovans took to the streets last week to celebrate their territory’s second anniversary of independence. But two years after Kosovo stunned the world by unilaterally declaring its autonomy from Serbia, the country’s sovereignty remains as contentious as ever. So much so that the world’s foremost legal body, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), was tasked to determine the legality of the move by the UN General Assembly in 2008. Since then, a carrousel of interested nations has paraded in front of judges at the ICJ to defend their opposing positions. Some, like the US, argue that Kosovo’s claim to independence in 2008 was justified under international law, but their vocal opponents – Russia, Iran, and many more – maintain just the opposite.
In an exclusive interview with The Daily Star, Serbia’s defense counsel in the court case, Marcelo Kohen, argues that beyond the question of Kosovo’s independence, it is often the plain national interest of states combating secessionist movements – from China to Iran – which is keeping many governments on their toes as they wait for the court’s verdict, expected to fall this spring.
Q: Can you detail Serbia’s position and arguments in this case?
A: The Serbian position is twofold. With regard to general international law, the unilateral declaration of independence is not in conformity with the principle of territorial integrity of states, and cannot be justified on the basis of the principle of self-determination because the Kosovo Albanians are not entitled to external self-determination. The second aspect is Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, which established an international regime for the territory, including the respect of [its] integrity.
Q: And what is the position of Kosovo on the case?
A: Essentially the position of the authors of the declaration of independence is that international law does not prohibit declarations of independence, that the creation of states is a matter of fact and not a matter of law, and that the Security Council Resolution 1244 is neutral with regard to the final status of Kosovo. So according to them, this allows the Kosovo population to declare their independence. A position I obviously consider untenable.
Q: The ruling of the ICJ on Kosovo’s independence will be a non-binding one. What is the value of such a ruling if states are not obligated to respect it?
A: Judgments by the court are binding. In contentious cases, the court has the possibility to decide and its decisions are binding to the parties. Advisory procedures are different. But nevertheless they have a very strong influence on the subject the court deals with.
You have some states considering that the declaration is illegal, you have other states pretending that international law regulates secession. So what the court will say will bring an end to the legal discussion. Moreover, you also have concrete consequences. You have some pressure by the United States in order to obtain more recognition, and if the court says that the unilateral declaration is illegal, it will create a deterrent effect [over states who mull recognizing Kosovo’s independence]. On the contrary, if the Court says it is in conformity with international law, then this will open the way for more recognitions. So many states are waiting for what the Court will say.
Q: And what are possible implications for other secessionist movements in the world?
A: What the international court will say with regard to Kosovo will be equally applicable to other situations in which states are facing secessionist attempts.
The most important case and comparable one is the situation in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, because the Russians are using the same arguments the United States and some Western Europeans countries use to justify Kosovo’s independence.
Q: Do the positions states defended when consulted by the ICJ not simply reflect their predictable national interest and own context, rather than a disinterested opinion on rules of international law on state sovereignty?
A: Obviously if states feel that their interest is at stake, they will participate in the [advisory] procedure. In this case, you have states like Spain, China, even Iran, which participated against the declaration of independence.
It is easy to imagine what their reasons are: in Iran, obviously, you have the Kurdish attempts of independence; in Spain you have the Basques and Catalonia; Taiwan and Tibet in China.
Q: Does that position not undermine the status of international law as a normative framework that defends the rights of people regardless of state interest?
MK: No, I don’t think so. It’s quite normal to have states thinking in different ways, interpreting norms in different ways, and in other cases obviously trying to manipulate the law.
This is easier to perceive at the international level. In my view, many states are perfectly aware that the declaration of independence is illegal, but they try to justify their political positions using legal arguments. That’s quite normal in international relations.
You will never find a state accepting that it has acted contrary to international law. What is essential here – as it was the case with the construction of the wall in occupied Palestinian territory – is that there will be the most authoritative voice stating what is the right interpretation of the rules at stake.