(english / francais / italiano / srpskohrvatski.
Sulla aggressione del 1999 raccomandiamo anche la lettura della documentazione raccolta sul nostro sito:
12 anni dopo, ritornano i teppisti dei "Diritti Umani"
0) Danas u Banoj Luci: Javna tribina - "Ne ratu!"
Iniziativa oggi a Banja Luka nel 12.mo anniversario dei bombardamenti contro la Jugoslavia
1) NATO cluster bombs to be cleared
Dopo 12 anni sono ancora più di 300 i siti non bonificati dalle "cluster bombs", arma vietata che però fu usata per imporre presunti "Diritti Umani"
2) Kosovo: a template for disaster (David Gibbs, The Guardian)
L'idea che quello del Kosovo sia il modello da seguire con l' "intervento umanitario" in Libia è un mito da sfatare
3) Прекинути страни оружани напад на Либију ! / Immediately stop external armed assault on Libya ! (Beogradski Forum)
Appello per la cessazione immediata della aggressione contro la Libia, nel 12mo anniversario di quella contro la Jugoslavia
JAVNU TRIBINU - "NE RATU!"
Tribina će se održati 24. marta (12-godišnjica NATO AGRESIJE NA SR JUGOSLAVIJU) u prostorijama Glavnog odbora SK BIH, Ul. Nikole Pašića 34 A, Banja Luka, sa početkom u 18 časova!
Tribini prisustvuju članovi Društva "Josip Broz Tito" Banja Luka, Sekcije potomaka boraca NOR-a, SUBNOR-a, Lige antifašista Jugo-istočne Evrope, Pokreta BH-Venecuelanske solidarnosti...
Generalni sekretar
уторак, 22 март 2011 19:46
Београдски форум за свет равноправних сматра да оружани напад групе земаља на Либију излази изван оквира резолуције Савета безбедности број 1973, да представља кршење принципа медјународних односа, и да је усмерен на остваривање контроле над природним ресурсима ове земље. Војни напад под слоганом ‘’Одисејева зора’’ прикрива настојање за повратак на колонијалне односе.
Јасно је да не постоје хуманитарне агресије.
Као сто је показала агресија НАТО на Србију (СРЈ) пре тачно 12 година, агресија изазива масовне цивилне жртве, разарања инфраструцтуре, економије и јавних служби неопходних за свакодневни живот градјана. Напад на Либију води дестабилизацији Магреба и региона, и Медитерана, подстицању сепаратизма И екстремизма.
Београдски форум за свет равноправних се придружује захтевима за хитни прекид оружаног напада групе земаља, заустављање страдања цивила, патњи становништва И разарања инфаструктуре. Либијски народ има право да своје унутрашње проблеме реши мирним путем уз очување суверенитета И територијалног интегритета земље.
Tuesday, 22 March 2011 19:51
The Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals holds that the armed assault of a group of countries against Libya goes beyond the scope of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, that it violates the principle of the international affairs enshrined in the United Nations Charter and, in its essence, is aimed at gaining effective control over the natural resources of that country.
It should be as clear as a day to anyone that there is no such a thing as humanitarian aggression.
As demonstrated by NATO aggression on Serbia/FRY twelve years ago, an aggression is bound to, and does, cause massive civilian deaths, and inflict destruction of infrastructure, economy and public services necessary for daily life of citizens. Aggression in general leads to destabilizing regions, stirring secessions, inciting terrorism and thriving international organized crime.
The Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals hereby joins the requests for immediate cessation of armed assault by a group of countries, in order to make it possible for the Libyan nation to deal with and solve its internal problems by peaceful means, while preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.
4) Clark’s dilemma on dropping devastating bombs on Serbia
Nei diari di Blair la vergogna delle azioni criminali della NATO in Serbia
5) NATO's 1999 aggression videos on YouTube
6) Ricordo e rimozione dei crimini NATO in Montenegro (2009)
7) Guerre du Kosovo : quand les Roumains volaient au secours des avions serbes... (2007)
=== 0 ===
SAVEZ KOMUNISTA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE ORGANIZUJE
JAVNU TRIBINU - "NE RATU!"
Tribina će se održati 24. marta (12-godišnjica NATO AGRESIJE NA SR JUGOSLAVIJU) u prostorijama Glavnog odbora SK BIH, Ul. Nikole Pašića 34 A, Banja Luka, sa početkom u 18 časova!
Tribini prisustvuju članovi Društva "Josip Broz Tito" Banja Luka, Sekcije potomaka boraca NOR-a, SUBNOR-a, Lige antifašista Jugo-istočne Evrope, Pokreta BH-Venecuelanske solidarnosti...
Generalni sekretar
=== 1 ===
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/society-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=03&dd=23&nav_id=73394
Tanjug News Agency - March 23, 2011
NATO cluster bombs to be cleared
BELGRADE: Clearing the ground in Bujanovac, Preševo and Kuršumlija in southern Serbia of cluster bombs left by the 1999 NATO bombing should start in April.
The project will be financed by a Norwegian donation worth EUR 3.4mn.
A memorandum of understanding between the Serbian government center for mine clearance and the Norwegian organization People's Aid is being prepared, reads a release from the demining center made available to reporters on Wednesday at the Serbian Interior Ministry.
The humanitarian demining project in these municipalities will last three years.
According to the data of the center, Bujanovac and Preševo have 1,389,900 square meters contaminated with different types of mines, and the area will be investigated further to determine precise information.
It has also been determined that 290 sites, located in 16 Serbian municipalities and covering a total of 14,920,000 square meters, are contaminated with cluster bombs from the NATO bombing.
110 more locations, 6,151,000 square meters in total, are suspected of containing cluster bombs, but the areas need to be investigated more thoroughly.
The 1999 attacks of the western military alliance left Serbia with 64 aerial bombs and rockets at 44 locations, some buried as deep as 20 meters in the ground and some lying in the Sava and Danube riverbeds.
Based on information received from citizens, the Interior Ministry's Emergency Situations Sector suspects that another 50 bombs and rockets are hidden at several dozen locations which are yet to be fully searched.
Tanjug News Agency - March 23, 2011
NATO cluster bombs to be cleared
BELGRADE: Clearing the ground in Bujanovac, Preševo and Kuršumlija in southern Serbia of cluster bombs left by the 1999 NATO bombing should start in April.
The project will be financed by a Norwegian donation worth EUR 3.4mn.
A memorandum of understanding between the Serbian government center for mine clearance and the Norwegian organization People's Aid is being prepared, reads a release from the demining center made available to reporters on Wednesday at the Serbian Interior Ministry.
The humanitarian demining project in these municipalities will last three years.
According to the data of the center, Bujanovac and Preševo have 1,389,900 square meters contaminated with different types of mines, and the area will be investigated further to determine precise information.
It has also been determined that 290 sites, located in 16 Serbian municipalities and covering a total of 14,920,000 square meters, are contaminated with cluster bombs from the NATO bombing.
110 more locations, 6,151,000 square meters in total, are suspected of containing cluster bombs, but the areas need to be investigated more thoroughly.
The 1999 attacks of the western military alliance left Serbia with 64 aerial bombs and rockets at 44 locations, some buried as deep as 20 meters in the ground and some lying in the Sava and Danube riverbeds.
Based on information received from citizens, the Interior Ministry's Emergency Situations Sector suspects that another 50 bombs and rockets are hidden at several dozen locations which are yet to be fully searched.
=== 2 ===
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/kosovo-template-for-disaster-libya
Kosovo: a template for disaster
The idea that Kosovo is a model for humanitarian intervention in Libya is based on a series of myths
David Gibbs
Tuesday March 22 2011
The Guardian
As they weigh up whether to support the attack on Muammar Gaddafi's regime [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/21/gaddafi-target-analysis" title="], some western commentators [http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=2033" title="commentators] are taking comfort from the 1999 Nato air war against Serbia, which is widely viewed as a successful humanitarian mission that protected Kosovans from Serbian aggression. Moreover it was done at low cost to the intervening powers, who suffered no combat casualties. And ultimately it led to the ousting of Serbia's villainous leader, Slobodan Milosevic [http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/mar/13/guardianobituaries.warcrimes" title="]. The Libya intervention, it is hoped, will have a similarly positive outcome.
In reality, Kosovo presents little basis for optimism with regard to Libya. Its success is based on a series of myths.
The first is that in Kosovo, war constituted a morally simple conflict, between aggressive Serbs and victimised Kosovan Albanians; and that Nato, in backing the Albanians, was furthering the cause of human rights. In fact, none of the parties were particularly moral. The war crimes of Serbian forces are well known, but their Kosovan adversaries committed crimes too. In early 1999, Tony Blair believed that the Kosovo Liberation Army was "not much better than the Serbs", according to Alastair Campbell's memoirs. And the UK defence minister George Robertson stated that until shortly before the Nato bombing campaign, "the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav [Serb] authorities had been."
Despite this record, Nato selected the KLA as its ground force, while its planes bombed the Serbs. And after Milosevic capitulated and the bombing ended, Nato forces in effect put the KLA in charge of Kosovo. Once in power, it promptly terrorised ethnic Serbs, Roma and other ethnic groups, forcing out almost a quarter million people.
The record of Nato complicity in KLA war crimes is very relevant for the intervention in Libya. Once again western states will be seeking local allies, in Benghazi and elsewhere, among the Libyan opposition to Gaddafi. We must hope that they are more careful in choosing them. However, the Kosovo case gives us little assurance. The states leading the Libya intervention clearly do not have a positive record in their past selection of allies in the Middle East. Indeed, such unsavoury figures as Hosni Mubarak, Zine Ben Ali [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests" title="] or Gaddafi himself had close ties to the states now claiming the moral high ground in their interventionist actions.
Another myth regarding Kosovo is that bombing improved the human rights situation. In reality, it made things worse, and augmented the suffering. Prior to the Nato campaign, the total number of people killed on all sides in the Kosovo conflict was 2,000, approximately half of whom were killed by Serbian forces. After the bombing began, however, there was a huge spike in Serb-perpetrated atrocities, which caused almost 10,000 deaths, combined with widespread ethnic cleansing. The Serbian forces were furious that they could not stop the Nato air attacks, so they took out their frustration on the relatively defenceless Albanians, causing a huge increase in the number of killings. The Nato bombing itself directly killed at least 500 civilians. When viewed from a humanitarian standpoint, Nato intervention was a disaster.
There is a danger that the current intervention in Libya could produce similar results. In response to the bombing, Gaddafi could lash out against his own people with even more viciousness than Milosevic did in Kosovo. And Gaddafi could resort to some of his old terrorist techniques, against both American and European citizens, with ugly consequences. Humanitarian intervention could, once again, lead to disaster.
Finally, it is wrong to remember the Kosovo intervention as being inexpensive or of brief duration. True, the bombing campaign lasted only 78 days. However, this was followed by an extended occupation involving thousands of Nato peacekeeping troops. A Nato force remains in Kosovo, with little prospect of departure.
A similar situation could occur in Libya: securing regime change will probably require a foreign occupation, which could last for years, in a country with three times the population of Kosovo and a much larger territory. The Nato powers may have no choice but to field troops, and to fund their occupation activities ? on top of the UK and US commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan, and during a global economic crisis.
guardian.co.uk Copyright (c) Guardian News and Media Limited. 2011
Kosovo: a template for disaster
The idea that Kosovo is a model for humanitarian intervention in Libya is based on a series of myths
David Gibbs
Tuesday March 22 2011
The Guardian
As they weigh up whether to support the attack on Muammar Gaddafi's regime [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/21/gaddafi-target-analysis" title="], some western commentators [http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=2033" title="commentators] are taking comfort from the 1999 Nato air war against Serbia, which is widely viewed as a successful humanitarian mission that protected Kosovans from Serbian aggression. Moreover it was done at low cost to the intervening powers, who suffered no combat casualties. And ultimately it led to the ousting of Serbia's villainous leader, Slobodan Milosevic [http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/mar/13/guardianobituaries.warcrimes" title="]. The Libya intervention, it is hoped, will have a similarly positive outcome.
In reality, Kosovo presents little basis for optimism with regard to Libya. Its success is based on a series of myths.
The first is that in Kosovo, war constituted a morally simple conflict, between aggressive Serbs and victimised Kosovan Albanians; and that Nato, in backing the Albanians, was furthering the cause of human rights. In fact, none of the parties were particularly moral. The war crimes of Serbian forces are well known, but their Kosovan adversaries committed crimes too. In early 1999, Tony Blair believed that the Kosovo Liberation Army was "not much better than the Serbs", according to Alastair Campbell's memoirs. And the UK defence minister George Robertson stated that until shortly before the Nato bombing campaign, "the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav [Serb] authorities had been."
Despite this record, Nato selected the KLA as its ground force, while its planes bombed the Serbs. And after Milosevic capitulated and the bombing ended, Nato forces in effect put the KLA in charge of Kosovo. Once in power, it promptly terrorised ethnic Serbs, Roma and other ethnic groups, forcing out almost a quarter million people.
The record of Nato complicity in KLA war crimes is very relevant for the intervention in Libya. Once again western states will be seeking local allies, in Benghazi and elsewhere, among the Libyan opposition to Gaddafi. We must hope that they are more careful in choosing them. However, the Kosovo case gives us little assurance. The states leading the Libya intervention clearly do not have a positive record in their past selection of allies in the Middle East. Indeed, such unsavoury figures as Hosni Mubarak, Zine Ben Ali [http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/14/tunisian-president-flees-country-protests" title="] or Gaddafi himself had close ties to the states now claiming the moral high ground in their interventionist actions.
Another myth regarding Kosovo is that bombing improved the human rights situation. In reality, it made things worse, and augmented the suffering. Prior to the Nato campaign, the total number of people killed on all sides in the Kosovo conflict was 2,000, approximately half of whom were killed by Serbian forces. After the bombing began, however, there was a huge spike in Serb-perpetrated atrocities, which caused almost 10,000 deaths, combined with widespread ethnic cleansing. The Serbian forces were furious that they could not stop the Nato air attacks, so they took out their frustration on the relatively defenceless Albanians, causing a huge increase in the number of killings. The Nato bombing itself directly killed at least 500 civilians. When viewed from a humanitarian standpoint, Nato intervention was a disaster.
There is a danger that the current intervention in Libya could produce similar results. In response to the bombing, Gaddafi could lash out against his own people with even more viciousness than Milosevic did in Kosovo. And Gaddafi could resort to some of his old terrorist techniques, against both American and European citizens, with ugly consequences. Humanitarian intervention could, once again, lead to disaster.
Finally, it is wrong to remember the Kosovo intervention as being inexpensive or of brief duration. True, the bombing campaign lasted only 78 days. However, this was followed by an extended occupation involving thousands of Nato peacekeeping troops. A Nato force remains in Kosovo, with little prospect of departure.
A similar situation could occur in Libya: securing regime change will probably require a foreign occupation, which could last for years, in a country with three times the population of Kosovo and a much larger territory. The Nato powers may have no choice but to field troops, and to fund their occupation activities ? on top of the UK and US commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan, and during a global economic crisis.
guardian.co.uk Copyright (c) Guardian News and Media Limited. 2011
=== 3 ===
Прекинути страни оружани напад на Либију !
уторак, 22 март 2011 19:46
Београдски форум за свет равноправних сматра да оружани напад групе земаља на Либију излази изван оквира резолуције Савета безбедности број 1973, да представља кршење принципа медјународних односа, и да је усмерен на остваривање контроле над природним ресурсима ове земље. Војни напад под слоганом ‘’Одисејева зора’’ прикрива настојање за повратак на колонијалне односе.
Јасно је да не постоје хуманитарне агресије.
Као сто је показала агресија НАТО на Србију (СРЈ) пре тачно 12 година, агресија изазива масовне цивилне жртве, разарања инфраструцтуре, економије и јавних служби неопходних за свакодневни живот градјана. Напад на Либију води дестабилизацији Магреба и региона, и Медитерана, подстицању сепаратизма И екстремизма.
Београдски форум за свет равноправних се придружује захтевима за хитни прекид оружаног напада групе земаља, заустављање страдања цивила, патњи становништва И разарања инфаструктуре. Либијски народ има право да своје унутрашње проблеме реши мирним путем уз очување суверенитета И територијалног интегритета земље.
---
Immediately stop external armed assault on Libya !
Tuesday, 22 March 2011 19:51
The Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals holds that the armed assault of a group of countries against Libya goes beyond the scope of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, that it violates the principle of the international affairs enshrined in the United Nations Charter and, in its essence, is aimed at gaining effective control over the natural resources of that country.
It should be as clear as a day to anyone that there is no such a thing as humanitarian aggression.
As demonstrated by NATO aggression on Serbia/FRY twelve years ago, an aggression is bound to, and does, cause massive civilian deaths, and inflict destruction of infrastructure, economy and public services necessary for daily life of citizens. Aggression in general leads to destabilizing regions, stirring secessions, inciting terrorism and thriving international organized crime.
The Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals hereby joins the requests for immediate cessation of armed assault by a group of countries, in order to make it possible for the Libyan nation to deal with and solve its internal problems by peaceful means, while preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.
=== 4 ===
http://www.emg.rs/en/news/serbia/144456.html
EMportal/Tanjug News Agency/Guardian - January 16, 2011
Clark’s dilemma on dropping devastating bombs on Serbia
EMportal/Tanjug News Agency/Guardian - January 16, 2011
Clark’s dilemma on dropping devastating bombs on Serbia
Strategist of the media war against Serbia, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's press secretary, published diaries which explain the background of an entire series of events which followed the bombing of Serbia in 1999, whose excerpts were published by the British “Guardian”.
Wesley Clark was “bothered” by a dilemma whether they should drop until then unknown devastating bombs on Serbia – with or without a warning, while Gerhard Schroeder was interested how the disinformation campaign is going, Tony Blair's press secretary Alastair Campbell wrote in his diaries.
Strategist of the media war against Serbia, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's press secretary, published diaries which explain the background of an entire series of events which followed the bombing of Serbia in 1999, whose excerpts were published by the British “Guardian”.
Friday 2 April - I was very tired still, and starting to get that achy feeling that exhaustion brings. We were losing the propaganda battle with the Serbs. Tony Blair called early on, and wanted a real sense of urgency injected into things.
He had spoken to Clinton about the timidity of the military strategy. He had spoken to Thatcher [Margaret Thatcher] last night who was appalled that the NAC and Nato ambassadors discussed [with each other] targeting plans.
He wanted the message out that we were intensifying attacks. I said we said that on Wednesday.
Tuesday 6 April - Family holiday France - The rightwing commentators were in full cry and we agreed to try to get Thatcher and Charles Powell [former foreign policy adviser to Thatcher] out saying the right hate the left fighting wars but they should be supporting what we are doing.
NATO might balk but we were going to have to get a grip of their communications and make sure capitals were more tightly drawn in to what they were saying and doing.
Wednesday 7 April - We were having some effect with the strategy for the right, eg Charles Powell and David Hart [former Thatcher adviser] were both going up, but the rightwing papers and commentators so hated us that they were determined to do what they could to help anything fail.
If this was a Tory war, they would support it every inch of the way.
We are losing the media war
Thursday 8 April - I was finding it impossible to switch off from it, and was starting to map out more changes I felt we should be making to the communications effort. A lot of this was about communication now.
Militarily, NATO is overwhelmingly more powerful than Belgrade. But Milosevic [Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia] has total control of his media and our media is vulnerable to their output.
So we can lose the public opinion battle and if we lose hands down in some of the NATO countries, we have a problem sustaining this.
Wesley Clark was “bothered” by a dilemma whether they should drop until then unknown devastating bombs on Serbia – with or without a warning, while Gerhard Schroeder was interested how the disinformation campaign is going, Tony Blair's press secretary Alastair Campbell wrote in his diaries.
Strategist of the media war against Serbia, British Prime Minister Tony Blair's press secretary, published diaries which explain the background of an entire series of events which followed the bombing of Serbia in 1999, whose excerpts were published by the British “Guardian”.
Friday 2 April - I was very tired still, and starting to get that achy feeling that exhaustion brings. We were losing the propaganda battle with the Serbs. Tony Blair called early on, and wanted a real sense of urgency injected into things.
He had spoken to Clinton about the timidity of the military strategy. He had spoken to Thatcher [Margaret Thatcher] last night who was appalled that the NAC and Nato ambassadors discussed [with each other] targeting plans.
He wanted the message out that we were intensifying attacks. I said we said that on Wednesday.
Tuesday 6 April - Family holiday France - The rightwing commentators were in full cry and we agreed to try to get Thatcher and Charles Powell [former foreign policy adviser to Thatcher] out saying the right hate the left fighting wars but they should be supporting what we are doing.
NATO might balk but we were going to have to get a grip of their communications and make sure capitals were more tightly drawn in to what they were saying and doing.
Wednesday 7 April - We were having some effect with the strategy for the right, eg Charles Powell and David Hart [former Thatcher adviser] were both going up, but the rightwing papers and commentators so hated us that they were determined to do what they could to help anything fail.
If this was a Tory war, they would support it every inch of the way.
We are losing the media war
Thursday 8 April - I was finding it impossible to switch off from it, and was starting to map out more changes I felt we should be making to the communications effort. A lot of this was about communication now.
Militarily, NATO is overwhelmingly more powerful than Belgrade. But Milosevic [Slobodan Milosevic, president of Serbia] has total control of his media and our media is vulnerable to their output.
So we can lose the public opinion battle and if we lose hands down in some of the NATO countries, we have a problem sustaining this.
=== 5 ===
NATO's 1999 aggression videos on YouTube
NATO's Illegal War Against Serbia/ Lies About Kosovo War
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9FN33NTMpLU
NATO launched a bombing campaign against Serbia in March 1999 to stop an onslaught ordered by then-President Slobodan Milosevic against the Albanian Muslim Terrorists in Kosovo. The air war lasted 78 days. During more than three months of bombing, NATO targeted mostly military targets, but also destroyed much of Serbia's infrastructure, including several key civilian bridges. Hundreds of people were killed in. The alliance faced criticism for dropping bombs with depleted uranium as well as cluster bombs, which eject a number of smaller "bomblets."
WATCH!
"The Lies Of The Racak "Massacre"/ Bill Clinton's Role In Kosovo"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-muEj_E0PY
Remember why NATO spent 78-days bombing Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999? There was the ethnic cleansing. The atrocities. The refugees chased out of Kosovo by the Serb army. The mass graves. The heaps of bodies tossed into vats of sulphuric acid at the Trepca mines.NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said there were 100,000 Kosovo Albanian Muslims unaccounted for.
Problem is, none of it happened.NATO's original estimate of 100,000 ethnic Albanians slaughtered, later revised downward to 10,000, turns out to be considerably exaggerated.Dr. Peter Markesteyn, a Winnipeg forensic pathologist, was among the first war crimes investigators to arrive in Kosovo after NATO ended its bombing campaign."We were told there were 100,000 bodies everywhere," said Dr. Markesteyn. "We performed 1,800 autopsies -- that's it."Fewer than 2,000 corpses. None found in the Trepca mines. No remains in the vats of sulphuric acid. Most found in isolated graves -- not in the mass graves NATO warned about. And no clue as to whether the bodies were those of KLA terrorists, civilians, even whether they were Serbs or ethnic Albanians. No wonder then that of all the incidents on which Slobodan Milosevic has been indicted for war crimes, the total body count is not 100,000, not 10,000, not even 1,800 -- but 391!
It was William Walker, at the time head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) who, on the morning of January 16, 1999, led the press to the Kosovo village of Racak, a KLA stronghold. There some 20 bodies were found in a shallow trench, and 20 more were found scattered throughout the village. The KLA terrorists, and Walker, alleged that masked Serb policemen had entered the village the previous day, and killed men, women and children at close range, after torturing and mutilating them. Chillingly, the Serb police were said to have whistled merrily as they went about their work of slaughtering the villagers.Clinton's Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, as eager to scratch her ever itchy trigger finger as her boss was to scratch his illimitable sexual itches, demanded that Yugoslavia be bombed immediately. Albright, like a kid agonizingly counting down the hours to Christmas, would have to wait until after Milosevic's rejection of NATO's ultimata at Rambouillet to get her wish.But not everyone was so sure that William Walker's story was to be believed. The French newspaper La Monde had some trouble swallowing the story. It reported on Jan. 21, 1999, a few days after the incident, that an Associated Press TV crew had filmed a gun battle at Racak between Serb police and KLA terrorists. Indeed, the crew was present because the Serbs had tipped them off that they were going to enter the village to arrest a man accused of shooting a police officer. Also present were two teams of KVM monitors.It seems unlikely that if you're about to carry out a massacre that you would invite the press -- and international observers -- to watch.And now there's a report that the Finnish forensic pathologists who investigated the incident on behalf of the European Union, say there was no evidence of a massacre. In an article to be published in Forensic Science International at the end of February, the Finnish team writes that none of the bodies were mutilated, there was no evidence of torture, and only one was shot at close range.
The pathologists say Walker was quick to come to the conclusion that there was a massacre, even though the evidence was weak.And they point out that there is no evidence that the deceased were from Racak.The KLA terrorists, the Serbs charge, faked the massacre by laying out their fallen comrades in the trench they, themselves, prepared, and the United States used the staged massacre as a pretext for the bombing.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9FN33NTMpLU
NATO launched a bombing campaign against Serbia in March 1999 to stop an onslaught ordered by then-President Slobodan Milosevic against the Albanian Muslim Terrorists in Kosovo. The air war lasted 78 days. During more than three months of bombing, NATO targeted mostly military targets, but also destroyed much of Serbia's infrastructure, including several key civilian bridges. Hundreds of people were killed in. The alliance faced criticism for dropping bombs with depleted uranium as well as cluster bombs, which eject a number of smaller "bomblets."
WATCH!
"The Lies Of The Racak "Massacre"/ Bill Clinton's Role In Kosovo"
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-muEj_E0PY
Remember why NATO spent 78-days bombing Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999? There was the ethnic cleansing. The atrocities. The refugees chased out of Kosovo by the Serb army. The mass graves. The heaps of bodies tossed into vats of sulphuric acid at the Trepca mines.NATO spokesman Jamie Shea said there were 100,000 Kosovo Albanian Muslims unaccounted for.
Problem is, none of it happened.NATO's original estimate of 100,000 ethnic Albanians slaughtered, later revised downward to 10,000, turns out to be considerably exaggerated.Dr. Peter Markesteyn, a Winnipeg forensic pathologist, was among the first war crimes investigators to arrive in Kosovo after NATO ended its bombing campaign."We were told there were 100,000 bodies everywhere," said Dr. Markesteyn. "We performed 1,800 autopsies -- that's it."Fewer than 2,000 corpses. None found in the Trepca mines. No remains in the vats of sulphuric acid. Most found in isolated graves -- not in the mass graves NATO warned about. And no clue as to whether the bodies were those of KLA terrorists, civilians, even whether they were Serbs or ethnic Albanians. No wonder then that of all the incidents on which Slobodan Milosevic has been indicted for war crimes, the total body count is not 100,000, not 10,000, not even 1,800 -- but 391!
It was William Walker, at the time head of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) who, on the morning of January 16, 1999, led the press to the Kosovo village of Racak, a KLA stronghold. There some 20 bodies were found in a shallow trench, and 20 more were found scattered throughout the village. The KLA terrorists, and Walker, alleged that masked Serb policemen had entered the village the previous day, and killed men, women and children at close range, after torturing and mutilating them. Chillingly, the Serb police were said to have whistled merrily as they went about their work of slaughtering the villagers.Clinton's Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, as eager to scratch her ever itchy trigger finger as her boss was to scratch his illimitable sexual itches, demanded that Yugoslavia be bombed immediately. Albright, like a kid agonizingly counting down the hours to Christmas, would have to wait until after Milosevic's rejection of NATO's ultimata at Rambouillet to get her wish.But not everyone was so sure that William Walker's story was to be believed. The French newspaper La Monde had some trouble swallowing the story. It reported on Jan. 21, 1999, a few days after the incident, that an Associated Press TV crew had filmed a gun battle at Racak between Serb police and KLA terrorists. Indeed, the crew was present because the Serbs had tipped them off that they were going to enter the village to arrest a man accused of shooting a police officer. Also present were two teams of KVM monitors.It seems unlikely that if you're about to carry out a massacre that you would invite the press -- and international observers -- to watch.And now there's a report that the Finnish forensic pathologists who investigated the incident on behalf of the European Union, say there was no evidence of a massacre. In an article to be published in Forensic Science International at the end of February, the Finnish team writes that none of the bodies were mutilated, there was no evidence of torture, and only one was shot at close range.
The pathologists say Walker was quick to come to the conclusion that there was a massacre, even though the evidence was weak.And they point out that there is no evidence that the deceased were from Racak.The KLA terrorists, the Serbs charge, faked the massacre by laying out their fallen comrades in the trench they, themselves, prepared, and the United States used the staged massacre as a pretext for the bombing.
=== 6 ===
(na srpskohrvatskom: Ostao tek gorak ukus
Il sapore amaro del passato
01.04.2009 Da Ulcinj, scrive
A dieci anni dall'intervento della Nato contro la Repubblica federale di Jugoslavia (Serbia e Montenegro), il Montenegro si trova ora sull’uscio di quest'organizzazione politico militare. Delle 49 persone rimaste uccise nella primavera del 1999 se ne ricordano solo i familiari
Sono in pochi in Montenegro a dare rilievo al tragico anniversario dell'inizio della campagna Nato. Le elezioni parlamentari anticipate e la crisi economica che sta scuotendo il paese occupano completamente la vita politica e sociale del più giovane membro dell'Onu.
Dalla coalizione di governo guidata dal premier Đukanović si afferma che la pace mantenuta all'epoca in Montenegro rappresenta, oggi, la sostanza fisiologica ed economica del paese, mentre il capo della diplomazia montenegrina Milan Roćen ritiene che la Nato non sia colpevole per le vittime che allora vi furono.
Allo stesso tempo in Montenegro i partiti filo-serbi credono che a Podgorica debba essere eretto un monumento per ricordare le vittime dei bombardamenti. “La colpa è del regime che fa di tutto per cancellare il ricordo del passato e per convincerci che ci hanno bombardato per il nostro bene”, si afferma tra le file della “Nuova democrazia serba” di Andrija Mandić.
Imprigionato dai suoi miti e dalle leggende, dietro cui è stata nascosta la verità, senza forti tradizioni democratiche e istituzioni, il paese alla fine degli anni Novanta del secolo scorso era in preda ad una “silenziosa guerra civile”. Molti temevano che avrebbe potuto trasformarsi in un vero conflitto.
Dalla coalizione di governo guidata dal premier Đukanović si afferma che la pace mantenuta all'epoca in Montenegro rappresenta, oggi, la sostanza fisiologica ed economica del paese, mentre il capo della diplomazia montenegrina Milan Roćen ritiene che la Nato non sia colpevole per le vittime che allora vi furono.
Allo stesso tempo in Montenegro i partiti filo-serbi credono che a Podgorica debba essere eretto un monumento per ricordare le vittime dei bombardamenti. “La colpa è del regime che fa di tutto per cancellare il ricordo del passato e per convincerci che ci hanno bombardato per il nostro bene”, si afferma tra le file della “Nuova democrazia serba” di Andrija Mandić.
Imprigionato dai suoi miti e dalle leggende, dietro cui è stata nascosta la verità, senza forti tradizioni democratiche e istituzioni, il paese alla fine degli anni Novanta del secolo scorso era in preda ad una “silenziosa guerra civile”. Molti temevano che avrebbe potuto trasformarsi in un vero conflitto.
Una popolazione ben armata, profondamente e uniformemente divisa sulla questione dell'identità politica e culturale si raccolse da un lato attorno al carismatico presidente Milo Đukanović - all’epoca era sostenuto dall'occidente - e dall’altro attorno all'ex presidente del Montenegro nonché leader del più forte partito d'opposizione, Partito socialista popolare (SNP), Momir Bulatović, che invece godeva del sostengo della Serbia di Milošević.
In quel periodo in Montenegro le forze erano ben bilanciate: Đukanović poteva disporre di una polizia ben addestrata, e Bulatović dell'esercito federale. Decine di migliaia di persone, su un totale di 630 mila abitanti, si guardavano attraverso il mirino. In molti pensavano che sarebbe giunto il momento della resa dei conti. Fu l'equilibrio della paura il fattore decisivo che impedì un conflitto tra fratelli.
Anche se un notevole contributo a contenere il conflitto fu dovuto anche la “Dichiarazione sul mantenimento della pace civile”, approvata all’unanimità dal Parlamento montenegrino pochi giorni dopo l’inizio dell’intervento della Nato.
D'altra parte il Kosovo è sempre stato un tema ben utilizzato quando c’era bisogno di scaldare gli animi dei montenegrini a favore di un attacco armato. Il vecchio “eroico” Montenegro si basa proprio sul “mito kosovaro”, sviluppato in proporzioni smisurate dal più grande poeta e re montenegrino, Petar Petrović Njegoš (1813-1851). Per questo l’intervento della Nato mise Đukanović in una posizione molto difficile. In modo tacito Đukanović si era posizionato a fianco degli alleati occidentali, e nel paese fu accusato di tradimento.
Gli stretti rapporti tra il premier montenegrino e Washington erano già iniziati alla fine del 1995, quando Đukanović e il vicepresidente del Partito democratico socialista, Svetozar Marović (l'ultimo presidente dell'Unione Serbia e Montenegro), fecero visita allo State Department e al Pentagono, proprio nel momento in cui stavano per concludersi i negoziati a Dayton sull'accordo di pace per la Bosnia Erzegovina.
Sapendo che i funzionari montenegrini a Washington avevano “cambiato l'abito”, e che al Montenegro era stato attribuito il ruolo di “portaerei americana per destabilizzare la Serbia”, il presidente serbo Slobodan Milošević voleva abbandonare i negoziati, ma alla base Wright-Patterson cedette alle pressioni dell'allora inviato speciale americano per i Balcani Richard Holbrooke.
Con ciò si spiega ogni tipo di appoggio offerto da Washington al Montenegro quando versava in situazioni di crisi e durante le sfide della fine degli anni Novanta. Misurato finanziariamente, l'aiuto ha superato il valore di 300 milioni di dollari, vale a dire che il Montenegro, dopo Israele, è il paese che ha ricevuto il più grande sostegno americano pro capite.
Anche durante gli attacchi, Đukanović veniva ricevuto nei centri delle capitali occidentali, motivo per cui il Montenegro fu poco esposto ai bombardamenti. Gli aerei dell’Alleanza partivano dalla base di “Aviano”, sorvolavano sopra il territorio del Montenegro per andare verso la Serbia e il Kosovo, e soltanto sporadicamente i loro obbiettivi erano l’Esercito jugoslavo di stanza in Montenegro.
Anche se spesso provocati dalla base militare nel porto di Bar, questo obbiettivo non fu mai bombardato. All’epoca i media scrivevano che il bombardamento non c’era stato perché Đukanović era continuamente in collegamento con l’allora presidente francese Jacques Chirac.
Sul fronte delle vittime, la tragedia più grande accadde il 30 aprile a Murino, nel nord est del Montenegro, quando morirono sei civili, di cui tre bambini. Durante i bombardamenti a Murino non c’era nemmeno una unità militare e non c’era nemmeno un obiettivo militare che potesse essere meta della Nato. In seguito, sul ponte dove sono morte quelle persone innocenti è stato eretto un monumento.
Nel 1999 decine di migliaia di profughi albanesi si rifugiarono in Montenegro. Una decina di giorni prima della tragedia di Murino, i soldati dell’esercito jugoslavo al nord del Montenegro, a Rožaj, avevano ucciso sei profughi albanesi del Kosovo. Il processo per questo crimine di guerra è da poco iniziato nel comune di Berane.
A dieci anni di distanza, pare che soltanto le famiglie delle persone morte ricordino l’intervento dell’Alleanza atlantica. Anche se un certo sapore amaro è rimasto nella bocca di molti. Motivo per cui soltanto il 40 percento dei cittadini del Montenegro è a favore dell’ingresso nella Nato.
In quel periodo in Montenegro le forze erano ben bilanciate: Đukanović poteva disporre di una polizia ben addestrata, e Bulatović dell'esercito federale. Decine di migliaia di persone, su un totale di 630 mila abitanti, si guardavano attraverso il mirino. In molti pensavano che sarebbe giunto il momento della resa dei conti. Fu l'equilibrio della paura il fattore decisivo che impedì un conflitto tra fratelli.
Anche se un notevole contributo a contenere il conflitto fu dovuto anche la “Dichiarazione sul mantenimento della pace civile”, approvata all’unanimità dal Parlamento montenegrino pochi giorni dopo l’inizio dell’intervento della Nato.
D'altra parte il Kosovo è sempre stato un tema ben utilizzato quando c’era bisogno di scaldare gli animi dei montenegrini a favore di un attacco armato. Il vecchio “eroico” Montenegro si basa proprio sul “mito kosovaro”, sviluppato in proporzioni smisurate dal più grande poeta e re montenegrino, Petar Petrović Njegoš (1813-1851). Per questo l’intervento della Nato mise Đukanović in una posizione molto difficile. In modo tacito Đukanović si era posizionato a fianco degli alleati occidentali, e nel paese fu accusato di tradimento.
Gli stretti rapporti tra il premier montenegrino e Washington erano già iniziati alla fine del 1995, quando Đukanović e il vicepresidente del Partito democratico socialista, Svetozar Marović (l'ultimo presidente dell'Unione Serbia e Montenegro), fecero visita allo State Department e al Pentagono, proprio nel momento in cui stavano per concludersi i negoziati a Dayton sull'accordo di pace per la Bosnia Erzegovina.
Sapendo che i funzionari montenegrini a Washington avevano “cambiato l'abito”, e che al Montenegro era stato attribuito il ruolo di “portaerei americana per destabilizzare la Serbia”, il presidente serbo Slobodan Milošević voleva abbandonare i negoziati, ma alla base Wright-Patterson cedette alle pressioni dell'allora inviato speciale americano per i Balcani Richard Holbrooke.
Con ciò si spiega ogni tipo di appoggio offerto da Washington al Montenegro quando versava in situazioni di crisi e durante le sfide della fine degli anni Novanta. Misurato finanziariamente, l'aiuto ha superato il valore di 300 milioni di dollari, vale a dire che il Montenegro, dopo Israele, è il paese che ha ricevuto il più grande sostegno americano pro capite.
Anche durante gli attacchi, Đukanović veniva ricevuto nei centri delle capitali occidentali, motivo per cui il Montenegro fu poco esposto ai bombardamenti. Gli aerei dell’Alleanza partivano dalla base di “Aviano”, sorvolavano sopra il territorio del Montenegro per andare verso la Serbia e il Kosovo, e soltanto sporadicamente i loro obbiettivi erano l’Esercito jugoslavo di stanza in Montenegro.
Anche se spesso provocati dalla base militare nel porto di Bar, questo obbiettivo non fu mai bombardato. All’epoca i media scrivevano che il bombardamento non c’era stato perché Đukanović era continuamente in collegamento con l’allora presidente francese Jacques Chirac.
Sul fronte delle vittime, la tragedia più grande accadde il 30 aprile a Murino, nel nord est del Montenegro, quando morirono sei civili, di cui tre bambini. Durante i bombardamenti a Murino non c’era nemmeno una unità militare e non c’era nemmeno un obiettivo militare che potesse essere meta della Nato. In seguito, sul ponte dove sono morte quelle persone innocenti è stato eretto un monumento.
Nel 1999 decine di migliaia di profughi albanesi si rifugiarono in Montenegro. Una decina di giorni prima della tragedia di Murino, i soldati dell’esercito jugoslavo al nord del Montenegro, a Rožaj, avevano ucciso sei profughi albanesi del Kosovo. Il processo per questo crimine di guerra è da poco iniziato nel comune di Berane.
A dieci anni di distanza, pare che soltanto le famiglie delle persone morte ricordino l’intervento dell’Alleanza atlantica. Anche se un certo sapore amaro è rimasto nella bocca di molti. Motivo per cui soltanto il 40 percento dei cittadini del Montenegro è a favore dell’ingresso nella Nato.
=== 7 ===
LES NOUVELLES DE ROUMANIE
Guerre du Kosovo : quand les Roumains volaient au secours des avions serbes...
Publié dans la presse : 12 septembre 2007
Mise en ligne : mercredi 19 septembre 2007
En 1999, alors que le pouvoir du Belgrade était complètement isolé du fait de sa politique au Kosovo, la Roumanie aurait sauvé l’aviation Yougoslave alors menacée de destruction par l’OTAN. Si cet étrange arrangement n’avait pas été conclu, il est probable que la compagnie Jugoslav Airlines n’existerait plus aujourd’hui.
Par Henri Gillet
La presse serbe et roumaine a relaté un épisode peu connu de la guerre du Kosovo, en 1999. L’aviation civile yougoslave était alors très inquiète du devenir de ses dix-sept avions de ligne et de celui de sa compagnie aérienne nationale, JAT (Yougoslav Airlines), après le conflit. Les messages envoyés aux pays voisins leur demandant de les accueillir étaient restés sans réponse et le ministère yougoslave des Affaires étrangères n’avait pu que confirmer le sentiment général : personne ne voulait aider le régime de Milosevic, même si, en l’occurrence, il s’agissait seulement de sauvegarder les intérêts futurs du peuple serbe.
La question est devenue d’une brûlante actualité dans la nuit du 24 au 25 mars quand un Mig 29 de l’Armée de l’Air yougoslave, criblé de balles, s’est posé en catastrophe sur l’aéroport civil de Surcin de Belgrade, ne pouvant atteindre l’aéroport militaire de Batajnica. Les employés de Surcin ont tenté de dissimuler l’appareil qui ne pouvait redécoller en le maquillant grossièrement en avion civil.
Mais grâce à leurs satellites, les Américains le repérèrent et le 19 avril, lors d’un briefing pour la presse, le porte parole de l’état-major de l’OTAN, James Shea, annonçait, photos à l’appui où on voyait apparaître une aile de MIG, que Surcin était devenu « un objectif militaire légitime ». Son bombardement était donc devenu une question de jours, voire d’heures.
La Roumanie, pays frontalier dont Belgrade n’est distant que de 75 km, se trouvait alors dans une position délicate. Son président, Emil Constantinescu avait pris le contre-pied de la politique traditionnelle et du sentiment général de la population, favorable à la Yougoslavie, pour s’aligner sur l’OTAN, une attitude qui entérinera le réalignement total de la politique extérieure roumaine et son ancrage à l’Occident. Aucune aide officielle ne pouvait donc être accordée aux voisins serbes. C’est alors que, selon les journaux serbe « Vecernje Novosti » (« Les Nouvelles du Soir ») et roumain « Jurnalul National », l’amitié qui lie les pilotes et l’univers de l’aéronautique à travers le monde entier, joua son rôle.
Le mois précédent, au début des hostilités, Goran Crijen, ancien pilote mais aussi et surtout directeur de la flotte civile de la JAT , était entré en contact avec un ami canadien, Donald Banker, professeur de droit aéronautique à la célèbre université Mc Gill, lui demandant si les relations de solidarité « aériennes » nouées par delà les continents étaient toujours valables en ce qui concerne les Balkans. Ayant obtenu une réponse positive, il lui rappela l’avoir entendu dire rendre un service au Secrétaire d’Etat aux transports roumain de l’époque, Aleodor Frâncu, en facilitant la venue de son fils dans une université canadienne pour y étudier les langues étrangères.
Deux heures plus tard, le lien était établi et Goran Crijen recevait un e-mail de Bucarest indiquant qu’en cas de besoin, la flotte civile yougoslave serait autorisée à se poser en Roumanie.
Sept minutes pour gagner la Roumanie
La situation étant devenue intenable après le 19 avril. Les autorités aériennes civiles yougoslaves décidèrent de passer à l’action et d’évacuer leur flotte, sans prévenir Milosevic, lequel serait rentré ensuite dans une colère terrible, ni les autres autorités politiques ou militaires, mais obtenant le feu vert du général Branislav Petrovic, commandant de la Défense anti-aérienne, lequel donna l’ordre de ne pas tirer sur les avions, sans pour autant pouvoir leur garantir une sécurité totale.
Le 29 avril, à 14 heures, les meilleurs pilotes de la JAT se retrouvèrent sur le tarmac de l’aéroport Surcin, sachant qu’ils allaient être amenés à prendre des risques énormes, dont celui d’être abattus sans sommation, en temps de guerre. Leur mission était d’emmener les avions sans se faire repérer par l’OTAN, disposant de sept minutes pour gagner la Roumanie et s’y mettre à l’abri, où une équipe roumaine au sol devait les guider en vue de leur atterrissage à l’aéroport Baneasa de Bucarest. Un Boeing 727 décolla le premier, suivi immédiatement d’un DC 10, puis d’un autre Boeing et ainsi de suite.
L’opération fut divisée en deux vagues, pour ne pas laisser le temps à l’OTAN de réagir. Elle fut recommencée avec succès le lendemain, aucun avion n’essuyant un tir. A Bucarest, les hélicoptères américains Apache ne purent que survoler l’aéroport pour s’assurer qu’il n’y avait aucun appareil militaire à s’être glissé dans cette étonnante caravane aérienne.