Jugoinfo
The Economist January 29, 2000
Sins of the secular missionaries
Aid and campaign groups, or NGOs, matter more and more in world
affairs. But they are often far from being "non-governmental",
as they claim. And they are not always a force for good
A YOUNG man thrusts his crudely printed calling card at the
visitor. After his name are printed three letters: NGO. "What do you
do?" the visitor asks."I have formed an NGO.""Yes, but what does it
do?""Whatever they want. I am waiting for some funds and then I will
make a project."
Once little more than ragged charities, non-governmental
organisations
(NGOs) are now big business. Somalia, where that exchange took place,
is heaven for them. In large parts of the country, western
governments,
the United Nations and foreign aid agencies cannot work directly; it
is
too dangerous. So outsiders must work through local groups, which
become a powerful source of patronage. "Anybody who's anybody is an
NGO
these days," sighs one UN official.
And not just in Somalia. NGOs now head for crisis zones as fast as
journalists do: a war, a flood, refugees, a dodgy election, even a
world trade conference, will draw them like a honey pot. Last spring,
Tirana, the capital of Albania, was swamped by some 200 groups
intending to help the refugees from Kosovo. In Kosovo itself, the
ground is now thick with foreign groups competing to foster
democracy,
build homes and proffer goods and services. Environmental activists
in
Norway board whaling ships; do-gooders gather for the Chiapas rebels
in
Mexico.
In recent years, such groups have mushroomed. A 1995 UN report on
global governance suggested that nearly 29,000 international NGOs
existed. Domestic ones have grown even faster. By one estimate, there
are now 2m in America alone, most formed in the past 30 years. In
Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, there
are at least 65,000. Dozens are created daily; in Kenya alone, some
240
NGOs are now created every year.
Most of these are minnows; some are whales, with annual incomes of
millions of dollars and a worldwide operation. Some are primarily
helpers, distributing relief where it is needed; some are mainly
campaigners, existing to promote issues deemed important by their
members. The general public tends to see them as uniformly
altruistic,
idealistic and independent. But the term "NGO", like the activities
of
the NGOs themselves, deserves much sharper scrutiny.
Governments' puppets?
The tag "Non-Governmental Organisation" was used first at the
founding
of the UN. It implies that NGOs keep their distance from officialdom;
they do things that governments will not, or cannot, do. In fact,
NGOs
have a great deal to do with governments. Not all of it is healthy.
Take the aid NGOs. A growing share of development spending, emergency
relief and aid transfers passes through them. According to Carol
Lancaster, a former deputy director of USAID, America's development
body, NGOs have become "the most important constituency for the
activities of development aid agencies". Much of the food delivered
by
the World Food Programme, a UN body, in Albania last year was
actually
handed out by NGOs working in the refugee camps. Between 1990 and
1994,
the proportion of the EU's relief aid channelled through NGOs rose
from
47% to 67%. The Red Cross reckons that NGOs now disburse more money
than the World Bank.
And governments are happy to provide that money. Of Oxfam's #98m
($162m) income in 1998, a quarter, #24.1m, was given by the British
government and the EU. World Vision US, which boasts of being the
world's "largest privately funded Christian relief and development
organisation", collected $55m-worth of goods that year from the
American government. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the winner of
last
year's Nobel peace prize, gets 46% of its income from government
sources. Of 120 NGOs which sprang up in Kenya between 1993 and the
end
of 1996, all but nine received all their income from foreign
governments and international bodies. Such official contributions
will
go on, especially if the public gets more stingy. Today's young,
educated and rich give a smaller share of their incomes away than did
-- and do -- their parents.
In Africa, where international help has the greatest influence,
western governments have long been shifting their aid towards NGOs.
America's help, some $711m last year, increasingly goes to approved
organisations, often via USAID. Europe's donors also say that
bilateral
aid should go to NGOs, which are generally more open and efficient
than
governments. For the UN, too, they are now seen as indispensable. The
new head of the UN's Development Programme says the body "will put a
lot more emphasis on relations with NGOs". Most such agencies now
have
hundreds of NGO partners.
So the principal reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that western
governments finance them. This is not a matter of charity, but of
privatisation: many "non-governmental" groups are becoming
contractors
for governments. Governments prefer to pass aid through NGOs because
it
is cheaper, more efficient -- and more at arm's length -- than direct
official aid.
Governments also find NGOs useful in ways that go beyond the
distribution of food and blankets. Some bring back useful
information,
and make it part of their brief to do so. Outfits such as the
International Crisis Group and Global Witness publish detailed and
opinionated reports from places beset by war or other disasters. The
work of Global Witness in Angola is actually paid for by the British
Foreign Office.
Diplomats and governments, as well as other NGOs, journalists and the
public, can make good use of these reports. As the staff of foreign
embassies shrink, and the need to keep abreast of events abroad
increases, governments inevitably turn to private sources of
information. In some benighted parts of the world, sometimes only
NGOs
can nowadays reveal what is going on.
Take, for example, human rights, the business of one of the biggest
of
the campaigning NGOs, Amnesty International. Amnesty has around 1m
members in over 162 countries, and its campaigns against political
repression, in particular against unfair imprisonment, are known
around
the world. The information it gathers is often unavailable from other
sources.
Where western governments' interests match those of campaigning NGOs,
they can form effective alliances. In 1997, a coalition of over 350
NGOs pushed for, and obtained, a treaty against the use of landmines.
The campaign was backed by the usual array of concerned governments
(Canada, the Scandinavians) and won the Nobel peace prize.
NGOs are also interesting and useful to governments because they work
in the midst of conflict. Many were created by wars: the Red Cross
after the Battle of Solferino in 1859, the Save the Children Fund
after
the first world war, MSF after the Biafran war. By being "close to
the
action" some NGOs, perhaps unwittingly, provide good cover for spies
--
a more traditional means by which governments gather information.
In some cases, NGOs are taking over directly from diplomats: not
attempting to help the victims of war, but to end the wars
themselves.
Some try to restrict arms flows, such as Saferworld, which is against
small arms. Others attempt to negotiate ceasefires. The Italian
Catholic lay community of Sant' Egidio helped to end 13 years of
civil
war in Mozambique in 1992. International Alert, a London-based peace
research group, tried the same for Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s.
Last
year, Unicef (a part of the UN) and the Carter Centre, founded by
ex-President Jimmy Carter, brought about a peace deal of sorts
between
Uganda and Sudan. There are now roughly 500 groups registered by the
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. "Civil
war demands civil action," say the organisers.
Larger NGOs have pledged not to act as "instruments of government
foreign policy". But at times they are seen as just that. Governments
are more willing to pay groups to deliver humanitarian aid to a war
zone than to deliver it themselves. Last autumn, America's Congress
passed a resolution to deliver food aid to rebels in southern Sudan
via
USAID and sympathetic Christian groups (religious NGOs earn the label
RINGOs, and are found everywhere).
Perhaps the most potent sign of the closeness between NGOs and
governments, aside from their financial links, is the exchange of
personnel. In developing countries, where the civil service is poor,
some governments ask NGOs to help with the paperwork requested by the
World Bank and other international institutions. Politicians, or
their
wives, often have their own local NGOs. In the developed world,
meanwhile, increasing numbers of civil servants take time off to work
for NGOs, and vice versa: Oxfam has former staff members not only in
the British government, but also in the Finance Ministry of Uganda.
This symbiotic relationship with government (earning some groups the
tag GRINGO) may make the governments of developing countries work
better. It may also help aid groups to do their job effectively. But
it
hardly reflects their independence.
NGOS can also stray too close to the corporate world. Some, known to
critics as "business NGOs", deliberately model themselves on, or
depend
greatly on, particular corporations. Bigger ones have commercial
arms,
media departments, aggressive head-hunting methods and a wide array
of
private fund-raising and investment strategies. Smaller ones can be
overwhelmed by philanthropic businesses or their owners: Bill Gates,
the head of Microsoft, gave $25m last year to an NGO that is looking
for a vaccine for AIDS, transforming it overnight from a small group
with a good idea to a powerful one with a lot of money to spend.
The business of helping
In 1997, according to the OECD, NGOs raised $5.5 billion from private
donors. The real figure may well be higher: as leisure, travel and
other industries have grown, so too have charities. In 1995
non-profit
groups (including, but not only, NGOs) provided over 12% of all jobs
in
the Netherlands, 8% in America and 6% in Britain.
Many groups have come to depend on their media presence to help with
fund-raising. This is bringing NGOs their greatest problems. They are
adapting from shoebox outfits, stuffing envelopes and sending off
perhaps one container of medicines, to sophisticated
multi-million-dollar operations. In the now-crowded relief market,
campaigning groups must jostle for attention: increasingly, NGOs
compete and spend a lot of time and money marketing themselves.
Bigger
ones typically spend 10% of their funds on marketing and
fund-raising.
The focus of such NGOs can easily shift from finding solutions and
helping needy recipients to pleasing their donors and winning
television coverage. Events at Goma, in Congo, in 1994 brought this
problem home. Tens of thousands of refugees from Rwanda, who had
flooded into Goma, depended on food and shelter from the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and from NGOs. Their dramatic plight drew
the
television cameras and, with them, the chance for publicity and huge
donations. A frantic scramble for funds led groups to lie about their
projects. Fearful that the media and then the public might lose
confidence in NGOs, the Red Cross drew up an approved list of NGOs
and
got them to put their names to a ten-point code of conduct,
reproduced
above.
Since then, NGOs have been working hard to improve. More than 70
groups and 142 governments backed the 1995 code of conduct, agreeing
that aid should be delivered "only on a basis of need". "We hold
ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources," they pledged. Yet in Kosovo last year
there
was a similar scramble, with groups pushing to be seen by camera
crews
as they worked. Personnel and resources were even shifted there from
worse wars and refugee crises in Africa.
As they get larger, NGOs are also looking more and more like
businesses themselves. In the past, such groups sought no profits,
paid
low wages -- or none at all -- and employed idealists. Now a whole
class of them, even if not directly backed by businesses, have taken
on
corporate trappings. Known collectively as BINGOs, these groups
manage
funds and employ staff which a medium-sized company would envy. Like
corporations, they attend conferences endlessly. Fund-raisers and
senior staff at such NGOs earn wages comparable to the private
sector.
Some bodies, once registered as charities, now choose to become
non-profit companies or charitable trusts for tax reasons and so that
they can control their spending and programmes more easily. Many big
charities have trading arms, registered as companies. One
manufacturing
company, Tetra Pak, has even considered sponsoring emergency food
delivery as a way to advertise itself. Any neat division between the
corporate and the NGO worlds is long gone. Many NGOs operate as
competitors seeking contracts in the aid market, raising funds with
polished media campaigns and lobbying governments as hard as any
other
business. Governments and UN bodies could now, in theory, ask for
tenders from businesses and NGOs to carry out their programmes. It
seems only a matter of time before this happens. If NGOs are cheap
and
good at delivering food or health care in tough areas, they should
win
the contracts easily.
Good intentions not enough
It could be argued that it does not matter even if NGOs are losing
their independence, becoming just another arm of government or
another
business. GRINGOs and BINGOs, after all, may be more efficient than
the
old sort of charity.
Many do achieve great things: they may represent the last hope for
civilians caught in civil wars, for those imprisoned unfairly and for
millions of desperate refugees. There are many examples of small,
efficient and inspirational groups with great achievements: the best
will employ local people, keep foreign expertise to a minimum,
attempt
precise goals (such as providing clean water) and think deeply about
the long-term impact of their work. Some of these grow into large,
well-run groups.
But there are also problems. NGOs may be assumed to be less
bureaucratic, wasteful or corrupt than governments, but
under-scrutinised groups can suffer from the same chief failing: they
can get into bad ways because they are not accountable to anyone.
Critics also suspect that some aid groups are used to propagate
western
values, as Christian missionaries did in the 19th century. Many NGOs,
lacking any base in the local population and with their money coming
from outside, simply try to impose their ideas without debate. For
example, they often work to promote women's or children's interests
as
defined by western societies, winning funds easily but causing social
disruption on the ground.
Groups that carry out population or birth-control projects are
particularly controversial; some are paid to carry out sterilisation
programmes in the poor parts of the world, because donors in the rich
world consider there are too many people there. Anti-"slavery"
campaigns in Africa, in which western NGOs buy children's freedom for
a
few hundred dollars each, are notorious. Unicef has condemned such
groups, but American NGOs continue to buy slaves -- or people they
consider slaves -- in southern Sudan. Clearly, buying slaves, if that
is what they are, will do little to discourage the practice of
trading
them.
NGOs also get involved in situations where their presence may prolong
or complicate wars, where they end up feeding armies, sheltering
hostages or serving as cover for warring parties. These may be the
unintended consequences of aid delivery, but they also complicate
foreign policy.
Even under calmer conditions, in non-emergency development work, not
all single-interest groups may be the best guarantors of long-term
success. They are rarely obliged to think about trade-offs in policy
or
to consider broad, cross-sector approaches to development. NGOs are
"often organised to promote particular goals...rather than the
broader
goal of development," argues Ms Lancaster. In Kosovo last spring,
"many
governments made bilateral funding agreements with NGOs, greatly
undermining UNHCR's ability to prioritise programmes or monitor
efficiency," says Peter Morris of MSF. This spring in Kosovo, "there
were instances of several NGOs competing to work in the same camps,
duplication of essential services," complains an Oxfam worker. And
whatever big international NGOs do in the developing world, they
bring
in western living standards, personnel and purchasing power which can
transform local markets and generate great local resentment. In
troubled zones where foreign NGOs flourish, weekends bring a line of
smart four-by-fours parked at the best beaches, restaurants or
nightclubs. The local beggars do well, but discrepancies between
expatriate staff and, say, impoverished local officials trying to do
the same work can cause deep antipathy. Not only have NGOs diverted
funds away from local governments, but they are often seen as
directly
challenging their sovereignty.
NGOs can also become self-perpetuating. When the problem for which
they
were founded is solved, they seek new campaigns and new funds. The
old
anti-apartheid movement, its job completed, did not disband, but
instead became another lobby group for southern Africa. As NGOs
become
steadily more powerful on the world scene, the best antidote to
hubris,
and to institutionalisation, would be this: disband when the job is
done. The chief aim of NGOs should be their own abolition.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
Sins of the secular missionaries
Aid and campaign groups, or NGOs, matter more and more in world
affairs. But they are often far from being "non-governmental",
as they claim. And they are not always a force for good
A YOUNG man thrusts his crudely printed calling card at the
visitor. After his name are printed three letters: NGO. "What do you
do?" the visitor asks."I have formed an NGO.""Yes, but what does it
do?""Whatever they want. I am waiting for some funds and then I will
make a project."
Once little more than ragged charities, non-governmental
organisations
(NGOs) are now big business. Somalia, where that exchange took place,
is heaven for them. In large parts of the country, western
governments,
the United Nations and foreign aid agencies cannot work directly; it
is
too dangerous. So outsiders must work through local groups, which
become a powerful source of patronage. "Anybody who's anybody is an
NGO
these days," sighs one UN official.
And not just in Somalia. NGOs now head for crisis zones as fast as
journalists do: a war, a flood, refugees, a dodgy election, even a
world trade conference, will draw them like a honey pot. Last spring,
Tirana, the capital of Albania, was swamped by some 200 groups
intending to help the refugees from Kosovo. In Kosovo itself, the
ground is now thick with foreign groups competing to foster
democracy,
build homes and proffer goods and services. Environmental activists
in
Norway board whaling ships; do-gooders gather for the Chiapas rebels
in
Mexico.
In recent years, such groups have mushroomed. A 1995 UN report on
global governance suggested that nearly 29,000 international NGOs
existed. Domestic ones have grown even faster. By one estimate, there
are now 2m in America alone, most formed in the past 30 years. In
Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, there
are at least 65,000. Dozens are created daily; in Kenya alone, some
240
NGOs are now created every year.
Most of these are minnows; some are whales, with annual incomes of
millions of dollars and a worldwide operation. Some are primarily
helpers, distributing relief where it is needed; some are mainly
campaigners, existing to promote issues deemed important by their
members. The general public tends to see them as uniformly
altruistic,
idealistic and independent. But the term "NGO", like the activities
of
the NGOs themselves, deserves much sharper scrutiny.
Governments' puppets?
The tag "Non-Governmental Organisation" was used first at the
founding
of the UN. It implies that NGOs keep their distance from officialdom;
they do things that governments will not, or cannot, do. In fact,
NGOs
have a great deal to do with governments. Not all of it is healthy.
Take the aid NGOs. A growing share of development spending, emergency
relief and aid transfers passes through them. According to Carol
Lancaster, a former deputy director of USAID, America's development
body, NGOs have become "the most important constituency for the
activities of development aid agencies". Much of the food delivered
by
the World Food Programme, a UN body, in Albania last year was
actually
handed out by NGOs working in the refugee camps. Between 1990 and
1994,
the proportion of the EU's relief aid channelled through NGOs rose
from
47% to 67%. The Red Cross reckons that NGOs now disburse more money
than the World Bank.
And governments are happy to provide that money. Of Oxfam's #98m
($162m) income in 1998, a quarter, #24.1m, was given by the British
government and the EU. World Vision US, which boasts of being the
world's "largest privately funded Christian relief and development
organisation", collected $55m-worth of goods that year from the
American government. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the winner of
last
year's Nobel peace prize, gets 46% of its income from government
sources. Of 120 NGOs which sprang up in Kenya between 1993 and the
end
of 1996, all but nine received all their income from foreign
governments and international bodies. Such official contributions
will
go on, especially if the public gets more stingy. Today's young,
educated and rich give a smaller share of their incomes away than did
-- and do -- their parents.
In Africa, where international help has the greatest influence,
western governments have long been shifting their aid towards NGOs.
America's help, some $711m last year, increasingly goes to approved
organisations, often via USAID. Europe's donors also say that
bilateral
aid should go to NGOs, which are generally more open and efficient
than
governments. For the UN, too, they are now seen as indispensable. The
new head of the UN's Development Programme says the body "will put a
lot more emphasis on relations with NGOs". Most such agencies now
have
hundreds of NGO partners.
So the principal reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that western
governments finance them. This is not a matter of charity, but of
privatisation: many "non-governmental" groups are becoming
contractors
for governments. Governments prefer to pass aid through NGOs because
it
is cheaper, more efficient -- and more at arm's length -- than direct
official aid.
Governments also find NGOs useful in ways that go beyond the
distribution of food and blankets. Some bring back useful
information,
and make it part of their brief to do so. Outfits such as the
International Crisis Group and Global Witness publish detailed and
opinionated reports from places beset by war or other disasters. The
work of Global Witness in Angola is actually paid for by the British
Foreign Office.
Diplomats and governments, as well as other NGOs, journalists and the
public, can make good use of these reports. As the staff of foreign
embassies shrink, and the need to keep abreast of events abroad
increases, governments inevitably turn to private sources of
information. In some benighted parts of the world, sometimes only
NGOs
can nowadays reveal what is going on.
Take, for example, human rights, the business of one of the biggest
of
the campaigning NGOs, Amnesty International. Amnesty has around 1m
members in over 162 countries, and its campaigns against political
repression, in particular against unfair imprisonment, are known
around
the world. The information it gathers is often unavailable from other
sources.
Where western governments' interests match those of campaigning NGOs,
they can form effective alliances. In 1997, a coalition of over 350
NGOs pushed for, and obtained, a treaty against the use of landmines.
The campaign was backed by the usual array of concerned governments
(Canada, the Scandinavians) and won the Nobel peace prize.
NGOs are also interesting and useful to governments because they work
in the midst of conflict. Many were created by wars: the Red Cross
after the Battle of Solferino in 1859, the Save the Children Fund
after
the first world war, MSF after the Biafran war. By being "close to
the
action" some NGOs, perhaps unwittingly, provide good cover for spies
--
a more traditional means by which governments gather information.
In some cases, NGOs are taking over directly from diplomats: not
attempting to help the victims of war, but to end the wars
themselves.
Some try to restrict arms flows, such as Saferworld, which is against
small arms. Others attempt to negotiate ceasefires. The Italian
Catholic lay community of Sant' Egidio helped to end 13 years of
civil
war in Mozambique in 1992. International Alert, a London-based peace
research group, tried the same for Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s.
Last
year, Unicef (a part of the UN) and the Carter Centre, founded by
ex-President Jimmy Carter, brought about a peace deal of sorts
between
Uganda and Sudan. There are now roughly 500 groups registered by the
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. "Civil
war demands civil action," say the organisers.
Larger NGOs have pledged not to act as "instruments of government
foreign policy". But at times they are seen as just that. Governments
are more willing to pay groups to deliver humanitarian aid to a war
zone than to deliver it themselves. Last autumn, America's Congress
passed a resolution to deliver food aid to rebels in southern Sudan
via
USAID and sympathetic Christian groups (religious NGOs earn the label
RINGOs, and are found everywhere).
Perhaps the most potent sign of the closeness between NGOs and
governments, aside from their financial links, is the exchange of
personnel. In developing countries, where the civil service is poor,
some governments ask NGOs to help with the paperwork requested by the
World Bank and other international institutions. Politicians, or
their
wives, often have their own local NGOs. In the developed world,
meanwhile, increasing numbers of civil servants take time off to work
for NGOs, and vice versa: Oxfam has former staff members not only in
the British government, but also in the Finance Ministry of Uganda.
This symbiotic relationship with government (earning some groups the
tag GRINGO) may make the governments of developing countries work
better. It may also help aid groups to do their job effectively. But
it
hardly reflects their independence.
NGOS can also stray too close to the corporate world. Some, known to
critics as "business NGOs", deliberately model themselves on, or
depend
greatly on, particular corporations. Bigger ones have commercial
arms,
media departments, aggressive head-hunting methods and a wide array
of
private fund-raising and investment strategies. Smaller ones can be
overwhelmed by philanthropic businesses or their owners: Bill Gates,
the head of Microsoft, gave $25m last year to an NGO that is looking
for a vaccine for AIDS, transforming it overnight from a small group
with a good idea to a powerful one with a lot of money to spend.
The business of helping
In 1997, according to the OECD, NGOs raised $5.5 billion from private
donors. The real figure may well be higher: as leisure, travel and
other industries have grown, so too have charities. In 1995
non-profit
groups (including, but not only, NGOs) provided over 12% of all jobs
in
the Netherlands, 8% in America and 6% in Britain.
Many groups have come to depend on their media presence to help with
fund-raising. This is bringing NGOs their greatest problems. They are
adapting from shoebox outfits, stuffing envelopes and sending off
perhaps one container of medicines, to sophisticated
multi-million-dollar operations. In the now-crowded relief market,
campaigning groups must jostle for attention: increasingly, NGOs
compete and spend a lot of time and money marketing themselves.
Bigger
ones typically spend 10% of their funds on marketing and
fund-raising.
The focus of such NGOs can easily shift from finding solutions and
helping needy recipients to pleasing their donors and winning
television coverage. Events at Goma, in Congo, in 1994 brought this
problem home. Tens of thousands of refugees from Rwanda, who had
flooded into Goma, depended on food and shelter from the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and from NGOs. Their dramatic plight drew
the
television cameras and, with them, the chance for publicity and huge
donations. A frantic scramble for funds led groups to lie about their
projects. Fearful that the media and then the public might lose
confidence in NGOs, the Red Cross drew up an approved list of NGOs
and
got them to put their names to a ten-point code of conduct,
reproduced
above.
Since then, NGOs have been working hard to improve. More than 70
groups and 142 governments backed the 1995 code of conduct, agreeing
that aid should be delivered "only on a basis of need". "We hold
ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources," they pledged. Yet in Kosovo last year
there
was a similar scramble, with groups pushing to be seen by camera
crews
as they worked. Personnel and resources were even shifted there from
worse wars and refugee crises in Africa.
As they get larger, NGOs are also looking more and more like
businesses themselves. In the past, such groups sought no profits,
paid
low wages -- or none at all -- and employed idealists. Now a whole
class of them, even if not directly backed by businesses, have taken
on
corporate trappings. Known collectively as BINGOs, these groups
manage
funds and employ staff which a medium-sized company would envy. Like
corporations, they attend conferences endlessly. Fund-raisers and
senior staff at such NGOs earn wages comparable to the private
sector.
Some bodies, once registered as charities, now choose to become
non-profit companies or charitable trusts for tax reasons and so that
they can control their spending and programmes more easily. Many big
charities have trading arms, registered as companies. One
manufacturing
company, Tetra Pak, has even considered sponsoring emergency food
delivery as a way to advertise itself. Any neat division between the
corporate and the NGO worlds is long gone. Many NGOs operate as
competitors seeking contracts in the aid market, raising funds with
polished media campaigns and lobbying governments as hard as any
other
business. Governments and UN bodies could now, in theory, ask for
tenders from businesses and NGOs to carry out their programmes. It
seems only a matter of time before this happens. If NGOs are cheap
and
good at delivering food or health care in tough areas, they should
win
the contracts easily.
Good intentions not enough
It could be argued that it does not matter even if NGOs are losing
their independence, becoming just another arm of government or
another
business. GRINGOs and BINGOs, after all, may be more efficient than
the
old sort of charity.
Many do achieve great things: they may represent the last hope for
civilians caught in civil wars, for those imprisoned unfairly and for
millions of desperate refugees. There are many examples of small,
efficient and inspirational groups with great achievements: the best
will employ local people, keep foreign expertise to a minimum,
attempt
precise goals (such as providing clean water) and think deeply about
the long-term impact of their work. Some of these grow into large,
well-run groups.
But there are also problems. NGOs may be assumed to be less
bureaucratic, wasteful or corrupt than governments, but
under-scrutinised groups can suffer from the same chief failing: they
can get into bad ways because they are not accountable to anyone.
Critics also suspect that some aid groups are used to propagate
western
values, as Christian missionaries did in the 19th century. Many NGOs,
lacking any base in the local population and with their money coming
from outside, simply try to impose their ideas without debate. For
example, they often work to promote women's or children's interests
as
defined by western societies, winning funds easily but causing social
disruption on the ground.
Groups that carry out population or birth-control projects are
particularly controversial; some are paid to carry out sterilisation
programmes in the poor parts of the world, because donors in the rich
world consider there are too many people there. Anti-"slavery"
campaigns in Africa, in which western NGOs buy children's freedom for
a
few hundred dollars each, are notorious. Unicef has condemned such
groups, but American NGOs continue to buy slaves -- or people they
consider slaves -- in southern Sudan. Clearly, buying slaves, if that
is what they are, will do little to discourage the practice of
trading
them.
NGOs also get involved in situations where their presence may prolong
or complicate wars, where they end up feeding armies, sheltering
hostages or serving as cover for warring parties. These may be the
unintended consequences of aid delivery, but they also complicate
foreign policy.
Even under calmer conditions, in non-emergency development work, not
all single-interest groups may be the best guarantors of long-term
success. They are rarely obliged to think about trade-offs in policy
or
to consider broad, cross-sector approaches to development. NGOs are
"often organised to promote particular goals...rather than the
broader
goal of development," argues Ms Lancaster. In Kosovo last spring,
"many
governments made bilateral funding agreements with NGOs, greatly
undermining UNHCR's ability to prioritise programmes or monitor
efficiency," says Peter Morris of MSF. This spring in Kosovo, "there
were instances of several NGOs competing to work in the same camps,
duplication of essential services," complains an Oxfam worker. And
whatever big international NGOs do in the developing world, they
bring
in western living standards, personnel and purchasing power which can
transform local markets and generate great local resentment. In
troubled zones where foreign NGOs flourish, weekends bring a line of
smart four-by-fours parked at the best beaches, restaurants or
nightclubs. The local beggars do well, but discrepancies between
expatriate staff and, say, impoverished local officials trying to do
the same work can cause deep antipathy. Not only have NGOs diverted
funds away from local governments, but they are often seen as
directly
challenging their sovereignty.
NGOs can also become self-perpetuating. When the problem for which
they
were founded is solved, they seek new campaigns and new funds. The
old
anti-apartheid movement, its job completed, did not disband, but
instead became another lobby group for southern Africa. As NGOs
become
steadily more powerful on the world scene, the best antidote to
hubris,
and to institutionalisation, would be this: disband when the job is
done. The chief aim of NGOs should be their own abolition.
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
REPUBBLICA
FEDERATIVA
SOCIALISTA
JUGOSLAVIA
Zotohem para flamurit të pionirëvet dhe para shokëvet
pionierë, që do të mësoj e do të jetoj si bir besnik i
Atdheut tim Republikeës Socialiste Federative të
Jugosllavisë. Zotohem që do të ruaj vëllazërimin e bashkimin
e popujvet tanë dhe lirinë e Atdheut, të fituar me gjakun e
djemvet tanë më të mirë.
PËR ATDHE ME TITON PËRPARA!
RROFTË 29 NËNTOR!
RROFTË SHOKU TITO!
Agim, Prishtinë
( http://www.sfrj.com )
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERATIVA
SOCIALISTA
JUGOSLAVIA
Zotohem para flamurit të pionirëvet dhe para shokëvet
pionierë, që do të mësoj e do të jetoj si bir besnik i
Atdheut tim Republikeës Socialiste Federative të
Jugosllavisë. Zotohem që do të ruaj vëllazërimin e bashkimin
e popujvet tanë dhe lirinë e Atdheut, të fituar me gjakun e
djemvet tanë më të mirë.
PËR ATDHE ME TITON PËRPARA!
RROFTË 29 NËNTOR!
RROFTË SHOKU TITO!
Agim, Prishtinë
( http://www.sfrj.com )
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
I PARTIGIANI JUGOSLAVI NELLA RESISTENZA FRANCESE
-----Original Message-----
From: democrite <democrite@...>
Date: 16 May 1999 17:55
Subject: Yugoslavs in the French Resistance
>SMALL IN NUMBER, GREAT IN SACRIFICE
>
>YUGOSLAV IMMIGRATION
>
> Relatively speaking, Yugoslav immigrants died the most. Small in
>number, they were great in sacrifice. As early as 1939, at the time of
>mobilisation, more than 1,500 Yugoslavs had voluntarily joined the
>French army. Later, at the time of occupation, nearly 3,000 took part
>in the various Resistance movements. Everywhere, in Pas-de-Calais,
>Corrèze, Haute-Savoy, Moselle and Paris, Yugoslavs distinguished
>themselves by their bravery and courage. The attitude of the Yugoslav
>fighters and Resistance workers was always inspired by the strong
>friendship and sincere loyalty they felt towards the countries which
>welcomed them, and they gave ample proof of their attachment at the
>darkest times.
> At Nîmes, in the Maritime Alps, in the Ardennes and in Haute-Savoy,
>more than fifty Yugoslavs fell victim to Nazi barbarity. The first
>thing the Yugoslav Resistance fighters had done had been to direct their
>activity towards the Croatian troops dragooned into the ranks of the
>Wehrmacht. It was thanks to such action that near Grenoble, a Croatian
>unit blew up a depot where a large amount of ammunition and explosives
>were stored, killing many Germans.
> At Villefranche-de-Rouergue resided a regiment of engineers made up of
>about 1,300 Croats. They had ended up in this region - where the
>peasants reminded them of their far-off homeland by their sobriety and
>the homespun of their clothes - after having refused to leave for the
>Eastern front. These soldiers found it quite natural to consider France
>as a country of friends and the population was quick to recognise them
>as such. A mutual current of friendship soon formed. It was not long
>before the soldiers heard of the maquis and decided their duty was to
>act too. They thought up a plan of escape. But out of the 1,300, there
>was one traitor. Seeing they had been exposed, the others took action.
>After a judgement in the name of Tito, they shot their officers,
>occupied the town and proclaimed liberty. Immediately, Hitler's forces
>flooded in from the surrounding centres - Toulouse, Albi, Limoges and
>Rodez. The men hardly had time to split up into small groups and take
>to the maquis. They left the town together so that the population would
>not be trapped between two enemy fires, and took up position in the
>surrounding hills ready for an unequal battle.
> 200 Croats were killed in the fight. More than 400 were taken prisoner
>and shot in the barracks courtyard. The remaining 600 or so were able
>to escape and carried on fighting by the sides of the French Resistance
>fighters.
> In the Ardennes, there were groups of immigrant partisans. The
>"Marshal Tito" corp., of which two leaders died during combat, was made
>up of Yugoslavs. In the region of Nancy, on the road to Germany, it was
>groups of immigrants of Yugoslav origin and Soviet prisoners who had
>escaped, who prevented the Nazis from coming to the aid of Wehrmacht
>groups cut off from their bases. The names of these heroic brigades
>were "Paris Commune", "Stalingrad" and "Jelezniack".
> From the ranks of these fighters came Resistance leaders, like General
>Ljubomir ILITCH, who by their courage and their self-sacrifice in the
>struggle against the fascist occupying army, won the friendship of all
>the Resistance workers. In homage to the participation to the struggle
>of Yugoslavs against the common enemy, the French authorities gave the
>names of two of their heroes, MIRNIK and BOLTAR, who were shot by the
>Germans, to two streets in the towns of Avion (Pas-de-Calais) and
>Toulouse. In the South of France, near Toulouse, sixteen Yugoslav
>immigrant fighters were awarded either the War Cross or the Resistance
>Medal for their courage and dedication.
>
>GENERAL ILITCH
>
> General Ljubomir ILITCH, former commander in the International Brigades
>in Spain, commander of the F.F.I. of the resistance of immigrants in
>France during German occupation, and one of the most active organisers
>of the maquis guerrillas, tells in his memoirs how he managed to join
>the Resistance movement in France.
> "In 1940, the Germans and the Vichy leaders decided to shut up in the
>camps all the "troublesome" elements who had shown in the past true
>attachment to the cause of liberty, of democracy and, thus, to France.
>All the committed antifascists were thus imprisoned and their situation
>got worse as clandestine resistance became active and it transpired
>clearly what role all the foreigners living in France were to play! The
>Vichy and Gestapo jailers split the prisoners up into the "ringleaders",
>who were strong and thus a danger to them, and the majority who were
>less spirited, weakened as they were by hunger, deprivation and
>demoralisation. We "dangerous" ones were sent to the prison of Castres,
>which was used as a depot and as a station passed through by prisoners
>on their way to concentration camps in Germany. When we were undressed
>and stripped of our papers, baggage, family photos and even identity
>cards, we understood that our departure for the death camps was
>approaching. That was how the Germans arranged the papers of the
>political deportees and kept them carefully in their archives. Among us
>in prison there were also French officers and allies who had dropped by
>parachute, and Belgian and Polish officers, doing intelligence work for
>the allies. We were totally cut off from the outside world yet even then
>we were able to study all the obstacles in our way, the safety catches,
>the alarm bells and electronic alarm systems set up by the Germans in
>case of a possible escape. The escape took place in broad daylight,
>thanks to each one of us carrying out perfectly our tasks according to
>given instructions.
> There were 36 of us who escaped, plus two women from the English
>intelligence service. We made it to the mountains, and made those
>chasing us lose all trace of us. At last, after a week, we established
>contact with the clandestine maquis and partisans and got down to action
>at once. Four of us were Yugoslavs: we all wanted to join Tito without
>delay to fight in our own country. But the difficulties in leaving were
>great: we would have had to pass through Spain, and we had stayed there
>as volunteers in the International Brigades in '36 - '39. Our faces
>were known there... So while waiting to go, we all put ourselves at the
>disposal of the French Resistance and began to work together with the
>F.T.P."(1).
>
>Jean STANKOVITCH
>
> An article in the 4th September 1946 issue of "Le Havre Libre" recalled
>the memory of this young hero of Yugoslav origin.
> Born in Le Havre, Jean Stankovitch, after studying at Dicquemare
>school, was taken by the Obligatory Work Service in '43. Refusing
>immediately to go to Germany, he stayed for some time hidden in the town
>under the name of Jean Coquelin. However, the inaction to which his
>illegal situation constrained him was not suited to him. He suffered
>from it, and often opened up about his feelings to his friend Maurice
>Leboucher, who was to be much talked of later. Leboucher, understanding
>well that Jean Stankovitch was driven by a burning desire to make
>himself useful, did not hesitate to advise him to come and join him at
>the German submarine base, in Le Havre, where he was able to get him
>hired as electrician.
> Jean Stankovitch spent some time there, and enjoyed the good tricks his
>friend and himself played on the occupying forces, good tricks which
>could be called, in other words, sabotage. "They think I'm from an
>electricity school!" he would say to his close friends. And this trick
>alone was enough to thrill him.
> His mother, however, fearing bombings, soon decided to go and live in
>Belleville. Jean followed her, most unwillingly. But he could not
>remain inactive there either.
> And in the days following the arrival of the allies, he was glad to act
>as a courier for them, passing through the barricades that then isolated
>Le Havre. For, unknown to his mother, he was a member of the Resistance
>group "France before all". There he had met a young man, three years
>younger than him, and the two of them had fomented multiple projects to
>undermine German organisation wherever their modest means might be used,
>whenever the time came to get down to action.
> On Saturday 2nd September, when the tanks were officially announced,
>the two comrades could no longer keep still. Despite their families'
>advice to be cautious, they escaped and ran to meet the tanks. Bernard
>Lefebvre who was heading for Saint-Cyr was glad to be able to get a lift
>on a tank. He felt as if he was driving up the road of triumph.
> A few kilometres on, they heard that a volunteer was wanted to carry a
>letter from the allies' lines to a certain castle of Fontenay where
>there was still a German officer. Jean proposed himself, and set off at
>once in company of a young lady who spoke German. Once they got there,
>they were kept waiting for over an hour, after which they were chased
>away: the message was an order to surrender! Startled, the young lady
>and Jean Stankovitch found themselves in the road with bursts of fire
>beginning to rain down on them. They were amazed to still be alive, so
>much anger had they read in the eyes of the officer to whom they had
>unknowingly been assigned to propose capitulation. And even though they
>had failed in their mission, they were still glad to get away from their
>goal.
> That evening, after having served as liaison agents between the many
>Resistance groups, Jean and Bernard met up and, together with the other
>comrades, discussed besides the English tanks. It is not known how an
>Alsacian soldier managed to slip up to them and ask them to be kind
>enough to accept to serve as an intermediary between ten of his comrades
>and the Allies to whom they wanted to surrender. Promised that they
>would not be hurt, they decided to meet by a farm between 6.30 and
>7.00am. At the decided moment, Stankovitch and Lefevbre went to the
>place as arranged and waited. The firing from the barricades became
>heavier, and it was difficult for them to believe that the Alsacians
>would manage to get there under such an avalanche of bullets. And yet,
>since they had given their word, they were bent on keeping it, and tried
>to stay put. What happened in the moments which followed? Doubtless a
>shell exploding nearby or a low burst of gunfire took them by surprise.
>Both of them were touched. Bernard Lefebvre was killed outright and
>Jean Sankovitch, fatally wounded, died one hour later, after terrible
>suffering, at the first aid centre at Rolleville which he had been taken
>to.
>
>Sava KOVATCHEVITCH
>
> Sava Kovatchevitch, originally from the Lika district, had come to
>France in 1937 to earn a living and help his family a little. After
>occupying France, the Germans sent him to do labour in Düsseldorf,
>Germany. There, he began with the other workers to do sabotage, but the
>Gestapo was after him, especially as he was teaching the deported
>workers how to commit sabotage. He left at the moment he was about to
>be arrested. At the time, he was already in contact with Yugoslav and
>French prisoners and, alongside the patriots of Lorraine, was helping
>them.
> He was in Lorraine under the name "Pierre" and had a heavy, dangerous
>task. With the help of the patriots of Lorraine, he created a huge
>organization to get people through Germany and Lorraine towards France
>and its maquis. He made false identity papers with the help of the
>mayor of Baynville, Pierre Semmoni and Victor Florch, a post inspector
>in Nancy. Alongside the patriots from Lorraine - Emile Kodari, Louis
>Vagner, Albert Vaguer, Alphonse Vagner, Victor Picrona, Pierre Vagner,
>Jeannette Koisser, from Metz, and Louise Florch, also from Metz - Sava
>got men through into France and saved thier lives. French and Yugoslav
>prisoners in camps in Germany knew of this and those who escaped from
>the Stalag XII F. came to find him. He obtained them civilian clothes,
>false identity papers and food; he got them over the border and the
>rivers near Metz.
> Sava was discovered by Pavelitch's oustachis in charge of keeping tabs
>on the Croatian workers deported to Germany. The Gestapo arrested him
>and tortured him for 72 days , starving and beating him, so that he
>would denounce the organisation by which war prisoners, civilian
>deportees and saboteurs got away into France. This son of the Lika held
>out and never even thought of letting out anything at all.
> "If I must die, I may as well die as a man, and not tarnish my Lika, "
>Sava would say.
> In the end, the Gestapo sent him to join a labour company. He
>succeeded in escaping, and started his work once more, even more
>secretly than before. He was searched for intensely, and in August 1944
>the place became too hot beneath his feet and he was forced to leave.
>He made it to France and joined the maquis again.
>Among the Yugoslav fighters who died in action, let us mention:
>Dimitri KOTOUROVIC (1911 - 1944), former fighter in the International
>Brigades in Spain, initiator and organiser of the first F.T.P. (ndlt:
>Franc Tireur et Partisan) groups in Marseille. Was killed heroically at
>his post in April 1944.
>Victor FILIPIC, shot by the Gestapo after committing sabotage at
>Sallaumines.
>Sava PAVLICEK, killed while fighting on August 18th 1944 in Sauppe.
>Givorad BOGOSAVLJEVIC, killed by the Germans during battle in August
>1944 in Quincy-Voisins.
>Stanko NOVAKOVIC, killed in action at Verdun in August 1944.
>Michel ARIEFF, nicknamed "Tito", killed in action at Mausouées Farm in
>August 1944.
>Zika PETROVIC, 25 years old, escpaded war prisoner, killed in action in
>Meaux.
>Rudolf CUCEK and Victor ERJAVEC, two miners in Pas-de-Calais, together
>shot by the Germans.
>BRUNOVIC, from Bruay-en Artois, killed in action in August 1942.
>FAJS, from Bruay-en Artois, killed while he was opposing resistance to
>the police who had come to arrest him in May 1943.
>
>Notes:
>1. Quoted in "Unis" bulletin n° 52, 17.2.1946.
>(On les nommait des étrangers, Les immigrés dans la résistance, by
>Gaston Laroche, F.T.P.F. colonel, Boris Matline)
>
>Souvenir Franco-Soviétique,
>Jean LEVEQUE,
>Villa "Florelle",
>28410 BROUE
>
>Translated from the French by P.M.
>
>--
>Les "Editions Democrite" publient un mensuel en francais :
>> "Les dossiers du BIP" avec des traductions d'articles provenant de la
>> presse communiste(grecque, allemande, anglaise, turque, russe, espagnole,
>> portugaise...)sur des evenements qui interessent des lecteurs
>communistes.
>> Editions Democrite, 52, bld Roger Salengro, 93190 LIVRY-GARGAN, FRANCE
>> e-mail : democrite@...
>
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
-----Original Message-----
From: democrite <democrite@...>
Date: 16 May 1999 17:55
Subject: Yugoslavs in the French Resistance
>SMALL IN NUMBER, GREAT IN SACRIFICE
>
>YUGOSLAV IMMIGRATION
>
> Relatively speaking, Yugoslav immigrants died the most. Small in
>number, they were great in sacrifice. As early as 1939, at the time of
>mobilisation, more than 1,500 Yugoslavs had voluntarily joined the
>French army. Later, at the time of occupation, nearly 3,000 took part
>in the various Resistance movements. Everywhere, in Pas-de-Calais,
>Corrèze, Haute-Savoy, Moselle and Paris, Yugoslavs distinguished
>themselves by their bravery and courage. The attitude of the Yugoslav
>fighters and Resistance workers was always inspired by the strong
>friendship and sincere loyalty they felt towards the countries which
>welcomed them, and they gave ample proof of their attachment at the
>darkest times.
> At Nîmes, in the Maritime Alps, in the Ardennes and in Haute-Savoy,
>more than fifty Yugoslavs fell victim to Nazi barbarity. The first
>thing the Yugoslav Resistance fighters had done had been to direct their
>activity towards the Croatian troops dragooned into the ranks of the
>Wehrmacht. It was thanks to such action that near Grenoble, a Croatian
>unit blew up a depot where a large amount of ammunition and explosives
>were stored, killing many Germans.
> At Villefranche-de-Rouergue resided a regiment of engineers made up of
>about 1,300 Croats. They had ended up in this region - where the
>peasants reminded them of their far-off homeland by their sobriety and
>the homespun of their clothes - after having refused to leave for the
>Eastern front. These soldiers found it quite natural to consider France
>as a country of friends and the population was quick to recognise them
>as such. A mutual current of friendship soon formed. It was not long
>before the soldiers heard of the maquis and decided their duty was to
>act too. They thought up a plan of escape. But out of the 1,300, there
>was one traitor. Seeing they had been exposed, the others took action.
>After a judgement in the name of Tito, they shot their officers,
>occupied the town and proclaimed liberty. Immediately, Hitler's forces
>flooded in from the surrounding centres - Toulouse, Albi, Limoges and
>Rodez. The men hardly had time to split up into small groups and take
>to the maquis. They left the town together so that the population would
>not be trapped between two enemy fires, and took up position in the
>surrounding hills ready for an unequal battle.
> 200 Croats were killed in the fight. More than 400 were taken prisoner
>and shot in the barracks courtyard. The remaining 600 or so were able
>to escape and carried on fighting by the sides of the French Resistance
>fighters.
> In the Ardennes, there were groups of immigrant partisans. The
>"Marshal Tito" corp., of which two leaders died during combat, was made
>up of Yugoslavs. In the region of Nancy, on the road to Germany, it was
>groups of immigrants of Yugoslav origin and Soviet prisoners who had
>escaped, who prevented the Nazis from coming to the aid of Wehrmacht
>groups cut off from their bases. The names of these heroic brigades
>were "Paris Commune", "Stalingrad" and "Jelezniack".
> From the ranks of these fighters came Resistance leaders, like General
>Ljubomir ILITCH, who by their courage and their self-sacrifice in the
>struggle against the fascist occupying army, won the friendship of all
>the Resistance workers. In homage to the participation to the struggle
>of Yugoslavs against the common enemy, the French authorities gave the
>names of two of their heroes, MIRNIK and BOLTAR, who were shot by the
>Germans, to two streets in the towns of Avion (Pas-de-Calais) and
>Toulouse. In the South of France, near Toulouse, sixteen Yugoslav
>immigrant fighters were awarded either the War Cross or the Resistance
>Medal for their courage and dedication.
>
>GENERAL ILITCH
>
> General Ljubomir ILITCH, former commander in the International Brigades
>in Spain, commander of the F.F.I. of the resistance of immigrants in
>France during German occupation, and one of the most active organisers
>of the maquis guerrillas, tells in his memoirs how he managed to join
>the Resistance movement in France.
> "In 1940, the Germans and the Vichy leaders decided to shut up in the
>camps all the "troublesome" elements who had shown in the past true
>attachment to the cause of liberty, of democracy and, thus, to France.
>All the committed antifascists were thus imprisoned and their situation
>got worse as clandestine resistance became active and it transpired
>clearly what role all the foreigners living in France were to play! The
>Vichy and Gestapo jailers split the prisoners up into the "ringleaders",
>who were strong and thus a danger to them, and the majority who were
>less spirited, weakened as they were by hunger, deprivation and
>demoralisation. We "dangerous" ones were sent to the prison of Castres,
>which was used as a depot and as a station passed through by prisoners
>on their way to concentration camps in Germany. When we were undressed
>and stripped of our papers, baggage, family photos and even identity
>cards, we understood that our departure for the death camps was
>approaching. That was how the Germans arranged the papers of the
>political deportees and kept them carefully in their archives. Among us
>in prison there were also French officers and allies who had dropped by
>parachute, and Belgian and Polish officers, doing intelligence work for
>the allies. We were totally cut off from the outside world yet even then
>we were able to study all the obstacles in our way, the safety catches,
>the alarm bells and electronic alarm systems set up by the Germans in
>case of a possible escape. The escape took place in broad daylight,
>thanks to each one of us carrying out perfectly our tasks according to
>given instructions.
> There were 36 of us who escaped, plus two women from the English
>intelligence service. We made it to the mountains, and made those
>chasing us lose all trace of us. At last, after a week, we established
>contact with the clandestine maquis and partisans and got down to action
>at once. Four of us were Yugoslavs: we all wanted to join Tito without
>delay to fight in our own country. But the difficulties in leaving were
>great: we would have had to pass through Spain, and we had stayed there
>as volunteers in the International Brigades in '36 - '39. Our faces
>were known there... So while waiting to go, we all put ourselves at the
>disposal of the French Resistance and began to work together with the
>F.T.P."(1).
>
>Jean STANKOVITCH
>
> An article in the 4th September 1946 issue of "Le Havre Libre" recalled
>the memory of this young hero of Yugoslav origin.
> Born in Le Havre, Jean Stankovitch, after studying at Dicquemare
>school, was taken by the Obligatory Work Service in '43. Refusing
>immediately to go to Germany, he stayed for some time hidden in the town
>under the name of Jean Coquelin. However, the inaction to which his
>illegal situation constrained him was not suited to him. He suffered
>from it, and often opened up about his feelings to his friend Maurice
>Leboucher, who was to be much talked of later. Leboucher, understanding
>well that Jean Stankovitch was driven by a burning desire to make
>himself useful, did not hesitate to advise him to come and join him at
>the German submarine base, in Le Havre, where he was able to get him
>hired as electrician.
> Jean Stankovitch spent some time there, and enjoyed the good tricks his
>friend and himself played on the occupying forces, good tricks which
>could be called, in other words, sabotage. "They think I'm from an
>electricity school!" he would say to his close friends. And this trick
>alone was enough to thrill him.
> His mother, however, fearing bombings, soon decided to go and live in
>Belleville. Jean followed her, most unwillingly. But he could not
>remain inactive there either.
> And in the days following the arrival of the allies, he was glad to act
>as a courier for them, passing through the barricades that then isolated
>Le Havre. For, unknown to his mother, he was a member of the Resistance
>group "France before all". There he had met a young man, three years
>younger than him, and the two of them had fomented multiple projects to
>undermine German organisation wherever their modest means might be used,
>whenever the time came to get down to action.
> On Saturday 2nd September, when the tanks were officially announced,
>the two comrades could no longer keep still. Despite their families'
>advice to be cautious, they escaped and ran to meet the tanks. Bernard
>Lefebvre who was heading for Saint-Cyr was glad to be able to get a lift
>on a tank. He felt as if he was driving up the road of triumph.
> A few kilometres on, they heard that a volunteer was wanted to carry a
>letter from the allies' lines to a certain castle of Fontenay where
>there was still a German officer. Jean proposed himself, and set off at
>once in company of a young lady who spoke German. Once they got there,
>they were kept waiting for over an hour, after which they were chased
>away: the message was an order to surrender! Startled, the young lady
>and Jean Stankovitch found themselves in the road with bursts of fire
>beginning to rain down on them. They were amazed to still be alive, so
>much anger had they read in the eyes of the officer to whom they had
>unknowingly been assigned to propose capitulation. And even though they
>had failed in their mission, they were still glad to get away from their
>goal.
> That evening, after having served as liaison agents between the many
>Resistance groups, Jean and Bernard met up and, together with the other
>comrades, discussed besides the English tanks. It is not known how an
>Alsacian soldier managed to slip up to them and ask them to be kind
>enough to accept to serve as an intermediary between ten of his comrades
>and the Allies to whom they wanted to surrender. Promised that they
>would not be hurt, they decided to meet by a farm between 6.30 and
>7.00am. At the decided moment, Stankovitch and Lefevbre went to the
>place as arranged and waited. The firing from the barricades became
>heavier, and it was difficult for them to believe that the Alsacians
>would manage to get there under such an avalanche of bullets. And yet,
>since they had given their word, they were bent on keeping it, and tried
>to stay put. What happened in the moments which followed? Doubtless a
>shell exploding nearby or a low burst of gunfire took them by surprise.
>Both of them were touched. Bernard Lefebvre was killed outright and
>Jean Sankovitch, fatally wounded, died one hour later, after terrible
>suffering, at the first aid centre at Rolleville which he had been taken
>to.
>
>Sava KOVATCHEVITCH
>
> Sava Kovatchevitch, originally from the Lika district, had come to
>France in 1937 to earn a living and help his family a little. After
>occupying France, the Germans sent him to do labour in Düsseldorf,
>Germany. There, he began with the other workers to do sabotage, but the
>Gestapo was after him, especially as he was teaching the deported
>workers how to commit sabotage. He left at the moment he was about to
>be arrested. At the time, he was already in contact with Yugoslav and
>French prisoners and, alongside the patriots of Lorraine, was helping
>them.
> He was in Lorraine under the name "Pierre" and had a heavy, dangerous
>task. With the help of the patriots of Lorraine, he created a huge
>organization to get people through Germany and Lorraine towards France
>and its maquis. He made false identity papers with the help of the
>mayor of Baynville, Pierre Semmoni and Victor Florch, a post inspector
>in Nancy. Alongside the patriots from Lorraine - Emile Kodari, Louis
>Vagner, Albert Vaguer, Alphonse Vagner, Victor Picrona, Pierre Vagner,
>Jeannette Koisser, from Metz, and Louise Florch, also from Metz - Sava
>got men through into France and saved thier lives. French and Yugoslav
>prisoners in camps in Germany knew of this and those who escaped from
>the Stalag XII F. came to find him. He obtained them civilian clothes,
>false identity papers and food; he got them over the border and the
>rivers near Metz.
> Sava was discovered by Pavelitch's oustachis in charge of keeping tabs
>on the Croatian workers deported to Germany. The Gestapo arrested him
>and tortured him for 72 days , starving and beating him, so that he
>would denounce the organisation by which war prisoners, civilian
>deportees and saboteurs got away into France. This son of the Lika held
>out and never even thought of letting out anything at all.
> "If I must die, I may as well die as a man, and not tarnish my Lika, "
>Sava would say.
> In the end, the Gestapo sent him to join a labour company. He
>succeeded in escaping, and started his work once more, even more
>secretly than before. He was searched for intensely, and in August 1944
>the place became too hot beneath his feet and he was forced to leave.
>He made it to France and joined the maquis again.
>Among the Yugoslav fighters who died in action, let us mention:
>Dimitri KOTOUROVIC (1911 - 1944), former fighter in the International
>Brigades in Spain, initiator and organiser of the first F.T.P. (ndlt:
>Franc Tireur et Partisan) groups in Marseille. Was killed heroically at
>his post in April 1944.
>Victor FILIPIC, shot by the Gestapo after committing sabotage at
>Sallaumines.
>Sava PAVLICEK, killed while fighting on August 18th 1944 in Sauppe.
>Givorad BOGOSAVLJEVIC, killed by the Germans during battle in August
>1944 in Quincy-Voisins.
>Stanko NOVAKOVIC, killed in action at Verdun in August 1944.
>Michel ARIEFF, nicknamed "Tito", killed in action at Mausouées Farm in
>August 1944.
>Zika PETROVIC, 25 years old, escpaded war prisoner, killed in action in
>Meaux.
>Rudolf CUCEK and Victor ERJAVEC, two miners in Pas-de-Calais, together
>shot by the Germans.
>BRUNOVIC, from Bruay-en Artois, killed in action in August 1942.
>FAJS, from Bruay-en Artois, killed while he was opposing resistance to
>the police who had come to arrest him in May 1943.
>
>Notes:
>1. Quoted in "Unis" bulletin n° 52, 17.2.1946.
>(On les nommait des étrangers, Les immigrés dans la résistance, by
>Gaston Laroche, F.T.P.F. colonel, Boris Matline)
>
>Souvenir Franco-Soviétique,
>Jean LEVEQUE,
>Villa "Florelle",
>28410 BROUE
>
>Translated from the French by P.M.
>
>--
>Les "Editions Democrite" publient un mensuel en francais :
>> "Les dossiers du BIP" avec des traductions d'articles provenant de la
>> presse communiste(grecque, allemande, anglaise, turque, russe, espagnole,
>> portugaise...)sur des evenements qui interessent des lecteurs
>communistes.
>> Editions Democrite, 52, bld Roger Salengro, 93190 LIVRY-GARGAN, FRANCE
>> e-mail : democrite@...
>
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
AUDIZIONI ALLA COMMISSIONE ESTERI DEL PARLAMENTO CANADESE
I contribuiti che diffondiamo in questo messaggio vengono dal Canada. Si
tratta di alcune audizioni tenute ad Ottawa, alla Camera dei Comuni,
dinanzi allo Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Trade da parte di varie personalita' ritenute a vario titolo "informate
sui fatti" riguardo alla aggressione della NATO contro la Repubblica
Federale di Jugoslavia. In particolare, i contributi seguenti sono le
testimonianze di JAMES BISSET, ex-ambasciatore canadese a Belgrado, ora
"indesiderato" nella stessa ambasciata canadese a Belgrado, e SERGE
TRIFKOVIC, professore di storia, responsabile per gli esteri di
"Chronicles - Magazine of American Culture".
Tutti i documenti sono stati diffusi dalla lista STOPNATO@...
===
Author: James Bisset
Publisher/Date: February 2000
Title: Notes for address to Standing Committee Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (Ca)
1: Introduction
I wish to thank the committee for giving me the opportunity of speaking
this morning.
It is some comfort to know that although I was not allowed to speak to
anyone in the Canadian embassy in Belgrade during a recent visit there
that I am free to speak to members of the Canadian parliament.
I have been an out spoken critic of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I
believe it to have been a tragic mistake -- a historic miscalculation
that will have far reaching implications.
When NATO bombs fell on Yugoslavia in the spring and summer of last year
they caused more than just death and destruction in that country. The
bombs also struck at the heart of international law and delivered a
serious blow to the framework of global security that since the end of
the second world war has protected all of us from the horrors of a
nuclear war.
Kosovo broke the ground rules for NATO engagement and the aggressive
military intervention by NATO into the affairs of a sovereign state for
other than defensive purposes marked an ominous turning point in the
aims and objectives of that organization. It is important that we
understand this and seek clarification as to whether this was a
"one-off" aberration or a signal of fundamental change in the nature and
purposes of the organization. This is something the committee might well
examine in the course of its work.
2: An Illegal War
NATO's war in Kosovo was conducted without the approval of the United
Nations Security Council. It was a violation of international law, the
United Nations charter and its own article 1, which requires NATO to
settle any international disputes by peaceful means and not to threaten
or use force, "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations."
Apologists for NATO including our own foreign and defence ministers try
to avoid this issue by simply not mentioning it. There has been no
attempt to explain why the United Nations Security Council was ignored.
No effort to spell out under whose authority did NATO bomb Yugoslavia.
The ministers and their officials continue to justify the air strikes on
the grounds that the bombs were necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and
atrocities, despite all the evidence that by far the bulk of the ethnic
cleansing took place after the bombing not before it. It was the bombing
that triggered off the worst of the ethnic cleansing.
As for the atrocities it now seems that here again we were lied to about
the extent of the crimes commited. United States Secretary of Defence
Cohen told us that at least 100,000 Kosovars had perished. Tony Blair
spoke of genocide being carried out in Kosovo. The media relished in
these atrocity stories and printed every story told to them by Albanian,
"eye witnesses." The myth that the war was to stop ethnic cleansing and
atrocities contiues to be perpetrated by department spokesmen and large
parts of the media.
No one wants to defend atrocities and the numbers game in such
circumstances becomes sordid. Nevertheless numbers do become important
if they are used to justify military action against a sovereign state.
in the case of Kosovo it appears that about 2000 people were killed
there prior to the NATO bombing. considering that a civil war had been
underway since 1993 this is not a remarkable figure and compared with a
great many other hot spots hardly enough to warrant a 79-day bombing
campaign. It is also interesting to note that the UN tribunal
indictement of Milosovic of May 1999, cites only one incident of deaths
before the bombing -- the infamous Racak incident -- which itself is
challenged by French journalists who were on the ground there and
suspect a frame-up involving US General Walker who sounded the alarm.
The Kosovo "war" reveals disturbing evidence of how lies and duplicity
can mislead us into accepting things that we instinctively know to be
wrong. Jamie Shea and other NATO apologists have lied to us about the
bombing. The sad thing is that most of the Canadian media, and our
political representatives have accepted without question what has been
told to us by NATO and our own foreign affairs spokesmen.
3: An Unecessary War
perhaps the most serious charge against the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
is that it was unnecessary. NATO chose bombing over diplomacy. Violence
over negotiation. NATO's leaders tried to convince us that dropping tons
of bombs on Yugoslavia was serving humanitarian purposes.
A UN Security Council resolution of October 1998 accepted by Yugoslavia,
authorized over 1300 monitors from the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] to enter Kosovo and try to de-escalate the
fighting. from the accounts of a number of these monitors their task was
successful. While cease-fire violations continued on both sides the
intensity of the armed struggle was considerably abated.
The former Czech foreign minister, Jiri Dienstbier, and Canada's own
Rollie Keith of Vancouver -- both monitors for the OSCE on the ground in
Kosovo -- have publicly stated that there were no international refugees
over the last five months of the OSCE's presence in Kosovo and the
number of internally displaced only amounted to a few thousands in the
weeks leading up to the bombing.
The OSCE mission demonstrated that diplomacy and negotiation might well
have resolved the Kosovo problem without resorting to the use of force.
It was the failure of the United States to accept any flexibility in its
dealing with Belgrade in the weeks leading up to the war that spelled
diplomatic failure.
The adamant refusal of the USA to involve either the Russians or the
United Nations in the negotiations. The refusal to allow any other
intermediary to deal with Milosovic and finally the imposition of the
Rambouillet ultimatum which was clearly designed to ensure that
Yugoslavia had no choice but to refuse its insulting terms.
It is now generally accepted by those who have seen the Rambouillet
agreement that no sovereign state could have agreed to its conditions.
The insistence of allowing acess to all of Yugoslavia by NATO forces and
the demand that a referendum on autonomy be held within three years
guaranteed a Serbian rejection.
The Serbian parliament did, however, on March 23, state a willingness to
"examine the character and extent of an international presence in Kosovo
immediately after the signing of an autonomy accord acceptable to all
national communities in Kosovo, the local Serb minority included. " The
United States was not interested in pursuing this offer. NATO needed its
war. NATO's formal commitment to resolve international disputes by
peaceful means was thrown out the window.
The Rambouillet document itself was not easily obtained from NATO
sources. The chairman of the defence committee of the French National
Assembly asked for a copy shortly after the bombing commenced but was
not given a copy until a few days before the UN peace treaty was signed.
I hope that members of this committee have a copy to look at and will be
able to find out when and if Canada was informed of its conditions.
4: NATO's campaign a total failure
We have been asked to believe that the war in Kosovo was fought for
human rights. Indeed the president of the Czech republic received a
standing ovation in this House of Commons when he stated that Kosovo was
the first war fought for human values rather than territory. I suspect
even President Havel would have second thoughts about that statement now
that a large part of Yugoslav territory has in effect been handed over
to the Albanians.
The war allegedly to stop ethnic cleansing has not done so. Serbs
Gypsies, Jews, and Slav muslims are being forced out of Kosovo under the
eyes of 45,000 NATO troops. Murder and anarchy reigns supreme in Kosovo
as the KLA and criminal elements have taken charge. The United Nations
admits failure to control the situation and warns Serbs not to return.
The war allegedly to restore stability to the Balkans has done the
opposite.Yugoslavia's neighbors are in a state of turmoil. Montenegro is
on the edge of civil war. Macedonia is now worried that Kosovo has shown
the way for its own sizeable Albanian minority to demand
self-determination. Albania has been encouraged to strive harder to
fulfill its dream of greater Albania. Serbia itself has been ruined
economically. Embittered and disillusioned it feels betrayed and
alienated from the western democracies.
The illegal and unecessary war has alienated the other great nuclear
powers, Russia and China. These countries are now convinced that the
west cannot be trusted. NATO expansion eastward is seen as an aggressive
and hostile threat and will be answered by an increase in the nuclear
arsenal of both nations. After Kosovo who can with any conviction
convince them that NATO is purely a defensive alliance dedicated to
peace and to upholding the principles of the United Nations?
More seriously the NATO bombing has destroyed NATO's credibility. NATO
stood for more than just a powerful military organization. It stood for
peace; the rule of law, and democratic institutions. The bombing of
Yugoslavia threw all of that out the window.
No longer can NATO stand on the moral high ground. Its action in
Yugoslavia revealed it to be an aggressive military machine prepared to
ignore international law and intervene with deadly force in the internal
affairs of any state with whose actions or behaviour it does not agree.
5: Conclusions
There are those who believe that the long standing principle of state
sovereignty can be over ruled when human rights violations are taking
place in a country. Until Kosovo the ground rules for such intervention
called for Security Council authority before such action could be taken.
Apologists for NATO argue that it was unlikely Security Council
authority could have been obtained because of the veto power of China or
Russia. So it would appear rather than even try to get consent NATO took
upon itself the powers of the Security Council. I am not sure we should
all be comfortable with this development.
Undoubtedly there may be times when such intervention is justified and
immediately Rwanda comes to mind -- but intervention for humanitarian
reasons is a dangerous concept. Because who is to decide when to take
such action and under whose authority? Hitler intervened in
Czechoslovakia because he claimed the human rights of the Sudeten
Germans were being violated. Those who advocate a change in the current
rules for intervention are free to do so but until the rules change
should we not all obey the ones that still have legitimacy?
NATO made a serious mistake in Kosovo. Its bombing campaign was not only
an unmitigated disaster but it changed fundamentally the very nature and
purposes of the alliance. Does article 1 of the NATO treaty still stand?
Does NATO still undertake to settle any international disputes in which
it may become involved by peaceful means? Do the NATO countries still
undertake to refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the united
nations?
Kosovo should serve as a warning call that Canadian democracy needs a
shot in the arm to wake it up to the realities that foreign policy is
important--important because as happened one day last march Canadians
can wake up and find they are at war. Canadian pilots were bombing
Serbia. yet there was no declaration of war. The Canadian parliament was
not consulted. The majority of the Canadian people had no idea where
Kosovo was -- let alone understand why our aircraft were bombing cities
in a fellow nation state that had been a staunch ally during two world
wars.
It was not only Yugoslav soverignty that was violated by NATO's illegal
action. Canadian sovereignty was also abused. Canada had become involved
in a war without any member of the Canadian parliament or the Canadian
people being consulted.the ultimate expression of a nation's sovereignty
is the right to declare war. NATO abrogated this right.
If it essential that we give up some of our sovereignty as the price we
pay for membership in global institutons such as NATO then it is
mandatory that such institutions follow their own rules, respect thrule
of law, and operate within the generally accepted framework of the
United Nations charter. This NATO did not do. It is for this reason I
would suggest your committee must ask some tough questions about the
nature of Canada's involvement in the Kosovo war.
(James Bisset is the former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia, who was
recently physically barred by the Canadian government from entering the
embassy in Belgrade.)
===
Testimony by S. Trifkovic, House of Commons SCFAIT, Ottawa, 17/02/2000
GEO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO
Testimony by S. Trifkovic
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
House of Commons, Ottawa, February 17, 2000
The war waged by NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 marks a significant
turning point, not only for America and NATO but also for “the West” as
a
whole. The principle of state sovereignty, and of the rule of law
itself, has
been subverted in the name of an allegedly humanitarian ideology. Facts
have been converted into fiction, and even the fictions invoked to
justify
the act are giving up all pretense to credibility. Old systems for the
protection of
national liberties, political, legal and economic, have now been
subverted into vehicles for their destruction. But so far from
demonstrating
the vigor of Western ruling elites in their ruthless pursuit of an
ideology of
multi-ethnic democracy and international human rights, the whole Balkan
entanglement may be as a disturbing revelation of those ruling elites’
moral and cultural decay. I shall therefore devote my remarks to the
consequences of the war for the emerging new international system, and –
ultimately – for the security and stability of the Western world itself.
Almost a decade separated ‘Desert Storm’ from ‘Humanitarian Bombing.’ In
1991 the Maastricht Treaty was signed, and the rest of the decade has
brought the gradual usurpation of traditional European sovereignty by a
corporate-controlled Brussels regime of unelected bureaucrats who now
feel
bold enough to tell Austria how to run its domestic affairs. On this
side
of the ocean we had the passage of NAFTA and in 1995 the Uruguay round
of GATT gave us the WTO. The nineties were thus a decade of gradual
foundation laying for the new international order. The denigration of
sovereign nationhood hypnotized the public into applauding the
dismantling
of the very institutions that offered the only hope of representative
empowerment. The process is sufficiently far advanced for President
Clinton to claim (“A Just and Necessary War,” NYT, May 23, 1999) that,
had
it not bombed Serbia, "NATO itself would have been discredited for
failing
to defend the very values that give it meaning."
The war was in fact both unjust and unnecessary, but the significance of
Mr. Clinton’s statement is in that he has openly declared null and void
the international system in existence ever since the Peace of Westphalia
(1648). It was an imperfect and often violated system, but nevertheless
it
provided the basis for international discourse from which only the
assorted red and black totalitarians have openly deviated. Since 24
March
1999 this is being replaced by the emerging Clinton Doctrine, a carbon
copy of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty that supposedly
justified the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like his
Soviet predecessor, Mr. Clinton used an abstract and ideologically
loaded
notion - that of universal “human rights” - as the pretext to violate
the law and
tradition. The Clinton Doctrine is rooted in the bipartisan hubris of
Washington’s foreign policy “elite,” tipsy on its own heady brew of the
“world’s last and only superpower.” Legal formalities are passé, and
moral
imperatives - never sacrosanct in international affairs - are replaced
by
a cynical exercise in situational morality, dependent on an actor’s
position within the superpower ’s value system.
And so imperial high-mindedness is back, but in a new form. Old
religion, national flags and nationalist rivalry play no part. But the
yearning
for excitement and importance, that took the British to Peking, Kabul
and
Khartoum, the French to Fashoda and Saigon, and the Americans to Manila,
has now re-emerged. As a result a war was waged on an independent nation
because it refused foreign troops on its soil. All other justifications
are post facto rationalizations. The powers that waged that war have
aided
and abetted secession by an ethnic minority, secession that – once
formally
effected - will render many European borders tentative. In the context
of
any other European nation the story would sound surreal. The Serbs,
however, have been demonized to the point where they must not presume to
be treated like others.
But the fact that the West could do anything it chose to the Serbs does
not explain why it should. It is hardly worth refuting, yet again, the
feeble excuses for intervention. “Humanitarian” argument has been
invoked.
But what about Kashmir, Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,
Algeria? Properly videotaped and Amanpourized, each would be good for a
dozen “Kosovos”. There was no “genocide,” of course. Compared to the
killing fields of the Third World Kosovo was an unremarkable,
low-intensity conflict, uglier perhaps than Northern Ireland a decade
ago,
but much less so than Kurdistan. A total of 2,108 fatalities on all
sides
in Kosovo until June 1999, in a province of over two million, favorably
compares to the annual homicide tally of 450 in Washington D.C.
(population 600,000). Counting corpses is poor form, but bearing in mind
the brutalities and “ethnic cleansings” ignored by NATO - or even
condoned, notably in Croatia in 1995, or in eastern Turkey - it is clear
that “Kosovo” is not about universal principles. In Washington Abdullah
Ocalan is a terrorist, but KLA are freedom fighters.
What was it about, then? “Regional stability”, we were told next: if we
didn ’t stop the conflict it would engulf Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, the
whole of the Balkans in fact, with much of Europe to follow. But the
cure
- bombing Serbia into detaching an ethnically pure-Albanian Kosovo to
the
KLA narco-mafia, under NATO’s benevolent eye – will unleash a chain
reaction throughout the ex-Communist half of Europe. Its first victim
will be
the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, where the restive Albanian
minority comprises a third of the total population. And will the
Pristina
model not be demanded by the Hungarians in Rumania (more numerous
than Kosovo’s Albanians), and in southern Slovakia? What will stop the
Russians in the Ukraine, in Moldova, in Estonia, and in northern
Kazakhstan from following suit? Or the Serbs and Croats in the
chronically
unstable and unviable Dayton-Bosnia? And finally, when the Albanians get
their secession on the grounds of their numbers, will the same apply
when
the Latinos in southern California or Texas eventually outnumber their
Anglo
neighbors and start demanding bilingual statehood, leading to
reunification
with Mexico? Are Russia and China to threaten the United States with
bombing if Washington does not comply?
The outcome in Kosovo, for now, is in line with a deeply flawed model of
the new Balkan order that seeks to satisfy the aspirations of all ethnic
groups in former Yugoslavia - except the Serbs. This is a disastrous
strategy for all concerned. Even if forced into submission now, the
Serbs
shall have no stake in the ensuing order of things. Sooner or later they
will fight to recover Kosovo. The Carthaginian peace imposed on the
Serbs
today will cause chronic imbalance and strife for decades to come. It
will
entangle the West in a Balkan quagmire, and guarantee a new war as soon
as Mr. Clinton’s successors lose interest in underwriting the ill-gotten
gains
of America’s Balkan clients.
NATO has won, for now, but “the West” has lost. The war has undermined
the very principles that constitute the West, namely the rule of law.
The
notion of “human rights” can never provide a basis for either the rule
of
law or morality. “Universal human rights,” detached from any rootedness
in
time or place, will be open to the latest whim of outrage or the latest
fad for victimhood. The misguided effort to transform NATO from a
defensive alliance into a mini-U.N. with “out-of-area” self-appointed
responsibilities, is a certain road to more Bosnias and more Kosovos
down
the line. Now that the Clintonistas and NATO were “successful” in
Kosovo,
we can expect new and even more dangerous adventures elsewhere. But
next time around the Russians, Chinese, Indians and others will know
better than to buy the slogans about free markets and democratic human
rights, and the future of “the West” in the eventually inevitable
conflict may
be uncertain. Canada should ponder the implications of this course, and
gather the courage to say “no” to global interventionism – for its own
sake,
and for the sake of peace and stability in the world. Is it really
obliged to
watch in undissenting submission as a long, dangerous military
experiment
is mounted which will lead us to a real war for Central Asia? Will it
soon be
'defending' new KLAs against 'genocide' along Russia’s Islamic rim,
among
ethnic groups as yet unknown to the Western press that can provide a
series of excuses for intervention, all as good, that is as bad, as the
Kosovo
Albanian excuse?
Was Canada’s imperial history so sweet that it must seek another
imperial command-center, in Washington, to compensate for the loss of
London? Does Canada today feel comfortable with the emerging truth: that
it has less freedom of choice about war and peace than it did as a free
Dominion under the old Statute of Westminster? For there can be no doubt
that the war NATO was fighting in April and May 1999 was not intended,
or
willed, by anything which can be called the Alliance, when the use of
force
was plotted inside the Beltway in 1998.
It is worth asking how far this re-acquisition of minor imperial status
-
by Canada and other NATO members - is creating a media-led political
process that leaves national decision-making meaningless, beyond a
formal
cheer-leading function. It is also worth asking how it came to be that
the
chief war aim of NATO was 'keeping the Alliance together', what
disciplines it implies, and how easily, and bloodily, it can be
repeated.
The moral absolutism that was invoked by the proponents of intervention
as
a substitute for rational argument can no longer be sustained. Genuine
dilemmas about our human responsibility for one another must not be used
to reactivate the viral imperialism of the re-extended West. The more
arrogant the new doctrine, the greater the willingness to lie for the
truth. To be capable of “doing something” sustains moral self-respect,
if
we can suppress the thought that we are not so much moral actors as
consumers of predigested choices. At the onset of the Millenium we are
living in a virtual Coliseum where exotic and nasty troublemakers can be
killed not by lions but by the magical flying machines of the Imperium.
As
the candidates for punishment - or martyrdom - are pushed into the
arena,
many denizens of “the West” react to the show as imperial consumers, not
as citizens with a parliamentary right and a democratic duty to question
the proceedings.
May the results of your present inquiry prove me wrong. Thank you.
>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>From: Peter Bein [mailto:pbein@...]
>>>>Sent: February 10, 2000 4:16 PM
>>>>To: 'HilchJ@...'
>>>>Subject:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>I am urging you that the following individuals be called to testify
before
>>>>the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(SCFAIT)
>>>>as expert witnesses re Canada's role in the conflict and
post-conflict
>>>>developments in Kosovo and Metohija. It is imperative that MPs in
SCAFIT
>>>>hear from and question experts who reflect all sides in this
conflict. The
>>>>MPs are already well acquainted with the perspectives of Canada's
military
>>>>and the Dept of Foreign Affairs, as their views were publicized for
many
>>>>months.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Mr. James Bissett, Canada's former ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and
>>>>Albania.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Michael Chossudovsky, professor of economics at the University
of
>>>>Ottawa.
>>>>
>>>>Mr. Roland Keith from Vancouver, B.C.,who was stationed in Kosovo
as a
>>>>monitor with the
>>>>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Rosalie Bertell, Director of Research at the International
Institute
>>of
>>>>Concern for Public Health in Toronto.
>>>>
>>>>Prof. Dr. Hari Sharma, professor emeritus of chemistry at the
University
>>of
>>>>Waterloo, Ontario.
>>>>
>>>>Prof. Dr. Michael Mandel, professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law
School ,
>>>>York
>>>>University, Toronto.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Serge Trifkovic, an author, former university professor,
historian,
>>>>foreign affairs editor of the "Chronicles - Magazine of American
>>>>Culture".
>>>>
>>>>Mrs. Radmila Swann, a retired federal public servant and a founding
member
>>>>of
>>>>the Ottawa Heritage Society.
>>>>
>>>>Mr. Nikola Rajkovic, a law student and a founding member of the
Centre for
>>>>Peace in the Balkans in Toronto.
>>>>
>>>>I trust that testimonies of these people will add a great value to
the
>>>>hearings.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Peter Bein, P.Eng.
>>>>Vancouver B.C.
>>>>tel. +604 822 1685
>>>>fax +604 822 3033
>>>>e-mail: pbein@...
>>>>
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
I contribuiti che diffondiamo in questo messaggio vengono dal Canada. Si
tratta di alcune audizioni tenute ad Ottawa, alla Camera dei Comuni,
dinanzi allo Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International
Trade da parte di varie personalita' ritenute a vario titolo "informate
sui fatti" riguardo alla aggressione della NATO contro la Repubblica
Federale di Jugoslavia. In particolare, i contributi seguenti sono le
testimonianze di JAMES BISSET, ex-ambasciatore canadese a Belgrado, ora
"indesiderato" nella stessa ambasciata canadese a Belgrado, e SERGE
TRIFKOVIC, professore di storia, responsabile per gli esteri di
"Chronicles - Magazine of American Culture".
Tutti i documenti sono stati diffusi dalla lista STOPNATO@...
===
Author: James Bisset
Publisher/Date: February 2000
Title: Notes for address to Standing Committee Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (Ca)
1: Introduction
I wish to thank the committee for giving me the opportunity of speaking
this morning.
It is some comfort to know that although I was not allowed to speak to
anyone in the Canadian embassy in Belgrade during a recent visit there
that I am free to speak to members of the Canadian parliament.
I have been an out spoken critic of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. I
believe it to have been a tragic mistake -- a historic miscalculation
that will have far reaching implications.
When NATO bombs fell on Yugoslavia in the spring and summer of last year
they caused more than just death and destruction in that country. The
bombs also struck at the heart of international law and delivered a
serious blow to the framework of global security that since the end of
the second world war has protected all of us from the horrors of a
nuclear war.
Kosovo broke the ground rules for NATO engagement and the aggressive
military intervention by NATO into the affairs of a sovereign state for
other than defensive purposes marked an ominous turning point in the
aims and objectives of that organization. It is important that we
understand this and seek clarification as to whether this was a
"one-off" aberration or a signal of fundamental change in the nature and
purposes of the organization. This is something the committee might well
examine in the course of its work.
2: An Illegal War
NATO's war in Kosovo was conducted without the approval of the United
Nations Security Council. It was a violation of international law, the
United Nations charter and its own article 1, which requires NATO to
settle any international disputes by peaceful means and not to threaten
or use force, "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations."
Apologists for NATO including our own foreign and defence ministers try
to avoid this issue by simply not mentioning it. There has been no
attempt to explain why the United Nations Security Council was ignored.
No effort to spell out under whose authority did NATO bomb Yugoslavia.
The ministers and their officials continue to justify the air strikes on
the grounds that the bombs were necessary to stop ethnic cleansing and
atrocities, despite all the evidence that by far the bulk of the ethnic
cleansing took place after the bombing not before it. It was the bombing
that triggered off the worst of the ethnic cleansing.
As for the atrocities it now seems that here again we were lied to about
the extent of the crimes commited. United States Secretary of Defence
Cohen told us that at least 100,000 Kosovars had perished. Tony Blair
spoke of genocide being carried out in Kosovo. The media relished in
these atrocity stories and printed every story told to them by Albanian,
"eye witnesses." The myth that the war was to stop ethnic cleansing and
atrocities contiues to be perpetrated by department spokesmen and large
parts of the media.
No one wants to defend atrocities and the numbers game in such
circumstances becomes sordid. Nevertheless numbers do become important
if they are used to justify military action against a sovereign state.
in the case of Kosovo it appears that about 2000 people were killed
there prior to the NATO bombing. considering that a civil war had been
underway since 1993 this is not a remarkable figure and compared with a
great many other hot spots hardly enough to warrant a 79-day bombing
campaign. It is also interesting to note that the UN tribunal
indictement of Milosovic of May 1999, cites only one incident of deaths
before the bombing -- the infamous Racak incident -- which itself is
challenged by French journalists who were on the ground there and
suspect a frame-up involving US General Walker who sounded the alarm.
The Kosovo "war" reveals disturbing evidence of how lies and duplicity
can mislead us into accepting things that we instinctively know to be
wrong. Jamie Shea and other NATO apologists have lied to us about the
bombing. The sad thing is that most of the Canadian media, and our
political representatives have accepted without question what has been
told to us by NATO and our own foreign affairs spokesmen.
3: An Unecessary War
perhaps the most serious charge against the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia
is that it was unnecessary. NATO chose bombing over diplomacy. Violence
over negotiation. NATO's leaders tried to convince us that dropping tons
of bombs on Yugoslavia was serving humanitarian purposes.
A UN Security Council resolution of October 1998 accepted by Yugoslavia,
authorized over 1300 monitors from the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] to enter Kosovo and try to de-escalate the
fighting. from the accounts of a number of these monitors their task was
successful. While cease-fire violations continued on both sides the
intensity of the armed struggle was considerably abated.
The former Czech foreign minister, Jiri Dienstbier, and Canada's own
Rollie Keith of Vancouver -- both monitors for the OSCE on the ground in
Kosovo -- have publicly stated that there were no international refugees
over the last five months of the OSCE's presence in Kosovo and the
number of internally displaced only amounted to a few thousands in the
weeks leading up to the bombing.
The OSCE mission demonstrated that diplomacy and negotiation might well
have resolved the Kosovo problem without resorting to the use of force.
It was the failure of the United States to accept any flexibility in its
dealing with Belgrade in the weeks leading up to the war that spelled
diplomatic failure.
The adamant refusal of the USA to involve either the Russians or the
United Nations in the negotiations. The refusal to allow any other
intermediary to deal with Milosovic and finally the imposition of the
Rambouillet ultimatum which was clearly designed to ensure that
Yugoslavia had no choice but to refuse its insulting terms.
It is now generally accepted by those who have seen the Rambouillet
agreement that no sovereign state could have agreed to its conditions.
The insistence of allowing acess to all of Yugoslavia by NATO forces and
the demand that a referendum on autonomy be held within three years
guaranteed a Serbian rejection.
The Serbian parliament did, however, on March 23, state a willingness to
"examine the character and extent of an international presence in Kosovo
immediately after the signing of an autonomy accord acceptable to all
national communities in Kosovo, the local Serb minority included. " The
United States was not interested in pursuing this offer. NATO needed its
war. NATO's formal commitment to resolve international disputes by
peaceful means was thrown out the window.
The Rambouillet document itself was not easily obtained from NATO
sources. The chairman of the defence committee of the French National
Assembly asked for a copy shortly after the bombing commenced but was
not given a copy until a few days before the UN peace treaty was signed.
I hope that members of this committee have a copy to look at and will be
able to find out when and if Canada was informed of its conditions.
4: NATO's campaign a total failure
We have been asked to believe that the war in Kosovo was fought for
human rights. Indeed the president of the Czech republic received a
standing ovation in this House of Commons when he stated that Kosovo was
the first war fought for human values rather than territory. I suspect
even President Havel would have second thoughts about that statement now
that a large part of Yugoslav territory has in effect been handed over
to the Albanians.
The war allegedly to stop ethnic cleansing has not done so. Serbs
Gypsies, Jews, and Slav muslims are being forced out of Kosovo under the
eyes of 45,000 NATO troops. Murder and anarchy reigns supreme in Kosovo
as the KLA and criminal elements have taken charge. The United Nations
admits failure to control the situation and warns Serbs not to return.
The war allegedly to restore stability to the Balkans has done the
opposite.Yugoslavia's neighbors are in a state of turmoil. Montenegro is
on the edge of civil war. Macedonia is now worried that Kosovo has shown
the way for its own sizeable Albanian minority to demand
self-determination. Albania has been encouraged to strive harder to
fulfill its dream of greater Albania. Serbia itself has been ruined
economically. Embittered and disillusioned it feels betrayed and
alienated from the western democracies.
The illegal and unecessary war has alienated the other great nuclear
powers, Russia and China. These countries are now convinced that the
west cannot be trusted. NATO expansion eastward is seen as an aggressive
and hostile threat and will be answered by an increase in the nuclear
arsenal of both nations. After Kosovo who can with any conviction
convince them that NATO is purely a defensive alliance dedicated to
peace and to upholding the principles of the United Nations?
More seriously the NATO bombing has destroyed NATO's credibility. NATO
stood for more than just a powerful military organization. It stood for
peace; the rule of law, and democratic institutions. The bombing of
Yugoslavia threw all of that out the window.
No longer can NATO stand on the moral high ground. Its action in
Yugoslavia revealed it to be an aggressive military machine prepared to
ignore international law and intervene with deadly force in the internal
affairs of any state with whose actions or behaviour it does not agree.
5: Conclusions
There are those who believe that the long standing principle of state
sovereignty can be over ruled when human rights violations are taking
place in a country. Until Kosovo the ground rules for such intervention
called for Security Council authority before such action could be taken.
Apologists for NATO argue that it was unlikely Security Council
authority could have been obtained because of the veto power of China or
Russia. So it would appear rather than even try to get consent NATO took
upon itself the powers of the Security Council. I am not sure we should
all be comfortable with this development.
Undoubtedly there may be times when such intervention is justified and
immediately Rwanda comes to mind -- but intervention for humanitarian
reasons is a dangerous concept. Because who is to decide when to take
such action and under whose authority? Hitler intervened in
Czechoslovakia because he claimed the human rights of the Sudeten
Germans were being violated. Those who advocate a change in the current
rules for intervention are free to do so but until the rules change
should we not all obey the ones that still have legitimacy?
NATO made a serious mistake in Kosovo. Its bombing campaign was not only
an unmitigated disaster but it changed fundamentally the very nature and
purposes of the alliance. Does article 1 of the NATO treaty still stand?
Does NATO still undertake to settle any international disputes in which
it may become involved by peaceful means? Do the NATO countries still
undertake to refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the united
nations?
Kosovo should serve as a warning call that Canadian democracy needs a
shot in the arm to wake it up to the realities that foreign policy is
important--important because as happened one day last march Canadians
can wake up and find they are at war. Canadian pilots were bombing
Serbia. yet there was no declaration of war. The Canadian parliament was
not consulted. The majority of the Canadian people had no idea where
Kosovo was -- let alone understand why our aircraft were bombing cities
in a fellow nation state that had been a staunch ally during two world
wars.
It was not only Yugoslav soverignty that was violated by NATO's illegal
action. Canadian sovereignty was also abused. Canada had become involved
in a war without any member of the Canadian parliament or the Canadian
people being consulted.the ultimate expression of a nation's sovereignty
is the right to declare war. NATO abrogated this right.
If it essential that we give up some of our sovereignty as the price we
pay for membership in global institutons such as NATO then it is
mandatory that such institutions follow their own rules, respect thrule
of law, and operate within the generally accepted framework of the
United Nations charter. This NATO did not do. It is for this reason I
would suggest your committee must ask some tough questions about the
nature of Canada's involvement in the Kosovo war.
(James Bisset is the former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia, who was
recently physically barred by the Canadian government from entering the
embassy in Belgrade.)
===
Testimony by S. Trifkovic, House of Commons SCFAIT, Ottawa, 17/02/2000
GEO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO
Testimony by S. Trifkovic
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
House of Commons, Ottawa, February 17, 2000
The war waged by NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999 marks a significant
turning point, not only for America and NATO but also for “the West” as
a
whole. The principle of state sovereignty, and of the rule of law
itself, has
been subverted in the name of an allegedly humanitarian ideology. Facts
have been converted into fiction, and even the fictions invoked to
justify
the act are giving up all pretense to credibility. Old systems for the
protection of
national liberties, political, legal and economic, have now been
subverted into vehicles for their destruction. But so far from
demonstrating
the vigor of Western ruling elites in their ruthless pursuit of an
ideology of
multi-ethnic democracy and international human rights, the whole Balkan
entanglement may be as a disturbing revelation of those ruling elites’
moral and cultural decay. I shall therefore devote my remarks to the
consequences of the war for the emerging new international system, and –
ultimately – for the security and stability of the Western world itself.
Almost a decade separated ‘Desert Storm’ from ‘Humanitarian Bombing.’ In
1991 the Maastricht Treaty was signed, and the rest of the decade has
brought the gradual usurpation of traditional European sovereignty by a
corporate-controlled Brussels regime of unelected bureaucrats who now
feel
bold enough to tell Austria how to run its domestic affairs. On this
side
of the ocean we had the passage of NAFTA and in 1995 the Uruguay round
of GATT gave us the WTO. The nineties were thus a decade of gradual
foundation laying for the new international order. The denigration of
sovereign nationhood hypnotized the public into applauding the
dismantling
of the very institutions that offered the only hope of representative
empowerment. The process is sufficiently far advanced for President
Clinton to claim (“A Just and Necessary War,” NYT, May 23, 1999) that,
had
it not bombed Serbia, "NATO itself would have been discredited for
failing
to defend the very values that give it meaning."
The war was in fact both unjust and unnecessary, but the significance of
Mr. Clinton’s statement is in that he has openly declared null and void
the international system in existence ever since the Peace of Westphalia
(1648). It was an imperfect and often violated system, but nevertheless
it
provided the basis for international discourse from which only the
assorted red and black totalitarians have openly deviated. Since 24
March
1999 this is being replaced by the emerging Clinton Doctrine, a carbon
copy of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty that supposedly
justified the Soviet-led occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Like his
Soviet predecessor, Mr. Clinton used an abstract and ideologically
loaded
notion - that of universal “human rights” - as the pretext to violate
the law and
tradition. The Clinton Doctrine is rooted in the bipartisan hubris of
Washington’s foreign policy “elite,” tipsy on its own heady brew of the
“world’s last and only superpower.” Legal formalities are passé, and
moral
imperatives - never sacrosanct in international affairs - are replaced
by
a cynical exercise in situational morality, dependent on an actor’s
position within the superpower ’s value system.
And so imperial high-mindedness is back, but in a new form. Old
religion, national flags and nationalist rivalry play no part. But the
yearning
for excitement and importance, that took the British to Peking, Kabul
and
Khartoum, the French to Fashoda and Saigon, and the Americans to Manila,
has now re-emerged. As a result a war was waged on an independent nation
because it refused foreign troops on its soil. All other justifications
are post facto rationalizations. The powers that waged that war have
aided
and abetted secession by an ethnic minority, secession that – once
formally
effected - will render many European borders tentative. In the context
of
any other European nation the story would sound surreal. The Serbs,
however, have been demonized to the point where they must not presume to
be treated like others.
But the fact that the West could do anything it chose to the Serbs does
not explain why it should. It is hardly worth refuting, yet again, the
feeble excuses for intervention. “Humanitarian” argument has been
invoked.
But what about Kashmir, Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,
Algeria? Properly videotaped and Amanpourized, each would be good for a
dozen “Kosovos”. There was no “genocide,” of course. Compared to the
killing fields of the Third World Kosovo was an unremarkable,
low-intensity conflict, uglier perhaps than Northern Ireland a decade
ago,
but much less so than Kurdistan. A total of 2,108 fatalities on all
sides
in Kosovo until June 1999, in a province of over two million, favorably
compares to the annual homicide tally of 450 in Washington D.C.
(population 600,000). Counting corpses is poor form, but bearing in mind
the brutalities and “ethnic cleansings” ignored by NATO - or even
condoned, notably in Croatia in 1995, or in eastern Turkey - it is clear
that “Kosovo” is not about universal principles. In Washington Abdullah
Ocalan is a terrorist, but KLA are freedom fighters.
What was it about, then? “Regional stability”, we were told next: if we
didn ’t stop the conflict it would engulf Macedonia, Greece, Turkey, the
whole of the Balkans in fact, with much of Europe to follow. But the
cure
- bombing Serbia into detaching an ethnically pure-Albanian Kosovo to
the
KLA narco-mafia, under NATO’s benevolent eye – will unleash a chain
reaction throughout the ex-Communist half of Europe. Its first victim
will be
the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, where the restive Albanian
minority comprises a third of the total population. And will the
Pristina
model not be demanded by the Hungarians in Rumania (more numerous
than Kosovo’s Albanians), and in southern Slovakia? What will stop the
Russians in the Ukraine, in Moldova, in Estonia, and in northern
Kazakhstan from following suit? Or the Serbs and Croats in the
chronically
unstable and unviable Dayton-Bosnia? And finally, when the Albanians get
their secession on the grounds of their numbers, will the same apply
when
the Latinos in southern California or Texas eventually outnumber their
Anglo
neighbors and start demanding bilingual statehood, leading to
reunification
with Mexico? Are Russia and China to threaten the United States with
bombing if Washington does not comply?
The outcome in Kosovo, for now, is in line with a deeply flawed model of
the new Balkan order that seeks to satisfy the aspirations of all ethnic
groups in former Yugoslavia - except the Serbs. This is a disastrous
strategy for all concerned. Even if forced into submission now, the
Serbs
shall have no stake in the ensuing order of things. Sooner or later they
will fight to recover Kosovo. The Carthaginian peace imposed on the
Serbs
today will cause chronic imbalance and strife for decades to come. It
will
entangle the West in a Balkan quagmire, and guarantee a new war as soon
as Mr. Clinton’s successors lose interest in underwriting the ill-gotten
gains
of America’s Balkan clients.
NATO has won, for now, but “the West” has lost. The war has undermined
the very principles that constitute the West, namely the rule of law.
The
notion of “human rights” can never provide a basis for either the rule
of
law or morality. “Universal human rights,” detached from any rootedness
in
time or place, will be open to the latest whim of outrage or the latest
fad for victimhood. The misguided effort to transform NATO from a
defensive alliance into a mini-U.N. with “out-of-area” self-appointed
responsibilities, is a certain road to more Bosnias and more Kosovos
down
the line. Now that the Clintonistas and NATO were “successful” in
Kosovo,
we can expect new and even more dangerous adventures elsewhere. But
next time around the Russians, Chinese, Indians and others will know
better than to buy the slogans about free markets and democratic human
rights, and the future of “the West” in the eventually inevitable
conflict may
be uncertain. Canada should ponder the implications of this course, and
gather the courage to say “no” to global interventionism – for its own
sake,
and for the sake of peace and stability in the world. Is it really
obliged to
watch in undissenting submission as a long, dangerous military
experiment
is mounted which will lead us to a real war for Central Asia? Will it
soon be
'defending' new KLAs against 'genocide' along Russia’s Islamic rim,
among
ethnic groups as yet unknown to the Western press that can provide a
series of excuses for intervention, all as good, that is as bad, as the
Kosovo
Albanian excuse?
Was Canada’s imperial history so sweet that it must seek another
imperial command-center, in Washington, to compensate for the loss of
London? Does Canada today feel comfortable with the emerging truth: that
it has less freedom of choice about war and peace than it did as a free
Dominion under the old Statute of Westminster? For there can be no doubt
that the war NATO was fighting in April and May 1999 was not intended,
or
willed, by anything which can be called the Alliance, when the use of
force
was plotted inside the Beltway in 1998.
It is worth asking how far this re-acquisition of minor imperial status
-
by Canada and other NATO members - is creating a media-led political
process that leaves national decision-making meaningless, beyond a
formal
cheer-leading function. It is also worth asking how it came to be that
the
chief war aim of NATO was 'keeping the Alliance together', what
disciplines it implies, and how easily, and bloodily, it can be
repeated.
The moral absolutism that was invoked by the proponents of intervention
as
a substitute for rational argument can no longer be sustained. Genuine
dilemmas about our human responsibility for one another must not be used
to reactivate the viral imperialism of the re-extended West. The more
arrogant the new doctrine, the greater the willingness to lie for the
truth. To be capable of “doing something” sustains moral self-respect,
if
we can suppress the thought that we are not so much moral actors as
consumers of predigested choices. At the onset of the Millenium we are
living in a virtual Coliseum where exotic and nasty troublemakers can be
killed not by lions but by the magical flying machines of the Imperium.
As
the candidates for punishment - or martyrdom - are pushed into the
arena,
many denizens of “the West” react to the show as imperial consumers, not
as citizens with a parliamentary right and a democratic duty to question
the proceedings.
May the results of your present inquiry prove me wrong. Thank you.
>>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>>From: Peter Bein [mailto:pbein@...]
>>>>Sent: February 10, 2000 4:16 PM
>>>>To: 'HilchJ@...'
>>>>Subject:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>I am urging you that the following individuals be called to testify
before
>>>>the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(SCFAIT)
>>>>as expert witnesses re Canada's role in the conflict and
post-conflict
>>>>developments in Kosovo and Metohija. It is imperative that MPs in
SCAFIT
>>>>hear from and question experts who reflect all sides in this
conflict. The
>>>>MPs are already well acquainted with the perspectives of Canada's
military
>>>>and the Dept of Foreign Affairs, as their views were publicized for
many
>>>>months.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>Mr. James Bissett, Canada's former ambassador to Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and
>>>>Albania.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Michael Chossudovsky, professor of economics at the University
of
>>>>Ottawa.
>>>>
>>>>Mr. Roland Keith from Vancouver, B.C.,who was stationed in Kosovo
as a
>>>>monitor with the
>>>>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Rosalie Bertell, Director of Research at the International
Institute
>>of
>>>>Concern for Public Health in Toronto.
>>>>
>>>>Prof. Dr. Hari Sharma, professor emeritus of chemistry at the
University
>>of
>>>>Waterloo, Ontario.
>>>>
>>>>Prof. Dr. Michael Mandel, professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law
School ,
>>>>York
>>>>University, Toronto.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Serge Trifkovic, an author, former university professor,
historian,
>>>>foreign affairs editor of the "Chronicles - Magazine of American
>>>>Culture".
>>>>
>>>>Mrs. Radmila Swann, a retired federal public servant and a founding
member
>>>>of
>>>>the Ottawa Heritage Society.
>>>>
>>>>Mr. Nikola Rajkovic, a law student and a founding member of the
Centre for
>>>>Peace in the Balkans in Toronto.
>>>>
>>>>I trust that testimonies of these people will add a great value to
the
>>>>hearings.
>>>>
>>>>Dr. Peter Bein, P.Eng.
>>>>Vancouver B.C.
>>>>tel. +604 822 1685
>>>>fax +604 822 3033
>>>>e-mail: pbein@...
>>>>
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
