Della miseria della opposizione di destra in Serbia
Terza parte:
IL SOSTEGNO U.S.A. AI PARTITI ED AI MEDIA REAZIONARI
1. Interferenze esplicite del Dipartimento di Stato (Reuters 20/5/00)
2. Dibattito al Senato USA sull'appoggio alla "opposizione"
(29/7/99 - prima parte)
===
Europe, U.S. Back Further Protests Against Milosevic
4.01 a.m. ET (812 GMT) May 20, 2000
WASHINGTON (Reuters) — The United States and Europe
are coordinating initiatives to encourage strong
opposition among the Serb people to President Slobodan
Milosevic, top U.S. and European officials said.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Jaime Gama,
foreign minister of Portugal which holds the European
Union presidency, told reporters they were encouraged
by public protests against Milosevic, who this week
cracked down on the independent media.
In a meeting here to prepare for next month's EU-U.S.
summit in Lisbon, Albright said they discussed ways to
"increase our support for the courageous men and women
who are demanding their rights in the cities and towns
across Serbia.'' Gama said the EU was focusing its
cooperation with Yugoslavia on "the civil society,
independent media, opposition municipalities, thus
creating conditions for a strong opposition coming
into the streets and expressing the will of the
people.''
He added: "And that's happening these last recent
months, and that's a very effective symbol of a
concrete hope for that country.''
The United States has helped coordinate the opposition
to Milosevic, condemning him for fomenting a series of
wars in former Yugoslavia culminating in NATO's air
campaign that drove marauding Serbian forces out of
Kosovo province last year.
Senior U.S. officials have held a number of meetings
with the disparate groups that oppose Milosevic, but
have been frustrated in their attempts to help forge a
united front.
Albright is due to discuss the issue with NATO allies
and with Balkan countries surrounding Serbia when she
attends a meeting of alliance foreign ministers in
Florence next Wednesday and Thursday.
BOLSHEVIK-STYLE OPPRESSION
The State Department on Wednesday condemned the
overnight occupation of the main independent
television station as an act of "desperate
Bolshevik-style oppression.''
It said Washington was adding six judges and
prosecutors linked with the crackdown to its list of
those barred from getting U.S. visas, as well as the
families of several unnamed top government officials.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told a news
briefing Washington would encourage its European
allies to join in this action and said Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright would discuss these and other
"joint actions'' during a NATO meeting in Florence
next week.
Albright said Friday that she had discussed the issue
with Gama, and said European countries "will be
considering this step.''
The U.S. list includes 808 names, not including the
six names due to be added, and is very similar to the
EU list, U.S. officials said.
In Belgrade around 2,000 opposition supporters
gathered on Friday for a third day of protests against
the government's seizure of the television station,
Studio B, but the turnout looked much smaller than
during the previous two nights.
On Thursday, hundreds of riot police broke up a rally
of around 10,000 at the same place, firing tear gas
and using batons. Several people were injured in the
clashes.
The opposition has accused the leftist-nationalist
authorities of leading the Balkan country into a state
of emergency and open dictatorship by seizing the
station.
===
STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG
Dear friends,
As the attack on Serbs and others continues in Kosovo and the US tries
to
assemble the forces to crush Serbia, it is very important to understand
just
how people like Richard Gelbard, formerly special Envoy to the Balkans,
view
the Serbian "Opposition." This is spelled out in detail in the text of
the
July 29, 1999 Senate hearings, supposedly concerning democratization of
Serbia. The text is most revealing. In it these officials state
plainly
that they view a CONTYROLLED opposition as a key part of their arsenal
of
weapons against Serbia. I have divided it into two emails, which follow.
Best regards,
Jared Israel
JULY 29, 1999, THURSDAY
HEARING OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
"PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA"
WITNESSES: ROBERT GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS
JAMES PARDEW, JR., DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY
OF
STATE FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION
CHAIRED BY SENATOR GORDON SMITH (R-OR)
SEN. G. SMITH: (Sounds gavel.) Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I
apologize for our late beginning, but we are voting a lot today. But we
adjourn (sic) this Subcommittee on European Affairs to discuss the
prospects
for democracy in Yugoslavia and what the United States can do to assist
those
in Serbia who seek to oust the dictatorial regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
Our first panel consists of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, special
representative
of the president and the secretary of State for implementation of the
Dayton
peace accords, and Ambassador James Pardew, deputy special advisor to
the
president the secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton implementation.
After we hear from administration representatives, the committee will
welcome
Ms. Sonja Biserko -- I apologize if my pronunciation is incorrect --
chairperson of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; Mr.
James
Hooper, executive director of the Balkan Action Council [Hooper has been
adviser to the KLA]; Father Irinej Dobrijevic, executive director of the
Office of External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church here in the
United
States; Mr. John Fox, director of the Washington office at the Open
Society
Institute. [Soros group]
This hearing, by the way, will be the first in a series for this
committee on
United States policy in the Balkans. This afternoon we're going to focus
specifically on what is happening in Serbia right now as opposition
parties
are rallying their supporters to take to the streets against Milosevic,
as
army reservists are launching protests after their return from Kosovo,
as the
Serbian Orthodox Church has at least spoken out in favor of replacing
the
regime for the good of the Serbian people. In the fall, we will examine
the
course of political and diplomatic events that led to the NATO bombing
in
Kosovo, as well as the lessons the United States and our NATO allies can
learn from the manner in which the war was waged. This has enormous
implications for NATO and its future. In addition, I'm pleased that
Senator
Rod Grams will convene a hearing in September to look into the response
of
UNHCR to the Kosovo- Albanian refugee crisis. I agree with Senator Grams
that
assessing the performance, both positive and negative, of UNHCR can be
useful, if and when we are faced with another refugee explosion in the
future.
I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses today to appear before
the
committee to share their thoughts and expertise on the prospects for
democracy in Yugoslavia.
We have an opportunity in Yugoslavia that we must not let pass.
Milosevic has been weakened by the Serbian defeat in Kosovo. And I feel
that
for the first time, many average citizens of Yugoslavia have finally
decided
that they've had enough as well of his policies of repression and
destruction.
He is now vulnerable. But as we all know, he has managed to be in
vulnerable
positions before, always managing to outmaneuver his opponents. He seems
to
be able to divide and conquer that way.
Now that he has been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, I can only
imagine
that his desperation to hang on to power has intensified. Since the end
of
the war in Kosovo, opposition leaders in Serbia have launched
demonstrations
throughout the country. But thus far they have been unable to coordinate
their message or their actions to reach out to a broader segment of the
population.
If these opposition forces have any hope of ousting Mr. Milosevic, it
seems
obvious to me that they must put aside personal differences and
political
ambition and for the sake of their country work together.
Ambassador Gelbard, I know that you have been working very hard on this
issue. And I hope that in your comments you can offer me and other
members
who will join us some hope that we're moving in the right direction.
Furthermore, there are several other actors in this process: Montenegran
President Milo Djukanovic, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the student
movement
which was so active in the 1996-97 demonstrations, and organizations
like the
independent media and trade unions. I'm interested in exploring what
role
they can play in bringing about democratic change for Serbia.
I note that just yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Serbian Democratization Act, legislation that was introduced by Senator
Helms
in March that I co-sponsored along with 11 other senators. Specifically,
the
legislation authorizes $100 million in democratic assistance to Serbia
over
the course of the next two years. This is critically important. We must
help
those who are trying to establish democracy in their country. I'm
pleased
that the administration agrees with this approach, and I understand that
tomorrow in Sarajevo the president will announce that the United States
will
dedicate $10 million for this purpose.
I encourage the administration to quickly identify appropriate
organizations
in Serbia so that this money can begin to have an effect as soon as
possible.
Milosevic must get this message: his days in power are over.
I believe we will soon be joined by Senator Biden and other members, but
without delay we will turn to you, Ambassador Gelbard, and we well
welcome
you and look forward to your remarks.
MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you particularly for giving
me
the opportunity once again to appear before the committee to discuss the
status of our efforts on democratization in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. With your permission, sir, I'd like to enter the full text
of
this statement for the record,
SEN. G. SMITH: Without objection, we'll receive that.
MR. GELBARD: This hearing comes at a moment of particular importance for
the
future of Yugoslavia and for the entire Southeast European region. The
success of the NATO air campaign, the deployment of KFOR, and the
establishment of the U.N. civil administration in Kosovo have left
President
Slobodan Milosevic weakened and his policies discredited domestically,
as
well as internationally.
Milosevic, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is now an international pariah and
an
indicted war criminal. While he and his regime remain in power in
Belgrade,
Serbia and the FRY cannot take their place among the community of
nations,
nor can they join the process of Euro- Atlantic integration symbolized
tomorrow by the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo.
Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly articulated by
President Clinton. As long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the
United
States will provide no reconstruction assistance to Serbia and we will
continue our policy of overall isolation. Although we continue to
provide the
people of Serbia with humanitarian assistance through international
organizations like UNHCR, we cannot allow Milosevic or his political
cronies
to benefit from our aid. Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges
would
funnel money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends,
prolonging the current regime and denying
Serbia any hope of a brighter future. We must keep Milosevic isolated.
Our European allies agree fully with this approach. We are working
closely
with them to coordinate our activities on Serbia and to deter any
attempt at
weakening the existing sanctions regime against the FRY.
Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support the forces of
democratic change that exist within Serbian society. Serbia's citizens
have
spontaneously demonstrated their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger
for
democratic government by gathering in the streets of cities throughout
the
country for the last several weeks. Opposition parties, taking advantage
of
the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have organized their own
rallies and
are beginning to mobilize for a larger effort in the fall. Serbia's
independent media are also attempting to struggle out from under the
weight
of a draconian and repressive media law. These are all very positive
signs,
and we want to nurture them.
At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize the
possibility
that the Milosevic regime will fall soon. Milosevic continues to hold
the
main levers of power in his hands, most importantly the army, the police
and
the state-owned media. Overcoming these obstacles would be difficult
even for
a united opposition in Serbia, but sadly the Serbian opposition remains
far
from united.
In all our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders -- and I am in
regular
contact with every segment of the democratic opposition -- we have urged
them
to overcome the politics of ego and to work together instead for the
common
good of Serbia and their people. I have repeatedly told opposition
leaders --
and I want to emphasize here that the United States, and the
international
community more broadly, cannot do their job for them.
Change in Serbia must come from within, not from the outside, which
means
from us. We can buttress the opposition's efforts; we can provide
training
and technical assistance to opposition parties; we can even provide
equipment, and we can help widen the reach of the independent media, but
we
cannot win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people. That can only
happen
if the opposition unites around a strong platform for positive change, a
platform that must emphasize the destructive nature of Milosevic's
policies
and presents a viable democratic alternative. It's not for us to pick a
single winner out of the opposition pack. It is for them to combine
their
different strengths in service for a great goal.
Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we are focusing
our
efforts and in what ways we are promoting democratization in the FRY.
Regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the very short term,
our
support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia's and
Yugoslavia's
future.
I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from ground zero by
any
means here. In the two years leading up to the Kosovo crisis, we spent
$16.5
million on programs in support of Serbia democratization. The beginning
of
the conflict in Kosovo and the subsequent closure of our embassy in
Belgrade
by necessity cut short some of our programs, but we're now revitalizing
our
democracy support as quickly as possible.
I would divide the U.S. government's efforts on Serbia democratization
into
five categories. First, as I noted at the beginning, we are making sure
that
Milosevic remains completely isolated. This involves not just our
sanctions
policy, which means three levels of sanctions, starting with the outer
wall,
the Kosovo- related sanctions started a year and a half ago, and then
the
wartime sanctions, including the fuel embargo, but also the visa ban,
which
has had a demonstrably negative effect on members of the Milosevic
regime
psychologically and in real terms, and, of course, the The Hague
Tribunal
indictments.
Second, we are beginning to assist a wide array of democratic groups,
including NGOs, political parties, independent media, youth
organizations and
independent labor unions, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. Third, we are
consulting closely with European allies in order to coordinate our
activities
both on Kosovo and on Serbia democratization generally. Fourth, we are
encouraging the active engagement of regional countries in Southeast
Europe,
and particularly the neighbors, to harness their expertise with
democratization and transition. And fifth, we're providing strong
support for
the reform government in the FRY Republic of Montenegro.
I would like to discuss briefly some of these tracks in greater detail.
As I
mentioned, over the past two years U.S. agencies such as AID, as well as
NGOs
such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican
Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy have spent $16.5
million
on projects aimed at the development of democratic governance and civil
society in the FRY. The situation this year was complicated by the
outbreak
of the conflict in Kosovo, but we still have money available in the
pipeline
for immediate use on Serbian democratization projects, and we're using
it
right now.
I am working closely with the National Endowment family, including IRI
and
NDI, to explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and,
crucially,
to encourage all opposition groups to work together. The consensus among
the
experts is that opposition parties will be best served if we provide
them
with technical assistance and first-class political advice, the kinds
that
may seem commonplace to us but represent a whole different way of
thinking to
them.
Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition in Serbia.
Youth
and student organizations, as well as independent labor unions, were
very
active in the '96-97 demonstrations in Serbia, and will undoubtedly be
important sources of mobilization in the future. The AFL-CIO's
Solidarity
Center has done good work with independent unions in Serbia and with our
support is now readying a new program for interaction.
On a larger economic scale, the Center for International Private
Enterprise
is preparing a program aimed at business leaders and independent
economists
in Serbia. Such economists, particularly those grouped under the G-17 in
Belgrade, are widely respected and influential in Serbian society.
In short, by working with these groups, we want to show the people of
Serbia
that our policy is not aimed against them but against their leadership.
With
regard to independent media, we are moving on two fronts. First, in
order to
increase the amount of objective news coverage reaching the Serbian
population, we are nearing completion of what we call the ring around
Serbia,
a network of transmitters that permits us to broadcast Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, and other international news programs on FM
frequencies
throughout the country. RFE has now increased its Serbian language
broadcasting to 13-1/2 hours daily.
Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia's own
independent media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer to get their news from
their
own sources, in their own context. To this end, AID, together with other
international donors, is reviewing a proposal by ANEM, the independent
electronic media network in Serbia, that would assist individual
television
and radio stations, as well as create new links among them.
Other programs to train journalists, support local print publications,
and
utilize Internet connections are also under consideration.
Overall, Mr. Chairman, I would add, as you know, that the administration
does
support the Serbian Democratization Act sponsored by Senator Helms and
you,
Mr. Chairman, and 11 others.
The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I'd like to highlight is
our
cooperation with the Europeans. The NATO alliance proved its strength
during
the Kosovo air campaign, and that solidarity has continued to be the
rule,
not the exception, in the post-conflict period. There are regular
consultations between Secretary Albright and her European colleagues on
issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia as well as periodic meetings at
the
expert level. The Western Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia
and
agree that isolating
Milosevic must be the cornerstone of our strategy.
We have pushed back on some efforts to lift selectively the oil embargo
and
provide fuel to opposition-controlled municipalities in Serbia, not
because
we object to helping opposition-run municipalities, but because oil is a
fungible commodity. And its distribution in Serbia would inevitably
benefit
Milosevic's regime. The Europeans, like us, are seeking the best ways to
promote democracy in Serbia. They are eager to coordinate their
democratization projects as well as to ensure that we are all sending
the
same message of unity to the Serbian opposition.
The third pillar of our policy is the effort to engage the countries of
Southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization process. Leaders of these
countries will meet together with Euro-Atlantic leaders tomorrow in
Sarajevo
under the rubric of the new stability pact for the region. At that
meeting
participants will reaffirm their commitment to democratic development
and
express their regret that the FRY cannot take its rightful place at the
summit because of the Milosevic regime.
We believe the countries of Central and Southeast Europe with their vast
experience in the transition to democratic and market- oriented
societies
have a great deal to offer the people of the FRY. We are encouraging
NGOs and
governments in the region to create links to democratic voices in Serbia
and
to share the benefits of the wisdom they've gained over the past decade.
Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional partners, we
assign
special importance to our cooperation with and support for the
government of
Montenegro.
This morning, I noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal accusing
the
United States of neglecting Montenegro, which I find astonishing in its
absolute incorrectness and the fact that it's totally wrong. We weren't
consulted on that editorial, of course. The fact is that over two years
ago
we recognized that Milo Djukanovic had the potential to become an
effective
counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian policies. I began
meeting
with Djukanovic regularly, even before he became the president of
Montenegro
a year and a half ago. I was with him during his inauguration when we
felt
that a strong international presence, a public presence, would deter a
Milosevic-inspired coup. The U.S. provided $20 million in budgetary
support
over the last several months, when no other countries stepped in to fill
the
gap, and we're prepared to do more.
We established a joint economic working group to discuss ways of
modernizing
the Montenegrin economy. We allowed Montenegrin-owned ships to enter
U.S.
ports during the conflict, and we provided a blanket waiver for
Montenegro
from FRY-related sanctions from the very beginning as a way of
stimulating
their economy.
Djukanovic has managed to craft a multi-ethnic democratic coalition
government that focused on political and economic reform and integration
with
the European mainstream. He and his government have consistently
demonstrated
courage and determination in implementing reform and in resisting
Belgrade's
attempts to strip Montenegro of its constitutional powers. As a result,
we
have steadily increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial
and
technical assistance as well as humanitarian assistance, with many
millions
of dollars through UNHCR.
Because the government of Montenegro represents the most credible and
powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we believe that President
Djukanovic and Montenegro can play a constructive role in promoting
democratic change in Serbia, too. While it's too small to change Serbia
directly, it can serve as a guiding light for the Serbian opposition.
What
Montenegro needs now is support from their European neighbors in
concrete
terms and particularly the same kind of sanctions waivers that we have
provided all along. We've urged the Europeans to take a more
forward-leaning
approach to Montenegro and come through in concrete terms.
Mr. Chairman, it's clear that we have not reached the point where we can
say
that Serbia is irreversibly on the road to democracy. Our efforts now,
however, can do two things. In the short term, we can help the
indigenous
Serbian opposition to focus their energies and more effectively
articulate
their anger and frustration of the Serbian public. In the longer term,
we can
cultivate and strengthen these forces that will carry the democracy
banner as
long as Milosevic remains in power. Both of these are important goals.
U.S.
leadership in this endeavor is critical, and your support is essential.
As I said, the proposed Serbian Democratization Act, which would
authorize
$100 million over two years for democratization projects, is an
excellent
example of the convergence of administration and congressional
perspectives
on the Serbia democracy issue. We look forward to working together with
Congress to bring democracy to Serbia and the entire Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and restore real stability to the region......
[continued, following email]
--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------
Terza parte:
IL SOSTEGNO U.S.A. AI PARTITI ED AI MEDIA REAZIONARI
1. Interferenze esplicite del Dipartimento di Stato (Reuters 20/5/00)
2. Dibattito al Senato USA sull'appoggio alla "opposizione"
(29/7/99 - prima parte)
===
Europe, U.S. Back Further Protests Against Milosevic
4.01 a.m. ET (812 GMT) May 20, 2000
WASHINGTON (Reuters) — The United States and Europe
are coordinating initiatives to encourage strong
opposition among the Serb people to President Slobodan
Milosevic, top U.S. and European officials said.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Jaime Gama,
foreign minister of Portugal which holds the European
Union presidency, told reporters they were encouraged
by public protests against Milosevic, who this week
cracked down on the independent media.
In a meeting here to prepare for next month's EU-U.S.
summit in Lisbon, Albright said they discussed ways to
"increase our support for the courageous men and women
who are demanding their rights in the cities and towns
across Serbia.'' Gama said the EU was focusing its
cooperation with Yugoslavia on "the civil society,
independent media, opposition municipalities, thus
creating conditions for a strong opposition coming
into the streets and expressing the will of the
people.''
He added: "And that's happening these last recent
months, and that's a very effective symbol of a
concrete hope for that country.''
The United States has helped coordinate the opposition
to Milosevic, condemning him for fomenting a series of
wars in former Yugoslavia culminating in NATO's air
campaign that drove marauding Serbian forces out of
Kosovo province last year.
Senior U.S. officials have held a number of meetings
with the disparate groups that oppose Milosevic, but
have been frustrated in their attempts to help forge a
united front.
Albright is due to discuss the issue with NATO allies
and with Balkan countries surrounding Serbia when she
attends a meeting of alliance foreign ministers in
Florence next Wednesday and Thursday.
BOLSHEVIK-STYLE OPPRESSION
The State Department on Wednesday condemned the
overnight occupation of the main independent
television station as an act of "desperate
Bolshevik-style oppression.''
It said Washington was adding six judges and
prosecutors linked with the crackdown to its list of
those barred from getting U.S. visas, as well as the
families of several unnamed top government officials.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told a news
briefing Washington would encourage its European
allies to join in this action and said Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright would discuss these and other
"joint actions'' during a NATO meeting in Florence
next week.
Albright said Friday that she had discussed the issue
with Gama, and said European countries "will be
considering this step.''
The U.S. list includes 808 names, not including the
six names due to be added, and is very similar to the
EU list, U.S. officials said.
In Belgrade around 2,000 opposition supporters
gathered on Friday for a third day of protests against
the government's seizure of the television station,
Studio B, but the turnout looked much smaller than
during the previous two nights.
On Thursday, hundreds of riot police broke up a rally
of around 10,000 at the same place, firing tear gas
and using batons. Several people were injured in the
clashes.
The opposition has accused the leftist-nationalist
authorities of leading the Balkan country into a state
of emergency and open dictatorship by seizing the
station.
===
STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG
Dear friends,
As the attack on Serbs and others continues in Kosovo and the US tries
to
assemble the forces to crush Serbia, it is very important to understand
just
how people like Richard Gelbard, formerly special Envoy to the Balkans,
view
the Serbian "Opposition." This is spelled out in detail in the text of
the
July 29, 1999 Senate hearings, supposedly concerning democratization of
Serbia. The text is most revealing. In it these officials state
plainly
that they view a CONTYROLLED opposition as a key part of their arsenal
of
weapons against Serbia. I have divided it into two emails, which follow.
Best regards,
Jared Israel
JULY 29, 1999, THURSDAY
HEARING OF THE EUROPEAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS
COMMITTEE
"PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN YUGOSLAVIA"
WITNESSES: ROBERT GELBARD, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DAYTON PEACE ACCORDS
JAMES PARDEW, JR., DEPUTY SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY
OF
STATE FOR KOSOVO AND DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION
CHAIRED BY SENATOR GORDON SMITH (R-OR)
SEN. G. SMITH: (Sounds gavel.) Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I
apologize for our late beginning, but we are voting a lot today. But we
adjourn (sic) this Subcommittee on European Affairs to discuss the
prospects
for democracy in Yugoslavia and what the United States can do to assist
those
in Serbia who seek to oust the dictatorial regime of Slobodan Milosevic.
Our first panel consists of Ambassador Robert Gelbard, special
representative
of the president and the secretary of State for implementation of the
Dayton
peace accords, and Ambassador James Pardew, deputy special advisor to
the
president the secretary of State for Kosovo and Dayton implementation.
After we hear from administration representatives, the committee will
welcome
Ms. Sonja Biserko -- I apologize if my pronunciation is incorrect --
chairperson of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia; Mr.
James
Hooper, executive director of the Balkan Action Council [Hooper has been
adviser to the KLA]; Father Irinej Dobrijevic, executive director of the
Office of External Affairs of the Serbian Orthodox Church here in the
United
States; Mr. John Fox, director of the Washington office at the Open
Society
Institute. [Soros group]
This hearing, by the way, will be the first in a series for this
committee on
United States policy in the Balkans. This afternoon we're going to focus
specifically on what is happening in Serbia right now as opposition
parties
are rallying their supporters to take to the streets against Milosevic,
as
army reservists are launching protests after their return from Kosovo,
as the
Serbian Orthodox Church has at least spoken out in favor of replacing
the
regime for the good of the Serbian people. In the fall, we will examine
the
course of political and diplomatic events that led to the NATO bombing
in
Kosovo, as well as the lessons the United States and our NATO allies can
learn from the manner in which the war was waged. This has enormous
implications for NATO and its future. In addition, I'm pleased that
Senator
Rod Grams will convene a hearing in September to look into the response
of
UNHCR to the Kosovo- Albanian refugee crisis. I agree with Senator Grams
that
assessing the performance, both positive and negative, of UNHCR can be
useful, if and when we are faced with another refugee explosion in the
future.
I appreciate the willingness of all our witnesses today to appear before
the
committee to share their thoughts and expertise on the prospects for
democracy in Yugoslavia.
We have an opportunity in Yugoslavia that we must not let pass.
Milosevic has been weakened by the Serbian defeat in Kosovo. And I feel
that
for the first time, many average citizens of Yugoslavia have finally
decided
that they've had enough as well of his policies of repression and
destruction.
He is now vulnerable. But as we all know, he has managed to be in
vulnerable
positions before, always managing to outmaneuver his opponents. He seems
to
be able to divide and conquer that way.
Now that he has been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal, I can only
imagine
that his desperation to hang on to power has intensified. Since the end
of
the war in Kosovo, opposition leaders in Serbia have launched
demonstrations
throughout the country. But thus far they have been unable to coordinate
their message or their actions to reach out to a broader segment of the
population.
If these opposition forces have any hope of ousting Mr. Milosevic, it
seems
obvious to me that they must put aside personal differences and
political
ambition and for the sake of their country work together.
Ambassador Gelbard, I know that you have been working very hard on this
issue. And I hope that in your comments you can offer me and other
members
who will join us some hope that we're moving in the right direction.
Furthermore, there are several other actors in this process: Montenegran
President Milo Djukanovic, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the student
movement
which was so active in the 1996-97 demonstrations, and organizations
like the
independent media and trade unions. I'm interested in exploring what
role
they can play in bringing about democratic change for Serbia.
I note that just yesterday the Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Serbian Democratization Act, legislation that was introduced by Senator
Helms
in March that I co-sponsored along with 11 other senators. Specifically,
the
legislation authorizes $100 million in democratic assistance to Serbia
over
the course of the next two years. This is critically important. We must
help
those who are trying to establish democracy in their country. I'm
pleased
that the administration agrees with this approach, and I understand that
tomorrow in Sarajevo the president will announce that the United States
will
dedicate $10 million for this purpose.
I encourage the administration to quickly identify appropriate
organizations
in Serbia so that this money can begin to have an effect as soon as
possible.
Milosevic must get this message: his days in power are over.
I believe we will soon be joined by Senator Biden and other members, but
without delay we will turn to you, Ambassador Gelbard, and we well
welcome
you and look forward to your remarks.
MR. GELBARD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you particularly for giving
me
the opportunity once again to appear before the committee to discuss the
status of our efforts on democratization in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. With your permission, sir, I'd like to enter the full text
of
this statement for the record,
SEN. G. SMITH: Without objection, we'll receive that.
MR. GELBARD: This hearing comes at a moment of particular importance for
the
future of Yugoslavia and for the entire Southeast European region. The
success of the NATO air campaign, the deployment of KFOR, and the
establishment of the U.N. civil administration in Kosovo have left
President
Slobodan Milosevic weakened and his policies discredited domestically,
as
well as internationally.
Milosevic, as you said, Mr. Chairman, is now an international pariah and
an
indicted war criminal. While he and his regime remain in power in
Belgrade,
Serbia and the FRY cannot take their place among the community of
nations,
nor can they join the process of Euro- Atlantic integration symbolized
tomorrow by the Stability Pact summit in Sarajevo.
Our policy with regard to Serbia has been very clearly articulated by
President Clinton. As long as the Milosevic regime is in place, the
United
States will provide no reconstruction assistance to Serbia and we will
continue our policy of overall isolation. Although we continue to
provide the
people of Serbia with humanitarian assistance through international
organizations like UNHCR, we cannot allow Milosevic or his political
cronies
to benefit from our aid. Helping to rebuild Serbia's roads and bridges
would
funnel money directly into the pockets of Milosevic and his friends,
prolonging the current regime and denying
Serbia any hope of a brighter future. We must keep Milosevic isolated.
Our European allies agree fully with this approach. We are working
closely
with them to coordinate our activities on Serbia and to deter any
attempt at
weakening the existing sanctions regime against the FRY.
Another key aspect of our policy on Serbia is to support the forces of
democratic change that exist within Serbian society. Serbia's citizens
have
spontaneously demonstrated their disgust for Milosevic and their hunger
for
democratic government by gathering in the streets of cities throughout
the
country for the last several weeks. Opposition parties, taking advantage
of
the popular sentiment against Milosevic, have organized their own
rallies and
are beginning to mobilize for a larger effort in the fall. Serbia's
independent media are also attempting to struggle out from under the
weight
of a draconian and repressive media law. These are all very positive
signs,
and we want to nurture them.
At the same time, however, I do not want to overemphasize the
possibility
that the Milosevic regime will fall soon. Milosevic continues to hold
the
main levers of power in his hands, most importantly the army, the police
and
the state-owned media. Overcoming these obstacles would be difficult
even for
a united opposition in Serbia, but sadly the Serbian opposition remains
far
from united.
In all our dealings with Serbian opposition leaders -- and I am in
regular
contact with every segment of the democratic opposition -- we have urged
them
to overcome the politics of ego and to work together instead for the
common
good of Serbia and their people. I have repeatedly told opposition
leaders --
and I want to emphasize here that the United States, and the
international
community more broadly, cannot do their job for them.
Change in Serbia must come from within, not from the outside, which
means
from us. We can buttress the opposition's efforts; we can provide
training
and technical assistance to opposition parties; we can even provide
equipment, and we can help widen the reach of the independent media, but
we
cannot win the hearts and minds of the Serbian people. That can only
happen
if the opposition unites around a strong platform for positive change, a
platform that must emphasize the destructive nature of Milosevic's
policies
and presents a viable democratic alternative. It's not for us to pick a
single winner out of the opposition pack. It is for them to combine
their
different strengths in service for a great goal.
Having said that, I would like to outline for you where we are focusing
our
efforts and in what ways we are promoting democratization in the FRY.
Regardless of whether Milosevic stays or goes in the very short term,
our
support for democratic forces is an investment in Serbia's and
Yugoslavia's
future.
I should note, in fact, that we are not beginning from ground zero by
any
means here. In the two years leading up to the Kosovo crisis, we spent
$16.5
million on programs in support of Serbia democratization. The beginning
of
the conflict in Kosovo and the subsequent closure of our embassy in
Belgrade
by necessity cut short some of our programs, but we're now revitalizing
our
democracy support as quickly as possible.
I would divide the U.S. government's efforts on Serbia democratization
into
five categories. First, as I noted at the beginning, we are making sure
that
Milosevic remains completely isolated. This involves not just our
sanctions
policy, which means three levels of sanctions, starting with the outer
wall,
the Kosovo- related sanctions started a year and a half ago, and then
the
wartime sanctions, including the fuel embargo, but also the visa ban,
which
has had a demonstrably negative effect on members of the Milosevic
regime
psychologically and in real terms, and, of course, the The Hague
Tribunal
indictments.
Second, we are beginning to assist a wide array of democratic groups,
including NGOs, political parties, independent media, youth
organizations and
independent labor unions, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. Third, we are
consulting closely with European allies in order to coordinate our
activities
both on Kosovo and on Serbia democratization generally. Fourth, we are
encouraging the active engagement of regional countries in Southeast
Europe,
and particularly the neighbors, to harness their expertise with
democratization and transition. And fifth, we're providing strong
support for
the reform government in the FRY Republic of Montenegro.
I would like to discuss briefly some of these tracks in greater detail.
As I
mentioned, over the past two years U.S. agencies such as AID, as well as
NGOs
such as the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican
Institute and the National Endowment for Democracy have spent $16.5
million
on projects aimed at the development of democratic governance and civil
society in the FRY. The situation this year was complicated by the
outbreak
of the conflict in Kosovo, but we still have money available in the
pipeline
for immediate use on Serbian democratization projects, and we're using
it
right now.
I am working closely with the National Endowment family, including IRI
and
NDI, to explore the best ways to help the Serbian opposition and,
crucially,
to encourage all opposition groups to work together. The consensus among
the
experts is that opposition parties will be best served if we provide
them
with technical assistance and first-class political advice, the kinds
that
may seem commonplace to us but represent a whole different way of
thinking to
them.
Political parties are not the sole outlets for opposition in Serbia.
Youth
and student organizations, as well as independent labor unions, were
very
active in the '96-97 demonstrations in Serbia, and will undoubtedly be
important sources of mobilization in the future. The AFL-CIO's
Solidarity
Center has done good work with independent unions in Serbia and with our
support is now readying a new program for interaction.
On a larger economic scale, the Center for International Private
Enterprise
is preparing a program aimed at business leaders and independent
economists
in Serbia. Such economists, particularly those grouped under the G-17 in
Belgrade, are widely respected and influential in Serbian society.
In short, by working with these groups, we want to show the people of
Serbia
that our policy is not aimed against them but against their leadership.
With
regard to independent media, we are moving on two fronts. First, in
order to
increase the amount of objective news coverage reaching the Serbian
population, we are nearing completion of what we call the ring around
Serbia,
a network of transmitters that permits us to broadcast Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe, and other international news programs on FM
frequencies
throughout the country. RFE has now increased its Serbian language
broadcasting to 13-1/2 hours daily.
Perhaps even more important, however, we want to strengthen Serbia's own
independent media. Serbs, like Americans, prefer to get their news from
their
own sources, in their own context. To this end, AID, together with other
international donors, is reviewing a proposal by ANEM, the independent
electronic media network in Serbia, that would assist individual
television
and radio stations, as well as create new links among them.
Other programs to train journalists, support local print publications,
and
utilize Internet connections are also under consideration.
Overall, Mr. Chairman, I would add, as you know, that the administration
does
support the Serbian Democratization Act sponsored by Senator Helms and
you,
Mr. Chairman, and 11 others.
The second aspect of U.S. policy on Serbia that I'd like to highlight is
our
cooperation with the Europeans. The NATO alliance proved its strength
during
the Kosovo air campaign, and that solidarity has continued to be the
rule,
not the exception, in the post-conflict period. There are regular
consultations between Secretary Albright and her European colleagues on
issues related to both Kosovo and Serbia as well as periodic meetings at
the
expert level. The Western Europeans support our basic approach on Serbia
and
agree that isolating
Milosevic must be the cornerstone of our strategy.
We have pushed back on some efforts to lift selectively the oil embargo
and
provide fuel to opposition-controlled municipalities in Serbia, not
because
we object to helping opposition-run municipalities, but because oil is a
fungible commodity. And its distribution in Serbia would inevitably
benefit
Milosevic's regime. The Europeans, like us, are seeking the best ways to
promote democracy in Serbia. They are eager to coordinate their
democratization projects as well as to ensure that we are all sending
the
same message of unity to the Serbian opposition.
The third pillar of our policy is the effort to engage the countries of
Southeast Europe in the Serbia democratization process. Leaders of these
countries will meet together with Euro-Atlantic leaders tomorrow in
Sarajevo
under the rubric of the new stability pact for the region. At that
meeting
participants will reaffirm their commitment to democratic development
and
express their regret that the FRY cannot take its rightful place at the
summit because of the Milosevic regime.
We believe the countries of Central and Southeast Europe with their vast
experience in the transition to democratic and market- oriented
societies
have a great deal to offer the people of the FRY. We are encouraging
NGOs and
governments in the region to create links to democratic voices in Serbia
and
to share the benefits of the wisdom they've gained over the past decade.
Finally, in addition to our efforts to work with regional partners, we
assign
special importance to our cooperation with and support for the
government of
Montenegro.
This morning, I noticed an editorial in the Wall Street Journal accusing
the
United States of neglecting Montenegro, which I find astonishing in its
absolute incorrectness and the fact that it's totally wrong. We weren't
consulted on that editorial, of course. The fact is that over two years
ago
we recognized that Milo Djukanovic had the potential to become an
effective
counterweight to Milosevic and his authoritarian policies. I began
meeting
with Djukanovic regularly, even before he became the president of
Montenegro
a year and a half ago. I was with him during his inauguration when we
felt
that a strong international presence, a public presence, would deter a
Milosevic-inspired coup. The U.S. provided $20 million in budgetary
support
over the last several months, when no other countries stepped in to fill
the
gap, and we're prepared to do more.
We established a joint economic working group to discuss ways of
modernizing
the Montenegrin economy. We allowed Montenegrin-owned ships to enter
U.S.
ports during the conflict, and we provided a blanket waiver for
Montenegro
from FRY-related sanctions from the very beginning as a way of
stimulating
their economy.
Djukanovic has managed to craft a multi-ethnic democratic coalition
government that focused on political and economic reform and integration
with
the European mainstream. He and his government have consistently
demonstrated
courage and determination in implementing reform and in resisting
Belgrade's
attempts to strip Montenegro of its constitutional powers. As a result,
we
have steadily increased our support for Montenegro, providing financial
and
technical assistance as well as humanitarian assistance, with many
millions
of dollars through UNHCR.
Because the government of Montenegro represents the most credible and
powerful opposition force in the FRY today, we believe that President
Djukanovic and Montenegro can play a constructive role in promoting
democratic change in Serbia, too. While it's too small to change Serbia
directly, it can serve as a guiding light for the Serbian opposition.
What
Montenegro needs now is support from their European neighbors in
concrete
terms and particularly the same kind of sanctions waivers that we have
provided all along. We've urged the Europeans to take a more
forward-leaning
approach to Montenegro and come through in concrete terms.
Mr. Chairman, it's clear that we have not reached the point where we can
say
that Serbia is irreversibly on the road to democracy. Our efforts now,
however, can do two things. In the short term, we can help the
indigenous
Serbian opposition to focus their energies and more effectively
articulate
their anger and frustration of the Serbian public. In the longer term,
we can
cultivate and strengthen these forces that will carry the democracy
banner as
long as Milosevic remains in power. Both of these are important goals.
U.S.
leadership in this endeavor is critical, and your support is essential.
As I said, the proposed Serbian Democratization Act, which would
authorize
$100 million over two years for democratization projects, is an
excellent
example of the convergence of administration and congressional
perspectives
on the Serbia democracy issue. We look forward to working together with
Congress to bring democracy to Serbia and the entire Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and restore real stability to the region......
[continued, following email]
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