http://www.counterpunch.org/schutz06052004.html
COUNTERPUNCH
Weekend Edition
June 5 / 6, 2004
On the Ruins of Yugoslavia
The Militarism of German Foreign Policy and the Dismantling of a
State
By CATHRIN SCHÜTZ
In the shadow of new wars, the memory of the aggression against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is more and more fading into
oblivion. Those who hoped for an inquiry about this first war in
which the Federal Republic of Germany militarily participated are
faced with silence. In Germany as in other countries, the
US-American filmmaker and author Michael Moore, who takes a stand
against Bush's belligerent policy in Iraq and who supported
General Wesley Clark in his Presidential pre-election campaign,
is highly celebrated. Clark, who in his function as NATO's
Supreme Commander in Europe led the bombing of Yugoslavia, was
the "anti-War Candidate", as Moore told his leftist audience.
"Collateral damage," including the bombing of civilians in
Varvarin, bodies mutilated by cluster bombs in Nis, employees
killed in the bombing of the RTS television station and the
Chinese embassy, as well as the "humanitarian" military
intervention as such, faced little opposition in the NATO
countries -- with the exception of Greece. Even the "left" walked
into the human-rights trap and supported -- although not
unanimously -- the attack on the "Belgrade regime".
This first direct participation of Germany in an illegal war of
aggression after World War II fundamentally changed German
foreign policy: since then (and not since 9/11), wars are seen as
a legitimate means of politics. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
himself admitted to being surprised by "how little it has been
recognized that the decision for war meant a fundamental change
in Germany's foreign and security policy."
The German Army, the Bundeswehr, has been transformed into a
global intervention force in order to defend Germany even at the
Hindukush, as Minister of Defence Peter Struck outlined in his
Defence Policy Rules. "This is not about unduly giving room to
military logic, but not to put this aspect of foreign politics
under a taboo, as it was done for so long", Schröder said in late
2001.
The first steps in this direction were already undertaken by the
then-governing Christian Democrats, CDU/CSU, in their 1992
Defense Rules. In the period prior to the "humanitarian" war
against Yugoslavia they had yet to acquaint the public with what
those really meant.
"I just think it is wrong to connect the moral too quickly with
questions of war and peace without taking the aspect of national
interest into considertaion. () For the future I predict a
considerable danger that the government, the ruling parties and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff will search for or create causes to
eliminate the barriers which are still in the way of a reunified
German foreign policy. Humanitarian issues serve as a
vehicle."(1) "(German) military operations must not take place
where German troops carried out their devastating actions in
World War II. I would be glad, if those who advocate it would not
always hide behind human rights to enforce this position", stated
Joseph Fischer -- in 1994.(2)
Since the NATO war of 1999 for him these principles belong to the
past. He clarified that he is not carrying out "Green" foreign
policy but "German".(3) The war against Yugoslavia opened the
door for following and future wars. The bombs were still falling
on Yugoslavia when NATO passed its new strategic concept, which
proclaimed its right to engage in offensive "out-of-area"
operations. While breaches of international law were part of a
public debate during the aggression on Yugoslavia and had to be
hidden under a humanitarian carpet, legal aspects seem to count
less and less in the continuing "War on Terror".
Germany didn't "slip into" the war
To understand developments in German foreign policy, one should
not confine the view to the military peak of the aggression
against Yugoslavia in 1999, in which Germany - according to
General ret. Heinz Loquai - by no means "slipped into" the role
of an allied power, but appeared to be the first country focusing
on a military solution as early as spring of 1998.(4)
Yugoslavia was essential for the emancipation of German foreign
policy and that change dates back to 1991.
The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 was the
first massive appearance of the Federal Republic of Germany on
the international stage. Despite all warnings the government of
Kohl/Genscher stood forth and thwarted any negotiated solutions
that could have prevented the bloody civil wars in which
Yugoslavia fell apart. "Regardless of all celebrated declarations
to stand for peace and to refrain from striving for power", given
by Germany just one year before in the so-called
"Two-Plus-Four"-treaty, "the Federal Republic of Germany
interfered massively in the internal affairs of one of the states
of the Anti-Hitler-Coalition. Germany, reunified and strong,
stepped on the international stage and for the first time since
World War II openly pursued great power politics -- in the
Balkans, where it had already wreaked great mischief twice in
this century.(5)
There was an "Independent State of Croatia" once before, in 1941
as a creation of Hitler and Mussolini, supported by the Roman
Catholic Church and led by the fascist Ustasha. Half a century
later, an independent Croatia was again established through the
influence of Germany and the Vatican. Croatia was governed by
Franjo Tudjman's party, which openly revived the politics of the
Ustasha who had committed some of the most horrible acts of
genocide in the 20th Century under their fascist leader Ante
Pavelic, murdering hundreds of thousands of Serbs.(6) To this
day, the crimes of the Ustasha are among the least recognized
crimes of World War II. Were Serbian survivors and their
descendants not the only ones to remember this part of history,
the German policy of recognition as well as the presentation of
the Croatian conflict in the media could not have happened nor
gone unchallenged as it did.
Kurt Köpruner, a businessman who travelled to Yugoslavia many
times in the 1990's and was thus an eye-witness to that tragedy,
concluded from heated debates on the impending disintegration of
the country end-1990 in Croatia: "If it really comes to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, this cannot possibly happen without
horrible bloodshed and hundreds of thousands of deaths".(7) He
began to realise why this was the common view when he read about
the course of World War II in the Balkans. For the first time, he
learned about mass slaughters by the Ustasha, Muslim and Albanian
SS divisions.
Tudjman, who became President in the first Croatian
multi-party-election in 1990 and who led the country into
independence with the help of Germany in 1991, had in 1989
already played down the Holocaust in general and the Ustasha
crimes against Serbs at the death camp of Jasenovac in
particular. Under Tudjman's rule a revival of Ustasha symbols and
ideals took place. A new constitution did not contain a single
word regarding the rights of Serbs living in Croatia. Terror
against Serbs started, "systematically and controlled from the
top". In masses, they were dismissed from work, and "messages
urging them to leave the country were stuck on the doors of Serb
houses."(8) In a referendum -- declared as illegal by Tudjman --
the Croatian Serbs voted to remain in Yugoslavia.
Months before German recognition and the outbreak of the war, on
May 2nd, 1991, the "Dalmatian Kristallnacht" took place.(9)
Supported by the local police, 2,000 Croats destroyed 116 Serbian
shops and houses in Zadar in an action lasting several hours. On
October 16th, 1991 the "Night of the Long Knifes" followed, with
more than hundred Serb civilians tortured and executed.(10) The
Western media remained silent. Only the New York Times reported
in December 1993: "The government of Croatia has forced
thousands of its opponents from their homes and from the country,
according to the new Zagreb office of Human Rigths. The actions
have been directed mostly against Serbs, but also against Croats
opposing the politics of President Tudjman. Since 1991, the Croatian
authorities have blown up or razed tens of thousands of mostly
Serb houses, but also houses of Croats. ... Whole families were
killed. All in all, about 280,000 Croatian Serbs have fled the
country." According to Susan Woodward, the Croatian government
had already expelled all Serbs that were under their control by
1993.(11) One should wonder whether this was the "democracy, that
the Serbs, as indigenous people, living in one-third of communist
Tito-created Croatia, had to accept", asked the New York Times
and added in April 1997: "Did the West become so sick as to allow
Croatian fascism to live its afterlife?"
How much the Croatian people really supported Tudjman's policy,
forseeing the bloodshed, remains unclear. At least the referendum
on independence should not be used to measure the support since
it was quite the opposite of the "clear and overwhelming will of
the Croatian people", as Westerners celebrated it. The voters
were considerably pressed to make the right choice in the
ballot.(12)
The distorted image of Serb expansion
Germany's recognition of Croatia should be questioned not only in
the light of the political powers it brought to the fore, but
also from a legal point of view. While the majority of
international law experts agree that Slovenia's secession was an
execution of the peoples' right to self-determination, it is
considered illegal in Croatia and Bosnia, where a main part of
the Serbs outside Serbia have been living for centuries in
coherent areas.(13)
Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly pointed out this problem. He did
not oppose the right to self-determination, but he demanded this
right for all peoples. "He pointed out that there are more than
six hundred thousand Serbs living in Croatia, who represent the
clear majority of the population in some areas of Krajina and
Slavonia. The right to self-determination would have to be
acknowledged to them as well. The existing borders between the
Yugoslav republics were mere administrative borders."(14)
Serbia showed a willingness to negotiate new borders and warned
all parties not to confront others with a fait accompli -- as
happened short thereafter due to German recognition -- which
would lead to an out of control escalation. To give up their
historical ground was an impossible demand for the Serbs. They
"said good-bye to Slovenia. They would also have let Croatia go
without the Krajina. Since it was the will of the Krajina Serbs,
Belgrade intended to tie the Krajina to the motherland. But
Croatia and later Bosnia wanted to take historical Serbian areas
into independence."(15)
Charles Boyd, former Deputy Commander in Chief of the US European
Command, in 1995 opposed "the popular image of this war (as) one
of unrelenting Serb expansion" in Foreign Affairs: "Much of what
Zagreb calls the occupied territories is in fact land held by
Serbs for more than three centuries The same is true of most
Serb land in Bosnia, what the Western media frequently refers to
as the 70 percent of was Bosnia seized by rebel Serbs In short,
the Serbs are not trying to conquer new territory, but merely to
hold on to what was already theirs."
The Milosevic administration demanded the right of
self-determination for the Serbs as well and warned of a
repetition of the crimes of World War II. "When the Croats
declared independence, they did not give the Serbs in their own
country -- and there are 600,000 of them -- any guarantees
whatsoever. It was therefore understandable that for this reason
the Serbs were very worried. First of all, if we bear in mind the
villainy of the Ustashas during World War II", Lord Carrington
stated. But when a settlement for the Krajina and Slavonia
question was just about to be achieved, "the European Community
decided end-1991 to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Croatia
received what it wanted, Slovenia as well, and they had no longer
a desire to go on with the peace conference. Hans Dietrich
Genscher wanted international recognition for Slovenia and
Croatia. Practically all the others opposed it."(16)
But the fears that arose in the minds of the Serbs were ignored
and depicted as an aggressive plan for "Greater Serbia".(17)
Soon, foreign states started to interfere in the conflict. German
military instructors were serving in Croatia, and the Bundeswehr
participated in air control missions and the Rapid Reaction Force
in Bosnia. Illegal arms deliveries to Slovenia and Croatia
followed, partly carried out through the German secret
service.(18) The US opposed the Serbs and supported the Croats
and Bosnian Muslims. "Finally, the NATO powers supported Croatian
nationalism, and in 1995 Tudjman's army, trained by US commanders
and illegally equipped by the 'International Community', was in a
position to complete the ethnic cleansing of the Krajina Serbs
which had begun with the help of the Nazis in 1941."(19)
According to the distinguished military journal "Jane's Defence
Weekly", the so-called "Operation Storm", the most brutal
campaign of ethnic cleansing in the time of Yugoslavia's
destruction, had been planned and executed not only by the Croat
Ante Gotovina but also by the Kosovo Albanian Agim Ceku who later
became head of the KLA.
In the case of Bosnia, it was the US that pressed for diplomatic
recognition. Again, the conflict was depicted as the result of
Serb aggression. But former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
defined the conflict as a three-sided civil war and not an
invasion being waged against a souvereign state. "Croatia and
Serbia support their compatriots in Bosnia. The most
irresponsible mistake in the current Bosnian tragedy was the
international recognition of the Bosnian state under the
authority of the Muslims. Blindly following the precedent of
Germany's premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the
international community created all the former Yugoslav republics
as independent states."(20)
The NATO operation in Macedonia, where Albanian rebels operating
out of Kosovo intensified their fighting in 2001, was highly
disputed in Germany. A "decision against the deployment of the
Bundeswehr would have been an important and valuable step towards
a change in German politics and would not have lacked its meaning
for future European politics and even the position of the US",
Knut Mertens of the Green Party said.(21) But on August 30th,
2001 the German Parliament approved the operation called
"Essential Harvest", which was not a peaceful arms collecting
mission, but clearly meant as military intervention by NATO and
the Bundeswehr respectively.(22)
Although the Social Democrat Gernot Erler promoted the deployment
of German soldiers by affirming that it would only be temporary,
the paraliament eventually approved the following operation
"Amber Fox" on September 27th, 2001. Almost invisible to the
German public, Germany took over the lead of the NATO mandate in
Macedonia in the shadow of 9/11.
Who is responsible for the Kosovo violence?
Following the NATO aggression of 1999 German troops were deployed
in Kosovo under the auspice of KFOR. As NATO and the UN stand by,
it is not only organized crime that is flourishing. In a
continuous and planned campaign and its massive recent
escalation, Kosovo is being ethnically cleansed of all
non-Albanians.
Despite official anouncements to disarm the KLA and restore a
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, it is mainly the US and Germany
that have financed the ongoing terror in Kosovo after the NATO
aggression by supporting the Kosovo Protection Corps. All other
countries had withdrawn their support for the Corps which is
manned by former KLA fighters after evidence had emerged that
they were responsible for murders and violent attacks.(23)
Following a 1999 Executive Order by the US President, the KLA was
trained in terrorist tactics, obviously inspired by the idea to
instigate a new crisis in case President Milosevic would win the
elections.(24)
Whether foreign powers directly backed the recent coordinated
acts of violence and expulsion or just stood by, in any case they
share responsibility. In the same way already predominant in 1998
both sides are held accountable for the terrorist violence of the
Albanian fighters who have always stood for an "ethnically pure
Kosova". In an absurd distortion of the facts, the UN Security
Council "called on all communities in Kosovo to stop all acts of
violence" as seen in 1998.
Anyway the restoration of a multi-ethnic Kosovo ever since has
been one of the fairy-tales only believed by those who thought
that NATO had intervened for "humanitarian reasons" in 1999.
Cathrin Schütz, born 1971, studied political science at
J.W.-Goethe Universtity in Frankfurt/Main. She is a contributing
writer for the German daily junge Welt. She is author of the book
"Die NATO-Intervention in Jugoslawien. Hintergründe,
Nebenwirkungen und Folgen", published in 2003 with a preface of
Member of German Parliament Willy Wimmer by Wilhelm Braumüller
Verlag, Vienna.
The article was published in a slightly shortened version on
March 26th 2004 in the German daily Neues Deutschland
Footnotes
1. "Die Woche", 12-30-1994
2. Fischer as quoted in: Horst-Eberhard Richter, "IPPNW
zum Jugoslawienkrieg", www.nato-tribunal.de
3. Cf. "Stern", 03-24-1999
4. Cf. Heinz Loquai, "Weichenstellungen für einen Krieg",
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003, pp44-45
5. Ralph Hartmann, "Die ehrlichen Makler", Dietz, Berlin
1999, p13
6. After World War II Pavelic fled to Argentinia via Rome and
died in a German hospital in Madrid in 1954, having been personally
blessed by Pope Pius XII. Until today the genocide of the Serbs
commited by Croats has been neither condemned adequately nor
seriously studied. At the opening celebration of the Holocaust
Museum in Washington, history was perverted: not the Serbs, but
the Croats were invited. That and further information are following
the work of Diana Johnstone, "Fool's Crusade, Yugoslavia, NATO
and Western Delusions", Monthly Review Press, New York 2002
7. Kurt Köpruner, "Reisen in das Land der Kriege",
Espresso, Berlin 2001, p27
8. Malte Olschewski, "Von den Karawanken bis zum Kosovo.
Die geheime Geschichte der Kriege in Jugoslawien", Braumüller,
Vienna 2000, p34
9. Köpruner, pp44, Olschewski, p34
10. Cf. Olschewski, p38
11. The other part, living in Krajina and other parts of Croatia
that were not controlled by Tudjman, was expelled in Operation
Storm in 1995 with the support of the US government.
12. Cf. Köpruner, pp51-53
13. Cf. Olschewski, p14
14. Köpruner, p31
15. Olschewski, p14
16. "Profil", 12-01-1993
17. To this day there has been no proof for the allegation that
Slobodan Milosevic planned to create a Greater Serbia. Ralph
Hartmann shows that Milosevic's Kosovo Polje Speech could only be
used as evidence for his "aggressive" and "nationalistic" line by
quoting out of context to change the meaning
18. Cf. Olschewski, p78,80
19. The US involvement in Operation Storm was openly mentioned
in a hearing of the US Congress on 02-28-2002. Cf. "The U. N.
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International
Justice of Show of Justice?", Hearing before the Committee on
International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress
20. Washington Post, 05-17-1993
21. Knut Mertens, "Neues NATO-Protektorat oder ehrliche
Friedenspolitik?", "Zeit-Fragen", 08-20-2001, p1
22. Cf. Tobias Pflüger, "Krieg, und zwar richtig", "junge
Welt", 08-23-2001
23. Cf. Interview with Member of Congress Dennis Kucinich by
Cathrin Schütz, "Wird Sanktionspolitik bald beendet? ", "junge
Welt", 10-07-2000.
24. Cf. Dennis Kucinich, "What I learnt from the War", The
Progressive, August 1999
The article was translated from German by Sebastian Bahlo and
Gregory Elich. Quotations originally appearing in English were
re-translated from German.
The author would like to thank Diana Johnstone for providing
urgently needed material and Sebastian Bahlo and Gregory Elich
for translation.
COUNTERPUNCH
Weekend Edition
June 5 / 6, 2004
On the Ruins of Yugoslavia
The Militarism of German Foreign Policy and the Dismantling of a
State
By CATHRIN SCHÜTZ
In the shadow of new wars, the memory of the aggression against
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is more and more fading into
oblivion. Those who hoped for an inquiry about this first war in
which the Federal Republic of Germany militarily participated are
faced with silence. In Germany as in other countries, the
US-American filmmaker and author Michael Moore, who takes a stand
against Bush's belligerent policy in Iraq and who supported
General Wesley Clark in his Presidential pre-election campaign,
is highly celebrated. Clark, who in his function as NATO's
Supreme Commander in Europe led the bombing of Yugoslavia, was
the "anti-War Candidate", as Moore told his leftist audience.
"Collateral damage," including the bombing of civilians in
Varvarin, bodies mutilated by cluster bombs in Nis, employees
killed in the bombing of the RTS television station and the
Chinese embassy, as well as the "humanitarian" military
intervention as such, faced little opposition in the NATO
countries -- with the exception of Greece. Even the "left" walked
into the human-rights trap and supported -- although not
unanimously -- the attack on the "Belgrade regime".
This first direct participation of Germany in an illegal war of
aggression after World War II fundamentally changed German
foreign policy: since then (and not since 9/11), wars are seen as
a legitimate means of politics. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
himself admitted to being surprised by "how little it has been
recognized that the decision for war meant a fundamental change
in Germany's foreign and security policy."
The German Army, the Bundeswehr, has been transformed into a
global intervention force in order to defend Germany even at the
Hindukush, as Minister of Defence Peter Struck outlined in his
Defence Policy Rules. "This is not about unduly giving room to
military logic, but not to put this aspect of foreign politics
under a taboo, as it was done for so long", Schröder said in late
2001.
The first steps in this direction were already undertaken by the
then-governing Christian Democrats, CDU/CSU, in their 1992
Defense Rules. In the period prior to the "humanitarian" war
against Yugoslavia they had yet to acquaint the public with what
those really meant.
"I just think it is wrong to connect the moral too quickly with
questions of war and peace without taking the aspect of national
interest into considertaion. () For the future I predict a
considerable danger that the government, the ruling parties and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff will search for or create causes to
eliminate the barriers which are still in the way of a reunified
German foreign policy. Humanitarian issues serve as a
vehicle."(1) "(German) military operations must not take place
where German troops carried out their devastating actions in
World War II. I would be glad, if those who advocate it would not
always hide behind human rights to enforce this position", stated
Joseph Fischer -- in 1994.(2)
Since the NATO war of 1999 for him these principles belong to the
past. He clarified that he is not carrying out "Green" foreign
policy but "German".(3) The war against Yugoslavia opened the
door for following and future wars. The bombs were still falling
on Yugoslavia when NATO passed its new strategic concept, which
proclaimed its right to engage in offensive "out-of-area"
operations. While breaches of international law were part of a
public debate during the aggression on Yugoslavia and had to be
hidden under a humanitarian carpet, legal aspects seem to count
less and less in the continuing "War on Terror".
Germany didn't "slip into" the war
To understand developments in German foreign policy, one should
not confine the view to the military peak of the aggression
against Yugoslavia in 1999, in which Germany - according to
General ret. Heinz Loquai - by no means "slipped into" the role
of an allied power, but appeared to be the first country focusing
on a military solution as early as spring of 1998.(4)
Yugoslavia was essential for the emancipation of German foreign
policy and that change dates back to 1991.
The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 was the
first massive appearance of the Federal Republic of Germany on
the international stage. Despite all warnings the government of
Kohl/Genscher stood forth and thwarted any negotiated solutions
that could have prevented the bloody civil wars in which
Yugoslavia fell apart. "Regardless of all celebrated declarations
to stand for peace and to refrain from striving for power", given
by Germany just one year before in the so-called
"Two-Plus-Four"-treaty, "the Federal Republic of Germany
interfered massively in the internal affairs of one of the states
of the Anti-Hitler-Coalition. Germany, reunified and strong,
stepped on the international stage and for the first time since
World War II openly pursued great power politics -- in the
Balkans, where it had already wreaked great mischief twice in
this century.(5)
There was an "Independent State of Croatia" once before, in 1941
as a creation of Hitler and Mussolini, supported by the Roman
Catholic Church and led by the fascist Ustasha. Half a century
later, an independent Croatia was again established through the
influence of Germany and the Vatican. Croatia was governed by
Franjo Tudjman's party, which openly revived the politics of the
Ustasha who had committed some of the most horrible acts of
genocide in the 20th Century under their fascist leader Ante
Pavelic, murdering hundreds of thousands of Serbs.(6) To this
day, the crimes of the Ustasha are among the least recognized
crimes of World War II. Were Serbian survivors and their
descendants not the only ones to remember this part of history,
the German policy of recognition as well as the presentation of
the Croatian conflict in the media could not have happened nor
gone unchallenged as it did.
Kurt Köpruner, a businessman who travelled to Yugoslavia many
times in the 1990's and was thus an eye-witness to that tragedy,
concluded from heated debates on the impending disintegration of
the country end-1990 in Croatia: "If it really comes to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, this cannot possibly happen without
horrible bloodshed and hundreds of thousands of deaths".(7) He
began to realise why this was the common view when he read about
the course of World War II in the Balkans. For the first time, he
learned about mass slaughters by the Ustasha, Muslim and Albanian
SS divisions.
Tudjman, who became President in the first Croatian
multi-party-election in 1990 and who led the country into
independence with the help of Germany in 1991, had in 1989
already played down the Holocaust in general and the Ustasha
crimes against Serbs at the death camp of Jasenovac in
particular. Under Tudjman's rule a revival of Ustasha symbols and
ideals took place. A new constitution did not contain a single
word regarding the rights of Serbs living in Croatia. Terror
against Serbs started, "systematically and controlled from the
top". In masses, they were dismissed from work, and "messages
urging them to leave the country were stuck on the doors of Serb
houses."(8) In a referendum -- declared as illegal by Tudjman --
the Croatian Serbs voted to remain in Yugoslavia.
Months before German recognition and the outbreak of the war, on
May 2nd, 1991, the "Dalmatian Kristallnacht" took place.(9)
Supported by the local police, 2,000 Croats destroyed 116 Serbian
shops and houses in Zadar in an action lasting several hours. On
October 16th, 1991 the "Night of the Long Knifes" followed, with
more than hundred Serb civilians tortured and executed.(10) The
Western media remained silent. Only the New York Times reported
in December 1993: "The government of Croatia has forced
thousands of its opponents from their homes and from the country,
according to the new Zagreb office of Human Rigths. The actions
have been directed mostly against Serbs, but also against Croats
opposing the politics of President Tudjman. Since 1991, the Croatian
authorities have blown up or razed tens of thousands of mostly
Serb houses, but also houses of Croats. ... Whole families were
killed. All in all, about 280,000 Croatian Serbs have fled the
country." According to Susan Woodward, the Croatian government
had already expelled all Serbs that were under their control by
1993.(11) One should wonder whether this was the "democracy, that
the Serbs, as indigenous people, living in one-third of communist
Tito-created Croatia, had to accept", asked the New York Times
and added in April 1997: "Did the West become so sick as to allow
Croatian fascism to live its afterlife?"
How much the Croatian people really supported Tudjman's policy,
forseeing the bloodshed, remains unclear. At least the referendum
on independence should not be used to measure the support since
it was quite the opposite of the "clear and overwhelming will of
the Croatian people", as Westerners celebrated it. The voters
were considerably pressed to make the right choice in the
ballot.(12)
The distorted image of Serb expansion
Germany's recognition of Croatia should be questioned not only in
the light of the political powers it brought to the fore, but
also from a legal point of view. While the majority of
international law experts agree that Slovenia's secession was an
execution of the peoples' right to self-determination, it is
considered illegal in Croatia and Bosnia, where a main part of
the Serbs outside Serbia have been living for centuries in
coherent areas.(13)
Slobodan Milosevic repeatedly pointed out this problem. He did
not oppose the right to self-determination, but he demanded this
right for all peoples. "He pointed out that there are more than
six hundred thousand Serbs living in Croatia, who represent the
clear majority of the population in some areas of Krajina and
Slavonia. The right to self-determination would have to be
acknowledged to them as well. The existing borders between the
Yugoslav republics were mere administrative borders."(14)
Serbia showed a willingness to negotiate new borders and warned
all parties not to confront others with a fait accompli -- as
happened short thereafter due to German recognition -- which
would lead to an out of control escalation. To give up their
historical ground was an impossible demand for the Serbs. They
"said good-bye to Slovenia. They would also have let Croatia go
without the Krajina. Since it was the will of the Krajina Serbs,
Belgrade intended to tie the Krajina to the motherland. But
Croatia and later Bosnia wanted to take historical Serbian areas
into independence."(15)
Charles Boyd, former Deputy Commander in Chief of the US European
Command, in 1995 opposed "the popular image of this war (as) one
of unrelenting Serb expansion" in Foreign Affairs: "Much of what
Zagreb calls the occupied territories is in fact land held by
Serbs for more than three centuries The same is true of most
Serb land in Bosnia, what the Western media frequently refers to
as the 70 percent of was Bosnia seized by rebel Serbs In short,
the Serbs are not trying to conquer new territory, but merely to
hold on to what was already theirs."
The Milosevic administration demanded the right of
self-determination for the Serbs as well and warned of a
repetition of the crimes of World War II. "When the Croats
declared independence, they did not give the Serbs in their own
country -- and there are 600,000 of them -- any guarantees
whatsoever. It was therefore understandable that for this reason
the Serbs were very worried. First of all, if we bear in mind the
villainy of the Ustashas during World War II", Lord Carrington
stated. But when a settlement for the Krajina and Slavonia
question was just about to be achieved, "the European Community
decided end-1991 to recognize Slovenia and Croatia. Croatia
received what it wanted, Slovenia as well, and they had no longer
a desire to go on with the peace conference. Hans Dietrich
Genscher wanted international recognition for Slovenia and
Croatia. Practically all the others opposed it."(16)
But the fears that arose in the minds of the Serbs were ignored
and depicted as an aggressive plan for "Greater Serbia".(17)
Soon, foreign states started to interfere in the conflict. German
military instructors were serving in Croatia, and the Bundeswehr
participated in air control missions and the Rapid Reaction Force
in Bosnia. Illegal arms deliveries to Slovenia and Croatia
followed, partly carried out through the German secret
service.(18) The US opposed the Serbs and supported the Croats
and Bosnian Muslims. "Finally, the NATO powers supported Croatian
nationalism, and in 1995 Tudjman's army, trained by US commanders
and illegally equipped by the 'International Community', was in a
position to complete the ethnic cleansing of the Krajina Serbs
which had begun with the help of the Nazis in 1941."(19)
According to the distinguished military journal "Jane's Defence
Weekly", the so-called "Operation Storm", the most brutal
campaign of ethnic cleansing in the time of Yugoslavia's
destruction, had been planned and executed not only by the Croat
Ante Gotovina but also by the Kosovo Albanian Agim Ceku who later
became head of the KLA.
In the case of Bosnia, it was the US that pressed for diplomatic
recognition. Again, the conflict was depicted as the result of
Serb aggression. But former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
defined the conflict as a three-sided civil war and not an
invasion being waged against a souvereign state. "Croatia and
Serbia support their compatriots in Bosnia. The most
irresponsible mistake in the current Bosnian tragedy was the
international recognition of the Bosnian state under the
authority of the Muslims. Blindly following the precedent of
Germany's premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the
international community created all the former Yugoslav republics
as independent states."(20)
The NATO operation in Macedonia, where Albanian rebels operating
out of Kosovo intensified their fighting in 2001, was highly
disputed in Germany. A "decision against the deployment of the
Bundeswehr would have been an important and valuable step towards
a change in German politics and would not have lacked its meaning
for future European politics and even the position of the US",
Knut Mertens of the Green Party said.(21) But on August 30th,
2001 the German Parliament approved the operation called
"Essential Harvest", which was not a peaceful arms collecting
mission, but clearly meant as military intervention by NATO and
the Bundeswehr respectively.(22)
Although the Social Democrat Gernot Erler promoted the deployment
of German soldiers by affirming that it would only be temporary,
the paraliament eventually approved the following operation
"Amber Fox" on September 27th, 2001. Almost invisible to the
German public, Germany took over the lead of the NATO mandate in
Macedonia in the shadow of 9/11.
Who is responsible for the Kosovo violence?
Following the NATO aggression of 1999 German troops were deployed
in Kosovo under the auspice of KFOR. As NATO and the UN stand by,
it is not only organized crime that is flourishing. In a
continuous and planned campaign and its massive recent
escalation, Kosovo is being ethnically cleansed of all
non-Albanians.
Despite official anouncements to disarm the KLA and restore a
multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, it is mainly the US and Germany
that have financed the ongoing terror in Kosovo after the NATO
aggression by supporting the Kosovo Protection Corps. All other
countries had withdrawn their support for the Corps which is
manned by former KLA fighters after evidence had emerged that
they were responsible for murders and violent attacks.(23)
Following a 1999 Executive Order by the US President, the KLA was
trained in terrorist tactics, obviously inspired by the idea to
instigate a new crisis in case President Milosevic would win the
elections.(24)
Whether foreign powers directly backed the recent coordinated
acts of violence and expulsion or just stood by, in any case they
share responsibility. In the same way already predominant in 1998
both sides are held accountable for the terrorist violence of the
Albanian fighters who have always stood for an "ethnically pure
Kosova". In an absurd distortion of the facts, the UN Security
Council "called on all communities in Kosovo to stop all acts of
violence" as seen in 1998.
Anyway the restoration of a multi-ethnic Kosovo ever since has
been one of the fairy-tales only believed by those who thought
that NATO had intervened for "humanitarian reasons" in 1999.
Cathrin Schütz, born 1971, studied political science at
J.W.-Goethe Universtity in Frankfurt/Main. She is a contributing
writer for the German daily junge Welt. She is author of the book
"Die NATO-Intervention in Jugoslawien. Hintergründe,
Nebenwirkungen und Folgen", published in 2003 with a preface of
Member of German Parliament Willy Wimmer by Wilhelm Braumüller
Verlag, Vienna.
The article was published in a slightly shortened version on
March 26th 2004 in the German daily Neues Deutschland
Footnotes
1. "Die Woche", 12-30-1994
2. Fischer as quoted in: Horst-Eberhard Richter, "IPPNW
zum Jugoslawienkrieg", www.nato-tribunal.de
3. Cf. "Stern", 03-24-1999
4. Cf. Heinz Loquai, "Weichenstellungen für einen Krieg",
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2003, pp44-45
5. Ralph Hartmann, "Die ehrlichen Makler", Dietz, Berlin
1999, p13
6. After World War II Pavelic fled to Argentinia via Rome and
died in a German hospital in Madrid in 1954, having been personally
blessed by Pope Pius XII. Until today the genocide of the Serbs
commited by Croats has been neither condemned adequately nor
seriously studied. At the opening celebration of the Holocaust
Museum in Washington, history was perverted: not the Serbs, but
the Croats were invited. That and further information are following
the work of Diana Johnstone, "Fool's Crusade, Yugoslavia, NATO
and Western Delusions", Monthly Review Press, New York 2002
7. Kurt Köpruner, "Reisen in das Land der Kriege",
Espresso, Berlin 2001, p27
8. Malte Olschewski, "Von den Karawanken bis zum Kosovo.
Die geheime Geschichte der Kriege in Jugoslawien", Braumüller,
Vienna 2000, p34
9. Köpruner, pp44, Olschewski, p34
10. Cf. Olschewski, p38
11. The other part, living in Krajina and other parts of Croatia
that were not controlled by Tudjman, was expelled in Operation
Storm in 1995 with the support of the US government.
12. Cf. Köpruner, pp51-53
13. Cf. Olschewski, p14
14. Köpruner, p31
15. Olschewski, p14
16. "Profil", 12-01-1993
17. To this day there has been no proof for the allegation that
Slobodan Milosevic planned to create a Greater Serbia. Ralph
Hartmann shows that Milosevic's Kosovo Polje Speech could only be
used as evidence for his "aggressive" and "nationalistic" line by
quoting out of context to change the meaning
18. Cf. Olschewski, p78,80
19. The US involvement in Operation Storm was openly mentioned
in a hearing of the US Congress on 02-28-2002. Cf. "The U. N.
Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International
Justice of Show of Justice?", Hearing before the Committee on
International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress
20. Washington Post, 05-17-1993
21. Knut Mertens, "Neues NATO-Protektorat oder ehrliche
Friedenspolitik?", "Zeit-Fragen", 08-20-2001, p1
22. Cf. Tobias Pflüger, "Krieg, und zwar richtig", "junge
Welt", 08-23-2001
23. Cf. Interview with Member of Congress Dennis Kucinich by
Cathrin Schütz, "Wird Sanktionspolitik bald beendet? ", "junge
Welt", 10-07-2000.
24. Cf. Dennis Kucinich, "What I learnt from the War", The
Progressive, August 1999
The article was translated from German by Sebastian Bahlo and
Gregory Elich. Quotations originally appearing in English were
re-translated from German.
The author would like to thank Diana Johnstone for providing
urgently needed material and Sebastian Bahlo and Gregory Elich
for translation.