----- Original Message -----
From: Petokraka78
To: antinato@...
Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2002 5:01 PM
Subject: Observations on Serbia's Elections



below is an article from a "Marxist" website that offers a pretty
good analysis of the prevailing political mood and atmosphere in
Serbia. The article is especially relevant with respect to the
failures of the main political currents to garner votes among an
electorate that is sick of empty promises, "austerity" measures,
national chauvinism, corruption, and national debasement and that
wants to remain focused on the pressing social questions that plague
the country (including the desire to preserve their independence in
the face of Serbia's conversion into an branch-plant and
infrastructural hub - with no benefits to the locals - of the global
economy).

While I disagree with the author's complete dismissal of the SPS -
which in my opinion can form the basis of a real popular movement
in Serbia if it goes back to its grassroots - and his overly
rhetorical conclusion (which, like much Trot literature ignores major
developments in revolutionary theory, new strategies of resistance,
and the changing nature of the "working class" and the capitalist
system during the last 80 years or so) there is a sense in which much
of this article really hits on some key points in terms of the
ultimate implications that the failure of these elections may have for
the future of Serbia, Yugoslavia, and ultimately the Balkans. Fact of
the matter is that these elections are really a cause for optimism as
they indicate a real failure of neoliberal ideology and Western
supremecist thinking to gain a hegemonic foothold in the country.

The election results indicate that the electorate in Serbia - despite
an intense media campaign aimed at brainwashing the people into
sheepishness, submissiveness, and into accepting their "inferiority"
(the excesses of which I witnessed this summer) - is still
overwhelmingly committed to:

1) an anti-imperialist position (polls continue to show that the least
trusted institutions in the country are NATO, the ICTY, and the
IFIs, i.e. the WB and IMF; this is in addition to wide spread
opposition to the "War on Terror," the War on Iraq, and Bush's
generalized global tyranny),
2) committed to social justice in society and a pervasive desire to
eliminate the parisitic political elites and their mafia supporters
that dominate the country (as well as to defend the system of workers
self-management and the concepts of socially owned and state
owned capital), and
3) is intelligent and impervious to attempts to change "the deeply
held collectivist values of the people" (which was a main point of
desired change as expressed in the G-17s first program that was
drafted in the 1997-8 period).

I base these conclusions on polling data that has come out of
Politika in the past two years, but also by my own comparisons of
the glaringly obvious gap that exists between a very progressive and
no-nonsense popular discourse that pervades street-level politics as
it were, throughout Yugoslavia, and the official discourse and
rhetoric of the political class (that is completely detached from the
harsh realities of daily life in Serbia).

Since no political stream currently matches the popular consensus -
although many parties instrumentally borrow very narrowly
conceived portions of this consensus for their own purposes - there
is thus no reason for most voters in Serbia to cast their ballots and
give legitimacy to anyone who they know will ultimately forget
them once the people's mandate is given (i.e. the vote is being used
as it should be by Serbia's citizens showing a real political
maturity, i.e. it is being used as the fundamental legitimating factor
that keeps the peoples representatives in check and as a key tool of
the citizen in a democracy through which he or she can reject the
excesses elite rule (of course this moderate formulation already
departs substantially from the current neoliberal notion of proper
"governance")).

As an aside, in reference to the G-17's comments on the alleged
need to "change" the feelings of social solidarity that the Yugoslav
population has towards each other, I actually remember my
pro-American aunt, who works for Djukanovic, tell me how the
Americans were very frustrated by the fact that their propaganda
during the Cold War was always least effective in Yugoslavia, but
particularly in Serbia and Montenegro, all the way into the late
1990s. She saw the situation as lamentable. Reflecting a deeply held
belief among Balkan political elites and pro-Western intellectuals -
that is properly explained in the article below - my aunt stated that
the Serbs were too primitive to understand what is best for them!
With such racist and arrogant attitudes its no wonder the "masses"
quickly saw through the DOS.

While there is reason for optimism, I agree with the author that if a
clearly defined and credible leftist option doesn't emerge soon - i.e.
one that concentrates on fostering and harnessing the three
ideological predispositions of the "average" voter in Serbia
mentioned above - it is possible that a quasi-fascist option will
capitalize on current discontent.

While the chauvinist discourse of that option, currently represented
by Seselj, would have to be muted - as it has been in the campaign
since there is no way of mobilizing large numbers on a purely
chauvinist platform in today's Serbia (in fact its never been done
since the return to multiparty democracy to Serbia in December
1990) - it would never be far from the surface knowing the Serbian
Radical Party's past. Although the Seselj option may remove DOS
and restore an "independent" foreign policy to some degree, it will
also lead to the countries isolation, extreme tensions with minority
groupings in the Sandjak, Vojvodina and Montenegro, the possible
imposition of martial law to clean up "corruption" (something Seselj
openly advocates), the definate loss of Kosovo, etc.

The point is not that the West wouldn't engineer such things if a
leftist party came to power - one could imagine even worse - but
that with the triumph of Seselj these things will happen with
minimal Western involvement, while irreperable harm will be done
to Serbia as a democratic state of all its citizens (which was a key
legacy of the communist era) and to the social fabric of the Balkans
that can only be preserved through interethnic alliances (again
another legacy of the Yugoslav era, which Milosevic attempted to
preserve in some sense, at least rhetorically and within the bounds of
the possible at that time).

I could be wrong about Seselj, and it could be argued that he is the
lesser of two evils - i.e. between him and Kostunica - but I don't
see how the average citizen will "win" out in the end if either option
that currently prevails emerges triumphant. What is happening in
Serbia is that the people are in a state of permanent insurection -
not a day goes by without protests, strikes, blockades, etc. - and a
complete refusal to legitimize the current political class in the
country. Djindjic has cynically attempted to capitalize on the voter
boycott by perpetuating his rule and reading it, through the
customarily convoluted logic of pro-Western Serbs, as a "victory"
for the DOS (in an attempt to trap citizens in a logic in which they
are damned if they vote and damned if they don't)

The fact is that the current situation in Serbia is one of profound
"fluidity" - to borrow a State Department euphamism that is used
when the consolidation of US hegemony is still up in the air. In this
situation there needs to be a profound move towards a party - such
as the SPS can be if it chooses to move beyond a narrow focus on
the farcical process at the Hague - that will not only represent the
people's interests but also facilitate their empowerement through the
forging of participatory institutions at the state, regional and local
levels (as in today's Venezuela). Only by entrenching popular
participation in the institutions of governance, the economy, the
media, the armed-forces, etc. will the people of Serbia be able to
resist the further impositions of an ascendent, heavily militarized
form of global fascism.

Thus what is needed is not only institutions for workers
self-management of enterprises - a reality that has slowed the
neoliberal agenda incredibly throughout the Balkans - but also
meaningful self-management type institutions in the fields of
education, local governance, the media, agriculture,
macro-economic decision making, the military etc. (something that
was envisioned partially, for instance, in the SANU memorandum
of 1986). It is only by pursuing such a popular transformative
strategy that Venezuela actually became the first country where the
people succesfully reversed the results of a US-engineered coup in
Latin America, thereby suggesting a new dawn for a region plagued
for 150 yrs by North American interventionism.

Those committed to a free Serbia, a free Yugoslavia, and a free
Balkans, must take a page from the book of the Bolivarian
revolution - naturally adapted to local realities - in order to
understand how best to resist the current fascist onslaught which
seeks to divert a global popular insurection by channeling popular
forces into various chauvinisms or into "neoliberal civil society"
movements empty of any meaning and content.

For this project to work its adherents must not be afraid of drawing
on the history of national liberation projects in the region and
succesful, popular anti-imperial resistance. In fact, only by
reawakening those memories can the people be strenghtened in their
desire to see meaningful social change occur. This is not to say that
the sloganeering of that past should be resumed, or that it should be
viewed uncritically, but such an inspiring example must not be
consigned to the trash-heap simply b/c of a few flaws that where
cynically exploited by chauvinist and anti-communist politicians
throughout the former Yugoslavia.

Fact of the matter is that the chauvinist and irrationally
anti-communist and racist anti-Third World ideologies of the last
ten years have brought nothing but misery and despair to the
Balkan peoples. Control of the "masses" is the key to the continued
triumph of capitalism, and it is thus only by working persistently to
devise new methods of liberating and empowering the people and
rejecting imposed categories - such as national, ethnic, religious,
racial, etc. differences - that anti-hegemonistic movements can
hope to truly succeed in freeing themselves of this system (the recent
lessons learned, both positive and negative, from popular struggles in
Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Ecuador, Palestine, Haiti, Indonesia, East
Timor, Brazil, Argentina, Nepal, Namibia, South Africa, Chiapas,
Western Sahara, Congo etc. are more than instructive in this
regard).

This, therefore, means not only adopting a rejectionist strategy -
such as that offered by Seselj - but also seeking to forge new paths
that will restore historical and political agency to the world's
impoverished majority by creating new institutions of truly
participatory democracy which will finally give real content to the
basic and fundamental human-right of the self-determination of
peoples.

{Wow! That was much more rhetorical than what follows :-), sorry
about that little rant, happy further reading...)

http://www.marxist.com/Europe/serbian_elections_sep2002.html

"Rainy Days"

An analysis of the failure of the recent
Serbian presidential elections
By Goran M. in Belgrade

On September 29, the first round of the
Serbian Presidential elections was
held. The two candidates, Kostunica
(Democratic Party of Serbia) and
Labus (Group of Citizens), went
through to the second round. Kostunica
won 1,123,420 votes, 30.89 percent,
while Labus won 995.200 votes, 27.36
percent. The remaining votes went to
Seselj with 845,308 votes (23.24%),
Draskovic with 159.959 votes (4.4%)
and Pelevic with139.047 votes (3.82%),
Zivojinovic with 119.052 votes (3,27%)
and Nebojsa Pavkovic with 75.662
votes (2.08%), with the other
candidates all receiving less than 2%. A
total of 3,637,062 voters, or 55.5
percent of the total electorate voted in
the first round. This was already quite
a low turnout, but at least it was above
the minimum 50% required by the
electoral law for the elections to be
valid. In the second round Kostunica of
the Democratic Party received 66.9%
and Labus 30.9%. But the turnout was
so low, only 45.5% of the total
electorate, that the elections were not
valid. The elections will have to be held
again!

In this article by a Yugoslav Marxist,
we give an idea of the mood among the
masses that has led to this stalemate. It
was obvious in the first round that
there was not much enthusiasm, but in
the second round an absolute majority
of Serbian voters clearly found no
reason to support either of the two
candidates or their pro-capitalist
policies.

-------

The DOS establishment and its local
apologists have once again shown us
their capacity for hypocrisy and how
low they are prepared to go in order to
justify their own failures. As they have
done in the past, government officials
and their faithful servants (the media,
political analysts, the NGO's.), have
not refrained from making comments
which insult the very intelligence of the
average Yugoslav. This attitude is
passing into an open form of
antagonism to, and disgust with, the
masses. Thus, in trying to escape
reality, the main reason given by the
majority of the country's 'analysts' for
the failure of the elections in Serbia is
the rain and the cold weather, which
had supposedly forced people to stay at
home!

The days in which the elections were
held were indeed rainy and depressing.
But most of all, in all probability, they
were extremely depressing for the DOS
itself, a coalition which had
triumphantly come to power after the
fall of Milosevic, and which now could
not manage to inspire confidence even
in one of its two candidates [Kostunica
and Labus].

Of course, through its [the DOS']
various media campaigns we have all
received a lesson on how Yugoslavs
are, supposedly, very sensitive to the
vicissitudes of the weather and that
they are also a very 'lazy and primitive
people' who lack the 'civil
consciousness' of the 'European
nations'. 'It's not difficult to be
good-mannered' comes to mind as a
good example. (This is a TV show that
runs every evening after the news on
national television. It is only a small
part of the propaganda that the DOS is
pushing in order to win support for "the
transition". The main idea is to "teach"
the Yugoslav masses how to act like
"Europeans". Every evening they give
lessons about "good manners" and they
finish off with the line: "Let's live like
the rest of the normal world!")

But, as if this were not enough, apart
from the rain and the "primitive nature
of the people", those poor presidential
candidates had to overcome the further
obstacle of that 'non-sensical',
'socialist' electoral law which states
that more than half of the electorate
needs to participate in the elections for
these to be valid.

Suddenly, all their 'democratism',
oath-taking to parliamentarism, and
loyalty to the voice of the people have
been thrown in the rubbish bin. 'Why
should we waste money on elections
when we don't win them?' the
gentlemen from the DOS have been
asking, 'Why insist on the idea that the
majority of the people should take part
in the elections?' Would it not be better
to change the law to one's own
advantage, or, even better, remove the
cosmetics and have the president
chosen by parliament - where there is a
secured majority? Besides, it is in
parliament that the cream of society is
to be found, an elite which is able to
take the important decisions, instead of
those masses, who are not
good-mannered, who do not understand
the importance of the transition.

"A step further from the European
Union"

In one united chorus the media
immediately started to moan about the
unsuccessful elections and have been
trying to convince us that such
'irresponsibility' will cost us dearly.
'We are now a step further away from
the European Union', one of these
analysts was whining, after the final
count of the percentage of the
population that had voted in the second
round of the presidential elections was
announced.

But, after all, these very same
gentlemen analysts and NGOs have
discovered that everything is not so
grim. We have finally had a modern
electoral race with campaigns and
candidates that reflect their
counterparts in Europe. The world
press went to great lengths to
emphasise that the two leading
candidates were
'democratically-oriented', moderate
politicians, and who above all were
supporters of the so-called 'reformist
course' and the transition [i.e. of
wholesale privatisation].

Ironically, it is that very 'flicker of
light' [of Western style privatisation] -
that all-important achievement of 'the
young Yugoslav democracy', which
the bourgeois press keeps on referring
to - that explains the lack of interest on
the part of the people, and the failure of
the election.

Labus

That sparse minority that makes up the
Belgrade 'middle-class' followed with
great pride the feeble, unconvincing,
and pre-arranged television "duel"
between Kostunica and Labus,
commenting on how finally in this
country we have a 'civilised dialogue'
and political culture without too many
sharp words. But the majority of
Yugoslavs asked themselves what all
this was for? What is the difference
between Kostunica and Labus?
Yugoslavia had finally received its
version of the Democrats and
Republicans - its own brand of a coin
with two faces.

Labus, tried to capitalise on the
illusions which many Yugoslavs still
have about the West. He entered the
electoral race as the champion of
"economic reform", the "candidate of
the citizens", the independent "expert"
who would bring the country close to
shining Europe! He could only count,
however, on the votes of those
surviving middle classes and a part of
the youth - those sections that retain
the most illusions in the West. The
working class and rural Serbia were
looking to Labus but they saw through
him and they recognised the hated
image of Prime Minister Djindjic and
his companions - the local business
elite.

The working class, despite the
aggressive media campaign, still
rejects everything that is associated
with Djindjic. They feel the open
anti-working class tone of his rhetoric,
and they are overcome by rage at the
very sight of him. Although it is victim
to various fantasies and propaganda,
the working class in Yugoslavia,
although still in a rather confused way,
is beginning to understand the true
meaning of the transition.

They have seen how the finance
minister Djelic dealt with the bank
workers and everyday they hear of the
threats to sell off (state) firms, together
with the lay-offs all this involves, and
on top of this they are forced to listen to
all the other mockery of Djindjic's
ministers.

There was a well-known pre-election
anecdote of a meeting between Labus
and a peasant, which was an apt
indicator of this mood. The peasant
asks Labus for advice about his cows.
The farmer asks Labus: " I own two
cows. One of them gives 15 litres of
milk and the other only 5. You are an
educated man, you tell me, which one
should I sell?" Labus answers: "Well,
sell the one that gives less milk, of
course!" Then the peasant answers
back, "If that is the case, why do you
sell the best state companies first?"
Labus appeared to the workers, and
justifiably so, to be a pawn of Djindjic
and who knows who else.

Labus's electoral team tried to
understand what made Kostunica so
popular for the wider population - and
they surprisingly stumbled upon an
'ingenious' conclusion - nationalism!
Labus's campaign billboards were thus
adorned in national colours, and carried
slogans, which Seselj (the far right
politician) himself could have adopted
without any fear for his own reputation.
Labus, in the middle of his campaign,
suddenly decided to visit a monastery,
and started using the Cyrillic alphabet
to sign his name, and even the fact that
his grandfather was an orthodox priest
"accidentally" found its way into the
press.

Instead of pushing the programme of
the extreme "neo-liberal" wing of the
DOS coalition and leading an openly
anti-nationalist campaign, Labus tried
to dress up in the clothes of
nationalism, but without any luck. The
hardened nationalists would never vote
for him. And in the eyes of the majority
of the population, who have had
enough of nationalism in the last
decade, he did not appear as radically
different from the others and thus they
remained apathetic.

It is also worth mentioning the dirty
campaign which his team conducted.
At times this was completely based on
cheap insults against and mockery of
Kostunica as a person. In this way they
destroyed the media image of Labus as
a 'sympathetic moderate intellectual'.
Thus it was revealed that Labus was in
no way an alternative to Kostunica. He
was quite clearly ready to dress up in
the clothes of Serbian nationalism, use
cheap insults and promise anything, in
order to grab power and to implement
his (or, to put it more precisely), the
IMF's economic programme.

Kostunica

Kostunica, by contrast, was absolutely
convinced that victory was his. So sure
was he that he did not even make the
effort to think up a programme which
he would, allegedly, implement.
Relying on his trademark position -
national pride and the already overdone
story of a constitution, law and
institutions of state - only towards the
end did he add a few vague points such
as battling crime. Furthermore,
Kostunica finally became aware of his
potentially most useful joker in the
pack - the image of the man who
would fight for the ordinary person in
the street and halt 'unjust privatisation'.
During his campaign, he only
occasionally used this argument. But
when did decide upon this risky feat it
turned out to be the one that paid most
dividends.

The DSS (Kostunica's party) and the
other 'god-fearing patriots' still think
they have enough room to present
themselves as the lawful politicians
who have not dirtied their hands. These
"proud Serbs" hope that, when the ship
starts sinking, they will be able to tell
the people: 'It was not our fault! It was
Djindjic and the mafia, which stands
behind him. It is because of them that
the transition has not succeeded!' Thus,
the problem is not privatisation in itself
- but the corrupt people who are
implementing it.

Had he had more courage and built his
whole campaign on this sort of
anti-privatisation demagogy, not only
would the elections have been
successful, but Kostunica would have
also won back the renown and
eminence he had gained in the
aftermath of October 5. Kostunica is
hesitant about using anti-privatisation
rhetoric because this would put into
doubt the support of the Western
bourgeois press, who might start
questioning his 'democratic'
credentials and his support for the
transition.

Kostunica is a typical conservative,
bourgeois politician, far from a fascist
and not in the least inclined to
Bonapartism, as the domestic 'left' is
labeling him. The West has Kostunica,
as well as all the other politicians, in
their pocket. Kostunica does not have
the strength of character to break away
and to execute his own plans as
Milosevic had once done, even though
objectively he could do so. He is
unconvincing and mild, and confused
by his own petty-bourgeois illusions.
When push comes to shove he is forced
to back Djindjic's shock therapy
economists and to admit that he
supports the reforms from the depths of
his soul, reforms that are 'of
fundamental importance to our
country'. Thus he is doomed to failure.
Kostunica, who is reluctant to fence
himself off completely form the sinking
ship, has succeeded in losing the
elections for which he had been already
declared the winner.

The Success of the Far Right

Apart from the scarce interest shown
by the electorate in the elections, the
main surprise, for many was the high
percentage won by the leader of the far
right Serbian Radical Party (SRS) -
Vojislav Seselj. Despite the fact that his
campaign was very modest indeed (in
comparison with the two candidates of
the DOS), Seselj succeeded in winning
23% of the votes. Together with
Kostunica's votes, it appears therefore
that a majority of those who did vote
chose the Right wing.

The Serbian Radical Party is one of the
few 'real parties' on our political scene.
'Real' in the sense that it: cultivates its
own cadres and a nucleus of activists,
has a developed infrastructure across
the whole country, has real
representation among the workers, and
fosters a real inner-party culture.
Unlike the majority of small parties in
the DOS which generally survive on
the donations of wealthy backers and
which are made up of a narrow circle
of political careerists and business
interest groups, the Radicals have
stable foundations and even on bad
days (from their point of view, after the
October 5) they have succeeded in not
slipping below three or four percent.
Such a structure and organisation
allows them to grow easily when the
right conditions exist. Thus, Seselj's
result is in no way a surprise and is not
even the high-point of the Radicals'
potential.

We pointed out long ago that the Right
could easily make a huge comeback
once the privatisation programme that
the DOS is pursuing is discredited
among the masses. At such a point the
West would feel no revulsion at
supporting an ultra-rightist force which
could divert the anger of the working
class and would continue the
restoration of capitalism, but this time
wrapped in the Serbian tricolour flag. If
no clear leftist alternative (a workers'
party) exists when such a scenario
develops then the workers will once
again be trapped in the snare of
nationalist demagogy.

This moment, however, has not yet
arrived. It is a fact that among the
Serbian working class the virus of
nationalism is still very much alive.
These recent election results are a
confirmation of this. But, stories of a
so-called 'Serbian national being' and
the incurable disease of nationalism,
which will never let go, is an idiocy.
The overall tendency within Serbian
society these days is one of fading
national sentiments. That tendency
would be even clearer if the 'bourgeois
option' did not hold back from a
stand-off with nationalism because of
its own opportunistic calculations.

Besides those 'incurable' elements -
the ultra-nationalist wing - the
majority of Seselj's votes come from
normal people from the lower classes
who are disillusioned with the politics
of the DOS, and who have before them
no alternative. The Socialist Party is so
corrupted and obsessed with hiding its
own crimes, that they are neither
capable nor desirous of organizing
themselves into a decent opposition
party. Some kind of left reformist party
is not even in the initial stages of being
formed. Seselj is thus able to present
himself as the only alternative to the
establishment and many vote for him
not because he struggles for 'Serbian
lands', but because he 'criticises'
Djindjic and co. Seselj has, unlike
Kostunica, profited greatly from his
criticisms of privatisation and the sale
of state firms. Of course, Seselj does
not criticize privatisation as such but
'the choice of buyers' and the price at
which they are sold.

The working class, for lack of a better
alternative, sees in Kostunica and
Seselj characters with integrity, leaders
who have an ear for 'the man in the
street'. The workers hope that these
individuals can at least offer some
salvation from the apocalypse that is
coming and from its most obvious
prophets, the gang of slick talking
yuppies gathered around Djindjic and
the Democratic Party. In this way,
many attempt to opt for the lesser of
two evils. That is the explanation for
the high percentage of votes that the
Right has got, from those people who
bothered to vote at all.

A Civil Society?

Still, the majority of the people have
clearly refused to choose between the
lesser of two evils! This is a huge
encouragement to the Marxists of
Yugoslavia. The boycott on the part of
the majority of the population proves
that the pro-European analysts, in a
certain way were right, and that the
laments of the NGOs are justified:
Yugoslavs clearly do not have that
'civil consciousness of the Western
nations'! But that is nothing new. The
working class of the Balkans as long as
six decades ago overcame and buried,
apparently forever, the narrow canons
of bourgeois democracy. Milosevic's
was not overthrown at the ballot box
either. We also reject this barren lie of
bourgeois democracy called 'elections'.
The only thing that the Yugoslav
working class is allowed to do under
such a regime is to choose the wing of
the ruling oligarchy which will oppress
them over the next four years! The
bourgeois parliamentary system,
whichever party has a majority in it,
poses no solution. The Yugoslav
working class must organise its own
party which will struggle for its own
rights and build its own institutions
which will place real control of society
into the hands of the masses.

Unlike the petty-bourgeois liberals
who are embarrassed and shedding
tears over the unsuccessful elections,
we Marxists are elated and proud at
level of political maturity shown by the
people. Yugoslav workers have in no
way 'distanced' themselves from the
EU. On the contrary, they have come a
step closer to their sisters and brothers
in the rest of Europe who also for years
have not been giving much credence to
the charades called elections in their
own countries.

Having said this however, even though
it may seem effective at first sight, a
boycott of the elections is not a solution
to the problem. As we can see, the
ruling oligarchy always finds a way of
legitimising its own rule. The
government is preparing a change in
the electoral law, which will give it the
chance to continue smoothly in power.

What we desperately need is a mass,
independent workers' party with a
revolutionary perspective which will
present the interests of those who did
not go out to vote. Only in this way can
the workers take on the ruling
oligarchies. Only in that way can a new
birth of nationalism be stopped. Only in
that way can the sale of state property
be halted and the living standards of the
working class be defended. The clear
dissatisfaction with the political
establishment must be channelled in the
direction of creating a proper
alternative. Passive resistance is not the
answer.

"Civil Society" is a fairytale of the
Belgrade liberals. Bearing in mind the
world crisis of capitalism and the
economic standing of our country, we
can say that Yugoslavia in the future
can expect anything but stable
parliamentarism. The only thing that is
guaranteed under the present set-up is
a series of unashamed attacks on
everyone's rights. It is an urgent task to
build an organisation through which we
shall lead a battle to defend the interests
of the working class!

October 2002