Subject: [yugoslaviainfo] Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 07:21:30 +0200
From: "Darka"
To: <Ova adresa el. pošte je zaštićena od spambotova. Omogućite JavaScript da biste je videli.>
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m052803.html
Antiwar.com
May 28, 2003
Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
How the US 'Ended' the Bosnian War
To End A War, by Richard Holbrooke
New York, Random House, June 1998, 432 pages (hardcover)
Few things have been as grossly misunderstood as the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known by its
birthplace as "Dayton." Agreed at the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton,
Ohio and initialed in Paris, France on 21 November
1995, the Dayton Agreement finally established
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, after a three-year
interethnic war following its 1992 international
recognition. It also completely failed to resolve any of
issues that caused the war.
Instead, it was a feat of social engineering
unprecedented at the time, attempting through force
and bluster to forge a nation out of bitter enmities.
That should not have surprised anyone, given that
force and bluster were the main character traits of
Dayton's chief creator, rogue American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke.
Proud 'Peacemaker'
Holbrooke had a long and distinguished career in
foreign affairs, starting from his Foreign Service job
in Vietnam in 1962. He also edited the Foreign
Policyjournal (1972-76), served as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
(1977-1981), US Ambassador to Germany (1993-94),
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (1994-96). It was in this last
capacity that he came to preside over the "peace
process" in Bosnia.
To End A War is an extraordinary book documenting
not just his endeavors in Bosnia, but the underlying
logic, emotions and politics behind them. For all his
failings - arrogance, ignorance and vanity easily
spring to mind - Holbrooke is also earnest. Though
his memoir is as self-serving as, say, Lord David
Owen's Balkan Odyssey, unlike Owen, Holbrooke is
not trying to make excuses: he is actually proud of his
actions, thoughts and opinions. There is not one hint
of modesty - false or otherwise - in Holbrooke, and
for that one must be grateful. For in chronicling his
efforts to badger, bully and beat the Bosnians into
ending their war - on American terms, of course - he
offers surprisingly clear insights into the U.S.
Balkans policy at the time, and his own role therein.
Reading Holbrooke's memoir, one needs to keep in
mind that this man is the chief creator of the current
Bosnian state, a paradox protectorate continuing to
exist in spite of itself.
'I Am The Empire'
Anyone who even slightly doubts the Official Truth
about the Balkans wars will be struck by Holbrooke's
cavalier dismissal of any pretense of civility when
dealing with the locals - especially the Serbs, for
whom he had only disdain dangerously bordering on
hatred. To him, prejudices, deceptions and
fabrications represent fully justified means to the
goal. Cautioned by his British colleague to treat Serbs
with some consideration, Holbrooke replied:
"The Serb view of history was their problem. ours
was to end a war." (110)
One is tempted to wonder if that was a royal "we."
Holbrooke not only represented the United States, he
literally made American policy concerning Bosnia,
often on the spot. He was no mere emissary, but an
avatar of the entire American government in the eyes
of the warring factions. When Secretary of State
Warren Christopher told him, "I'm not always sure
what you are doing, or why. but you always seem to
have a reason, and it seems to work," (239) it was
abundantly clear that Holbrooke had a carte blanche
from his superiors.
Bombs for Peace
One thing Holbrooke used this power for was to
orchestrate Imperial intervention and support certain
combatants in actions that would normally be
condemned as despicable and even atrocious. For
example, the greatest ethnic cleansing of the entire
war, the August 1995 Croat offensive against the
Serbian Krajina, is put into perspective in Chapter 6.
During one meeting with Croatian officials, Robert
Frasure, a senior US diplomat who soon thereafter
died on the road to Sarajevo, handed Holbrooke a
note:
Dick: We "hired" these guys to be our junkyard dogs
because we were desperate. We need to try to
"control" them. But it is no time to get squeamish
about things. (73)
Holbrooke's sympathies for the official Bosnian
Muslim cause (as opposed to the real cause) are
revealed as early as Chapter 3. In a 1992 policy
proposal to the Clinton administration, he advocated
"direct use of force against the Serbs," (52) something
he finally had a chance to do in 1995. After an
explosion in Sarajevo killed a dozen people in the
marketplace, NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb
targets determined months in advance (102).
The bombing helped establish NATO - and the
Americans - as the strongest party in the conflict.
Peace took a back seat to power: "It is now essential to
establish that we are negotiating from a position of
strength. if the air strikes resume and hurt the
negotiations, so be it." (119)
There was also no doubt as to whose side the US
supported: "It helped that Izetbegovic saw I was
fighting hard for something he desperately wanted -
the resumption of the bombing." (131)
Holbrooke's determination resulted in a plea to
Washington: "Give us bombs for peace." (132) And a
strategy was born.
Holbrooke and Milosevic
By the time the bombing, cajoling, badgering, and
"shuttle diplomacy" gathered the representatives of
three warring parties at the airbase near Dayton -
deliberately chosen as a display of American air
power (233) - Holbrooke was almost completely in
control of orchestrating the end the Bosnian War. His
greatest coup was managing to maneuver Serbian
president Milosevic into representing the Bosnian
Serbs, thus making it appear Belgrade was always
behind their actions - just what the Muslim and
western propaganda had alleged all along.
Those especially interested in better understanding
Milosevic can find much useful information in
Holbrooke's memoir. Even though he worked
relentlessly against the "Serb aggression," (42) and
tried to trick, bully and double-cross the Serbian
leader, Holbrooke cannot help but describe Milosevic
with a mixture of grudging admiration and respect:
"Watching Milosevic turn on his charm, Warren
Cristopher observed that had fate dealt him a
different birthplace and education, he would have
been a successful politician in a democratic country."
(235)
No wonder that Milosevic wants to call Holbrooke as
a defense witness before the Hague Inquisition.
Liar, Cheat and Bully
Holbrooke's own accounts of Dayton indicate that his
team was literally negotiating on behalf of the
Muslims, whose role was limited to petulantly
rejecting all solutions in the hope that better (i.e. more
favorable) ones would be produced next. At one point,
the Americans succeeded in securing 55% of the
territory for the Muslim-Croat Federation - until
Milosevic accidentally saw the charts aimed to
persuade the Muslims and angrily accused Holbrooke
of cheating him (295).
Realizing the Americans were not honest brokers,
Milosevic then tried to strike a deal with the Muslims
directly, and signed away territory after territory to
make that possible:
"It was clear: Milosevic wanted an agreement then
and there. But he insisted, at all times, to 51-49."
(299)
But even as Milosevic and Izetbegovic's foreign
minister Silajdzic agreed on a map (though with much
protestations from the Croats), Izetbegovic himself
refused to accept it! Here is Holbrooke's reaction:
"At 11:00 a.m., [EU envoy Carl] Bildt came to my
room to ask how we were doing. 'We are deeply
concerned,' I said, that even if Milosevic makes more
concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.'
'Do you think Izetbegovic even wants a deal?' Carl
asked. It was a question that Warren Christopher had
also been asking. 'I'm never quite sure,' I replied.
'Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than
peace - but he can't have both.' Chris Hill, normally
highly supportive of the Bosnians, exploded in
momentary anger and frustration. 'These people are
impossible to help,' he said. It was a telling statement
from a man who had devoted years of his life to the
search for ways to help create a Bosnian state." (302)
Note that "Bosnian" here is used interchangeably with
"Muslim." Policy was made based on such ignorant
assumptions. But were they ignorant, or deliberately
malicious? For Holbrooke himself uses the term
"Muslims" often enough. For example, when
discussing the status of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo,
which both he and Izetbegovic insisted on reuniting
under Muslim rule:
"[Milosevic] still sought political equality among
ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected
because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who
would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb
obstructionism." (259)
As a result, Sarajevo is over 90% Muslim today.
A Call to Empire
As a direct result of Dayton, Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia are again increasingly vulnerable to political
domination by the Muslims - the very issue which
sparked the war in 1992. But Holbrooke could care
less - when the Dayton agreement was signed, it
accomplished a much greater purpose than ending the
Bosnian War: "Suddenly, the war was over - and
America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined."
(358)
Indeed, it was Holbrooke who most clearly articulated
the Imperial argument that intervention in the
Balkans helped shape the post-Cold War course of
U.S. foreign policy:
"Criticism of President Clinton as a weak leader
ended abruptly, especially in Europe and among the
Muslim nations. [.] [E]ven those who chafed at the
reassertion of American power conceded, at least
implicitly, its necessity. [.] After Dayton, American
foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular.
This may have been as much perception as reality, but
the perception mattered." (359)
It began with Bosnia, continued in Kosovo, and went
on to Afghanistan and Iraq, each intervention more
brazen than the one before, each accepted because of
the precedent of the one before. That Bush escalated
the policy initiated under Clinton only shows that
Empire transcends party lines.
Holbrooke concluded To End A War with a call to
Empire:
"There will be other Bosnias in our lives - areas
where early outside involvement can be decisive, and
American leadership will be required. The world's
richest nation, one that presumes to great moral
authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to
conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The
world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric
the next time we face a challenge to peace." (369)
Even though he is no longer a major player, his call
has been heeded. So much for the "day everything
changed."
From Star to Footnote
Crafting the Dayton Accords may have been the
pinnacle of Holbrooke's career. After a two-year
stint as an investment banker, he re-entered
diplomatic waters with mixed results. In late 1998, he
tried to repeat his work in Bosnia by persuading
Yugoslav president Milosevic to surrender Kosovo.
But the same trick could not work on Milosevic
twice. Holbrooke returned home in defeat.
The following year, he was nominated as the US
Ambassador to the UN, but the appointment stalled
when he was accused of violating federal ethics
guidelines. He admitted no wrongdoing but paid the
fine. After the UN stint, he was tapped to become
Secretary of State in Gore's administration. The
scandal-ridden election of 2000 extinguished that
hope. Richard Holbrooke thus passed from the
diplomatic stage, and it is unclear whether he will
ever step into the limelight again. But even as he
becomes a footnote in American politics, the effects
of his 1995 campaign in Bosnia remain, lingering on
as a reminder of what one arrogant, unscrupulous man
can do with Imperial power.
And if that is not the best argument against the
existence of Imperial power, what is?
-Nebojsa Malic
Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 07:21:30 +0200
From: "Darka"
To: <Ova adresa el. pošte je zaštićena od spambotova. Omogućite JavaScript da biste je videli.>
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m052803.html
Antiwar.com
May 28, 2003
Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
How the US 'Ended' the Bosnian War
To End A War, by Richard Holbrooke
New York, Random House, June 1998, 432 pages (hardcover)
Few things have been as grossly misunderstood as the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known by its
birthplace as "Dayton." Agreed at the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton,
Ohio and initialed in Paris, France on 21 November
1995, the Dayton Agreement finally established
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, after a three-year
interethnic war following its 1992 international
recognition. It also completely failed to resolve any of
issues that caused the war.
Instead, it was a feat of social engineering
unprecedented at the time, attempting through force
and bluster to forge a nation out of bitter enmities.
That should not have surprised anyone, given that
force and bluster were the main character traits of
Dayton's chief creator, rogue American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke.
Proud 'Peacemaker'
Holbrooke had a long and distinguished career in
foreign affairs, starting from his Foreign Service job
in Vietnam in 1962. He also edited the Foreign
Policyjournal (1972-76), served as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
(1977-1981), US Ambassador to Germany (1993-94),
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (1994-96). It was in this last
capacity that he came to preside over the "peace
process" in Bosnia.
To End A War is an extraordinary book documenting
not just his endeavors in Bosnia, but the underlying
logic, emotions and politics behind them. For all his
failings - arrogance, ignorance and vanity easily
spring to mind - Holbrooke is also earnest. Though
his memoir is as self-serving as, say, Lord David
Owen's Balkan Odyssey, unlike Owen, Holbrooke is
not trying to make excuses: he is actually proud of his
actions, thoughts and opinions. There is not one hint
of modesty - false or otherwise - in Holbrooke, and
for that one must be grateful. For in chronicling his
efforts to badger, bully and beat the Bosnians into
ending their war - on American terms, of course - he
offers surprisingly clear insights into the U.S.
Balkans policy at the time, and his own role therein.
Reading Holbrooke's memoir, one needs to keep in
mind that this man is the chief creator of the current
Bosnian state, a paradox protectorate continuing to
exist in spite of itself.
'I Am The Empire'
Anyone who even slightly doubts the Official Truth
about the Balkans wars will be struck by Holbrooke's
cavalier dismissal of any pretense of civility when
dealing with the locals - especially the Serbs, for
whom he had only disdain dangerously bordering on
hatred. To him, prejudices, deceptions and
fabrications represent fully justified means to the
goal. Cautioned by his British colleague to treat Serbs
with some consideration, Holbrooke replied:
"The Serb view of history was their problem. ours
was to end a war." (110)
One is tempted to wonder if that was a royal "we."
Holbrooke not only represented the United States, he
literally made American policy concerning Bosnia,
often on the spot. He was no mere emissary, but an
avatar of the entire American government in the eyes
of the warring factions. When Secretary of State
Warren Christopher told him, "I'm not always sure
what you are doing, or why. but you always seem to
have a reason, and it seems to work," (239) it was
abundantly clear that Holbrooke had a carte blanche
from his superiors.
Bombs for Peace
One thing Holbrooke used this power for was to
orchestrate Imperial intervention and support certain
combatants in actions that would normally be
condemned as despicable and even atrocious. For
example, the greatest ethnic cleansing of the entire
war, the August 1995 Croat offensive against the
Serbian Krajina, is put into perspective in Chapter 6.
During one meeting with Croatian officials, Robert
Frasure, a senior US diplomat who soon thereafter
died on the road to Sarajevo, handed Holbrooke a
note:
Dick: We "hired" these guys to be our junkyard dogs
because we were desperate. We need to try to
"control" them. But it is no time to get squeamish
about things. (73)
Holbrooke's sympathies for the official Bosnian
Muslim cause (as opposed to the real cause) are
revealed as early as Chapter 3. In a 1992 policy
proposal to the Clinton administration, he advocated
"direct use of force against the Serbs," (52) something
he finally had a chance to do in 1995. After an
explosion in Sarajevo killed a dozen people in the
marketplace, NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb
targets determined months in advance (102).
The bombing helped establish NATO - and the
Americans - as the strongest party in the conflict.
Peace took a back seat to power: "It is now essential to
establish that we are negotiating from a position of
strength. if the air strikes resume and hurt the
negotiations, so be it." (119)
There was also no doubt as to whose side the US
supported: "It helped that Izetbegovic saw I was
fighting hard for something he desperately wanted -
the resumption of the bombing." (131)
Holbrooke's determination resulted in a plea to
Washington: "Give us bombs for peace." (132) And a
strategy was born.
Holbrooke and Milosevic
By the time the bombing, cajoling, badgering, and
"shuttle diplomacy" gathered the representatives of
three warring parties at the airbase near Dayton -
deliberately chosen as a display of American air
power (233) - Holbrooke was almost completely in
control of orchestrating the end the Bosnian War. His
greatest coup was managing to maneuver Serbian
president Milosevic into representing the Bosnian
Serbs, thus making it appear Belgrade was always
behind their actions - just what the Muslim and
western propaganda had alleged all along.
Those especially interested in better understanding
Milosevic can find much useful information in
Holbrooke's memoir. Even though he worked
relentlessly against the "Serb aggression," (42) and
tried to trick, bully and double-cross the Serbian
leader, Holbrooke cannot help but describe Milosevic
with a mixture of grudging admiration and respect:
"Watching Milosevic turn on his charm, Warren
Cristopher observed that had fate dealt him a
different birthplace and education, he would have
been a successful politician in a democratic country."
(235)
No wonder that Milosevic wants to call Holbrooke as
a defense witness before the Hague Inquisition.
Liar, Cheat and Bully
Holbrooke's own accounts of Dayton indicate that his
team was literally negotiating on behalf of the
Muslims, whose role was limited to petulantly
rejecting all solutions in the hope that better (i.e. more
favorable) ones would be produced next. At one point,
the Americans succeeded in securing 55% of the
territory for the Muslim-Croat Federation - until
Milosevic accidentally saw the charts aimed to
persuade the Muslims and angrily accused Holbrooke
of cheating him (295).
Realizing the Americans were not honest brokers,
Milosevic then tried to strike a deal with the Muslims
directly, and signed away territory after territory to
make that possible:
"It was clear: Milosevic wanted an agreement then
and there. But he insisted, at all times, to 51-49."
(299)
But even as Milosevic and Izetbegovic's foreign
minister Silajdzic agreed on a map (though with much
protestations from the Croats), Izetbegovic himself
refused to accept it! Here is Holbrooke's reaction:
"At 11:00 a.m., [EU envoy Carl] Bildt came to my
room to ask how we were doing. 'We are deeply
concerned,' I said, that even if Milosevic makes more
concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.'
'Do you think Izetbegovic even wants a deal?' Carl
asked. It was a question that Warren Christopher had
also been asking. 'I'm never quite sure,' I replied.
'Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than
peace - but he can't have both.' Chris Hill, normally
highly supportive of the Bosnians, exploded in
momentary anger and frustration. 'These people are
impossible to help,' he said. It was a telling statement
from a man who had devoted years of his life to the
search for ways to help create a Bosnian state." (302)
Note that "Bosnian" here is used interchangeably with
"Muslim." Policy was made based on such ignorant
assumptions. But were they ignorant, or deliberately
malicious? For Holbrooke himself uses the term
"Muslims" often enough. For example, when
discussing the status of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo,
which both he and Izetbegovic insisted on reuniting
under Muslim rule:
"[Milosevic] still sought political equality among
ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected
because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who
would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb
obstructionism." (259)
As a result, Sarajevo is over 90% Muslim today.
A Call to Empire
As a direct result of Dayton, Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia are again increasingly vulnerable to political
domination by the Muslims - the very issue which
sparked the war in 1992. But Holbrooke could care
less - when the Dayton agreement was signed, it
accomplished a much greater purpose than ending the
Bosnian War: "Suddenly, the war was over - and
America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined."
(358)
Indeed, it was Holbrooke who most clearly articulated
the Imperial argument that intervention in the
Balkans helped shape the post-Cold War course of
U.S. foreign policy:
"Criticism of President Clinton as a weak leader
ended abruptly, especially in Europe and among the
Muslim nations. [.] [E]ven those who chafed at the
reassertion of American power conceded, at least
implicitly, its necessity. [.] After Dayton, American
foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular.
This may have been as much perception as reality, but
the perception mattered." (359)
It began with Bosnia, continued in Kosovo, and went
on to Afghanistan and Iraq, each intervention more
brazen than the one before, each accepted because of
the precedent of the one before. That Bush escalated
the policy initiated under Clinton only shows that
Empire transcends party lines.
Holbrooke concluded To End A War with a call to
Empire:
"There will be other Bosnias in our lives - areas
where early outside involvement can be decisive, and
American leadership will be required. The world's
richest nation, one that presumes to great moral
authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to
conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The
world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric
the next time we face a challenge to peace." (369)
Even though he is no longer a major player, his call
has been heeded. So much for the "day everything
changed."
From Star to Footnote
Crafting the Dayton Accords may have been the
pinnacle of Holbrooke's career. After a two-year
stint as an investment banker, he re-entered
diplomatic waters with mixed results. In late 1998, he
tried to repeat his work in Bosnia by persuading
Yugoslav president Milosevic to surrender Kosovo.
But the same trick could not work on Milosevic
twice. Holbrooke returned home in defeat.
The following year, he was nominated as the US
Ambassador to the UN, but the appointment stalled
when he was accused of violating federal ethics
guidelines. He admitted no wrongdoing but paid the
fine. After the UN stint, he was tapped to become
Secretary of State in Gore's administration. The
scandal-ridden election of 2000 extinguished that
hope. Richard Holbrooke thus passed from the
diplomatic stage, and it is unclear whether he will
ever step into the limelight again. But even as he
becomes a footnote in American politics, the effects
of his 1995 campaign in Bosnia remain, lingering on
as a reminder of what one arrogant, unscrupulous man
can do with Imperial power.
And if that is not the best argument against the
existence of Imperial power, what is?
-Nebojsa Malic