[ "C'erano solo due ragioni credibili per invadere l'Iraq: il controllo
del petrolio e la difesa del dollaro..." Lo scrive John Chapman sul
Guardian. E specifica: la "vera colpa" di Saddam e' stata quella di
aver proposto, pochi anni fa, che il suo petrolio venisse pagato in
euro.
Tutti lo sanno, tranne il pubblico italiano: il petrolio oramai
scarseggia (siamo attorno al "picco di estrazione"), percio' e' sempre
piu' strategico: e' di ieri il superamento della soglia-record di 42
dollari al barile! E, di fatto, il valore del dollaro e' oggi fissato
solo dalla violenza militare, poiche' esso non corrisponde piu',
nemmeno alla lontana, all'effettivo stato dell'economia degli USA (vedi
il loro vertiginoso deficit).
Come nascondere questa semplice, devastante realta'?
Beh, per esempio inventandosi le "armi di distruzione di massa di
Saddam", come ha fatto Blair, oppure evocando la "spirale
guerra-terrorismo", come fa Bertinotti... (a cura di I. Slavo) ]
The real reasons Bush went to war
WMD was the rationale for invading Iraq. But what was really driving
the US were fears over oil and the future of the dollar
John Chapman
Wednesday July 28, 2004
The Guardian
There were only two credible reasons for invading Iraq: control over
oil and preservation of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. Yet
the government has kept silent on these factors, instead treating us to
the intriguing distractions of the Hutton and Butler reports.
Butler's overall finding of a "group think" failure was pure charity.
Absurdities like the 45-minute claim were adopted by high-level
officials and ministers because those concerned recognised the
substantial reason for war - oil. WMD provided only the bureaucratic
argument: the real reason was that Iraq was swimming in oil.
Some may still believe the eve-of-war contention by Donald Rumsfeld
that "We won't take forces and go around the world and try to take
other people's oil ... That's not how democracies operate." Maybe
others will go along with Blair's post-war contention: "There is no way
whatsoever, if oil were the issue, that it would not have been
infinitely easier to cut a deal with Saddam."
But senior civil servants are not so naive. On the eve of the Butler
report, I attended the 40th anniversary of the Mandarins cricket club.
I was taken aside by a knighted civil servant to discuss my contention
in a Guardian article earlier this year that Sir Humphrey was no longer
independent. I had then attacked the deceits in the WMD report, and
this impressive official and I discussed the geopolitical issues of
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and US unwillingness to build nuclear power
stations and curb petrol consumption, rather than go to war.
Saddam controlled a country at the centre of the Gulf, a region with a
quarter of world oil production in 2003, and containing more than 60%
of the world's known reserves. With 115bn barrels of oil reserves, and
perhaps as much again in the 90% of the country not yet explored, Iraq
has capacity second only to Saudi Arabia. The US, in contrast, is the
world's largest net importer of oil. Last year the US Department of
Energy forecast that imports will cover 70% of domestic demand by 2025.
By invading Iraq, Bush has taken over the Iraqi oil fields, and
persuaded the UN to lift production limits imposed after the Kuwait
war. Production may rise to 3m barrels a day by year end, about double
2002 levels. More oil should bring down Opec-led prices, and if Iraqi
oil production rose to 6m barrels a day, Bush could even attack the
Opec oil-pricing cartel.
Control over Iraqi oil should improve security of supplies to the US,
and possibly the UK, with the development and exploration contracts
between Saddam and China, France, India, Indonesia and Russia being set
aside in favour of US and possibly British companies. And a US military
presence in Iraq is an insurance policy against any extremists in Iran
and Saudi Arabia.
Overseeing Iraqi oil supplies, and maybe soon supplies from other Gulf
countries, would enable the US to use oil as power. In 1990, the then
oil man, Dick Cheney, wrote that: "Whoever controls the flow of Persian
Gulf oil has a stranglehold not only on our economy but also on the
other countries of the world as well."
In the 70s, the US agreed with Saudi Arabia that Opec oil should be
traded in dollars. American governments have since been able to print
dollars to cover huge trading deficits, with the further benefit of
those dollars being placed in the US money markets. In return, the US
allowed the Opec countries to operate a production and pricing cartel.
Over the past 15 years, the overall US deficit with the rest of the
world has risen to $2,700bn - an abuse of its privileged currency
position. Although about 80% of foreign exchange and half of world
trade is in dollars, the euro provides a realistic alternative. Euro
countries also have a bigger share of world trade, and of trade with
Opec countries, than the US.
In 1999, Iran mooted pricing its oil in euros, and in late 2000 Saddam
made the switch for Iraqi oil. In early 2002 Bush placed Iran and Iraq
in the axis of evil. If the other Opec countries had followed Saddam's
move to euros, the consequences for Bush could have been huge.
Worldwide switches out of the dollar, on top of the already huge
deficit, would have led to a plummeting dollar, a runaway from US
markets and dramatic upheavals in the US.
Bush had many reasons to invade Iraq, but why did Blair join him? He
might have squared his conscience by looking at UK oil prospects. In
1968, when North Sea oil was in its infancy, as private secretary to
the minister of power I wrote a report on oil policy, advocating
changes like the setting up of a British national oil company (as was
done). My proposals found little favour with the BP/Shell-supporting
officials, but Richard Marsh, the then minister, pressed them and the
petroleum division was expanded into an operations division and a
planning division.
Sadly, when I was promoted out of private office the free-trading
petroleum officials conspired to block my posting to the planning
division, where I would surely have advocated a prudent exploitation of
North Sea resources to reduce our dependence on the likes of Iraq. UK
North Sea oil output peaked in 1999, and has since fallen by one-sixth.
Exports now barely cover imports, and we shall shortly be a net oil
importer. Supporting Bush might have been justified on geo-strategic
grounds.
Oil and the dollar were the real reasons for the attack on Iraq, with
WMD as the public reason now exposed as woefully inadequate. Should we
now look at Bush and Blair as brilliant strategists whose actions will
improve the security of our oil supplies, or as international conmen?
Should we support them if they sweep into Iran and perhaps Saudi
Arabia, or should there be a regime change in the UK and US instead?
If the latter, we should follow that up by adopting the pious aims of
UN oversight of world oil exploitation within a world energy plan, and
the replacement of the dollar with a new reserve currency based on a
basket of national currencies.
· John Chapman is a former assistant secretary in the civil service, in
which he served from 1963-96
del petrolio e la difesa del dollaro..." Lo scrive John Chapman sul
Guardian. E specifica: la "vera colpa" di Saddam e' stata quella di
aver proposto, pochi anni fa, che il suo petrolio venisse pagato in
euro.
Tutti lo sanno, tranne il pubblico italiano: il petrolio oramai
scarseggia (siamo attorno al "picco di estrazione"), percio' e' sempre
piu' strategico: e' di ieri il superamento della soglia-record di 42
dollari al barile! E, di fatto, il valore del dollaro e' oggi fissato
solo dalla violenza militare, poiche' esso non corrisponde piu',
nemmeno alla lontana, all'effettivo stato dell'economia degli USA (vedi
il loro vertiginoso deficit).
Come nascondere questa semplice, devastante realta'?
Beh, per esempio inventandosi le "armi di distruzione di massa di
Saddam", come ha fatto Blair, oppure evocando la "spirale
guerra-terrorismo", come fa Bertinotti... (a cura di I. Slavo) ]
The real reasons Bush went to war
WMD was the rationale for invading Iraq. But what was really driving
the US were fears over oil and the future of the dollar
John Chapman
Wednesday July 28, 2004
The Guardian
There were only two credible reasons for invading Iraq: control over
oil and preservation of the dollar as the world's reserve currency. Yet
the government has kept silent on these factors, instead treating us to
the intriguing distractions of the Hutton and Butler reports.
Butler's overall finding of a "group think" failure was pure charity.
Absurdities like the 45-minute claim were adopted by high-level
officials and ministers because those concerned recognised the
substantial reason for war - oil. WMD provided only the bureaucratic
argument: the real reason was that Iraq was swimming in oil.
Some may still believe the eve-of-war contention by Donald Rumsfeld
that "We won't take forces and go around the world and try to take
other people's oil ... That's not how democracies operate." Maybe
others will go along with Blair's post-war contention: "There is no way
whatsoever, if oil were the issue, that it would not have been
infinitely easier to cut a deal with Saddam."
But senior civil servants are not so naive. On the eve of the Butler
report, I attended the 40th anniversary of the Mandarins cricket club.
I was taken aside by a knighted civil servant to discuss my contention
in a Guardian article earlier this year that Sir Humphrey was no longer
independent. I had then attacked the deceits in the WMD report, and
this impressive official and I discussed the geopolitical issues of
Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and US unwillingness to build nuclear power
stations and curb petrol consumption, rather than go to war.
Saddam controlled a country at the centre of the Gulf, a region with a
quarter of world oil production in 2003, and containing more than 60%
of the world's known reserves. With 115bn barrels of oil reserves, and
perhaps as much again in the 90% of the country not yet explored, Iraq
has capacity second only to Saudi Arabia. The US, in contrast, is the
world's largest net importer of oil. Last year the US Department of
Energy forecast that imports will cover 70% of domestic demand by 2025.
By invading Iraq, Bush has taken over the Iraqi oil fields, and
persuaded the UN to lift production limits imposed after the Kuwait
war. Production may rise to 3m barrels a day by year end, about double
2002 levels. More oil should bring down Opec-led prices, and if Iraqi
oil production rose to 6m barrels a day, Bush could even attack the
Opec oil-pricing cartel.
Control over Iraqi oil should improve security of supplies to the US,
and possibly the UK, with the development and exploration contracts
between Saddam and China, France, India, Indonesia and Russia being set
aside in favour of US and possibly British companies. And a US military
presence in Iraq is an insurance policy against any extremists in Iran
and Saudi Arabia.
Overseeing Iraqi oil supplies, and maybe soon supplies from other Gulf
countries, would enable the US to use oil as power. In 1990, the then
oil man, Dick Cheney, wrote that: "Whoever controls the flow of Persian
Gulf oil has a stranglehold not only on our economy but also on the
other countries of the world as well."
In the 70s, the US agreed with Saudi Arabia that Opec oil should be
traded in dollars. American governments have since been able to print
dollars to cover huge trading deficits, with the further benefit of
those dollars being placed in the US money markets. In return, the US
allowed the Opec countries to operate a production and pricing cartel.
Over the past 15 years, the overall US deficit with the rest of the
world has risen to $2,700bn - an abuse of its privileged currency
position. Although about 80% of foreign exchange and half of world
trade is in dollars, the euro provides a realistic alternative. Euro
countries also have a bigger share of world trade, and of trade with
Opec countries, than the US.
In 1999, Iran mooted pricing its oil in euros, and in late 2000 Saddam
made the switch for Iraqi oil. In early 2002 Bush placed Iran and Iraq
in the axis of evil. If the other Opec countries had followed Saddam's
move to euros, the consequences for Bush could have been huge.
Worldwide switches out of the dollar, on top of the already huge
deficit, would have led to a plummeting dollar, a runaway from US
markets and dramatic upheavals in the US.
Bush had many reasons to invade Iraq, but why did Blair join him? He
might have squared his conscience by looking at UK oil prospects. In
1968, when North Sea oil was in its infancy, as private secretary to
the minister of power I wrote a report on oil policy, advocating
changes like the setting up of a British national oil company (as was
done). My proposals found little favour with the BP/Shell-supporting
officials, but Richard Marsh, the then minister, pressed them and the
petroleum division was expanded into an operations division and a
planning division.
Sadly, when I was promoted out of private office the free-trading
petroleum officials conspired to block my posting to the planning
division, where I would surely have advocated a prudent exploitation of
North Sea resources to reduce our dependence on the likes of Iraq. UK
North Sea oil output peaked in 1999, and has since fallen by one-sixth.
Exports now barely cover imports, and we shall shortly be a net oil
importer. Supporting Bush might have been justified on geo-strategic
grounds.
Oil and the dollar were the real reasons for the attack on Iraq, with
WMD as the public reason now exposed as woefully inadequate. Should we
now look at Bush and Blair as brilliant strategists whose actions will
improve the security of our oil supplies, or as international conmen?
Should we support them if they sweep into Iran and perhaps Saudi
Arabia, or should there be a regime change in the UK and US instead?
If the latter, we should follow that up by adopting the pious aims of
UN oversight of world oil exploitation within a world energy plan, and
the replacement of the dollar with a new reserve currency based on a
basket of national currencies.
· John Chapman is a former assistant secretary in the civil service, in
which he served from 1963-96