(2. continua)
Blackmail and Extortion of Proof
If Richard Goldstone had possessed reliable and incriminating evidence
against Djukic and Krsmanovic, the disturbing realization that he had
broken the Rules of the Tribunal would not have bothered him much.
Since,
however, there was no such proof or the hope that it would be found,
Goldstone was forced to twist, distort and falsify the facts in an
attempt
to extract himself. In this he was generously assisted by the president
of
the First Trial Chamber, French judge Claude Jorda. The first step was
to
change the legal status of Djordje Djukic and Aleksa Krsmanovic. To do
this
Richard Goldstone and the responsible judges off-handedly forgot that on
13
February 1996 The Hague Tribunal spokesman, Christian Chartier, publicly
announced that investigation into
two hig ranking officers had begun, that as uspects they had been
informed
that they had the right not to answer questions, the right to choose a
lawyer and that they would have at their disposal a court translator.
The
very next day, 14 February 1996, Goldstone himself announced that Djukic
and Krsmanovic had been transferred to The Hague "under suspicion that
during the conflict in former Yugoslavia they had committed serious
breaches of international humanitarian laws". However, instead of this
qualification, on 28 February Goldstone suddenly changed the status of
the
prisoners to potential witnesses, to the shock of defense lawyers, Toma
Fila and Milan Vujin, who immediately stated that this was "the first
time"
they had heard their clients were witnesses and not suspects. (3)
The real reason behind the change in the prisoners' status was due to
the
fact that in order to summon witnesses to The Hague it was not necessary
to
have either a formal demand for competence deferral by the Trial Chamber
or
a formal decision by the Sarajevo High Court deferring its competence to
the International Tribunal. According to Rule 90 bis which was
subsequently
added, the International Tribunal can demand, in the interest of a
testimony, temporary access to detained persons. Thus it turns out that
Djukic and Krsmanovic were kidnapped and formally placed under criminal
investigation in Sarajevo so that, hand cuffed, they could be
transferred
to The Hague prison in order to supposedly testify. In this way the
Prosecutor and the judges 'enriched' the international practice of
criminal
law by instituting the preventive arrest of witnesses - something
unknown
to any civilized criminal legislation. A witness can only be forcefully
brought to court if he or she does not respond to a subpoena or excuse
their absence.
Illegal Indictment
The act of issuing a bill of indictment against General Djordje Djukic
in
itself was a new and serious violation of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. In the surprising change of Djukic's and rsmanovic's status
from
suspects to witnesses, Richard Goldstone tacitly admitted that the Rules
had been seriously violated since there had been no previous institution
of
competence deferral procedures. Therefore, it could be assumed that the
same mistake would not be made again. It has already
been said that investigation against General Djordje Djukic and his
detention in prison had been set in motion by ruling no. Ki-57/96 of the
High Court in Sarajevo of 6 February. This meant that criminal
proceedings
before the court of the Muslim-Croat Federation had been instigated.
Under
such circumstances, especially as he did not possess any proof, the
Tribunal Prosecutor was not in the position to directly press charges
against Djukic. To do this he first had to propose to the Trial Chamber
that it submit a formal demand for deferral of competence. Only when the
High Court in Sarajevo delivered its decision to defer its competence to
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal would Richard Goldstone
have
had the authority to issue a bill of indictment. However, he once again
broke Rules 9 and 10 of the Tribunal and did just this without the
Sarajevo
High Court deferring competence to the International Tribunal, or indeed
the International Tribunal taking over jurisdiction of this case. To
make
matters worse, Goldstone was supported by Justice Adolphus Godwin
Karibi-Whyte, who accepted the bill of indictment and signed the arrest
warrant fully aware that formal take-over of jurisdiction had not taken
place. Once again it was made clear that neither the Prosecutor nor
certain
of the judges afforded minimum respect to the Rules that should have
been-the backbone of their work.
Aside from formal default the indictment against Djukic had
inadmissible
material shortcomings - Djukic's responsibility was neither specified
nor
backed by any reliable evidence. It was stated that General Djordje
Djukic,
in his capacity as assistant Chief of Staff of Logistics, was
responsible
for the following duties: rear area supplies to all units of the Bosnian
Serb army; recommendations for all cadre appointments; issuance of
orders
related to the delivery of supplies for the Bosnian Serb army
units, regulation of rear area transfers; decisions on the procurement
and
use of materials and technical equipment from the Bosnian Serb army
warehouses. Furthermore, "Djordje Djukic, in agreement with others,
planned, prepared or aided the actions and operations of the Bosnian
Serb
army and its allies", which included the bombing of civilian buildings.
This bombing lasted from May 1992 until December 1995. During this time
"the Bosnian Serb armed forces in Sarajevo deliberately, arbitrarily and
on
a widespread and systematic basis, bombed civilian targets that were of
no
military importance in order to kill, wound, terrorize and demoralize
the
civilian population of Sarajevo".
Hence, by supplying the entire Republika Srpska army, Djukic was
directly
responsible for the war crimes committed. This indictment however, did
not
provide sufficient evidence on the basis of which a causal relationship
could have been established between the deeds of the accused and their
consequences that were qualified as war crimes. Instead of this there
was
an attempt to "prove" that General Djordje Djukic, as assistant Chief of
Staff of Logistics was directly responsible for all operations on the
front
surrounding Sarajevo.
Special attention should be paid to the fact that the Prosecutor did
not
submit the exact dates of the shelling during the given period. This
would
have lent support to the presumed causal relationship between Djordje
Djukic's acts and their consequences - the wounding, killing, and
terrorizing of the civilian population. The Prosecutor did not do this
knowing that throughout the period in question, Djordje Djukic's poor
state
of health had resulted in his extended absence from work for treatment
in
the Military Medical Academy hospital in Belgrade. In fact, had the
exact
dates of the bombing been specified Djukic would have had the perfect
alibi
- reliable proof that on the days in question he was undergoing serious
medical treatment instead of planning and preparing the crimes he was
allegedly
responsible for.
Such incomplete and inexact charges could be used as an indictment
against
thousands of other Serbian soldiers simply by introducing their personal
information and stressing their strict liability for action in any area
of
the front. This, of course, could only happen if strict liability were
an
accepted concept within the criminal law of the International Tribunal
in
The Hague. However, this is something long discarded in civilized
countries.
The evidence collected by the prosecutor was the weakest aspect in the
indictment against General Djordje Djukic. It was based on an overview
of
the organizational structure of the civil and military authority in
Republika Srpska and the internal organization of certain political
parties, including
that of Arkan (Zeljko Raznjatovic). It consisted of information related
only to General Djukic, in particular the way in which he assumed his
position in the Republika Srpska army and his official duties and
obligations. Especially surprising is the fact that this indictment
included data on
Radovan Karadzic. President of Republika Srpska, and General Ratko
Mladic,
Commander of the Republika Srpska army, and their alleged activities
(despite the fact that Richard Goldstone had already charged the two
separately). In all likelihood this was an attempt on the part of
Richard
Goldstone to implicate General Djordje Djukic merely because he
belonged
to the same military organization as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.
A
tabular schedule of the alleged bombing of civilian targets and
population
was provided with no reference to who drew up this schedule
(it could have been done by a journalist on the basis of newspaper
reports), or how reliable the data were.
On the basis of such unconvincing and totally undetermined evidence,
Richard Goldstone detained and indicted Djordje Djukic of alleged action
that could have resulted in life imprisonment. He thereby made it clear
that the Bosnian Serbs came under a special legal category subject to
the
rule of the Queen of Hearts from Alice in Wonderland: "Sentence first -
verdict afterwards".
Professional Defeat Portrayed As "Victory of Humanism"
The Prosecutor knew very well that the offered "facts" were no sort of
proof of Djukic's individual responsibility, but he hoped that by the
time
the case (which was constantly postponed) came to court either something
convincing would be found, or the accused, in his poor state of health
would agree to "cooperate" with the Tribunal as a witness thereby more
or
less validating his presence at The Hague. However, when it became clear
that this last hope would come to nothing, Richard Goldstone summoned
the
strength to make one more desperate move: he proposed the dropping of
charges. Instead of publicly admitting that he had not succeeded in
collecting reliable and convincing evidence, he tried to promote his own
magnanimity and humanity. Despite the fact that he knew of Djukic's
incurable illness from the very beginning, Goldstone only now found it
necessary to inform the Tribunal that according to the independent
opinion
of Danish doctors, Djukic was suffering from terminal cancer that had
already metastased to other organs, including the spine. To save face,
he
ended with hoping that "the withdrawal of the indictment will not be
against his right to indict the accused at some time in the future for
these same offenses should the medical condition of the accused change".
Had the Prosecutor been truly prepared to face up to his own
professional
and human conscience, he would have had to ask himself whether the
kidnapping of Djordje Djukic, his long and debilitating "interrogation"
and
torture in the prison in Muslim Sarajevo, as well as his indictment did
not
exacerbate an accelerated worsening of his already fatal state of
health.
Would Djordje Djukic not have lived longer had he not been exposed to
such
maltreatment, loss of freedom and unfounded accusation? Instead of this
Richard Goldstone coldly noted that the accused probably would not
survived his trial and even if he did, the progressive worsening of his
health would make him almost incapable or meaningfully participating in
his
own defense. Under such conditions his trial would be inherently unfair.
Djukic's defense lawyers, Milan Vujin and Toma Fila, immediately
opposed
Richard Goldstone's proposal and his attempt to wash his hands, under
the
guise of humanity, of his numerous mistakes and the great harm he had
done
Djordje Djukic. With good reason, the defense lawyers claimed that the
Prosecutor had not backed his indictment with any form of evidence of
the
alleged guilt of Djordje Djukic. They demanded of the Tribunal that it
unconditionally free Djukic due to lack of evidence. They
also warned that any other resolution would leave the shadow of
suspicion
of Djukic's guilt as a war criminal thereby damaging his reputation and
honor.
The Trial Chamber presided over by French Justice Claude Jorda
immediately
perceived that Richard Goldstone's proposal was not in accordance with
Rule
51, which states:"The Prosecutor may withdraw an indictment without
leave,
at any time before its confirmation, but thereafter only with leave of
the
Judge who confirmed it or, if at trial only with leave of the Trial
Chamber". As no conditions are specified for the withdrawal of an
indictment as for example in the case of ill health of the accused, it
can
be assumed that this can only be done if the grounds for indictment
disappear. This implies that there was no longer any suspicion, let
alone
evidence, that war crimes had been committed by General Djukic. Thus the
withdrawal of the indictment as proposed by he Prosecutor, meant that it
should never have been made. To indict again for the same offenses
could
not be done as a result of Djukic's improvement of health since
conditional
withdrawal of an indictment does not exist. He could only be indicted
again
on the basis of new, collected evidence.
Confronted by this state of affairs, the Trial Chamber tried to find a
solution which would, at least temporarily, save the face of the
Tribunal
and its Prosecutor. Citing Rule 65 on provisional release, it decided to
free Djukic from detention due to his poor state of health and the lack
of
proper medical care in the prison, leaving the indictment in force.
However, this was a breach of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence that
were
passed by the Tribunal itself. Paragraph (B) of Rule 65 states that a
detained person can be temporarily released "only in exceptional
circumstances, after hearing the representatives of the host country",
i.e.
Holland, and possibly of the Yugoslav Federal Republic where Djukic
traveled to on his release. In a feverish rush to find a way out of this
worrying and humiliating position, the Trial Chamber conveniently forgot
this important stipulation, and gave
no hearing to either Dutch or Yugoslav Government representatives.
Thereby
Djukic's case ended as it began - by flagrant and shameful breach of the
rules that are laid down in civilized criminal procedures. There only
remained for the Appeals Chamber to rule on the Prosecutor's appeal and
the complaint lodged by the defense lawyers who persistently demanded
that
the case be closed with a meritorious, and not procedural, verdict -
meaning that Djordje Djukic be freed on lack of evidence which would
preserve his reputation. Despite their professional and moral defeat,
the
Prosecutor and judges at The Hague at least had the satisfaction of
knowing
that they had shortened the life (6) of General Djordje Djukic by
speeding
up his death - like the riders of the Apocalypse. Djukic's death
came very fast. Already on 18 May 1996, General Djordje Djukic silently
passed away.
If at first glance this looked like clumsy and naive sophistry, in
essence
and by its consequences it was diabolical subterfuge. By changing the
status of the prisoners from suspects to witnesses, the Prosecutor
practically "offered" General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic the
opportunity
to testify
against other people in return for their own release from the charges
and
trial. Clearly this was a form of blackmail and extortion. The
Prosecutor
must have known that such "testimony" is of doubtful credibility since
it
is hard to believe someone who would implicate someone else in order to
be
absolved. What is worse is that the blackmail was substantiated by a
dangerous threat: either you "sing" here in The Hague or we'll hand you
back to your torturers in Muslim Sarajevo. That this was blackmail and
threat was clear to the president of the Trial Chamber, Claude Jorda,
who
almost incredulously asked General Djukic and his lawyer - Milan Vujin
and
Toma Fila - a number of times whether they were aware that if Djukic did
not "voluntarily" testify at The Hague he would be returned to Muslim
Sarajevo where his only hope was the death sentence for alleged
participation in genocide (4) to say nothing of abuse and torture in
prison, something the Muslim police are accustomed and partial to.
In face of the firm refusal of General Djordje Djukic and Colonel
Aleksa
Krsmanovic to "cooperate" with the Prosecutor, at the beginning of May
1996
Richard Goldstone pulled another diabolical move: he decided to separate
the fates of the two Hague prisoners by indicting General Djukic and
returning Colonel Krsmanovic to the mercy of the Muslim police and
Sarajevo
judiciary. This separation was difficult because both were rear officers
-
Djukic was assistant Chief of Staff of Logistics of the Republika Srpska
army, and Krsmanovic deputy commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija rear
corps.
If General Djukic was charged with taking part in the bombing and
destruction of Sarajevo because he supplied with food and ammunition the
Sarajevo-Romanija corps that had surrounded Muslim Sarajevo, why should
Colonel Krsmanovic, who sent the supplies he received from Djukic to the
artillery batteries on the heights around Sarajevo, not answer for the
same
crime? However, what was impossible from the point of view of legal
logic
and principles, was permissible and possible from a practical point of
view, and this is the only thing that seemed to govern Richard
Goldstone.
And what was this practical purpose? When the Prosecutor offered Djukic
and Krsmanovic the opportunity to "cooperate" by implicating their
seniors
(5), their refusal would have had to be so severely punished that in the
future any other person forcefully brought to "testify" at The Hague
would
have had in mind their example and been aware there was no choice but
to
cooperate. This is why Krsmanovic was immediately returned to Sarajevo,
even though the Prosecutor and judges knew very well the danger their
untried witness, against whom they could bring absolutely no charges, no
matter how great their desire to do so, would be exposed to. Richard
Goldstone issued a bill of indictment against General Djordje Djukic
with
the intention of punishing him in a likewise manner for refusing to
"cooperate". Thus he offered the Tribunal its first big opportunity to
bring to trial a high ranking officer of the Serbian Army. Perhaps he
hoped
that this indictment along with the serious state of Djukic's health
would
force Djukic to give in and "sing". Goldstone was not at all worried by
the
cruel abuse of Djukic's serious state of health since all means are
allowed
in carrying out of international justice.
***
To be posted soon, PART II: The Mistreatment of Col. Aleksa Krsmanovic
.
Footnotes
(1) Nasa Borba, 9 February 1996, according to FoNet report of 8
February 1996.
(2) Nasa Borba, 8 February 1996, according to a report by Mirko Klarin,
correspondent in Brussels.
(3) Nasa Borba, 28 February 1996, according to a report by Mirko
Klarin, correspondent in Brussels
(4) Nasa Borba, 1 March 1996 according to a report by Mirko Klarin,
correspondent in Brussels.
(5) In a conversation with Tribunal President Antonio Cassese, one of
the
attorneys asked if President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic
were those who they had in mind. Cassese answered that they needed to
go much higher as if he were sure who was above Karadzic and Mladic
(6) "Doctor Slobodan Ivkovic, who looked after Djordje Djukic during
his
last days, said that "inadequate treatment and therapy during his time
in
prison and hospital brought on a sudden deterioration in the General's
health" and added that General Djukic received salted, greasy food
which
"third and fourth year medical students know that patients operated on
for
cancer of pancreas must not eat". Nasa Borba, 9 February 1996.
The URL for this article is
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/cavoski/c-.htm
www.tenc.net [Emperor's Clothes]
***********************************************************
Bernard Kouchner's Legacy of Failure
by T.V. Weber & Alida Weber (11-7-2000)
We have long complained about the U.S. news media and its failure to
inform the public about the Clinton Administration's legacy of anarchy
and
mayhem in Kosovo. The news media in the U.S. has been virtually silent
about the ongoing genocide against Serbs and other minorities who
continue
to be victimized by terrorists associated with the "disbanded" KLA and
its
sympathizers in the U.N./KFOR occupation.
Over the past few months, though, the level of bloodshed has increased
enough that news of it begins to trickle through the blockade in the
mainstream U.S. news media.
In a 'Newsweek' interview May 15, Bernard Kouchner, the U.N. official
in
charge of the occupation of Kosovo, even admitted, "Apparently a Serb
has a
20 times greater chance of being a victim of a crime than an Albanian
does." But the tone of the Newsweek interview made it clear that neither
Kouchner nor the magazine's interviewer were unduly concerned about this
fact.
An article by 'Associated Press' writer Danica Kirka, "Three Killed in
Shooting in Kosovo," appeared in the 'Washington Post' May 29, 2000. The
article describes an act of senseless slaughter, in which an
unidentified
attacker, "thought to be an Albanian terrorist" and "armed with an
automatic weapon,
opened fire on a group of Serbs gathered in a store in Cernica." Killed
in
the attack were three Serbs: 4-year-old Milos Petrovic; Petrovic's
grandfather, Vojin Vasic, 60; and Tihomir Simjanovic, 45.
Bernard Kouchner was ready with crocodile tears, saying, "What can
possibly be gained by killing a child?"
But according to the article, Kouchner insisted that "only the regime
of
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic stands to gain by unrest in this
southern Serb province."
By making such a statement, Kouchner attempts to shift the blame for
this
innocent child's death to Mr. Milosevic. But that's ridiculous.
Milosevic,
for nearly a year, has had no control, nor even any influence, over
events
in Kosovo. Kouchner himself is the man in charge.
This incident is particularly revealing of Kouchner's true nature, but
the
murder of yet another Serb in Kosovo is, sadly, no isolated event. Too
many
other such crimes have been committed in recent months to repeat all of
them here, but an abundance of reports are available in news archives on
the Internet, for those who can stand to read such a catalogue of
tragedy
and horror.
Most revealing of all is the recent action by Doctors Without Borders
(a/k/a M�decins Sans Fronti�res or MSF), an organization that Kouchner
himself helped to found.
It should tell us something when even MSF can't keep up the charade any
longer. On August 7, 2000, MSF announced in a news release that their
organization is withdrawing from Kosovo. In their words:
"M�decins Sans Fronti�res has decided to reduce its teams and to
stop its present operations in the Kosovar enclaves. The
humanitarian organisation refuses to continue its operations on
behalf of the ethnic minorities in a context where basic
protection
for these populations is not being guaranteed by the military and
civilian administration of Kosovo." (See
http://www.msf.org/projects/europe/kosovo/reports/2000/08/pr-enclaves/
and http://www.egroups.com/message/decani/33582.).
MSF's news release was picked up by 'Associated Press 'and appeared in
'Nando Times' but did not receive wide coverage in the U.S.
Like so many other self-styled do-gooders who have made their careers
in
corrupt government bureaucracies and equally corrupt NGOs, Kouchner is a
trafficker in human misery. He won't willingly do anything to put
himself
and his fellow vultures out of business. After all, the longer he keeps
the
misery going, the longer he, and others like him, keep their jobs. But
this
works only so long as he can continue blaming the misery on someone
other
than himself. And it's getting harder for him to get away with that.
As Kouchner's term as administrator of occupied Kosovo draws to a
close,
it is clear that the reign of corruption, lawlessness, and terror in
Kosovo
represents Kouchner's personal failure. The rest of the world knows it,
even if Kouchner does not.
Further reading
1) For more articles by the Webers, please go to
http://emperors-clothes.com/artbyauth.html and click on "W"
2) Bernard Kouchner has been amazingly open in his advocacy of Kosovo
'independence' (in quotes because it comes the independence movement has
been inspired for 15 years by promises of aid and massive aid from the
U./S. and Germany) see: 'Solana and Kouchner push Kosovo 'Independence'
at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/lovein.htm
3) For more on the character of U.N. control of Kosovo see 'How will
you
plead at the trial, Mr. Annan?' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm
***
The URL for this article is
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/weber/weber.htm
www.tenc.net [Emperor's Clothes]
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Blackmail and Extortion of Proof
If Richard Goldstone had possessed reliable and incriminating evidence
against Djukic and Krsmanovic, the disturbing realization that he had
broken the Rules of the Tribunal would not have bothered him much.
Since,
however, there was no such proof or the hope that it would be found,
Goldstone was forced to twist, distort and falsify the facts in an
attempt
to extract himself. In this he was generously assisted by the president
of
the First Trial Chamber, French judge Claude Jorda. The first step was
to
change the legal status of Djordje Djukic and Aleksa Krsmanovic. To do
this
Richard Goldstone and the responsible judges off-handedly forgot that on
13
February 1996 The Hague Tribunal spokesman, Christian Chartier, publicly
announced that investigation into
two hig ranking officers had begun, that as uspects they had been
informed
that they had the right not to answer questions, the right to choose a
lawyer and that they would have at their disposal a court translator.
The
very next day, 14 February 1996, Goldstone himself announced that Djukic
and Krsmanovic had been transferred to The Hague "under suspicion that
during the conflict in former Yugoslavia they had committed serious
breaches of international humanitarian laws". However, instead of this
qualification, on 28 February Goldstone suddenly changed the status of
the
prisoners to potential witnesses, to the shock of defense lawyers, Toma
Fila and Milan Vujin, who immediately stated that this was "the first
time"
they had heard their clients were witnesses and not suspects. (3)
The real reason behind the change in the prisoners' status was due to
the
fact that in order to summon witnesses to The Hague it was not necessary
to
have either a formal demand for competence deferral by the Trial Chamber
or
a formal decision by the Sarajevo High Court deferring its competence to
the International Tribunal. According to Rule 90 bis which was
subsequently
added, the International Tribunal can demand, in the interest of a
testimony, temporary access to detained persons. Thus it turns out that
Djukic and Krsmanovic were kidnapped and formally placed under criminal
investigation in Sarajevo so that, hand cuffed, they could be
transferred
to The Hague prison in order to supposedly testify. In this way the
Prosecutor and the judges 'enriched' the international practice of
criminal
law by instituting the preventive arrest of witnesses - something
unknown
to any civilized criminal legislation. A witness can only be forcefully
brought to court if he or she does not respond to a subpoena or excuse
their absence.
Illegal Indictment
The act of issuing a bill of indictment against General Djordje Djukic
in
itself was a new and serious violation of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. In the surprising change of Djukic's and rsmanovic's status
from
suspects to witnesses, Richard Goldstone tacitly admitted that the Rules
had been seriously violated since there had been no previous institution
of
competence deferral procedures. Therefore, it could be assumed that the
same mistake would not be made again. It has already
been said that investigation against General Djordje Djukic and his
detention in prison had been set in motion by ruling no. Ki-57/96 of the
High Court in Sarajevo of 6 February. This meant that criminal
proceedings
before the court of the Muslim-Croat Federation had been instigated.
Under
such circumstances, especially as he did not possess any proof, the
Tribunal Prosecutor was not in the position to directly press charges
against Djukic. To do this he first had to propose to the Trial Chamber
that it submit a formal demand for deferral of competence. Only when the
High Court in Sarajevo delivered its decision to defer its competence to
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal would Richard Goldstone
have
had the authority to issue a bill of indictment. However, he once again
broke Rules 9 and 10 of the Tribunal and did just this without the
Sarajevo
High Court deferring competence to the International Tribunal, or indeed
the International Tribunal taking over jurisdiction of this case. To
make
matters worse, Goldstone was supported by Justice Adolphus Godwin
Karibi-Whyte, who accepted the bill of indictment and signed the arrest
warrant fully aware that formal take-over of jurisdiction had not taken
place. Once again it was made clear that neither the Prosecutor nor
certain
of the judges afforded minimum respect to the Rules that should have
been-the backbone of their work.
Aside from formal default the indictment against Djukic had
inadmissible
material shortcomings - Djukic's responsibility was neither specified
nor
backed by any reliable evidence. It was stated that General Djordje
Djukic,
in his capacity as assistant Chief of Staff of Logistics, was
responsible
for the following duties: rear area supplies to all units of the Bosnian
Serb army; recommendations for all cadre appointments; issuance of
orders
related to the delivery of supplies for the Bosnian Serb army
units, regulation of rear area transfers; decisions on the procurement
and
use of materials and technical equipment from the Bosnian Serb army
warehouses. Furthermore, "Djordje Djukic, in agreement with others,
planned, prepared or aided the actions and operations of the Bosnian
Serb
army and its allies", which included the bombing of civilian buildings.
This bombing lasted from May 1992 until December 1995. During this time
"the Bosnian Serb armed forces in Sarajevo deliberately, arbitrarily and
on
a widespread and systematic basis, bombed civilian targets that were of
no
military importance in order to kill, wound, terrorize and demoralize
the
civilian population of Sarajevo".
Hence, by supplying the entire Republika Srpska army, Djukic was
directly
responsible for the war crimes committed. This indictment however, did
not
provide sufficient evidence on the basis of which a causal relationship
could have been established between the deeds of the accused and their
consequences that were qualified as war crimes. Instead of this there
was
an attempt to "prove" that General Djordje Djukic, as assistant Chief of
Staff of Logistics was directly responsible for all operations on the
front
surrounding Sarajevo.
Special attention should be paid to the fact that the Prosecutor did
not
submit the exact dates of the shelling during the given period. This
would
have lent support to the presumed causal relationship between Djordje
Djukic's acts and their consequences - the wounding, killing, and
terrorizing of the civilian population. The Prosecutor did not do this
knowing that throughout the period in question, Djordje Djukic's poor
state
of health had resulted in his extended absence from work for treatment
in
the Military Medical Academy hospital in Belgrade. In fact, had the
exact
dates of the bombing been specified Djukic would have had the perfect
alibi
- reliable proof that on the days in question he was undergoing serious
medical treatment instead of planning and preparing the crimes he was
allegedly
responsible for.
Such incomplete and inexact charges could be used as an indictment
against
thousands of other Serbian soldiers simply by introducing their personal
information and stressing their strict liability for action in any area
of
the front. This, of course, could only happen if strict liability were
an
accepted concept within the criminal law of the International Tribunal
in
The Hague. However, this is something long discarded in civilized
countries.
The evidence collected by the prosecutor was the weakest aspect in the
indictment against General Djordje Djukic. It was based on an overview
of
the organizational structure of the civil and military authority in
Republika Srpska and the internal organization of certain political
parties, including
that of Arkan (Zeljko Raznjatovic). It consisted of information related
only to General Djukic, in particular the way in which he assumed his
position in the Republika Srpska army and his official duties and
obligations. Especially surprising is the fact that this indictment
included data on
Radovan Karadzic. President of Republika Srpska, and General Ratko
Mladic,
Commander of the Republika Srpska army, and their alleged activities
(despite the fact that Richard Goldstone had already charged the two
separately). In all likelihood this was an attempt on the part of
Richard
Goldstone to implicate General Djordje Djukic merely because he
belonged
to the same military organization as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.
A
tabular schedule of the alleged bombing of civilian targets and
population
was provided with no reference to who drew up this schedule
(it could have been done by a journalist on the basis of newspaper
reports), or how reliable the data were.
On the basis of such unconvincing and totally undetermined evidence,
Richard Goldstone detained and indicted Djordje Djukic of alleged action
that could have resulted in life imprisonment. He thereby made it clear
that the Bosnian Serbs came under a special legal category subject to
the
rule of the Queen of Hearts from Alice in Wonderland: "Sentence first -
verdict afterwards".
Professional Defeat Portrayed As "Victory of Humanism"
The Prosecutor knew very well that the offered "facts" were no sort of
proof of Djukic's individual responsibility, but he hoped that by the
time
the case (which was constantly postponed) came to court either something
convincing would be found, or the accused, in his poor state of health
would agree to "cooperate" with the Tribunal as a witness thereby more
or
less validating his presence at The Hague. However, when it became clear
that this last hope would come to nothing, Richard Goldstone summoned
the
strength to make one more desperate move: he proposed the dropping of
charges. Instead of publicly admitting that he had not succeeded in
collecting reliable and convincing evidence, he tried to promote his own
magnanimity and humanity. Despite the fact that he knew of Djukic's
incurable illness from the very beginning, Goldstone only now found it
necessary to inform the Tribunal that according to the independent
opinion
of Danish doctors, Djukic was suffering from terminal cancer that had
already metastased to other organs, including the spine. To save face,
he
ended with hoping that "the withdrawal of the indictment will not be
against his right to indict the accused at some time in the future for
these same offenses should the medical condition of the accused change".
Had the Prosecutor been truly prepared to face up to his own
professional
and human conscience, he would have had to ask himself whether the
kidnapping of Djordje Djukic, his long and debilitating "interrogation"
and
torture in the prison in Muslim Sarajevo, as well as his indictment did
not
exacerbate an accelerated worsening of his already fatal state of
health.
Would Djordje Djukic not have lived longer had he not been exposed to
such
maltreatment, loss of freedom and unfounded accusation? Instead of this
Richard Goldstone coldly noted that the accused probably would not
survived his trial and even if he did, the progressive worsening of his
health would make him almost incapable or meaningfully participating in
his
own defense. Under such conditions his trial would be inherently unfair.
Djukic's defense lawyers, Milan Vujin and Toma Fila, immediately
opposed
Richard Goldstone's proposal and his attempt to wash his hands, under
the
guise of humanity, of his numerous mistakes and the great harm he had
done
Djordje Djukic. With good reason, the defense lawyers claimed that the
Prosecutor had not backed his indictment with any form of evidence of
the
alleged guilt of Djordje Djukic. They demanded of the Tribunal that it
unconditionally free Djukic due to lack of evidence. They
also warned that any other resolution would leave the shadow of
suspicion
of Djukic's guilt as a war criminal thereby damaging his reputation and
honor.
The Trial Chamber presided over by French Justice Claude Jorda
immediately
perceived that Richard Goldstone's proposal was not in accordance with
Rule
51, which states:"The Prosecutor may withdraw an indictment without
leave,
at any time before its confirmation, but thereafter only with leave of
the
Judge who confirmed it or, if at trial only with leave of the Trial
Chamber". As no conditions are specified for the withdrawal of an
indictment as for example in the case of ill health of the accused, it
can
be assumed that this can only be done if the grounds for indictment
disappear. This implies that there was no longer any suspicion, let
alone
evidence, that war crimes had been committed by General Djukic. Thus the
withdrawal of the indictment as proposed by he Prosecutor, meant that it
should never have been made. To indict again for the same offenses
could
not be done as a result of Djukic's improvement of health since
conditional
withdrawal of an indictment does not exist. He could only be indicted
again
on the basis of new, collected evidence.
Confronted by this state of affairs, the Trial Chamber tried to find a
solution which would, at least temporarily, save the face of the
Tribunal
and its Prosecutor. Citing Rule 65 on provisional release, it decided to
free Djukic from detention due to his poor state of health and the lack
of
proper medical care in the prison, leaving the indictment in force.
However, this was a breach of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence that
were
passed by the Tribunal itself. Paragraph (B) of Rule 65 states that a
detained person can be temporarily released "only in exceptional
circumstances, after hearing the representatives of the host country",
i.e.
Holland, and possibly of the Yugoslav Federal Republic where Djukic
traveled to on his release. In a feverish rush to find a way out of this
worrying and humiliating position, the Trial Chamber conveniently forgot
this important stipulation, and gave
no hearing to either Dutch or Yugoslav Government representatives.
Thereby
Djukic's case ended as it began - by flagrant and shameful breach of the
rules that are laid down in civilized criminal procedures. There only
remained for the Appeals Chamber to rule on the Prosecutor's appeal and
the complaint lodged by the defense lawyers who persistently demanded
that
the case be closed with a meritorious, and not procedural, verdict -
meaning that Djordje Djukic be freed on lack of evidence which would
preserve his reputation. Despite their professional and moral defeat,
the
Prosecutor and judges at The Hague at least had the satisfaction of
knowing
that they had shortened the life (6) of General Djordje Djukic by
speeding
up his death - like the riders of the Apocalypse. Djukic's death
came very fast. Already on 18 May 1996, General Djordje Djukic silently
passed away.
If at first glance this looked like clumsy and naive sophistry, in
essence
and by its consequences it was diabolical subterfuge. By changing the
status of the prisoners from suspects to witnesses, the Prosecutor
practically "offered" General Djukic and Colonel Krsmanovic the
opportunity
to testify
against other people in return for their own release from the charges
and
trial. Clearly this was a form of blackmail and extortion. The
Prosecutor
must have known that such "testimony" is of doubtful credibility since
it
is hard to believe someone who would implicate someone else in order to
be
absolved. What is worse is that the blackmail was substantiated by a
dangerous threat: either you "sing" here in The Hague or we'll hand you
back to your torturers in Muslim Sarajevo. That this was blackmail and
threat was clear to the president of the Trial Chamber, Claude Jorda,
who
almost incredulously asked General Djukic and his lawyer - Milan Vujin
and
Toma Fila - a number of times whether they were aware that if Djukic did
not "voluntarily" testify at The Hague he would be returned to Muslim
Sarajevo where his only hope was the death sentence for alleged
participation in genocide (4) to say nothing of abuse and torture in
prison, something the Muslim police are accustomed and partial to.
In face of the firm refusal of General Djordje Djukic and Colonel
Aleksa
Krsmanovic to "cooperate" with the Prosecutor, at the beginning of May
1996
Richard Goldstone pulled another diabolical move: he decided to separate
the fates of the two Hague prisoners by indicting General Djukic and
returning Colonel Krsmanovic to the mercy of the Muslim police and
Sarajevo
judiciary. This separation was difficult because both were rear officers
-
Djukic was assistant Chief of Staff of Logistics of the Republika Srpska
army, and Krsmanovic deputy commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija rear
corps.
If General Djukic was charged with taking part in the bombing and
destruction of Sarajevo because he supplied with food and ammunition the
Sarajevo-Romanija corps that had surrounded Muslim Sarajevo, why should
Colonel Krsmanovic, who sent the supplies he received from Djukic to the
artillery batteries on the heights around Sarajevo, not answer for the
same
crime? However, what was impossible from the point of view of legal
logic
and principles, was permissible and possible from a practical point of
view, and this is the only thing that seemed to govern Richard
Goldstone.
And what was this practical purpose? When the Prosecutor offered Djukic
and Krsmanovic the opportunity to "cooperate" by implicating their
seniors
(5), their refusal would have had to be so severely punished that in the
future any other person forcefully brought to "testify" at The Hague
would
have had in mind their example and been aware there was no choice but
to
cooperate. This is why Krsmanovic was immediately returned to Sarajevo,
even though the Prosecutor and judges knew very well the danger their
untried witness, against whom they could bring absolutely no charges, no
matter how great their desire to do so, would be exposed to. Richard
Goldstone issued a bill of indictment against General Djordje Djukic
with
the intention of punishing him in a likewise manner for refusing to
"cooperate". Thus he offered the Tribunal its first big opportunity to
bring to trial a high ranking officer of the Serbian Army. Perhaps he
hoped
that this indictment along with the serious state of Djukic's health
would
force Djukic to give in and "sing". Goldstone was not at all worried by
the
cruel abuse of Djukic's serious state of health since all means are
allowed
in carrying out of international justice.
***
To be posted soon, PART II: The Mistreatment of Col. Aleksa Krsmanovic
.
Footnotes
(1) Nasa Borba, 9 February 1996, according to FoNet report of 8
February 1996.
(2) Nasa Borba, 8 February 1996, according to a report by Mirko Klarin,
correspondent in Brussels.
(3) Nasa Borba, 28 February 1996, according to a report by Mirko
Klarin, correspondent in Brussels
(4) Nasa Borba, 1 March 1996 according to a report by Mirko Klarin,
correspondent in Brussels.
(5) In a conversation with Tribunal President Antonio Cassese, one of
the
attorneys asked if President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic
were those who they had in mind. Cassese answered that they needed to
go much higher as if he were sure who was above Karadzic and Mladic
(6) "Doctor Slobodan Ivkovic, who looked after Djordje Djukic during
his
last days, said that "inadequate treatment and therapy during his time
in
prison and hospital brought on a sudden deterioration in the General's
health" and added that General Djukic received salted, greasy food
which
"third and fourth year medical students know that patients operated on
for
cancer of pancreas must not eat". Nasa Borba, 9 February 1996.
The URL for this article is
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/cavoski/c-.htm
www.tenc.net [Emperor's Clothes]
***********************************************************
Bernard Kouchner's Legacy of Failure
by T.V. Weber & Alida Weber (11-7-2000)
We have long complained about the U.S. news media and its failure to
inform the public about the Clinton Administration's legacy of anarchy
and
mayhem in Kosovo. The news media in the U.S. has been virtually silent
about the ongoing genocide against Serbs and other minorities who
continue
to be victimized by terrorists associated with the "disbanded" KLA and
its
sympathizers in the U.N./KFOR occupation.
Over the past few months, though, the level of bloodshed has increased
enough that news of it begins to trickle through the blockade in the
mainstream U.S. news media.
In a 'Newsweek' interview May 15, Bernard Kouchner, the U.N. official
in
charge of the occupation of Kosovo, even admitted, "Apparently a Serb
has a
20 times greater chance of being a victim of a crime than an Albanian
does." But the tone of the Newsweek interview made it clear that neither
Kouchner nor the magazine's interviewer were unduly concerned about this
fact.
An article by 'Associated Press' writer Danica Kirka, "Three Killed in
Shooting in Kosovo," appeared in the 'Washington Post' May 29, 2000. The
article describes an act of senseless slaughter, in which an
unidentified
attacker, "thought to be an Albanian terrorist" and "armed with an
automatic weapon,
opened fire on a group of Serbs gathered in a store in Cernica." Killed
in
the attack were three Serbs: 4-year-old Milos Petrovic; Petrovic's
grandfather, Vojin Vasic, 60; and Tihomir Simjanovic, 45.
Bernard Kouchner was ready with crocodile tears, saying, "What can
possibly be gained by killing a child?"
But according to the article, Kouchner insisted that "only the regime
of
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic stands to gain by unrest in this
southern Serb province."
By making such a statement, Kouchner attempts to shift the blame for
this
innocent child's death to Mr. Milosevic. But that's ridiculous.
Milosevic,
for nearly a year, has had no control, nor even any influence, over
events
in Kosovo. Kouchner himself is the man in charge.
This incident is particularly revealing of Kouchner's true nature, but
the
murder of yet another Serb in Kosovo is, sadly, no isolated event. Too
many
other such crimes have been committed in recent months to repeat all of
them here, but an abundance of reports are available in news archives on
the Internet, for those who can stand to read such a catalogue of
tragedy
and horror.
Most revealing of all is the recent action by Doctors Without Borders
(a/k/a M�decins Sans Fronti�res or MSF), an organization that Kouchner
himself helped to found.
It should tell us something when even MSF can't keep up the charade any
longer. On August 7, 2000, MSF announced in a news release that their
organization is withdrawing from Kosovo. In their words:
"M�decins Sans Fronti�res has decided to reduce its teams and to
stop its present operations in the Kosovar enclaves. The
humanitarian organisation refuses to continue its operations on
behalf of the ethnic minorities in a context where basic
protection
for these populations is not being guaranteed by the military and
civilian administration of Kosovo." (See
http://www.msf.org/projects/europe/kosovo/reports/2000/08/pr-enclaves/
and http://www.egroups.com/message/decani/33582.).
MSF's news release was picked up by 'Associated Press 'and appeared in
'Nando Times' but did not receive wide coverage in the U.S.
Like so many other self-styled do-gooders who have made their careers
in
corrupt government bureaucracies and equally corrupt NGOs, Kouchner is a
trafficker in human misery. He won't willingly do anything to put
himself
and his fellow vultures out of business. After all, the longer he keeps
the
misery going, the longer he, and others like him, keep their jobs. But
this
works only so long as he can continue blaming the misery on someone
other
than himself. And it's getting harder for him to get away with that.
As Kouchner's term as administrator of occupied Kosovo draws to a
close,
it is clear that the reign of corruption, lawlessness, and terror in
Kosovo
represents Kouchner's personal failure. The rest of the world knows it,
even if Kouchner does not.
Further reading
1) For more articles by the Webers, please go to
http://emperors-clothes.com/artbyauth.html and click on "W"
2) Bernard Kouchner has been amazingly open in his advocacy of Kosovo
'independence' (in quotes because it comes the independence movement has
been inspired for 15 years by promises of aid and massive aid from the
U./S. and Germany) see: 'Solana and Kouchner push Kosovo 'Independence'
at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/lovein.htm
3) For more on the character of U.N. control of Kosovo see 'How will
you
plead at the trial, Mr. Annan?' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm
***
The URL for this article is
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/weber/weber.htm
www.tenc.net [Emperor's Clothes]
Global Reflexion - Amsterdam - The Netherlands
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