http://www.observer.co.uk/Print/0,3858,4601418,00.html
Observer Worldview Extra
Iraq after Saddam - the next Yugoslavia?
Online commentary: Will the model for
post-Saddam Iraq be post-war Japan or Yugoslavia
after 1992? A former US Ambassador argues that
too little is being done to ensure that the right
choices are made after a war
Robert L Barry
Sunday February 9, 2003
The Observer
Following Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security
Council, war with Iraq seems virtually inevitable. This could
be done without a new Security Council resolution - but the
United States and the United Kingdom would own the
problem of what to do with Iraq on the morning after
Saddam goes. Our publics are not prepared to take on this
burden, and more time is needed to develop support for a
large scale multilateral effort at nation-building.
The central question concerning post-Saddam Iraq is
whether we will be looking at Yugoslavia in 1992 or Japan
in 1945. Based on my years in post-war Bosnia, the
Yugoslav parallel seems compelling. There are strong
separatist movements in both countries. Both have
neighbours which would pull it in different directions, both
are awash in arms, and bloody reprisals will likely take place
in Iraq as they have in the former Yugoslavia. Political
parties care more about gaining control of resources and state
industries than about introducing democracy. Corruption and
a weak justice system discourage foreign investment. The
military and police and judiciary need to be rebuilt from the
ground up. And outside help is urgently needed to repair war
damage and deteriorated infrastructure.
In the former Yugoslavia we have dealt with these problems
through a major effort at nation-building, involving tens of
thousands of peacekeeping troops, thousands of civilian
experts from the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE, the World
Bank, the IMF and more than 50 nations around the world.
Yet a decade later the job is far from done, despite the
expenditure of somewhere close to $100 billion. There is
little sign that serious preparations are under way to deal
with post-Saddam Iraq.
The first question to face on the morning after is who is in
charge. If Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post is correct,
President Bush has decided to assign responsibility to the US
Department of Defense, with US Central Command
commander General Tommy Franks in command, assisted by
a civilian political adviser.
If the past is any guide, the US Defense Department will be
eager to get out of the business of running Iraq, especially
since the one thing all Iraqi exile groups oppose is a US
military government. The idea of a UN civil administration
has been mentioned, but no planning for this, or even UN
relief operations, can begin without the backing of the
Security Council. A UN administration would also be
unpopular with many Iraqis and would be slow to mobilize
and expensive to maintain. Another option is the
appointment of a High Representative of the international
community, drawn from among the "coalition of the
willing". Lord Paddy Ashdown, who fills this role in Bosnia,
has learned that this model fosters dependence, is very
expensive, and is difficult to end.
Another urgent question concerns the size of the occupation
force and the duration of their mandate. Most reporting
points to the need for some 75,000-100,000 troops. The US
and the UK could not sustain a force of this size, given the
need to rotate units to their home bases and maintain
readiness elsewhere. So a new coalition of the willing would
have to be created to maintain the peace - or the US and UK
standing armies would have to be increased significantly to
meet the demand. Based on NATO's experience in Bosnia
and Kosovo, peacekeepers will have to remain on the ground
for at least five years.
On the morning after Saddam goes, there will be an
immediate need for large-scale international assistance, to
rebuild and provide relief. The costs of rebuilding the
infrastructure, even in the absence of major war damage, are
likely to be huge. A donors' conference, such as followed the
victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, is the usual first
resort of the international community. But the Afghan
donors' conference was notable for pledges that were never
redeemed, and given resentment in Europe over US and
British policies in Iraq, a major contribution by the EU
would be a surprise.
If war comes, it will not be about oil, but what to do with the
oil fields which will be occupied in the opening days of war
will be a major headache. Rival Kurdish groups and the
Turks may come to blows over the rich fields around Kirkuk,
an area which Saddam has "cleansed" of its original Kurdish
and Turkmen population. Much has been made of the
possibility of using Iraqi oil revenues to finance rebuilding
the economy, but increasing production or even restoring
production will be slow, and will depend on foreign
investment. Who will decide what to do about Iraq's billions
in external debts, for example to Russia and France?
Faced with these alternatives and given the US Defense
Department's distaste for nation building, a possible "exit
strategy" would be to toss the ball to Iraqis as soon as
decently possible. This was the course the US aimed at in
Bosnia, believing that elections within a year would enable
NATO forces to withdraw. As we learned to our regret,
premature elections aggravated the problem.
In some quarters in Washington talk of finding a secular
authority figure, possibly a general who might emerge as an
early defector from Saddam, has replaced talk about a
democratic Iraq inside its current borders. This would be a
short-sighted solution.
Secretary Powell made the case that Saddam Hussein is in
material breach of Security Council Resolution 1441, and
that inspections are not the answer. But turning to the our
publics and the international community on the morning
after Saddam goes with a request for help in cleaning up the
mess left behind will not be good for Iraq, the Middle East
or the transatlantic relationship.
Giving diplomacy more time will produce a Security
Council resolution, even if not unanimous, which will be
needed to mobilize the support of governments for a major
effort at nation-building in Iraq. That time can be well used
to win the support of our own publics for taking on a burden
larger than war.
Robert L Barry, a retired US Ambassador, headed the
OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1998 to 2001
and is a member of the board of the British American
Security Information Council.
Send us your views
You can write to the author of this piece at
rlbarry796@....
Email Observer site editor Sunder Katwala at
observer@... with comments on
articles or ideas for future pieces.
About Observer Worldview
Observer Worldview contains the best of The Observer's
recent international commentary and reporting, along with
exclusive online coverage each week. The online pieces are
also trailed in the newspaper. Please get in touch if you
would like to offer a piece
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003
Observer Worldview Extra
Iraq after Saddam - the next Yugoslavia?
Online commentary: Will the model for
post-Saddam Iraq be post-war Japan or Yugoslavia
after 1992? A former US Ambassador argues that
too little is being done to ensure that the right
choices are made after a war
Robert L Barry
Sunday February 9, 2003
The Observer
Following Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security
Council, war with Iraq seems virtually inevitable. This could
be done without a new Security Council resolution - but the
United States and the United Kingdom would own the
problem of what to do with Iraq on the morning after
Saddam goes. Our publics are not prepared to take on this
burden, and more time is needed to develop support for a
large scale multilateral effort at nation-building.
The central question concerning post-Saddam Iraq is
whether we will be looking at Yugoslavia in 1992 or Japan
in 1945. Based on my years in post-war Bosnia, the
Yugoslav parallel seems compelling. There are strong
separatist movements in both countries. Both have
neighbours which would pull it in different directions, both
are awash in arms, and bloody reprisals will likely take place
in Iraq as they have in the former Yugoslavia. Political
parties care more about gaining control of resources and state
industries than about introducing democracy. Corruption and
a weak justice system discourage foreign investment. The
military and police and judiciary need to be rebuilt from the
ground up. And outside help is urgently needed to repair war
damage and deteriorated infrastructure.
In the former Yugoslavia we have dealt with these problems
through a major effort at nation-building, involving tens of
thousands of peacekeeping troops, thousands of civilian
experts from the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE, the World
Bank, the IMF and more than 50 nations around the world.
Yet a decade later the job is far from done, despite the
expenditure of somewhere close to $100 billion. There is
little sign that serious preparations are under way to deal
with post-Saddam Iraq.
The first question to face on the morning after is who is in
charge. If Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post is correct,
President Bush has decided to assign responsibility to the US
Department of Defense, with US Central Command
commander General Tommy Franks in command, assisted by
a civilian political adviser.
If the past is any guide, the US Defense Department will be
eager to get out of the business of running Iraq, especially
since the one thing all Iraqi exile groups oppose is a US
military government. The idea of a UN civil administration
has been mentioned, but no planning for this, or even UN
relief operations, can begin without the backing of the
Security Council. A UN administration would also be
unpopular with many Iraqis and would be slow to mobilize
and expensive to maintain. Another option is the
appointment of a High Representative of the international
community, drawn from among the "coalition of the
willing". Lord Paddy Ashdown, who fills this role in Bosnia,
has learned that this model fosters dependence, is very
expensive, and is difficult to end.
Another urgent question concerns the size of the occupation
force and the duration of their mandate. Most reporting
points to the need for some 75,000-100,000 troops. The US
and the UK could not sustain a force of this size, given the
need to rotate units to their home bases and maintain
readiness elsewhere. So a new coalition of the willing would
have to be created to maintain the peace - or the US and UK
standing armies would have to be increased significantly to
meet the demand. Based on NATO's experience in Bosnia
and Kosovo, peacekeepers will have to remain on the ground
for at least five years.
On the morning after Saddam goes, there will be an
immediate need for large-scale international assistance, to
rebuild and provide relief. The costs of rebuilding the
infrastructure, even in the absence of major war damage, are
likely to be huge. A donors' conference, such as followed the
victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, is the usual first
resort of the international community. But the Afghan
donors' conference was notable for pledges that were never
redeemed, and given resentment in Europe over US and
British policies in Iraq, a major contribution by the EU
would be a surprise.
If war comes, it will not be about oil, but what to do with the
oil fields which will be occupied in the opening days of war
will be a major headache. Rival Kurdish groups and the
Turks may come to blows over the rich fields around Kirkuk,
an area which Saddam has "cleansed" of its original Kurdish
and Turkmen population. Much has been made of the
possibility of using Iraqi oil revenues to finance rebuilding
the economy, but increasing production or even restoring
production will be slow, and will depend on foreign
investment. Who will decide what to do about Iraq's billions
in external debts, for example to Russia and France?
Faced with these alternatives and given the US Defense
Department's distaste for nation building, a possible "exit
strategy" would be to toss the ball to Iraqis as soon as
decently possible. This was the course the US aimed at in
Bosnia, believing that elections within a year would enable
NATO forces to withdraw. As we learned to our regret,
premature elections aggravated the problem.
In some quarters in Washington talk of finding a secular
authority figure, possibly a general who might emerge as an
early defector from Saddam, has replaced talk about a
democratic Iraq inside its current borders. This would be a
short-sighted solution.
Secretary Powell made the case that Saddam Hussein is in
material breach of Security Council Resolution 1441, and
that inspections are not the answer. But turning to the our
publics and the international community on the morning
after Saddam goes with a request for help in cleaning up the
mess left behind will not be good for Iraq, the Middle East
or the transatlantic relationship.
Giving diplomacy more time will produce a Security
Council resolution, even if not unanimous, which will be
needed to mobilize the support of governments for a major
effort at nation-building in Iraq. That time can be well used
to win the support of our own publics for taking on a burden
larger than war.
Robert L Barry, a retired US Ambassador, headed the
OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1998 to 2001
and is a member of the board of the British American
Security Information Council.
Send us your views
You can write to the author of this piece at
rlbarry796@....
Email Observer site editor Sunder Katwala at
observer@... with comments on
articles or ideas for future pieces.
About Observer Worldview
Observer Worldview contains the best of The Observer's
recent international commentary and reporting, along with
exclusive online coverage each week. The online pieces are
also trailed in the newspaper. Please get in touch if you
would like to offer a piece
Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003