(english / italiano)
La Unione Europea premia la pulizia etnica in Croazia
1. UE: CROAZIA; VERHEUGEN, SI' APERTURA NEGOZIATI IN 2005
2. CROAZIA: PROFUGHI SERBI, SOLO IL 14 PER CENTO VUOLE TORNARE / Poll:
Most Serb refugees unwilling to return to Croatia
3. The Z-4 Plan and the Run-up to Operation Storm (by Andy Wilcoxson)
=== 1 ===
UE: CROAZIA; VERHEUGEN, SI' APERTURA NEGOZIATI IN 2005
(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 6 OTT - Il commissario europeo all'allargamento,
Guenter Verheugen, ha indicato oggi che Bruxelles raccomandera' ai capi
di Stato e di governo dell'Ue di ''aprire i negoziati con la Croazia
per l'adesione all'Ue all'inizio dell'anno prossimo''. La decisione
definitiva sull'apertura dei negoziati con Zagabria sara' presa dai
leader Ue nel summit del 17 dicembre prossimo a Bruxelles. (ANSA) CM
06/10/2004 14:05
=== 2 ===
CROAZIA: PROFUGHI SERBI, SOLO IL 14 PER CENTO VUOLE TORNARE
(ANSA) - ZAGABRIA, 15 SET - Solo il 14 per cento dei 188 mila profughi
serbi di Croazia ha intenzione di ritornare alle loro case che hanno
abbandonato durante la guerra serbocroata (1991-1995) e oltre l'85 per
cento ha dichiarato invece di non aver alcun intenzione di rientrare.
E' l'esito di un sondaggio realizzato per conto dell'Organizzazione per
la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa (Osce), pubblicato oggi sulla
stampa croata. Circa 300 mila serbi di Croazia fuggirono davanti all'
offensiva delle truppe di Zagabria che nel 1995 ripresero il controllo
della regione della Krajina, dove quattro anni prima era stata
proclamata la Repubblica serba di Krajina in contrasto con la
proclamazione dell'indipendenza della Croazia dalla Federazione
jugoslava. Secondo statistiche del governo croato finora circa 112.000
serbi sono ritornati, mentre appunto secondo il sondaggio realizzato su
un campione di mille persone in Serbia e in Bosnia, la maggioranza dei
188.000 che non sono rientrati ha l'intenzione di restare nei paesi
dove hanno vissuto negli ultimi nove anni. Il sondaggio e' il punto di
partenza di una vasta campagna congiunta dell'Osce, delle Nazioni
unite, della Commissione europea e del governo croato che in autunno
sara' lanciata in Serbia, Bosnia e Croazia per incoraggiare il rientro.
Cosi' come si auspica il ritorno dei serbi dalla Croazia, si spera
anche nel rientro dei croato-bosniaci che durante la guerra sono
fuggiti dalla Republika Srpska (Rs, entita' serba della Bosnia). Il
ritorno dei profughi serbi e' una delle condizioni fondamentali per
l'ingresso della Croazia nell'Unione europea e i negoziati di adesione
dovrebbero iniziare nei primi mesi del 2005. (ANSA). COR-VD
15/09/2004 18:36
---
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/news/world_4830365KathiLev&xml/
&aspKath/world.asp?fdate=16/09/2004
Associated Press
September 16, 2004
Poll: Most Serb refugees unwilling to return to Croatia
ZAGREB - About 85 percent of ethnic Serbs who fled
their homes in Croatia during the 1991-95 war here are
not prepared to return, fearing discrimination and
mistreatment, a poll released yesterday suggested. At
the same time, nearly two in three Croats interviewed
by the respected polling agency Puls don’t want to see
them back, the survey found. The poll of 1,000 Serb
refugees now living in neighboring Serbia-Montenegro
and Bosnia was conducted for the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
=== 3 ===
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg-anl082804.htm
www.slobodan-milosevic.org, Saturday, August 28, 2004
The Z-4 Plan and the Run-up to Operation Storm
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Throughout 1995 the Contact Group was conducting peace negotiations in
Geneva between the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) Government, and the
Croatian Government.
On August 3, 1995 the RSK Prime Minister, Milan Babic, announced that
Kinin had accepted the so-called "Z-4 Plan" which envisioned the
integration of the RSK into the Croatian state, while giving autonomy
to the Serbs living there. Babic had reached the agreement on August
2nd through negotiations with the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, Peter
Galbraith.
Unfortunately, the Krajina Serbs’ acceptance of the Z-4 Plan was
rejected by Croatia, and Operation Storm was launched the next day.
During Operation Storm the Croats killed or expelled approximately
200,000 Serbs. This article will examine the events that immediately
preceded Operation Storm.
On August 3rd Galbraith went on Croatian TV and announced that "Mr.
Babic agreed to negotiate the reintegration of the Serb-held areas in
Croatia. Mr. Babic said that he was going to instruct his delegation in
Geneva about these points. According to our reports, he has already
done so." [1]
According to an August 3, 1995 interview that Babic gave to Serbia's
FoNet news agency, Galbraith had promised that the United States would
protect the Krajina Serbs from any Croatian military offensive.
Babic told FoNet that: "I spoke to US Ambassador [to Croatia, Peter]
Galbraith last night. Today I also made a statement which supported the
stand of our delegation in Geneva. Mr. Galbraith promised me that his
government would uphold our stand and that it would intervene to
prevent Croatia from carrying out its military strike, provided we made
public the stands we adopted earlier and which we made public today."
[2]
Unfortunately, in spite of the good-will of the Serbian side, the
Croats had no intention of reaching a peace agreement and broke-off
negotiations.
According to Babic, "Despite the fact that our delegation had accepted
all of the co-chairman, [Thorvald Stoltenberg's] proposals, the Croats
did not accept anything and broke off today's talks." [3]
Babic's claims were backed-up by Glasgow's "The Herald" newspaper.
Consider the following excerpts from the August 4th edition of that
paper:
Last night [August 3, 1995], an American mediator said a leader of the
rebel Krajina Serbs had offered significant concessions so that there
was now no reason for Croatia to go to war.
The US ambassador to Croatia, Mr. Peter Galbraith, said Krajina Serb
“prime minister” Milan Babic had agreed to hold talks on the “peaceful
re-integration” into Croatia of Serb-held areas." [4]
[…]
“On my part, I can state that we are ready to enter negotiations on a
political solution with Zagreb,” Babic said.
He said a “modified and improved” version of the so-called Z-4 plan
drafted by the United States, Russia, the United Nations, and the
European Union could serve as a basis for talks. [5]
[…]
Ambassador Galbraith said Babic had told the Serb delegation holding
last-ditch talks in Geneva to carry out his pledges. The Croatians in
Geneva consider the talks to have broken down.
However, UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg said the discussions in
Geneva could yet help to avert a new war. “We did not reach an
agreement but I felt it is not far away,” he told reporters. [6]
The Serbian side had agreed to the Z-4 Plan. Babic publicly stated his
acceptance of the Z-4 Plan. He had instructed his negotiators in Geneva
to implement the agreement, and the U.S. Ambassador Galbraith confirmed
all of this with his public statements. In spite of all of this the
Croats still decided to break off talks. But why; what justification
did they use to break off the talks?
The answer to that question is contained in the transcripts of the
so-called "trial" of Slobodan Milosevic.
When Milan Babic testified as a witness against Milosevic, the
prosecution entered into evidence [as Exhibit 352, tab 104] a
coded-cable dated August 3, 1995 from the U.K. embassy in Zagreb,
regarding a conversation between Galbraith and Babic.
The cable read: "RSK Prime Minister tells my American colleague that to
avoid war he is ready to meet Tudjman's conditions and will announce
this today. Unclear whether he has other RSK leadership on board.
Milosevic being briefed by Americans on Galbraith's discussions with
Babic, need to get Belgrade backing to lend credibility." [7]
When the prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, put the cable to Babic to get
his reaction he said:
"I don't know about any briefing of Milosevic by international factors.
All I know is that a member of the French embassy in Belgrade had told
me that Milosevic did not support us." [8]
Milosevic was not briefed by the Americans. Galbraith complained that
they could not get a hold of Milosevic, but we'll discuss that later.
At this point we can start to see what gave the Croats their excuse to
break-off the negotiations. The French said that Milosevic did not
support the Z-4 Plan, and the British said that without his support the
negotiations had no credibility. Therefore, the Croats could say that
the negotiations were not being done in good-faith, and had their
excuse to break off the talks.
Of course it is totally false that Milosevic didn't support the Z-4
Plan. Already in April 1995, Milosevic told Babic that Z-4 was "a good
plan." [9]
When Babic, through his negotiations with Galbraith, agreed to the Z-4
Plan; he called Milosevic on the morning of August 3, 1995 to inform
him. According to Babic, Milosevic approved and said, "Yes. Yes.
Everything should be done peacefully [or 'mirno' in Serbian]." [10]
So, twice Milosevic told Babic that Z-4 was a good plan. He told him
that it was good four months before he agreed to it, and he supported
Babic’s decision when he agreed to it in the negotiations with
Galbraith.
Of course, none of this stopped Galbraith from blaming Milosevic for
the talks breaking down. Never mind that neither Serbia, nor the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was even invited to those talks.
When Galbraith testified he said, "In August of 1995, this was August
2nd, this was the meeting I had in Belgrade with Babic which produced
the last-minute agreement to try to head off the war."
"The next day Rudy Perina [the US charges d'affaires in Belgrade]
requested an appointment to see Mr. Milosevic to demarche him to
support the Galbraith-Babic agreement. He refused to see Mr. Perina
that day, the 3rd of August, and the next day the Croatian army
attacked the Krajina." [11]
It is completely untrue that Milosevic "refused to see Perina."
Milosevic was not in Belgrade on August 3rd, and therefore he could not
possibly see Perina in Belgrade. However, this doesn't mean that Perina
couldn't speak to him on the phone, and secure his support for the
agreement in that way.
Take a look at the following exchange between Milosevic and Galbraith:
MILOSEVIC: Mr. Galbraith, I never refused to receive Rudy Perina. I
wasn't in Belgrade at that time.
MR. MAY: It's no use repeating that. You've heard what the witness
says. If you can give evidence about it, no doubt you may.
GALBRAITH: Your Honour, if I can point out, even if the [accused] were
not in Belgrade, which I don't know, there are telephones, and we did
use telephones to talk to leaders on urgent matters.
MILOSEVIC: Why then didn't they speak to me by telephone? They didn't
want to talk to me, Mr. Galbraith. Why don't you say that?
GALBRAITH: We desperately wanted to talk to you. We desperately wanted
you to support this last-minute agreement. We desperately wanted to
head off the war. Mr. Babic also wanted to see you and get you to
support this last-minute agreement. As he said to me, one sentence from
you and Knin would have agreed, and I think there would have been a
very good chance at that point that Operation Storm, even at that last
minute, Operation Storm could have been headed off and a 180.000 Serbs
from the Krajina would not have been driven from their homes and a huge
humanitarian catastrophe would not have happened.
MILOSEVIC: Mr. Galbraith, Babic testified here. He asked to see me. He
heard that I wasn't in Belgrade. He asked for my telephone from people
from the Ministry of the Interior, and my telephone was known to all my
associates always. I was on vacation. He reached me by phone. [12]
At this point Milosevic is cut-off by Mr. May, but notice that
Galbraith didn’t explain how come nobody called Milosevic, even though
he claims that they “desperately wanted to talk to him.” However, later
in the cross-examination Milosevic re-visits the topic and look at the
lame answer that he gets from Galbraith:
MILOSEVIC: Before we move on, just one thing, please. Since you said
that you could not reach me, that Perina could not reach me, that
Roberts could not reach me because I was away on vacation, if you
already wanted to give this kind of information, why didn't you give it
to the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, anybody, or why didn't you
request telephone contact with me? It was possible at any time.
GALBRAITH: It was for -- referring now to the August meeting or August
3rd events, it was for the charges of the United States to try to get
in contact with you. He attempted to get in contact with you. I don't
know the particulars of it. Some of these officials the United States
did not see because we did not recognise the government of -- of the
so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
MILOSEVIC: That's not correct. Perina contacted the Foreign Minister,
Jovanovic, and many others. So if you really cared about this, if you
really wanted to convey some information or a demarche, are you trying
to say that the US charges d'affaires could not deliver this at my
office and would he not have known that I would have gotten it
immediately for sure, or couldn't he have requested to speak to me on
the telephone? He didn't ask for any such thing. He just asked for me
to receive him and the answer given to him was I was not in Belgrade
and that was it.
There's a saying in Serbia, Mr. Galbraith, and it says that a person
requests something and prays to God not to get it. So I think that this
was the case. [13]
Galbraith's answer is nonsense; the U.S. wouldn't contact any officials
of the FRY Government to try and get in contact with Milosevic, because
the U.S. didn't recognize the FRY. That is obviously a lie.
Milosevic is right; Galbraith never wanted to contact him. Galbraith
wanted the negotiations to fail. He wanted the Croats to attack the
Krajina Serbs, and now he wants to make Milosevic the scapegoat, and
blame him for the genocide that was committed against his own people.
Look at what happened: France made up the lie that Milosevic didn’t
support the Z-4 Plan; the U.K. decided that the negotiations had no
credibility without Milosevic’s support, the Americans deliberately
failed to contact Milosevic to see if he supported the plan or not,
then the Croats broke off talks and launched Operation Storm.
The international community, specifically France, England and the U.S.
undermined the, negotiations by lying about Milosevic’s position, and
handed the Croats the pretext to break-off negotiations, and that’s not
all. The Americans gave the Croats the go-ahead to attack.
On August 18, 1995, just two weeks after Operation Storm, Galbraith and
Richard Holbrooke went to Zagreb and met with Tudjman and his cabinet.
The stenographic notes from that meeting were obtained by Milosevic and
entered into evidence at the tribunal. In the stenographic notes
Holbrooke is quoted as saying:
"You had just justification for a military operation in Western
Slavonia, and I kept defending it in Washington. You will recall that
the two of us met in London immediately afterwards, and then we went to
the US embassy to meet Gore. It was a very dramatic exchange of views.
Some people wanted Gore to tell you -- tell us that you would be
withdrawing from Western Slavonia and we said absolutely not. You have
to stay there.”
“You've closed the back door, that is to say, your country, and then we
discussed your activities in Livanjsko Polje, and then we stated the
following: Continue, carry on."
"We publicly said that we were concerned. However, privately, you knew
what we wanted." [14]
So, Holbrooke is boasting that he defended Operation Flash (the Croat
attack on Western Slavonia) in Washington. Then he tells the Croats to
“carry on” with activities in Livanjsko Polje where they were getting
ready for Operation Storm, and then at this meeting that took place
only two weeks after Operation Storm, he says to Tudjman “We publicly
said that we were concerned. However, privately, you knew what we
wanted.”
The writing is on the wall. The international community and the Croats
had the same objective: To commit genocide against the Krajina Serbs.
Holbrooke publicly professed concern for the fate of the civilians in
the Krajina, while secretly plotting their demise together with Tudjman.
On August 3rd Galbraith was promising Babic that the United States
would protect the Krajina Serbs [15], and the very next day, as Croatia
was waging its offensive, American warplanes were bombing the Krajina
Serbs’ air defense systems. [16]
The day before Croatia launched Operation Storm, Galbraith said that
there was no reason for Croatia to go to war, since there was now an
agreement with Babic [17], but when Galbraith testified he sang a
different tune, and mocked Milosevic for being surprised when the
Croats attacked.
Galbraith said: “I mean, I don't -- Mr. Milosevic must have been very
cut off on top of the mountain, because everybody else in the world
understood that in August 1995, Europe was on the verge of the biggest
battle since the Second World War. And how any leader, any responsible
leader could be on vacation with all this happening and with the fate
of so many people, may I add, so many Serbs, at stake, I cannot
understand. But, you know, it was clear that the Croatians were going
to attack. It was in the press. It was -- their forces were mobilised.
I mean, he could not have not known this. -- And so -- I mean, what
else can I say?” [18]
Galbraith, who personally, the day before the attack took place reached
an agreement with Babic, and said that there was no reason for an
attack, is now saying that everybody knew there would be an attack and
that Milosevic was stupid for not seeing it?!
The implication that Galbraith is making is that Milosevic knew about
the attack in advance, and could have somehow stopped it, but didn’t.
It defies logic that anybody would think that an attack would happen
after a peace agreement had been reached. Babic agreed to the Z-4 Plan.
Milosevic supported the Z-4 Plan. Galbraith promised Babic that the
United States would stop any Croatian attack. The British Embassy’s
August 3, 1995 coded-cable stated that Babic was “ready to meet
Tudjman's conditions.” Galbraith had said himself that there was no
reason for the Croats to launch a war.
How was Milosevic supposed to know that an attack would happen? And
what could he have done about it even if he did know? Babic agreed to
the Z-4 Plan, and agreed to Tudjman’s conditions. Did Galbraith want
Milosevic to send in the Yugoslav Army so that Serbia could be accused
of “aggression” and bombed that much sooner?
Croatia and the International Community committed a horrific crime
against the Serbian people. Operation Storm was pure evil, and those
responsible for it such as, Holbrooke, Galbraith, and Tudjman should
burn for what they did.
Footnotes:
1. Croatian TV satellite service, Zagreb, in Serbo-Croat 1730 gmt 3 Aug
95 BBC Monitoring 5 Aug 95, "Krajina Serb leader reportedly agrees
concessions to Croatia"
2. FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat 2015 gmt 3 Aug 95 BBC
Monitoring 5 Aug 95, "Babic comments on Geneva outcome"
3. Ibid.
4. The Herald (Glasgow), August 4, 1995, "Shelling starts as Serbs
offer a deal"
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13261, line 24.
8. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13262, line 6
9. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23162, line 17
10. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13260, line 6
11. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23157, line 20
12. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23158, line 3
13. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23169, line 22
14. Milosevic trial transcript - January 22, 2004 - page 31373, line 8
15. FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat 2015 gmt 3 Aug 95 BBC
Monitoring 5 Aug 95, "Babic comments on Geneva outcome"
16. The Navy Times, "August 25, 1995, "Navy jets bomb Serb missile
sites"
17. The Herald (Glasgow), August 4, 1995, "Shelling starts as Serbs
offer a deal"
18. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23160, line 1
19. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13261, line 24
La Unione Europea premia la pulizia etnica in Croazia
1. UE: CROAZIA; VERHEUGEN, SI' APERTURA NEGOZIATI IN 2005
2. CROAZIA: PROFUGHI SERBI, SOLO IL 14 PER CENTO VUOLE TORNARE / Poll:
Most Serb refugees unwilling to return to Croatia
3. The Z-4 Plan and the Run-up to Operation Storm (by Andy Wilcoxson)
=== 1 ===
UE: CROAZIA; VERHEUGEN, SI' APERTURA NEGOZIATI IN 2005
(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 6 OTT - Il commissario europeo all'allargamento,
Guenter Verheugen, ha indicato oggi che Bruxelles raccomandera' ai capi
di Stato e di governo dell'Ue di ''aprire i negoziati con la Croazia
per l'adesione all'Ue all'inizio dell'anno prossimo''. La decisione
definitiva sull'apertura dei negoziati con Zagabria sara' presa dai
leader Ue nel summit del 17 dicembre prossimo a Bruxelles. (ANSA) CM
06/10/2004 14:05
=== 2 ===
CROAZIA: PROFUGHI SERBI, SOLO IL 14 PER CENTO VUOLE TORNARE
(ANSA) - ZAGABRIA, 15 SET - Solo il 14 per cento dei 188 mila profughi
serbi di Croazia ha intenzione di ritornare alle loro case che hanno
abbandonato durante la guerra serbocroata (1991-1995) e oltre l'85 per
cento ha dichiarato invece di non aver alcun intenzione di rientrare.
E' l'esito di un sondaggio realizzato per conto dell'Organizzazione per
la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa (Osce), pubblicato oggi sulla
stampa croata. Circa 300 mila serbi di Croazia fuggirono davanti all'
offensiva delle truppe di Zagabria che nel 1995 ripresero il controllo
della regione della Krajina, dove quattro anni prima era stata
proclamata la Repubblica serba di Krajina in contrasto con la
proclamazione dell'indipendenza della Croazia dalla Federazione
jugoslava. Secondo statistiche del governo croato finora circa 112.000
serbi sono ritornati, mentre appunto secondo il sondaggio realizzato su
un campione di mille persone in Serbia e in Bosnia, la maggioranza dei
188.000 che non sono rientrati ha l'intenzione di restare nei paesi
dove hanno vissuto negli ultimi nove anni. Il sondaggio e' il punto di
partenza di una vasta campagna congiunta dell'Osce, delle Nazioni
unite, della Commissione europea e del governo croato che in autunno
sara' lanciata in Serbia, Bosnia e Croazia per incoraggiare il rientro.
Cosi' come si auspica il ritorno dei serbi dalla Croazia, si spera
anche nel rientro dei croato-bosniaci che durante la guerra sono
fuggiti dalla Republika Srpska (Rs, entita' serba della Bosnia). Il
ritorno dei profughi serbi e' una delle condizioni fondamentali per
l'ingresso della Croazia nell'Unione europea e i negoziati di adesione
dovrebbero iniziare nei primi mesi del 2005. (ANSA). COR-VD
15/09/2004 18:36
---
http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/news/world_4830365KathiLev&xml/
&aspKath/world.asp?fdate=16/09/2004
Associated Press
September 16, 2004
Poll: Most Serb refugees unwilling to return to Croatia
ZAGREB - About 85 percent of ethnic Serbs who fled
their homes in Croatia during the 1991-95 war here are
not prepared to return, fearing discrimination and
mistreatment, a poll released yesterday suggested. At
the same time, nearly two in three Croats interviewed
by the respected polling agency Puls don’t want to see
them back, the survey found. The poll of 1,000 Serb
refugees now living in neighboring Serbia-Montenegro
and Bosnia was conducted for the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe.
=== 3 ===
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg-anl082804.htm
www.slobodan-milosevic.org, Saturday, August 28, 2004
The Z-4 Plan and the Run-up to Operation Storm
Written by: Andy Wilcoxson
Throughout 1995 the Contact Group was conducting peace negotiations in
Geneva between the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK) Government, and the
Croatian Government.
On August 3, 1995 the RSK Prime Minister, Milan Babic, announced that
Kinin had accepted the so-called "Z-4 Plan" which envisioned the
integration of the RSK into the Croatian state, while giving autonomy
to the Serbs living there. Babic had reached the agreement on August
2nd through negotiations with the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia, Peter
Galbraith.
Unfortunately, the Krajina Serbs’ acceptance of the Z-4 Plan was
rejected by Croatia, and Operation Storm was launched the next day.
During Operation Storm the Croats killed or expelled approximately
200,000 Serbs. This article will examine the events that immediately
preceded Operation Storm.
On August 3rd Galbraith went on Croatian TV and announced that "Mr.
Babic agreed to negotiate the reintegration of the Serb-held areas in
Croatia. Mr. Babic said that he was going to instruct his delegation in
Geneva about these points. According to our reports, he has already
done so." [1]
According to an August 3, 1995 interview that Babic gave to Serbia's
FoNet news agency, Galbraith had promised that the United States would
protect the Krajina Serbs from any Croatian military offensive.
Babic told FoNet that: "I spoke to US Ambassador [to Croatia, Peter]
Galbraith last night. Today I also made a statement which supported the
stand of our delegation in Geneva. Mr. Galbraith promised me that his
government would uphold our stand and that it would intervene to
prevent Croatia from carrying out its military strike, provided we made
public the stands we adopted earlier and which we made public today."
[2]
Unfortunately, in spite of the good-will of the Serbian side, the
Croats had no intention of reaching a peace agreement and broke-off
negotiations.
According to Babic, "Despite the fact that our delegation had accepted
all of the co-chairman, [Thorvald Stoltenberg's] proposals, the Croats
did not accept anything and broke off today's talks." [3]
Babic's claims were backed-up by Glasgow's "The Herald" newspaper.
Consider the following excerpts from the August 4th edition of that
paper:
Last night [August 3, 1995], an American mediator said a leader of the
rebel Krajina Serbs had offered significant concessions so that there
was now no reason for Croatia to go to war.
The US ambassador to Croatia, Mr. Peter Galbraith, said Krajina Serb
“prime minister” Milan Babic had agreed to hold talks on the “peaceful
re-integration” into Croatia of Serb-held areas." [4]
[…]
“On my part, I can state that we are ready to enter negotiations on a
political solution with Zagreb,” Babic said.
He said a “modified and improved” version of the so-called Z-4 plan
drafted by the United States, Russia, the United Nations, and the
European Union could serve as a basis for talks. [5]
[…]
Ambassador Galbraith said Babic had told the Serb delegation holding
last-ditch talks in Geneva to carry out his pledges. The Croatians in
Geneva consider the talks to have broken down.
However, UN mediator Thorvald Stoltenberg said the discussions in
Geneva could yet help to avert a new war. “We did not reach an
agreement but I felt it is not far away,” he told reporters. [6]
The Serbian side had agreed to the Z-4 Plan. Babic publicly stated his
acceptance of the Z-4 Plan. He had instructed his negotiators in Geneva
to implement the agreement, and the U.S. Ambassador Galbraith confirmed
all of this with his public statements. In spite of all of this the
Croats still decided to break off talks. But why; what justification
did they use to break off the talks?
The answer to that question is contained in the transcripts of the
so-called "trial" of Slobodan Milosevic.
When Milan Babic testified as a witness against Milosevic, the
prosecution entered into evidence [as Exhibit 352, tab 104] a
coded-cable dated August 3, 1995 from the U.K. embassy in Zagreb,
regarding a conversation between Galbraith and Babic.
The cable read: "RSK Prime Minister tells my American colleague that to
avoid war he is ready to meet Tudjman's conditions and will announce
this today. Unclear whether he has other RSK leadership on board.
Milosevic being briefed by Americans on Galbraith's discussions with
Babic, need to get Belgrade backing to lend credibility." [7]
When the prosecutor, Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff, put the cable to Babic to get
his reaction he said:
"I don't know about any briefing of Milosevic by international factors.
All I know is that a member of the French embassy in Belgrade had told
me that Milosevic did not support us." [8]
Milosevic was not briefed by the Americans. Galbraith complained that
they could not get a hold of Milosevic, but we'll discuss that later.
At this point we can start to see what gave the Croats their excuse to
break-off the negotiations. The French said that Milosevic did not
support the Z-4 Plan, and the British said that without his support the
negotiations had no credibility. Therefore, the Croats could say that
the negotiations were not being done in good-faith, and had their
excuse to break off the talks.
Of course it is totally false that Milosevic didn't support the Z-4
Plan. Already in April 1995, Milosevic told Babic that Z-4 was "a good
plan." [9]
When Babic, through his negotiations with Galbraith, agreed to the Z-4
Plan; he called Milosevic on the morning of August 3, 1995 to inform
him. According to Babic, Milosevic approved and said, "Yes. Yes.
Everything should be done peacefully [or 'mirno' in Serbian]." [10]
So, twice Milosevic told Babic that Z-4 was a good plan. He told him
that it was good four months before he agreed to it, and he supported
Babic’s decision when he agreed to it in the negotiations with
Galbraith.
Of course, none of this stopped Galbraith from blaming Milosevic for
the talks breaking down. Never mind that neither Serbia, nor the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was even invited to those talks.
When Galbraith testified he said, "In August of 1995, this was August
2nd, this was the meeting I had in Belgrade with Babic which produced
the last-minute agreement to try to head off the war."
"The next day Rudy Perina [the US charges d'affaires in Belgrade]
requested an appointment to see Mr. Milosevic to demarche him to
support the Galbraith-Babic agreement. He refused to see Mr. Perina
that day, the 3rd of August, and the next day the Croatian army
attacked the Krajina." [11]
It is completely untrue that Milosevic "refused to see Perina."
Milosevic was not in Belgrade on August 3rd, and therefore he could not
possibly see Perina in Belgrade. However, this doesn't mean that Perina
couldn't speak to him on the phone, and secure his support for the
agreement in that way.
Take a look at the following exchange between Milosevic and Galbraith:
MILOSEVIC: Mr. Galbraith, I never refused to receive Rudy Perina. I
wasn't in Belgrade at that time.
MR. MAY: It's no use repeating that. You've heard what the witness
says. If you can give evidence about it, no doubt you may.
GALBRAITH: Your Honour, if I can point out, even if the [accused] were
not in Belgrade, which I don't know, there are telephones, and we did
use telephones to talk to leaders on urgent matters.
MILOSEVIC: Why then didn't they speak to me by telephone? They didn't
want to talk to me, Mr. Galbraith. Why don't you say that?
GALBRAITH: We desperately wanted to talk to you. We desperately wanted
you to support this last-minute agreement. We desperately wanted to
head off the war. Mr. Babic also wanted to see you and get you to
support this last-minute agreement. As he said to me, one sentence from
you and Knin would have agreed, and I think there would have been a
very good chance at that point that Operation Storm, even at that last
minute, Operation Storm could have been headed off and a 180.000 Serbs
from the Krajina would not have been driven from their homes and a huge
humanitarian catastrophe would not have happened.
MILOSEVIC: Mr. Galbraith, Babic testified here. He asked to see me. He
heard that I wasn't in Belgrade. He asked for my telephone from people
from the Ministry of the Interior, and my telephone was known to all my
associates always. I was on vacation. He reached me by phone. [12]
At this point Milosevic is cut-off by Mr. May, but notice that
Galbraith didn’t explain how come nobody called Milosevic, even though
he claims that they “desperately wanted to talk to him.” However, later
in the cross-examination Milosevic re-visits the topic and look at the
lame answer that he gets from Galbraith:
MILOSEVIC: Before we move on, just one thing, please. Since you said
that you could not reach me, that Perina could not reach me, that
Roberts could not reach me because I was away on vacation, if you
already wanted to give this kind of information, why didn't you give it
to the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, anybody, or why didn't you
request telephone contact with me? It was possible at any time.
GALBRAITH: It was for -- referring now to the August meeting or August
3rd events, it was for the charges of the United States to try to get
in contact with you. He attempted to get in contact with you. I don't
know the particulars of it. Some of these officials the United States
did not see because we did not recognise the government of -- of the
so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
MILOSEVIC: That's not correct. Perina contacted the Foreign Minister,
Jovanovic, and many others. So if you really cared about this, if you
really wanted to convey some information or a demarche, are you trying
to say that the US charges d'affaires could not deliver this at my
office and would he not have known that I would have gotten it
immediately for sure, or couldn't he have requested to speak to me on
the telephone? He didn't ask for any such thing. He just asked for me
to receive him and the answer given to him was I was not in Belgrade
and that was it.
There's a saying in Serbia, Mr. Galbraith, and it says that a person
requests something and prays to God not to get it. So I think that this
was the case. [13]
Galbraith's answer is nonsense; the U.S. wouldn't contact any officials
of the FRY Government to try and get in contact with Milosevic, because
the U.S. didn't recognize the FRY. That is obviously a lie.
Milosevic is right; Galbraith never wanted to contact him. Galbraith
wanted the negotiations to fail. He wanted the Croats to attack the
Krajina Serbs, and now he wants to make Milosevic the scapegoat, and
blame him for the genocide that was committed against his own people.
Look at what happened: France made up the lie that Milosevic didn’t
support the Z-4 Plan; the U.K. decided that the negotiations had no
credibility without Milosevic’s support, the Americans deliberately
failed to contact Milosevic to see if he supported the plan or not,
then the Croats broke off talks and launched Operation Storm.
The international community, specifically France, England and the U.S.
undermined the, negotiations by lying about Milosevic’s position, and
handed the Croats the pretext to break-off negotiations, and that’s not
all. The Americans gave the Croats the go-ahead to attack.
On August 18, 1995, just two weeks after Operation Storm, Galbraith and
Richard Holbrooke went to Zagreb and met with Tudjman and his cabinet.
The stenographic notes from that meeting were obtained by Milosevic and
entered into evidence at the tribunal. In the stenographic notes
Holbrooke is quoted as saying:
"You had just justification for a military operation in Western
Slavonia, and I kept defending it in Washington. You will recall that
the two of us met in London immediately afterwards, and then we went to
the US embassy to meet Gore. It was a very dramatic exchange of views.
Some people wanted Gore to tell you -- tell us that you would be
withdrawing from Western Slavonia and we said absolutely not. You have
to stay there.”
“You've closed the back door, that is to say, your country, and then we
discussed your activities in Livanjsko Polje, and then we stated the
following: Continue, carry on."
"We publicly said that we were concerned. However, privately, you knew
what we wanted." [14]
So, Holbrooke is boasting that he defended Operation Flash (the Croat
attack on Western Slavonia) in Washington. Then he tells the Croats to
“carry on” with activities in Livanjsko Polje where they were getting
ready for Operation Storm, and then at this meeting that took place
only two weeks after Operation Storm, he says to Tudjman “We publicly
said that we were concerned. However, privately, you knew what we
wanted.”
The writing is on the wall. The international community and the Croats
had the same objective: To commit genocide against the Krajina Serbs.
Holbrooke publicly professed concern for the fate of the civilians in
the Krajina, while secretly plotting their demise together with Tudjman.
On August 3rd Galbraith was promising Babic that the United States
would protect the Krajina Serbs [15], and the very next day, as Croatia
was waging its offensive, American warplanes were bombing the Krajina
Serbs’ air defense systems. [16]
The day before Croatia launched Operation Storm, Galbraith said that
there was no reason for Croatia to go to war, since there was now an
agreement with Babic [17], but when Galbraith testified he sang a
different tune, and mocked Milosevic for being surprised when the
Croats attacked.
Galbraith said: “I mean, I don't -- Mr. Milosevic must have been very
cut off on top of the mountain, because everybody else in the world
understood that in August 1995, Europe was on the verge of the biggest
battle since the Second World War. And how any leader, any responsible
leader could be on vacation with all this happening and with the fate
of so many people, may I add, so many Serbs, at stake, I cannot
understand. But, you know, it was clear that the Croatians were going
to attack. It was in the press. It was -- their forces were mobilised.
I mean, he could not have not known this. -- And so -- I mean, what
else can I say?” [18]
Galbraith, who personally, the day before the attack took place reached
an agreement with Babic, and said that there was no reason for an
attack, is now saying that everybody knew there would be an attack and
that Milosevic was stupid for not seeing it?!
The implication that Galbraith is making is that Milosevic knew about
the attack in advance, and could have somehow stopped it, but didn’t.
It defies logic that anybody would think that an attack would happen
after a peace agreement had been reached. Babic agreed to the Z-4 Plan.
Milosevic supported the Z-4 Plan. Galbraith promised Babic that the
United States would stop any Croatian attack. The British Embassy’s
August 3, 1995 coded-cable stated that Babic was “ready to meet
Tudjman's conditions.” Galbraith had said himself that there was no
reason for the Croats to launch a war.
How was Milosevic supposed to know that an attack would happen? And
what could he have done about it even if he did know? Babic agreed to
the Z-4 Plan, and agreed to Tudjman’s conditions. Did Galbraith want
Milosevic to send in the Yugoslav Army so that Serbia could be accused
of “aggression” and bombed that much sooner?
Croatia and the International Community committed a horrific crime
against the Serbian people. Operation Storm was pure evil, and those
responsible for it such as, Holbrooke, Galbraith, and Tudjman should
burn for what they did.
Footnotes:
1. Croatian TV satellite service, Zagreb, in Serbo-Croat 1730 gmt 3 Aug
95 BBC Monitoring 5 Aug 95, "Krajina Serb leader reportedly agrees
concessions to Croatia"
2. FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat 2015 gmt 3 Aug 95 BBC
Monitoring 5 Aug 95, "Babic comments on Geneva outcome"
3. Ibid.
4. The Herald (Glasgow), August 4, 1995, "Shelling starts as Serbs
offer a deal"
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13261, line 24.
8. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13262, line 6
9. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23162, line 17
10. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13260, line 6
11. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23157, line 20
12. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23158, line 3
13. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23169, line 22
14. Milosevic trial transcript - January 22, 2004 - page 31373, line 8
15. FoNet news agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat 2015 gmt 3 Aug 95 BBC
Monitoring 5 Aug 95, "Babic comments on Geneva outcome"
16. The Navy Times, "August 25, 1995, "Navy jets bomb Serb missile
sites"
17. The Herald (Glasgow), August 4, 1995, "Shelling starts as Serbs
offer a deal"
18. Milosevic trial transcript - June 26, 2003 - page 23160, line 1
19. Milosevic trial transcript - November 21, 2002 - page 13261, line 24