(english)
UCK / BND:
Terror network operating in Kosovo a key for understanding March riots
[ In Germania e' finalmente scoppiato lo scandalo del sostegno fornito
dal BND (Bundesnachrichendienst - servizio segreto militare) alle bande
di assassini che da cinque anni compiono la pulizia etnica di tutte le
nazionalita' non-albanesi sul territorio della provincia serba di
Kosovo e Metohija (ultimo eclatante episodio: i pogrom di massa dello
scorso marzo, che hanno causato una ventina di morti e decine di
migliaia di profughi). Disponiamo finalmente (vedi piu' sotto in questo
messaggio) di una versione in lingua inglese di alcuni degli articoli
usciti in questi giorni sulla stampa serba e tedesca; abbiamo inviato e
continueremo a far circolare anche tutta la documentazione in lingua
tedesca, specialmente gli articoli dell'inviato di Junge Welt a
Belgrado, Juergen Elsaesser. DOBBIAMO INVECE REGISTRARE E STIGMATIZZARE
IL SILENZIO TOMBALE CHE SU QUESTO SCANDALO DI PORTATA INTERNAZIONALE E'
STATO STESO DA TUTTA LA STAMPA ITALIANA E DI ALTRI PAESI: l'Italia in
particolare, che pure ha molte migliaia di soldati in Kosovo,
inquadrati nelle forze di occupazione coloniale KFOR insieme ai
tedeschi, si distingue come al solito per la sua totale mancanza di
autonomia, sia politico-militare che giornalistico-intellettuale, anche
sulle piu' gravi questioni strategiche. (A cura di I. Slavo) ]
More links:
London Telegraph: Pogrom Aftermath: German MPs Want Answers to Army's
Failures in Kosovo (by Hannah Cleaver)
http://www.realitymacedonia.org.mk/web/news_page.asp?nid=3941
===
( see the original URL for many interesting pictures:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/85182 )
ERP KIM Newsletter 27-11-04
Terror network operating in Kosovo a key for understanding March riots
"I assume that either from the cabinet or directly from the BND the
information got to the Bundeswehr. This means that the Albanian attacks
on Serbs in Kosovo on March 17 and 18 were tolerated by the Bundeswehr
because they did not want to ruin their relations with the KLA. Namely,
if action had been taken against militant forces in the KLA before
hand, it was to be expected that structures existed that would
afterwards turn against the Bundeswehr as an occupying army" (Erich
Schmidt-Eenboom, see down)
Contents:
1. NIN, When Intelligence Officers Fan the Flames, Nov 25, 2004
2. Neues Deutschland, Was Violence in Kosovo Tolerated, Nov 23, 2004
Disclaimer:
The views expressed by the authors of newspaper articles or other texts
which are not official communiqués or news reports by the Diocese are
their own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Serbian
Orthodox Church
--- 1 ---
www.nin.co.yu
Nedeljne Informativne Novine, Belgrade
November 25, 2004
When intelligence officers fan the flames
Why is the Serbian community silent on reports by German ZDF television
presenting serious accusations against the German intelligence service
(BND) in connection with the March pogroms in Kosovo and Metohija
[PHOTO: The local network]
In two segments of more than four minutes each broadcast on November 18
and 20 as major news during the main news program, ZDF reporters
documented the following: that the German intelligence service (BND -
Bundesnachrichtendienst) knew three weeks prior to March 17 that
organized attacks on Serbs throughout Kosovo and Metohija were being
prepared, that the BND knew this because it was tapping the
conversations of one of the organizers of the pogrom, that this man's
name is Samedin Xhezairi, also known as Commander Hoxha, and that
Xhezairi, for his part, was a BND spy but also an intermediary between
Albanian extremists and al-Q'aida. The reporters cited transcripts of
conversations from the intelligence services as well as confidential
NATO documents, and the dilemmas they opened, directly and indirectly,
were why BND did not relay the information to the German government,
and through it to the commander of the German Kfor contingent in
Prizren and Holger Kammerhof, then commander in chief of NATO troops in
Kosovo? Could the violence have been prevented if key political and
military structures in Berlin and Kosovo and Metohija had received
timely information from the German intelligence officers? And finally -
with what kind of suspicious characters is the BND cooperating?
That the ZDF information was volatile was demonstrated by the quick
reaction of the German government. The very next day after the
broadcast of the first part, government spokesperson Bela Anda sharply
denied at a press conference ZDF claims that the BND but not the German
troops in the field knew that Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija were
preparing violence against the Serbs. Anda emphasized that the BND and
the German Army had a completely "mutually corresponding picture of the
situation" but refused to comment on cooperation between the BND and
the extremist Xhezairi.
The German media and the media in the region where the German language
is spoken gladly accepted the ZDF news and the government reaction,
some very gladly. The Austrian paper "Kurir", for example, placed the
headline of "Al-Q'aida fanned the violence in Kosovo" above its report.
Although things are indeed serious they are not quite as simple as the
headline suggests.
NIN's journalist accompanied the ZDF journalists during their
investigations in this region and also learned additional information.
Thanks to the exclusive information at our disposal we can put together
the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle still far from complete but clear enough
to be able to recognize the contours of the somber scenario.
The protagonist of this story is Samedin Xhezairi, called Commander
Hoxha, an Austrian citizen of Albanian origin who today lives in
Prizren. In the last issue of NIN we presented major facts about him to
which we will add that Xhezairi lived in Austria and joined the Kosovo
Liberation Army when armed conflict in Kosovo began, taking part in the
activity in three operative zones. He was a fighter in Chechnya,
trained in Afghanistan and acted as the commander of the mujaheddin
112th Brigade operating in the summer of 2001 in the region of Tetovo.
In August of the same year 80 members of the 3/502 battalion of U.S.
paratroopers evacuated him from Arachinovo, together with his Albanian
extremists and 17 instructors of the U.S. private military company MPRI
which was training the Albanian paramilitary formations.
According to confidential NATO information from 2002 prepared by the
German intelligence services BND and ZNBw (Zentrum für Nachrichtenwesen
der Bundeswehr), Xhezairi has been tasked with forming a branch of
Allah's Army - Hezbollah, and his telephone number has been found in
confiscated documents from identified members of al-Q'aida. Samedin
Xhezairi is an active member of the KLA Veterans' Association, which is
collecting money for "humanitarian aid" through a German bank. The
Albanians consider him to be a charismatic "holy man" and count him
among the most eminent Albanian leaders.
The same NATO information presented to KFOR Headquarters on May 17,
2002 indicate that his involvement with Islamist elements in Kosovo is
far reaching. At the center of local Islamist structures in Prizren is
Hoxha Mazlumi who is active in the Jeni Mahala ("New Territory")
mosque. Through his closest associates, including Xhezairi, Mazlumi has
established an organization with his own paramilitary, intelligence
service and logistical, financial and propaganda network (see
illustration). Through his people Mazlumi has ties to the Kosovo
Protection Corps, the Kosovo Police Service, UNMIK and al-Q'aida.
The NATO documents state that the potential intentions and capabilities
of Mazlumi's organization are "quick mobilization of the masses for
demonstrations, fanning of aggressive stance among the non-Islamist
population toward Kfor, development of a Islamist dam in Prizren,
initiation of unrest to demonstrate the failure of the international
community, taking advantage of the fact that Kosovska Mitrovica in the
center of Kfor's attention, while the south of Kosovo is under less
observation by international forces..."
[ Breaking news -BND admission
At the printing deadline for this issue of NIN we have learned that BND
chief August Hanning has admitted that the ZDF documents also in NIN's
possession are authentic ]
Thus, it was known for at least two years that in Prizren a cell of
extremist Islamism was being born right under the eyes of German Kfor.
It is not surprising that the temperature in that city jumped when ZDF
journalists arrived and began to ask awkward questions of both the
German troops and the Islamist extremists. At the same time, it is
interesting that the Germans were less talkative than their temporary
neighbors. They stuck firmly to the official version of events: no one
knew anything about the preparation of the March pogroms; German Kfor,
like all members of international forces throughout Kosovo, were caught
by surprise by the violence, and consequently unable to react
adequately. When confronted with evidence that the BND was informed
regarding the preparations by Albanian terrorists, the German soldiers
categorically rejected every possibility of being privy to the
information themselves.
Unlike them, Samedin Xhezairi was not particularly reluctant to admit
some things to the German reporters even though his nervousness was
apparent. He warned his collocutors no less than four times that they
must show the report they were preparing to the BND before broadcasting
it, as if it was necessary to ask the intelligence service for its
approval with the reporters' discoveries. Apparently, Xhezairi
understood this to be an obligation on his part toward his former
employers. Commander Hoxha did not deny working for the BND as a spy
but he depicted this as some form of entertainment. He did not deny
having taken part in the recorded conversations regarding the
preparation of the violence nor did he reject the fact that organized
structures exist: "We are former fighters; we know each other just like
U.S. veterans. As long as the people are alive, these structures exist."
He also explained the use of coded conversations to the German
reporters: "You agree beforehand that, for example, the word 'health'
means 'liquidate him' and then you just say 'health' and the people
tapping your conversation don't know what it means." In fact, the
conversations Xhezairi took part in at the end of February and
beginning of March were not very well coded, and any listener of
average education could understand them, let alone intelligence service
experts. Mention was made, for example, that "in two or three weeks the
party will begin" and that "in Prizren everything is prepared for a hot
party" while the question asked was "can you guarantee it will be a
blast in Urosevac". Some of Xhezairi's collocutors also complained that
they still had not organized enough buses to transport the activists.
According to transcripts in the possession of ZDF journalists, Samedin
Xhezairi commanded the March operations in Prizren and Urosevac, and
probably in Orahovac, too. The BND knew and not only the BND.
[ According to confidential NATO information from 2002 prepared by the
German intelligence services BND and ZNBw (Zentrum für Nachrichtenwesen
der Bundeswehr), Samedin Xhezairi has been tasked with forming a branch
of "Allah's Army", the Hezbollah, and his telephone number has been
found in confiscated documents from identified members of al-Q'aida.
Samedin Xhezairi is an active member of the KLA Veterans' Association,
which is collecting money for "humanitarian aid" through a German bank.
The Albanians consider him to be a charismatic "holy man" and count him
among the most eminent Albanian leaders (NIN weekly) ]
NIN also received confirmation of this from German intelligence service
expert Erich Schmidt-Eenboom who told us: "Until March 4 - two weeks
before the pogroms - Commander Hoxha was a BND spy for 500 euros per
month, probably more because of his connections with al-Q'aida than
because of Kosovo. On March 4 he was deactivated after the BND learned
from partner services - probably the Austrian military intelligence
service - that they were tapping his conversations. The BND advised him
of this fact." According to some sources, after this discovery Xhezairi
fled to Bosnia, returning immediately prior to March 17 to Prizren. It
is not known whether someone temporarily removed him or if he left for
personal reasons. What is known, and what Erich Schmidt-Eenboom
confirmed for NIN, is the fact that Xhezairi was working for at least
one other intelligence service, the CIA. That is why U.S. paratroopers
evacuated him in 2001 from Arachinovo.
Some German media and politicians these days are not even questioning
the reliability of the ZDF reports according to which the BND was aware
of the criminal activities of its collaborator Xhezairi. For example,
the spokesperson of the Greens on defense matters, Winfried Nachtwei,
stated that the ZDF investigations are based on "fairly solid and
certain indications". And former coordinator of the German secret
services in the government Bernd Schmidbauer said that the ZDF
information regarding the suspect role of the BND "must be taken very
seriously" and requires a thorough investigation into lack of
communication between the BND and the German Army.
[ PHOTO: German Defense minister Struck in Kosovo ]
The statements of Nachtwei and Schmidbauer follow a scandal after the
March events in Kosovo in which German defense minister Peter Struck
and his army were implicated. Struck and the German contingent in
Kosovo found themselves in the limelight of public attention after
media reports revealed that at the time of the attack by Albanian
terrorists there was chaos among the German troops and that the burned
body of a Serb man was found in Prizren after Struck claimed that there
were no casualties in the German area of responsibility. The latest
revelations regarding the role of the BND correspond with this stunning
picture of disorganization on the part of German military and security
structures. If the BND had the information and failed to forward it to
the government and army, that means there is no help for anyone
dependent on the protection of state institutions. That is the
approximate image of the intelligence service and the army among the
German public at present.
However, Erich Schmidt-Eenboom categorically rejects this
interpretations and tells NIN that the German government spokesperson
was telling the truth in his denial of the ZDF report: "The BND
certainly informed the Chancellor's cabinet. It is inconceivable that
the BND failed to do so under the present political conditions and good
cooperation with the German government. The statement of spokesperson
Anda is correct - the BND and the German Army had a 'mutually
corresponding picture of the situation'. That means that the German
contingent in Prizren and its commander colonel Hinkelmann consciously
failed to respond to the attacks, that they allowed everything to
happen in order to avoid coming into direct contact with the Albanians.
Because the consequence of having done so would have been Albanian
violence against the German Army, and that would have ruined the good
image of the peacekeeping mission. The irony of the whole story is that
the Germany government and the KLA have a common final goal, and that
is an independent state of Kosovo without concession of territory to
the Serbs. Only Berlin also needs to be careful with respect to the
timeline as far as allies who still oppose this are concerned, as is
the case with France."
Schmidt-Eenboom also reminds of the history of cooperation between the
BND and the KLA: "What German journalists and their Dutch colleagues at
VPRO Radio Television investigated has a long tradition. Since the
beginning of the 1990s the BND has maintained contacts with the KLA
which was then considered to be a terrorist organization. Although we
have to admit that the KLA has stronger ties with the CIA than the BND.
Commander Hoxha had ties with the CIA, the BND and with the Austrian
military intelligence service which has devoted great attention to this
region and has very good connections with the KLA."
Such facts, of course, are not mentioned in the media and among the
general public in Germany because life is not easy for those who bear
such knowledge, either. After the ZDF reports were broadcast the BND
launched a campaign against one of the authors, journalist Franz Josef
Hutsch and began to spread stories in Berlin that his revelations are
based on false information from Serbian intelligence services, and that
he is of pro-Serbian orientation because he was a defense witness in
the Milosevic trial and after than gave an interview to NIN. To be of
pro-Serbian orientation is tantamount to the German public to being,
for example, a member of al-Q'aida.
However, the editors of ZDF strongly support Hutsch, as Hans-Ulrich
Gack, one of the co-authors of the controversial broadcasts, tells NIN.
There is even more compromising material for the BND and the German
government, and now everyone is waiting for the further unfolding of
events.
[ "What German journalists and their Dutch colleagues at VPRO Radio
Television investigated has a long tradition. Since the beginning of
the 1990s the BND has maintained contacts with the KLA which was then
considered to be a terrorist organization. Although we have to admit
that the KLA has stronger ties with the CIA than the BND. Commander
Hoxha had ties with the CIA, the BND and with the Austrian military
intelligence service which has devoted great attention to this region
and has very good connections with the KLA." (NIN weekly) ]
The German public, for example, still does not know what NIN reported
in its last issue: that the terrorist structures in Kosovo are being
systematically armed by state-of-the-art G-22 sniper rifles, which are
arriving in the southern Serbian province in large quantities. Taking
into account the fact that Commander Hoxha stated in his interview for
German television that he can immediately mobilize 30,000 fighters, and
that "it is no longer necessary to wait for the spring for a new
attack; all we need is a spark" it may happen that the German public
will suddenly find itself confronted by new-old questions without clear
answers: Who will be to blame if the Albanian terrorists carry out yet
another, perhaps final ethnic cleansing in Kosovo? Can Kfor protect the
Serbs from new violence, and is it even in their interest to do so? Are
Islamist fundamentalist cells being born in Kosovo under the eyes of
the peacekeeping forces that might even become a threat to Europe? Are
Western intelligence sources participating, actively or passively, in
this process and thus creating a new army of "talibans" who will one
day turn against them? And so on and so on.
There are so many questions and the answers are wrapped in a veil of
silence or being consciously obscured. It appears that both the Serbian
public and Serbian politicians are fleeing from facing important facts.
We have not heard any official statements following the news from
Germany while "European Serbian National Television", for example,
reported on the whole issue as if Kosovo and Metohija was some province
in the Congo, not one whose fate is still, at rhetorically, a part of
Serbia's state interests. It would appear that these are matters of
interest only to "the dark forces of the past" whose remaining days are
numbered.
By Mira Beham
--- 2 ---
Was violence in Kosovo tolerated?
What did the German Intelligence Service, the Bundeswehr and the German
government know about planning of violence attacks by Albanian
extremists on the Serbian minority in Kosovo, which is under a NATO
protectorate
(Text in German: http://www.nd-online.de/artikel.asp?AID=63282&IDC=2)
Neues Deutschland, BERLIN
Interview with secret service expert Erich Schmidt-Eenboom by Stefan
Tenner
(Photo: Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, head of the Institute for Peace Policy
in Weilheim, Germany)
Berlin, November 23 - In March of this year, after the bloody pogroms
of Albanian extremists against the Serbs in Kosovo, the leadership of
the Bundeswehr established with regret that "no one suspected anything
about this concentrated operation". Reports by ZDF television and the
newspaper "Junge Welt" last week, however, support that at least the
German Intelligence Service (BND) knew of the attacks several weeks
before they occurred. During the course of a wire-tapped conversation,
former KLA fighter Samedin Xhezairi ordered am associate to take care
of the "explosive mood" in the south of Kosovo in two to three weeks.
Xhezairi was allegedly a paid spy for the BND and maintained
connections with al-Q'aida. At least 19 people died in ensuing violent
riots, including a Serb man killed in the German area of responsibility
of Prizren.
Deputies of the CDU, FDP and Greens this weekend requested an
explanation regarding whether the BND concealed important information.
The German government denies it. But why was the response inadequate?
Then Kfor commander Holger Kammerhof claims that he was not previously
informed of this. In any case, there were no more troops for the
protection of Serbian enclaves.
Question: How reliable is information that the BND knew of the
preparations for the anti-Serb pogrom?
Answer: Investigations primarily broadcast by our Dutch colleagues at
VPRO Radio are correct. Since the beginning of the 1990s the BND has
maintained connections with the KLA which is considered to be a
terrorist organization. At the same time, however, it must be admitted
that the BND does not have the first and most important role. The KLA
is first of all a child of the CIA. This was especially apparent in the
summer of 2001 in Macedonia when KLA fighters were evacuated with U.S.
military protection.
Question: What do you know about Samedin Xhezairi?
Answer: This commander of the 112th (KLA) Brigade, who fought under the
nom de guerre of Hoxha, took part in the rebellion in Macedonia in
clashes against the local government. He maintained ties with the CIA
which resulted in his being able to gather 17 U.S. military advisors
around him. In addition to the BND, the Austrian military intelligence
service should also be mentioned as it devoted special attention to
this region and has good connections with the KLA.
Question: Was Xhezairi a BND spy?
Answer: Connections with the BND existed until the beginning of March
of this year. They ceased 14 days before the pogrom in Kosovo. That
means that the BND renounced its source because he seemed too
suspicious and militant.
Question: What happened to the information regarding preparations for
the pogrom?
Answer: I will begin with the assumption that the BND certainly
informed the German government. It is almost inconceivable that such
important information from the BND, whose president August Hanning, is
a member of the Chancellor's cabinet, would not be relayed. As well, I
assume that either from the cabinet or directly from the BND the
information got to the Bundeswehr. This means that the Albanian attacks
on Serbs in Kosovo on March 17 and 18 were tolerated by the Bundeswehr
because they did not want to ruin their relations with the KLA. Namely,
if action had been taken against militant forces in the KLA before
hand, it was to be expected that structures existed that would
afterwards turn against the Bundeswehr as an occupying army.
On the other hand, from a long-term perspective, it is in Germany's
interest for Kosovo to become an independent state. It shares this
interest with the KLA, which by such violence is attempting to increase
political pressure to act. Namely, the political future of Kosovo still
has not been determined. According to the German model, the province is
expected to become an independent state. However, there are other NATO
allies, including the United States, who wish to play on another
political hand.
Question: Samedin Xhezairi allegedly also had connections with
al-Q'aida. Did al-Q'aida, then, directly participate in the preparation
of the riots in Kosovo?
Answer: We must not overestimate al-Q'aida and think of it in terms of
a centralized organization. It is in fact a loose network involving
many Islamic terrorists with common ideological principles and a common
past in Afghan training camps who share a common goal, so there is no
need for an al-Q'aida headquarters to issue a single order, a political
command.
Question: How do you assess the situation in Kosovo keeping in mind the
position of the Serbian minority and the resolution of the status issue
planned for next year?
Answer: There is a strong political need to tell the Kosovo Albanians
in clear terms what the final political configuration will look like.
An independent state of Kosovo Albanians, considering the militancy of
the KLA, would mean that the Serbian minority in the region could not
live in safety. Consequently perhaps thought should be given, since the
majority of Serbs live in the region near the border with Serbia, to
whether a line of separation could be drawn and whether the parts that
are primarily Serb could be appended to the former Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. I think that an eventual independent state of Kosovo within
its present borders would be an explosive political solution because it
would mean the expulsion of Serbs from the centuries-old regions or
they might, on their part, resort to counter-violence with the support
of Belgrade.
Question: What needs to change in German foreign policy?
Answer: It is not enough to play the military hand and to maintain a
Kfor contingent that is supposed to look after a relative peace. People
in the region need political opportunity. And if Kosovo has the desire
to get closer to or even join the European Union then there is a strong
political argument to demand protection for minorities. At the same
time, mediation process must begin: diplomats from many countries must
sit at the same table with the conflicting sides in order to find a
political solution.
[This text was translated into English from a Serbian translation.]
---
ERP KIM Info-Service is the official Information Service of the Serbian
Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren and works with the blessing of
His Grace Bishop Artemije.
Our Information Service is distributing news on Kosovo related issues.
The main focus of the Info-Service is the life of the Serbian Orthodox
Church and the Serbian community in the Province of Kosovo and
Metohija. ERP KIM Info Service works in cooperation with
www.serbian-translation.com as well as the Kosovo Daily News (KDN) News
List
Disclaimer:
The views expressed by the authors of newspaper articles or other texts
which are not official communiqués or news reports by the Diocese are
their own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Serbian
Orthodox Church
Additional information on our Diocese and the life of the Kosovo Serb
Community may be found at:
http://www.kosovo.com
If you want to unsubscribe go to the page:
http://www.kosovo.com/erpkiminfo.html
Copyright 2004, ERP KIM Info-Service
UCK / BND:
Terror network operating in Kosovo a key for understanding March riots
[ In Germania e' finalmente scoppiato lo scandalo del sostegno fornito
dal BND (Bundesnachrichendienst - servizio segreto militare) alle bande
di assassini che da cinque anni compiono la pulizia etnica di tutte le
nazionalita' non-albanesi sul territorio della provincia serba di
Kosovo e Metohija (ultimo eclatante episodio: i pogrom di massa dello
scorso marzo, che hanno causato una ventina di morti e decine di
migliaia di profughi). Disponiamo finalmente (vedi piu' sotto in questo
messaggio) di una versione in lingua inglese di alcuni degli articoli
usciti in questi giorni sulla stampa serba e tedesca; abbiamo inviato e
continueremo a far circolare anche tutta la documentazione in lingua
tedesca, specialmente gli articoli dell'inviato di Junge Welt a
Belgrado, Juergen Elsaesser. DOBBIAMO INVECE REGISTRARE E STIGMATIZZARE
IL SILENZIO TOMBALE CHE SU QUESTO SCANDALO DI PORTATA INTERNAZIONALE E'
STATO STESO DA TUTTA LA STAMPA ITALIANA E DI ALTRI PAESI: l'Italia in
particolare, che pure ha molte migliaia di soldati in Kosovo,
inquadrati nelle forze di occupazione coloniale KFOR insieme ai
tedeschi, si distingue come al solito per la sua totale mancanza di
autonomia, sia politico-militare che giornalistico-intellettuale, anche
sulle piu' gravi questioni strategiche. (A cura di I. Slavo) ]
More links:
London Telegraph: Pogrom Aftermath: German MPs Want Answers to Army's
Failures in Kosovo (by Hannah Cleaver)
http://www.realitymacedonia.org.mk/web/news_page.asp?nid=3941
===
( see the original URL for many interesting pictures:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/85182 )
ERP KIM Newsletter 27-11-04
Terror network operating in Kosovo a key for understanding March riots
"I assume that either from the cabinet or directly from the BND the
information got to the Bundeswehr. This means that the Albanian attacks
on Serbs in Kosovo on March 17 and 18 were tolerated by the Bundeswehr
because they did not want to ruin their relations with the KLA. Namely,
if action had been taken against militant forces in the KLA before
hand, it was to be expected that structures existed that would
afterwards turn against the Bundeswehr as an occupying army" (Erich
Schmidt-Eenboom, see down)
Contents:
1. NIN, When Intelligence Officers Fan the Flames, Nov 25, 2004
2. Neues Deutschland, Was Violence in Kosovo Tolerated, Nov 23, 2004
Disclaimer:
The views expressed by the authors of newspaper articles or other texts
which are not official communiqués or news reports by the Diocese are
their own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Serbian
Orthodox Church
--- 1 ---
www.nin.co.yu
Nedeljne Informativne Novine, Belgrade
November 25, 2004
When intelligence officers fan the flames
Why is the Serbian community silent on reports by German ZDF television
presenting serious accusations against the German intelligence service
(BND) in connection with the March pogroms in Kosovo and Metohija
[PHOTO: The local network]
In two segments of more than four minutes each broadcast on November 18
and 20 as major news during the main news program, ZDF reporters
documented the following: that the German intelligence service (BND -
Bundesnachrichtendienst) knew three weeks prior to March 17 that
organized attacks on Serbs throughout Kosovo and Metohija were being
prepared, that the BND knew this because it was tapping the
conversations of one of the organizers of the pogrom, that this man's
name is Samedin Xhezairi, also known as Commander Hoxha, and that
Xhezairi, for his part, was a BND spy but also an intermediary between
Albanian extremists and al-Q'aida. The reporters cited transcripts of
conversations from the intelligence services as well as confidential
NATO documents, and the dilemmas they opened, directly and indirectly,
were why BND did not relay the information to the German government,
and through it to the commander of the German Kfor contingent in
Prizren and Holger Kammerhof, then commander in chief of NATO troops in
Kosovo? Could the violence have been prevented if key political and
military structures in Berlin and Kosovo and Metohija had received
timely information from the German intelligence officers? And finally -
with what kind of suspicious characters is the BND cooperating?
That the ZDF information was volatile was demonstrated by the quick
reaction of the German government. The very next day after the
broadcast of the first part, government spokesperson Bela Anda sharply
denied at a press conference ZDF claims that the BND but not the German
troops in the field knew that Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija were
preparing violence against the Serbs. Anda emphasized that the BND and
the German Army had a completely "mutually corresponding picture of the
situation" but refused to comment on cooperation between the BND and
the extremist Xhezairi.
The German media and the media in the region where the German language
is spoken gladly accepted the ZDF news and the government reaction,
some very gladly. The Austrian paper "Kurir", for example, placed the
headline of "Al-Q'aida fanned the violence in Kosovo" above its report.
Although things are indeed serious they are not quite as simple as the
headline suggests.
NIN's journalist accompanied the ZDF journalists during their
investigations in this region and also learned additional information.
Thanks to the exclusive information at our disposal we can put together
the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle still far from complete but clear enough
to be able to recognize the contours of the somber scenario.
The protagonist of this story is Samedin Xhezairi, called Commander
Hoxha, an Austrian citizen of Albanian origin who today lives in
Prizren. In the last issue of NIN we presented major facts about him to
which we will add that Xhezairi lived in Austria and joined the Kosovo
Liberation Army when armed conflict in Kosovo began, taking part in the
activity in three operative zones. He was a fighter in Chechnya,
trained in Afghanistan and acted as the commander of the mujaheddin
112th Brigade operating in the summer of 2001 in the region of Tetovo.
In August of the same year 80 members of the 3/502 battalion of U.S.
paratroopers evacuated him from Arachinovo, together with his Albanian
extremists and 17 instructors of the U.S. private military company MPRI
which was training the Albanian paramilitary formations.
According to confidential NATO information from 2002 prepared by the
German intelligence services BND and ZNBw (Zentrum für Nachrichtenwesen
der Bundeswehr), Xhezairi has been tasked with forming a branch of
Allah's Army - Hezbollah, and his telephone number has been found in
confiscated documents from identified members of al-Q'aida. Samedin
Xhezairi is an active member of the KLA Veterans' Association, which is
collecting money for "humanitarian aid" through a German bank. The
Albanians consider him to be a charismatic "holy man" and count him
among the most eminent Albanian leaders.
The same NATO information presented to KFOR Headquarters on May 17,
2002 indicate that his involvement with Islamist elements in Kosovo is
far reaching. At the center of local Islamist structures in Prizren is
Hoxha Mazlumi who is active in the Jeni Mahala ("New Territory")
mosque. Through his closest associates, including Xhezairi, Mazlumi has
established an organization with his own paramilitary, intelligence
service and logistical, financial and propaganda network (see
illustration). Through his people Mazlumi has ties to the Kosovo
Protection Corps, the Kosovo Police Service, UNMIK and al-Q'aida.
The NATO documents state that the potential intentions and capabilities
of Mazlumi's organization are "quick mobilization of the masses for
demonstrations, fanning of aggressive stance among the non-Islamist
population toward Kfor, development of a Islamist dam in Prizren,
initiation of unrest to demonstrate the failure of the international
community, taking advantage of the fact that Kosovska Mitrovica in the
center of Kfor's attention, while the south of Kosovo is under less
observation by international forces..."
[ Breaking news -BND admission
At the printing deadline for this issue of NIN we have learned that BND
chief August Hanning has admitted that the ZDF documents also in NIN's
possession are authentic ]
Thus, it was known for at least two years that in Prizren a cell of
extremist Islamism was being born right under the eyes of German Kfor.
It is not surprising that the temperature in that city jumped when ZDF
journalists arrived and began to ask awkward questions of both the
German troops and the Islamist extremists. At the same time, it is
interesting that the Germans were less talkative than their temporary
neighbors. They stuck firmly to the official version of events: no one
knew anything about the preparation of the March pogroms; German Kfor,
like all members of international forces throughout Kosovo, were caught
by surprise by the violence, and consequently unable to react
adequately. When confronted with evidence that the BND was informed
regarding the preparations by Albanian terrorists, the German soldiers
categorically rejected every possibility of being privy to the
information themselves.
Unlike them, Samedin Xhezairi was not particularly reluctant to admit
some things to the German reporters even though his nervousness was
apparent. He warned his collocutors no less than four times that they
must show the report they were preparing to the BND before broadcasting
it, as if it was necessary to ask the intelligence service for its
approval with the reporters' discoveries. Apparently, Xhezairi
understood this to be an obligation on his part toward his former
employers. Commander Hoxha did not deny working for the BND as a spy
but he depicted this as some form of entertainment. He did not deny
having taken part in the recorded conversations regarding the
preparation of the violence nor did he reject the fact that organized
structures exist: "We are former fighters; we know each other just like
U.S. veterans. As long as the people are alive, these structures exist."
He also explained the use of coded conversations to the German
reporters: "You agree beforehand that, for example, the word 'health'
means 'liquidate him' and then you just say 'health' and the people
tapping your conversation don't know what it means." In fact, the
conversations Xhezairi took part in at the end of February and
beginning of March were not very well coded, and any listener of
average education could understand them, let alone intelligence service
experts. Mention was made, for example, that "in two or three weeks the
party will begin" and that "in Prizren everything is prepared for a hot
party" while the question asked was "can you guarantee it will be a
blast in Urosevac". Some of Xhezairi's collocutors also complained that
they still had not organized enough buses to transport the activists.
According to transcripts in the possession of ZDF journalists, Samedin
Xhezairi commanded the March operations in Prizren and Urosevac, and
probably in Orahovac, too. The BND knew and not only the BND.
[ According to confidential NATO information from 2002 prepared by the
German intelligence services BND and ZNBw (Zentrum für Nachrichtenwesen
der Bundeswehr), Samedin Xhezairi has been tasked with forming a branch
of "Allah's Army", the Hezbollah, and his telephone number has been
found in confiscated documents from identified members of al-Q'aida.
Samedin Xhezairi is an active member of the KLA Veterans' Association,
which is collecting money for "humanitarian aid" through a German bank.
The Albanians consider him to be a charismatic "holy man" and count him
among the most eminent Albanian leaders (NIN weekly) ]
NIN also received confirmation of this from German intelligence service
expert Erich Schmidt-Eenboom who told us: "Until March 4 - two weeks
before the pogroms - Commander Hoxha was a BND spy for 500 euros per
month, probably more because of his connections with al-Q'aida than
because of Kosovo. On March 4 he was deactivated after the BND learned
from partner services - probably the Austrian military intelligence
service - that they were tapping his conversations. The BND advised him
of this fact." According to some sources, after this discovery Xhezairi
fled to Bosnia, returning immediately prior to March 17 to Prizren. It
is not known whether someone temporarily removed him or if he left for
personal reasons. What is known, and what Erich Schmidt-Eenboom
confirmed for NIN, is the fact that Xhezairi was working for at least
one other intelligence service, the CIA. That is why U.S. paratroopers
evacuated him in 2001 from Arachinovo.
Some German media and politicians these days are not even questioning
the reliability of the ZDF reports according to which the BND was aware
of the criminal activities of its collaborator Xhezairi. For example,
the spokesperson of the Greens on defense matters, Winfried Nachtwei,
stated that the ZDF investigations are based on "fairly solid and
certain indications". And former coordinator of the German secret
services in the government Bernd Schmidbauer said that the ZDF
information regarding the suspect role of the BND "must be taken very
seriously" and requires a thorough investigation into lack of
communication between the BND and the German Army.
[ PHOTO: German Defense minister Struck in Kosovo ]
The statements of Nachtwei and Schmidbauer follow a scandal after the
March events in Kosovo in which German defense minister Peter Struck
and his army were implicated. Struck and the German contingent in
Kosovo found themselves in the limelight of public attention after
media reports revealed that at the time of the attack by Albanian
terrorists there was chaos among the German troops and that the burned
body of a Serb man was found in Prizren after Struck claimed that there
were no casualties in the German area of responsibility. The latest
revelations regarding the role of the BND correspond with this stunning
picture of disorganization on the part of German military and security
structures. If the BND had the information and failed to forward it to
the government and army, that means there is no help for anyone
dependent on the protection of state institutions. That is the
approximate image of the intelligence service and the army among the
German public at present.
However, Erich Schmidt-Eenboom categorically rejects this
interpretations and tells NIN that the German government spokesperson
was telling the truth in his denial of the ZDF report: "The BND
certainly informed the Chancellor's cabinet. It is inconceivable that
the BND failed to do so under the present political conditions and good
cooperation with the German government. The statement of spokesperson
Anda is correct - the BND and the German Army had a 'mutually
corresponding picture of the situation'. That means that the German
contingent in Prizren and its commander colonel Hinkelmann consciously
failed to respond to the attacks, that they allowed everything to
happen in order to avoid coming into direct contact with the Albanians.
Because the consequence of having done so would have been Albanian
violence against the German Army, and that would have ruined the good
image of the peacekeeping mission. The irony of the whole story is that
the Germany government and the KLA have a common final goal, and that
is an independent state of Kosovo without concession of territory to
the Serbs. Only Berlin also needs to be careful with respect to the
timeline as far as allies who still oppose this are concerned, as is
the case with France."
Schmidt-Eenboom also reminds of the history of cooperation between the
BND and the KLA: "What German journalists and their Dutch colleagues at
VPRO Radio Television investigated has a long tradition. Since the
beginning of the 1990s the BND has maintained contacts with the KLA
which was then considered to be a terrorist organization. Although we
have to admit that the KLA has stronger ties with the CIA than the BND.
Commander Hoxha had ties with the CIA, the BND and with the Austrian
military intelligence service which has devoted great attention to this
region and has very good connections with the KLA."
Such facts, of course, are not mentioned in the media and among the
general public in Germany because life is not easy for those who bear
such knowledge, either. After the ZDF reports were broadcast the BND
launched a campaign against one of the authors, journalist Franz Josef
Hutsch and began to spread stories in Berlin that his revelations are
based on false information from Serbian intelligence services, and that
he is of pro-Serbian orientation because he was a defense witness in
the Milosevic trial and after than gave an interview to NIN. To be of
pro-Serbian orientation is tantamount to the German public to being,
for example, a member of al-Q'aida.
However, the editors of ZDF strongly support Hutsch, as Hans-Ulrich
Gack, one of the co-authors of the controversial broadcasts, tells NIN.
There is even more compromising material for the BND and the German
government, and now everyone is waiting for the further unfolding of
events.
[ "What German journalists and their Dutch colleagues at VPRO Radio
Television investigated has a long tradition. Since the beginning of
the 1990s the BND has maintained contacts with the KLA which was then
considered to be a terrorist organization. Although we have to admit
that the KLA has stronger ties with the CIA than the BND. Commander
Hoxha had ties with the CIA, the BND and with the Austrian military
intelligence service which has devoted great attention to this region
and has very good connections with the KLA." (NIN weekly) ]
The German public, for example, still does not know what NIN reported
in its last issue: that the terrorist structures in Kosovo are being
systematically armed by state-of-the-art G-22 sniper rifles, which are
arriving in the southern Serbian province in large quantities. Taking
into account the fact that Commander Hoxha stated in his interview for
German television that he can immediately mobilize 30,000 fighters, and
that "it is no longer necessary to wait for the spring for a new
attack; all we need is a spark" it may happen that the German public
will suddenly find itself confronted by new-old questions without clear
answers: Who will be to blame if the Albanian terrorists carry out yet
another, perhaps final ethnic cleansing in Kosovo? Can Kfor protect the
Serbs from new violence, and is it even in their interest to do so? Are
Islamist fundamentalist cells being born in Kosovo under the eyes of
the peacekeeping forces that might even become a threat to Europe? Are
Western intelligence sources participating, actively or passively, in
this process and thus creating a new army of "talibans" who will one
day turn against them? And so on and so on.
There are so many questions and the answers are wrapped in a veil of
silence or being consciously obscured. It appears that both the Serbian
public and Serbian politicians are fleeing from facing important facts.
We have not heard any official statements following the news from
Germany while "European Serbian National Television", for example,
reported on the whole issue as if Kosovo and Metohija was some province
in the Congo, not one whose fate is still, at rhetorically, a part of
Serbia's state interests. It would appear that these are matters of
interest only to "the dark forces of the past" whose remaining days are
numbered.
By Mira Beham
--- 2 ---
Was violence in Kosovo tolerated?
What did the German Intelligence Service, the Bundeswehr and the German
government know about planning of violence attacks by Albanian
extremists on the Serbian minority in Kosovo, which is under a NATO
protectorate
(Text in German: http://www.nd-online.de/artikel.asp?AID=63282&IDC=2)
Neues Deutschland, BERLIN
Interview with secret service expert Erich Schmidt-Eenboom by Stefan
Tenner
(Photo: Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, head of the Institute for Peace Policy
in Weilheim, Germany)
Berlin, November 23 - In March of this year, after the bloody pogroms
of Albanian extremists against the Serbs in Kosovo, the leadership of
the Bundeswehr established with regret that "no one suspected anything
about this concentrated operation". Reports by ZDF television and the
newspaper "Junge Welt" last week, however, support that at least the
German Intelligence Service (BND) knew of the attacks several weeks
before they occurred. During the course of a wire-tapped conversation,
former KLA fighter Samedin Xhezairi ordered am associate to take care
of the "explosive mood" in the south of Kosovo in two to three weeks.
Xhezairi was allegedly a paid spy for the BND and maintained
connections with al-Q'aida. At least 19 people died in ensuing violent
riots, including a Serb man killed in the German area of responsibility
of Prizren.
Deputies of the CDU, FDP and Greens this weekend requested an
explanation regarding whether the BND concealed important information.
The German government denies it. But why was the response inadequate?
Then Kfor commander Holger Kammerhof claims that he was not previously
informed of this. In any case, there were no more troops for the
protection of Serbian enclaves.
Question: How reliable is information that the BND knew of the
preparations for the anti-Serb pogrom?
Answer: Investigations primarily broadcast by our Dutch colleagues at
VPRO Radio are correct. Since the beginning of the 1990s the BND has
maintained connections with the KLA which is considered to be a
terrorist organization. At the same time, however, it must be admitted
that the BND does not have the first and most important role. The KLA
is first of all a child of the CIA. This was especially apparent in the
summer of 2001 in Macedonia when KLA fighters were evacuated with U.S.
military protection.
Question: What do you know about Samedin Xhezairi?
Answer: This commander of the 112th (KLA) Brigade, who fought under the
nom de guerre of Hoxha, took part in the rebellion in Macedonia in
clashes against the local government. He maintained ties with the CIA
which resulted in his being able to gather 17 U.S. military advisors
around him. In addition to the BND, the Austrian military intelligence
service should also be mentioned as it devoted special attention to
this region and has good connections with the KLA.
Question: Was Xhezairi a BND spy?
Answer: Connections with the BND existed until the beginning of March
of this year. They ceased 14 days before the pogrom in Kosovo. That
means that the BND renounced its source because he seemed too
suspicious and militant.
Question: What happened to the information regarding preparations for
the pogrom?
Answer: I will begin with the assumption that the BND certainly
informed the German government. It is almost inconceivable that such
important information from the BND, whose president August Hanning, is
a member of the Chancellor's cabinet, would not be relayed. As well, I
assume that either from the cabinet or directly from the BND the
information got to the Bundeswehr. This means that the Albanian attacks
on Serbs in Kosovo on March 17 and 18 were tolerated by the Bundeswehr
because they did not want to ruin their relations with the KLA. Namely,
if action had been taken against militant forces in the KLA before
hand, it was to be expected that structures existed that would
afterwards turn against the Bundeswehr as an occupying army.
On the other hand, from a long-term perspective, it is in Germany's
interest for Kosovo to become an independent state. It shares this
interest with the KLA, which by such violence is attempting to increase
political pressure to act. Namely, the political future of Kosovo still
has not been determined. According to the German model, the province is
expected to become an independent state. However, there are other NATO
allies, including the United States, who wish to play on another
political hand.
Question: Samedin Xhezairi allegedly also had connections with
al-Q'aida. Did al-Q'aida, then, directly participate in the preparation
of the riots in Kosovo?
Answer: We must not overestimate al-Q'aida and think of it in terms of
a centralized organization. It is in fact a loose network involving
many Islamic terrorists with common ideological principles and a common
past in Afghan training camps who share a common goal, so there is no
need for an al-Q'aida headquarters to issue a single order, a political
command.
Question: How do you assess the situation in Kosovo keeping in mind the
position of the Serbian minority and the resolution of the status issue
planned for next year?
Answer: There is a strong political need to tell the Kosovo Albanians
in clear terms what the final political configuration will look like.
An independent state of Kosovo Albanians, considering the militancy of
the KLA, would mean that the Serbian minority in the region could not
live in safety. Consequently perhaps thought should be given, since the
majority of Serbs live in the region near the border with Serbia, to
whether a line of separation could be drawn and whether the parts that
are primarily Serb could be appended to the former Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. I think that an eventual independent state of Kosovo within
its present borders would be an explosive political solution because it
would mean the expulsion of Serbs from the centuries-old regions or
they might, on their part, resort to counter-violence with the support
of Belgrade.
Question: What needs to change in German foreign policy?
Answer: It is not enough to play the military hand and to maintain a
Kfor contingent that is supposed to look after a relative peace. People
in the region need political opportunity. And if Kosovo has the desire
to get closer to or even join the European Union then there is a strong
political argument to demand protection for minorities. At the same
time, mediation process must begin: diplomats from many countries must
sit at the same table with the conflicting sides in order to find a
political solution.
[This text was translated into English from a Serbian translation.]
---
ERP KIM Info-Service is the official Information Service of the Serbian
Orthodox Diocese of Raska and Prizren and works with the blessing of
His Grace Bishop Artemije.
Our Information Service is distributing news on Kosovo related issues.
The main focus of the Info-Service is the life of the Serbian Orthodox
Church and the Serbian community in the Province of Kosovo and
Metohija. ERP KIM Info Service works in cooperation with
www.serbian-translation.com as well as the Kosovo Daily News (KDN) News
List
Disclaimer:
The views expressed by the authors of newspaper articles or other texts
which are not official communiqués or news reports by the Diocese are
their own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Serbian
Orthodox Church
Additional information on our Diocese and the life of the Kosovo Serb
Community may be found at:
http://www.kosovo.com
If you want to unsubscribe go to the page:
http://www.kosovo.com/erpkiminfo.html
Copyright 2004, ERP KIM Info-Service