At its Western Balkans Summit the EU woos the non-member nations of Southeastern Europe with lip service. Russia and also China, the major vaccine supplier, are gaining influence in the region...
BERLIN/BRUSSELS(Own report) - Paying lip service to alleged enlargement plans, the EU is seeking to shield the six non-member countries in Southeast Europe from Russian, Chinese and Turkish influence. The EU reconfirms its commitment to the "enlargement process" - i.e. the admission of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo, which had seceded from Serbia in violation of international law, into the EU - according to a declaration adopted yesterday by the EU leaders in Brdo pri Kranju, Slovenia. Experts are not taking this statement seriously. To promote closer ties to the EU, the leaders also announced billions of euros in support of infrastructure projects and to provide the region with larger amounts of Covid-19 vaccines. So far, China has supplied more vaccine than the EU and is even building a vaccine plant in Serbia. Latvia's prime minister more blatantly calls for eliminating the influence of such countries as Russia and China in Southeast Europe "This is our backyard."
No Longer Without an Alternative
The EU took these decisions at its Western Balkans Summit yesterday, because - having been increasingly self-absorbed and entangled in its global activities - it has long since ceased to be without an alternative for the non-member countries of Southeastern Europe. Russia has reinforced its relations with North Macedonia and especially with Serbia, with whom it has been its third largest trading partner for years. Moscow and Belgrade have also concluded a "strategic partnership."[1] China, in turn, is intensifying its relations to almost all of the countries in the region and is now Serbia's second most important supplier - just behind Germany. It is particularly supporting infrastructure projects in Southeast Europe - the most famous example is the modernization of the railroad line between Belgrade and Budapest.[2] Turkey's efforts to gain influence have been little noticed but relatively successful. Turkey is particularly cooperating with countries, whose populations have a significant Muslim sector - especially with Bosnia- Herzegovina as well as Albania and Kosovo.[3] Last year, the Trump administration had also massively interfered - against the will of the EU.[4]
"Us or Them"
The above-mentioned countries' partial growth of influence in Southeast Europe is causing resentment and resistance within in the EU. "Western Balkans Conferences" have been taking place almost annually since 2014, where some - usually only a few - EU-sates and the EU Commission meet with the six non-EU member countries of Southeastern Europe, with the aim of strengthening their bonds with the Union. The establishment of this EU format - at times, referred to as the "Berlin Process" - was in answer to the first "16+1"-Summit in April 2012, in whose framework, China has since been meeting annually with Eastern and Southeastern European EU and Non-EU countries.[5] However, there have been no major achievements to date. This is why Austria's Chancellor Sebastian Kurz used yesterday's Western Balkans Summit to warn: “If the European Union does not offer this region a real perspective, we have to be aware that other superpowers - China, Russia or Turkey - will play a bigger role there."[6] Latvian Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš expressed similar views when he remarked that "either Europe extends the hand and pulls these countries toward us or someone else will extend a hand and pull these countries in a different direction." Kariņš openly proclaimed: "This is our backyard."[7]
Only Lip Service
Being under pressure, the EU was seeking verbal concessions yesterday. EU membership for the six non-EU Southeast European countries has been stalled for years. In the meantime their membership is no longer considered a realistic option, due to various objections raised within the EU. To dispel this - accurate - impression, Brussels has had the formulation included in yesterday's "Brdo Declaration:" "the EU reconfirms its commitment to the enlargement process" - "enlargement" written in bold letters.[8] Admittedly, hardly anyone is convinced by this commitment. According to Kosovo's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Petrit Selimi, “politicians in countries in Northern and Western Europe" are regularly "paying lip-service" to enlargement. "De facto, the EU enlargement is dead."[9] Indeed, the Brdo Declaration restricts the alleged enlargement process commitment by stating that it is "based upon credible reforms by partners" and a "fair and rigorous conditionality." Slovenia, which currently holds the European Council presidency, urged the EU to commit to admitting the Western Balkan states by 2030, at the latest. That demand was clearly rejected.
No New Funds
The few concrete measures agreed on at the Western Balkans Summit yesterday, include a nearly €30 billion investment package. It is comprised of €9 billion in grant funding and €20 billion in investments, leveraged by the new Western Balkans Guarantee Facility, and intended "primarily to finance infrastructure in the Balkans and its ties to the EU."[10] Thus, it serves as a direct countermeasure to Chinese support for Southeast European infrastructure projects. However, these are not new funds. In principle, they were already planned last year by the EU Commission.[11]
The main Vaccine Supplier
In addition, the EU has announced that it would support the six non-EU countries in their fight against the Covid-19 pandemic. Already the Union "and its Member States ... have provided 2,9 million vaccine doses through various channels to the Western Balkans," according to the Brdo Declaration. There is "more to come." The objective is to help the Southeast European countries to "reach similar vaccination rates as the EU average by the end of 2021." If this is achieved the EU will, of course, not be able to claim the sole credit for it. Alongside Sputnik V vaccines, the countries of the region have, above all, been supplied with the Chinese (Sinopharm, Sinovac) vaccines. According to the Beijing-headquartered Bridge Consulting, Chinese vaccine deliveries have so far been at around 7.6 million doses. In Serbia, where a plant is already producing Sputnik V vaccines, a factory for producing the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine will be built. The factory is a joint venture between Serbia, China and the United Arab Emirates worth €30 mil.[12]
Propaganda Rather than Action
Apparently suspecting that merely moderate EU material support would not suffice for firmly binding the six Southeastern European nations to the Union, Brussels has now insisted on commitments. The EU is "by far the region’s closest partner, main investor and principal donor," according to yesterday's Brdo Declaration. The "unprecedented scale and range of this support must be fully recognized and conveyed by the partners in their public debate and communication."[13] Here, the lack of political-economic binding power is being replaced by propaganda.[14]
[1] See also The Hegemony over Southeast Europe.
[2] See also Strategic Rivalry over Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
[3] See also The New Partners in Ankara (II).
[4] See also Kriegsverbrechen im Kosovo.
[5] See also Ein Kompass für Südosteuropa.
[6] EU hält sich den Westbalkan weiter warm. n-tv.de 06.10.2021.
[7] Laurence Norman: EU's Balkan Expansion Plans Stall. wsj.com 06.10.2021.
[8] Brdo Declaration, 6 October 2021.
[9] Laurence Norman: EU's Balkan Expansion Plans Stall. wsj.com 06.10.2021.
[10] Ein größerer Trostpreis für den Westbalkan. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 06.10.2021.
[11] Westbalkan: Wirtschafts- und Investitionsplan zur Unterstützung der wirtschaftlichen Erholung und Konvergenz. ec.europa.eu 06.10.2020.
[12] Serbia starts building Europe's first Sinopharm vaccine plant. intellinews.com 09.09.2021. See also Die Impfstoffdiplomatie der EU.
[13] Brdo Declaration, 6 October 2021.
[14] See also The "Politics of Generosity".
Observers see the EU’s influence waning in non-EU countries of Southeastern Europe. Think tanks headquartered in Berlin propose sanctions for “kleptocracy” against the countries of the region.
BERLIN/SKOPJE/BELGRADE(Own report) - The EU should add "kleptocracy" to its sanctions regime and extend the sanctions’ provisions to the Western Balkans. This is being proposed by the Berlin-based think tank, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), in answer to the EU's waning leverage in Southeast Europe. For instance, observers rate the recent resignation of North Macedonia's Prime Minister, Zoran Zaev, as a serious setback for Brussels. Zaev had made considerable concessions to be admitted to the list of candidates for EU accession negotiations, but had been ignored by the EU. Observers diagnose further setbacks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the CSU politician Christian Schmidt has been installed as the - non-elected - High Representative endowed with extensive powers, and in Serbia, where opinion polls indicate overwhelming approval for close cooperation with Russia and China, accompanied by a very critical opinion toward the EU.
Forsaken
The resignation of North Macedonia's Prime Minister Zoran Zaev is seen as a serious setback for the EU in the non-EU countries of Southeast Europe. In 2019, Zaev had managed to rename his country, against strong opposition and with the aid of dubious political maneuvering, to North Macedonia. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[1]) At the time, he justified the change of name with his efforts to open EU accession negotiations. Brussels showed no appreciation, and is still rejecting Skopje's aspired accession negotiations.[2] Observers largely attribute Zaev's party's heavy defeat in the recent municipal elections to the EU's having forsaken him, as well as to his having failed to accomplish his primary political objective. Zaev's resignation, in the aftermath of his party's electoral defeat, is seen as a momentous signal. Not only will "every future head of state in Skopje think twice and even three times about whether it makes sense to take the demands and reform expectations of an EU seriously, whose promises of membership have become hollow," writes one correspondent. Zaev may have been "the last head of state in the region, for quite some time, who was prepared to take significant political risks" in favor of the EU.[3]
Not Democratically Elected
The EU is also facing setbacks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where, more than a quarter of a century after the war ended, EU troops ("Operation Althea") are still stationed. A High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, endowed with extensive powers is still residing in Sarajevo - since August 1, the CSU politician Christian Schmid. In the UN Security Council, Russia is growing increasingly unwilling to reapprove the "Althea" mandate, arguing in particular, that it is unacceptable that Bosnia-Herzegovina is permanently submitted to the control of a non-democratically elected representative of foreign powers. The political and economic situations are desolate, corruption and poverty are nourishing discontent. The Bosnian Serbs, in particular, are putting into question the status quo. Since some time, observers have been warning of secessionist objectives. In such a situation, Schmidt's predecessor, Valentin Inzko, used his mandate in July 2021, to impose a law that penalizes the denial of the Srebrenica massacre. This had further exacerbated tensions. Milorad Dodik, arguably the most influential Bosnian Serb politician, recently announced the retrieval of authority from Sarajevo back to the Republika Serbska.[4] Observers fear escalation.
Serbia's Allies
Other setbacks are reported from Serbia, where Russia and China have provided support in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic - especially through the delivery of vaccines [5] - which has led to both countries' growth in popularity. In an opinion poll taken last summer, by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) - in part, to assess respective experiences in fighting the pandemic - 72 percent of responding Serbs considered that China’s political system works "well," or even "very well." In respect to Russia, it was 64 percent to the EU, only 46 percent, and to the USA only 36 percent.[6] Fifty-four percent of the respondents consider Russia, and 47 percent, China, to truly be "allies" of their country, as opposed to only 11 percent for the EU and a mere 6 percent for the USA. If one adds those you rate Russia and China as "necessary partners," the results are a vast majority of 95 and 91 percent respectively.
"Anti-Western Narratives"
The Berlin-based EU-oriented think tank ECFR views with apprehension, the fact that Serbia seeks to expand its influence in Southeast Europe. This is said to be happening with the aid of Serbian-speaking minorities in neighboring countries, where Belgrade has strong influence. In July, Serbia's interior minister Aleksandar Vulin was quoted to have said "the task of this generation of politicians is to create the Serbian world, that is, to unite Serbs wherever they live."[7] This was primarily in reference to Serb minorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. At the same time, the Serb government is relying on Serbian media's influence in neighboring countries, according to the ECFR. For example, recently Telekom Srbija secured the soccer broadcasting rights for the popular British Premier League and will broadcast their games on Arena Sport, a regional channel that can be received in all non-EU countries in Southeastern Europe. Critics see a political strategy behind this: The government in Belgrade seeks to expand the Serbian media's influence in the neighboring countries to disseminate its "anti-western narratives."[8] This corresponds to the country’s growing ties to China and Russia.
The Offence: "Kleptocracy"
To prevent further loss of EU influence in the six non-EU Southeastern European countries, a recent paper by the ECFR proposes several measures. The EU could, for example, propose "access to the single market," thereby permanently binding them economically into a European orbit, of course without them having any participation in decision-making.[9] Another proposal is if Western Balkans states join the European Defense Union (EDU), they will be able to take part in PESCO projects. This is aimed at also being able to call on these armed forces for EU military missions. ECFR also makes a plea for the European Prosecutor's Office to conduct cross-border investigations jointly with Southeast European authorities and to dispatch the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) into these countries. Last, but not least, the think tank proposes that the "European Magnitsky Act" [10] sanctions regime adopted about a year ago, add "kleptocracy" to its list of offences and extend the act's provisions to the Western Balkans. This would significantly increase the EU's leverage in the region. This is what Latvia's Prime Minister Krišjānis Kariņš had meant, when he declared "This is our backyard."[11]
[1] See also NATO's Thirtieth Member .
[2] See also Bulgariens "mazedonische Frage".
[3] Michael Martens: Der Mann, der alles auf die EU gesetzt hatte. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 02.11.2021.
[4] Michael Martens: Russische Ränkespiele. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 03.11.2021.
[5] See also Strategic Rivalry over Eastern and Southeastern Europe and Die Impfstoffdiplomatie der EU.
[6] Joanna Hosa, Vessela Tcherneva: Pandemic trends: Serbia looks east, Ukraine looks west. ecfr.eu 05.08.2021.
[7] Vessela Tcherneva: Western Balkans in trouble: Why the EU should make a new offer to the region. ecfr.eu 11.11.2021.
[8] Marko Milosavljevič: Game on for the Premier League in Serbia? euractiv.com 08.07.2021.
[9] Vessela Tcherneva: Western Balkans in trouble: Why the EU should make a new offer to the region. ecfr.eu 11.11.2021.
[10] See also The Global Judges (II)
[11] See also "This is Our Backyard!"