Da "Il manifesto" del 18 Febbraio 2000:

VATICANO
A SAN PIETRO L'ORO DI PAVELIC

Duemila sopravvissuti al genocidio del regime ustascia fanno causa allo
Ior: rivendicano il tesoro depositato, o donato per grazia ricevuta, da
Pavelic al Vaticano

- MARCO AURELIO RIVELLI -

U na bomba che esplode scuotendo il Vaticano: George Zivkovich, classe
1937, serbo di religione ortodossa, residente in California, si è
recentemente rivolto ai tribunali americani citando in giudizio la Santa
Sede, e più precisamente l'Istituto per le opere di religione, lo Ior, cioè
la banca vaticana già protagonista di numerosi scandali negli ultimi
decenni. Zivkovich, che, ragazzo, era scampato al genocidio serbo
perpetrato dagli ustascia croati negli anni 1941-1945, rivendica il tesoro
che l'ex dittatore Ante Pavelic aveva lasciato in custodia, o donato per
grazia ricevuta, al Vaticano nel '45. Lo affiancano nell'azione giudiziaria
circa 2.000 compatrioti.

Il regime ustascia, portato al governo in Croazia in quegli anni, grazie
all'invasione delle forze dell'Asse, fu il più feroce espresso dai
nazifascisti. Più feroce ancora di quello hitleriano, ed è tutto dire: in
quello stato che contava poco più di sei milioni di abitanti, un terzo dei
quali serbi di religione ortodossa, gli ustascia massacrarono un milione di
questi unitamente a 50 mila ebrei e 30 mila zingari, cioè il 20 per cento
della popolazione. All'eccidio parteciparono numerosi sacerdoti e frati
cattolici con la complicità di vescovi, con la connivenza del Primate,
arcivescovo Stepinac, recentemente beatificato, il tutto con l'implicito
beneplacito di Pio XII.

Crollato il suo regno, Pavelic scappò insieme ai suoi gerarchi e a 500
religiosi cattolici fra i più compromessi nell'eccidio, trovando rifugio a
Roma dove visse per tre anni nascosto nel Collegio di San Girolamo degli
Illirici, in Via Tomacelli, edificio protetto dalla extraterritorialità
vaticana. Non giunse a mani vuote, ma, come tutti gli ospiti che si
rispettino, portò un dono: l'oro, i gioielli e i titoli rapinati alle
vittime. Anche a Stepinac aveva lasciato un presente, trentasei casse
d'oro, che l'arcivescovo si fece incautamente scoprire un anno dopo dal
governo di Tito. Il Vaticano ricambiò il munifico omaggio facendo fuggire
questo criminale in Argentina nel 1949, vestito in abiti talari e munito di
adeguato passaporto. Con le stesse modalità la Santa Sede aiutò a fuggire
duecento ustascia e cinquemila delinquenti nazisti, l'aristocrazia del
crimine, fra i quali il Dottor Mengele, Walter Rauff, Adolf Eichmann, Erick
Priebke, Franz Stangl. A capo dell'Organizzazione di soccorso vaticana, che
attivò quella che gli alleati denominarono rat line, la via dei topi, vi
erano Draganovic, monsignore ed ex colonnello ustascia, e il vescovo Alois
Hudal, titolare in Roma della chiesa di Santa Maria dell'Anima, uomo di
fiducia di papa Pacelli. Le memorie di Hudal pubblicate in tedesco dopo la
sua morte, rappresentano la più dettagliata documentazione della via dei
topi: "compito svolto per incarico del Vaticano", come egli afferma.

Dell'oro croato nascosto in Vaticano correvano voci fin dall'immediato
dopoguerra nell'ambiente dei servizi segreti. Gli ustascia emigrati in
Argentina si confidarono con le autorità di quel paese, attivando la stessa
Evita Peron, subito partita per l'Italia allo scopo di convincere Pio XII a
rispettare gli impegni presi con Pavelic di restituirgli una parte del
bottino. Evita tornò a Buenos Aires a mani vuote perché l'oro non era stato
restituito, ma affidato in gestione al vescovo Alberto di Jorio, presidente
dello Ior, e al suo alter ego Bernardino Nogara.

La regia vaticana nella via dei topi viene documentata per la prima volta
da un rapporto - top secret - inviato il 15 maggio 1947 dall'addetto
militare Usa a Roma Vincent LaVista, al Segretario di Stato americano
George Marshall, che dettaglia le responsabilità vaticane e la
partecipazione di numerosi sacerdoti all'attività illegale e clandestina.
LaVista informa che grossi quantitativi di oro, trafugato alle vittime,
sarebbero stati occultati nei Palazzi Apostolici. Questo documento segue di
poco quello dell'agente speciale del Tesoro Usa Emerson Bigelow, che
documenta come nelle casse vaticane sia finito un quantitativo d'oro per un
valore di 200 milioni di franchi svizzeri, depredato dagli ustascia.
Analoga affermazione viene dalle memorie di James V. Milano, comandante del
430 distaccamento del controspionaggio dell'Us Army's Counter Intelligence
Corps, il quale aggiunge altri particolari a quelli già noti.

Il 22 luglio 1997 il quotidiano francese Nice Matin, pubblica un articolo
intitolato "Oro croato al Vaticano?" L'amministrazione americana indaga su
un trasferimento di ottocento milioni di franchi francesi", nel quale è
scritto: "Bill Clinton ha annunciato ieri che il Dipartimento del Tesoro
sta studiando il documento d'archivio che rivela che la Santa Sede ha
conservato dell'oro dell'antico regime fascista di Croazia. Secondo il
documento, diffuso da una rete televisiva americana, una parte rilevante
delle riserve d'oro del regime fascista croato, del valore di circa
ottocento milioni di franchi, sotto forma di lingotti d'oro, sarebbe stato
immagazzinato presso il Vaticano, verso la fine della Seconda guerra
mondiale, per evitare che venisse sequestrato dagli alleati... Secondo voci
insistenti queste riserve, essenzialmente costituite da lingotti d'oro, in
seguito sarebbero state dirottate, a cura del Vaticano, verso la Spagna e
l'Argentina. L'estensore del documento afferma comunque di ritenere che
queste voci siano state diffuse dal Vaticano per nascondere la verità:
secondo lui quese riserve non hanno mai lasciato la cttà pontificia". La
Santa Sede, attraverso il portavoce del ppa, Joaquin Navarro Valls,
smentisce tutto, definendo le notizie riportate dal quotidiano francese
"informazioni senza alcun fondamento".

La certezza che il tesoro ustascia si trovi ancora in Vaticano riceve il
crisma dell'ufficialità il 2 giugno 1998 dal Rapporto Usa stilato dal
sttosegretario di Stato Usa Stuart Eizenstat, che afferma, fra l'altro, che
gli archivi ustascia furono portati in Vaticano, così come oro e gioielli.
Aggiunge che "anche se non ci sono prove dell'implicazione diretta del papa
e dei suoi consiglieri, sembra inverosimile che essi abbiano del tutto
ignorato ciò che stava accadendo. Le autorità vaticane hanno affermato di
non avere trovato alcun documento suscettibile di fare luce sulla questione
dell'oro ustascia". La reazione ufficiale di parte vaticana, espressa dal
portavoce pontificio Joaquin Navarro Valls è: "il segretario dell'Istituto
San Girolamo, che era all'epoca Krunoslav Draganovic, ha forse utilizzato
quest'oro unicamente a proprio titolo, senza l'autorizzazione dell'Istituto
e senza che il Vaticano lo sapesse".

L'avvocata americana Keelyn Friesen, che coordina l'azione giudiziaria
contro lo Ior e gli altri accusati di complicità nell'imboscamento del
tesoro ustascia promossa da Zivkovic e dai suoi compagni, promette
battaglia dura ed esige giustizia. Una giustizia, che se deve suonare
condanna per l'indegno agire di uomini della Chiesa, chiama anche in causa
tutti i successori di Pio XII.


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
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The Economist January 29, 2000

Sins of the secular missionaries

Aid and campaign groups, or NGOs, matter more and more in world
affairs. But they are often far from being "non-governmental",
as they claim. And they are not always a force for good



A YOUNG man thrusts his crudely printed calling card at the
visitor. After his name are printed three letters: NGO. "What do you
do?" the visitor asks."I have formed an NGO.""Yes, but what does it
do?""Whatever they want. I am waiting for some funds and then I will
make a project."

Once little more than ragged charities, non-governmental
organisations
(NGOs) are now big business. Somalia, where that exchange took place,
is heaven for them. In large parts of the country, western
governments,
the United Nations and foreign aid agencies cannot work directly; it
is
too dangerous. So outsiders must work through local groups, which
become a powerful source of patronage. "Anybody who's anybody is an
NGO
these days," sighs one UN official.

And not just in Somalia. NGOs now head for crisis zones as fast as
journalists do: a war, a flood, refugees, a dodgy election, even a
world trade conference, will draw them like a honey pot. Last spring,
Tirana, the capital of Albania, was swamped by some 200 groups
intending to help the refugees from Kosovo. In Kosovo itself, the
ground is now thick with foreign groups competing to foster
democracy,
build homes and proffer goods and services. Environmental activists
in
Norway board whaling ships; do-gooders gather for the Chiapas rebels
in
Mexico.

In recent years, such groups have mushroomed. A 1995 UN report on
global governance suggested that nearly 29,000 international NGOs
existed. Domestic ones have grown even faster. By one estimate, there
are now 2m in America alone, most formed in the past 30 years. In
Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, there
are at least 65,000. Dozens are created daily; in Kenya alone, some
240
NGOs are now created every year.

Most of these are minnows; some are whales, with annual incomes of
millions of dollars and a worldwide operation. Some are primarily
helpers, distributing relief where it is needed; some are mainly
campaigners, existing to promote issues deemed important by their
members. The general public tends to see them as uniformly
altruistic,
idealistic and independent. But the term "NGO", like the activities
of
the NGOs themselves, deserves much sharper scrutiny.

Governments' puppets?

The tag "Non-Governmental Organisation" was used first at the
founding
of the UN. It implies that NGOs keep their distance from officialdom;
they do things that governments will not, or cannot, do. In fact,
NGOs
have a great deal to do with governments. Not all of it is healthy.
Take the aid NGOs. A growing share of development spending, emergency
relief and aid transfers passes through them. According to Carol
Lancaster, a former deputy director of USAID, America's development
body, NGOs have become "the most important constituency for the
activities of development aid agencies". Much of the food delivered
by
the World Food Programme, a UN body, in Albania last year was
actually
handed out by NGOs working in the refugee camps. Between 1990 and
1994,
the proportion of the EU's relief aid channelled through NGOs rose
from
47% to 67%. The Red Cross reckons that NGOs now disburse more money
than the World Bank.

And governments are happy to provide that money. Of Oxfam's #98m
($162m) income in 1998, a quarter, #24.1m, was given by the British
government and the EU. World Vision US, which boasts of being the
world's "largest privately funded Christian relief and development
organisation", collected $55m-worth of goods that year from the
American government. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the winner of
last
year's Nobel peace prize, gets 46% of its income from government
sources. Of 120 NGOs which sprang up in Kenya between 1993 and the
end
of 1996, all but nine received all their income from foreign
governments and international bodies. Such official contributions
will
go on, especially if the public gets more stingy. Today's young,
educated and rich give a smaller share of their incomes away than did
-- and do -- their parents.

In Africa, where international help has the greatest influence,
western governments have long been shifting their aid towards NGOs.
America's help, some $711m last year, increasingly goes to approved
organisations, often via USAID. Europe's donors also say that
bilateral
aid should go to NGOs, which are generally more open and efficient
than
governments. For the UN, too, they are now seen as indispensable. The
new head of the UN's Development Programme says the body "will put a
lot more emphasis on relations with NGOs". Most such agencies now
have
hundreds of NGO partners.

So the principal reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that western
governments finance them. This is not a matter of charity, but of
privatisation: many "non-governmental" groups are becoming
contractors
for governments. Governments prefer to pass aid through NGOs because
it
is cheaper, more efficient -- and more at arm's length -- than direct
official aid.

Governments also find NGOs useful in ways that go beyond the
distribution of food and blankets. Some bring back useful
information,
and make it part of their brief to do so. Outfits such as the
International Crisis Group and Global Witness publish detailed and
opinionated reports from places beset by war or other disasters. The
work of Global Witness in Angola is actually paid for by the British
Foreign Office.

Diplomats and governments, as well as other NGOs, journalists and the
public, can make good use of these reports. As the staff of foreign
embassies shrink, and the need to keep abreast of events abroad
increases, governments inevitably turn to private sources of
information. In some benighted parts of the world, sometimes only
NGOs
can nowadays reveal what is going on.

Take, for example, human rights, the business of one of the biggest
of
the campaigning NGOs, Amnesty International. Amnesty has around 1m
members in over 162 countries, and its campaigns against political
repression, in particular against unfair imprisonment, are known
around
the world. The information it gathers is often unavailable from other
sources.

Where western governments' interests match those of campaigning NGOs,
they can form effective alliances. In 1997, a coalition of over 350
NGOs pushed for, and obtained, a treaty against the use of landmines.
The campaign was backed by the usual array of concerned governments
(Canada, the Scandinavians) and won the Nobel peace prize.

NGOs are also interesting and useful to governments because they work
in the midst of conflict. Many were created by wars: the Red Cross
after the Battle of Solferino in 1859, the Save the Children Fund
after
the first world war, MSF after the Biafran war. By being "close to
the
action" some NGOs, perhaps unwittingly, provide good cover for spies
--
a more traditional means by which governments gather information.

In some cases, NGOs are taking over directly from diplomats: not
attempting to help the victims of war, but to end the wars
themselves.
Some try to restrict arms flows, such as Saferworld, which is against
small arms. Others attempt to negotiate ceasefires. The Italian
Catholic lay community of Sant' Egidio helped to end 13 years of
civil
war in Mozambique in 1992. International Alert, a London-based peace
research group, tried the same for Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s.
Last
year, Unicef (a part of the UN) and the Carter Centre, founded by
ex-President Jimmy Carter, brought about a peace deal of sorts
between
Uganda and Sudan. There are now roughly 500 groups registered by the
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. "Civil
war demands civil action," say the organisers.

Larger NGOs have pledged not to act as "instruments of government
foreign policy". But at times they are seen as just that. Governments
are more willing to pay groups to deliver humanitarian aid to a war
zone than to deliver it themselves. Last autumn, America's Congress
passed a resolution to deliver food aid to rebels in southern Sudan
via
USAID and sympathetic Christian groups (religious NGOs earn the label
RINGOs, and are found everywhere).

Perhaps the most potent sign of the closeness between NGOs and
governments, aside from their financial links, is the exchange of
personnel. In developing countries, where the civil service is poor,
some governments ask NGOs to help with the paperwork requested by the
World Bank and other international institutions. Politicians, or
their
wives, often have their own local NGOs. In the developed world,
meanwhile, increasing numbers of civil servants take time off to work
for NGOs, and vice versa: Oxfam has former staff members not only in
the British government, but also in the Finance Ministry of Uganda.
This symbiotic relationship with government (earning some groups the
tag GRINGO) may make the governments of developing countries work
better. It may also help aid groups to do their job effectively. But
it
hardly reflects their independence.

NGOS can also stray too close to the corporate world. Some, known to
critics as "business NGOs", deliberately model themselves on, or
depend
greatly on, particular corporations. Bigger ones have commercial
arms,
media departments, aggressive head-hunting methods and a wide array
of
private fund-raising and investment strategies. Smaller ones can be
overwhelmed by philanthropic businesses or their owners: Bill Gates,
the head of Microsoft, gave $25m last year to an NGO that is looking
for a vaccine for AIDS, transforming it overnight from a small group
with a good idea to a powerful one with a lot of money to spend.

The business of helping

In 1997, according to the OECD, NGOs raised $5.5 billion from private
donors. The real figure may well be higher: as leisure, travel and
other industries have grown, so too have charities. In 1995
non-profit
groups (including, but not only, NGOs) provided over 12% of all jobs
in
the Netherlands, 8% in America and 6% in Britain.

Many groups have come to depend on their media presence to help with
fund-raising. This is bringing NGOs their greatest problems. They are
adapting from shoebox outfits, stuffing envelopes and sending off
perhaps one container of medicines, to sophisticated
multi-million-dollar operations. In the now-crowded relief market,
campaigning groups must jostle for attention: increasingly, NGOs
compete and spend a lot of time and money marketing themselves.
Bigger
ones typically spend 10% of their funds on marketing and
fund-raising.
The focus of such NGOs can easily shift from finding solutions and
helping needy recipients to pleasing their donors and winning
television coverage. Events at Goma, in Congo, in 1994 brought this
problem home. Tens of thousands of refugees from Rwanda, who had
flooded into Goma, depended on food and shelter from the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and from NGOs. Their dramatic plight drew
the
television cameras and, with them, the chance for publicity and huge
donations. A frantic scramble for funds led groups to lie about their
projects. Fearful that the media and then the public might lose
confidence in NGOs, the Red Cross drew up an approved list of NGOs
and
got them to put their names to a ten-point code of conduct,
reproduced
above.

Since then, NGOs have been working hard to improve. More than 70
groups and 142 governments backed the 1995 code of conduct, agreeing
that aid should be delivered "only on a basis of need". "We hold
ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources," they pledged. Yet in Kosovo last year
there
was a similar scramble, with groups pushing to be seen by camera
crews
as they worked. Personnel and resources were even shifted there from
worse wars and refugee crises in Africa.

As they get larger, NGOs are also looking more and more like
businesses themselves. In the past, such groups sought no profits,
paid
low wages -- or none at all -- and employed idealists. Now a whole
class of them, even if not directly backed by businesses, have taken
on
corporate trappings. Known collectively as BINGOs, these groups
manage
funds and employ staff which a medium-sized company would envy. Like
corporations, they attend conferences endlessly. Fund-raisers and
senior staff at such NGOs earn wages comparable to the private
sector.
Some bodies, once registered as charities, now choose to become
non-profit companies or charitable trusts for tax reasons and so that
they can control their spending and programmes more easily. Many big
charities have trading arms, registered as companies. One
manufacturing
company, Tetra Pak, has even considered sponsoring emergency food
delivery as a way to advertise itself. Any neat division between the
corporate and the NGO worlds is long gone. Many NGOs operate as
competitors seeking contracts in the aid market, raising funds with
polished media campaigns and lobbying governments as hard as any
other
business. Governments and UN bodies could now, in theory, ask for
tenders from businesses and NGOs to carry out their programmes. It
seems only a matter of time before this happens. If NGOs are cheap
and
good at delivering food or health care in tough areas, they should
win
the contracts easily.

Good intentions not enough

It could be argued that it does not matter even if NGOs are losing
their independence, becoming just another arm of government or
another
business. GRINGOs and BINGOs, after all, may be more efficient than
the
old sort of charity.

Many do achieve great things: they may represent the last hope for
civilians caught in civil wars, for those imprisoned unfairly and for
millions of desperate refugees. There are many examples of small,
efficient and inspirational groups with great achievements: the best
will employ local people, keep foreign expertise to a minimum,
attempt
precise goals (such as providing clean water) and think deeply about
the long-term impact of their work. Some of these grow into large,
well-run groups.

But there are also problems. NGOs may be assumed to be less
bureaucratic, wasteful or corrupt than governments, but
under-scrutinised groups can suffer from the same chief failing: they
can get into bad ways because they are not accountable to anyone.
Critics also suspect that some aid groups are used to propagate
western
values, as Christian missionaries did in the 19th century. Many NGOs,
lacking any base in the local population and with their money coming
from outside, simply try to impose their ideas without debate. For
example, they often work to promote women's or children's interests
as
defined by western societies, winning funds easily but causing social
disruption on the ground.

Groups that carry out population or birth-control projects are
particularly controversial; some are paid to carry out sterilisation
programmes in the poor parts of the world, because donors in the rich
world consider there are too many people there. Anti-"slavery"
campaigns in Africa, in which western NGOs buy children's freedom for
a
few hundred dollars each, are notorious. Unicef has condemned such
groups, but American NGOs continue to buy slaves -- or people they
consider slaves -- in southern Sudan. Clearly, buying slaves, if that
is what they are, will do little to discourage the practice of
trading
them.

NGOs also get involved in situations where their presence may prolong
or complicate wars, where they end up feeding armies, sheltering
hostages or serving as cover for warring parties. These may be the
unintended consequences of aid delivery, but they also complicate
foreign policy.

Even under calmer conditions, in non-emergency development work, not
all single-interest groups may be the best guarantors of long-term
success. They are rarely obliged to think about trade-offs in policy
or
to consider broad, cross-sector approaches to development. NGOs are
"often organised to promote particular goals...rather than the
broader
goal of development," argues Ms Lancaster. In Kosovo last spring,
"many
governments made bilateral funding agreements with NGOs, greatly
undermining UNHCR's ability to prioritise programmes or monitor
efficiency," says Peter Morris of MSF. This spring in Kosovo, "there
were instances of several NGOs competing to work in the same camps,
duplication of essential services," complains an Oxfam worker. And
whatever big international NGOs do in the developing world, they
bring
in western living standards, personnel and purchasing power which can
transform local markets and generate great local resentment. In
troubled zones where foreign NGOs flourish, weekends bring a line of
smart four-by-fours parked at the best beaches, restaurants or
nightclubs. The local beggars do well, but discrepancies between
expatriate staff and, say, impoverished local officials trying to do
the same work can cause deep antipathy. Not only have NGOs diverted
funds away from local governments, but they are often seen as
directly
challenging their sovereignty.

NGOs can also become self-perpetuating. When the problem for which
they
were founded is solved, they seek new campaigns and new funds. The
old
anti-apartheid movement, its job completed, did not disband, but
instead became another lobby group for southern Africa. As NGOs
become
steadily more powerful on the world scene, the best antidote to
hubris,
and to institutionalisation, would be this: disband when the job is
done. The chief aim of NGOs should be their own abolition.



--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
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REPUBBLICA
FEDERATIVA
SOCIALISTA
JUGOSLAVIA


Zotohem para flamurit të pionirëvet dhe para shokëvet
pionierë, që do të mësoj e do të jetoj si bir besnik i
Atdheut tim Republikeës Socialiste Federative të
Jugosllavisë. Zotohem që do të ruaj vëllazërimin e bashkimin
e popujvet tanë dhe lirinë e Atdheut, të fituar me gjakun e
djemvet tanë më të mirë.
PËR ATDHE ME TITON PËRPARA!
RROFTË 29 NËNTOR!
RROFTË SHOKU TITO!
Agim, Prishtinë

( http://www.sfrj.com )


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
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I PARTIGIANI JUGOSLAVI NELLA RESISTENZA FRANCESE


-----Original Message-----
From: democrite <democrite@...>
Date: 16 May 1999 17:55
Subject: Yugoslavs in the French Resistance


>SMALL IN NUMBER, GREAT IN SACRIFICE
>
>YUGOSLAV IMMIGRATION
>
> Relatively speaking, Yugoslav immigrants died the most. Small in
>number, they were great in sacrifice. As early as 1939, at the time of
>mobilisation, more than 1,500 Yugoslavs had voluntarily joined the
>French army. Later, at the time of occupation, nearly 3,000 took part
>in the various Resistance movements. Everywhere, in Pas-de-Calais,
>Corrèze, Haute-Savoy, Moselle and Paris, Yugoslavs distinguished
>themselves by their bravery and courage. The attitude of the Yugoslav
>fighters and Resistance workers was always inspired by the strong
>friendship and sincere loyalty they felt towards the countries which
>welcomed them, and they gave ample proof of their attachment at the
>darkest times.
> At Nîmes, in the Maritime Alps, in the Ardennes and in Haute-Savoy,
>more than fifty Yugoslavs fell victim to Nazi barbarity. The first
>thing the Yugoslav Resistance fighters had done had been to direct their
>activity towards the Croatian troops dragooned into the ranks of the
>Wehrmacht. It was thanks to such action that near Grenoble, a Croatian
>unit blew up a depot where a large amount of ammunition and explosives
>were stored, killing many Germans.
> At Villefranche-de-Rouergue resided a regiment of engineers made up of
>about 1,300 Croats. They had ended up in this region - where the
>peasants reminded them of their far-off homeland by their sobriety and
>the homespun of their clothes - after having refused to leave for the
>Eastern front. These soldiers found it quite natural to consider France
>as a country of friends and the population was quick to recognise them
>as such. A mutual current of friendship soon formed. It was not long
>before the soldiers heard of the maquis and decided their duty was to
>act too. They thought up a plan of escape. But out of the 1,300, there
>was one traitor. Seeing they had been exposed, the others took action.
>After a judgement in the name of Tito, they shot their officers,
>occupied the town and proclaimed liberty. Immediately, Hitler's forces
>flooded in from the surrounding centres - Toulouse, Albi, Limoges and
>Rodez. The men hardly had time to split up into small groups and take
>to the maquis. They left the town together so that the population would
>not be trapped between two enemy fires, and took up position in the
>surrounding hills ready for an unequal battle.
> 200 Croats were killed in the fight. More than 400 were taken prisoner
>and shot in the barracks courtyard. The remaining 600 or so were able
>to escape and carried on fighting by the sides of the French Resistance
>fighters.
> In the Ardennes, there were groups of immigrant partisans. The
>"Marshal Tito" corp., of which two leaders died during combat, was made
>up of Yugoslavs. In the region of Nancy, on the road to Germany, it was
>groups of immigrants of Yugoslav origin and Soviet prisoners who had
>escaped, who prevented the Nazis from coming to the aid of Wehrmacht
>groups cut off from their bases. The names of these heroic brigades
>were "Paris Commune", "Stalingrad" and "Jelezniack".
> From the ranks of these fighters came Resistance leaders, like General
>Ljubomir ILITCH, who by their courage and their self-sacrifice in the
>struggle against the fascist occupying army, won the friendship of all
>the Resistance workers. In homage to the participation to the struggle
>of Yugoslavs against the common enemy, the French authorities gave the
>names of two of their heroes, MIRNIK and BOLTAR, who were shot by the
>Germans, to two streets in the towns of Avion (Pas-de-Calais) and
>Toulouse. In the South of France, near Toulouse, sixteen Yugoslav
>immigrant fighters were awarded either the War Cross or the Resistance
>Medal for their courage and dedication.
>
>GENERAL ILITCH
>
> General Ljubomir ILITCH, former commander in the International Brigades
>in Spain, commander of the F.F.I. of the resistance of immigrants in
>France during German occupation, and one of the most active organisers
>of the maquis guerrillas, tells in his memoirs how he managed to join
>the Resistance movement in France.
> "In 1940, the Germans and the Vichy leaders decided to shut up in the
>camps all the "troublesome" elements who had shown in the past true
>attachment to the cause of liberty, of democracy and, thus, to France.
>All the committed antifascists were thus imprisoned and their situation
>got worse as clandestine resistance became active and it transpired
>clearly what role all the foreigners living in France were to play! The
>Vichy and Gestapo jailers split the prisoners up into the "ringleaders",
>who were strong and thus a danger to them, and the majority who were
>less spirited, weakened as they were by hunger, deprivation and
>demoralisation. We "dangerous" ones were sent to the prison of Castres,
>which was used as a depot and as a station passed through by prisoners
>on their way to concentration camps in Germany. When we were undressed
>and stripped of our papers, baggage, family photos and even identity
>cards, we understood that our departure for the death camps was
>approaching. That was how the Germans arranged the papers of the
>political deportees and kept them carefully in their archives. Among us
>in prison there were also French officers and allies who had dropped by
>parachute, and Belgian and Polish officers, doing intelligence work for
>the allies. We were totally cut off from the outside world yet even then
>we were able to study all the obstacles in our way, the safety catches,
>the alarm bells and electronic alarm systems set up by the Germans in
>case of a possible escape. The escape took place in broad daylight,
>thanks to each one of us carrying out perfectly our tasks according to
>given instructions.
> There were 36 of us who escaped, plus two women from the English
>intelligence service. We made it to the mountains, and made those
>chasing us lose all trace of us. At last, after a week, we established
>contact with the clandestine maquis and partisans and got down to action
>at once. Four of us were Yugoslavs: we all wanted to join Tito without
>delay to fight in our own country. But the difficulties in leaving were
>great: we would have had to pass through Spain, and we had stayed there
>as volunteers in the International Brigades in '36 - '39. Our faces
>were known there... So while waiting to go, we all put ourselves at the
>disposal of the French Resistance and began to work together with the
>F.T.P."(1).
>
>Jean STANKOVITCH
>
> An article in the 4th September 1946 issue of "Le Havre Libre" recalled
>the memory of this young hero of Yugoslav origin.
> Born in Le Havre, Jean Stankovitch, after studying at Dicquemare
>school, was taken by the Obligatory Work Service in '43. Refusing
>immediately to go to Germany, he stayed for some time hidden in the town
>under the name of Jean Coquelin. However, the inaction to which his
>illegal situation constrained him was not suited to him. He suffered
>from it, and often opened up about his feelings to his friend Maurice
>Leboucher, who was to be much talked of later. Leboucher, understanding
>well that Jean Stankovitch was driven by a burning desire to make
>himself useful, did not hesitate to advise him to come and join him at
>the German submarine base, in Le Havre, where he was able to get him
>hired as electrician.
> Jean Stankovitch spent some time there, and enjoyed the good tricks his
>friend and himself played on the occupying forces, good tricks which
>could be called, in other words, sabotage. "They think I'm from an
>electricity school!" he would say to his close friends. And this trick
>alone was enough to thrill him.
> His mother, however, fearing bombings, soon decided to go and live in
>Belleville. Jean followed her, most unwillingly. But he could not
>remain inactive there either.
> And in the days following the arrival of the allies, he was glad to act
>as a courier for them, passing through the barricades that then isolated
>Le Havre. For, unknown to his mother, he was a member of the Resistance
>group "France before all". There he had met a young man, three years
>younger than him, and the two of them had fomented multiple projects to
>undermine German organisation wherever their modest means might be used,
>whenever the time came to get down to action.
> On Saturday 2nd September, when the tanks were officially announced,
>the two comrades could no longer keep still. Despite their families'
>advice to be cautious, they escaped and ran to meet the tanks. Bernard
>Lefebvre who was heading for Saint-Cyr was glad to be able to get a lift
>on a tank. He felt as if he was driving up the road of triumph.
> A few kilometres on, they heard that a volunteer was wanted to carry a
>letter from the allies' lines to a certain castle of Fontenay where
>there was still a German officer. Jean proposed himself, and set off at
>once in company of a young lady who spoke German. Once they got there,
>they were kept waiting for over an hour, after which they were chased
>away: the message was an order to surrender! Startled, the young lady
>and Jean Stankovitch found themselves in the road with bursts of fire
>beginning to rain down on them. They were amazed to still be alive, so
>much anger had they read in the eyes of the officer to whom they had
>unknowingly been assigned to propose capitulation. And even though they
>had failed in their mission, they were still glad to get away from their
>goal.
> That evening, after having served as liaison agents between the many
>Resistance groups, Jean and Bernard met up and, together with the other
>comrades, discussed besides the English tanks. It is not known how an
>Alsacian soldier managed to slip up to them and ask them to be kind
>enough to accept to serve as an intermediary between ten of his comrades
>and the Allies to whom they wanted to surrender. Promised that they
>would not be hurt, they decided to meet by a farm between 6.30 and
>7.00am. At the decided moment, Stankovitch and Lefevbre went to the
>place as arranged and waited. The firing from the barricades became
>heavier, and it was difficult for them to believe that the Alsacians
>would manage to get there under such an avalanche of bullets. And yet,
>since they had given their word, they were bent on keeping it, and tried
>to stay put. What happened in the moments which followed? Doubtless a
>shell exploding nearby or a low burst of gunfire took them by surprise.
>Both of them were touched. Bernard Lefebvre was killed outright and
>Jean Sankovitch, fatally wounded, died one hour later, after terrible
>suffering, at the first aid centre at Rolleville which he had been taken
>to.
>
>Sava KOVATCHEVITCH
>
> Sava Kovatchevitch, originally from the Lika district, had come to
>France in 1937 to earn a living and help his family a little. After
>occupying France, the Germans sent him to do labour in Düsseldorf,
>Germany. There, he began with the other workers to do sabotage, but the
>Gestapo was after him, especially as he was teaching the deported
>workers how to commit sabotage. He left at the moment he was about to
>be arrested. At the time, he was already in contact with Yugoslav and
>French prisoners and, alongside the patriots of Lorraine, was helping
>them.
> He was in Lorraine under the name "Pierre" and had a heavy, dangerous
>task. With the help of the patriots of Lorraine, he created a huge
>organization to get people through Germany and Lorraine towards France
>and its maquis. He made false identity papers with the help of the
>mayor of Baynville, Pierre Semmoni and Victor Florch, a post inspector
>in Nancy. Alongside the patriots from Lorraine - Emile Kodari, Louis
>Vagner, Albert Vaguer, Alphonse Vagner, Victor Picrona, Pierre Vagner,
>Jeannette Koisser, from Metz, and Louise Florch, also from Metz - Sava
>got men through into France and saved thier lives. French and Yugoslav
>prisoners in camps in Germany knew of this and those who escaped from
>the Stalag XII F. came to find him. He obtained them civilian clothes,
>false identity papers and food; he got them over the border and the
>rivers near Metz.
> Sava was discovered by Pavelitch's oustachis in charge of keeping tabs
>on the Croatian workers deported to Germany. The Gestapo arrested him
>and tortured him for 72 days , starving and beating him, so that he
>would denounce the organisation by which war prisoners, civilian
>deportees and saboteurs got away into France. This son of the Lika held
>out and never even thought of letting out anything at all.
> "If I must die, I may as well die as a man, and not tarnish my Lika, "
>Sava would say.
> In the end, the Gestapo sent him to join a labour company. He
>succeeded in escaping, and started his work once more, even more
>secretly than before. He was searched for intensely, and in August 1944
>the place became too hot beneath his feet and he was forced to leave.
>He made it to France and joined the maquis again.
>Among the Yugoslav fighters who died in action, let us mention:
>Dimitri KOTOUROVIC (1911 - 1944), former fighter in the International
>Brigades in Spain, initiator and organiser of the first F.T.P. (ndlt:
>Franc Tireur et Partisan) groups in Marseille. Was killed heroically at
>his post in April 1944.
>Victor FILIPIC, shot by the Gestapo after committing sabotage at
>Sallaumines.
>Sava PAVLICEK, killed while fighting on August 18th 1944 in Sauppe.
>Givorad BOGOSAVLJEVIC, killed by the Germans during battle in August
>1944 in Quincy-Voisins.
>Stanko NOVAKOVIC, killed in action at Verdun in August 1944.
>Michel ARIEFF, nicknamed "Tito", killed in action at Mausouées Farm in
>August 1944.
>Zika PETROVIC, 25 years old, escpaded war prisoner, killed in action in
>Meaux.
>Rudolf CUCEK and Victor ERJAVEC, two miners in Pas-de-Calais, together
>shot by the Germans.
>BRUNOVIC, from Bruay-en Artois, killed in action in August 1942.
>FAJS, from Bruay-en Artois, killed while he was opposing resistance to
>the police who had come to arrest him in May 1943.
>
>Notes:
>1. Quoted in "Unis" bulletin n° 52, 17.2.1946.
>(On les nommait des étrangers, Les immigrés dans la résistance, by
>Gaston Laroche, F.T.P.F. colonel, Boris Matline)
>
>Souvenir Franco-Soviétique,
>Jean LEVEQUE,
>Villa "Florelle",
>28410 BROUE
>
>Translated from the French by P.M.
>
>--
>Les "Editions Democrite" publient un mensuel en francais :
>> "Les dossiers du BIP" avec des traductions d'articles provenant de la
>> presse communiste(grecque, allemande, anglaise, turque, russe, espagnole,
>> portugaise...)sur des evenements qui interessent des lecteurs
>communistes.
>> Editions Democrite, 52, bld Roger Salengro, 93190 LIVRY-GARGAN, FRANCE
>> e-mail : democrite@...
>


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