Jugoinfo
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> From: Claudio Vito <claudiovitobuttazzo@...>
> Date sent: Sat, 18 Nov 2000 12:18:17 +0100 (CET)
> Send reply to: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> Subject: [noocse-bo] Re: Che c'entra Radio Free Europe con No-ocse?
>
> [ Double-click this line for list subscription options ]
>
> Sono esterreftto. Apro il sito no-ocse e vi trovo
> messaggi, che pubblicizzano i programmi della radio
> della Cia Free Europe. Questa radio, che serve da
> anticipatore e copertura politico-ideologica
> dell'espansione economico-miliare nel neoliberismo
> nell'est-europeo, ha sede, dal 1990 a Praga (prima
> della caduta del muro era a Monaco di Baviera). E'
> finanziata direttamente dal Pentagono e vi lavora
> personale accuratamente selezionato tra le fila
> dell'anticomunsimo più sofisticato. La sede della
> radio, a Praga, è l'enorme e modernissimo edificio,
> attrezzato con tutti i comfort, che, prima della
> divisione della Cecoslovacchia, ospitava il parlamento
> federale cecoslovacco. E' stato affittato dai
> leccapiedi del governo ceco a Rdio Free Europe al
> prezzo simbolico di una corona (50 lire) annue. E' lo
> stesso governo che fa chiudere dalla polizia le
> emittenti indipendenti messe su alla meglio dai
> compagni del movimento ceco (prorio in questi giorni è
> stato chiuso dalla polizia a Praga il centro sociale
> Ladronka, l'unico centro sociale sopravvissuto in
> questi anni in quella città e dove funzionava anche
> una piccola emittente alternativa. E' stato chiuso con
> la scusa dei rumori. In realtà, è gia pronto un grande
> progetto di speculazione edilizia e di costruzione di
> un lussuoso complesso turistico-alberghiero).
> Le trasmissioni russe di questa radio Cia, addetta
> alla diversione ideologica neoliberista e
> guerrafondaia, è diretta da un italia (di cui ora non
> rivelo il nome), che fa da supervisore per tutte le
> trasmissioni dirette nei paesi slavi. Questo
> personaggio è stato per diversi anni in Urss ai tempi
> della guerra fredda con compiti di spionaggio e di
> provocazione. Una redazione serba presso radio free
> Europa è fuzionante da anni. I suoi membri sono stati
> accuratamente scelti tra i militanti di Otpor (alla
> faccia del pluralismo!), il movimento finanziato dallo
> speculatore finanziario Soros (non a caso di origini
> ungheresi), il quale finanzia pure radio B92 (tutto
> questo, naturalmente, lo fa per grande amore verso la
> democrazia!).
> ATTENTI, COMPAGNI! A VOLTE IL NEMICO MARCIA ALLA
> NOSTRA TESTA!
>
> --- Danica Razlag <razlag@...> ha scritto: >
> > Original text in Serbian at:
> > HYPERLINK
> >
> "http://www.danas.org/programi/most/2000/11/20001112125926.asp"
> >
> >
> >
> http://www.danas.org/programi/most/2000/11/20001112125926.asp
> >
> >
> > RADIO FREE EUROPE
> > Programs in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and Albanian
> > languages
> >
> > RADIO BRIDGE (RADIO MOST)
> >
> > November 12, 2000 7:00 p.m.
> >
> > NO ONE HAS A MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE
> >
> > In Pristina: Ylber HYSA, director of the Campaign
> > for Civil Initiatives
> > of Kosovo and In Kosovo Polje: Protosyncellus Sava
> > JANJIC, spokesman of the
> > Serb National Council of Kosovo and Metohija
> >
> > Moderator: Omer KARABEG
> >
> > Have the victory of the opposition in elections in
> > the Federal Republic of
> > Yugoslavia and the victory of the Democratic
> > Alliance of Kosovo in local
> >
> > elections in that province created conditions for
> > the beginning of true dialog
> > on the future of Kosovo?
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Hysa, do you think that after the fall of
> > Milosevic conditions have
> > been created for the beginning of a dialog between
> > Ibrahim Rugova,
> >
> > whose party won office in the majority of Kosovo
> > municipalities, and the
> > president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
> > Vojislav Kostunica?
> >
> > HYSA: I do not think that conditions have been
> > created for the beginning of a
> > dialog. Rugova is the president of a party which won
> > in the local
> >
> > elections in 21 of a total of 30 municipalities,
> > which is how many of them
> > there are in Kosovo, taking into account that Serbs
> > are in the majority
> >
> > in three municipalities and the Serbs, as you know,
> > did not participate in the
> > elections. This does not give him a mandate to
> > represent Kosovo.
> >
> > Such a mandate can be obtained only in national
> > elections which have yet to be
> > held in Kosovo. After all, Security Council
> > Resolution 1244 is
> >
> > very clear with respect to this point. It says that
> > first democratic
> > institutions are to be created in Kosovo, and only
> > then can talks take place
> >
> >
> > regarding the future status of Kosovo.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Hysa, does this mean that in Kosovo at this
> > moment no person and no
> > party has a mandate to engage in dialog with
> > representatives of
> >
> > Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
> >
> > HYSA: I think that is the case. Besides, I think
> > that such a dialog would be
> > risky, that it would be premature and that it would
> > not yield any
> >
> > results. Before it begins, a lot of things need to
> > be done in both Serbia and
> > Kosovo. Before us is the long path of
> > democratization, the long path
> >
> > of building institutions and consequently, at this
> > moment we would stand to
> > gain absolutely nothing from such talks even if they
> > were possible.
> >
> > JANJIC: The Albanians themselves must decide who on
> > the Albanian side is going
> > to participate in talks; that is their own business.
> > I think,
> >
> > nevertheless, that it is necessary to begin some
> > sort of preliminary talks and
> > negotiations in order to realize what is foreseen by
> > Resolution 1244
> >
> > which does not mention the issue of status but does
> > talk about the substantial
> > autonomy of Kosovo within the framework of the
> > Federal Republic
> >
> > of Yugoslavia.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Janjic, if I understand correctly, you are
> > of the opinion that a
> > dialog could begin, as long as the most sensitive
> > issue, the issue of the
> >
> > status of Kosovo, is left unopened?
> >
> > JANJIC: Absolutely. There can be no talks on the
> > status of Kosovo under
> > conditions where there is no respect for the basic
> > human rights of
> >
> > Serbs and members of other non-Albanian communities
> > which live in Kosovo and
> > Metohija. In my opinion it is first necessary to
> > realize what is
> >
> > foreseen by Resolution 1244. I would agree with Mr.
> > Hysa that at this moment
> > we need to concentrate on the building of democratic
> > institutions
> >
> > which I understand to mean only those institutions
> > which are foreseen by
> > Resolution 1244. I mean, therefore, those
> > institutions which would, first
> >
> > of all, enable respect for the human rights and
> > freedoms of all the residents
> > of Kosovo and Metohija but not those institutions
> > which would fall
> >
> > outside the scope of the Resolution and prejudice
> > the issue of the province’s
> > status.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Hysa, if the issue of the status of Kosovo
> > were to be left aside,
> > would it be possible at this moment to establish a
> > dialog between the
> >
> > Serb and Albanian sides regarding other key issues,
> > regarding issues of
> > coexistence?
> >
> > HYSA: There are different kinds of dialog. This
> > discussion, too, which we are
> > holding on "Radio Bridge is one form of dialog.
> > However,
> >
> > institutions have not yet been established in Kosovo
> > which would be able to
> > conduct official dialogs. If I understand correctly,
> > what you are
> >
> > saying and what Mr. Janjic insists on is the
> > creation of some sort of positive
> > relations, or so-called "confidence building
> > measures". One such
> >
> > step, for example, would be if the Albanian
> > prisoners in Serb jails were to be
> > released. That would be a positive example.
> >
> > RFE: Do you think that this is an issue about which
> > both Albanian and Serb
> > sides could talk about at this moment?
> >
> > HYSA: I do not think that this is something on which
> > we can negotiate. Because
> > these people are war hostages, not prisoners. Now,
> > after its
> >
> > acceptance into the United Nations, the Federal
> > Republic of Yugoslavia should
> > respect the standards of the international community
> > and free the
> >
> > imprisoned Albanians. This is a problem which should
> > be resolved by the
> > international community and Serbia. This is not an
> > issue on which we
> >
> > can negotiate.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Janjic, in your opinion should all
> > Albanians who are presently in
> > prisons in Serbia be released?
> >
> === message truncated ===
>
> ______________________________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Il tuo indirizzo gratis e per sempre @... su http://mail.yahoo.it
>
> Per partecipare: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
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> Problemi in lista? Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> Web: http://www.contropiani2000.org - No Copyright Zone
> Segnalazioni per il sito: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
>
> ------- End of forwarded message -------
---
Questo e' il bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'".
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only").
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Per contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid=91979 oppure
> http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
Sito WEB del Coordinamento:
> http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eCircle ti offre una nuova opportunita:
la tua agenda sul web - per te e per i tuoi amici
Organizza on line i tuoi appuntamenti .
E' facile, veloce e gratuito!
Da oggi su
http://www.ecircle.it/ad187946/www.ecircle.it
> To: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> From: Claudio Vito <claudiovitobuttazzo@...>
> Date sent: Sat, 18 Nov 2000 12:18:17 +0100 (CET)
> Send reply to: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> Subject: [noocse-bo] Re: Che c'entra Radio Free Europe con No-ocse?
>
> [ Double-click this line for list subscription options ]
>
> Sono esterreftto. Apro il sito no-ocse e vi trovo
> messaggi, che pubblicizzano i programmi della radio
> della Cia Free Europe. Questa radio, che serve da
> anticipatore e copertura politico-ideologica
> dell'espansione economico-miliare nel neoliberismo
> nell'est-europeo, ha sede, dal 1990 a Praga (prima
> della caduta del muro era a Monaco di Baviera). E'
> finanziata direttamente dal Pentagono e vi lavora
> personale accuratamente selezionato tra le fila
> dell'anticomunsimo più sofisticato. La sede della
> radio, a Praga, è l'enorme e modernissimo edificio,
> attrezzato con tutti i comfort, che, prima della
> divisione della Cecoslovacchia, ospitava il parlamento
> federale cecoslovacco. E' stato affittato dai
> leccapiedi del governo ceco a Rdio Free Europe al
> prezzo simbolico di una corona (50 lire) annue. E' lo
> stesso governo che fa chiudere dalla polizia le
> emittenti indipendenti messe su alla meglio dai
> compagni del movimento ceco (prorio in questi giorni è
> stato chiuso dalla polizia a Praga il centro sociale
> Ladronka, l'unico centro sociale sopravvissuto in
> questi anni in quella città e dove funzionava anche
> una piccola emittente alternativa. E' stato chiuso con
> la scusa dei rumori. In realtà, è gia pronto un grande
> progetto di speculazione edilizia e di costruzione di
> un lussuoso complesso turistico-alberghiero).
> Le trasmissioni russe di questa radio Cia, addetta
> alla diversione ideologica neoliberista e
> guerrafondaia, è diretta da un italia (di cui ora non
> rivelo il nome), che fa da supervisore per tutte le
> trasmissioni dirette nei paesi slavi. Questo
> personaggio è stato per diversi anni in Urss ai tempi
> della guerra fredda con compiti di spionaggio e di
> provocazione. Una redazione serba presso radio free
> Europa è fuzionante da anni. I suoi membri sono stati
> accuratamente scelti tra i militanti di Otpor (alla
> faccia del pluralismo!), il movimento finanziato dallo
> speculatore finanziario Soros (non a caso di origini
> ungheresi), il quale finanzia pure radio B92 (tutto
> questo, naturalmente, lo fa per grande amore verso la
> democrazia!).
> ATTENTI, COMPAGNI! A VOLTE IL NEMICO MARCIA ALLA
> NOSTRA TESTA!
>
> --- Danica Razlag <razlag@...> ha scritto: >
> > Original text in Serbian at:
> > HYPERLINK
> >
> "http://www.danas.org/programi/most/2000/11/20001112125926.asp"
> >
> >
> >
> http://www.danas.org/programi/most/2000/11/20001112125926.asp
> >
> >
> > RADIO FREE EUROPE
> > Programs in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian and Albanian
> > languages
> >
> > RADIO BRIDGE (RADIO MOST)
> >
> > November 12, 2000 7:00 p.m.
> >
> > NO ONE HAS A MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE
> >
> > In Pristina: Ylber HYSA, director of the Campaign
> > for Civil Initiatives
> > of Kosovo and In Kosovo Polje: Protosyncellus Sava
> > JANJIC, spokesman of the
> > Serb National Council of Kosovo and Metohija
> >
> > Moderator: Omer KARABEG
> >
> > Have the victory of the opposition in elections in
> > the Federal Republic of
> > Yugoslavia and the victory of the Democratic
> > Alliance of Kosovo in local
> >
> > elections in that province created conditions for
> > the beginning of true dialog
> > on the future of Kosovo?
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Hysa, do you think that after the fall of
> > Milosevic conditions have
> > been created for the beginning of a dialog between
> > Ibrahim Rugova,
> >
> > whose party won office in the majority of Kosovo
> > municipalities, and the
> > president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
> > Vojislav Kostunica?
> >
> > HYSA: I do not think that conditions have been
> > created for the beginning of a
> > dialog. Rugova is the president of a party which won
> > in the local
> >
> > elections in 21 of a total of 30 municipalities,
> > which is how many of them
> > there are in Kosovo, taking into account that Serbs
> > are in the majority
> >
> > in three municipalities and the Serbs, as you know,
> > did not participate in the
> > elections. This does not give him a mandate to
> > represent Kosovo.
> >
> > Such a mandate can be obtained only in national
> > elections which have yet to be
> > held in Kosovo. After all, Security Council
> > Resolution 1244 is
> >
> > very clear with respect to this point. It says that
> > first democratic
> > institutions are to be created in Kosovo, and only
> > then can talks take place
> >
> >
> > regarding the future status of Kosovo.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Hysa, does this mean that in Kosovo at this
> > moment no person and no
> > party has a mandate to engage in dialog with
> > representatives of
> >
> > Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?
> >
> > HYSA: I think that is the case. Besides, I think
> > that such a dialog would be
> > risky, that it would be premature and that it would
> > not yield any
> >
> > results. Before it begins, a lot of things need to
> > be done in both Serbia and
> > Kosovo. Before us is the long path of
> > democratization, the long path
> >
> > of building institutions and consequently, at this
> > moment we would stand to
> > gain absolutely nothing from such talks even if they
> > were possible.
> >
> > JANJIC: The Albanians themselves must decide who on
> > the Albanian side is going
> > to participate in talks; that is their own business.
> > I think,
> >
> > nevertheless, that it is necessary to begin some
> > sort of preliminary talks and
> > negotiations in order to realize what is foreseen by
> > Resolution 1244
> >
> > which does not mention the issue of status but does
> > talk about the substantial
> > autonomy of Kosovo within the framework of the
> > Federal Republic
> >
> > of Yugoslavia.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Janjic, if I understand correctly, you are
> > of the opinion that a
> > dialog could begin, as long as the most sensitive
> > issue, the issue of the
> >
> > status of Kosovo, is left unopened?
> >
> > JANJIC: Absolutely. There can be no talks on the
> > status of Kosovo under
> > conditions where there is no respect for the basic
> > human rights of
> >
> > Serbs and members of other non-Albanian communities
> > which live in Kosovo and
> > Metohija. In my opinion it is first necessary to
> > realize what is
> >
> > foreseen by Resolution 1244. I would agree with Mr.
> > Hysa that at this moment
> > we need to concentrate on the building of democratic
> > institutions
> >
> > which I understand to mean only those institutions
> > which are foreseen by
> > Resolution 1244. I mean, therefore, those
> > institutions which would, first
> >
> > of all, enable respect for the human rights and
> > freedoms of all the residents
> > of Kosovo and Metohija but not those institutions
> > which would fall
> >
> > outside the scope of the Resolution and prejudice
> > the issue of the province’s
> > status.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Hysa, if the issue of the status of Kosovo
> > were to be left aside,
> > would it be possible at this moment to establish a
> > dialog between the
> >
> > Serb and Albanian sides regarding other key issues,
> > regarding issues of
> > coexistence?
> >
> > HYSA: There are different kinds of dialog. This
> > discussion, too, which we are
> > holding on "Radio Bridge is one form of dialog.
> > However,
> >
> > institutions have not yet been established in Kosovo
> > which would be able to
> > conduct official dialogs. If I understand correctly,
> > what you are
> >
> > saying and what Mr. Janjic insists on is the
> > creation of some sort of positive
> > relations, or so-called "confidence building
> > measures". One such
> >
> > step, for example, would be if the Albanian
> > prisoners in Serb jails were to be
> > released. That would be a positive example.
> >
> > RFE: Do you think that this is an issue about which
> > both Albanian and Serb
> > sides could talk about at this moment?
> >
> > HYSA: I do not think that this is something on which
> > we can negotiate. Because
> > these people are war hostages, not prisoners. Now,
> > after its
> >
> > acceptance into the United Nations, the Federal
> > Republic of Yugoslavia should
> > respect the standards of the international community
> > and free the
> >
> > imprisoned Albanians. This is a problem which should
> > be resolved by the
> > international community and Serbia. This is not an
> > issue on which we
> >
> > can negotiate.
> >
> > RFE: Mr. Janjic, in your opinion should all
> > Albanians who are presently in
> > prisons in Serbia be released?
> >
> === message truncated ===
>
> ______________________________________________________________________
> Do You Yahoo!?
> Il tuo indirizzo gratis e per sempre @... su http://mail.yahoo.it
>
> Per partecipare: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> Iscriversi: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> Cancellarsi: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> Problemi in lista? Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
> Web: http://www.contropiani2000.org - No Copyright Zone
> Segnalazioni per il sito: Questo indirizzo email è protetto dagli spambots. È necessario abilitare JavaScript per vederlo.
>
> ------- End of forwarded message -------
---
Questo e' il bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'".
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only").
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Per contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid=91979 oppure
> http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
Sito WEB del Coordinamento:
> http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eCircle ti offre una nuova opportunita:
la tua agenda sul web - per te e per i tuoi amici
Organizza on line i tuoi appuntamenti .
E' facile, veloce e gratuito!
Da oggi su
http://www.ecircle.it/ad187946/www.ecircle.it
SERBIA DEPLOYS PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO US
I think Serbia should impose a Bosnia type solution
on the U.S. There could be two entitities,
a Bushman league, and a Nader-Gore Federation with
a joint presidency consisting of 1 each from the
Bush, Gore, and Nader camps. USFOR would have
to be stationed to keep the three camps from
fighting, but Serbian Ambassador to the UN
(Mr. Wholestream) has said that it would be
a success because USFOR would still be there
in 30 years.
Prof. David Lorge Parnas, P.Eng.
Director of the Software Engineering Programme
Department of Computing and Software
Faculty of Engineering
McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ontario Canada L8S 4L7
---
Questo e' il bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'".
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only").
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Per contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid=91979 oppure
> http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
Sito WEB del Coordinamento:
> http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eCircle ti offre una nuova opportunita:
Il tuo sondaggio sul web sugli argomenti che preferisci
Facile da gestire e con rappresentazioni grafiche dei risultati.
E' facile, veloce e gratuito!
Da oggi su
http://www.ecircle.it/ad186752/www.ecircle.it
I think Serbia should impose a Bosnia type solution
on the U.S. There could be two entitities,
a Bushman league, and a Nader-Gore Federation with
a joint presidency consisting of 1 each from the
Bush, Gore, and Nader camps. USFOR would have
to be stationed to keep the three camps from
fighting, but Serbian Ambassador to the UN
(Mr. Wholestream) has said that it would be
a success because USFOR would still be there
in 30 years.
Prof. David Lorge Parnas, P.Eng.
Director of the Software Engineering Programme
Department of Computing and Software
Faculty of Engineering
McMaster University,
Hamilton, Ontario Canada L8S 4L7
---
Questo e' il bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'".
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only").
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Per contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid=91979 oppure
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>The Rockford Institute
>CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
>www.rockfordinstitute.org
>
>Report on TRI/CFIA Conference
>AMERICAN POLICY IN THE BALKANS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION:
>L E A D E R S H I P O R M A R G I N A L I Z A T I O N ?
>held in Washington D.C. on November 14, 2000
>
>Contents:
>I - INTRODUCTION: Conference Objective
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>IV - CONCLUSION
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>===========================================
>I - THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Rockford Institute's Center for International Affairs takes an active
>interest in Balkan affairs not because Southeast Europe is an inherently
>important part of the world - which it is not - but because American
>policies in that region over the past decade have come to embody all that
>is wrong with the fundamental assumptions, values, and modus operandi of
>the decision-making community in Washington.
>
>It is our considered opinion that a thorough revision of those policies,
>and the subsequent new approach of the United States to the Balkans would
>be an important step towards a new, national interest-based foreign policy
>formulation in general. Accordingly, we saw the election of Vojislav
>Kostunica as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the
>downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, as a welcome opportunity to make that step.
>
>Aware of the importance of time, and apprehensive that in the absence of
>specific alternative proposals the outgoing national security team's
>prejudices and bureaucratic inertia may impose a negative continuity on the
>new Administration, we convened a conference in the nation's capital on
>November 14 to discuss these issues. We gathered a team of analysts who
>take an active interest in Southeast Europe and who share the desire for an
>active, national interest-based U.S. foreign policy, free from passionate
>attachments and ideological straightjackets, in the Balkans or any other
>part of the world.
>
>The panel, chaired by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director of TRI's Center for
>International Affairs, included Gary Dempsey of CATO Institute, Dr. John C.
>Hulsman of Heritage Foundation, Cliff Kincaid (Washington-based
>investigative reporter and broadcaster), Bill Lind (Free Congress
>Foundation), Dr. Branko Milanovic who is a senior economist with The World
>Bank, The Hon. Branko Terzic of Deloitte & Touche, Benjamin Works
>(SIRI-US), as well as senior policy analysts and advisors from both the
>U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. While the individual speakers
>offered thoughts on a variety of topics relevant to American policy toward
>post-Milosevic Serbia, the overall consensus of the panelists and
>participants is summarized in the following policy recommendations for the
>incoming administration in Washington. Also included are some suggestions
>for the newly elected government in Belgrade.
>
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>
>1. All key European countries have moved rapidly to reestablish normal
>relations with Belgrade based on Serbia's unique position in the heart of
>the Balkans. America's failure to follow suit will cause rift with
>Europeans and turn American leadership into self-imposed marginalization.
>In order to avoid such outcome, detrimental to its interests, the United
>States must move away from the now evident failure of a policy toward
>Serbia publicly based only on the personality of one man - Slobodan
>Milosevic - and predicated on the unrealistic notion that his removal from
>power would solve all outstanding regional problems. While his downfall has
>vastly improved the prospects for repairing historically close ties between
>the U.S. and Serbia, the new Washington Administration should define a new,
>national interest-based approach to the former Yugoslavia without delay.
>
>2. A national interest-based policy ought to reassess U.S. relations
>with Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) on the basis of prospects for (i)
>regional stability and development and (ii) promotion of American
>commercial interests. It must avoid every temptation to vindicate ex post
>facto the failed 1990s policy premised on treating the Serbian nation not
>as an integral part of an extended European economic and political
>structure but as an inherently antagonistic entity and a permanent black
>hole at the center of the region. The departure from office of persons
>inseparable from the Clinton Administration's failures - notably Secretary
>of State Albright, Ambassador Holbrooke, and President Clinton himself -
>will greatly improve prospects for this reassessment.
>
>3. The new team in Washington should be aware of the damage caused to
>American interests by the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 and by the
>ongoing, open-ended, and ultimately futile "nation-building" mission in
>Kosovo. The new Administration should take note of legislative efforts,
>such as the Warner/Byrd amendment in the Senate and the Kasich amendment in
>the House of Representatives, which reflect an increasing Congressional
>awareness of that damage. It should support such efforts. Far from
>constituting some ill-defined "isolationist" retreat from America's
>international responsibilities, they reflect the desire of elected
>representatives of the American people to impose reasonable burden-sharing
>criteria on the Kosovo mission. These efforts are a positive step in the
>achievement of a national interest-based reassessment of American policy
>and of an early American disengagement from Kosovo.
>
>4. The United States should stop the current efforts by the outgoing
>Administration and supporters of its policy in the Congress and in NGOs to
>impose a de facto (and, later, de jure) independent status for Kosovo.
>These efforts are manifested in the re-launching of the long-discredited
>notion of Kosovo as a third republic in Yugoslavia, and in willful efforts
>to misconstrue the wording of Security Council Resolution 1244 as not
>specifying that Kosovo is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic
>of Serbia as well as that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. If
>continued, U.S. support for Kosovo independence will have twofold effect.
>It will unnecessarily further impair regional stability, which remains the
>only real American interest in the Balkans. Moreover, it will further
>damage American relations with our allies, who are opposed to Kosovo
>independence. The recent elections favoring moderate forces associated with
>Ibrahim Rugova (who also favors Kosovo independence but who has
>demonstrated a dedication to nonviolent methods distinctly different from
>those of the Clinton Administration's favored entity, the Kosovo Liberation
>Army) lends some hope that some reasonable solution among the parties can
>be found. In summary, the next Administration should base its Kosovo policy
>on
>(i) the need for the parties, if possible, to work a settlement out for
>themselves, and
>(ii) to follow the lead of out European allies in facilitating a solution,
>rather than trying to dictate one as the current Administration is
>inclined.
>
>5. Similarly, the United States should cease efforts to pressure
>Belgrade to accept the independence of Montenegro, a status the people of
>Montenegro have not indicated they desire. Even if it is accepted that the
>U.S. is no longer formally encouraging the secessionist minority in
>Podgorica, some segments of the bureaucracy (notably at the Department of
>State) and NGOs with known close links to the Clinton Administration are
>still effectively doing so.
>
>6. The United States should expeditiously follow the lead of our
>European allies in removing of all sanctions against Yugoslavia, including
>the so-called outer wall. Continued use sanctions against the new
>democratic government in Belgrade to force compliance with preexisting
>demands by the Clinton Administration is counterproductive. It effectively
>prevents American companies from taking optimal advantage of the many
>business opportunities that are opening up in Serbia - opportunities that
>will be taken by their European competitors. It is noted that despite
>hortatory language in current legislation regarding such demands, the
>President currently has full legal authority to lift sanctions, and he
>should use it as soon as possible. This should be done
>(i) immediately, with respect to compliance with sanctions still formally
>in effect, and
>(ii) as quickly as possible, with respect to formal lifting of sanctions
>imposed by legislation or by executive order.
>The United States should favor immediately rescinding resolutions by the
>Security Council imposing sanctions, most notably SC747 of May 30, 1992.
>The United States, both bilaterally and in international bodies, should
>support efforts to provide appropriate aid to Yugoslavia for economic
>reconstruction.
>
>7. The United States should cease all efforts to coerce the new
>government in Belgrade into surrendering persons indicted by The Hague war
>crimes tribunal. These efforts may result in further dangerous precedents
>contrary to the American interest in opposing the establishment of a
>standing international criminal court, for which The Hague tribunal for
>Yugoslavia and its counterpart for Rwanda are precursors. Such coercion is
>also counterproductive in that, if successful, it would undercut the
>legitimacy of the new government in Belgrade, which was elected as an
>authentic expression of the national will by an electorate that uniformly
>regards The Hague tribunal as politicized tool of American policy rather
>than a judicial body. The United States should favor the repatriation of
>the tribunal's functions to the Yugoslav successor states, including
>Serbia-Montenegro. In particular, the United States should regard as
>sufficient for the purposes of justice forthcoming steps by the new
>authorities in Belgrade to hold its own citizens responsible for violations
>of domestic law.
>
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>
>While the focus of the conference was to arrive at specific recommendations
>to the new American Administration, there was also a consensus on
>suggestions for the new democratic government in Belgrade and for President
>Kostunica:
>
>1. Belgrade should move to repair relations with Washington, and the
>re-establishment of full diplomatic relations will be a welcome first step.
>At the same time, such efforts should be pursued in a quiet, businesslike
>way at the diplomatic "working level." Any high-visibility state visits at
>the head of state or foreign minister level would be counterproductive
>prior to the departure of the current Administration. If such contacts are
>inevitable, they should take place in third countries, in the context of
>multilateral gatherings. Belgrade's current focus on Europe is entirely
>appropriate and should continue for the time being. In all contacts with
>the outgoing Administration the Yugoslav government should not hesitate to
>raise unresolved issues that the Clinton team can and should rectify,
>including the unconditional removal of the outer wall of sanctions and the
>granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Yugoslavia.
>
>2. Belgrade should move with deliberation on economic reconstruction.
>While the outline of transition suggested by the G-17 group of economists
>is useful, the new Yugoslav authorities should take note of the
>difficulties experienced by other formerly socialist economies during the
>past decade. It should not neglect broader public interest in favor of the
>models of transition and theories of political economy that may result in a
>Gaydar-like de-industrialization. The government in Belgrade should be
>aware that
>(i) the record of the IMF in promoting sustained economic development is
>ambiguous; and
>(ii) the European Union, while an essential partner in the economic
>recovery of Yugoslavia, may be more interested in it as a pool of
>inexpensive labor than as a potential equal partner.
>In each instance, outside advice and assistance should be accepted in a
>discriminating manner. Foreign investment is to be encouraged, but measures
>should be taken to ensure that foreign acquisitions of domestic enterprises
>do not result in asset-stripping. The development of a patriotic business
>culture in Serbia is inseparable from the reassertion of the country's
>self-respect, dignity and sovereignty.
>
>3. The new government in Belgrade should not compromise on the
>principle that Kosovo is sovereign Serbian, as well as Yugoslav territory.
>At the same time, based on existing realities, it should begin to establish
>dialogue with other essential parties. In particular, Belgrade should
>insist that UNMIK and KFOR comply with provisions of UNSC Resolution 1244
>regarding reintroduction of Yugoslav forces into Kosovo, particularly with
>reference to restoring the integrity of Kosovo's border with neighboring
>states. Belgrade should insist that UNMIK and KFOR live up to their
>responsibility to demilitarize the former elements of the Kosovo Liberation
>Army (which remain under arms) and to protect all persons in Kosovo
>regardless of ethnicity or religion. It should be insisted that a workable,
>short-term plan be reached for the return to their homes of persons who
>fled or were driven out of Kosovo since the end of the war and for their
>subsequent protection. The Belgrade government should make efforts to
>conduct a dialogue with moderate (i.e., non-KLA) Albanians on achieving a
>peaceful solution.
>
>4. The Belgrade government absolutely should not surrender any person
>to The Hague war crimes tribunal. While the consensus of the conference was
>against any cooperation with the tribunal (including establishment of an
>office in Belgrade), it was suggested that some contact might be useful
>(i) only if such contacts on the territory of Serbia or Montenegro are not
>investigatory but purely for exchange of information, and
>(ii) as a means to transfer functions currently claimed by the tribunal to
>national courts.
>It was recommended that the Belgrade authorities should expect any
>cooperation to presuppose a willingness of the tribunal to take appropriate
>action with respect to violations of the laws of war by persons acting on
>behalf of the countries supporting the tribunal. It was specifically
>suggested that materials relating to the activities of Agim Ceku both
>during "Operation Storm" and in Kosovo, as well as any available
>information about other relevant activities, be provided to the tribunal's
>representatives as a test case of their willingness to act as a legitimate
>instrument of justice. It was suggested that all related statements by
>current Administration's officials - such as James O'Brien's warning to
>Belgrade that Washington expects Yugoslavia to fully cooperate with The
>Hague by April 2001 - should be treated as an exercise in rhetorical
>bravado, since no current official can impose conditions on a foreign party
>that would be binding for the new Administration. It was unanimously
>concluded that Belgrade's refusal to allow the tribunal's jurisdiction in
>Yugoslavia and to surrender its citizens is the greatest single service
>that the Serbs can render to the real international community - the
>community of people, in America and elsewhere, who reject the notion of
>supranational authority.
>
>IV - CONCLUSION
>
>In our view it is both possible and desirable that the relations between
>the United States and Yugoslavia will improve and develop on the basis of
>mutual respect, friendship and common interest.
>
>The regime of Slobodan Milosevic was one obstacle to the development of
>such relations, and his removal provides an opportunity to make a fresh
>start. The other obstacle to such relations is the ideology of hegemonist
>interventionism that prevails in America's current foreign policy
>establishment. It is contrary to the authentic tradition of the American
>republic, to its true interests, and to the will of the American people. It
>should be replaced by national interest-based policies, in the Balkans and
>elsewhere.
>
>By revising its approach to Yugoslavia, and developing truly even-handed
>policies that will be free from ideological and special interest pressures,
>the next Administration will act in the true American interest, and in the
>interest of peace, stability and prosperity in the Balkans.
>
>By standing firm on the key issues that affect its own national interest,
>and especially by refusing to compromise its sovereignty (The Hague) and
>territorial integrity (Kosovo), the government of Yugoslavia will also help
>promote such new policies in Washington. If it bases its strategy firmly on
>the principle of enlightened nationalism, and refuses to be drawn into any
>arrangements that may erode those fundamental principles, Belgrade will
>best defend its own interests while at the same time contributing to the
>abandonment of the insidious path of imperial over-reach in Washington.
>
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Conference was honored by a video address by the President of
>Yugoslavia, Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, that contained his views on the current
>state of relations between his country and the United States and his
>thinking on the ways to overcome existing problems in the period ahead.
>Here is the transcript of the address:
>
>"Regardless of who emerges as the winner from the present electoral
>imbroglio, we can safely assume that by the end of January there will be a
>new Administration in Washington.
>"When it comes to the Balkans, that Administration will be as "new" as the
>newly elected President wants it to be. In my opinion this provides both
>our countries with a unique opportunity to turn a new page, not only in
>rhetoric but also in fact, and to make a fresh start after a very difficult
>decade in our relations.
>"Some of the wounds of that decade will take time to heal, and the healing
>process will not be aided by our pretending that they do not exist. And
>yet, there are times when the opportunities for a change of course simply
>must be taken, when it would be foolish, or tragic, not to make the
>attempt. In Belgrade it would be foolish; in Washington it would be tragic.
>We are fully prepared to do our part. We hope and trust that America will
>do hers.
>"Let me deal briefly with the legacy of the past, and then look ahead.
>"There are no inherent disputes between our two countries, which had been
>friends and allies for most of the past century. Those problems that do
>exist could have been avoided, and are not insoluble.
>"One such problem is Kosovo. While a complete normalization of relations
>between our countries would be much easier if NATO were not in occupation
>of our sovereign territory, making progress in other areas will facilitate
>the quest for a lasting solution in the southern Serbian province. There is
>no easy, obvious, or early solution. We know this, and by now Washington
>also knows this better than it did.
>"We should turn our sadly shared experience into a more common attitude,
>and move towards a shared judgment. Milosevic did not invent the Kosovo
>problem, and his disappearance by itself cannot solve the historic
>difficulties that he made so much worse.
>"His crimes must be properly assessed. This is just as important for you
>as it is for us. Important for us because his orders were executed by our
>citizens in our sovereign jurisdiction; important for you because his
>crimes were given such ideological and mesmerizing importance, and even
>invented when there were not enough of them. The crimes and criminality of
>the "KLA," so obvious to us, were - in this mesmerized environment -
>largely invisible to ordinary Americans, and ignored by their leaders.
>"The first thing we can all do is stop pretending that there is a story of
>blame from which we ourselves are exempt, or from which anyone is exempt.
>We must break the cycle of blame. This rupture is an essential part of
>peace-making at every level.
>"This brings me to the question of war crimes. We have exactly the same
>problem with international jurisdictions as Americans do. Like you, we know
>enough about the world to know that international politics can distort the
>idea of justice. Let me assure you: anti-Serbianism is as common a
>prejudice in the Balkans as is anti-Americanism on the world stage. The
>essential case for justice, the need for it, is simply this: that the human
>heart craves it.
>"We accept that the judicial process should be an integral part of eventual
>reconciliation. But the instrumentalization of judicial retaliation can
>only postpone effective reconciliation, and make it more difficult. Sooner
>rather than later the work of the Hague Tribunal - with which we shall find
>modes of cooperation - should be repatriated to the successor states of the
>former Yugoslavia. If there is to be a supra-national alternative, it could
>only be a world tribunal to which all members of the United Nations submit
>their jurisdiction and their sovereignty. I am not suggesting that the
>creation of such a body is desirable, let alone inevitable; I am simply
>stating a fact.
>"Kosovo, The Hague, and other problems need resolving, but they should not
>be allowed to dominate the dialogue between our countries. There are many
>areas of potentially fruitful cooperation and mutually beneficial exchange
>that can and should be developed. America's creativity, so impressively
>evidenced in science, technology, and sustained economic growth, and
>America's inexhaustible entrepreneurial drive can help us rejoin the ranks
>of European nations to which we rightfully belong.
>"I hope that the Rockford Institute conference on American policy in the
>Balkans in the coming decade will make a real contribution to the
>attainment of that objective. I extend my best wishes to all its
>participants, and look forward to seeing their specific recommendations."
>****************************************
>Report prepared by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director
>Center for International Affairs of The Rockford Institute
>
>HEAD OFFICE CHICAGO AREA OFFICE
>928 N Main Street 4722 Oakton Street
>Rockford, IL 61103 Skokie, IL 60076-3012
>(815) 964-5054 (847) 679-9850
>Facsimile 964-9403 Facsimile 679-9851
>
>Attachment Converted: C:\CYBERNET\EUDORA\ATTACH\TRIDCDCo.doc
>
---
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Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid=91979 oppure
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> http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Il tuo sondaggio sul web sugli argomenti che preferisci
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>CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
>www.rockfordinstitute.org
>
>Report on TRI/CFIA Conference
>AMERICAN POLICY IN THE BALKANS FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION:
>L E A D E R S H I P O R M A R G I N A L I Z A T I O N ?
>held in Washington D.C. on November 14, 2000
>
>Contents:
>I - INTRODUCTION: Conference Objective
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>IV - CONCLUSION
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>===========================================
>I - THE PURPOSE OF THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Rockford Institute's Center for International Affairs takes an active
>interest in Balkan affairs not because Southeast Europe is an inherently
>important part of the world - which it is not - but because American
>policies in that region over the past decade have come to embody all that
>is wrong with the fundamental assumptions, values, and modus operandi of
>the decision-making community in Washington.
>
>It is our considered opinion that a thorough revision of those policies,
>and the subsequent new approach of the United States to the Balkans would
>be an important step towards a new, national interest-based foreign policy
>formulation in general. Accordingly, we saw the election of Vojislav
>Kostunica as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the
>downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, as a welcome opportunity to make that step.
>
>Aware of the importance of time, and apprehensive that in the absence of
>specific alternative proposals the outgoing national security team's
>prejudices and bureaucratic inertia may impose a negative continuity on the
>new Administration, we convened a conference in the nation's capital on
>November 14 to discuss these issues. We gathered a team of analysts who
>take an active interest in Southeast Europe and who share the desire for an
>active, national interest-based U.S. foreign policy, free from passionate
>attachments and ideological straightjackets, in the Balkans or any other
>part of the world.
>
>The panel, chaired by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director of TRI's Center for
>International Affairs, included Gary Dempsey of CATO Institute, Dr. John C.
>Hulsman of Heritage Foundation, Cliff Kincaid (Washington-based
>investigative reporter and broadcaster), Bill Lind (Free Congress
>Foundation), Dr. Branko Milanovic who is a senior economist with The World
>Bank, The Hon. Branko Terzic of Deloitte & Touche, Benjamin Works
>(SIRI-US), as well as senior policy analysts and advisors from both the
>U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives. While the individual speakers
>offered thoughts on a variety of topics relevant to American policy toward
>post-Milosevic Serbia, the overall consensus of the panelists and
>participants is summarized in the following policy recommendations for the
>incoming administration in Washington. Also included are some suggestions
>for the newly elected government in Belgrade.
>
>II - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION
>
>1. All key European countries have moved rapidly to reestablish normal
>relations with Belgrade based on Serbia's unique position in the heart of
>the Balkans. America's failure to follow suit will cause rift with
>Europeans and turn American leadership into self-imposed marginalization.
>In order to avoid such outcome, detrimental to its interests, the United
>States must move away from the now evident failure of a policy toward
>Serbia publicly based only on the personality of one man - Slobodan
>Milosevic - and predicated on the unrealistic notion that his removal from
>power would solve all outstanding regional problems. While his downfall has
>vastly improved the prospects for repairing historically close ties between
>the U.S. and Serbia, the new Washington Administration should define a new,
>national interest-based approach to the former Yugoslavia without delay.
>
>2. A national interest-based policy ought to reassess U.S. relations
>with Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) on the basis of prospects for (i)
>regional stability and development and (ii) promotion of American
>commercial interests. It must avoid every temptation to vindicate ex post
>facto the failed 1990s policy premised on treating the Serbian nation not
>as an integral part of an extended European economic and political
>structure but as an inherently antagonistic entity and a permanent black
>hole at the center of the region. The departure from office of persons
>inseparable from the Clinton Administration's failures - notably Secretary
>of State Albright, Ambassador Holbrooke, and President Clinton himself -
>will greatly improve prospects for this reassessment.
>
>3. The new team in Washington should be aware of the damage caused to
>American interests by the NATO war against Yugoslavia in 1999 and by the
>ongoing, open-ended, and ultimately futile "nation-building" mission in
>Kosovo. The new Administration should take note of legislative efforts,
>such as the Warner/Byrd amendment in the Senate and the Kasich amendment in
>the House of Representatives, which reflect an increasing Congressional
>awareness of that damage. It should support such efforts. Far from
>constituting some ill-defined "isolationist" retreat from America's
>international responsibilities, they reflect the desire of elected
>representatives of the American people to impose reasonable burden-sharing
>criteria on the Kosovo mission. These efforts are a positive step in the
>achievement of a national interest-based reassessment of American policy
>and of an early American disengagement from Kosovo.
>
>4. The United States should stop the current efforts by the outgoing
>Administration and supporters of its policy in the Congress and in NGOs to
>impose a de facto (and, later, de jure) independent status for Kosovo.
>These efforts are manifested in the re-launching of the long-discredited
>notion of Kosovo as a third republic in Yugoslavia, and in willful efforts
>to misconstrue the wording of Security Council Resolution 1244 as not
>specifying that Kosovo is part of the sovereign territory of the Republic
>of Serbia as well as that of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. If
>continued, U.S. support for Kosovo independence will have twofold effect.
>It will unnecessarily further impair regional stability, which remains the
>only real American interest in the Balkans. Moreover, it will further
>damage American relations with our allies, who are opposed to Kosovo
>independence. The recent elections favoring moderate forces associated with
>Ibrahim Rugova (who also favors Kosovo independence but who has
>demonstrated a dedication to nonviolent methods distinctly different from
>those of the Clinton Administration's favored entity, the Kosovo Liberation
>Army) lends some hope that some reasonable solution among the parties can
>be found. In summary, the next Administration should base its Kosovo policy
>on
>(i) the need for the parties, if possible, to work a settlement out for
>themselves, and
>(ii) to follow the lead of out European allies in facilitating a solution,
>rather than trying to dictate one as the current Administration is
>inclined.
>
>5. Similarly, the United States should cease efforts to pressure
>Belgrade to accept the independence of Montenegro, a status the people of
>Montenegro have not indicated they desire. Even if it is accepted that the
>U.S. is no longer formally encouraging the secessionist minority in
>Podgorica, some segments of the bureaucracy (notably at the Department of
>State) and NGOs with known close links to the Clinton Administration are
>still effectively doing so.
>
>6. The United States should expeditiously follow the lead of our
>European allies in removing of all sanctions against Yugoslavia, including
>the so-called outer wall. Continued use sanctions against the new
>democratic government in Belgrade to force compliance with preexisting
>demands by the Clinton Administration is counterproductive. It effectively
>prevents American companies from taking optimal advantage of the many
>business opportunities that are opening up in Serbia - opportunities that
>will be taken by their European competitors. It is noted that despite
>hortatory language in current legislation regarding such demands, the
>President currently has full legal authority to lift sanctions, and he
>should use it as soon as possible. This should be done
>(i) immediately, with respect to compliance with sanctions still formally
>in effect, and
>(ii) as quickly as possible, with respect to formal lifting of sanctions
>imposed by legislation or by executive order.
>The United States should favor immediately rescinding resolutions by the
>Security Council imposing sanctions, most notably SC747 of May 30, 1992.
>The United States, both bilaterally and in international bodies, should
>support efforts to provide appropriate aid to Yugoslavia for economic
>reconstruction.
>
>7. The United States should cease all efforts to coerce the new
>government in Belgrade into surrendering persons indicted by The Hague war
>crimes tribunal. These efforts may result in further dangerous precedents
>contrary to the American interest in opposing the establishment of a
>standing international criminal court, for which The Hague tribunal for
>Yugoslavia and its counterpart for Rwanda are precursors. Such coercion is
>also counterproductive in that, if successful, it would undercut the
>legitimacy of the new government in Belgrade, which was elected as an
>authentic expression of the national will by an electorate that uniformly
>regards The Hague tribunal as politicized tool of American policy rather
>than a judicial body. The United States should favor the repatriation of
>the tribunal's functions to the Yugoslav successor states, including
>Serbia-Montenegro. In particular, the United States should regard as
>sufficient for the purposes of justice forthcoming steps by the new
>authorities in Belgrade to hold its own citizens responsible for violations
>of domestic law.
>
>III - RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NEW AUTHORITIES IN BELGRADE
>
>While the focus of the conference was to arrive at specific recommendations
>to the new American Administration, there was also a consensus on
>suggestions for the new democratic government in Belgrade and for President
>Kostunica:
>
>1. Belgrade should move to repair relations with Washington, and the
>re-establishment of full diplomatic relations will be a welcome first step.
>At the same time, such efforts should be pursued in a quiet, businesslike
>way at the diplomatic "working level." Any high-visibility state visits at
>the head of state or foreign minister level would be counterproductive
>prior to the departure of the current Administration. If such contacts are
>inevitable, they should take place in third countries, in the context of
>multilateral gatherings. Belgrade's current focus on Europe is entirely
>appropriate and should continue for the time being. In all contacts with
>the outgoing Administration the Yugoslav government should not hesitate to
>raise unresolved issues that the Clinton team can and should rectify,
>including the unconditional removal of the outer wall of sanctions and the
>granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status to Yugoslavia.
>
>2. Belgrade should move with deliberation on economic reconstruction.
>While the outline of transition suggested by the G-17 group of economists
>is useful, the new Yugoslav authorities should take note of the
>difficulties experienced by other formerly socialist economies during the
>past decade. It should not neglect broader public interest in favor of the
>models of transition and theories of political economy that may result in a
>Gaydar-like de-industrialization. The government in Belgrade should be
>aware that
>(i) the record of the IMF in promoting sustained economic development is
>ambiguous; and
>(ii) the European Union, while an essential partner in the economic
>recovery of Yugoslavia, may be more interested in it as a pool of
>inexpensive labor than as a potential equal partner.
>In each instance, outside advice and assistance should be accepted in a
>discriminating manner. Foreign investment is to be encouraged, but measures
>should be taken to ensure that foreign acquisitions of domestic enterprises
>do not result in asset-stripping. The development of a patriotic business
>culture in Serbia is inseparable from the reassertion of the country's
>self-respect, dignity and sovereignty.
>
>3. The new government in Belgrade should not compromise on the
>principle that Kosovo is sovereign Serbian, as well as Yugoslav territory.
>At the same time, based on existing realities, it should begin to establish
>dialogue with other essential parties. In particular, Belgrade should
>insist that UNMIK and KFOR comply with provisions of UNSC Resolution 1244
>regarding reintroduction of Yugoslav forces into Kosovo, particularly with
>reference to restoring the integrity of Kosovo's border with neighboring
>states. Belgrade should insist that UNMIK and KFOR live up to their
>responsibility to demilitarize the former elements of the Kosovo Liberation
>Army (which remain under arms) and to protect all persons in Kosovo
>regardless of ethnicity or religion. It should be insisted that a workable,
>short-term plan be reached for the return to their homes of persons who
>fled or were driven out of Kosovo since the end of the war and for their
>subsequent protection. The Belgrade government should make efforts to
>conduct a dialogue with moderate (i.e., non-KLA) Albanians on achieving a
>peaceful solution.
>
>4. The Belgrade government absolutely should not surrender any person
>to The Hague war crimes tribunal. While the consensus of the conference was
>against any cooperation with the tribunal (including establishment of an
>office in Belgrade), it was suggested that some contact might be useful
>(i) only if such contacts on the territory of Serbia or Montenegro are not
>investigatory but purely for exchange of information, and
>(ii) as a means to transfer functions currently claimed by the tribunal to
>national courts.
>It was recommended that the Belgrade authorities should expect any
>cooperation to presuppose a willingness of the tribunal to take appropriate
>action with respect to violations of the laws of war by persons acting on
>behalf of the countries supporting the tribunal. It was specifically
>suggested that materials relating to the activities of Agim Ceku both
>during "Operation Storm" and in Kosovo, as well as any available
>information about other relevant activities, be provided to the tribunal's
>representatives as a test case of their willingness to act as a legitimate
>instrument of justice. It was suggested that all related statements by
>current Administration's officials - such as James O'Brien's warning to
>Belgrade that Washington expects Yugoslavia to fully cooperate with The
>Hague by April 2001 - should be treated as an exercise in rhetorical
>bravado, since no current official can impose conditions on a foreign party
>that would be binding for the new Administration. It was unanimously
>concluded that Belgrade's refusal to allow the tribunal's jurisdiction in
>Yugoslavia and to surrender its citizens is the greatest single service
>that the Serbs can render to the real international community - the
>community of people, in America and elsewhere, who reject the notion of
>supranational authority.
>
>IV - CONCLUSION
>
>In our view it is both possible and desirable that the relations between
>the United States and Yugoslavia will improve and develop on the basis of
>mutual respect, friendship and common interest.
>
>The regime of Slobodan Milosevic was one obstacle to the development of
>such relations, and his removal provides an opportunity to make a fresh
>start. The other obstacle to such relations is the ideology of hegemonist
>interventionism that prevails in America's current foreign policy
>establishment. It is contrary to the authentic tradition of the American
>republic, to its true interests, and to the will of the American people. It
>should be replaced by national interest-based policies, in the Balkans and
>elsewhere.
>
>By revising its approach to Yugoslavia, and developing truly even-handed
>policies that will be free from ideological and special interest pressures,
>the next Administration will act in the true American interest, and in the
>interest of peace, stability and prosperity in the Balkans.
>
>By standing firm on the key issues that affect its own national interest,
>and especially by refusing to compromise its sovereignty (The Hague) and
>territorial integrity (Kosovo), the government of Yugoslavia will also help
>promote such new policies in Washington. If it bases its strategy firmly on
>the principle of enlightened nationalism, and refuses to be drawn into any
>arrangements that may erode those fundamental principles, Belgrade will
>best defend its own interests while at the same time contributing to the
>abandonment of the insidious path of imperial over-reach in Washington.
>
>APPENDIX: ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT KOSTUNICA TO THE CONFERENCE
>
>The Conference was honored by a video address by the President of
>Yugoslavia, Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, that contained his views on the current
>state of relations between his country and the United States and his
>thinking on the ways to overcome existing problems in the period ahead.
>Here is the transcript of the address:
>
>"Regardless of who emerges as the winner from the present electoral
>imbroglio, we can safely assume that by the end of January there will be a
>new Administration in Washington.
>"When it comes to the Balkans, that Administration will be as "new" as the
>newly elected President wants it to be. In my opinion this provides both
>our countries with a unique opportunity to turn a new page, not only in
>rhetoric but also in fact, and to make a fresh start after a very difficult
>decade in our relations.
>"Some of the wounds of that decade will take time to heal, and the healing
>process will not be aided by our pretending that they do not exist. And
>yet, there are times when the opportunities for a change of course simply
>must be taken, when it would be foolish, or tragic, not to make the
>attempt. In Belgrade it would be foolish; in Washington it would be tragic.
>We are fully prepared to do our part. We hope and trust that America will
>do hers.
>"Let me deal briefly with the legacy of the past, and then look ahead.
>"There are no inherent disputes between our two countries, which had been
>friends and allies for most of the past century. Those problems that do
>exist could have been avoided, and are not insoluble.
>"One such problem is Kosovo. While a complete normalization of relations
>between our countries would be much easier if NATO were not in occupation
>of our sovereign territory, making progress in other areas will facilitate
>the quest for a lasting solution in the southern Serbian province. There is
>no easy, obvious, or early solution. We know this, and by now Washington
>also knows this better than it did.
>"We should turn our sadly shared experience into a more common attitude,
>and move towards a shared judgment. Milosevic did not invent the Kosovo
>problem, and his disappearance by itself cannot solve the historic
>difficulties that he made so much worse.
>"His crimes must be properly assessed. This is just as important for you
>as it is for us. Important for us because his orders were executed by our
>citizens in our sovereign jurisdiction; important for you because his
>crimes were given such ideological and mesmerizing importance, and even
>invented when there were not enough of them. The crimes and criminality of
>the "KLA," so obvious to us, were - in this mesmerized environment -
>largely invisible to ordinary Americans, and ignored by their leaders.
>"The first thing we can all do is stop pretending that there is a story of
>blame from which we ourselves are exempt, or from which anyone is exempt.
>We must break the cycle of blame. This rupture is an essential part of
>peace-making at every level.
>"This brings me to the question of war crimes. We have exactly the same
>problem with international jurisdictions as Americans do. Like you, we know
>enough about the world to know that international politics can distort the
>idea of justice. Let me assure you: anti-Serbianism is as common a
>prejudice in the Balkans as is anti-Americanism on the world stage. The
>essential case for justice, the need for it, is simply this: that the human
>heart craves it.
>"We accept that the judicial process should be an integral part of eventual
>reconciliation. But the instrumentalization of judicial retaliation can
>only postpone effective reconciliation, and make it more difficult. Sooner
>rather than later the work of the Hague Tribunal - with which we shall find
>modes of cooperation - should be repatriated to the successor states of the
>former Yugoslavia. If there is to be a supra-national alternative, it could
>only be a world tribunal to which all members of the United Nations submit
>their jurisdiction and their sovereignty. I am not suggesting that the
>creation of such a body is desirable, let alone inevitable; I am simply
>stating a fact.
>"Kosovo, The Hague, and other problems need resolving, but they should not
>be allowed to dominate the dialogue between our countries. There are many
>areas of potentially fruitful cooperation and mutually beneficial exchange
>that can and should be developed. America's creativity, so impressively
>evidenced in science, technology, and sustained economic growth, and
>America's inexhaustible entrepreneurial drive can help us rejoin the ranks
>of European nations to which we rightfully belong.
>"I hope that the Rockford Institute conference on American policy in the
>Balkans in the coming decade will make a real contribution to the
>attainment of that objective. I extend my best wishes to all its
>participants, and look forward to seeing their specific recommendations."
>****************************************
>Report prepared by Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Director
>Center for International Affairs of The Rockford Institute
>
>HEAD OFFICE CHICAGO AREA OFFICE
>928 N Main Street 4722 Oakton Street
>Rockford, IL 61103 Skokie, IL 60076-3012
>(815) 964-5054 (847) 679-9850
>Facsimile 964-9403 Facsimile 679-9851
>
>Attachment Converted: C:\CYBERNET\EUDORA\ATTACH\TRIDCDCo.doc
>
---
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