1. Covic: Basic guidelines for resolving the Kosmet crisis
2. RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th
meeting, on 10 June 1999
=== 1 ===
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:49:01 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 1/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(1)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
1/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Dr. Neboisa Covic,
Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and
President of the Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro
and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
The Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija][1] crisis, like all
controversial issues of Serbs, Albanians and other peoples in the
region, represents the basis of the BALKAN CRISIS. Instead of
constantly dwelling on the past we must turn toward the future in the
hope that one day the Balkan peoples will establish ties and become
integrated. It is essential to achieve good and stable relations among
the countries in the region.
It is necessary for us to jointly arrive at European and world
standards, and free ourselves of the misconception that the Balkan
peoples of Europe are second-class peoples and that they are in
constant need of tutors.
The "standards before status" approach presupposes a liberal
democracy, individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, religious
pluralism, market competitiveness... Europe is offering us membership
in exchange for conquering the past, and it does not want a game for a
political entity surrounded by those whose leaders do not accept that
conquering one's own past is liberating its future freedom. Freedom
from the past and turning toward the future does not mean the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija if we want a sustainably stable
region. The countries in this region need to build a network of mutual
ties in all domains. This approach will reduce the importance and
frustrations regarding borders and thus contribute to the concept of
multiethnicity.
A positive foundation for the constitutional and legal status of
Kosmet within Serbia in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, whose
implementation must be analogous to similar processes in the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement [Dayton-Paris Peace Accords] in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Erdut Agreement in Croatia in order to
avoid the trap of "double standards." It is not good that some
international decision makers are interpreting certain documents
however they see fit, and this approach does not contribute to
resolving problems. This is the same logic used by those who hastily
and frequently force the topic of "the final status of Kosovo," using
the following approaches:
''Without the final status of Kosovo there can be no advance in
reforms";
''Without the final status of Kosovo nationalism and xenophobia
are being fanned in Belgrade";
''Without the final status of Kosovo Belgrade will have problems
with respect to its own priorities: reconstruction, the economy, and
gradual integration into the international community"; and
''Serbia cannot become a fully democratic country until the
status of its southern province is resolved."
in the attempt to realize some partial geopolitical interest,
contrary to the process of consistent implementation of UNSC Res. 1244.
Occasionally the topic of "final status" is artfully substituted with
talk about "standards" more concerned with prejudicing status that with
standards themselves. The criteria of enclaves and ghettoes must yield
before global and European standards of normal life. Lack of success in
respecting the "standards before status" approach would be lack of
success in the implementation of UNSC Res. 1244, and therefore a
failure on the part of the international community. It is manifestly
clear that without the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees there can be no multiethnic life and therefore no progress in
Kosmet.
Not only is the number of returnees insignificant but the number
of desperate people who will not, dare not and cannot return to the
territory of Kosovo and Metohija has grown immensely. If the
international community continues to content itself with political
rhetoric about rights and the necessity of Serb returns to Kosmet
without the same kind of energetic measures undertaken in Bosnia to
force the conflicting sides to enable returns to displaced people and
refugees, if territories where they once lived are not provided for the
Serbs with appropriate social and political institutions, if something
does not change radically by the end of the year in the position of the
international community and UNMIK in Kosovo and Metohija, then only a
few desperate people will return to Kosmet. To date their number does
not exceed two percent of the displaced population.
In many areas in Kosmet the situation is more difficult for the
Serbs and other non-Albanians than it was at the end of the twentieth
century despite the efforts of the international community and the
proclaimed declarations of Albanian leaders. We must understand that
something is very wrong in Kosmet and that a prolific future demands
political initiative. If the domestic and international public, as well
as the majority of Kosmet Albanians do not begin to understand the
necessity of holding Albanian leaders to their word, political
responsibility will remain a completely foreign concept, and the great
majority of displaced persons will not return to their homes.
Albanian political leaders must demonstrate the readiness to risk
their lives by speaking the truth and thus toppling the idols of their
destructive nationalism. This is the only way we can avoid "having the
future turn its back on us because we failed to conquer our past."
Issues relating to the prosperity of the citizens and peoples of
the Balkans cannot be resolved solely by insisting on historical and
national categories but also on cooperation and integration, equality
and multiethnicity. The principles of national self-determination are
the principles of a war-time, not a peace-time organization of European
states, and therefore, of Balkan states, too. All those who insist only
on these principles in Kosmet are losers from the start - Serbs guided
by the principle of historic origin and Albanians with the principle of
national self-determination.
In conditions of distinct multiethnicity the principle of
national self-determination is not a democratic but a discriminatory
and war principles. It cannot be implemented for several reasons. If
the right to national self-determination is made possible for the
Albanians as a universal, positive international principle, then it
must be implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. If it is used an
exclusive principle only for the Albanians, it would represent
discrimination toward all other Balkan peoples. The demand that an
ethnically pure state be formed in the Balkans does not differ, in
essence, from the demand that a state be formed exclusively of
ideological or religious like-minded persons.
The Albanians are completely homogenous in their demand for the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija. Albanians in Kosmet are sabotaging
cooperation with UNMIK in accordance with UNSC Res. 1244. It is now
manifestly clear that they are insincere. The status of human rights,
security, and freedom of movement for the Serbian national community
and other non-Albanian communities is exceptionally low.
The former regime used Kosovo and Metohija to draw attention away
from everyday problems and its own failed policies. Among political
organizations in Serbia there is no homogenous position regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet. The fate of Kosovo and Metohija is
viewed with an incredible indifference, among individuals in the ruling
coalition and even in the approach to the principle regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet.
We must find the right balance between our goal and strategy
toward Kosovo and Metohija and the political and other dependence of
Serbia on international decision makers among whom some or openly or
covertly sympathizers and supporters of Albanian separatist goals.
There are attempts to consciously and purposely undermine UNSC
Res. 1244 with regard to the sovereignty of Serbia-Montenegro in Kosovo
and Metohija through the following:
a.. speeding up the solution of the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija;
b.. evident violations of UNSC Res. 1244 by international
decision makers with the constant interpretation of same that
everything is being done according to the Resolution. The problem is
who interprets and arbitrates with regard to the Resolution and its
implementation?
c.. tempting political and material offers being made toward
Serbia with the goal of convincing her to give up her southern province
in exchange for easier and faster ascension to the EU and NATO.
It is impermissible for a serious and responsible government to
find ourselves in the situation of A EUROPEAN STATE GIVING UP A
SIGNIFICANT PART OF ITS TERRITORY in order to satisfy international
expectations and pressures.
Expectations exist among some international subjects that within
Serbia a consciousness will crystallize regarding acceptance and
shaping of a political and legal framework that would ease and enable a
decision on separating Kosovo and Metohija from Kosovo. The creation of
a loose union between Serbia and Montenegro serves to support such a
thesis.
There is a danger that the separation of Kosmet from Serbia will
be carried out by a skillful political maneuver used to circumvent the
formal violation of the principle of further unchangeability of borders
and thus satisfy the demand of the Kosmet Albanians for independence
from Serbia.
Kosovo and Metohija are rapidly being furnished with the
necessary state attributes. Parallel to this, attempts exist to prepare
Serbia, its public and Government, to give up on its legitimate and
internationally recognized right to Kosmet. This would be disguised by
the supposed joining of the state of Kosovo to the present sate union
of Serbia and Montenegro. It is assumed that Serbia will be unable to
immediately concur with the independence of Kosovo and Metohija;
however, this could be carried out through appropriate compensation in
the form of quick ascension to Euro-Atlantic organizations and large
investments. The plan is to carry this out in two phases to avoid
destabilization of Daytonian Bosnia and Herzegovina and faltering
Macedonia[2], as well as some other European countries. Momentous
preparations are already in the works for the implementation of this
strategy through the activities of various U.S. and European NGOs,
analytical centers and lobbyist groups openly advocating the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija, that is, the self-determination of
Albanians in that province. Unacceptable are approaches to blackmail
Serbia advocated by certain lobbyists who propose the following very
dangerous theses:
"Discussion regarding practical matters should take place
parallel to the process of decision-making regarding the final status
of the province, with appropriate compensation for Serbia."
"No agreement between Belgrade and the Albanian leaders in Kosovo
should be implemented until the independence of the province is
proclaimed."
"The Serbian pain resulting from the loss of Kosovo can be
compensated by practical gains in the economic and social spheres."
"If Serbia wants certain issues to be resolved, she must accept
the independence of Kosovo."
"Finally, the resolution of the status of Kosovo should be the
precondition for the ascension of Serbia to the EU. 'Status before
integration' would be an appropriate motto for the region."
No one from the international community will oppose independence
as the solution for Kosovo and Metohija if Serbia agrees to it.
Serbia's acquiescence to the amputation of Kosmet would end the
international community's (U.S. and EU's) problems in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia because there would be no further question of
the rewarding of separatism but an agreed upon separation of Kosmet
from Serbia. This represents a great danger for Serbia if state
organizations accept it indifferently.
The entire strategy consists of the following: The Serb public
and official government need to be convinced that it is in Serbia's own
best interest to get rid of the burden of Kosovo and Metohija as soon
as possible in order to join Euro-Atlantic organizations more easily
and quickly.
/continued/
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[1] The official name of the southern Serbia's Province is used
throughout the text. Kosovo and Metohija (pronounced as Kossovo and
Metóchya) is often abbreviated as KOSMET.
[2] Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
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Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 11:01:37 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 2/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(2)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
2/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
/continued/
The basic position of the Serbian state and its organizations
should be based on the following guidelines and principles:
(i) Serbia must not give up Kosovo and Metohija at any price and
no politician in Serbia has a right to take this approach. Everything
that is done with Kosmet from now on without the acquiescence of Serbia
would be illegal and represent extortion.
(ii) Firm and clear insistence on UNSC Res. 1244[3]. State
sovereignty has priority over the separatist aspirations of a minority
ethnic community living in it. Not one international document
acknowledges the right to secession of minority ethnic communities. The
break up of the territorial integrity of Serbia must not be permitted.
(iii) The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe in Helsinki guarantees the inviolability of external border
of member countries, except in the case of their concurrence; these
principles were confirmed at an international conference in The Hague,
and the adoption of the findings of the Badinter Arbitration
Commission[4].
By voting to accept the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) as a member, the UN General Assembly ratified the
position of the Badinter Commission with respect to the sovereignty of
Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija, as the province is located within her
AVNOJ[5] borders.
Full respect for the London Agreement of 1913, the Versailles
Peace Treaty of 1919 and the Paris Peace Agreement of 1947 where the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija is confirmed.
At the same time, it is well to keep in mind situations where the
international community can interpret these documents to suit itself
when the need arises. Hence these documents do not give absolute
protection and support if there is no consensus regarding these issues
in Belgrade.
(iv) The new constitution of Serbia, in addition to the part on
the inviolability of her territory, should include a special provision
prohibiting the renouncement of Kosmet, and this provision should be
confirmed and emphasized for the benefit of all international decision
makers, particularly the UN (Security Council and General Assembly),
the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(v) A clear and categorical position that the ascension of
Serbia-Montenegro to the Council of Europe, the European Union, the
World Trade Organization or Partnership for Peace/NATO is only possible
within the AVNOJ borders of Serbia-Montenegro.
(vi) Constantly insist before international decision makers that
our country is not asking for anything more than what other former
Yugoslav republics and Eastern European countries already have: namely,
guaranteed territorial integrity and external borders, equal treatment
and intact national and state dignity.
(vii) That legal protection be sought from the permanent
International Court of Justice in The Hague with respect to the
privatization of Serbian state-owned property in Kosovo and Metohija.
(viii) Our program for the final status of Kosovo and Metohija is
based on the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet and this is
non-negotiable; everything else can be a topic of negotiation and
agreement. Sovereignty and democracy are not opposing values and
represent a sufficient broad and flexible framework within which the
final status of Kosovo and Metohija can be found recognizing the
legitimate interests of both sides.
(ix) Insistence on the broadest autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija,
with international guarantees and supervision, as a framework within
which the Albanian national community can be offered a high level of
independence with respect to its mother state of Serbia. By so doing
Kosovo and Metohija are provided with all the advantages of faster
progress in a broader community, with the goal of integration into
Balkan and Euro-Atlantic organizations.
(x) It is essential to make it easier for the Albanian community
to understand that an independent Kosovo and Metohija is unrealistic
and dangerous as a factor of permanent instability in the region. All
citizens of Kosmet and the region must face the European reality that
does not permit the forcible change of borders. The province of Kosovo
and Metohija may become an entity with more than autonomy but less than
statehood within the framework of Serbia. Within the framework of such
an entity the Serbian community would receive territorial and cultural
autonomy. After the ascension of the state union to the EU, which is
expected in the near future, the psychological crowding upon the
suggested final status of Kosmet would be less apparent. All citizens
would become members of a broad Balkan and European family where
national and state borders no longer have the significance they had in
the past.
(xi) It is essential that Serbia firmly and consistently, without
regard for changes in the government organization, uphold its position
on its sovereignty in Kosmet. No government in Serbia has the right to
renounce the land deeds in the province of Kosovo and Metohija or to
transfer them to others in whole or in part. Renouncing Kosmet would
mean giving up the national and state rights of Serbia, and toying with
the fate of her southern province.
(xii) Serbia must act very responsibly and decisively to prevent
certain international decision makers in supporting the independence of
Kosovo and Metohija. The position of all relevant subjects of Serbia
must be clear: If the international community, or one of its parts,
proclaims the independence of Kosmet without the acquiescence of
Serbia, this will mean forcible extortion of the a part of Serbian
territory outside the norms of international law and the risk that this
forcible precedent may be turned against the international community.
(xiii) Serbia has no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration;
however, the haste for Serbia-Montenegro's ascension to Euro-Atlantic
organizations must be carried out at the right speed and with a sense
of balance. It must occur that the impression is made that Serbia and
the state union do not care about Kosmet, and that they might consider
some solution less than the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and
Metohija.
(xiv) It is impermissible for any representative of the official
government to issue official or unofficial statements where it is
possible to discern doubt with respect to the maintenance of the
present borders of Serbia, or to allow the possibility of exchanging
Kosovo and Metohija, or even abandoning the entire province if it is
left without a Serbian population.
(xv) Kosovo and Metohija must not be viewed as an obstacle or a
burden to be rid of in order to achieve the ascension of the state
union to the EU and NATO as soon as possible. No active politician on
the Serbian scene today has the right to this approach, regardless of
whether he is part of the government or the opposition.
(xvi) It is necessary to protect the cultural and historic
identity of the Serbian people preserved in Orthodox Christian
monasteries, churches, and cemeteries.[6] Long-term measures are
essential to protect our cultural and historic treasures located in
Kosmet through the following:
a.. Selection and categorization of cultural and religious
monuments
b.. Establishment of protective zones around the most important
cultural monuments (patrimonial sites)
c.. Implementation of a model of preservation for cultural and
historic monuments
(xvii) Insistence on the beginning of dialog between Belgrade and
Pristina in the presence of all relevant international decision makers;
upon the arrival of the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General [head of UNMIK] this will include respecting the mechanism of
the high task group defined in the joint document signed between
Belgrade and Pristina (November 5, 2001). [7] In addition to UNSC Res.
1244, the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement[8] and the
Constitutional Framework[9], there is also an Agreement on Cooperation
between Yugoslavia and UNMIK that is internationally recognized to
which we must adhere.
(xviii) Insistence that the Hague tribunal continue issuing
indictments against war criminals who unquestionably committed
genocidal crimes in Kosmet, including those among the ranks of the
Albanians. Serbia must energetically, through all international forums
and the Hague tribunal, demand the trial of Albanian war criminals
because she has also begun to try her own Serbian war criminals. If the
Hague tribunal does not undertake more significant action with respect
to these issues, it will be a sign that permanent terrorism and
extremist by Albanian extremist groups is free to continue unpunished
in Kosmet.
(xix) It is essential to carry out the operationalization of
standards in such a way that it is exactly known who is responsible for
what, by when it must be implemented and by when a certain level of
standards is to be achieved. It is necessary to establish a mechanism
for following progress in the attainment of a certain level of
standards. It is unacceptable to allow the SRSG himself to assess
whether a result has been achieved or not. For that very reason, the
Contact Group, together with Belgrade and UNMIK, should follow progress
toward achievement of standards on a monthly basis, and submit a
quarterly report regarding same to the UN Security Council and
Secretary-General.
(xx) There can be no discussion regarding the status of Kosmet
until all provisions of UNSC Res. 1244 are implemented, and full
respect for the Military-Technical Agreement, the Constitutional
Framework and the Agreement on Cooperation between Yugoslavia and UNMIK
are ensured.
We cannot discuss the final status of Kosovo and Metohija until
appropriate standards of multiethnic life are achieved, and this is to
a great extent dependent on the conscience of the citizens and
politicians leading them. What is important to us is constant tracking
of the actual situation and progress so that meeting of certain
criteria is realized by a date when it will be possible to discuss a
date for the beginning of dialog on the status of Kosmet.
It is essential that all subjects understand that it is very
dangerous to force any type of solution for the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija. No matter how absurd it may sound, time the great
protector of us all. Otherwise, we will divide everything and draw new
borders only to find ourselves once again drawn into new dangerous and
bloody conflicts that bring destruction, not integration and progress.
It is time for the Serbs and the Albanians, as well as the
Macedonians and all other peoples in the Balkans, to think a little bit
on their possible future fate on the basis of their experience in the
recent past. The basic experience is that no annexation of territory,
no change of border have resulted in greater economic power or progress
but in destruction, devastation, enormous human and material losses,
and poverty. The accent of our future should be within the framework of
solutions based on the integrative processes of the Western Balkans.
After all UNSC Res. 1244 and the international troops are here
partially due to future integrations and the control of that process.
Otherwise there is a danger that the leaders of the majority
population in Kosmet will not allow a large number of displaced and
expelled persons to return there, to their own land and their own
homes. If that is the case, it will turn out that the prerequisite for
the new Kosovo was the crime of ethnic cleansing. I am convinced that
the international community will not support leaders and residents who
reject the norms of the civilization that waged war for them.
(The text was presented by Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Nebojsa
Covic at the press conference in Belgrade, July 22, 2003)
Translation: S. Lazovic
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[3] UNSC Resolution 1244:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm
[4] Badinter Commission, a group of European jurists set up in
1991 by the European Union to arbitrate disputes and establish criteria
for recognition of independence for the former Yugoslav republics. The
Arbitration Commission became known as the Badinter Commission after
the name of the French lawyer (Robert Badinter) appointed as its
president. Badinter Commission's report [at the time of the collapse of
former Yugoslavia] says that Serbia should remain within its [legal]
boundaries, i.e. including Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomous provinces.
[5] AVNOJ: Antifasisticko Vijece Narodnog Oslobodjenja
Jugoslavije (Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of
Yugoslavia), the government body of Tito's partisans that in 1943
declared formation of the new Yugoslavia and in 1945 determined borders
of the republics within that are now, with exception of Montenegro,
considered international borders. According to this mapping Kosovo and
Metohija Province was an integral part of Republic of Serbia, and not a
separate Republic. Although the Province, according to the 1974
Constitution was allowed to have direct representatives in the Federal
Parliament too, Kosovo nevertheless remained a province of Serbia and
never became a separate Republic.
[6] See UNSC Resolution 1244, Annex 2, 6
[7] So called "Haekkerup-Covic Agreement", signed on November 5,
2001
http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/14/320901.html
[8] Military-Technical Agreement:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm
[9] Constitutional Framework, May 15, 2001:
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm
Footnotes supplied by ERP KIM Info-service
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=== 2 ===
Resolution 1244 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June 1999
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of
23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14
May 1999,
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the
requirements of these resolutions,
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well
as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999,
expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes in safety,
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution)
and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in
Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and
annex 2,
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel
and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under
the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be
based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in
the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1
above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and
begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all
military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices,
of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence, and further
requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative
to coordinate closely with the international security presence to
ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a
mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its
responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective
international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that
the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security
presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the
return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and
paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can
operate, a transitional administration can be established, and
humanitarian aid can be delivered;
d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility for this task;
e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work
of the international civil presence;
g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations;
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil
presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo;
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil
presence will include:
a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account
of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long
as required;
c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a
political settlement, including the holding of elections;
d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the
consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other
peace-building activities;
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement;
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction;
h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police
forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police
personnel to serve in Kosovo;
j. Protecting and promoting human rights;
k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations,
and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such
organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of
international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this
context the importance of convening an international donors'
conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g)
above, at the earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the
international security presence, with the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security
presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General;
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution
1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of
the international civil and security presences;
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other
international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to
further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and
regional cooperation;
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the
implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are
established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter
unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports
from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences,
the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of
this resolution;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 1
Statement by the Chairman
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on
the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the KLA;
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of
the crisis region.
Annex 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards
a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided
under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for
all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes
of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of
the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The
interim administration to provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
Liaison with the international civil mission and the international
security presence;
Marking/clearing minefields;
Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government
for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a
settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic
self-governing institutions.
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the
implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy,
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance
of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement
to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified
in the footnote below.( 1) A military-technical agreement will then be
rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional
modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb
personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be
withdrawn;
Returning personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel;
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
Timetable for their return;
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
Rules governing their relationship to the international security
presence and the international civil mission.
Notes
Other required elements:
A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven
days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a
25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be
under the supervision of the international security presence and will
be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of
verifiable withdrawals;
The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall
not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.
2. RESOLUTION 1244 (1999) adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th
meeting, on 10 June 1999
=== 1 ===
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 10:49:01 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 1/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(1)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
1/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Dr. Neboisa Covic,
Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia and
President of the Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro
and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
The Kosmet [Kosovo and Metohija][1] crisis, like all
controversial issues of Serbs, Albanians and other peoples in the
region, represents the basis of the BALKAN CRISIS. Instead of
constantly dwelling on the past we must turn toward the future in the
hope that one day the Balkan peoples will establish ties and become
integrated. It is essential to achieve good and stable relations among
the countries in the region.
It is necessary for us to jointly arrive at European and world
standards, and free ourselves of the misconception that the Balkan
peoples of Europe are second-class peoples and that they are in
constant need of tutors.
The "standards before status" approach presupposes a liberal
democracy, individual rights and freedoms, the rule of law, religious
pluralism, market competitiveness... Europe is offering us membership
in exchange for conquering the past, and it does not want a game for a
political entity surrounded by those whose leaders do not accept that
conquering one's own past is liberating its future freedom. Freedom
from the past and turning toward the future does not mean the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija if we want a sustainably stable
region. The countries in this region need to build a network of mutual
ties in all domains. This approach will reduce the importance and
frustrations regarding borders and thus contribute to the concept of
multiethnicity.
A positive foundation for the constitutional and legal status of
Kosmet within Serbia in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, whose
implementation must be analogous to similar processes in the
implementation of the Dayton Agreement [Dayton-Paris Peace Accords] in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the Erdut Agreement in Croatia in order to
avoid the trap of "double standards." It is not good that some
international decision makers are interpreting certain documents
however they see fit, and this approach does not contribute to
resolving problems. This is the same logic used by those who hastily
and frequently force the topic of "the final status of Kosovo," using
the following approaches:
''Without the final status of Kosovo there can be no advance in
reforms";
''Without the final status of Kosovo nationalism and xenophobia
are being fanned in Belgrade";
''Without the final status of Kosovo Belgrade will have problems
with respect to its own priorities: reconstruction, the economy, and
gradual integration into the international community"; and
''Serbia cannot become a fully democratic country until the
status of its southern province is resolved."
in the attempt to realize some partial geopolitical interest,
contrary to the process of consistent implementation of UNSC Res. 1244.
Occasionally the topic of "final status" is artfully substituted with
talk about "standards" more concerned with prejudicing status that with
standards themselves. The criteria of enclaves and ghettoes must yield
before global and European standards of normal life. Lack of success in
respecting the "standards before status" approach would be lack of
success in the implementation of UNSC Res. 1244, and therefore a
failure on the part of the international community. It is manifestly
clear that without the return of internally displaced persons and
refugees there can be no multiethnic life and therefore no progress in
Kosmet.
Not only is the number of returnees insignificant but the number
of desperate people who will not, dare not and cannot return to the
territory of Kosovo and Metohija has grown immensely. If the
international community continues to content itself with political
rhetoric about rights and the necessity of Serb returns to Kosmet
without the same kind of energetic measures undertaken in Bosnia to
force the conflicting sides to enable returns to displaced people and
refugees, if territories where they once lived are not provided for the
Serbs with appropriate social and political institutions, if something
does not change radically by the end of the year in the position of the
international community and UNMIK in Kosovo and Metohija, then only a
few desperate people will return to Kosmet. To date their number does
not exceed two percent of the displaced population.
In many areas in Kosmet the situation is more difficult for the
Serbs and other non-Albanians than it was at the end of the twentieth
century despite the efforts of the international community and the
proclaimed declarations of Albanian leaders. We must understand that
something is very wrong in Kosmet and that a prolific future demands
political initiative. If the domestic and international public, as well
as the majority of Kosmet Albanians do not begin to understand the
necessity of holding Albanian leaders to their word, political
responsibility will remain a completely foreign concept, and the great
majority of displaced persons will not return to their homes.
Albanian political leaders must demonstrate the readiness to risk
their lives by speaking the truth and thus toppling the idols of their
destructive nationalism. This is the only way we can avoid "having the
future turn its back on us because we failed to conquer our past."
Issues relating to the prosperity of the citizens and peoples of
the Balkans cannot be resolved solely by insisting on historical and
national categories but also on cooperation and integration, equality
and multiethnicity. The principles of national self-determination are
the principles of a war-time, not a peace-time organization of European
states, and therefore, of Balkan states, too. All those who insist only
on these principles in Kosmet are losers from the start - Serbs guided
by the principle of historic origin and Albanians with the principle of
national self-determination.
In conditions of distinct multiethnicity the principle of
national self-determination is not a democratic but a discriminatory
and war principles. It cannot be implemented for several reasons. If
the right to national self-determination is made possible for the
Albanians as a universal, positive international principle, then it
must be implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. If it is used an
exclusive principle only for the Albanians, it would represent
discrimination toward all other Balkan peoples. The demand that an
ethnically pure state be formed in the Balkans does not differ, in
essence, from the demand that a state be formed exclusively of
ideological or religious like-minded persons.
The Albanians are completely homogenous in their demand for the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija. Albanians in Kosmet are sabotaging
cooperation with UNMIK in accordance with UNSC Res. 1244. It is now
manifestly clear that they are insincere. The status of human rights,
security, and freedom of movement for the Serbian national community
and other non-Albanian communities is exceptionally low.
The former regime used Kosovo and Metohija to draw attention away
from everyday problems and its own failed policies. Among political
organizations in Serbia there is no homogenous position regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet. The fate of Kosovo and Metohija is
viewed with an incredible indifference, among individuals in the ruling
coalition and even in the approach to the principle regarding the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet.
We must find the right balance between our goal and strategy
toward Kosovo and Metohija and the political and other dependence of
Serbia on international decision makers among whom some or openly or
covertly sympathizers and supporters of Albanian separatist goals.
There are attempts to consciously and purposely undermine UNSC
Res. 1244 with regard to the sovereignty of Serbia-Montenegro in Kosovo
and Metohija through the following:
a.. speeding up the solution of the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija;
b.. evident violations of UNSC Res. 1244 by international
decision makers with the constant interpretation of same that
everything is being done according to the Resolution. The problem is
who interprets and arbitrates with regard to the Resolution and its
implementation?
c.. tempting political and material offers being made toward
Serbia with the goal of convincing her to give up her southern province
in exchange for easier and faster ascension to the EU and NATO.
It is impermissible for a serious and responsible government to
find ourselves in the situation of A EUROPEAN STATE GIVING UP A
SIGNIFICANT PART OF ITS TERRITORY in order to satisfy international
expectations and pressures.
Expectations exist among some international subjects that within
Serbia a consciousness will crystallize regarding acceptance and
shaping of a political and legal framework that would ease and enable a
decision on separating Kosovo and Metohija from Kosovo. The creation of
a loose union between Serbia and Montenegro serves to support such a
thesis.
There is a danger that the separation of Kosmet from Serbia will
be carried out by a skillful political maneuver used to circumvent the
formal violation of the principle of further unchangeability of borders
and thus satisfy the demand of the Kosmet Albanians for independence
from Serbia.
Kosovo and Metohija are rapidly being furnished with the
necessary state attributes. Parallel to this, attempts exist to prepare
Serbia, its public and Government, to give up on its legitimate and
internationally recognized right to Kosmet. This would be disguised by
the supposed joining of the state of Kosovo to the present sate union
of Serbia and Montenegro. It is assumed that Serbia will be unable to
immediately concur with the independence of Kosovo and Metohija;
however, this could be carried out through appropriate compensation in
the form of quick ascension to Euro-Atlantic organizations and large
investments. The plan is to carry this out in two phases to avoid
destabilization of Daytonian Bosnia and Herzegovina and faltering
Macedonia[2], as well as some other European countries. Momentous
preparations are already in the works for the implementation of this
strategy through the activities of various U.S. and European NGOs,
analytical centers and lobbyist groups openly advocating the
independence of Kosovo and Metohija, that is, the self-determination of
Albanians in that province. Unacceptable are approaches to blackmail
Serbia advocated by certain lobbyists who propose the following very
dangerous theses:
"Discussion regarding practical matters should take place
parallel to the process of decision-making regarding the final status
of the province, with appropriate compensation for Serbia."
"No agreement between Belgrade and the Albanian leaders in Kosovo
should be implemented until the independence of the province is
proclaimed."
"The Serbian pain resulting from the loss of Kosovo can be
compensated by practical gains in the economic and social spheres."
"If Serbia wants certain issues to be resolved, she must accept
the independence of Kosovo."
"Finally, the resolution of the status of Kosovo should be the
precondition for the ascension of Serbia to the EU. 'Status before
integration' would be an appropriate motto for the region."
No one from the international community will oppose independence
as the solution for Kosovo and Metohija if Serbia agrees to it.
Serbia's acquiescence to the amputation of Kosmet would end the
international community's (U.S. and EU's) problems in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia because there would be no further question of
the rewarding of separatism but an agreed upon separation of Kosmet
from Serbia. This represents a great danger for Serbia if state
organizations accept it indifferently.
The entire strategy consists of the following: The Serb public
and official government need to be convinced that it is in Serbia's own
best interest to get rid of the burden of Kosovo and Metohija as soon
as possible in order to join Euro-Atlantic organizations more easily
and quickly.
/continued/
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
[1] The official name of the southern Serbia's Province is used
throughout the text. Kosovo and Metohija (pronounced as Kossovo and
Metóchya) is often abbreviated as KOSMET.
[2] Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Date: Fri, 25 Jul 2003 11:01:37 -0300
From: "decani3"
To: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Subject: ERP KIM COVIC: BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE
KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part 2/2), JULY 24
July 24, 2003
ERP KIM Newsletter 24-07-03b(2)
BASIC GUIDELINES FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO-METOHIJA CRISIS (Part
2/2)
The text is available in MS Word format (87 Kb) at:
http://www.kosovo.com/covic_guidelines.doc
Joint Coordinating Center of Serbia-Montenegro and
the Republic of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija
Belgrade, July 22, 2003
/continued/
The basic position of the Serbian state and its organizations
should be based on the following guidelines and principles:
(i) Serbia must not give up Kosovo and Metohija at any price and
no politician in Serbia has a right to take this approach. Everything
that is done with Kosmet from now on without the acquiescence of Serbia
would be illegal and represent extortion.
(ii) Firm and clear insistence on UNSC Res. 1244[3]. State
sovereignty has priority over the separatist aspirations of a minority
ethnic community living in it. Not one international document
acknowledges the right to secession of minority ethnic communities. The
break up of the territorial integrity of Serbia must not be permitted.
(iii) The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe in Helsinki guarantees the inviolability of external border
of member countries, except in the case of their concurrence; these
principles were confirmed at an international conference in The Hague,
and the adoption of the findings of the Badinter Arbitration
Commission[4].
By voting to accept the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) as a member, the UN General Assembly ratified the
position of the Badinter Commission with respect to the sovereignty of
Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija, as the province is located within her
AVNOJ[5] borders.
Full respect for the London Agreement of 1913, the Versailles
Peace Treaty of 1919 and the Paris Peace Agreement of 1947 where the
sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija is confirmed.
At the same time, it is well to keep in mind situations where the
international community can interpret these documents to suit itself
when the need arises. Hence these documents do not give absolute
protection and support if there is no consensus regarding these issues
in Belgrade.
(iv) The new constitution of Serbia, in addition to the part on
the inviolability of her territory, should include a special provision
prohibiting the renouncement of Kosmet, and this provision should be
confirmed and emphasized for the benefit of all international decision
makers, particularly the UN (Security Council and General Assembly),
the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(v) A clear and categorical position that the ascension of
Serbia-Montenegro to the Council of Europe, the European Union, the
World Trade Organization or Partnership for Peace/NATO is only possible
within the AVNOJ borders of Serbia-Montenegro.
(vi) Constantly insist before international decision makers that
our country is not asking for anything more than what other former
Yugoslav republics and Eastern European countries already have: namely,
guaranteed territorial integrity and external borders, equal treatment
and intact national and state dignity.
(vii) That legal protection be sought from the permanent
International Court of Justice in The Hague with respect to the
privatization of Serbian state-owned property in Kosovo and Metohija.
(viii) Our program for the final status of Kosovo and Metohija is
based on the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosmet and this is
non-negotiable; everything else can be a topic of negotiation and
agreement. Sovereignty and democracy are not opposing values and
represent a sufficient broad and flexible framework within which the
final status of Kosovo and Metohija can be found recognizing the
legitimate interests of both sides.
(ix) Insistence on the broadest autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija,
with international guarantees and supervision, as a framework within
which the Albanian national community can be offered a high level of
independence with respect to its mother state of Serbia. By so doing
Kosovo and Metohija are provided with all the advantages of faster
progress in a broader community, with the goal of integration into
Balkan and Euro-Atlantic organizations.
(x) It is essential to make it easier for the Albanian community
to understand that an independent Kosovo and Metohija is unrealistic
and dangerous as a factor of permanent instability in the region. All
citizens of Kosmet and the region must face the European reality that
does not permit the forcible change of borders. The province of Kosovo
and Metohija may become an entity with more than autonomy but less than
statehood within the framework of Serbia. Within the framework of such
an entity the Serbian community would receive territorial and cultural
autonomy. After the ascension of the state union to the EU, which is
expected in the near future, the psychological crowding upon the
suggested final status of Kosmet would be less apparent. All citizens
would become members of a broad Balkan and European family where
national and state borders no longer have the significance they had in
the past.
(xi) It is essential that Serbia firmly and consistently, without
regard for changes in the government organization, uphold its position
on its sovereignty in Kosmet. No government in Serbia has the right to
renounce the land deeds in the province of Kosovo and Metohija or to
transfer them to others in whole or in part. Renouncing Kosmet would
mean giving up the national and state rights of Serbia, and toying with
the fate of her southern province.
(xii) Serbia must act very responsibly and decisively to prevent
certain international decision makers in supporting the independence of
Kosovo and Metohija. The position of all relevant subjects of Serbia
must be clear: If the international community, or one of its parts,
proclaims the independence of Kosmet without the acquiescence of
Serbia, this will mean forcible extortion of the a part of Serbian
territory outside the norms of international law and the risk that this
forcible precedent may be turned against the international community.
(xiii) Serbia has no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration;
however, the haste for Serbia-Montenegro's ascension to Euro-Atlantic
organizations must be carried out at the right speed and with a sense
of balance. It must occur that the impression is made that Serbia and
the state union do not care about Kosmet, and that they might consider
some solution less than the sovereignty of Serbia in Kosovo and
Metohija.
(xiv) It is impermissible for any representative of the official
government to issue official or unofficial statements where it is
possible to discern doubt with respect to the maintenance of the
present borders of Serbia, or to allow the possibility of exchanging
Kosovo and Metohija, or even abandoning the entire province if it is
left without a Serbian population.
(xv) Kosovo and Metohija must not be viewed as an obstacle or a
burden to be rid of in order to achieve the ascension of the state
union to the EU and NATO as soon as possible. No active politician on
the Serbian scene today has the right to this approach, regardless of
whether he is part of the government or the opposition.
(xvi) It is necessary to protect the cultural and historic
identity of the Serbian people preserved in Orthodox Christian
monasteries, churches, and cemeteries.[6] Long-term measures are
essential to protect our cultural and historic treasures located in
Kosmet through the following:
a.. Selection and categorization of cultural and religious
monuments
b.. Establishment of protective zones around the most important
cultural monuments (patrimonial sites)
c.. Implementation of a model of preservation for cultural and
historic monuments
(xvii) Insistence on the beginning of dialog between Belgrade and
Pristina in the presence of all relevant international decision makers;
upon the arrival of the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General [head of UNMIK] this will include respecting the mechanism of
the high task group defined in the joint document signed between
Belgrade and Pristina (November 5, 2001). [7] In addition to UNSC Res.
1244, the Kumanovo Military-Technical Agreement[8] and the
Constitutional Framework[9], there is also an Agreement on Cooperation
between Yugoslavia and UNMIK that is internationally recognized to
which we must adhere.
(xviii) Insistence that the Hague tribunal continue issuing
indictments against war criminals who unquestionably committed
genocidal crimes in Kosmet, including those among the ranks of the
Albanians. Serbia must energetically, through all international forums
and the Hague tribunal, demand the trial of Albanian war criminals
because she has also begun to try her own Serbian war criminals. If the
Hague tribunal does not undertake more significant action with respect
to these issues, it will be a sign that permanent terrorism and
extremist by Albanian extremist groups is free to continue unpunished
in Kosmet.
(xix) It is essential to carry out the operationalization of
standards in such a way that it is exactly known who is responsible for
what, by when it must be implemented and by when a certain level of
standards is to be achieved. It is necessary to establish a mechanism
for following progress in the attainment of a certain level of
standards. It is unacceptable to allow the SRSG himself to assess
whether a result has been achieved or not. For that very reason, the
Contact Group, together with Belgrade and UNMIK, should follow progress
toward achievement of standards on a monthly basis, and submit a
quarterly report regarding same to the UN Security Council and
Secretary-General.
(xx) There can be no discussion regarding the status of Kosmet
until all provisions of UNSC Res. 1244 are implemented, and full
respect for the Military-Technical Agreement, the Constitutional
Framework and the Agreement on Cooperation between Yugoslavia and UNMIK
are ensured.
We cannot discuss the final status of Kosovo and Metohija until
appropriate standards of multiethnic life are achieved, and this is to
a great extent dependent on the conscience of the citizens and
politicians leading them. What is important to us is constant tracking
of the actual situation and progress so that meeting of certain
criteria is realized by a date when it will be possible to discuss a
date for the beginning of dialog on the status of Kosmet.
It is essential that all subjects understand that it is very
dangerous to force any type of solution for the final status of Kosovo
and Metohija. No matter how absurd it may sound, time the great
protector of us all. Otherwise, we will divide everything and draw new
borders only to find ourselves once again drawn into new dangerous and
bloody conflicts that bring destruction, not integration and progress.
It is time for the Serbs and the Albanians, as well as the
Macedonians and all other peoples in the Balkans, to think a little bit
on their possible future fate on the basis of their experience in the
recent past. The basic experience is that no annexation of territory,
no change of border have resulted in greater economic power or progress
but in destruction, devastation, enormous human and material losses,
and poverty. The accent of our future should be within the framework of
solutions based on the integrative processes of the Western Balkans.
After all UNSC Res. 1244 and the international troops are here
partially due to future integrations and the control of that process.
Otherwise there is a danger that the leaders of the majority
population in Kosmet will not allow a large number of displaced and
expelled persons to return there, to their own land and their own
homes. If that is the case, it will turn out that the prerequisite for
the new Kosovo was the crime of ethnic cleansing. I am convinced that
the international community will not support leaders and residents who
reject the norms of the civilization that waged war for them.
(The text was presented by Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Nebojsa
Covic at the press conference in Belgrade, July 22, 2003)
Translation: S. Lazovic
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--
[3] UNSC Resolution 1244:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm
[4] Badinter Commission, a group of European jurists set up in
1991 by the European Union to arbitrate disputes and establish criteria
for recognition of independence for the former Yugoslav republics. The
Arbitration Commission became known as the Badinter Commission after
the name of the French lawyer (Robert Badinter) appointed as its
president. Badinter Commission's report [at the time of the collapse of
former Yugoslavia] says that Serbia should remain within its [legal]
boundaries, i.e. including Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomous provinces.
[5] AVNOJ: Antifasisticko Vijece Narodnog Oslobodjenja
Jugoslavije (Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of
Yugoslavia), the government body of Tito's partisans that in 1943
declared formation of the new Yugoslavia and in 1945 determined borders
of the republics within that are now, with exception of Montenegro,
considered international borders. According to this mapping Kosovo and
Metohija Province was an integral part of Republic of Serbia, and not a
separate Republic. Although the Province, according to the 1974
Constitution was allowed to have direct representatives in the Federal
Parliament too, Kosovo nevertheless remained a province of Serbia and
never became a separate Republic.
[6] See UNSC Resolution 1244, Annex 2, 6
[7] So called "Haekkerup-Covic Agreement", signed on November 5,
2001
http://www.serbia.sr.gov.yu/news/2001-11/14/320901.html
[8] Military-Technical Agreement:
http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm
[9] Constitutional Framework, May 15, 2001:
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm
Footnotes supplied by ERP KIM Info-service
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--
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
=== 2 ===
Resolution 1244 (1999)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting,
on 10 June 1999
The Security Council,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and the primary responsibility of the Security Council
for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of
23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14
May 1999,
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the
requirements of these resolutions,
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo,
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well
as all terrorist acts by any party,
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999,
expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return
to their homes in safety,
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution)
and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper presented in
Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's agreement to that paper,
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and
annex 2,
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a
threat to international peace and security,
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel
and the implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under
the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be
based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in
the principles and other required elements in annex 2;
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the
principles and other required elements referred to in paragraph 1
above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and
begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all
military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized;
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and
Serb military and police personnel will be permitted to return to
Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices,
of international civil and security presences, with appropriate
equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the
Security Council, a Special Representative to control the
implementation of the international civil presence, and further
requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative
to coordinate closely with the international security presence to
ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a
mutually supportive manner;
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to
establish the international security presence in Kosovo as set out in
point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its
responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective
international civil and security presences to Kosovo, and demands that
the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security
presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:
a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the
return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and
paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;
b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed
Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph 15 below;
c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced
persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can
operate, a transitional administration can be established, and
humanitarian aid can be delivered;
d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil
presence can take responsibility for this task;
e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as
appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work
of the international civil presence;
g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the
international civil presence, and other international organizations;
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant
international organizations, to establish an international civil
presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for
Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide
transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to
ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of
Kosovo;
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil
presence will include:
a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of
substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account
of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long
as required;
c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional
institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government pending a
political settlement, including the holding of elections;
d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its
administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the
consolidation of Kosovo's local provisional institutions and other
peace-building activities;
e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's
future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);
f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo's
provisional institutions to institutions established under a political
settlement;
g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other
economic reconstruction;
h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian
organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;
i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police
forces and meanwhile through the deployment of international police
personnel to serve in Kosovo;
j. Protecting and promoting human rights;
k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced
persons to their homes in Kosovo;
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations,
and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such
organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective delivery of
international aid;
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to
contribute to economic and social reconstruction as well as to the safe
return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this
context the importance of convening an international donors'
conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g)
above, at the earliest possible date;
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the
international security presence, with the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia;
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end
immediately all offensive actions and comply with the requirements for
demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security
presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General;
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution
1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and related matériel for the use of
the international civil and security presences;
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other
international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the
Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to
further the promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and
regional cooperation;
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the
implementation of all aspects of this resolution;
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are
established for an initial period of 12 months, to continue thereafter
unless the Security Council decides otherwise;
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular
intervals on the implementation of this resolution, including reports
from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences,
the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of
this resolution;
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
Annex 1
Statement by the Chairman
on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on
the political solution to the Kosovo crisis:
Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;
Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;
Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security
presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations, capable of
guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives;
Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by
the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;
The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and
unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations;
A political process towards the establishment of an interim political
framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for
Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of the KLA;
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of
the crisis region.
Annex 2
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards
a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and
paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective
international civil and security presences, acting as may be decided
under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the
achievement of common objectives.
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic
Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified
command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for
all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes
of all displaced persons and refugees.
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of
the international civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. The
interim administration to provide transitional administration while
establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and
normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel
will be permitted to return to perform the following functions:
Liaison with the international civil mission and the international
security presence;
Marking/clearing minefields;
Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;
Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the
supervision of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid
organizations.
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim
political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government
for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the
demilitarization of UCK. Negotiations between the parties for a
settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic
self-governing institutions.
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and
stabilization of the crisis region. This will include the
implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad
international participation in order to further promotion of democracy,
economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance
of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement
to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified
in the footnote below.( 1) A military-technical agreement will then be
rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional
modalities, including the roles and functions of Yugoslav/Serb
personnel in Kosovo:
Withdrawal
Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and
delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be
withdrawn;
Returning personnel
Equipment associated with returning personnel;
Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;
Timetable for their return;
Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;
Rules governing their relationship to the international security
presence and the international civil mission.
Notes
Other required elements:
A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven
days to complete withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a
25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours;
Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be
under the supervision of the international security presence and will
be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands);
Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of
verifiable withdrawals;
The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall
not extend the previously determined time for completion of withdrawals.