[ Saremo grati a chi potesse trasmetterci una traduzione di questa
intervista in tempi rapidi ! CNJ ]
Interview with ex-foreign minister of Yugoslavia
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2004-04-07.html
Journalist: Noah Tucker
Friday, 26th March 2004
Zivadin Jovanovic, former Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia (in the
Milosevic government) interviewed by Noah Tucker
Why was Yugoslavia singled out for special treatment by the West?
Mainly because of the geo-political interests of NATO and especially
the USA. The former Yugoslavia is situated in an extremely important
position in Europe. It is on the bridgehead to the Middle East and
Caspian regions – I don’t need to speak of why these are so important.
I believe that NATO considered Yugoslavia to be a stumbling block in
its eastward expansion and strategic control of Eurasia. So it was in
their interests to weaken and fragment Yugoslavia in order to gain
easier control and access.
Also, global changes in Europe made American troops and NATO bases in
Central Europe unnecessary. There was no more danger from the Warsaw
Pact and Russia. So it was understandable that NATO was trying to find
a new role, and looking for locations for new bases, more in line with
the new situation and new strategic objectives.
Now they have Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo and Mitohija, Krivolak in
Macedonia, and Tusla in Bosnia, near the border with Serbia. The
Americans would also like to have bases in inner Serbia, including one
on our highest mountain, Kapaonik.
The USA has been building a network of bases in the Balkans - as well
as Greece, they have Romania, Croatia and Albania, which are members of
the ‘Partnership for Peace’ and candidate members of NATO.
Why did Yugoslavia stay out of NATO? Will Serbia apply to join NATO?
Yugoslavia was never the same as the other Eastern European countries.
From the beginning of World War 2 we were part of the Allied forces,
unlike Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania which did not join the
Allies until the end of the war. We liberated ourselves, rather than
being liberated by the Red Army. Also we resisted Stalin. We had a
position which was between Warsaw and Brussels, independent of Moscow
and Washington. So for historical reasons we are different from the
rest and have to be treated differently.
We have to have a dialogue, even some co-operation with NATO. But we
were victims of NATO aggression only five years ago, which has had a
terrible effect on our economy, our society, and people’s health. There
are two points in my opinion-
Firstly, any strategic change, for instance entering the ‘Partnership
for Peace’ or NATO, could only be decided by a referendum.
Secondly, Serbia and Montenegro should pursue its own security within
the European security concept, or by seeking recognition for a position
of active neutrality.
Could you explain two tactical decisions by the government of which you
were a member – the agreement to the ceasefire in Kosovo in October
1998, under which the Kosovo Liberation Army greatly strengthened its
positions with US assistance, and the agreement with NATO in June 1999
which allowed NATO to claim victory even though the Yugoslavian Armed
Forces were apparently still capable of fighting?
On the so-called ceasefire in 1998 - the Yugoslavian government always
wanted to be co-operative in achieving stability. In accepting the
demand for the ceasefire in Kosovo and Mitohija, Yugoslavia respected
the fact that the USA had overall influence over the UCK (KLA). Their
terrorism was like a cancer for Serbia. The government hoped that the
United States would exercise control over them.
Was that not naive?
We had the experience of the Dayton agreement. Peace was reached in
Bosnia, however unfavourable that was to Serbians, and it resulted in
some stability. So in 1998, the Yugoslavian Government counted on a
reasonable possibility that the USA would hold to their part of the
agreement.
On the end of the bombing in 1999 – it is a historical fact that NATO
and US generals miscalculated about the strength of the Yugoslavian
defence. Recall the statements that in three days, seven days, fourteen
days and so on, Serbia will kneel. That is the case in spite of the
fact that the military power of NATO was without comparison to
Yugoslavian military equipment and potential.
The war had to be ended at some stage. It ended at a point when the
Yugoslavian military equipment and manpower was not too badly affected
by the 78 days of continuous bombardment. But NATO had started widely
and massively to attack civilian targets – cities, television stations,
markets, trains, hospitals, schools, bridges, electricity transformers,
and so on.
The bombing ended by an agreement which placed responsibility for
Kosovo and Metohija in the hands of the United Nations Security Council
rather than NATO. Putting aside the abuses of the Security Council – we
are talking of the right moment to reach agreement.
And finally, it is my understanding that our military reserves, of
petrol, ammunition etc were by then rather exhausted. Sanctions, lack
of foreign currency, almost an iron curtain erected around us by
neighbouring countries under very strong American pressure, made it
very difficult, nearly impossible, to replenish our reserves. The
Yeltsin government in Russia, instead of helping us to make these
pressures at least sustainable, was transmitting American pressures to
us.
Can you explain something about the transfer of power in Yugoslavia and
Serbia in the year 2000?
This had many characteristics of American pressure and interference,
including interference in the electoral process. This was contrary to
basic international principles and UN resolutions.
According to official US Congress records, the USA poured in over $100
million for ‘democratisation’ in Serbia. This went to the DOS
‘Democratic Coalition’ parties, opposition media and some NGOs. This is
not to mention the money from George Soros. That degree of
interference, unimaginable in any Western country, led to a deformation
of the will of the electorate in the September and December 2000
elections.
Personally, I think that the consequences of this change – which
essentially was the result of Western interests rather than the result
of real freedom of citizenship – are still felt in Serbia. Everyone was
surprised at how the Radicals gained such popularity in Serbia. The
explanation is that the most recent election results, of 28th December
2003, were a reaction against the artificial results in 2000.
What about the Socialist Party?
The Socialist Party suffered badly because it was considered the only
real danger for the DOS. So combined pressures from inside and abroad
led to fractionalization of the party, with part of it in practice
joining the DOS coalition.
These pressures continue. The Americans would like the Socialist Party
to become anti-Milosevic. But I think they may also prove to be
counterproductive, not helpful for political stability and
relationships with the West. A country with such huge economic
problems, an explosive social situation, an undefined state, calls for
a very strong socialist party, and there is no chance to invent a
better one than the Socialist Party of Serbia that already exists. So
the next general elections may be even more of a disappointment for the
West than the results of December 2003.
intervista in tempi rapidi ! CNJ ]
Interview with ex-foreign minister of Yugoslavia
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2004-04-07.html
Journalist: Noah Tucker
Friday, 26th March 2004
Zivadin Jovanovic, former Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia (in the
Milosevic government) interviewed by Noah Tucker
Why was Yugoslavia singled out for special treatment by the West?
Mainly because of the geo-political interests of NATO and especially
the USA. The former Yugoslavia is situated in an extremely important
position in Europe. It is on the bridgehead to the Middle East and
Caspian regions – I don’t need to speak of why these are so important.
I believe that NATO considered Yugoslavia to be a stumbling block in
its eastward expansion and strategic control of Eurasia. So it was in
their interests to weaken and fragment Yugoslavia in order to gain
easier control and access.
Also, global changes in Europe made American troops and NATO bases in
Central Europe unnecessary. There was no more danger from the Warsaw
Pact and Russia. So it was understandable that NATO was trying to find
a new role, and looking for locations for new bases, more in line with
the new situation and new strategic objectives.
Now they have Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo and Mitohija, Krivolak in
Macedonia, and Tusla in Bosnia, near the border with Serbia. The
Americans would also like to have bases in inner Serbia, including one
on our highest mountain, Kapaonik.
The USA has been building a network of bases in the Balkans - as well
as Greece, they have Romania, Croatia and Albania, which are members of
the ‘Partnership for Peace’ and candidate members of NATO.
Why did Yugoslavia stay out of NATO? Will Serbia apply to join NATO?
Yugoslavia was never the same as the other Eastern European countries.
From the beginning of World War 2 we were part of the Allied forces,
unlike Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania which did not join the
Allies until the end of the war. We liberated ourselves, rather than
being liberated by the Red Army. Also we resisted Stalin. We had a
position which was between Warsaw and Brussels, independent of Moscow
and Washington. So for historical reasons we are different from the
rest and have to be treated differently.
We have to have a dialogue, even some co-operation with NATO. But we
were victims of NATO aggression only five years ago, which has had a
terrible effect on our economy, our society, and people’s health. There
are two points in my opinion-
Firstly, any strategic change, for instance entering the ‘Partnership
for Peace’ or NATO, could only be decided by a referendum.
Secondly, Serbia and Montenegro should pursue its own security within
the European security concept, or by seeking recognition for a position
of active neutrality.
Could you explain two tactical decisions by the government of which you
were a member – the agreement to the ceasefire in Kosovo in October
1998, under which the Kosovo Liberation Army greatly strengthened its
positions with US assistance, and the agreement with NATO in June 1999
which allowed NATO to claim victory even though the Yugoslavian Armed
Forces were apparently still capable of fighting?
On the so-called ceasefire in 1998 - the Yugoslavian government always
wanted to be co-operative in achieving stability. In accepting the
demand for the ceasefire in Kosovo and Mitohija, Yugoslavia respected
the fact that the USA had overall influence over the UCK (KLA). Their
terrorism was like a cancer for Serbia. The government hoped that the
United States would exercise control over them.
Was that not naive?
We had the experience of the Dayton agreement. Peace was reached in
Bosnia, however unfavourable that was to Serbians, and it resulted in
some stability. So in 1998, the Yugoslavian Government counted on a
reasonable possibility that the USA would hold to their part of the
agreement.
On the end of the bombing in 1999 – it is a historical fact that NATO
and US generals miscalculated about the strength of the Yugoslavian
defence. Recall the statements that in three days, seven days, fourteen
days and so on, Serbia will kneel. That is the case in spite of the
fact that the military power of NATO was without comparison to
Yugoslavian military equipment and potential.
The war had to be ended at some stage. It ended at a point when the
Yugoslavian military equipment and manpower was not too badly affected
by the 78 days of continuous bombardment. But NATO had started widely
and massively to attack civilian targets – cities, television stations,
markets, trains, hospitals, schools, bridges, electricity transformers,
and so on.
The bombing ended by an agreement which placed responsibility for
Kosovo and Metohija in the hands of the United Nations Security Council
rather than NATO. Putting aside the abuses of the Security Council – we
are talking of the right moment to reach agreement.
And finally, it is my understanding that our military reserves, of
petrol, ammunition etc were by then rather exhausted. Sanctions, lack
of foreign currency, almost an iron curtain erected around us by
neighbouring countries under very strong American pressure, made it
very difficult, nearly impossible, to replenish our reserves. The
Yeltsin government in Russia, instead of helping us to make these
pressures at least sustainable, was transmitting American pressures to
us.
Can you explain something about the transfer of power in Yugoslavia and
Serbia in the year 2000?
This had many characteristics of American pressure and interference,
including interference in the electoral process. This was contrary to
basic international principles and UN resolutions.
According to official US Congress records, the USA poured in over $100
million for ‘democratisation’ in Serbia. This went to the DOS
‘Democratic Coalition’ parties, opposition media and some NGOs. This is
not to mention the money from George Soros. That degree of
interference, unimaginable in any Western country, led to a deformation
of the will of the electorate in the September and December 2000
elections.
Personally, I think that the consequences of this change – which
essentially was the result of Western interests rather than the result
of real freedom of citizenship – are still felt in Serbia. Everyone was
surprised at how the Radicals gained such popularity in Serbia. The
explanation is that the most recent election results, of 28th December
2003, were a reaction against the artificial results in 2000.
What about the Socialist Party?
The Socialist Party suffered badly because it was considered the only
real danger for the DOS. So combined pressures from inside and abroad
led to fractionalization of the party, with part of it in practice
joining the DOS coalition.
These pressures continue. The Americans would like the Socialist Party
to become anti-Milosevic. But I think they may also prove to be
counterproductive, not helpful for political stability and
relationships with the West. A country with such huge economic
problems, an explosive social situation, an undefined state, calls for
a very strong socialist party, and there is no chance to invent a
better one than the Socialist Party of Serbia that already exists. So
the next general elections may be even more of a disappointment for the
West than the results of December 2003.