--- In yugoslaviainfo @ yahoogroups.com, Predrag Tosic wrote:

[ An excellent and timely piece by American university professor and
author Edward Herman.

An excerpt: "[...] Croatian authorities were also delighted with the
claims of a Srebrenica massacre, as this deflected attention from their
prior devastating ethnic cleansing of Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in
Western Bosnia (almost entirely ignored by the Western media), [6] and it
provided a cover for their already planned removal of several hundred
thousand Serbs from the Krajina area in Croatia. This massive ethnic
cleansing operation was carried out with U.S. approval and logistical
support within a month of the Srebrenica events, and it may well have
involved the killing of more Serb civilians than Bosnian Muslim
civilians
killed in the Srebrenica area in July: most of the Bosnian Muslim victims
were fighters, not civilians, as the Bosnian Serbs bused the Srebrenica
women and children to safety; the Croatians made no such provision and
many women, children and old people were slaughtered in Krajina. [7] The
ruthlessness of the Croats was impressive: "UN troops watched horrified
as Croat soldiers dragged the bodies of dead Serbs along the road
outside
the UN compound and then pumped them full of rounds from the AK-47s. They
then crushed the bullet-ridden bodies under the tracks of a tank." [8]
But
this was hardly noticed in the wake of the indignation and propaganda
generated around Srebrenica with the aid of the mainstream media, whose
co-belligerency role in the Balkan wars was already well-entrenched. [9]"

P. T. ]



http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=74&ItemID=8244

ZMAG (USA)

The Politics of the Srebrenica Massacre*

by Edward S. Herman; July 07, 2005


"Srebrenica" has become the symbol of evil, and specifically Serb evil. It
is commonly described as "a horror without parallel in the history of
Europe
since the Second World War" in which there was a cold-blooded
execution "of
at least 8,000 Muslim men and boys." [1] The events in question took place
in or near the Bosnian town of Srebrenica between July 10 and 19, 1995, as
the Bosnian Serb army (BSA) occupied that town and fought with and killed
many Bosnian Muslims, unknown numbers dying in the fighting and by
executions. There is no question but that there were executions, and that
many Bosnian Muslim men died during the evacuation of Srebrenica and its
aftermath. But even though only rarely discussed there is a major issue of
how many were executed, as numerous bodies found in local grave sites were
victims of fighting, and many Bosnian Muslim men who fled Srebrenica
reached
Bosnian Muslim territory safely. Some bodies were also those of the many
Serbs killed in the forays by the Bosnian Muslims out of Srebrenica
in the
years before July 1995.

The Srebrenica massacre has played a special role in the politics of
Western treatment of the restructuring of the former-Yugoslavia and in
Western interventionism more broadly, and it is receiving renewed
attention
and memorialization at its tenth anniversary in July 2005. It is
regularly
cited as proof of Serb evil and genocidal intent and helped justify a
focus
on punishing the Serbs and Milosevic and NATO's 1999 war on Serbia. It has
also provided important moral support for the further Western wars of
vengeance, power projection, and "liberation," having shown that there is
evil that the West can and must deal with forcibly.

However, there are three matters that should have raised serious questions
about the massacre at the time and since, but didn't and haven't. One was
that the massacre was extremely convenient to the political needs of the
Clinton administration, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Croats (see Section 1
below). A second was that there had been (and were after Srebrenica) a
series of claimed Serb atrocities, that were regularly brought forth at
strategic moments when forcible intervention by the United States and NATO
bloc was in the offing but needed some solid public relations support, but
which were later shown to be fraudulent (Section 2). A third is that the
evidence for a massacre, certainly of one in which 8,000 men and boys
were
executed, has always been problematic, to say the least (Sections 3
and 4).

1. Political Convenience

The events of Srebrenica and claims of a major massacre were extremely
helpful to the Clinton administration, the Bosnian Muslim leadership, and
Croatian authorities. Clinton was under political pressure in 1995
both from
the media and from Bob Dole to take more forceful action in favor of the
Bosnian Muslims, [2] and his administration was eager to find a
justification for more aggressive policies. Clinton officials rushed
to the
Srebrenica scene to confirm and publicize the claims of a massacre,
just as
William Walker did later at Racak in January 1999. Walker's immediate
report to Madeleine Albright caused her to exult that "spring has come
early
this year." [3] Srebrenica allowed the "fall to come early" for the
Clinton
administration in the summer of 1995.

Bosnian Muslim leaders had been struggling for several years to persuade
the NATO powers to intervene more forcibly on their behalf, and there is
strong evidence that they were prepared not only to lie but also to
sacrifice their own citizens and soldiers to serve the end of inducing
intervention (matters discussed further in Section 2). Bosnian Muslim
officials have claimed that their leader, Alija Izetbegovic, told them
that
Clinton had advised him that U.S. intervention would only occur if the
Serbs
killed at least 5,000 at Srebrenica. [4] The abandonment of
Srebrenica by
a military force much larger than that of the attackers, and a
retreat that
made that larger force vulnerable and caused it to suffer heavy casualties
in fighting and vengeance executions, helped produce numbers that
would meet
the Clinton criterion, by hook or by crook. There is other evidence that
the retreat from Srebrenica was not based on any military necessity
but was
strategic, with the personnel losses incurred considered a necessary
sacrifice for a larger purpose. [5]

Croatian authorities were also delighted with the claims of a Srebrenica
massacre, as this deflected attention from their prior devastating ethnic
cleansing of Serbs and Bosnian Muslims in Western Bosnia (almost entirely
ignored by the Western media), [6] and it provided a cover for their
already planned removal of several hundred thousand Serbs from the
Krajina
area in Croatia. This massive ethnic cleansing operation was carried out
with U.S. approval and logistical support within a month of the Srebrenica
events, and it may well have involved the killing of more Serb civilians
than Bosnian Muslim civilians killed in the Srebrenica area in July:
most of
the Bosnian Muslim victims were fighters, not civilians, as the Bosnian
Serbs bused the Srebrenica women and children to safety; the Croatians
made
no such provision and many women, children and old people were slaughtered
in Krajina. [7] The ruthlessness of the Croats was impressive: "UN troops
watched horrified as Croat soldiers dragged the bodies of dead Serbs
along
the road outside the UN compound and then pumped them full of rounds from
the AK-47s. They then crushed the bullet-ridden bodies under the
tracks of a
tank." [8] But this was hardly noticed in the wake of the indignation and
propaganda generated around Srebrenica with the aid of the mainstream
media, whose co-belligerency role in the Balkan wars was already
well-entrenched. [9]

The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and UN also had
an important role to play in the consolidation of the standard Srebrenica
massacre narrative. From its inception the ICTY served as an arm of
the NATO
powers, who created it, funded it, served as its police arm and main
information source, and expected and got responsive service from the
organization. [10] The ICTY focused intensively on Srebrenica and provided
important and nominally independent corroboration of the massacre claims
along with citable "judicial" claims of planned "genocide." The UN is
less
thoroughly integrated into NATO-power demands, but it is highly responsive
and in the Srebrenica case it came through just as the United States
and its
main allies desired. [11]

This political interest in the Srebrenica massacre hardly proves that the
establishment narrative is wrong. It does, however, suggest the need for
caution and an awareness of the possibility of falsification and inflated
claims. That awareness has been entirely absent from mainstream
treatment of
Srebrenica.

2. The Serial Lying Before and After Srebrenica

At each stage in the dismantlement of Yugoslavia, its ethnic cleansing,
and before and during the NATO war over the Kosovo province of Serbia in
1999, propaganda lies played a very important role in forwarding conflict
and anti-Serb actions. There were lies of omission and lies that directly
conveyed false impressions and information. An important form of lie of
omission was the regular presentation of Serb misbehavior as unique
to the
Serbs, not also characteristic of the behavior of the Muslims and
Croatians or of the conflict overall. In case after case the media would
report on Serb attacks and atrocities, having neglected to report the
prior
assaults on Serbs in those same towns and making the Serb behavior
seem like
unprovoked acts of aggression and barbarity.

This was evident from the very start of the serious fighting in 1991 in
the republic of Croatia. In their treatment of the Eastern Croatian
city of
Vukovar, for example, the media (and ICTY) focused exclusively on the
federal Yugoslav army's capture of the town in the fall of 1991,
completely
ignoring the prior spring and summer's slaughter by Croatian National
Guard
troops and paramilitaries of hundreds of ethnic Serbs who had lived
in the
Vukovar area. According to Raymond K. Kent, "a substantial Serb
population in the major Slavonian city of Vukovar disappeared without
having
fled, leaving traces of torture in the old Austrian the spring catacombs
under the city along with evidence of murder and rape. The Western media,
whose demonization of the Serbs was well underway, chose to overlook these
events." [12] This selective and misleading focus was standard media and
ICTY practice.

Lies of omission were also clear in the attention given Bosnian Serb
prison camps like Omarska, which the media focused on intensively and with
indignation, when in fact the Muslims and Croats had very similar prison
camps-at Celebici, Tarcin, Livno, Bradina, Odzak, and in the Zetra
camp in
Sarajevo, among other sites-[13] with roughly comparable numbers,
facilities, and certainly no worse treatment of prisoners; [14] but in
contrast with the Serbs, the Muslims and Croats hired competent PR
firms and
refused permission to inspect their facilities-and the already
well-developed structure of bias made the media little interested in
any but
Serb camps.

Wild allegations of Auschwitz-like conditions in Serb "concentration
camps" were spread by "journalists of attachment" who lapped up propaganda
handouts by Muslim and Croat officials and PR hirlings. Roy Gutman,
who won
a Pulitzer prize jointly with John Burns for Bosnia reporting in 1993,
depended heavily on Croat and Muslim officials and witnesses with suspect
credentials and implausible claims, and he was a major source of
inflated,
one-sided, and false "concentration camp" propaganda. [15] John Burns'
Pulitzer award was based on an extended interview with Boris Herak, a
captured Bosnian Serb supplied to him and a Soros-funded film-maker by the
Bosnian Muslims. Several years later Herak admitted that his extremely
implausible confession had been coerced and that he had been forced to
memorize many pages of lies. Two of his alleged victims also turned up
alive
in later years. In reporting on Herak, John Burns and the New York Times
(and the Soros-funded film) suppressed the credibility-damaging fact that
Herak had also accused former UNPROFOR commandant, Canadian General Lewis
Mackenzie, of having raped young Muslim women at a Serb-run bordello. [16]
These scandalous awards are symptomatic of the media bias that was
already
overwhelming in 1992 and 1993.

In a recent development of interest, on a visit to the dying Alija
Izetbegovic, Bernard Kouchner asked him about the Bosnian Serb
concentration
camps, whereupon Izetbegovic, surprisingly, admitted that these claims had
been inflated with the aim of getting NATO to bomb the Serbs. [17] This
important confession has not been mentioned in the U.S. or British
mainstream media.

One of the most important propaganda lies of the 1990s featured the
Serb-run Trnopolje camp, visited by Britain's ITN reporters in August
1992.
These reporters photographed the resident Fikret Alic, showing him
emaciated and seemingly inside a concentration camp fence. In fact,
Fikret
Alic was in a transit camp, was a sick man (and was sick with tuberculosis
long before reaching the camp), was not in any way representative of
others
in the camp, and was soon able to move to Sweden. Furthermore, the
fence was
around the photographers, not the man photographed. [18] But this hugely
dishonest photo was featured everywhere in the West as proving a
Serb-organized Auschwitz, was denounced by NATO high officials, and helped
provide the moral basis for the creation of the ICTY and its clear
focus on
Serb evil.

In the case of the siege of Sarajevo, as with conflict around many "safe
haven" towns, the Bosnian Muslim government engaged in a steady program of
provoking the Serbs, blaming them for the ensuing response, lying about
casualties, and trying-usually successfully-to place the blame on the
Serbs. As Tim Fenton has said, "Massacre allegations by the Bosnian
Muslims
followed any reported conflict as night followed day: most notoriously
Muslim Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic claimed the UN was responsible
for the
deaths of 70,000 in Bihac in early 1995, when in fact there had barely
been
any fighting and casualties were small." [19]

A remarkable feature of the Bosnian Muslim struggle to demonize the
Serbs, in order to get NATO to come to Bosnian Muslim aid with bombs, was
their willingness to kill their own people. This was most notable in the
case of the ruthless bombing of Sarajevo civilians in three massacres: in
1992 (the "Breadline Massacre"), 1994 (the Markale "Market Massacre")
and a
"Second Market Massacre" in 1995. In the standard narrative the Serbs
were
responsible for these massacres, and it is admittedly not easy to believe
that the Muslim leadership would kill their own for political advantage
even if the evidence points strongly in that direction. But these
massacres
were all extremely well timed to influence imminent NATO and UN
decisions to
intervene more forcibly on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims. More important,
numerous UN officials and senior Western military officials have claimed
that the evidence is strong in all three cases that the actions were
planned
and executed by Bosnian Muslims. [20] U.S. Army officer John E. Sray, who
was on the scene in Bosnia during these and other massacres and was
head of
the U.S. intelligence section in Sarajevo, even suggested that the
incidents, and probable Bosnian Muslim official connivance in these
atrocities, "deserve a thorough scrutiny by the International War Crimes
Tribunal." [21] Needless to say no such scrutiny was forthcoming. In
short,
this view of the three massacres is not conspiracy theory, it is a
conclusion based on serious and substantial evidence, but not even
debated
in the party-line dominated accounts of recent Balkan history. [22]

Both before and after Srebrenica lying about numbers killed was also
standard practice, helpful in sustaining the dominant narrative. For
Bosnia,
in December 1992 the Bosnian Muslim government claimed 128,444 deaths of
their forces and people, a number which grew to 200,000 by June 1993,
rising
to 250,000 in 1994. [23] These figures were swallowed without a qualm by
Western politicians, media, and intellectual war-campaigners (e.g., David
Rieff), with Clinton himself using the 250,000 figure in a speech in
November 1995. Former State Department official George Kenney has long
questioned these figures and marveled at media gullibility in accepting
these claims without the least interest in verification. His own estimate
ran between 25,000 and 60,000. [24] More recently, a study sponsored
by the
Norwegian government estimated the Bosnian war dead as 80,000, and one
sponsored by the Hague Tribunal itself came up with a figure of 102,000
dead. [25] Neither of these studies has been reported on in the U.S.
media,
which had regularly offered its readers/listeners the inflated numbers.

A similar inflation process took place during the 78-day NATO bombing war
in 1999, with high U.S. officials at various moments claiming 100,000,
250,000 and 500,000 Serb killings of Kosovo Albanians, along with the
lavish use of the word "genocide" to describe Serb actions in Kosovo. [26]
This figure gradually shrank to 11,000, and has remained there despite the
fact that only some 4,000 bodies were found in one of the most intense
forensic searches in history, and with unknown numbers of those bodies
combatants, Serbs, and civilian victims of U.S. bombing. But the
11,000
must be valid because the NATO governments and ICTY say it is, and Michael
Ignatieff assured readers of the New York Times that "whether those 11,334
bodies will be found depends on whether the Serb military and the police
removed them." [27]

This record of systematic disinformation certainly does not disprove the
truth of the standard narrative on the Srebrenica massacre. It does,
however, suggest the need for a close look at the claims, which have
proved
so convenient, a close look that the mainstream has steadily refused to
provide.

3. The Problematic Massacre Claims

By the time of the Srebrenica events of July 1995 the stage had been well
set for making massacre claims effective. The serial lying had been
largely
unchallenged in the mainstream, the demonization process and
good-versus-evil dichotomy had been well established, the ICTY and UN
leadership were closely following the agenda of the United States and its
NATO allies, and the media were on board as co-belligerents.

In this environment, context-stripping was easy. One element of context
was the fact that the "safe area" concept was a fraud, as the safe areas
were supposed to have been disarmed, but weren't, and with UN connivance.
[28] They were therefore used by the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and
other
safe havens as launching pads for attacks on nearby Serb villages. In the
three years prior to the massacre well over a thousand Serb civilians were
killed by Muslim forces in scores of devastated nearby villages; [29] and
well before July 1995 the Srebrenica Muslim commander Nasir Oric proudly
showed Western reporters videos of some of his beheaded Serb victims and
bragged about his killings. [30] Testifying before the Tribunal on
February
12, 2004, UN military commander in Bosnia in 1992 and 1993, General
Philippe Morillon, stated his conviction that the attack on Srebrenica
was a
"direct reaction" to the massacres of Serbs by Nasir Oric and his
forces in
1992 and 1993, massacres with which Morillon was closely familiar. [31]
Morillon's testimony was of no interest to the Western media, and when the
ICTY finally got around to indicting Nasir Oric on March 28, 2003, very
possibly to create the image of judicial balance, he was charged with
killing only seven Serbs who were tortured and beaten to death after
capture, and with the "wanton destruction" of nearby villages. Although he
openly bragged to Western reporters of slaughtering Serb civilians,
the ICTY
reportedly "found no evidence that there were civilian casualties in the
attacks on Serb villages in his theater of operations." [32]

When the Bosnian Serbs captured Srebrenica in July 1995, it was reported
that the 28th regiment of the Bosnian Muslim Army (BMA), comprising
several
thousand men, had just fled the town. [33] The media failed to ask how
such
a large force could have been present in a disarmed "safe area."
Having also
succeeded in ignoring the prior abuses emanating from the safe area, this
allowed them to follow a quickly established party line of a planned
"genocide" and inexplicable brutality rather than the vengeance which the
media allow as semi-exoneration of violence by "worthy" victims (e.g.,
Kosovo Albanians driving out and killing Serbs and Roma after the NATO
takeover of Kosovo).

A second element of context was the possible political basis for the
surrender of Srebrenica by a force in a good defensive position,
outnumbering the attacking BSA by a 6-1 or 8-1 ratio, but retreating in
advance of the assault, their leaders having been withdrawn previously by
order of the Bosnian Muslim leadership. [34] This left the population
unprotected, and made the BMA cadres vulnerable as they retreated in
disarray toward Bosnian Muslim lines. Could this have been another
self-sacrificing maneuver by the leadership to produce victims, perhaps
designed to help meet the Clinton 5,000 target and induce more
forcible NATO
intervention? These questions never arose in the mainstream media.

The Srebrenica events had a number of features that made it possible to
claim 8,000 "men and boys" executed. One was the confusion and uncertainty
about the fate of the fleeing Bosnian Muslim forces, some reaching Tuzla
safely, some killed in the fighting, and some captured. The 8,000
figure was
first provided by the Red Cross, based on their crude estimate that
the BSA
had captured 3,000 men and that 5,000 were reported "missing." [35] It is
well established that thousands of those "missing" had reached Tuzla or
were killed in the fighting, [36] but in an amazing transformation
displaying the eagerness to find the Bosnian Serbs evil and the Muslims
victims, the "reaching safety/killed-in-action" basis of being
missing was
ignored and the missing were taken as executed! This misleading
conclusion
was helped along by the Red Cross's reference to the 5,000 as having
"simply disappeared," and its failure to correct this politically biased
usage and claim despite its own recognition that "several thousand"
refugees
had reached Central Bosnia. [37]

It was also helped along by the Bosnian Muslim leadership's refusal to
disclose the names and numbers of those reaching safety, [38] but
there was
a remarkable readiness in the Western establishment not only to ignore
those
reaching safety, but also to disregard deaths in fighting and to take dead
bodies as proving executions. The will to believe here was limitless:
reporter David Rohde saw a bone sticking up in a grave site near
Srebrenica,
which he just knew by instinct was a remnant of an execution and serious
evidence of a "massacre." [39] It was standard media practice to move
from
an asserted and unproven claim of thousands missing, or a report of the
uncovering of bodies in a grave site, to the conclusion that the claim of
8,000 executed was thereby demonstrated. [40]

With 8,000 executed and thousands killed in the fighting there should have
been huge grave sites and satellite evidence of both executions, burials,
and any body removals. But the body searches in the Srebrenica
vicinity were
painfully disappointing, with only some two thousand bodies found in
searches through 1999, including bodies killed in action and possibly Serb
bodies, some pre-dating July 1995. The sparseness of these findings led to
claims of body removal and reburial, but this was singularly
unconvincing as
the Bosnian Serbs were under intense military pressure after July
1995. This
was the period when NATO was bombing Serb positions and Croat/Muslim
armies
were driving towards Banja Luka. The BSA was on the defensive and was
extremely short of equipment and resources, including gasoline. To have
mounted an operation of the magnitude required to exhume, transport and
rebury thousands of corpses would have been far beyond the BSA's
capacity at
that time. Furthermore, in carrying out such a program they could hardly
hope to escape observation from OSCE personnel, local civilians, and
satellite observations.

On August 10, 1995, Madeleine Albright showed some satellite photos at a
closed session of the Security Council, as part of a denunciation of the
Bosnian Serbs, including one photo showing people--allegedly Bosnian
Muslims
near Srebrenica--assembled in a stadium, and one allegedly taken shortly
thereafter showing a nearby field with "disturbed" soil. These photos have
never been publicly released, but even if they are genuine they don't
prove
either executions or burials. Furthermore, although the ICTY speaks of
"an organized and comprehensive effort" to hide bodies, and David Rohde
claimed a "huge Serb effort to hide bodies," [41] neither Albright nor
anyone else has ever shown a satellite photo of people actually being
executed, buried, or dug up for reburial, or of trucks conveying thousands
of bodies elsewhere. This evidence blank occurred despite Albright's
warning
the Serbs that "We will be watching," and with satellites at that time
making at least eight passes per day and geostationary drones able to
hover
and take finely detailed pictures in position over Bosnia during the
summer
of 1995. [42] The mainstream media have found this failure to confirm
of no
interest.

There have been a great many bodies gathered at Tuzla, some 7,500 or more,
many in poor condition or parts only, their collection and handling
incompatible with professional forensic standards, their provenance
unclear
and link to the July 1995 events in Srebrenica unproven and often
unlikely,
[43] and the manner of their death usually uncertain. Interestingly,
although the Serbs were regularly accused of trying to hide bodies, there
has never been any suggestion that the Bosnian Muslims, long in charge of
the body search, might shift bodies around and otherwise manipulate
evidence, despite their substantial record of dissembling. A systematic
attempt to use DNA to trace connections to Srebrenica is underway, but
entails many problems, apart from that of the integrity of the material
studied and process of investigation, and will not resolve the question of
differentiating executions from deaths in combat. There are also lists of
missing, but these lists are badly flawed, with duplications, individuals
listed who had died before July 1995, who fled to avoid BSA service,
or who
registered to vote in 1997, and they include individuals who died in
battle
or reached safety or were captured and assumed a new existence elsewhere.
[44]

The 8,000 figure is also incompatible with the basic arithmetic of
Srebrenica numbers before and after July 1995. Displaced persons from
Srebrenica-that is, massacre survivors-- registered with the World Health
Organization and Bosnian government in early August 1995, totalled 35,632.
Muslim men who reached Muslim lines "without their families being
informed"
totaled at least 2,000, and some 2,000 were killed in the fighting. That
gives us 37,632 survivors plus the 2,000 combat deaths, which would
require
the prewar population of Srebrenica to have been 47,000 if 8,000 were
executed, whereas the population before July was more like 37-40,000
(Tribunal judge Patricia Wald gave 37,000 as her estimate). The numbers
don't add up. [45]

There were witnesses to killings at Srebrenica, or those who claimed to be
witnesses. There were not many of these, and some had a political axe to
grind or were otherwise not credible, [46] but several were believable and
were probably telling of real and ugly events. But we are talking here of
evidence of hundreds of executions, not 8,000 or anything close to
it. The
only direct participant witness claim that ran to a thousand was that of
Drazen Erdemovic, an ethnic Croat associated with a mercenary group of
killers whose members were paid 12 kilos of gold for their Bosnian service
(according to Erdemovic himself) and ended up working in the Congo on
behalf of French intelligence. His testimony was accepted despite its
vagueness and inconsistencies, lack of corroboration, and his
suffering from
mental problems sufficient to disqualify him from trial--but not from
testifying before the Tribunal, free of cross-examination. within two
weeks
of this disqualification from trial. This and other witness evidence
suffered from serious abuse of the plea-bargaining process whereby
witnesses could receive mitigating sentences if they cooperated
sufficiently
with the prosecution. [47]

It is also noteworthy how many relatively impartial observers in or near
Srebrenica in July 1995 didn't see any evidence of massacres,
including the
members of the Dutch forces present in the "safe area" and people like
Henry
Wieland, the chief UN investigator into alleged human rights abuses, who
could find no eyewitnesses to atrocities after five days of interviewing
among the 20,000 Srebrenica survivors gathered at the Tuzla airport
refugee
camp. [48]

4. Anomalies

One anomaly connected with Srebrenica has been the stability of the
figure of Bosnian Muslim victims-8,000 in July 1995 and 8,000 today,
despite the crudity of the initial estimate, the evidence that many or
most
of the 5,000 "missing" reached Bosnian Muslim territory or were killed in
the fighting, and the clear failure to produce supportive physical
evidence
despite a massive effort. In other cases, like the 9/11 fatality estimate,
and even the Bosnian killings and Kosovo bombing war estimates, the
original
figures were radically scaled down as evidence of body counts made the
earlier inflated numbers unsustainable. [49] But because of its key
political role for the United States, Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and an
almost religious ardour of belief in this claim, Sebrenica has been immune
to evidence. From the beginning until today the number has been taken
as a
given, a higher truth, the questioning of which would show a lack of faith
and very likely "apologetics" for the demon.

Another anomaly also showing the sacred, untouchable, and politicized
character of the massacre in Western ideology has been the ready
designation
of the killings as a case of "genocide." The Tribunal played an important
role here, with hard-to-match gullibility, unrestrained
psychologizing, and
incompetent legal reasoning, which the judges have applied to Serb-related
cases only. On gullibility, one Tribunal judge accepted as fact the
witness
claim that Serb soldiers had forced an old Muslim man to eat the liver of
his grandson; [50] and the judges repeatedly stated as an established fact
that 7-8,000 Muslim men had been executed, while simultaneously
acknowledging that the evidence only "suggested" that "a majority" of the
7-8,000 missing had not been killed in combat, which yields a number
substantially lower than 7-8,000. [51]

The Tribunal dealt with the awkward problem of the genocide-intent Serbs
bussing Bosnian Muslim women and children to safety by arguing that
they did
this for public relations reasons, but as Michael Mandel points out,
failing
to do some criminal act despite your desire is called "not committing a
crime." [52] The Tribunal never asked why the genocidal Serbs failed to
surround the town before its capture to prevent thousands of males from
escaping to safety, or why the Bosnian Muslim soldiers were willing to
leave
their women and children as well as many wounded comrades to the
mercies of
the Serbs; [53] and they failed to confront the fact that 10,000 mainly
Muslim residents of Zvornik sought refugee from the civil war in Serbia
itself, as prosecution witness Borislav Jovic testified. [54]

Among the other idiocies in the Tribunal judges' argument, it was genocide
if you killed many males in a group in order to reduce the future
population
of that group, thereby making it unviable in that area. Of course, you
might
want to kill them to prevent their killing you in the future, but the
court
knows Serb psychology better-that couldn't be the sole reason, there must
have been a more sinister aim. The Tribunal reasoning holds forth the
possibility that with only a little prosecution-friendly judicial
psychologizing any case of killing enemy soldiers can be designated
genocide.

There is also the problem of definition of the group. Were the Serbs
trying to eliminate all the Muslims in Bosnia, or Muslims globally? Or
just
in Srebrenica? The judges suggested that pushing them out of the
Srebrenica
area was itself genocide, and they essentially equated genocide with
ethnic
cleansing. [55] It is notable that the ICTY has never called the Croat
ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Krajina Serbs "genocide" although in that
case
many women and children were killed and the ethnic cleansing applied to a
larger area and larger victim population than in Srebrenica. [56] (On
August 10, 1995, Madeleine Albright cried out to the Security Council that
"as many as 13,000 men, women and children were driven from their
homes" in
Srebrenica.) [57] Perhaps the ICTY had accepted Richard Holbrooke's
comic
designation of Krajina as a case of "involuntary expulsions." [58] The
bias is blatant; the politicization of a purported judicial
enterprise is
extreme.

Media treatment of the Srebrenica and Krajina cases followed the same
pattern and illustrates well how the media make some victims worthy and
others unworthy in accord with a political agenda. With the Serbs their
government's target, and their government actively aiding the massive
Croat
ethnic cleansing program in Krajina, the media gave huge and indignant
treatment to the first, with invidious language, calls for action, and
little context. With Krajina, attention was slight and passing,
indignation
was absent, detailed reporting on the condition of the victims was
minimal,
descriptive language was neutral, and there was context offered that made
the events understandable. The contrast is so gross as to be droll: the
attack on Srebrenica "chilling," "murderous," "savagery," "cold-blooded
killing," "genocidal," "aggression,"and of course "ethnic cleansing."
With
Krajina, the media used no such strong language-even ethnic cleansing was
too much for them. The Croat assault was merely a big "upheaval" that is
"softening up the enemy," "a lightning offensive," explained away as a
"response to Srebrenica" and a result of Serb leaders "overplaying their
hand." The Washington Post even cited U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter
Galbraith saying the "the Serb exodus was not 'ethnic cleansing'."
[59] The
paper does not allow a challenge to that judgment. In fact, however, the
Croat operations in Krajina left Croatia as the most ethnically
purified of
all the former components of the former Yugoslavia, although the NATO
occupation of Kosovo has allowed an Albanian ethnic cleansing that is
rivalling that of Croatia in ethnic purification.

Another anomaly in the Srebrenica case is the insistence on bringing all
the criminals (Serb) to trial and getting the willing executioners
(Serb) to
admit guilt as necessary for justice and essential for reconciliation. A
problem is that justice cannot be one-sided or it ceases to be
justice, and
shows its true face as vengeance and a cover for other political ends.
Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was by no means one-sided, and deaths by
nationality were not far off from population proportionality; [60] the
Serbs
claim and have documented thousands of deaths at the hands of the
Bosnian
Muslims and their imported Mujahedin cadres, and by the Croatians, and
they
have their own group examining and trying to identify bodies at an
estimated
73 mass graves. [61] This victimization has hardly been noticed by the
Western media or ICTY-the distinguished Yugoslav forensic expert Dr. Zoran
Stankovic observed back in 1996 that "the fact that his team had
previously
identified the bodies of 1,000 Bosnian Serbs in the [Srebrenica]
region had
not interested prosecutor Richard Goldstone." [62] Instead, there is a
steady refrain about the Serbs tendency to whine, whereas Bosnian Muslim
complaints are taken as those of true victims and are never designated
whining.

Rather than producing reconciliation the steady focus on Srebrenica
victims and killers makes for more intense hatred and nationalism, just as
the Kosovo war and its violence exacerbated hatred and tensions there and
showed that Clinton's claimed objective of a tolerant multi-ethnic Kosovo
was a fraud. In Kosovo, this one-sided propaganda and NATO control has
unleashed serious and unremitting anti-Serb-along with anti-Roma,
anti-Turk,
anti-dissident-Albanian-- violence, helped along by the willingness of the
NATO authorities to look the other way as their allies-the purported
victims-take their revenge and pursue their long-standing aim of ethnic
purification. [63] In Bosnia and Serbia the Serbs have been under steady
attack, humiliated, and their leaders and military personnel punished,
while the criminals among the Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and NATO powers
(e.g., Clinton, Blair, Albright, Holbrooke) suffer no penalties [64]
and may
even be portrayed as dispensers of justice (Clinton et al.).
.
It is clear that the objectives of the retribution-pushers are not
justice and reconciliation-they are to unify and strengthen the
position of
the Bosnian Muslims, to crush the Republica Srpska, and possibly even
eliminate it as an independent entity in Bosnia, to keep Serbia
disorganized, weak and dependent on the West, and to continue to put the
U.S. and NATO attack and dismantlement of Yugoslavia in a favorable light.
The last objective requires diverting attention from the Clinton/Bosnian
Muslim role in giving Al Qaeda a foothold in the Balkans, Izetbegovic's
close alliance with Osama bin Laden, his Islamic Declaration declaring
hostility to a multi-ethnic state, [65] the importation of 4,000
Mujahaden
to fight a holy war in Bosnia, with active Clinton administration aid, and
the KLA-Al Qaeda connection.

These aspects of the siding with the Bosnian Muslims have always been
awkward for the war propagandists, and they became more so after 9/11-the
U.S. 9/11 Commission Report claims that two of the 19 hijackers, Nawaf al
Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, and a "mastermind" of the attack, Khalid
Sheikh
Mohammed, "fought" in Bosnia, and that bin Laden had "service" offices in
Zagreb and Sarajevo. [66] Despite the huge focus on 9/11 and Al Qaeda
these
links have not been featured in the mainstream media and have not
influenced
Bosnian proconsul Paddy Ashdown, who attended Izetbegovic's funeral and
continues to push Bosnian Muslim interests. The Serbs, of course, were
complaining about the brutality (and beheadings) of the Mujahaden in
1993,
but the media and ICTY were not interested then and remain uninterested.
Let's just talk about Srebrenica, the Bosnian Muslims as unique
victims, and
Clinton's and the West's generous if belated service to those victimized
underdogs.

But didn't the Bosnian Serbs "confess" that they had murdered 8,000
civilians? This has been the take of the Western media, but again
demonstrating their subservience to their leaders' political agenda. The
Bosnian Serbs actually did put out a report on Srebrenica in September
2002,
[67] but this report was rejected by Paddy Ashdown for failing to come up
with the proper conclusions. He therefore forced a further report by
firing
a stream of Republica Srpska politicians and analysts, threatening the RS
government, and eventually extracting a report prepared by people who
would
come to the officially approved conclusions. [68] This report, issued on
June 11, 2004, was then greeted in the Western media as a meaningful
validation of the official line-the refrain was, the Bosnian Serbs "admit"
the massacre, which should finally settle any questions. Amusingly, even
this coerced and imposed report didn't come near acknowledging 8,000
executions (it speaks of "several thousand" executions). What this episode
"proves" is that the Western campaign to make the defeated Serbia
grovel is
not yet terminated, and the media's continuing gullibility and propaganda
service.

Conclusion

The "Srebrenica massacre" is the greatest triumph of propaganda to emerge
from the Balkan wars. Other claims and outright lies have played
their role
in the Balkan conflicts, but while some have retained a modest place
in the
propaganda repertoire despite challenge (Racak, the Markale massacre, the
Serb refusal to negotiate at Rambouillet, 250,000 Bosnian dead, the
aim of a
Greater Serbia as the driving force in the Balkan wars), [69] the
Srebrenica
massacre reigns supreme for symbolic power. It is the symbol of Serb evil
and Bosnian Muslim victimhood, and the justice of the Western
dismantling of
Yugoslavia and intervention there at many levels, including a bombing war
and colonial occupations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

But the link of this propaganda triumph to truth and justice is
non-existent. The disconnection with truth is epitomized by the fact that
the original estimate of 8,000, including 5,000 "missing"--who had left
Srebrenica for Bosnian Muslim lines-was maintained even after it had been
quickly established that several thousand had reached those lines and that
several thousand more had perished in battle. This nice round number lives
on today in the face of a failure to find the executed bodies and
despite
the absence of a single satellite photo showing executions, bodies,
digging, or trucks transporting bodies for reburial. The media have
carefully refrained from asking questions on this point, despite
Albright's
August 1995 promise that "We will be watching."

That Albright statement, and the photos she did display at the time,
helped divert attention from the ongoing "Krajina massacre" of Serbs in
Croatian Krajina, an ethnic cleansing process of great brutality and
wider
scope than that at Srebrenica, in which there was less real fighting
than at
Srebrenica, mainly attacks on and the killing and removal of defenseless
civilians. At Srebrenica the Bosnian Serbs moved women and children to
safety, and there is no evidence of any of them being murdered; [70]
whereas in Krajina there was no such separation and an estimated 368 women
and children were killed, along with many too old and infirm to flee. [71]
One measure of the propaganda success of the "Srebrenica massacre" is
that
the possibility that the intense focus on the Srebrenica massacre was
serving as a cover for the immediately following "Krajina massacre,"
supported by the United States, was outside the orbit of thought of the
media. For the media, Srebrenica helped bring about Krajina, and the Serbs
had it coming. [72]

The media have played an important role in making the Srebrenica massacre
a propaganda triumph. As noted earlier, the media had become a
co-belligerent by 1991, and all standards of objectivity disappeared in
their subservience to the pro-Bosnian Muslim and anti-Serb agenda.
Describing the reporting of Christine Amanpour and others on a battle
around
Gorazde, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John Sray wrote back in October 1995
that these news reports "were devoid of any semblance of truth," that
Americans were suffering from "a cornucopia of disinformation," that
"America has not been so pathetically deceived" since the Vietnam War, and
that popular perceptions of Bosnia "have been forged by a prolific
propaganda machine..[that has] managed to manipulate illusions to further
Muslim goals." [73]

That propaganda machine also conquered the liberals and much of the left
in the United States, who swallowed the dominant narrative of the evil
Serbs seeking hegemony, employing uniquely brutal and genocidal
strategies,
and upsetting a previous multi-cultural haven in Bosnia-run by Osama bin
Laden's friend and ally Alija Izetbegovic, and with rectification brought
belatedly by Clinton, Holbrooke and Albright working closely with Iran,
Turkey and Saudi Arabia! The liberal/left war coalition needed to
find the
Serbs demons in order to justify imperial warfare, and they did so by
accepting and internalizing a set of lies and myths that make up the
dominant narrative. [74] This liberal/"cruise missile left" (CML)
combo was
important in helping develop the "humanitarian intervention" rationale for
attacking Serbia on behalf of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and in fact
preparing the ground for Bush's eventual basing of his own wars on the
quest
for "liberation." [75] The Srebrenica massacre helped make the
liberals and
CML true believers in the crusade in the Balkans and gave moral backup to
their servicing the expanding imperial role of their country and its
allies.

Former UN official Cedric Thornberry, writing in 1996, noted that
"prominently in parts of the international liberal media" the position is
"that the Serbs were the only villains," and back at UN headquarters
in the
spring of 1993 he was warned: "Take cover-the fix is on." [76] The
fix was
on, even if only tacit and built-in to the government-media-Tribunal
relationship. It helped make the Srebrenica massacre the symbol of evil
and, with the help of Tribunal "justice," and support of liberals
and CML,
provided a cover for the U.S.-NATO attack on and dismantling of
Yugoslavia, colonial occupations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and
justification for
"humanitarian intervention" more broadly. What more could be asked of a
propaganda system?

Notes:

*This paper is partly drawn from and cites chapters in a forthcoming book
on the Srebrenica massacre, Srebrenica: The Politics of War Crimes,
written
by George Bogdanich, Tim Fenton, Philip Hammond, Edward S. Herman,
Michael
Mandel, Jonathan Rooper, and George Szamuely. This book is referred to in
the notes below as Politics of War Crimes. The author and his colleagues
are indebted to Diana Johnstone, David Peterson, Vera Vratusa-Zunjic,
Milan
Bulajic, Milivoje Ivanisevic, Konstantin Kilibarda, and George
Pumphrey for
advice. Johnstone's Fools Crusade is a fine basic statement of an
alternative perspective on the Balkan Wars; George Pumphrey's "Srebrenica:
Three Years Later, And Still Searching," is a classic critique of the
establishment Srebrenica massacre narrative and repeatedly hit the target
with facts and analyses still not rebutted.

1. "Bosnia: 2 Officials Dismissed for Obstructing Srebrenica Inquiry," AP
Report, New York Times, April 17, 2004; Marlise Simons, "Bosnian Serb
Leader
Taken Before War Crimes Tribunal," New York Times, April 8, 2000; UN, The
Fall of Srebrenica (A/54/549), Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
General Assembly resolution 53/35, November 15, 1999, par. 506
(http://www.un.org/News/ossg/srebrenica.pdf )

2. See Ivo Pukanic, "US Role In Storm: Thrilled With Operation Flash,
President Clinton Gave the Go Ahead to Operation Storm," Nacional
(Zagreb),
May 24, 2005.

3. Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its
Allies Went to War," Washington Post, April 18, 1999

4. "Some surviving members of the Srebrenica delegation have stated that
President Izetbegovic also told that he had learned that a NATO
intervention
in Bosnia and Herzegovina was possible, but could occur only if the Serbs
were to break into Srebrenica, killing at least 5,000 of its people.
President Izetbegovic has flatly denied making such a statement." The Fall
of Srebrenica (A/54/549), Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
General Assembly resolution 53/35, November 15, 1999, par. 115,
(http://www.haverford.edu/relg/sells/reports/UNsrebrenicareport.htm)
The UN report does not mention that there were nine others present
at that
meeting, and that one of them, Hakija Meholijic, former Srebrenica
chief of
police, has stated that eight of them (all those living) "can confirm" the
Clinton suggestion. (Dani, June 22, 1998:
http://cdsp.neu.edu/info/students/marko/dani/dani2.html)

5. Politics of War Crimes, Bogdanich, chapter 2, "Prelude to Capture,"
and Fenton, chapter 3, "Military Context." See also Tim Ripley, Operation
Deliberate Force (Center for Defence and Security Studies: 1999), p. 145.

6. In his Balkan Odyssey, Lord David Owen stated that "By acquiescing in
the Croatian government's seizure of Western Slavonia, the Contact
Group had
in effect given the green light to the Bosnian Serbs to attack Srebrenica
and Zepa" (pp. 199-200). Owen was mistaken; the Contact Group was serving
one side only, and the media's failure to report on and criticize the
approved aggression made it possible to present the takeover of Srebrenica
as a unique and unprovoked evil.

7. Veritas estimated that 1,205 civilians were killed in Operation Storm,
including 358 women and 10 children. In the graves around Srebrenica
through
1999, among the 1,895 bodies only one was identified as female. See
"Croatian Serb Exodus Commemorated," Agence France Press, Aug. 4, 2004;
also, Veritas at www.veritas.org.yu.

8. Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force, p. 192. See also footnotes 56 and
70.

9. The co-belligerency role was described by Peter Brock in "Dateline
Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press," Foreign Policy, Winter 1993-94. A
forthcoming book by Brock, on Media Cleansing: UNcovering Yugoslavia's
Civil
Wars, shows this partisanship in greater and effective detail. In his
autobiography, U. S. Secretary of State James Baker says that he
instructed
his press secretary, Margaret Tutweiler to help Bosnian Foreign Minister
Haris Silajdzic utilize the Western media to further the Bosnian Muslim
cause, noting that he "had her talk to her contacts at the four television
networks, the Washington Post and the New York Times." James A. Baker, The
Politics of Diplomacy (Putnam: 1995), pp. 643-4.

10. As NATO PR spokesman Jamie Shea stated on May 16, 1999, when asked
about NATO's vulnerability to Tribunal charges, he was not worried. The
prosecutor, he said, will start her investigation "because we will
allow her
to." Further, "NATO countries are those that have provided the
finance," and
on the need to build a second chamber "so that prosecutions can be speeded
up...we and the Tribunal are all one on this, we want to see war criminals
brought to justice." http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990516b.htm
See Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder (London: Pluto,
2004), chaps. 4-5; Edward Herman, "The Milosevic Trial, Part 1," Z
Magazine,
April 2002.

11. See Politics of War Crimes, chap. 7, Bogdanich, "UN Report on
Srebrenica-A distorted Picture of Events."

12. Raymond K. Kent, "Contextualizing Hate: The Hague Tribunal, the
Clinton Administration and the Serbs," Dialogue (Paris), v. 5, no. 20,
December, 1996 (as posted to the Emperor's Clothes website,
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/misc/kent.htm)

13. Carl Savitch, "Celebici,"
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/savich/047.shtml.

14. It would be hard to surpass the savagery of the Bosnian Muslims at
the Celebici camp, described in ibid. See also, Diana Johnstone, Fools'
Crusade (Pluto: 2002), pp. 71-72.

15. See the two works by Peter Brock, note 9 above; also Johnstone, Fools'
Crusade, pp. 70-83.

16. For details and citations see Brock's article and book (note 9 above).

17. Bernard Kouchner, Les Guerriers de la Paix (Paris: Grasset, 2004),
pp. 372-4.

18. Johnstone, Fools' Crusade, pp, 72-73; Thomas Deichmann,
"Misinformation: TV Coverage of a Bosnian Camp," Covert Action Quarterly,
Fall, 1998, pp. 52-55.

19. In a private communication dated November 21, 2003.

20. For a good summary of the case that these were "Self-Inflicted
Atrocities," with further references, see the Senate Staff Report of
January
16, 1997, on "Clinton Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia
Into
Militant Islamic Base,"
http://www.senate.gov/%7erpc/releases/1997/iran.htm#top. See also Cees
Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, 1992 - 1995, London: Lit
Verlag,
2003, pp. 68-69:
http://213.222.3.5/srebrenica/toc/p6_c02_s004_b01.html ).

21. John E. Sray, "Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Buyer Beware,"
Foreign Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, October, 1995,
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/bosnia2.htm>.

22. For exceptions to this rule, Leonard Doyle, "Muslims 'slaughter their
own people.'" The Independent, Aug. 22, 1992; Hugh Manners, "Serbs 'Not
Guilty' of Massacre," The Sunday Times [London], Oct. 1, 1995. David
Binder
was unable to get his own paper, the New York Times, to publish
analyses of
possible Muslim involvement in Sarajevo massacres; he had to publish these
elsewhere. See David Binder, "The Balkan Tragedy: Anatomy of a Massacre,"
Foreign Policy, No. 97, Winter, 1994-1995; David Binder, "Bosnia's
Bombers,"
The Nation, October 2, 1995

23. For a good summary, Srdja Trifkovic, "Une spectaculaire revision de
chiffres," Balkan Infos (B.I.), February 2005.

24. George Kenney, "The Bosnian Calculation," New York Times Magazine,
April 23, 1995.

25. See Trifkovic, supra note 23; also,
http://grayfalcon.blogspot.com/2004/12/death-tolls-part-3.html.

26. See Edward Herman and David Peterson, "The NATO-Media Lie Machine:
'Genocide' in Kosovo," Z Magazine, May 2000:
http://www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/hermanmay2000.htm

27. Michael Ignatieff, "Counting Bodies in Kosovo," New York Times,
November 21, 1999.

28. Politics of War Crimes, Bogdanovich, chap. 2, "Prelude to Capture."

29. Detailed evidence was presented to the UN on "War Crimes and Crimes
of Genocide in Eastern Bosnia (Communes of Bratunac Skelani, and
Srebrenica)
Committed Against the Serbian Population from April 1982 to April
1993," by
the Yugoslav Ambassador to the UN; see also Joan Phillips, "Victims and
Villains in Bosnia's War," Southern Slav Journal, Spring-Summer 1992.

30. Bill Schiller, "Muslims' hero vows he'll fight to the last man,"
Toronto Star, January 31, 1994; John Pomfret, "Weapons, Cash and Chaos
Lend
Clout to Srebrenica's Tough Guy," Washington Post, February 16, 1994.

31. Carl Savich, "Srebrenica and Naser Oric: An Analysis of General
Philippe Morillon's Testimony at the ICTY," http:/www.serbianna.co.

32. "No Evidence of Civilian Casualties in Operations By Bosnian
Commander," BBC Monitoring International Reports, April 11, 2003; for a
review of Oric's operations and a critical analysis of the ICTY decision,
Carl Savitch, "Srebrenica: The Untold Story,"
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/savich/o51.html.

33. Politics of War Crimes, chaps 2-3. The UN estimated that there had
been 3-4,000 Bosnian Muslim soldiers in Srebrenica just before its fall.

34. Ibid.

35. Politics of War Crimes, chap. 2.

36. "Conflict in the Balkans, 8000 Muslims Missing," AP, New York Times,
Sept. 15, 1995.

37. One Red Cross official told a German interviewer that the Muslims
who reached safety "cannot be removed from the list of
missing..because we
have not received their names," quoted in Pumphrey, "Srebrenica: Three
Years
Later, And Still Searching." See also, "Former Yugoslavia: Srebrenica:
help
for families still awaiting news," International Committee of the Red
Cross,
September 13, 1995
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/7609D560283849CFC1256B6600595006

38. Ibid.

39. Johnstone, Fools' Crusade, p. 76.

40. This jump from a few bodies to 8,000 was recently illustrated in the
treatment by Tim Judah and Daniel Sunter in the London Observer of the
video
of six killings of Bosnian Muslims, given heavy publicity in June 2005-it
is the "smoking gun, the final, incontrovertible proof of Serbia's part in
the Srebrenica massacres in which more than 7,500 Bosnian Muslim men and
boys were murdered." ("How the video that put Serbia in dock was
brought to
light," June 5).
.
41. ICTY, Amended Joinder Indictment, May 27, 2002, Par. 51:
http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/nik-ai020527c.htm.; David Rohde,
"The World Five Years Later: The Battle of Srebrenica Is Now Over The
Truth," New York Times, July 9, 2000.

42. Steven Lee Meyers, "Making Sure War Crimes Aren't Forgotten," New York
Times, September 22, 1997. In fact, one U.S. official acknowledged in
late
July 1995 that "satellites have produced nothing." Paul Quinn-Judge,
"Reports of Atrocities Unconfirmed So Far: U.S. Aerial Surveillance
Reveals
Little," Boston Globe, July 27, 1995.

43. The web site of the International Commission on Missing Persons in the
Former Yugoslavia acknowledges that the bodies "have been exhumed from
various gravesites in northeast HiH," not just in the Srebrenica region;
quoted in a 2003 Statement by ICMP Chief of Staff Concerning Persons
Reported Missing from Srebrenica in July 1995, Gordon Bacon.

44. Politics of War Crimes, Rooper, chap. 4, "The Numbers Game."

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.; also, Politics of War Crimes, Szamuely, chap. 5, "Witness
Evidence."

47. Szamuely, "Witness Evidence."

48. Tim Butcher, "Serb Atrocities in Srebrenica are Unproven," The Daily
Telegraph, July 24, 1995.

49. Politics of War Crimes, Rooper, chap. 4, "The Numbers Game."

50. This claim appears in the November 1995 indictments of Radovan
Karadzic and Ratko Mladic; it was recounted by the French policeman,
Jean-Rene Ruez, and first surfaced at the ICTY in early July, 1996,
during a
seven-day publicity-stunt-type hearing into the charges against
Karadzic and
Mladic. As Associated Press reported Ruez's liver-eating testimony at the
time (Jennifer Chao, July 3, 1996):

"Amid the feverish mass murder was throat-gagging sadism. Ruez cited an
incident where a soldier forced a man to cut open his grandson's
stomach and
eat part of his liver. "He took the old man and put a knife in his
hand ...
and cut open the stomach of the little boy and then with the tip of his
knife took out an organ from the inside of the child's stomach and he
forced
the man to eat that part,' Ruez told the court."

51. Politics of War Crimes, Mandel, chap. 6, "The ICTY Calls It
'Genocide'."

52. Ibid.

53. Chris Hedges, "Bosnian Troops Cite Gassing At Zepa," New York Times,
July 27, 1995.

54. Jovic testified in the Milosevic trial on November 18,
2003-www.slobodan-milosevic.org- November 18, 2003.

55. Politics of War Crimes, Mandel, chap. 6; also, Michael Mandel, How
America Gets Away With Murder (Pluto: 2004), pp. 157-8.

56. Carlos Martins Branco, a former UN military observer in Bosnia,
contended that it was in Krajina rather than Srebrenica that one can
identify a pre-meditated genocidal process "when the Croatian army
implemented the mass murder of all Serbians found there. In this instance,
the media maintained an absolute silence, despite the fact that this
genocide occurred over a three month period. The objective of
Srebrenica was
ethnic cleansing and not genocide, unlike what happened in Krajina, in
which, although there was not military action, the Croatian army decimated
villages." "Was Srebrenica A Hoax? Eye-Witness Account of a Former UN
Military Observer in Bosnia,"
http://globalresearch.ca/articles/BRA403A.html

57. Madeleine Albright, again before the Security Council (The Situation
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/PV.3564), UN Security
Council,
August 10, 1995, 5.30 p.m., pp. 6-7):

58. Richard Holbrooke, on The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Transcript #5300,
August 24, 1995.

59. "U.N. Report: Bosnian Serbs Massacred Srebrenica Muslims," Washington
Post, Aug. 12, 1995; John Pomfret, "Investigators Begin Exhuming Group of
Mass Graves in Bosnia," Washington Post, July 8, 1996. Biggest
"upheaval" is
in "Softening Up The Enemy," Newsweek, Aug. 21, 1995.

60. See the evidence drawn from the Norwegian study of Bosnia casualties
in: http://grayfalcon.blogspot.com/2004/12/death-tolls-part-3.html.

61. Slavisa Sabijic, "The Trade in Bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina":
http://www.serbianna.com/press/010.html; Joan Phillips, "Victims and
Villains in Bosnia's War," Southern Slav Journal, Spring-Summer 1992.

62. "Yugoslav Forensic Expert Says No Proof About Srebrenica Mass Grave,"
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 15, 1996.

63. Kosta Christitch, "Les veritable raisons d'une faillite," B.I., March
2005. As Diana Johnstone has said, "by endorsing every accusation against
Serbs, and ignoring crimes against Serbs, the United States and its NATO
allies have given carte blanche to violence against them. Ethnic Albanian
children are growing up in the belief that nobody really blames them for
hunting down elderly 'Skrinje' (the ethnic slur for Serbs) and beating
them
to death." "The OSCE Report: Things Told and Things Seen," ZNet
Commentary,
Dec. 26, 1999.

64. There have been a modest number of exceptions, mainly Muslim and Croat
small fry, usually indicted at a time when the imbalance appeared
exceptionally gross and some PR offset was needed. None of the leaders of
Croatia or Bosnia were indicted, although it was alleged that indictments
were near soon after Tudjman's and Izetbegovic's deaths, although the long
delays were never explained. No leader or anybody else in NATO was ever
indicted. For a good discussion of the deep bias, Mandel, How America Gets
Away With Murder, Part II.

65. In his 1970 Islamic Declaration, never repudiated by him, Izetbegovic
said: "There is neither peace nor coexistence between the 'Islamic
religion'
and non-Islamic social and political institutions. Having the right to
govern
its own world, Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of
putting a
foreign ideology into practice on its territory." Quoted in Johnstone,
Fools' Crusade, p. 58.

66. The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Official Government Edition, pp.
58, 146-147, 155, 238-239.

67. Documentation Centre of Republic of Srpska, Report About Case
Srebrenica (The First Part), (Banja Luka, Sept. 2002).

68. Gregory Copley, "US Official Implicated With Bosnian High
Representative Ashdown in Attempting to Force Fabricated Report on
Srebrenica," Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, September 8, 2003:
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/ssi09082003.htm; Nebojsa Malic,
"Srebrenica Revisited: Reports, Confessions and the Elusive Truth,"
Antiwar.com, June 24, 2004:
http://antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=2865

69. On the fallacies of the claims regarding Racak, Rambouillet and the
Serb drive for a Greater Serbia as a reality and causal force, see
Johnstone, Fools' Crusade, and Mandel, How America Gets Away with Murder.

70. Only one body found around Srebrenica in the graves explored through
1999 was identified as female.

71. See note 7 above. Tim Ripley says that "Thousands of people, those too
old or infirm to flee,.remained behind. UN patrols soon found
hundreds had
been murdered by Croat soldiers and civilians. Almost every home had been
looted." (p. 192).

72. Serb refugees in Srebrenica in 1997 are explained as "coming from
neighborhoods elsewhere that Croat and Muslim armies emptied in
retaliation
for the Srebrenica atrocities and other such killings." Dana Priest, "U.S.
Troops Extend a Hand To Refugees Tainted by War," Washington Post,
Feb. 18,
1997.

73. Sray, "Selling the Bosnian Myth."

74. For an account and critique of these humanitarian interventionists,
see Edward Herman and David Peterson, "Morality's Avenging Angels: The New
Humanitarian Crusaders," in David Chandler, ed., Rethinking Human Rights
(Palgrave: 2002). For a more extensive dismantling of their arguments, see
Johnstone's Fools' Crusade and Mandel's How America Gets Away With Murder.

75. On the meaning and application of "cruise missile left" (my phrase),
see my "The Cruise Missile Left: Aligning with Power," Z Magazine,
November,
2002; and "The Cruise Missile Left (part 5): Samantha Power And The
Genocide
Gambit," ZNet Commentaries, May 17, 2004.

76. Cedric Thornberry, "Saving the War Crimes Tribunal; Bosnia
Herzegovina," Foreign Policy, September 1996.

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