[ A parte il punto 7 - "Perchè punire la Serbia democratica?" - che
suona ingenuo se non proprio errato (che vuol dire "democratica?
"Democratica" nel senso della NATO??), le seguenti "Dieci ragioni per
cui il Kosovo non deve essere indipendente", elencate da A. Mitic,
meritano davvero di essere tenute a mente... (Italo Slavo)

Apart from Point no.7 - "Why punish the democratic Serbia?" - which
sounds like naif if not completely mistaken (what does "democratic"
mean? "Democratic" in the sense NATO uses the term??), the following
reasons, listed by A. Mitic, are really worth keeping in mind... (IS) ]


NEW EUROPE (European Weekly)
October 30 – November 5, 2005 Issue Number 649

Pros and cons of Kosovo dilemma

In a ten point critical and thorough commentary analyst Aleksandar
Mitic reasons why Kosovo should not be independent


1) Why should one side get it all, the other side lose it all?

The independence of Kosovo is a maximalist solution in which one side
– the Albanian community – gets it all, and the other side – the
Kosovo Serbs and Serbia – loses it all. The Kosovo Serbs and Serbia
will never accept this solution – it can only be imposed but can never
be a result of a compromise. Such a solution also plants on the long
run the seeds of injustice, frustration and instability in the region.

2) Why create a completely new state from the scratch?

An independent Kosovo would be a completely unprincipled solution for
the borders in the Balkans, after that same independence was refused
to some other nations during the 1990s. Let's take the example of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is, under the Dayton accords, composed
of two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslim and
Croat entity) and the Republika Srpska (Serb entity). Just as Kosovo,
Republika Srpska is a protectorate, with the troops from NATO
countries on its soil. Just as in Kosovo, some 90 percent of its
population is made of one ethnic community. Strategically, the Serbs
as the majority community in Republika Srpska have the same
aspirations as the Kosovo Albanians: to become independent. But in
Republika Srpska, the international community is tearing down all
existing symbols and structures of statehood, even those allowed by
the Dayton peace accords. Republika Srpska is in fact, in the process
of being absorbed in a centralized state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
the proclaimed name of stability, multiethnicity and European
integration – but against the will of the majority community. In
Kosovo, only 100km south, that same international community is doing a
completely opposite thing: it is building a new state from the scratch
and treating Kosovo as an "independent state in the making". Is there
any logic in that?

3) Why break up the most multiethnic country in the region?

Just as it rushed with the breakup of the former multiethnic
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, with an independence of Kosovo, the
international community could be rushing to break up Serbia, the most
multiethnic country in the Balkans. If the majority Albanian community
in Kosovo gets independence, what kind of example would that represent
for the Muslim majority in the Sandzak region, the Albanian one in
southern Serbia, the Serbian one in eastern Montenegro, the Albanian
one in western Macedonia, the Serbian one in eastern Slavonia or the
Hungarian one in northern Vojvodina?

4) Why endanger international law?

It is clear that Kosovo could get independence only outside the UN
Security Council, where at least Russia and China would veto such an
option (due to Taiwan, Tibet, Chechenya). A solution without the UN
Security Council approval would be a new slap in the face of
international law. The framework for the resolution of the future
status of Kosovo can be found in the resolution 1244 of the UN
Security Council. Under that resolution, "the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia",
nowadays Serbia and Montenegro. In Resolution 1244 "self-governing" is
mentioned three times, "self-government" four times,
"self-administration" one time, "substantial autonomy" three times
whereas neither "self-determination" nor "independence" is mentioned
in the document. The "sovereignty" of Yugoslavia is mentioned three
times.

5) Why would Kosovo be an exception in the world?

Kosovo cannot be an exception in the world. It would be necessary to
carefully consider the future status of Kosovo since it would likely
have an effect on secessionist movements elsewhere in the region, in
Europe and in the world: Basque province, Corsica, Tibet, Taiwan,
Kurdistan, Scotland, Quebec, Tamil Eeam, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Northern Cyprus, Kashmir, Southern Thailand, etc. All the secessionist
movements in the world will follow with great attention the situation
in Kosovo as a possible precedent.

6) Why did NATO intervene in 1999?

Given the developments in Kosovo since 1999, the independence of
Kosovo would, sooner or later, most probably lead to a monoethnic
Albanian Kosovo. As such, it would completely undermine the arguments
of those who supported the NATO bombings in 1999 in the name of the
"multiethnicity" of Kosovo. The bombing of 1999 would historically be
seen as a campaign for the independence of Kosovo, which is light
years away from the proclaimed goals of a "humanitarian intervention".

7) Why punish the democratic Serbia?

The democratic authorities in Belgrade are firmly on the pro-European
road. They have opened negotiations on the Stabilisation and
Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU – a first step towards full
membership —, they are adopting European laws and reforms proposed by
the international financial institutions. They have established an
efficient cooperation with the International War Crimes Tribunal in
The Hague (all those indicted for the 1999 war crimes in Kosovo are in
The Hague).
Serbia has fulfilled all security demands required in the process of
reforms: it has respected from A to Z the articles of the 1999
Kumanovo accords with NATO on the retreat of security structures from
Kosovo; it has shown restraint and close cooperation with NATO in the
management of the Albanian uprising in 2000-01 in southern Serbia; it
has succeeded in preventing the spillover of violence from Kosovo to
the rest of Serbia during the March 2004 massive anti-Serb violence in
Kosovo; it has been praised by Western diplomats for its management of
ethnic tensions in southern Serbia and in the Vojvodina province; it
has reformed its military and police structures along the lines of the
standards of the OSCE and the Partnership for Peace. It is proposing a
compromising solution for the future status of Kosovo.
Why punish it with the loss of a part of its territory, a birthplace
of the Serbian state, which is still today home to some 1,300 Serbian
monasteries, churches and other Orthodox objects – many of them jewels
of medieval architecture. What kind of consequence would an
independence of Kosovo have on democracy in Serbia? If the Albanian
side gets a maximum of its demands just so that it does not provoke
new tensions and conflicts, who can guarantee that Serbs would
peacefully watch and accept the loss of Kosovo? Does that mean that
the threat of barbarism and violence is winning over interethnic
cooperation and tolerance?

8) Why create a second Albanian state?

The independence of Kosovo and its likely monoethnic character would
mean the creation of a second Albanian national state in the world:
the nation of "Kosovars" in fact does not exist in the European
meaning of the word. There are Albanians, Serbs and other communities
who live in Kosovo. On the other side, according to the UNDP, there
are some 5,000 different ethnic groups living in some 200 countries of
the world. Under the figures of the study "Minorities at Risk", some
509 ethnic groups in the world consider themselves as politically
discriminated. A huge number of them are dreaming of autonomy. Why
would one nation – the Albanian one – get two independent STATES?

9) Why impose independence as "The only solution for Kosovo"?

The key objective should be to give the Kosovo Albanians a maximum of
opportunities and real means to manage their future without feeling
threatened, but also without threatening the interests of other
groups, the security and the shaky stability of the region. Within the
principles of the international community (no return to the situation
from before 1999, no joining to neighbouring states, no partition),
there is a series of options that look much more like a compromise
that an imposed solution of independence.
A sustainable and just solution is one that lies between the standard
autonomy for Kosovo - unacceptable for the Albanian aspirations - and
the full, "conditional" or "immediate" independence - unacceptable for
the Serbs and the Serbian state. Between these two, there is a myriad
of thinkable options - for Kosovo in the region and internally inside
Kosovo: substantial autonomy, confederation, Kosovo as a Euro region,
the Hong Kong model (one state – two systems), South Tirol, Bavaria, etc.

10) Why create new states in a "Borderless Europe"?

If the entire southeastern Europe is going towards European
integration and membership in the European Union – where borders are
no longer "important", if this process is underway and will be
finished in the decade to come, why create a new state in the heart of
Europe? Why create new borders at such high cost if those same borders
will be brought down in the matter of several years? Where is the
logic of European integration in the independence of Kosovo?


(Aleksandar Mitic is Chief Analyst at the Institute of Serbia and
Montenegro in Brussels and Lecturer at the University of Belgrade)