Unused Opportunities for Peace?

Heinz Loquai

Kosovo - A Missed Opportunity for a Peaceful Solution to the Conflict?

The Kosovo Verification Mission was a big challenge for the OSCE - the
most difficult operational task that it has had to deal with since its founding.
Linked to this Mission was the hope for a peaceful solution of the Kosovo
conflict. Did it have any chance at all of meeting the expectations attached to
it? Was the use of military force in the final analysis inevitable in order to
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe?
This article undertakes to provide answers to these questions. Of course it
represents no more than an initial effort, written mainly from an OSCE perspective.
There must be further studies if we are to have a full picture of the
development of this conflict.

The Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement

Background:

For a long time the Kosovo conflict stood in the shadow of the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It was not dealt with in the Dayton Peace Agreement of 14
December 1995 because at that time it was not yet so virulent, no quick solution
seemed possible and any attempt at one would have put at risk the urgent
ending of the Bosnian war.
Resistance on the part of the Kosovo Albanians against Serbia's policy of oppression,
for a long time peaceful, had enjoyed no success. At the beginning
of 1998, the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA, also known as UCK) began to
carry out attacks against Serbian security forces and civilians and against Albanian
"collaborators". Their goal was to win Kosovo's independence from
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) through guerrilla warfare. The
KLA carried out its operations from villages located in the vicinity of the Albanian
border and in central Kosovo inhabited mainly by Albanians. The
Yugoslav security forces struck back, often with disproportionate violence.
The civilian population as is customary in this kind of warfare were misused
as living shields by the partisans and thus suffered as well. They fled from
the areas where fighting was going on. In June 1998 the KLA had 30 to 40
per cent of the territory of Kosovo under their control. The Serbian special
police who were brought in, occasionally supported by the army, intensified
their operations in summer 1998 and drove the KLA back.
The United Nations Security Council intervened in the conflict through its
Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998. In this Resolution it condemned both the
excessive force used by Serbian police forces and "all acts of terrorism by the
Kosovo Liberation Army". Both parties to the conflict were called upon to
enter into a political dialogue without preconditions. With a wealth of initiatives
and conversations at the highest level, the OSCE tried to stop the violence
and promote a political solution. However, the attempt to establish an
OSCE mission in Kosovo failed due to resistance from the FRY. It wanted
first to renew Yugoslav participation in the OSCE, which had been discontinued
in 1992. But the United States and Albania opposed this with particular
vehemence in Vienna. The Balkan Contact Group, the European Union
and Russia also joined the search for a political solution. NATO, too, had
taken up the Kosovo problem in early 1998 and over the summer had produced
a barrage of threats which, however, were directed exclusively against
the Yugoslav leadership.
In September and at the beginning of October 1998 the situation reached the
crisis point. In mid-September and later in that month the number of refugees
was estimated at 300,000 of whom about 50,000 were living out in the open,
mostly in forests. On 23 September 1998 the United Nations Security
Council passed Resolution 1199. What was new in it was a sharper condemnation
of the violence being used by the Yugoslav side, concern over an impending
humanitarian catastrophe, and the assertion that the worsening of the
situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region.
This meant that the conflict had taken on a new character for the UN.
In the United States pressure was being applied by the media at this time to
bring about a military intervention in Kosovo. But Russia had declared unambiguously
that it would not vote for any UN resolution that provided for
the use of military force. A number of European countries also had reservations
about NATO action without a mandate from the UN Security Council.
And in Bonn a change of government was about to take place.
In this situation, the American diplomat, Richard Holbrooke, the master
builder of the Dayton Peace Agreement, undertook along with his colleague
Christopher Hill a final effort to work out a political solution with the Yugoslav
leadership. During his talks in Belgrade he urged NATO to increase the
military pressure on Yugoslavia by threatening to intervene. Indeed, on 24
September 1998 NATO had already threatened Yugoslavia with air attacks in
unmistakable terms. On 13 October 1998, the day on which the Holbrooke-
Milošević agreement was concluded, the NATO Council authorized the Secretary-
General of the Alliance to begin "air strikes" against the FRY, in other
words to start a war. In the opinion of participants at the negotiations in Belgrade
these impending air strikes were an unmistakable threat of war causing
the Yugoslav leadership to concede to the agreement.
The Most Important Provisions of the Agreement and Its Further
Development

The Holbrooke-Milošević agreement is a political framework agreement that
sets forth certain essential points. The most important results of this agreement
were:

- The deployment of an OSCE mission, the Kosovo Verification Mission
(KVM), with up to 2,000 unarmed, international "verifiers" (this concept
was important to Holbrooke in order to emphasize the more active role
of verifiers as compared with simple observers). The Mission was to be
responsible for verifying compliance with UN Resolution 1199, supervising
elections in Kosovo, and providing support in building institutions
and setting up a police apparatus. Not specified in the agreement but important
for developing a climate of trust and security, the ubiquitous
presence of the OSCE in Kosovo was supposed to create an international
public in Kosovo and persuade the refugees to return.
- The creation of an air surveillance system to supplement the observation
activity of the OSCE using manned aircraft and unmanned spacecraft.
This system, to be operated by NATO, was supposed to be stationed outside
of Yugoslavia, in Macedonia.
- A declaration of commitment by Belgrade to conclude an agreement
with the Kosovo Albanians by 1 November 1998 providing for extensive
self-government of Kosovo within the Yugoslav state in accordance with
the terms of Resolution 1199.

This basic agreement had to be supplemented by separate specific understandings
in order to be implemented. Thus agreements were concluded in
quick succession on 15 October 1998 between NATO and the FRY, with regard
to the air surveillance system, and between the OSCE and the FRY on
16 October, with respect to the OSCE Mission. The Yugoslav side turned out
to be co-operative in these follow-up negotiations, so that the agreements
were reached in a very short time. During the negotiations, the Yugoslav side
repeatedly demanded that NATO's threat of war be withdrawn. But the threat
potential remained and may well have hastened the negotiating process.

Assessment of the Agreement

The agreement of 13 October 1998 was the last chance to avert a war. Without
an accord, NATO would have started the air war against the FRY on 17
October 1998. Now there was widespread relief that it had once again proved
possible to prevent a war. And so, many participating States at the meeting of
the OSCE's Permanent Council on 15 October expressed a favourable view
of the agreement. Albania also gave its approval in principle on this occasion
but pointed out that the Albanian government still regarded the stationing of
NATO troops in Kosovo as a necessity. The Kosovo Albanians were dissatisfied
because they had not been involved in the negotiating process and the
result seemed to push their goal - a Kosovo independent of the FRY - a long
distance away. They had hoped that NATO military action, which they still
favoured, would hasten the move towards independence. The United States
had demonstrated once again that it could also get results at the negotiating
table; it saw its view confirmed that a credible threat of military action could
bring about desired political results and all in all it welcomed the fact that
NATO had emerged stronger from this crisis.
Holbrooke had indeed managed to extract substantial concessions from the
Yugoslav President. Milošević accepted a strong OSCE presence in Kosovo,
something which he had always made dependent on certain conditions in the
past, even when much smaller numbers of personnel had been involved. The
verifiers were assured of complete and unimpeded freedom of movement.
The FRY accepted responsibility for their security. It undertook to provide
administrative support to the OSCE Mission in carrying out its responsibilities,
to set up liaison offices and to co-operate with the Mission. The army
and the police were to inform the OSCE of troop movements. Military forces
and special police in Kosovo were to be reduced to a certain strength. This
was worked out in detail on 25 October 1998 in a special agreement between
NATO and the Yugoslav General Staff.
This new responsibility represented a quantum leap for the OSCE with regard
to operational tasks. For a long time it had established and led only small
missions of up to 25 members. With the Missions to Bosnia and Herzegovina
and to Croatia the number of personnel went up to 400 for the first time. The
deployment of up to 2,000, and occasionally even more, international staff,
along with several hundred local employees, far exceeded the planning and
leadership capacity of the OSCE's small staff in Vienna. And time was of the
essence! The OSCE had to show the flag quickly in Kosovo and cover the
region with a dense surveillance network. This would only be possible if the
OSCE participating States quickly reinforced the Vienna staff with qualified
personnel, speedily provided experts and verifiers for use in Kosovo, supplied
equipment and vehicles, and expanded the Organization's financial resources.
It is a simple fact that the OSCE does not - as NATO does - have
troops available on short notice and experienced leadership staffs; rather, it
has to ask the participating States for the personnel in connection with each
operational task individually, select the people and train them. This is no big
problem for small missions, but in the case of one the size of the Kosovo
mission it would take months if the normal routine were used. There was
general agreement, however, that the time immediately after conclusion of
the agreement would be of decisive importance for any lasting success.
Thus the OSCE was at a crossroads. If it succeeded in mastering the terribly
difficult task in Kosovo it would emerge strengthened and with enhanced
prestige from this test. A failure of the OSCE Mission would inevitably result
in a lessening of the OSCE's significance in the system of international organizations.

Organization and Increase in Staff at the Kosovo Verification Mission

The basic outline of the organizational structure of the OSCE Mission was set
forth in the agreement between the FRY and the OSCE. However, the agreement
provided for enough organizational flexibility so that the structure could
be adapted to the requirements of the task. The Mission was divided into:

- a headquarters in Priština,
- five regional centres in fairly large cities,
- field offices in small towns and communities,
- groups of verifiers working out of the field offices,
- a training centre, and
- a liaison office in Belgrade to maintain contact with the Yugoslav government.

There were Yugoslav liaison officers to facilitate co-operation between the
Yugoslav government and the OSCE.
The United States had already presented its views on the Mission's structure
and working methods on 16 October in Vienna. This unexpectedly rapid
presentation of their standpoint caused a certain unease amongst a number of
countries. Although the American speakers described their ideas as suggestions,
the polished and detailed presentation gave a clear indication of the
American desire to control proceedings for which the other countries had as
yet no definite conception. American resolve was further reflected in the fact
that on 17 October 1998, i.e. before the OSCE Permanent Council had even
officially adopted the decision to establish the Mission, and without prior
consultation with other countries - which is the usual practice in making such
appointments - the American diplomat William Walker had been named
Head of the Verification Mission by the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE,
the Polish Foreign Minister, Bronisław Geremek. The Europeans, who had
also been interested in the top job, were left with the deputy positions. A
Frenchman, Gabriel Keller, became First Deputy. An Englishman, a Russian,
an Italian and a German were chosen as additional Deputies.
On 17 October a 13-man OSCE delegation was already in Belgrade to work
with the Yugoslav side in preparing the deployment of the Mission. NATO
started its air surveillance on the same day.
On 25 October 1998 the Permanent Council of the OSCE made its formal
decision on the establishment of the Kosovo Mission, the way having been
paved by the adoption of Resolution 1203 by the UN Security Council on the
previous day.
Under the circumstances, it was clear that it would not be possible for the
verifiers to show up on the scene immediately. In order to have limited
monitoring, an agreement was reached with the FRY to temporarily expand
Diplomatic Observer Missions that had been set up in summer of 1998. They
were to carry out surveillance activity on behalf of the OSCE and later be absorbed
into the OSCE Mission. Thus there was a limited international presence
on the scene, at least for a transitional period.
On 16 November 1998 in Kosovo, there were 60 OSCE employees in the
headquarters and in the training centre as well as nearly 300 members of the
Diplomatic Observer Mission, of whom about 60 per cent were Americans. A
month later the Mission had grown to 803 members although almost half of
them were local employees (drivers, interpreters, secretaries and the like).
Approximately one third of the international personnel were verifiers in the
area to be observed. Taken together with the remaining 200 diplomatic observers,
they were still far too few to ensure a permanent presence even at the
most critical points. On 16 February 1999 - i.e. five months after conclusion
of the agreement between the OSCE and the FRY - the number of international
OSCE workers had climbed to 934, still less than half of the target figure.
Shortly before the Mission was withdrawn, on 18 March 1999, about 65
per cent of the agreed-upon maximum number of members had been reached.
This unsatisfactorily slow growth in personnel corresponded to delays in
other areas. The security of OSCE personnel was of major concern to the
countries that sent them and to the OSCE itself. Yugoslavia had, to be sure,
agreed to guarantee the security of this personnel. But their rescue system
was not very efficient in emergencies. Hence Switzerland made a rescue helicopter
available to the OSCE, but despite intervention at the highest levels
the Yugoslav government refused to let the helicopter enter the country,
pointing instead to its own rescue system. Appeals by the OSCE to participating
States for a mobile medical core and medical vehicles went unanswered
for a long time. A team of German medics was the first to arrive, but
not until 7 December.
Armoured vehicles, which because of the danger of mines and of armed attacks
provided important protection to personnel, represented a further problem.
From the beginning diplomatic observers had had such vehicles - about
one for every three people. The OSCE Mission did not receive its first vehicle
of this kind until the end of November 1998 and by the end of December
had about 40 of them - one for every seven verifiers!
On 2 December, at the OSCE's Ministerial Council in Oslo, the German Foreign
Minister criticized the OSCE in unusually sharp terms. Fischer stated:
"We are not unaware of the difficulties in setting up the KVM. Nevertheless,
we are worried about its slow progress, its lack of transparency and the application
of unequal standards in the choice of personnel. The planning proc-
ess has scarcely begun for some of the core responsibilities of the KVM. This
is particularly true with regard to the police." In principle the Foreign Minister
was right. However the German government had only a few days before
that, i.e. on 25 November, decided to deploy 40 police officers!
There is no doubt that there were organizational gaps and other weaknesses
in the staff organs of the OSCE. Nor was the leadership style of the American
Head of Mission particularly helpful to the rapid construction of the Mission.
He did not arrive in Kosovo until three weeks after his appointment. Because
he had reserved all decisions on organization and personnel for himself, there
were repeated delays. Experienced candidates often had to spend some weeks
waiting before finally being accepted. Even so, the main problem lay with the
participating States themselves where there was often a huge gap between
verbal support for the OSCE and the contributions actually made in personnel,
material and financial resources. Nor did the new German government
give the impression that it attached top political priority to the Kosovo Mission.
Governments which later sent thousands of soldiers to Kosovo with
heavy equipment obviously had problems making a few hundred unarmed
verifiers rapidly available.

Events in Kosovo from October 1998 until March 1999

The objective here is not to provide a chronological account of all events.
Rather, our attention will be focused first on the initial weeks after conclusion
of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement, because key accents were set
during that time. Second, we shall attempt to provide an accurate picture of
the immediate pre-war period, i.e. from the beginning of March 1999 until
the outbreak of war. The highly detailed daily reports of the OSCE are the
main source.
On 29 September 1998 the Serbian leadership declares that the KLA has been
defeated. On 6 October 1998 the picture in Kosovo is as follows: Police control
points have been reduced in number; the special police are hardly visible;
the military forces have been almost entirely withdrawn into their barracks;
army units not belonging to the Priština-Corps, which is permanently stationed
in Kosovo, are being transferred to barracks outside of Kosovo. Refugees
are returning to their villages, hesitantly thus far, and are beginning to
prepare for winter there. Only a few refugees are still seen out in the open,
although the supply situation remains critical. However, in those places
where the Serbian military and police have pulled back the KLA are returning.
They are using northern Albania as a base for attacks against the Serbs
and also as a place for withdrawal. The Yugoslav side has obviously started
to meet the requirements of UN Resolution 1199. The KLA, with word and
deed, is working against it.

After conclusion of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement the picture does not
change much. On 17 and 18 October the KLA carry out a number of raids
against Yugoslav security forces. Four policemen and two soldiers are killed
in the process. On 20 October the KLA abducts two Tanjug correspondents.
KLA leaders call for a continuation of the armed struggle. Yugoslav troops
from Priština are transferred to the areas where KLA operations are concentrated.
The Serbian police remain present in many places, but they are less
visible. At the end of October the situation continues to be ambiguous. The
Yugoslav side still appears to be on course in fulfilling UN requirements. The
Yugoslav army has withdrawn a large portion of the troops that were to leave
Kosovo. Police forces have also been reduced. Their control points are now
manned only by traffic police. Refugees are returning to their places of residence
in larger numbers. But the KLA is filtering back as well, using refugee
camps for protection; it continues to attack Yugoslav security forces and has
regained control over a number of villages. Members of the KLA express
their disappointment that NATO has not yet intervened but are confident that
they can still bring this about. On 23 October, after pressure has been put on
him by EU ambassadors, the Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova speaks out
publicly for the first time in favour of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement
and calls on the armed Kosovo-Albanian groups to exercise restraint.
In mid-November the overall situation is outwardly calm but there is tension
in certain regions. Most of the refugees have returned. The Yugoslav side is
obviously determined to observe the agreement for the most part while the
KLA is expanding and reinforcing its positions, again and again attacking the
police and the army in guerrilla warfare style. By this time the KLA is better
armed and equipped, has reorganized itself and is taking over sovereign responsibilities
in the areas it controls. The Serbian side complains that there
are still no OSCE verifiers on the scene. Representatives of the Serbian security
forces warn that they cannot tolerate the present situation much longer.
They themselves have to comply with the limitations of the agreement while
the KLA is operating without interference.
A tense calm continues to prevail until the end of November with scattered
incidents in very limited areas. As of 20 November there are no more refugees
living in the open; international assistance has begun to arrive on a large
scale. The KLA is continuing to mount attacks from the protection of villages.
The diplomatic observers, who are still the only OSCE presence on the
scene, are much more than passive onlookers. Their presence strengthens the
sense of security of the civilian population; they exercise a moderating influence
on the parties to the conflict and mediate in the event of disputes. Cooperation
between the diplomats and the Serbs and Albanians is generally
good.
After the beginning of December developments, which have hitherto been for
the most part favourable, no longer continue that way. On 2 December Belgrade
sends a memorandum to the OSCE charging that international organi-
zations and representatives of certain countries are maintaining contact with
"terrorists, killers, kidnappers and other criminals calling themselves KLA".
On 5 December the general staff of the KLA declares that they stand firm to
their commitment to "the just fight towards the creation of our independent
and democratic state". Rugova states at a press conference that the stationing
of NATO troops in Kosovo would ensure lasting security. The armed encounters
between the Serbian police and the KLA grow in number. The Serbian
civilian population in Kosovo becomes hostile towards international assistance
organizations, which they reproach for giving one-sided help to the
Albanians. The deputy commander of police in Kosovo on 15 December expresses
his growing disappointment. He says he is trying to keep the "terrorists"
under control but the international community is reinforcing them.
The American Christopher Hill and the Austrian Wolfgang Petritsch are not
making headway in the political negotiations they are trying to conduct. On
18 November Hill had declared in Vienna that it was realistic to expect Belgrade
and the Kosovo-Albanian side to find a provisional political solution
before Christmas. On 7 December Hill's proposal is rejected by the Albanians
as unacceptable. In the Permanent Council of the OSCE Petritsch expresses
the view on 16 December that the prospects for substantial steps towards a
political solution are not good at the present time. According to Petritsch, the
central problem remains the divisions on the Kosovo-Albanian side. And this
is not so much a question of arguments over substance as of personal differences.
Petritsch also asserts, all Kosovo-Albanian representatives continue to
stand uncompromisingly for independence.
On 11 December the OSCE carries out its first weapons inspection of the
Yugoslav army without finding anything significant to take exception to.
More inspections follow.
On 14 December there is a serious incident in the vicinity of the Albanian
border. The Yugoslav army stops 140 armed Albanians on their way into
Kosovo, shoots 36 and takes nine prisoners who are later freed. On the same
evening two men shoot indiscriminately in a bar frequented by young Serbs
in Peć, killing six students and seriously wounding three.
At this time protests by Kosovo Serbs against the OSCE begin. It and, in particular,
the United States are accused of supporting the KLA and of doing
nothing to clear up the whereabouts of 2,000 Serbs the KLA is supposed to
have abducted and imprisoned. These protests are later directed against the
leadership in Belgrade as well; the Yugoslav and the Serbian President are
given an ultimatum to come to Priština.
The time from mid-December 1998 until the end of February 1999 is characterized
by stagnation in the political negotiating process in Kosovo and by
a growing number of armed encounters - for the most part initiated by the
KLA and met by the Yugoslav police and army with a disproportionate use
of force. Working conditions become more difficult for the OSCE verifiers.
There are new movements of refugees in the fighting zones. Both sides com-
ply less and less with the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement. Again and again
the OSCE is able to intervene and de-escalate the situation, stabilizing it to a
certain - although very tense - level. But in the absence of a political solution
there does not appear to be any likelihood of lasting control over the conflict.
But there are many encouraging events as well. On 25 January 1999, Head of
Mission Walker reports in Vienna that the people in Kosovo are coming more
and more to realize that the Mission is a useful institution. For example, it
had protected Serbian electricians when they were carrying out necessary repairs
on the destroyed electrical facilities in Kosovo-Albanian villages. And
it had mediated in the question of whether to open schools. On 15 February
1999 the buildings of the colleges of law, economics and pedagogy are given
back to the Albanian academic authorities in Priština. (Albanian students had
been excluded since 1991.) Clear progress in ensuring the due process of legal
proceedings is ascribed to the presence of OSCE human rights experts.
In the middle of January 1999 NATO had already started to give thought to
how pressure on the Yugoslav side could be increased. The use of NATO
ground troops in Kosovo was discussed in the North Atlantic Council as was
the possibility of an ultimatum tied to a threat of air attacks. On 1 February,
in the Permanent Council of the OSCE, the United States called for arrangements
to withdraw the OSCE observers quickly in the event of threatened
NATO strikes. France opposed such measures, however, since negotiations
were still determining the logic of events. On 6 February, negotiations begin
in Rambouillet.
At the end of February and the beginning of March 1999 increased preparations
for war by the Yugoslav army are detected. Reservists are called up,
weapons are issued to civilians, bridges are primed to be blown up, troops are
regrouped and transferred out of barracks to field exercises and stationed in
the regions near the borders to Albania and Macedonia. There is no doubt
that these activities are a violation to the agreement. The Serbian justification
- that these were measures to protect against the threat of a NATO attack -
cannot from a military point of view be denied. As a consequence of a growing
military presence and increasingly frequent heavy fighting the Albanian
civilian population start to leave their villages again. There are reports from
Albanian villagers on the plundering of their houses by Serbian soldiers.
The final reports of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo between 15 and 18 March
1999 permit the following summary: the armed disputes are local and of limited
duration; they are concentrated in the areas around Priština and Mitrovica.
The Yugoslav army is bringing in new troops and expanding the defence
positions on the border to Albania and Macedonia. The Kosovo-Albanian
civilian population leave territory being fought over but return to their
villages when the danger is past and start reconstruction work. There has
been considerable violation of the October agreements by both sides. Developments
are again moving towards a crisis. On 19 March 1999 the negotiations
in Paris are broken off.

On the same day the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, now the Norwegian Foreign
Minister Knut Vollebæk, decides on the recommendation of Head of Mission
Walker to withdraw the OSCE Mission from Kosovo. The justification is that
the security of Mission members can no longer be guaranteed and the Mission
can no longer fulfil its responsibilities. The actual situation in Kosovo
does not support this rationale, however. For example, the OSCE reports on
18 March: the situation in the region remains generally tense, but calm. On
this day the OSCE carries out 120 patrols with no difficulty. The main reason
for the decision to withdraw the Mission before NATO air attacks began was
no doubt to protect international verifiers from exposure to Serbian violence.
President Bill Clinton also explains the planned air attacks in a speech on 19
March. The decision had obviously already been made. On 18 March, in Vienna,
Russia had continued to argue that the Mission should remain in
Kosovo because it was the only stabilizing factor there. But the withdrawal
on 20 March 1999 begins anyway. At 12 o'clock the last OSCE vehicle
crosses the border into Macedonia. Following the example of the OSCE, the
employees of other international organizations also withdraw from the province.
Kosovo is largely free of international control and assistance.

The events show that there certainly were opportunities for a peaceful solution
of the Kosovo conflict. The opportunity was ready to be grasped between
the middle of October and the beginning of December 1998. During
those weeks the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been steering a course
towards peace. The doves in that country had obviously got the upper hand.
The Kosovo Albanians ought to have been brought or forced onto the same
course. A rapid and omnipresent deployment of the OSCE Mission would
have been able to secure the path to peace. Neither succeeded.
But even thereafter there were frequent periods of relative calm and opportunities
for a peaceful solution of the conflict still existed. Beginning in December
1998, however, the hawks were circling once again. Both parties to
the conflict escalated their use of force. The KLA felt that it was close to the
goal that it had so doggedly pursued - a NATO attack against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav hard-liners had been seeking to eliminate
the KLA and its entire infrastructure. Neither had much consideration
for the civilian population, which was used for the purposes of each side.
However, there is no evidence that a carefully prepared and systematic plan
to drive out the Kosovo-Albanian population existed before the beginning of
the air attacks. The OSCE had always been able to contain the conflicts and,
on a case-by-case basis, to bring about a fragile stability.
After the end of January 1999, however, the pressure for a military solution
through NATO, with the United States in the lead, became ever stronger. It is
clear that the United States wanted to end the conflict quickly. NATO's
credibility appeared to be at stake. And all of this just a few weeks before the
NATO summit in Washington celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Alliance.
This was another reason why the time for a negotiated solution became
very short. What happened afterwards was, more and more, determined by
the logic of war.
Those who ultimately decided to begin the air attacks must have known that
the Yugoslav leadership would do everything possible to destroy the KLA,
using all resources and without regard for the civilian population, and that the
Yugoslav army, police and bands of soldiers who were no longer under international
observation - and even more inflamed by the air attacks - would
commit acts of violence against the Albanian civilian population. It ought to
have been equally clear that the NATO air attacks would require weeks in
order to bring about a real weakening of the Yugoslav military potential. A
horrible humanitarian catastrophe following the beginning of the air attacks
was in fact quite predictable.
In view of this predictability, the question remains why the small risk of continued
negotiations and of giving peace a chance was not taken and why, instead,
the high risk that war necessarily entailed was chosen. This question,
however, will have to wait some time for a convincing answer.

Quello che Cristicchi dimentica. Magazzino 18, gli «italiani brava gente» e le vere larghe intese

di Piero Purini (guest blogger),
con una postilla di Wu Ming e una breve linkografia ragionata.

[Abbiamo chiesto allo storico Piero Purini  - o Purich, cognome della famiglia prima che il fascismo lo italianizzasse - di guardare il discusso spettacolo di Simone Cristicchi e recensirlo per Giap.
Purini è autore del fondamentale Metamorfosi etniche. I cambiamenti di popolazione a Trieste, Gorizia, Fiume e in Istria. 1914-1975, appena ristampato da KappaVu con una prefazione di Jože Pirjevec.
Consigliamo questo libro a chiunque voglia conoscere e capire la storia del confine orientale nel Novecento. L'autore ha scovato, consultato e confrontato non solo fonti "nostrane", come troppo spesso accade, ma anche fonti in lingua tedesca, slovena, croata e inglese.
Per potersi dedicare alla ricerca degli «esodi» e delle migrazioni forzate nella zona che va dal Friuli orientale al Quarnero, Purini è dovuto andare all'Università di Klagenfurt, visto che in Italia aveva trovato solo porte chiuse. Metamorfosi etniche è l'espansione della sua tesi di dottorato.
Piero è modesto e non lo dice in giro, ma un paio di settimane fa lui e Poljanka Dolhar hanno messo in fuga da Radio 3 Marcello Veneziani, e senza nemmeno fargli «Buh!» Cliccare e ascoltare per credere, ma solo dopo aver letto l'articolo qui sotto.
In calce, una nostra postilla su «memoria condivisa» e rimozione del conflitto.
Ricordiamo che sotto il post ci sono due comandi: uno permette di salvarlo in ePub, l'altro lo apre in versione ottimizzata per la stampa.]
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Magazzino 18 di Simone Cristicchi mi è sembrato un’operazione teatrale molto furba con uno scopo politico più che evidente: fornire uno strumento artistico efficace per propagandare la cosiddetta memoria condivisa, tanto cara al mondo politico «postideologico», secondo cui tutti gli italiani devono riconoscersi in una storia comune. Storia comune di cui, fin dal nefasto incontro Fini-Violante del 1998, le foibe e l’esodo sono pietre angolari.

Questa finalità prettamente politica è andata decisamente a scapito del valore artistico dello spettacolo: ne è risultata una pièce teatrale che mette insieme in maniera piuttosto bislacca generi disparati, richiami furbeschi all’immaginario collettivo italiano, imitazioni di spettacoli o film più o meno familiari allo spettatore medio. Un mix nazionalpopolare (a mio avviso piuttosto noioso e stucchevole) in cui troviamo un impiegato romano burino (che risulterà nostalgicamente simile ad alcune macchiette di Alberto Sordi); suggestioni musicali che si ispirano evidentemente a Schindler’s List (a suggerire per l’ennesima volta l’improprio paragone tra l’esodo giuliano-dalmata e la Shoah); imbarazzanti imitazioni di Marco Paolini, sia nella struttura dello spettacolo, sia nella recitazione; discutibili inserti tipo musical (alcuni brani non stonerebbero in film Disney come Pomi d’ottone e manici di scopa o Tutti insieme appassionatamente).

Secondo me, proprio l’ultima di queste canzoni – una via di mezzo traAladdin e Il re Leone – mostra l’ambiguità che permea l’intero spettacolo. La canzone si intitola Non dimenticare e recita: «Non è un’offesa che cede al rancore / non è ferita da rimarginare / è l’undicesimo comandamento: / non dimenticare».
E’ sottinteso, ciò che non si deve dimenticare è la tragedia delle foibe e dell’esodo, ma per ricordare questi eventi Cristicchi non esita a dimenticarne o trascurarne completamente altri che potrebbero risultare estremamente scomodi per lo scopo del suo spettacolo: appunto la creazione di una memoria collettiva esclusivamente italiana.

Cinque minuti e poi…

Innanzitutto Cristicchi dimentica di contestualizzare storicamente l’esodo. E’ vero che nello spettacolo è stata inserita una scena in cui vengono narrati i suoi antefatti storici, ma questa scena è del tutto assente nel cd allegato al libro e, se non sbaglio, ridotta nella lunghezza in alcune repliche, in quanto – almeno così mi sembra confrontando la trasmissione Rai, il cd e alcuni spezzoni tratti da YouTube – lo spettacolo viene modificato a seconda del luogo dov’è rappresentato.

Tale spiegazione storica è comunque troppo breve (cinque minuti scarsi su uno spettacolo di un’ora e tre quarti), superficiale, inesatta e abbonda di luoghi comuni. Talmente sbrigativa che sembra essere stata inserita al solo scopo di prevenire eventuali accuse di scarsa obiettività e dare un’apparenza bipartisan allo spettacolo.

La complessità etnico-linguistico-nazionale del territorio è liquidata dicendo che «per questo fazzoletto di terra ci sono passati tutti: italiani, austriaci, francesi, ungheresi, slavi». Già con questa descrizione Cristicchi può creare confusione nel pubblico: lo spettatore inconsapevole non sa che in questo territorio c’erano popolazioni autoctone (italiani, sloveni e croati) presenti da secoli, spesso fuse e mescolate tra loro, mentre Austria-Ungheria e Francia furono le entità statali che lo amministrarono.

Anche sul termine «italiani» ci sarebbe da ridire, in quanto, più che di «italiani» si trattava di popolazioni che parlavano il dialetto istroveneto della zona. Probabilmente la maggior parte degli italofoni residenti a Trieste o a Gorizia avevano la percezione di sé come fedeli sudditi asburgici, mentre l’irredentismo era appannaggio di una limitata ma rumorosa minoranza di altoborghesi (che proprio per la loro posizione sociale riusciva ad amplificare a dismisura le tesi favorevoli all’Italia) e di un’altrettanta sparuta minoranza di giovani contestatori che vedevano nel mito dell’Italia la contrapposizione ad un’Austria percepita come vecchia, bigotta ed opprimente. Esisteva anche una comunità di diverse decine di migliaia di persone di lingua tedesca, che risiedeva sul territorio da almeno 120 anni, e una miriade di piccole ma culturalmente vivacissime comunità non italiane: ebrei, serbi, cechi, greci, armeni, svizzeri, rumeni, turchi.

Gli altri esodi prima dell’esodo

Ciò che Cristicchi dimentica è che questo equilibrio e questa (fragile) convivenza non furono interrotte dal fascismo – come sostiene inMagazzino 18 -, ma già dalle autorità militari italiane subito dopo la conquista del territorio nel 1918.

Cristicchi dimentica che con la vittoria nella Grande Guerra l’Italia si annesse un territorio che comprendeva circa 500.000 non italiani.

Cristicchi, che ha voluto scrivere uno spettacolo sull’«Esodo», dimentica che quello giuliano-dalmata non fu il primo spostamento forzato di popolazione di questo territorio: già a partire dal novembre ’18 si verificò una diaspora degli abitanti della zona, che se ne andavano perchè temevano l’arrivo delle truppe italiane o perché la nuova sistemazione politica del territorio impediva loro di poter restare.

Cristicchi dimentica che le autorità militari italiane già nel novembre 1918 chiusero tutte le scuole della comunità tedesca della Venezia Giulia trasformandole in buona parte in caserme;
dimentica che insegnanti tedeschi, sloveni e croati persero il lavoro, furono espulsi o addirittura internati perchè continuavano ad insegnare clandestinamente nelle loro lingue;
dimentica che migliaia di reduci dell’esercito austroungarico non poterono tornare alle proprie case perchè le autorità militari permettevano il rientro ai soli reduci di lingua italiana;
dimentica che già nel primo anno di occupazione (1918-’19) l’intellighenzia culturale slovena e croata (850 persone tra sacerdoti ed insegnanti) venne internata nel Meridione perché rappresentava il veicolo di sopravvivenza della lingua e della cultura delle due minoranze;
dimentica che vi fu una campagna di delazione nei confronti di chi in casa parlava ancora tedesco, o che molti di coloro che erano definiti “austriacanti” (anche di lingua italiana) vennero fatti salire senza troppe cerimonie sui treni e spediti a Vienna o a Graz.
Dal 1918 al 1920 la vox populi locale parlò di oltre 40.000 partenze dalla sola Trieste verso Austria e Jugoslavia.

Cristicchi dimentica (o non sa) che l’esodo da Pola di cui parla nel suo spettacolo fu preceduto da un altro che nel 1918-’19 vide la partenza di oltre un terzo degli abitanti, e che fu questo esodo a rendere la popolazione così compattamente italiana, dal momento che se ne andarono la stragrande maggioranza dei tedeschi e una parte consistente dei croati e degli sloveni.

Cristicchi ignora che nel periodo tra le due guerre oltre 100.000 abitanti della Venezia Giulia partirono per Jugoslavia, Austria o Argentina perché le condizioni del territorio sotto l’Italia erano per loro invivibili;
dimentica – o più probabilmente non sa, perchè la storiografia italiana non ne ha quasi mai parlato – che nel 1919 più di mille ferrovieri tedeschi e sloveni del compartimento di Trieste vennero pretestuosamente licenziati in tronco durante uno sciopero e spediti in Austria e in Jugoslavia per poterli sostituire con personale ferroviario italiano;
dimentica che lo Stato italiano portò avanti una campagna di insediamento di italiani provenienti soprattutto dal Veneto e dalla Puglia per sostituire i non italiani che erano partiti e che dal ’18 al ’31 furono quasi 130.000 gli immigrati nella Venezia Giulia, un numero tale che le autorità dovettero addirittura proibire l’immigrazione nelle nuove province, perché la situazione economica del territorio non permetteva di fornire occupazione a tutti.

I primi immigrati ad arrivare furono 47.000 tra militari, carabinieri, poliziotti, guardie carcerarie, che dovevano imporre un controllo di stampo quasi coloniale alle nuove terre. La militarizzazione del territorio è particolarmente evidente se viene confrontata con la situazione prebellica: prima del conflitto l’Austria manteneva di stanza nel Litorale solamente 25.000 tra soldati e gendarmi, di cui ben 17.000 concentrati a Pola, dove si trovava la più grande base militare della marina austroungarica.
Cristicchi, poi, dimentica (ma più probabilmente ignora) che nel settembre del 1920, per piegare un sciopero, l’esercito cannoneggiò le case del rione “rosso” di San Giacomo, caso unico nella storia d’Italia di uso dell’artiglieria pesante contro un centro abitato in tempo di pace.

L’incendio del Narodni Dom

Nella sua scena di «introduzione storica» Cristicchi parla delle violenze contro i non-italiani (attribuendole tutte al fascismo, ancor prima che il partito fascista esistesse) e cita – giustamente – l’incendio del Narodni Dom, l’enorme casa del popolo, centro culturale e simbolo degli sloveni, dei croati e dei cechi nel centro di Trieste. Cristicchi sostiene che la sua distruzione fu «la prima grande frattura tra gli italiani della Venezia Giulia e la popolazione slovena e croata». Affermazione discutibile, visto che tensioni e violenze ce n’erano già state prima, e che – ad esempio – già in epoca asburgica il principale partito italiano, quello liberalnazionale, aveva ottenuto che a Trieste venisse impedita la costruzione di un liceo sloveno.

[IMMAGINE: L’incendio del Narodni Dom di Trieste, 13 luglio 1920]

Per giunta Cristicchi presenta l’incendio del Narodni Dom come una reazione all’uccisione di due militari italiani a Spalato. La stampa nazionalista dell’epoca aveva però omesso di dire che quei due militari avevano appena mitragliato i partecipanti ad una manifestazione, uccidendone uno, e pure Cristicchi omette questo particolare. Invece, rispetto all’incendio, in un’intervista a Repubblica ha sostenuto che ci sono «dubbi e chiaroscuri» (aggiungendo tra l’altro «Lì è morta una persona soltanto»!), insinuando forse l’interpretazione in voga durante il fascismo secondo cui dal palazzo si sparò e vennero gettate bombe contro gli assedianti, versione già ampiamente smentita dalla stampa non fascista e dalla stampa straniera dell’epoca, nonché da storici titolati e decisamente non sospettabili di simpatie filoslave come Carlo Schiffrer.

Chi ha detto «Italiano = fascista»?

Magazzino 18 descrive le prevaricazioni che il fascismo adottò per legge contro le minoranze:
il divieto di utilizzare lingue straniere nei tribunali e negli uffici pubblici (ma dimentica che gli sloveni riottennero questo diritto solo nel 2001!);
la totale chiusura delle scuole slovene e croate;
la rimozione delle tabelle in lingue slave (ma dimentica che ancor oggi nel centro di Trieste non ci sono le tabelle bilingui per non urtare la sensibilità di qualcuno…);
l’italianizzazione di «molti» cognomi (si parla di 100.000 persone solo a Trieste, mezzo milione in tutta la Venezia Giulia… Solo «molti»?) e quella dei toponimi (con paesi che ancor oggi, nonostante gli esiti di referendum locali, non possono tornare ufficialmente al nome originario perché è necessaria una votazione in parlamento)…
«Gradualmente,» dice Cristicchi, «gli spazi culturali, economici e sociali degli slavi vengono soppressi». Corretto. Ma non sarebbe stato male aggiungere che accanto alle chiusure per legge avvenivano veri e propri pogrom antislavi, con distruzione di tipografie, circoli, case private, negozi. Chi parlava sloveno o croato in pubblico rischiava bastonate, sputi (alcuni zelanti maestri erano usi sputare in bocca agli alunni che non parlavano in italiano), olio di ricino e addirittura olio da motore, come quello che venne somministrato al dirigente di coroLojze Bratuž, che morì un mese dopo.

[IMMAGINE: Lojze Bratuž, italianizzato in Luigi Bertossi. Morto a Gorizia nel 1937 a soli trentaquattro anni. Una squadra fascista lo sequestrò e gli fece bere a forza olio da motore. Il giorno della sua morte, gli amici si radunarono di fronte all’ospedale e cantarono una canzone slovena (gesto proibito dal fascismo), poi fuggirono per non subire violenze a loro volta.]

Cristicchi scrive che il risentimento produsse tra sloveni e croati l’equazione «italiano = fascista». E anche qui c’è una bella dimenticanza. In realtà questa uguaglianza non fu un’invenzione di sloveni e croati, ma per un ventennio fu portata avanti dalla propaganda fascista: proclamando l’entrata in guerra contro l’Etiopia, dal balcone di palazzo Venezia, il Duce aveva enfaticamente affermato: «L’identità tra Italia e fascismo è perfetta, assoluta, inalterabile». Dunque anche qui si attribuisce agli slavi come errore di valutazione una parola d’ordine che invece era ben radicata nell’ideologia fascista e probabilmente gradita a non pochi italiani.

Occupazione fascista e Resistenza

Cristicchi passa poi all’analisi del periodo bellico: cita l’invasione della Jugoslavia, gli incendi di villaggi, i massacri di civili, i crimini di guerra per cui nessuno ha mai pagato, gli ordini delittuosi di Roatta, le migliaia di morti nei campi di internamento, in primis quello di Arbe (anche se attribuisce tutto ciò a Mussolini, quando invece dietro di lui c’era tutto un apparato militare e amministrativo-burocratico che sosteneva le sue avventure belliche al di là dell’appartenenza al fascismo).

Tutto corretto storicamente, ma troppo sbrigativo: quelle che sono le cause principali di foibe e deportazioni sono liquidate in poche frasi. Forse Cristicchi avrebbe potuto ricordare la città di Lubiana, circondata da filo spinato e trasformata essa stessa in un enorme campo di concentramento; avrebbe potuto spiegare come i militari italiani a Podhum uccisero 91 abitanti, ne deportarono 900 e rasero al suolo l’intero paese, non diversamente da quanto i tedeschi fecero a Sant’Anna di Stazzema o a Marzabotto. Avrebbe potuto dire che la Slovenia ebbe un numero di vittime pari al 6,3% della popolazione, addirittura la città di Lubiana raggiunse il 9% di vittime; avrebbe potuto dire che la Jugoslavia contò un milione e centomila vittime su una popolazione di 15 milioni (solo a titolo di paragone l’Italia su 43 milioni ebbe circa 450.000 vittime).

Soprattutto, Cristicchi dimentica (o non sa) che molti di quelli che sfuggirono ai massacri italiani e tedeschi andarono ad ingrossare le fila della resistenza antifascista di Tito.

[IMMAGINE: Partigiani della divisione italiana Garibaldi, inquadrata nel II° Korpus dell’Esercito Popolare di Liberazione della Jugoslavia.]

I partigiani, nel racconto di Cristicchi, ad un certo punto «scendono dalle montagne dell’interno dove sono accampati» ed iniziano a girare casa per casa alla ricerca delle loro vittime su cui sfogare la propria vendetta.

Cristicchi omette di dire che i partigiani non fecero campeggio in montagna per poi andare ad ammazzare gli italiani: sostennero una lotta durissima contro le forze dell’Asse, contro i nazifascisti e dopo l’8 settembre 1943 contro i tedeschi e contro i collaborazionisti italiani che continuarono a combattere a fianco dei nazisti. Perché anche questo Cristicchi dimentica: che con l’armistizio e la dissoluzione dell’esercito italiano, una parte dei soldati italiani riuscì a tornare a casa, mentre altri si unirono proprio a quelle forze di Tito che sarebbero «scese dalle montagne» per «colpire gli italiani che sono un ostacolo» alla grande Jugoslavia (termine inventato: non è mai esistita una «grande Jugoslavia», a significarne l’espansionismo, a differenza di «grande Serbia», o «grande Germania»).
Altri soldati italiani continuarono a combattere assieme ai tedeschi. Cristicchi dimentica di dire che spesso questi collaborazionisti italiani si incaricarono del «lavoro sporco» (rastrellamenti, torture, esecuzioni), forse facendo – questi sì – odiare gli italiani in quanto fascisti.

Inoltre, quando parla dei partigiani Cristicchi li descrive sempre come «bande», «titini», «ribelli» rimuovendo il fatto che i soldati di Tito non furono bande feroci e selvagge, bensì un esercito che combatteva contro l’Asse e considerato parte integrante delle forze alleate.

Infoibare la storia

L’argomento foibe, poi, è un condensato di luoghi comuni e dimenticanze.

Innanzitutto Cristicchi omette la distinzione tra le cosiddette «foibe istriane» (1943) e le «foibe triestine» (1945). Le prime furono una sorta di jacquerie, di rivolta contadina contro chi aveva detenuto il potere fino ad allora, in cui la rappresaglia politica potè mescolarsi in alcuni casi a vendette personali. Cristicchi esclama: «Sta gente è stata ammazzata in tempo de pace!», ma dimentica che nel settembre ’43 c’era ancora la guerra.

Sulle foibe triestine, Cristicchi sfrutta il solito luogo comune secondo cui tutte le vittime sarebbero state infoibate. Come sa chiunque si occupi anche lontanamente dell’argomento, gli scomparsi del maggio ’45 finiti effettivamente nelle voragini carsiche sono stati una minoranza: qualche decina di persone. Gli altri furono deportati in quanto appartenenti a forze armate che avevano combattuto contro l’esercito jugoslavo, al pari di quanto accadde agli italiani catturati da inglesi, francesi, americani e russi. Le condizioni della prigionia non erano certamente delle più facili (ma i soldati catturati in Russia o in Africa non ebbero condizioni migliori); va detto però che buona parte di chi non aveva responsabilità personali riuscì a tornare.

Per fascisti e collaborazionisti vennero allestiti processi che si conclusero anche con condanne a morte. Il fatto però che le persone venissero liquidate «in quanto italiane» è smentito sia dal fatto che alcuni fascisti colpevoli di crimini vennero liberati dagli jugoslavi che non li riconobbero (il che la dice lunga sulla «terribile efficienza» della polizia segreta jugoslava), sia dai numeri. Cristicchi dà cifre vaghe (500, 5.000, 10.000, 14.000), mentre quasi tutti quelli che sono andati a spulciarsi uno per uno le liste dei “desaparecidos” concordano su un numero tra 1.000 e 2.000 persone. Cifre analoghe a quelle dei morti negli ultimi giorni di guerra a Genova, a Torino o in Emilia. Dove però mai nessuno è stato ucciso «in quanto italiano». Mi sembra dunque che questi numeri siano la riprova numerica del fatto che in queste terre le esecuzioni del maggio ’45 non hanno risposto ad una logica di pulizia etnica, bensì siano state la – purtroppo – fisiologica resa dei conti di un conflitto che era stato atroce e fortemente ideologico.

Se poi si vanno a confrontare le cifre delle vittime a guerra finita in Jugoslavia, si nota come altrove – dove Tito non doveva temere di rendere conto agli alleati – la mano della giustizia partigiana fu estremamente più pesante rispetto alla Venezia Giulia dove sarebbe avvenuta la «pulizia etnica».

Sorvolo sul caso Norma Cossetto, sulla descrizione della foiba (che sembra tratta pari pari dal racconto del sedicente sopravvissuto Graziano Udovisi) e sulla strage di Vergarolla, in quanto Cristicchi le interpreta come avvenimenti sicuri, ma dimentica di segnalare che si tratta invece di singoli episodi sui quali sono cresciuti a dismisura racconti mai corroborati da prove, o al massimo si sono fatte ipotesi investigative.

Davvero «non si può vivere senza essere italiani»?

Rispetto all’esodo è interessante come Cristicchi generalizzi l’esodo da Pola, facendo credere che anche l’esodo dalle altre parti dell’Istria, da Fiume, da Zara, dalla Zona B, dal Muggesano si sia svolto nello stesso modo. La questione è che l’esodo da Pola risponde a tutti i clichés di cui lo spettacolo ha bisogno: la partenza in tempi brevi, le navi, il trasporto delle masserizie, la neve, la bora.

Cristicchi dimentica che l’esodo fu un fenomeno estremamente complesso, che avvenne con modalità e tempi diversi: Zara fu addirittura sfollata ancora durante la guerra a causa dei bombardamenti angloamericani, l’esodo di Fiume si risolse in pochi mesi, l’esodo dalla Zona B si prolungò per anni, dando il tempo agli abitanti di fare una lunga analisi sul se, sul come e sul quando partire; quello del Muggesano coinvolse una popolazione in larghissima parte comunista cominformista che in maggioranza rifiutò l’aiuto delle associazioni dei profughi per non essere strumentalizzata dalla destra o dalla DC.

Soprattutto, Cristicchi dimentica le mille cause di questa complessità. Banalizza affermando che ci fu una causa sola: la gente partì «perché non si può vivere senza essere italiani».

In nome di questa tesi, Cristicchi rimuove il fatto che la Jugoslavia stava realizzando riforme di stampo socialista nell’economia: aveva appena approvato pesanti restrizioni nel commercio privato, imposto la distribuzione delle derrate alimentari attraverso cooperative, pesantemente tassato le rendite finanziarie, attuato una riforma agraria in base alla quale venne proclamata l’abolizione della mezzadria, del colonato e del lavoro agricolo su appalto, assegnato le terre ai contadini che dimostrassero di lavorarle da almeno quindici anni, e infine stabilito il sequestro dei latifondi e la distribuzione delle terre, nonché l’uso collettivo delle macchine agricole, tassando pesantemente le terre incolte ed i terreni oltre determinate superfici.

In un contesto del genere, che qui mi sono limitato a riassumere, è chiaro che tutta una serie di categorie (proprietari immobiliari, commercianti all’ingrosso e al dettaglio, imprenditori, locatori, addetti alla distribuzione ecc.) videro la partenza come l’unica soluzione dei loro problemi, a prescindere da quale paese vi fosse oltre frontiera. Credo che sull’esodo abbia giocato molto di più la paura di un sistema economico-politico demonizzato dal fascismo, dalla chiesa e dall’influente DC che di là dal confine spingeva per la partenza del maggior numero di persone. Non si dimentichi inoltre che per la piccola e media borghesia (quella che oggi viene chiamata middle class) la questione si semplificava in un’equazione molto banale: Jugoslavia = comunismo = miseria, Italia = Stati Uniti = ricchezza.

Un’altra paura che spingeva alla partenza era il sovvertimento di quello che fino ad allora era stato l’ordine sociale: le classi che avevano detenuto il potere venivano ad essere spazzate via da una sorta di tsunami sociale. Operai e braccianti diventavano arbitri dell’esistenza di chi fino ad allora aveva tenuto le redini del sistema sociale e ora non intendeva diventare subalterno agli ex servi. Non dunque fuga per l’italianità, quanto fuga dal socialismo, dal ridimensionamento sociale e dalla (probabile) miseria.

Cristicchi dimentica che le autorità italiane spinsero sotterraneamente all’esodo: attraverso le organizzazioni degli esuli, in Istria si pubblicavano appelli per la partenza e si reclamizzavano i veri e finti vantaggi che i profughi avrebbero avuto in Italia (non si dimentichi che comunque, da un punto di vista economico, l’Istria era una delle zone più depresse del Regno d’Italia e perciò l’esodo poteva essere addirittura allettante). La DC, riuscita ad accreditarsi come la forza politica che maggiormente tutelava i profughi, doveva rendere solida la propria base nelle terre di confine e dopo il 1954 la massa di profughi fu fatta fermare a Trieste, nell’intento da parte del governo di rendere più sicura una città che in realtà molto fedele all’Italia non era mai stata (i due quinti dell’elettorato triestino si esprimevano per partiti favorevoli all’indipendenza). A Trieste i profughi ebbero precedenza nell’impiego pubblico e privato e graduatorie privilegiate nell’assegnazione di case popolari. In Magazzino 18 si dimentica che, con la saturazione del mercato del lavoro e l’impossibilità di accedere ad alloggi, circa 25.000 triestini dovettero optare per l’emigrazione in Australia.

Anche i numeri confutano la tesi che gli esuli siano partiti per mantenere la propria italianità. Cristicchi, prendendo come oro colato il numero canonico di 350.000 profughi (in realtà inventato da Flaminio Rocchi), dimentica che in base al censimento del 1936 il numero di italiani residenti nelle terre perse era di 264.799. Se si dà credito alla cifra di Rocchi, si afferma automaticamente che 85.000 non italiani partirono… per restare italiani!

Non ho grandi considerazioni da fare sul pessimo accoglimento dei profughi a Bologna, salvo ricordare che purtroppo accoglienze di questo genere sono piuttosto frequenti: anche i profughi sloveni dopo la prima guerra mondiale, quando giunsero nei loro luoghi di destinazione in Jugoslavia, vennero spesso accolti con epiteti come lahi– spregiativo di «italiani» – e fašisti, proprio coloro dai quali stavano scappando.

Sulle condizioni dei campi profughi, è indubbio che esse furono terribili, ma solo una minoranza assoluta dei profughi ci visse per dieci anni (come si dice in Magazzino 18): per la maggior parte fu un periodo di transizione relativamente breve: in genere, dopo qualche anno, a volte solo qualche mese, i profughi ottenevano alloggi popolari di buona qualità. A Trieste vennero edificati interi rioni esclusivamente per profughi, come il complesso di Chiarbola con 112 edifici per un totale di 868 appartamenti.

Visita a Goli Otok

Infine due accenni: il «controesodo» e i «rimasti».
Cristicchi dimentica che, tra i cantierini monfalconesi andati in Jugoslavia per «costruire il socialismo», quelli che non abbracciarono la causa del Cominform poterono tranquillamente restare in Jugoslavia. Degli altri solo una minoranza venne arrestata ed internata. La maggior parte potè tranquillamente (e mestamente) tornarsene in Bisiacheria. I monfalconesi che finirono nei gulag della costa adriatica furono una quarantina, a dimostrazione che non ci fu alcun accanimento contro di essi «in quanto italiani», ma solo in quanto irriducibili stalinisti.

«Non esiste un monumento, una targa. Niente. Goli Otok non c’è nemmeno sui dépliant», dice Cristicchi. Gli segnalo che i dépliant su Goli Otok ci sono eccome e ci si possono anche fare delle visite di diverse ore. Resterà un po’ deluso, perché quella che lui definisce «per quasi 40 anni la prigione della Jugoslavia» fu un carcere per prigionieri politici per non più di dieci anni. Divenne poi un penitenziario per criminali comuni e negli anni ’70 fu trasformato in riformatorio, in cui i giovani detenuti venivano indirizzati all’attività turistica. Alcuni abitanti della costa mi hanno raccontato che in estate i turisti potevano raggiungere l’isola in barca e mangiare al ristorante del riformatorio, dove i reclusi lavoravano come cuochi e camerieri. Raccontano ancor oggi di piatti di pesce ottimi e prezzi bassissimi. Dal 1988 l’intero complesso è stato chiuso ed è ora fatiscente.

I «rimasti»

Cristicchi parla della triste sorte dei rimasti, ma dimentica che le comunità italiane di Fiume, Rovigno, Capodistria, Pola, Cittanova (anzi, come piace dire a lui storpiando: Rigeca, Rovini, Coper, Pula, Novigrad…) ebbero scuole italiane, bilinguismo, la possibilità di relazionarsi con gli uffici pubblici nella propria madrelingua, circoli culturali, cori, giornali, case editrici, rappresentanti nelle istituzioni politiche ecc.

In conclusione credo che Cristicchi sia il primo a dover rispettare quel suo «undicesimo comandamento»: all’inizio di Magazzino 18 parla di un’«enorme amnesia», ma mi pare che questo spettacolo continui a perpetuare un’amnesia altrettanto enorme su altri aspetti che è assolutamente necessario conoscere per capire la storia.
Non dimenticare, caro Simone.

Anzi, magari la prossima volta, per non dimenticare, cerca di informarti meglio.

⁂

Una postilla sulla «memoria condivisa»

Anche noi, finalmente, abbiamo trovato il tempo e lo stomaco di vedereMagazzino 18.

Siamo pienamente d’accordo con il nostro guest blogger quando dice che l’intento dello show è chiaramente politico e tutta l’operazione si inserisce nella costruzione della solita «memoria condivisa» pseudo-pacificatrice.

E’ su quest’ultima che vogliamo aggiungere qualcosa.

La «memoria condivisa» è in realtà smemoria collettiva, una ri-narrazione della storia italiana che finge di voler mettere d’accordo tutti, siano essi oppressori od oppressi; sfruttatori eredi di sfruttatori o sfruttati eredi di sfruttati; nipoti di italiani che combatterono agli ordini di Graziani (cioè di Hitler) o nipoti di italiani trucidati dai nazifascisti.
Non devono più esserci destra e sinistra, ragioni buone e cattive, scelte giuste e sbagliate. Soprattutto, non deve più esserci lotta. A sostituire tutto questo, una marmellata di «opinioni» preventivamente rese innocue, neutralizzate. Tutti abbiamo avuto le nostre vittime, e le vittime sono vittime, i morti sono tutti uguali ecc.

Frasi come «i morti sono tutti uguali» significano in realtà: tutte le storie si equivalgono, una scelta è valsa l’altra, chi ha avuto ha avuto, chi ha dato ha dato, e chi cazzo siete voi per dirci cosa dobbiamo fare, non ci rompete i coglioni.
I morti saranno forse «tutti uguali» (qualunque cosa significhi), ma sono diverse – a volte opposte e inconciliabili – le cause per cui si muore. Se non si riconosce questo, l’uguaglianza tra i morti è solo una supercazzola per difendere un sistema basato sulla disuguaglianza tra i vivi.

Dopo il riconoscimento delle «buone ragioni» dei «ragazzi di Salò» (ma «italiani di Hitler» sarebbe più preciso), è stata tutta una valanga.
In questo processo il «centrosinistra» ha molte più responsabilità del «centrodestra», che è solo passato dalle porte che gentilmente gli venivano aperte. Non a caso quell’apertura ai repubblichini la feceLuciano Violante.

Per capirci: se a fini retorici dovessimo dare a questo revisionismo storico omologante un nome di persona, sarebbe quello di Giorgio Napolitano, che ne è il massimo propugnatore istituzionale. Che dire di quest’estratto da un suo famoso discorso del 2007, dove ogni frase contiene un falso storico?

Ukraine: Leading Russian MP Warns Of Yugoslav Scenario

 ===  Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia - ONLUS https://www.cnj.it/ http://www.facebook.com/cnj.onlus/  === * ===

PIETRO BENEDETTI

IN

DRUG
GOJKO

REGIA DI

ELENA MOZZETTA

Lo spettacolo è ora anche un libro per i tipi di
Davide Ghaleb Editore 

UNO SPETTACOLO PRODOTTO DA ANPI VITERBO
TRATTO DAI RACCONTI 
DEL PARTIGIANO NELLO MARIGNOLI
IDEATO DA GIULIANO CALLISTI E SILVIO ANTONINI
TESTI TEATRALI - PIETRO BENEDETTI
CONSULENZA LETTERARIA - ANTONELLO RICCI
MUSICHE - BEVANO QUARTET E FIORE BENIGNI
FOTO - DANIELE VITA
UN RINGRAZIAMENTO PARTICOLARE A NELLO MARIGNOLI

SI RINGRAZIANO INOLTRE
I RAGAZZI DEL CSOA CENTRO SOCIALE EX VALLE FAUL 
DAVIDE BONINSEGNA
THORSTEN METZ 
ARCI VITERBO

---

a Civitavecchia, martedì 25 febbraio 2014
alle ore 10:30 presso il Teatro Traiano

in occasione della Giornata del Ricordo

DRUG GOJKO

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a Vetralla (VT), Sabato 1 marzo 2014  
alle ore 21 presso: MusicALcentro - Vicolo della Bucaccia

DRUG GOJKO

Na misi u rimskoj crkvi svetog Jeronima kardinal Angelo Amato, prefekt Kongregacije za proglašavanje svetih, najavio je da će papa Franjo proglasiti Stepinca svetim, na osnovu nalaze lekarske komisije koja je potvrdila čudesna ozdravljenja od strane Stepinca.

Kardinal Amato održao je misu na godišnjicu smrti Alojzija Stepinca, koji je umro u Krašiću pre 54 godine. 

Očekuje se da će sam papa Franjo veoma brzo javno da objavi datum kada će proglasiti Stepinca svetim, ali pre toga i kardinalski zbor treba da se složi sa dokumentacijom koju je prikupila vatikanska Kongregacija. 

Očekuje se da će proglašenje Alojzija Stepinca svetim biti do kraja ove godine. I papa Jovan Pavle II biće proglašem svetim 27. aprila u Rimu, gde se očekuje dolazak nekoliko miliona vernika iz celog sveta.

Šta je sporno u vezi Stepinca

Papa Benedikt XVI je u junu 2011. u Zagrebu rekao da se bivši zagrebački nadvbiskup Alojzije Stepinac zahvaljujući hrišćanskoj savesti odupirao totalitarizmu, a u vreme nacizma branio Jevreje i pravoslavce. 

Zbog tih reči o Stepincu na račun pape stigle su brojne kritike u stranim medijima. Američka agencija AP navela je da je "Stepinac podržavao ustaše čija je okrutnost bila tako ekstremna da su uspeli da šokiraju i nacističke gazde". 

"Papa je u pravu kada proklinje zločinačke ustaške vojne snage, ali nije u pravu kada odaje priznanje jednom od njihovih zagovarača", citirao je AP Elana Steniberga iz Američkog udruženja žrtava holokausta. 

Austrijska novinska agencija APA i švajcarski mediji podsetili su, povodom posete pape Hrvatskoj, na masovna ubistva ustaškog režima tokom Drugog svetskog rata, posebno navodeći ulogu zapovednika Ante Pavelića, koji je vladao, kako ističu mediji, uz asistenciju Vatikana. Tako APA podsetila da je Pavelić, nakon Drugog svetskog rata, pobegao zahvaljujući pomoći Vatikana. 

APA naglašava da se dokazi o sumnjivoj ulozi Stepinca mogu naći u dokumentaciji iz Drugog svetskog rata - i to ne iz arhive kasnijih komunističkih vlasti, već iz nemačkih i italijanskih arhiva - i dodaje da je bilo i franjevaca u ustaškim uniformama koji su zapovedali logorima srmti, kao u slučaju Miroslava Filipovića iz Jasenovca, koji je svojeručno ubijao. 

APA je podsetila i da je "Enciklopedija Britanika" navela da je stravičnost masakra nad Srbima nadmašila samo masovno uništenje poljskih Jevreja u nacističkoj Nemačkoj. Vatikan je, kako ističe APA, bio detaljno informisan o događanjima u Hrvatskoj, a tokom vladavine ustaša uništeno je oko 300 pravoslavnih crkava, a 128 sveštenika zlostavljano i ubijeno. 

I britanski javni servis BBC naveo je u svom izveštaju iz Zagreba da je papa posetio grob “kontroverznog kardinala iz Drugog svetskog rata”. 

Takođe, Stepinca su jugoslovenske vlasti osudile da je sarađivao sa ustašama i Ante Pavelićem. Za njega se takođe pretpostavljalo da je znao za dešavanja u logoru Jasenovac, i pokrštavanje nekoliko hiljada Srba.

The Vatican has officially confirmed that Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac will soon be declared a saint.

Immediately upon the entering of the Germans in Zagreb, on April 10, 1941, Stepinac supported the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia (ISC), which was declared a state by the Ustasha (Croatian fascist movement), and in 1945, he fought for the preservation of the regime headed by Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic.

Budaj believes that a protest against sanctifying Stepinac, who took part in the creation and implementation of NDH ideas during World War II, needs to be made even at the cost of breaking off diplomatic relations with the Vatican.

“I hope that the Serbian Orthodox Church will react, since this particular decision made by the Vatican is also undermining the ecumenical relations between the two churches,” Budaj said, stressing that Israel and many Jewish institutions in the territory of the former Yugoslavia should react to this strongly and immediately.

It is not at all surprising that the new Pope Francis is proclaiming Stepinac a saint, as that road was mapped by the Catholic Church in Croatia immediately after the verdict against Stepinac had been delivered, said Budaj, who is also director of the Margel Institute, a Jewish NGO in Zagreb.

On October 11, 1946, Stepinac was found guilty of high treason and war crimes – for his relations with the Croatian Ustasha and collaboration with the occupation forces – and was sentenced to 16 years in prison.

In 1951, he was transferred to his native village of Krasic, where he spent the remainder of his life confined to his home parish until his death on February 10, 1960. As a sign of support, the Vatican awarded Stepinac the title of cardinal in 1952.

Budaj pointed out that already during his trial, the West and the Catholic world considered Stepinac to be a martyr and innocent victim of Communist persecution, that Stepinac has been made a cardinal while alive and beatified after death, and is now to be declared a saint of the Roman Catholic Church.

He would be the only saint to receive a high distinction from the Ustasha headman, and that while being the Archbishop of Zagreb, for a merit he earned as a helper of a fascist, criminal regime, Budaj said, adding that a report about it appeared in Narodne Novine, the official mouthpiece of the NDH.

“While Monsignor Svetozar Ritig, prebendary of the Zagreb Chapter (Kaptol), saw in Pavelic an evil in the making as early as in 1929, Stepinac wholeheartedly greeted and served Pavelic. Ritig has no street (named after him) in Zagreb, as he was an anti-fascist, while Stepinac has all the honors as a clerical fascist,” said Budaj.

Budaj said it is no big wonder that Stepinac will be canonized, as the Vatican was recognized as a state by fascist Benito Mussolini’s Lateran Treaty in 1929.

“I do not want to hear about Stepinac’s great merit in ‘saving’ Jews, because he was all the while drawing up in the official Catholic press Pavelic’s racial provisions by which the Jews were taken to concentration camps.

I do not want to hear about his efforts to save certain Serbs, because he was on the Committee of Three in charge of conversions to Catholicism and I do not want to hear about his being a martyr and saint because he left his own Catholic priests to be tortured by the Ustasha in Jasenovac (Ustasha concentration camp) just because they were under suspicion of being opponents of the regime,” Budaj said.

He pointed out that Stepinac never regretted over violent conversion of Serbs into Catholicism or over Jews being forcibly taken to be baptized, even though he knew it would not save them from being taken to the camp.

“He never repented his Catholic ‘baptized souls’ burning Jewish and Serbian churches, plundering around as wild hordes, raping and killing as crusader armies once did across the Holy Land,” Budaj said in an interview for SRNA news agency that was published in Banja Luka-based Nezavisne Novine.

He added that Stepinac knew about it all, but nevertheless bestowed blessings on the NDH and served it, even after its collapse, hiding Ustasha criminals, stolen Jewish gold and Ustasha state archive in the Zagreb Kaptol.

“To me, as a free man, Stepinac will never be a saint, as I am not bound by decisions of the Pope, nor have I lost my mind to believe in that fraudulent alchemy of miraculous transformation of a criminal into a saint,” said Budaj.

Stepinac ruši odnose sa Vatikanom?

Zagreb - Saradnik Centra Simon Vizental Alen Budaj kaže da bivše zemlje SFRJ, posebno Srbija, moraju uložiti oštar protest zbog namjere da Alojzije Stepinac bude svetac.

Budaj smatra da diplomatski protest treba uložiti Vatikanu, čak i po cijenu da to dovede to prekida diplomatskih odnosa.

"Nadam se da će to učiniti i SPC, jer ova odluka Vatikana potkopava i ekumenske odnose dvije crkve", rekao je Budaj istakavši da bi i Izrael trebalo hitno i najoštrije da reaguje, kao i mnoge jevrejske institucije na području bivše SFRJ.

"Proglašenje svetim osobe koja je učestvovala u kreiranju i provođenju politike fašističke ustaške tvorevine Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) nije i neće dobiti priznanje pravednika među narodima Jad Vašema nikada", kaže Budaj, koji je i direktor jevrejske nevladine organizacije "Margelov institut" iz Zagreba.

Budaj napominje da se ne treba uopšte čuditi što novi papa Franja proglašava Stepinca svecem, jer je taj put zacrtala Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj odmah nakon presude Stepincu.

Zbog saradnje sa okupatorom i ustašama Stepinac je osuđen na 16 godina zatvorske kazne, ali je 1951. pušten u kućni pritvor u rodno selo Krašić, gdje je kao znak podrške Vatikana 1952. dobio zvanje kardinala i gdje je umro 10. februara 1960. od rijetke bolesti policitemije.

"On je već na suđenju za Zapad i katolike momentalno postao nevini mučenik jugoslovenskog komunističkog režima, proglašen kardinalom za života, nakon smrti blaženim, a evo uskoro i svecem Rimokatoličke crkve", podseća Budaj.

On naglašava da će to biti jedini svetac koji se za svoje zasluge jednom fašističkom zločinačkom režimu okitio visokim odlikovanjem ustaškog poglavnika i to kao zagrebački nadbiskup, a o tome su izvjestile "Narodne novine" kao službeno glasilo NDH.

"S druge strane, dok je kanonik zagrebačkog Kaptola monsinjor Svetozar Ritig još 1929. godine u (Ante) Paveliću video zlo koje se sprema, Stepinac je Pavelića obijeručke dočekao i služio mu. Ritig nema ulicu u Zagrebu, jer bio je antifašista, ali Stepinac ima sve počasti kao klerofašista", ističe Budaj.

On ponavlja da ne treba previše biti začuđen zbog kanonizacije Stepinca, jer Vatikan je 1929. Lateranskim ugovorima priznat kao država od fašiste Benita Musolinija.

"Ne želim slušati o velikim zaslugama Stepinca za "spašavanje" Jevreja, jer je istovremeno donosio u službenoj katoličkoj štampi Pavelićeve rasne odredbe po kojima su Jevreji odvođeni u logore.Ne želim slušati kako se zalagao za spas pojedinih Srba jer je bio u Odboru trojice za pokrštavanje i ne želim slušati da je bio mučenik i svetac jer je ostavio vlastite katoličke sveštenike da ih ustaše izmrcvare u Jasenovcu samo zato jer su bili pod sumnjom da su protivnici režima", navodi Budaj.

On podsjeća da se Stepinac nikad nije pokajao zbog toga što su Srbi pokatoličavani nasilno i što su Jevreji privođeni na krštenje, iako je znao da ih to neće spasiti logora.

"Nije se uopšte pokajao što su njegove katoličke "krštene duše" palile jevrejske i srpske hramove, pljačkale kao divlje horde, silovale i ubijale kao nekada krstaške vojske po Svetoj zemlji", kaže Budaj, prenijele su banjalučke "Nezavisne novine".

On navodi da je Stepinac sve to znao, ali je uprkos tome blagoslovio NDH i služio joj, čak i nakon njenog sloma, skrivajući na Kaptolu ustaške zločince, oteto jevrejsko zlato i ustašku državnu arhivu.

"Za mene, kao slobodnog čovjeka, on nikada neće biti svetac, jer me ne obavezuje papina odluka, niti me moj razum napustio pa da povjerujem u tu prevarantsku alhemiju čudesnog preobražaja zločinca u sveca", zaključuje Budaj.

Vatikan je zvanično potvrdio da će kardinal Alojzije Stepinac uskoro biti proglašen za sveca. 

Stepinac je odmah po ulasku Nemaca u Zagreb 10. aprila 1941. podržao osnivanje NDH, pružao je podršku ustaškom režimu, a 1945. borio se za očuvanje tog režima.

DAL TESTO – “I due ascoltarono la sua storia, la verificarono con le informazioni che avevano raccolto e alla fine gli proposero di mettere la sua esperienza di corriere al servizio dell'organizzazione. Jarschel accettò, ebbe una paga e un passaporto a tutta prova e qualche giorno dopo partì per la sua prima missione a Genova: aveva «un messaggio delicato» da consegnare personalmente «a un tale Draganović». Per un anno Jarschel fece la spola fra Milano, Genova e Roma. Quando accompagnava personaggi tedeschi di riguardo la scorta era quasi sempre formata da ex ustascia, talvolta da qualche ex fascista. Nella primavera del 1947 Jarschel dovette lasciare Milano per motivi di sicurezza. Un sacerdote tedesco venne a prenderlo a San Cristoforo con una vecchia Fiat e lo portò «in un convento di Milano, adiacente alla chiesa di San Lorenzo, in piazza Vetra». La sera stessa, accompagnati dal prete tedesco, sette fuggiaschi vestiti da frati partirono in treno per Roma. Jarschel stette qualche tempo «in clausura» con altri camerati nel convento di monsignor Hudal a Santa Maria dell'Anima; dovette raccontare per iscritto tutta la sua storia nei minimi dettagli e restò un paio di settimane in «ritiro spirituale» sotto la guida di un gesuita tedesco. Superate le prove, con undici camerati Jarschel partì per il Medio Oriente, dove trovò un ingaggio come istruttore militare.
  “Fra il 1945 e il 1948, lungo la stessa via percorsa da Jarschel - o con poche varianti - migliaia di fuggiaschi giunsero in Italia e ripartirono verso paesi lontani. I nazisti la chiamavano klosterweg, gli Ustascia put samostana, gli investigatori americani monastry-road, quelli italiani la strada dei conventi. A volte distinti per nazionalità, a volte mescolati nelle stesse comitive, tedeschi, austriaci, croati e collaborazionisti vari viaggiavano lungo la via dei conventi secondo piani prestabiliti dai tre principali artefici dell’esfiltrazione, l'ex colonnello delle SS Walter Rauff, monsignor Krunoslav Draganović e il vescovo austriaco Alois Hudal.”

  GLI AUTORI – Pino Adriano, regista e giornalista televisivo, ha realizzato un centinaio di programmi per la RAI con particolare riguardo alla storia economica, sociale e politica del Novecento italiano. Ha scritto Corpi di reato. Quattro storie degli anni di piombo (2000), di cui è coautore Giorgio Cingolani, e L'intrigo di Berna (2010). 
  Giorgio Cingolani, storico e saggista, ha scritto Il Fermano negli anni '20 (1994), La destra in armi (1996) e, con Pino Adriano, Corpi di reato. Quattro storie degli anni di piombo(2000). Collabora a riviste di settore.

PROVIDING MERCENARIES AND ROBBING NOT THE WAY TO BETTER LIFE

Zivadin Jovanovic
Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals 
Belgrade, February, 2014.

15 years since NATO aggression against Serbia and Montenegro, Interview with David Stockinger, editor of „Werkstatt Blatt“, Austria

D.S: You are president of „Belgrade Forum for the World of Equals“. How and why was the Forum founded? What is the political character and the goals of this organization?

Z.J: In 2001, a group of independent minded intellectuals founded the Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals as an independent, non-partisan, non-profit association. In fact, it was reaction to the NATO 1999 military aggression and subsequent October 5th, 2000 coup. We realized that it was the overture of global interventionism, overthrowing of legitimate governments, imposing rule of might instead of rule of law. Our objectives have been and still are: promotion of peace, freedom, law and justice, democratization of international relations, sovereign equality of countries, nations, and individuals. We stand for protection of human rights in their entirety – social, economic, cultural, educational, political and other rights as enshrined in the Universal UN Declaration on Protection of Human Rights. Our method is publishing books, articles, organizing conferences, round tables, press conferences. Forum is the member of World Peace Council (WPC) and maintains close cooperation with other organizations with similar orientation, on national and international levels.
On March 22nd and 23rd this year, Belgrade Forum organizes International Conference „Global Peace vs. global interventionism and imperialism“, on occasion of the 15th anniversary of NATO aggression against Serbia (FRY). Together with many friends, peace and solidarity activists, from all over the world, we will recall that this criminal act left about 4.000 dead and about 8.000 seriously wounded, that direct economic damage was valued at about 120 billion of US dollars, that destructive effects of missiles with depleted uranium continue to indefinitely cause so far unknown deceases, deformations and deaths. It will be opportunity to send from Belgrade the message that these crimes must not be repeated anywhere in the world.

D.S: 15 years ago NATO bombed SR Yugoslavia; 14 years ago there was a coup against socialist government of Slobodan Milosevic on 5.October 2000. In this time you have been Minister for foreign Affairs. From the 90-ies (until now) western medias and politicians created a hateful campaign against Serbia as „the evil of Europe“. Our organization „Solidarwerkstatt Österreich“ was very active in the anti-NATO demonstrations in 1999 and asked for solidarity with Yugoslavia. How do you see the development of SR Yugoslavia and later Serbia politically, economically and in foreign relations since October 5th, 2000?

Z.J: The Belgrade Forum is grateful to the friends of „Solidarwerkstatt Osterreich“, as well as to all other independent minded people in Austria and all over the world, for their moral support and solidarity with people of Yugoslavia who have been victims of the criminal military NATO aggression 15 years ago. Serbia and Serbs have been satanized by western media, portrayed as new Nazis. Why? So many lies have been produced to justify imperial and revanchist policies of certain western countries towards Serbia. Yugoslavia was abolished by EU/USA, Serbia and Serbian nation fragmented; economy ruined and handed over to multinational corporations. Officially present rate of unemployment is 25%, out of which about 50% are young people up to 30 years of age. Every day army of about 800.000 jobless grows for new 600 unemployed. At the same time employment in public (non-productive) services has been growing by 1.800 employs monthly believed to be loyalists of the ruling parties! Most probably, this has been part of preparations for the new extraordinary elections which have been just announced for mid March this year. Back, 15 years ago there were 9.000 employees in Serbian state administration. Today there are 30.000! Foreign debt of Serbia amounts today to over 30 billion euro, or 60% of GDP, 20% higher than officially acceptable. Serbia’s indebtedness is below red line. Rationalizing of bureaucratic apparatus and of public spending is almost unimaginable having in mind extent of party-racy in all spheres of public life.

All governments since 2000 have been described as pro-western but the revanchist anti-Serbian policy of the West has hardly changed. The West supports pro-western governments in Serbia (like everywhere) but definitely not pro-Serbian policies and interests. In 2008 Albanian leadership in Pristine, in fact, leadership of the former terrorist UCK, proclaimed unilateral, illegal independence of Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija. NATO and EU member governments were first to recognize this unilateral and illegal act violating all basic principles of UN and OSCE Charters, Serbian constitution and UN SC resolution 1244. The so called „status neutral“ EULEX has been engaged in creating institutions of this phantom state and leading EU member states in creating and equipping (arming) its „security forces“. Today, same governments continue to blackmail Serbia to waive all rights to the Province of Kosovo and Metohija in exchange for the beginning of negotiations for membership in EU! Formally, Serbia is militarily neutral, but unilateral concessions to NATO, USA and EU, are beyond those provided to NATO by its full member countries!
I believe that Serbia should upgrade its formal neutrality to substantial and constitutionally defined. To achieve this, to secure balanced international position, it is necessary to expand bilateral relations with Russia, China, India, with countries all over the world, which support Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and which do not attach any political strings to economic or other fields of cooperation.
Serbia as a small peace loving country should not join NATO which is imperial, aggressive alliance. NATO records and objectives have nothing in common with Serbia’s records and objectives. Wherever intervenes, NATO leaves behind hundreds thousands dead, crippled, devastated economies and human environment, chaos, terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, fragmentation of states... Present situations in Afghanistan, Irk, Libya and elsewhere, mirror real aims of NATO’s its „humanitarian “and „democratic“ substance of its objectives.
So called “responsibility to protect” is a mere smoke curtain for leading powers of NATO to occupy and rob other countries of their wealth. Member countries, especially smaller ones, are there simply to provide mercenaries in service of imperial powers.

D.S.: The „International Court for Crimes in former Yugoslavia “in Den Haag is still working. President Milosevic an many other Serbs died there. Russian officials call for closing this court. In my point of view this court never had the task to determine the truth and ensure justice, but only to legitimize the policy of the Western powers against former Yugoslavia and Serbia. Is my assumption correct?

Z.J: Hague tribunal, in my opinion, has been a key tool of leading NATO governments to pass on responsibility for the destruction of Yugoslavia and for crimes committed during 1999 aggression, from NATO leaders as real culprits to Serbia and Serbs as victims. In a broader sense, it is a tool to impose obedience and dictatorship in international relations. Although established by UN SC it has been financed by private sectors, some Arab countries, Soros Foundation, among others. 
In spite of the fact that civil wars in Bosnia and Croatia started by violent secessions led by the leaderships of those former Yugoslav Republics, supported by the leading NATO/EU countries, primarily by governments of Germany, Great Britain and USA, Serbia (FRY) was accused for apparent aggression. UN SR for Bosnia Yasushi Akashi reported in May 1992 that there was no evidence of Yugoslav Army’s presence in Bosnia. He noted, however, that there was sufficient evidence of Croatian troops present in Bosnia and involved in armed clashes there. This report, however, reached Security Council members only after the most severe UN sanctions were imposed on Serbia (FRY). Akashi’s report was, apparently, mishandled by UN administration (“administrative mistake“). Only Serbian top political and military leaderships have been tried by Hague tribunal. Many of them, as you mentioned, died in Hague before reaching the end of trials, including former Serbian and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.
Serbian politician Vojislav Seselj spent, up to now, full 11 years in Hague prison and his hearing has not as yet been finished!? Actually, it is questionable if it will ever be concluded. Two weeks ago it was announced that Seselj got a cancer and that now is undergoing chemotherapy!
Hague tribunal had refused to investigate the cases of NATO crimes against peace and stability, against civilians, human environment and many others. The documentation on human organ trafficking in Kosovo and Metohija officially submitted to the Tribunal had been destroyed! Following the imitative of the Swiss lawyer and MP Dick Marty, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted report and resolution demanding through investigation. Report indicated involvement of Hashim Tachi, among others, in human organs trafficking. There have not been either results, or signs of political will to pursue the investigation. Instead, there was initiative from influential circle in Washington to award Hashim Tachi with Nobel Prize for Peace! Croatian generals accused of ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate killing of Serbs in 1995, have been acquitted by Hague Tribunal! Ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Serbs from Croatia and massive killing of Serbian civilians while taking refuge from Croatia are not worth of being sanctioned! Is it, really, just a „double standards justice“? Or „winner’s justice“? Or, it is a shame of the civilization we happen to live in?

D.S: Since 2012 Serbia has a new government. Same forces like before 5.Oct. 2000 are back in power again. Obviously Serbian people were sick of „Democratic Party“- governments and former president Boris Tadic. On the other side the current government describes „European Integrations“ as one of their priorities. Are there changes in daily policy compared with the western pushed neoliberal „Democrats“? What is the role of SPS, your former party, especially?

Z.J: All the time since so called „democratic changes “of October 2000, whoever wins elections, governments have been formed by western power centers. Serbian democracy has “genetic” error. It was prepared by „Stelt“ bombers, „Tomahawks “and cursing and depleted uranium missiles, cluster, graphite and other bombes. Effects of „humanitarian“ and „smart“ achievements are still visible through the ruins in the center of Belgrade and felt in functioning of „democracy“ amassing unemployment, malnutrition, the worst health services… Democracy installed by tens if not hundreds of millions of US dollars, Deutche marks, British Pounds, Norwegian Crowns, reinforced by „independent“ mass-medias and by hundreds of foreign financed so called NGO-s, has been „changes-proved“. So far.

D.S.: In April 2013 Serbia and separatist Kosovo-Albanian authorities in Pristina signed the „Brussels Agreement“ on the „Normalization of the relations between Belgrade and Pristine“. In autumn there were regional elections in the province, which were not boycotted by Belgrade for the first time, but on the other side Kosovo-Serbs in big number ignored those elections. Is there a rift now between Kosovo-Serbs because of the stance of Belgrade authorities? Do you think that the Kosovo issue is and will be a „frozen conflict“ for the next decades?

Z.J: So called Brussels Agreement on principles of normalization, is a dictate to Serbia to relinquish herself of the chunk of state territory - of Kosovo and Metohija. It is not agreement because Serbia was blackmailed, threatened to be once again isolated and remaining Serbs expelled. It is not a compromise because Serbia and 120.000 Serbs in the Province got nothing in exchange for accepting „reintegration“ in phantom „Republic of Kosovo“, except two promises: one, that negotiations for membership in EU will start in January 2014; and two, that remaining Serbs in the Province, for the time being, may not be ethnically cleansed, as it has been the case of their 250.000 compatriots who still, 15 years after, are not permitted to return to their homes in the Province.
Brussels so called negotiations was yet another Anglo-American-German made formula to take the problem out of hands of UN Security Council, thus neutralizing Russia’s and China’s support to Serbia and to push aside UN SC resolution 1244 (1999) which provides guaranties of sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia and autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija within the state of Serbia. Essentially, „negotiations“ have been staged as the way to formalize achievement of the objective of NATO 1999 aggression. To legalize usurpation of the state territory with Serbia’s consent, signature and seal.
This cannot be lasting solution: it is not a compromise, but dictate; it is contrary to the basic principles of international law enshrined in the UN and Helsinki Charters; it is contrary to the legitimate vital interests and Constitution of Serbia; it is violation of the UN SC resolution 1244 (1999) binding all members of UN; manipulation to isolate Russia (and China) from supporting Serbia and taking part in finding compromise for the problem wherein Russia obviously has interest, is unwise and shortsighted policy; EU is in long term crises, its foreign and security policy has no perspective if based on dictates and methods of colonial periods, especially with the view of multipolarization of the world relations.

D.S.: What is your opinion about the relations between Serbia and other former Ex-YU countries?

Z.J: Relations with the former Yugoslav Republics and with all neighboring countries should be top priority. To be sound and stable these relations must be strictly based on the principles of reciprocity, non-interference, open borders, and full respect of the rights of national minority. The fact that some neighbors are members of EU and NATO, should not limit our cooperation which, naturally, has many economic, infrastructural, cultural and other advantages.
Serious problem in relations with Croatia is continued discrimination of Serbs, political obstacles for free and safe return of Serbian refugees, unpaid compensation for the property to those who do not wish to returns and, particularly as of late, revival of ustashi-fascist anti-Serbian atmosphere in Croatia. Under Dayton Peace Agreement Serbia have established special parallel relations with Republica Srpska. These relations should be further developed and not treated by anybody as detrimental to the relations with the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia should stay widely opened for cooperation with Sarajevo wherever Sarajevo shows interest. With one exception only – not in revising the Dayton Peace Agreement and making unitary state under domination of Moslems (Bosnians).
Serbia being guarantor of the Deyton Agreement, should support Bosnia and Herzegovina as union of three equal, constituent peoples (Serbs, Bosnians and Croats) and two equal entities (Republica Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Ideas of majorization in Sarajevo‘s institutions, apparently, in the interest of „functional state“, would be, not only blatant violation of Dayton, but step towards renewed conflicts. Nobody should expect Belgrade to exercise pressure over the present leadership of Republica Srpska to relinquish constitutional rights and responsibilities of Republica Srpska as defined in Dayton, in order to please expectations of either Sarajevo, or Brussels and Washington.

D.S: It is obvious that Russia and China become more and more important for the Balkan region. Are those countries and the countries of Eurasian Community an alternative to EU integrations for Serbia? Furthermore Russia and China are traditional political allies of Serbia. Do you think that will be the basis for further and deeper development of cooperation?

Z.J: Let me say firstly, that Russia and China are unavoidable powers in world relations. Recent developments in the world, especially in Europe, Middle and Far East have shown, their influence is growing. The future World order is unimaginable without respecting new distribution of power based on growing economic, political and military strength of Russia, China and some new integrations. It is clear that the world economic crisis cannot be resolved without these two powers, without BRICS and G-20. Processes in solving such crises as, for example, over Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, now Ukraine, could hardly move ahead without direct participation of Russia and in many cases, China.
Serbia has traditionally good and friendly relations with both countries. This has been formalized and reaffirmed by signature of documents of strategic partnerships with them. Russia, for example, has devised about five billions US dollars for investments in Serbia in the next three years. These investments will improve modernization of infrastructure, sector of energy, petro-chemical industry. Russia is financing construction of the gas pipe-line „South Stream“ through Serbia which is important for the country’s long term energy-security, but this project adds new quality to geopolitical relevance of Serbia as a transiting and cross-roads (pipe-lines) country. China is also involved in construction of strategically important projects like bridges (Danube), thermo-electric power production, highways and so on. At the recent China – South- East Europe regional Summit in Bucharest, Serbia was treated as highest ranking market for Chinese investments.
Some countries and their regional integrations which have been addicted to monopoly and privileges in less developed countries, have to accommodate to the new realities because Russia and China have become favorable economic and political partners in many countries without political strings. If not, Europe and the World will be faced with tensions, new divisions and even, confrontations. If NATO, for example, as relic of the Cold War era, is not dissolved, if its self proclaimed right to interventions, in fact, aggressive wars contrary to UN Charter and international law, is not abounded, the world will again be faced with new military blocks, arms race - with new serious risks and threats to peace and stability. Europe and the world do not need this.

D.S: European Union sees itself as a new superpower. On the other side EU is in the deepest economic crisis ever. Southern periphery countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain etc. are „re-colonized“ by EU-German fiscal policy. Furthermore we see an increasing militarization of EU sometimes in cooperation with, sometimes autonomic to NATO. Organization „Solidarwerkstatt Österreich“ criticizes EU and asks for a sovereign, neutral, peaceful and social-orientated way of development of Austria. Do you think that is possible, do you think that there is no alternative to EU integrations also for Serbia or it is only propaganda and dogma of the elites?

Z.J: EU highly paid autocracy is hardly objective. They tend to imitate US imperial manners and methods. The fact is that the world crisis has hit EU and USA the most. But it is very risky and dangerous if USA, NATO and EU adopt a policy of transferring the burden of the crises, to other countries, by military means. After all, financial and economic crisis is the baby of their own neoliberal system. Looking for cheap energy, cheap strategic minerals, large markets and strategic communications have reached limits. The time has come to adapt to these limits and not to imitate superpowers, be it by military or financial means.
Any serious country should have alternatives, Serbia included. EU as the only alternative is not advisable. Especially not in the period of fast and profound changes in the world relations. EU does not have record of understanding Serbia’s legitimate interests, even less in supporting Serbia on international scene. Just the opposite. The roles and „impartiality“ of Genschner, Solana, Fischer, Badinter, Petrich, Ahtisari should not be forgotten. Pursuing the policy of „the only alternative“ would be like voluntarily accepting to live with closed ayes, in semi-dreaming state, or even to voluntarily put a stronghold over own neck.
I am convinced that Serbia should stay neutral developing balanced relations with all countries and integrations which accept Serbia as a real partner, who respect its legitimate interest and dignity, according to universal principles.
Serbia needs other partners so much as they need Serbia. Not less, not more. This should be leading approach of Serbia’s foreign policy. But, Serbia has to be responsible towards own potentials - economic, human, natural, cultural, geo-political. To be accepted and respected on equal footing abroad, there is great need to move forward these potentials.
Aggressive NATO with imperial strategy is not a place for peace-loving Serbia. It is better for Serbia to have good neighborly relations with EU than to pay EU membership by accepting dictate and relinquishing own rights towards Kosovo and Metohija as integral part of the state territory. Safeguarding normal relations with all neighbors, including EU, Serbia should more actively expand its relations with Russia, China, India, Brazil, with Asia, Latin America, Africa, with all nonaligned countries. I believe that this is appropriate way for Serbia to, once again, become very prosperous country in economy, ethnology, science, culture, living standard of its citizens. Anyway, there are much better ways to earn and secure decent living, than to render mercenaries to NATO and participate in robbing other countries of their natural and economic richness.

D.S: What is your view for the future regarding relations between Austria and Serbia. Do you think that a cooperation between organizations like „Belgrade Forum“ and „Solidarwerkstatt Österreich“ would be wise for our common struggle against war and imperialism and for souverainism and for a social-orientated welfare state?

Z.J: Serbia and Austria have tradition of fruitful economic, scientific and cultural cooperation. Danube and tens of thousands of Serbs living and working in Austria make Serbia and Austria close, neighboring countries. In the past, the two countries were closely cooperating within European group of nonaligned and neutral countries rendering important contribution to peace and stability process in our continent. We do not need intermediates in investment, or commerce. Austria with its high technology and knowhow, both in industry and agriculture, can play even stronger role in Serbia’s development policy. Two countries can promote joint involvement in third countries, especially in Africa. They should also exchange experiences in maintaining neutrality, which I believe, will be even more relevant in period of profound changes in Euro-Asia and the World.