Informazione
Justice for Yugoslavia!
Four years after the end of NATO "humanitarian" bombings...
1. Important links:
http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org/ - and more
2. When bombs fell on Belgrade
(Reprinted from the April 3, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper)
3. A PARADOX?... Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No'
To Iraq (by Claus Häcking, Deutsche Welle)
=== 1 ===
LINKS:
A summary of NATO destructions, with many photos:
http://www.sramota.com/nato/
24/3: On the Day a Tragic Era Started (by Milos Markovic)
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-04-07_1.html
March 24, 1999: NATO's Humanitarian Trigger (by Diana Johnstone)
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-controversies16.html
=== http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org
Subject: Highly Recommended Web Site: Justice Yugoslavia
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2003 09:36:13 -0700 (PDT)
From: Rick Rozoff
Please find the time to visit (and revisit) the
updated Web site of the Campaign for Justice for the
Peoples of Yugoslavia at the address listed below.
It's run by David Roberts in Britain and is
consistently characterized by the insight and
integrity that are the hallmarks of David himself.
Yours for peace and justice,
Rick Rozoff
3 June
Dear Friends,
My http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org web site is now
functioning. It offers an alternative view of the
"humanitarian bombing".
It has a Nuremberg Prosecutor's damning criticism of
the NATO bombing and my own investigation called "NATO
on Trial - The Deceptions, Illegality, and Tragedy
of the Bombing of Yugoslavia: The manipulation of
public opinion, the media and politicians."
I hope you may find it interesting.
If you can publicise the site widely I'd be grateful.
Best wishes,
David
=== 2 ===
http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/edit0403.php
EDITORIAL
When bombs fell on Belgrade
As U.S. missiles pouring into Baghdad murder the very people Bush is
claiming to "liberate," the world should recall a similar aggression
by U.S. imperialism just four years ago. On March 24, 1999, the
Pentagon opened a bombing campaign on Yugoslavia that lasted 78
days. Washington sold that war with the big lie that it was a noble
venture, a "humanitarian" intervention. It was supposed to rescue
Kosovo and especially its ethnic Albanian population from alleged Serb
repression.
Washington then had closer collaboration from its NATO allies. The big
powers submerged their rivalry in order to smash independent
Yugoslavia.
Western politicians and the ruling class media got public support for
the war through an intensive campaign of demonization of the Yugoslav
leader Slobodan Milosevic, just as they do Saddam Hussein today. But
the assault on Yugoslavia had as little to do with Milosevic as the
war on Iraq today has to do with Hussein--except that neither
leader was ready to prostrate his country and submit to the interests
of Western imperialism.
The goal of the 78 days of brutal bombing--preceded by 10 years of
subversion, the fomenting of civil war and economic sanctions--was to
remove the one remaining independent country in Eastern Europe that
had kept some of the gains of its socialist revolution. Its people,
resources, industry and strategic location were to be taken over to
serve imperialist interests.
Taking stock today of the region that was once, and may again someday
be Yugoslavia, one can see clearly just what imperialist
"humanitarian" intervention has brought.
Four dependent mini-states, two imperialist protectorates and a Serbia
in chains have replaced an independent state of southern Slavs that
had 24 million people.
U.S. and NATO military bases dominate the territory. German and U.S.
capital dominate the economy.
Kosovo has become an apartheid state run by organized crime, a center
of drugs and prostitution based on the kidnapping of women. The
right-wing KLA gangs have driven out Serbs, Jews and other minority
people who lived there.
Whatever Yugoslav industry is potentially profitable, especially in
Serbia, has been sold at dirt-cheap prices to Western imperialism. The
rest has been closed, creating 30-50 percent unemployment and reducing
two-thirds of people in Serbia to official poverty.
The imperialist takeover has failed even to bring order. The recent
assassination of NATO-stooge Zoran Djindjic, Serbia's prime minister,
brought that failure home.
Anyone studying developments in the region following the U.S.-NATO
takeover of Yugoslavia might get a hint as to why the Iraqis are
fighting so hard to prevent the U.S.-British imper ialist gang from
seizing their country.
- END -
Reprinted from the April 3, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper
(Copyright Workers World Service: Everyone is permitted to copy and
distribute verbatim copies of this document, but changing it is not
allowed. For more information contact Workers World, 55 W. 17 St., NY,
NY 10011; via email: ww@....
Subscribe wwnews-on@....
Unsubscribe wwnews-off@.... Support independent news
http://www.workers.org/orders/donate.php)
=== 3 ===
PARADOXES...
Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No' To Iraq
http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,7489_A_811834_1_A,00.html
19.03.2003
Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No' To Iraq
=
NATO strikes in Belgrade: Germany's first military deployment since
World War II
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has ruled out German military
participation in an Iraq war. But four years ago the Bundeswehr took
part in NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia without a U.N. mandate. So why
then and not now?
Chancellor Schroeder somberly addressed the nation on March 24, 1999,
shortly after NATO began bombing Yugoslavia. He announced that his
government had made a difficult decision.
"After all, this is the first time since World War II that German
soldiers have been deployed in combat," he said. "We are not waging a
war, but we must bring about a peaceful solution in Kosovo, even
if that requires the use of military force." [1]
Schroeder explained that this was the reason why the German government
had decided to take part in the military campaign against Slobodan
Milosevic's regime.
Today, the same governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens has
rejected involvement in a war against Iraq, arguing that military
intervention would only serve to further destabilize the Middle East.
In 1999, the government used the opposite argument, maintaining
that the Balkans would be in greater danger if Germany did not act.
Explaining the contradiction
"In Kosovo, we had a situation of ongoing danger," [2] Social
Democratic Party foreign policy spokeswoman Ute Zapf told
Deutsche Welle in an interview. "It was about ethnic expulsion and
impending genocide. [3] Now, in Iraq, we have a potential threat
from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction [4] but no immediate danger."
Zapf insisted the problems were very different.
Germany's opposition parties hold a different view. Christoph Schmidt,
defense spokesman for the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian
sister party, the Christian Social Union, criticized the government
for committing itself too early to a "no" vote on participation in
order to assure Shroeder's autumn reelection bid last year. Now,
Schmidt says, Schroeder has no maneuvering room to change his
position.
"July 2002 was the point of departure," Schmidt explains. "Then
Schroeder tried to take advantage of the mood against military
intervention (in Iraq) for the election campaign. The price was that
other foreign policy options were abandoned. And now, getting out of
that without losing face is hard."
Political perspectives
Guenther Joetze believes that neither of these explanations is
sufficient. The former president of the Federal Academy for Security
Policy has written a book about Germany's role in the Kosovo conflict
and is working on a new book about its role in the Iraq crisis. Joetze
ascribes the German government's differing attitudes toward Kosovo and
Iraq to numerous motives. Above all, says Joetze, the government holds
different political perspectives for the two crisis regions.
In Kosovo, the international community was aiming to enforce
humanitarian and democratic standards [5], which cannot be transmitted
to Iraq as easily [6], Joetze maintains. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein
is not considered the only rogue [sic] in the region, which is why
the government does not believe that a war will improve the situation.
In the case of Kosovo, Joetze says, Germany's partners in NATO
expected that the German army, the Bundeswehr, would take part in
military operations [7]. The government had little choice but to say
"yes," Joetze maintains. Plus, the government had only been in office
for a short time and had to prove itself in the realm of foreign
policy. [sic]
"The Social Democrats didn't want to start their term in government
with discord in the coalition," Joetze insists. "Whereas, for Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer of the Green Party, the question was a
different one. It was made clear to him (as the junior partner
in the governing coalition) that he could only remain foreign
minister and a governing partner if he towed the same line."
International peacekeeping
Today, Joetze says the government is in a different position --
not just because it has been in office for four years, but also
because Germany is now the second-largest contributor of troops to
international peacekeeping operations [8] around the world.
"The defense minister and the chancellor say we continually prove
ourselves to be reliable partners," Joetze says. "We are prepared to
make our contribution. We can afford to have another opinion on one
particular question."
"(In 1999) the only international operation the Bundeswehr was
involved in was the air campaign against Yugoslavia. [9] There weren't
any German troops in Macedonia or Afghanistan yet. The issue was the
first NATO troop deployment."
Besides, the mood among the population has changed in the past four
years. Then, most Germans were in favor of a war against the Milosevic
regime. Today, the majority rejects a war against Saddam Hussein. [10]
In that light, Joetze defends Schroeder's firm position against an
Iraq war. Nor does he find the anti-war stance "reprehensible," as
some members of Germany's opposition government have. On the contrary,
he says, a major pillar of democratically elected representatives is
the idea of listening to the voice of the people and acting on those
wishes. [sic]
Claus Haecking
[NOTES by CNJ:
1. Compare with the terror and apartheid regime which has been
established in Kosovo since NATO bombings stopped.
2. Note that the true danger was initiated by the German BND support
to the UCK racially-motivated terrorists.
3. The expulsion of non-Albanians as well as democratic Albanians from
Kosovo has been successfully carried on after the NATO bombings.
4. This has been proved to be another big lie after the aggression
against Iraq was performed.
5. If this was the aim, then just have a look at the shameful results.
6. This is either racist or nonsense.
7. This is reasonable, due to the historical long-term colonial and
imperialistic role of Germany in the Balkans.
8. They use to call them like that.
9. Here, the bombings onto chemical plants and civilian
infrastructures, also by use of "depleted" uranium, are meant.
10. The desinformation and demonization campaign has been not
effective enough this time?]
Four years after the end of NATO "humanitarian" bombings...
1. Important links:
http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org/ - and more
2. When bombs fell on Belgrade
(Reprinted from the April 3, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper)
3. A PARADOX?... Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No'
To Iraq (by Claus Häcking, Deutsche Welle)
=== 1 ===
LINKS:
A summary of NATO destructions, with many photos:
http://www.sramota.com/nato/
24/3: On the Day a Tragic Era Started (by Milos Markovic)
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-04-07_1.html
March 24, 1999: NATO's Humanitarian Trigger (by Diana Johnstone)
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-controversies16.html
=== http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org
Subject: Highly Recommended Web Site: Justice Yugoslavia
Date: Tue, 3 Jun 2003 09:36:13 -0700 (PDT)
From: Rick Rozoff
Please find the time to visit (and revisit) the
updated Web site of the Campaign for Justice for the
Peoples of Yugoslavia at the address listed below.
It's run by David Roberts in Britain and is
consistently characterized by the insight and
integrity that are the hallmarks of David himself.
Yours for peace and justice,
Rick Rozoff
3 June
Dear Friends,
My http://www.justiceyugoslavia.org web site is now
functioning. It offers an alternative view of the
"humanitarian bombing".
It has a Nuremberg Prosecutor's damning criticism of
the NATO bombing and my own investigation called "NATO
on Trial - The Deceptions, Illegality, and Tragedy
of the Bombing of Yugoslavia: The manipulation of
public opinion, the media and politicians."
I hope you may find it interesting.
If you can publicise the site widely I'd be grateful.
Best wishes,
David
=== 2 ===
http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/edit0403.php
EDITORIAL
When bombs fell on Belgrade
As U.S. missiles pouring into Baghdad murder the very people Bush is
claiming to "liberate," the world should recall a similar aggression
by U.S. imperialism just four years ago. On March 24, 1999, the
Pentagon opened a bombing campaign on Yugoslavia that lasted 78
days. Washington sold that war with the big lie that it was a noble
venture, a "humanitarian" intervention. It was supposed to rescue
Kosovo and especially its ethnic Albanian population from alleged Serb
repression.
Washington then had closer collaboration from its NATO allies. The big
powers submerged their rivalry in order to smash independent
Yugoslavia.
Western politicians and the ruling class media got public support for
the war through an intensive campaign of demonization of the Yugoslav
leader Slobodan Milosevic, just as they do Saddam Hussein today. But
the assault on Yugoslavia had as little to do with Milosevic as the
war on Iraq today has to do with Hussein--except that neither
leader was ready to prostrate his country and submit to the interests
of Western imperialism.
The goal of the 78 days of brutal bombing--preceded by 10 years of
subversion, the fomenting of civil war and economic sanctions--was to
remove the one remaining independent country in Eastern Europe that
had kept some of the gains of its socialist revolution. Its people,
resources, industry and strategic location were to be taken over to
serve imperialist interests.
Taking stock today of the region that was once, and may again someday
be Yugoslavia, one can see clearly just what imperialist
"humanitarian" intervention has brought.
Four dependent mini-states, two imperialist protectorates and a Serbia
in chains have replaced an independent state of southern Slavs that
had 24 million people.
U.S. and NATO military bases dominate the territory. German and U.S.
capital dominate the economy.
Kosovo has become an apartheid state run by organized crime, a center
of drugs and prostitution based on the kidnapping of women. The
right-wing KLA gangs have driven out Serbs, Jews and other minority
people who lived there.
Whatever Yugoslav industry is potentially profitable, especially in
Serbia, has been sold at dirt-cheap prices to Western imperialism. The
rest has been closed, creating 30-50 percent unemployment and reducing
two-thirds of people in Serbia to official poverty.
The imperialist takeover has failed even to bring order. The recent
assassination of NATO-stooge Zoran Djindjic, Serbia's prime minister,
brought that failure home.
Anyone studying developments in the region following the U.S.-NATO
takeover of Yugoslavia might get a hint as to why the Iraqis are
fighting so hard to prevent the U.S.-British imper ialist gang from
seizing their country.
- END -
Reprinted from the April 3, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper
(Copyright Workers World Service: Everyone is permitted to copy and
distribute verbatim copies of this document, but changing it is not
allowed. For more information contact Workers World, 55 W. 17 St., NY,
NY 10011; via email: ww@....
Subscribe wwnews-on@....
Unsubscribe wwnews-off@.... Support independent news
http://www.workers.org/orders/donate.php)
=== 3 ===
PARADOXES...
Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No' To Iraq
http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,7489_A_811834_1_A,00.html
19.03.2003
Why Germany Voted 'Yes' To Invade Yugoslavia But 'No' To Iraq
=
NATO strikes in Belgrade: Germany's first military deployment since
World War II
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has ruled out German military
participation in an Iraq war. But four years ago the Bundeswehr took
part in NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia without a U.N. mandate. So why
then and not now?
Chancellor Schroeder somberly addressed the nation on March 24, 1999,
shortly after NATO began bombing Yugoslavia. He announced that his
government had made a difficult decision.
"After all, this is the first time since World War II that German
soldiers have been deployed in combat," he said. "We are not waging a
war, but we must bring about a peaceful solution in Kosovo, even
if that requires the use of military force." [1]
Schroeder explained that this was the reason why the German government
had decided to take part in the military campaign against Slobodan
Milosevic's regime.
Today, the same governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens has
rejected involvement in a war against Iraq, arguing that military
intervention would only serve to further destabilize the Middle East.
In 1999, the government used the opposite argument, maintaining
that the Balkans would be in greater danger if Germany did not act.
Explaining the contradiction
"In Kosovo, we had a situation of ongoing danger," [2] Social
Democratic Party foreign policy spokeswoman Ute Zapf told
Deutsche Welle in an interview. "It was about ethnic expulsion and
impending genocide. [3] Now, in Iraq, we have a potential threat
from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction [4] but no immediate danger."
Zapf insisted the problems were very different.
Germany's opposition parties hold a different view. Christoph Schmidt,
defense spokesman for the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian
sister party, the Christian Social Union, criticized the government
for committing itself too early to a "no" vote on participation in
order to assure Shroeder's autumn reelection bid last year. Now,
Schmidt says, Schroeder has no maneuvering room to change his
position.
"July 2002 was the point of departure," Schmidt explains. "Then
Schroeder tried to take advantage of the mood against military
intervention (in Iraq) for the election campaign. The price was that
other foreign policy options were abandoned. And now, getting out of
that without losing face is hard."
Political perspectives
Guenther Joetze believes that neither of these explanations is
sufficient. The former president of the Federal Academy for Security
Policy has written a book about Germany's role in the Kosovo conflict
and is working on a new book about its role in the Iraq crisis. Joetze
ascribes the German government's differing attitudes toward Kosovo and
Iraq to numerous motives. Above all, says Joetze, the government holds
different political perspectives for the two crisis regions.
In Kosovo, the international community was aiming to enforce
humanitarian and democratic standards [5], which cannot be transmitted
to Iraq as easily [6], Joetze maintains. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein
is not considered the only rogue [sic] in the region, which is why
the government does not believe that a war will improve the situation.
In the case of Kosovo, Joetze says, Germany's partners in NATO
expected that the German army, the Bundeswehr, would take part in
military operations [7]. The government had little choice but to say
"yes," Joetze maintains. Plus, the government had only been in office
for a short time and had to prove itself in the realm of foreign
policy. [sic]
"The Social Democrats didn't want to start their term in government
with discord in the coalition," Joetze insists. "Whereas, for Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer of the Green Party, the question was a
different one. It was made clear to him (as the junior partner
in the governing coalition) that he could only remain foreign
minister and a governing partner if he towed the same line."
International peacekeeping
Today, Joetze says the government is in a different position --
not just because it has been in office for four years, but also
because Germany is now the second-largest contributor of troops to
international peacekeeping operations [8] around the world.
"The defense minister and the chancellor say we continually prove
ourselves to be reliable partners," Joetze says. "We are prepared to
make our contribution. We can afford to have another opinion on one
particular question."
"(In 1999) the only international operation the Bundeswehr was
involved in was the air campaign against Yugoslavia. [9] There weren't
any German troops in Macedonia or Afghanistan yet. The issue was the
first NATO troop deployment."
Besides, the mood among the population has changed in the past four
years. Then, most Germans were in favor of a war against the Milosevic
regime. Today, the majority rejects a war against Saddam Hussein. [10]
In that light, Joetze defends Schroeder's firm position against an
Iraq war. Nor does he find the anti-war stance "reprehensible," as
some members of Germany's opposition government have. On the contrary,
he says, a major pillar of democratically elected representatives is
the idea of listening to the voice of the people and acting on those
wishes. [sic]
Claus Haecking
[NOTES by CNJ:
1. Compare with the terror and apartheid regime which has been
established in Kosovo since NATO bombings stopped.
2. Note that the true danger was initiated by the German BND support
to the UCK racially-motivated terrorists.
3. The expulsion of non-Albanians as well as democratic Albanians from
Kosovo has been successfully carried on after the NATO bombings.
4. This has been proved to be another big lie after the aggression
against Iraq was performed.
5. If this was the aim, then just have a look at the shameful results.
6. This is either racist or nonsense.
7. This is reasonable, due to the historical long-term colonial and
imperialistic role of Germany in the Balkans.
8. They use to call them like that.
9. Here, the bombings onto chemical plants and civilian
infrastructures, also by use of "depleted" uranium, are meant.
10. The desinformation and demonization campaign has been not
effective enough this time?]
1. VAPAJ SRPSKOG NARODA IZ VITINE
2. Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM
=== 1 ===
Informativna sluzba
Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve
30. maj 2003. godine
VAPAJ SRPSKOG NARODA IZ VITINE
Srpsko nacionalno vece Kosova i Metohije je poslalo tekst vapaja -
apela srpskog naroda iz Vitine u kome je popis nasilnickih dogadjaja
u Kosovskom Pomoravlju. Nakon porasta nasilja i pritisaka na srpsko
stanovnistvo ovog kraja, uz uporno negiranje pogorsanja bezbednosne
situacije od predstavnika americkog KFOR-a i UNMIK-a, narodu Kosovskog
Pomoravlja nije nista drugo preostalo nego da se javnim apelom obrati
srpskom narodu i vlastima u Beogradu i zatrazi njihovu pomoc.
VAPAJ PREOSTALOG SRPSKOG ZIVLJA NA TERITORIJI OPSTINE VITINA
Opet su nas po koji put ubili, opet smo po ko zna koji put postali
mete, tek sto smo se ponadali da je ubijanju kraj, da cemo moci barem
u svojim domovima, na svojim imanjima biti mirni. Ali mira i dalje
nema:
14. maja 2003. godine, na izlasku iz srpskog sela Vrbovac Albanci
pucnjevima zastrasuju zitelje tog sela.
15. maja 2003. godine u selu Mogila, inace mesovitog sastava,
uzvikivanjem antisrpskih parola po srpskim ulicama i klicanjem Ademu
Jasariju, Albanci provociraju Srbe i tokom noci su jednom Srbinu iz
pomenutog sela ukrali stoku.
16. maja 2003. godine albanski ucenici, dok slobodno prolaze kroz
srpsko selo Vrbovac, na albanskom jeziku pevaju provokativne pesme, u
smislu «Sve smo Srbe proterali i vas cemo uskoro». Vec istog dana od
strane Albanaca stizu glasine da ce ubiti sedmoro Srba iz ovih
krajeva.
17. maja 2003. godine, Albanci ostvaruju svoju pretnju ubivsi na
zverski nacin Zorana Mirkovica, starog 44 godine, pored njegovog tela
ostavljajuci poruku u kojoj stoji u naslovu: Albanska nacionalna
armija, a tekst pretece sadrzine potpisao je tzv. ''komandant Celi''.
Nastradali Zoran, profesor ruskog jezika, otac troje maloletne dece,
veliki covek i dobar domacin, krenuo je biciklom u obilazak svog
imanja. Ubivsi njega, ubili su jos jedan deo nase ranjene,
raskrvavljene i bespomocne duse.
19. maja 2003. godine, u srpskom selu Klokot pokusavaju da kidnapuju
Srbina iz tog sela, Stanka Misica, koji je takodje posao da obidje
svoje imanje u blizini sela, ali uspeva da se nekako izvuce, najvise
zahvaljujuci blizini crkve i punktu KFOR-a, gde je i pobegao.
21. maja 2003. godine, u Vitini, u sopstvenom dvoristu je pretucen
90-godisnjeg starac Slavko Stamenkovic, naocigled njegove zene kojoj
su rukom zatvorili usta kako ne bi dozivala u pomoc.
22. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokotu je pretucen ucenik drugog razreda
Srednje ekonomske skole Milan Pavic, u blizini svoje kuce, dok je na
autobuskoj stanici cekao skolski autobus.
25. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokot zapaljena je kuca Momcila Savica.
Skrhani bolom, kad nas beznadje i bespomocnost olicena u 45 nevino
ubijenih dusa i deset zivota za koje se neizvesnost sve vise pretvara
u strasnu izvesnost, bez potvrde, po ko zna koji put dizemo svoj glas.
Ne znamo da li da ove reci nazovemo apelom, jer smo apelima i Bogu
dosadili, ili protestom - protestom protiv sveopsteg zla koje na
ogromnu zalost lezi tu pored nas i oko nas, ali ga niko ne vidi, a
posebno oni koji su za to zaduzeni i za to placeni; i ne znamo dokle
cemo jos biti mete za odstrel, samo zato sto smo Srbi i sto jos uvek
zivimo u svojim ognjistima.
Svaka zrtva koju smo u koraku, u snu, u poslu, u strahu dali, rana je
koja nikada nece zaceliti. Od oko 11.000 koliko nas je bilo na
podrucju opstine Vitina, od dolaska KFOR-a ostalo nas je nekih 3.000,
u dva srpska sela, jedno koje je to bilo do pre godinu dana, od 15
mesovitih sela ostala su jos samo dva, a opstinski centar Vitina od 70
procenata srpskog sastava postao je tamnica za stotinak staraca i onih
koji nemaju gde.
Zivot u tim getoiziranim mestima, gde je prividno sve u nekoj normali,
gde god da se nalazis, sa svakog drveta, iz svakog jarka, iz svakog
automobila, vreba te potencijalna opasnost, jer su se sva stradanja
desavala u slicnim situacijama, mucki, bez izazova i znanja. Takvo
stanje neminovno donosi pitanje - ko je sledeca zrtva?
I pored svakog napora da ostanemo prisebni i ubedimo ljude oko sebe da
postoji neko ko o nama misli, ne mozemo da ubedimo sebe, jer nas
stvarnost demantuje, pa smo postali sumnjicavi i na Boziju pomoc.
17. maja pala je poslednja zrtva, Boze daj! Nas veliki prijatelj i
veliki, veliki covek, s obzirom koliko smo mi mali i nejaki. Jos jedna
porodica je ostala ucveljena, bez hranioca, sa neizvesnom buducnoscu.
Necemo Vas kritikovati, jer Vas ne boli, i mozda ce ovo pismo biti tek
puki tekst koji ce zavrsiti u korpi, ali ako ste poceli, procitajte ga
do kraja, misleci na svoje porodice koje su, nadamo se, srecne i
daleko od zla koje je nasa svakodnevica, i koje nas unistava samo zato
sto smo pravoslavni Srbi.
OVO JE PROTEST NASE DUSE SVIMA KOJI SU ZA TO ODGOVORNI:
PROTIV UBIJANjA koje nas prati i preti nasem istrebljenju, jer se za
to ne bira ni mesto, niti vreme, ni oruzje, niti nacin, ni ime, niti
prezime, ni uzrast, niti starost, samo je bitno da je zrtva
pravoslavni Srbin i da je cilj ostvaren: jos jedan Srbin manje, jos
jedno oruzje koje ubija razloge opstajanja na rodnom ognjistu.
PROTIV FIZICKOG UGNjETAVANjA koje se svakodnevno manifestuje kroz
ranjavanja, prebijanja, kamenovanja, i druge vidove represija, sto
uslovljava strah za odrzavanjem golog zivota, strah za slobodnim
kretanjem i radom, a zavrsava najcesce napustanjem svojih vekovnih
ognjista i strahom za povratkom na njih.
PROTIV DUHOVNOG GENOCIDA koje se manifestuje kroz unistavanje
visevekovnog nasledja jednog naroda, kroz rusenje njegovih svetinja
(crkava i manastira), skrnavljenje grobalja i unistavanje tragova
postojanja i kulture jednog hriscanskog naroda koji se civilizacijski
izvorno identifikuje na podrucju Kosmeta.
PROTIV SVAKOG OBLIKA INSTITUCIONALNE DISKRIMINACIJE koja nazalost samo
zamenjuje fizicke oblike pritisaka i u kombinaciji s njima unistava
svaki vid perspektive za blisku, a jos vise za dalju buducnost
zajednickog zivljenja.
PROTIV MRZNjE I GOVORA ORUZJA UMESTO RAZUMA.
PROTIV NARUSAVANjA SVOJINSKIH PRAVA kroz razne oblike unistavanja,
prisvajanja, otudjivanja: kuca, stanova, zemljista, poljoprivredne
mehanizacije, stoke i ostalog. Za navedene pojave zaduzeni subjekti
medjunarodne zajednice imaju milione podataka i dokaza, ali problemi
vec cetiri godine ostaju nereseni, sto kod preostalih Srba radja
osecaj konstantne bespomocnosti i nezainteresovanosti za
institucionalnu borbu za ostvarivanje svojih prava.
PROTIV SOCIJALNE BEDE koja je uslovljena proterivanjem sa radnih mesta
hiljada radnika, cime je bez sredstava za egzistenciju ostao veliki
broj porodica, sto je dodatno uslovilo odlazak sa svojih ognjista.
PROTIV SMANjENjA PRISUSTVA SNAGA KFOR-A sto uslovljava i otvara siri
prostor za delovanje terorizma.
PROTIV DELOVANjA ALBANSKE TERORISTICKE ORGANIZACIJE «ANA» NA OVIM
PROSTORIMA
U IME BESPOMOCNIH SRBA OPSTINE VITINA
SRPSKO NACIONALNO VECE ZA KOSOVO I METOHIJU, OPSTINA VITINA
Slede potpisi clanova SNV KIM opstine Vitina
=== 2 ===
[O polemike oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM procitaj:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2520 ]
Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/glas_dijaspore/2003-05-19_1.html
Slobodan R. Stojanovic
Brazil, 19. maja 2003. godine
Posstovana gospodo,
ZZelim da se ukljuccim u ovu diskusiju ne bih li
doprineo pojassnjavanju nekih vazznih taccaka.
Najvechi problem u ovom sluccaju je taj ssto su oba
sagovornika u pravu. I Emil Vlajki i SNV Kosova i
Metohije. Ipak postoje detalji koji su po meni vrlo
vazzni za sagledavanje problema. Evo o ccemu se radi:
Ako nekoga treba kriviti za MAZOHISTICKO SLUGANSTVO
onda to nisu organizacije Srba sa Kosova i Metohije,
vech vlada drzzave Srbije. Odgovornost te vlade za
buduchnost srpskog naroda, kako materijalnu tako i
duhovnu, neuporedivo je vecha od odgovornosti svih
organizacija Srba sa Kosova zajedno.
Ali ni to nije najvechi problem. Najvechi problem je
stav vechinskog dela srpskog naroda prema Kosovu i
Metohiji i svojih trenutnim nedachama. Jer ne traba da
gubimo iz vida da vlada jedne drzzave kako-tako ipak
predstavlja vechinu naroda. Dakle, pravo pitanje je:
Koja je to volja vechine srpskog naroda?
Na ovo pitanje odgovor smo dobili u visse navrata.
1. Neposredno po zakljuccenju primirja, kojim su
Kosovo i Metohija postali strani protektorat, u
Beogradu se mogao ccitati ccuveni grafit: "Imass
mostove, jebess Kosovo." Ljudi su se tada radovali
kraju rata, i nisu tugovali zbog gubitka Kosova.
Ustvari mnogi jesu, ali ono ssto je tada moglo da se
vidi, dakle ono ssto se nametalo kao vechina, bila je
radost i slavlje zbog kraja rata.
2. Iako je ta ista vechina sve vreme stajala uz svoga
vodju - najpre su mu na referendumu dali ovlasschenja
da brani Kosovo, a zatim su slavljenjem okonccanja
rata podrzzali njegov potpis kapitulacije -, ta ista
magarecha vechina ga je srussila s vlasti, vodjena i
navodjena ssargarepom od 70-90 miliona dolara. I ne
samo to. Da ne bi bilo nikakve sumnje na ccijoj su
strani, oni su na juriss zauzeli Narodnu Skupsstinu,
unusstili dokaze o prethodnim izborima, pokrali mnoge
vredne umetniccke predmete, unisstili mnoge koje nisu
mogli da ponesu, i ZAPALILI SKUPSSTINU.
Neki mogu da kazzu kako se nije radilo o vechini. Ali
ja o tim podacima sudim prema stvarnom efektu, a ne
prema teoretskim brojevima koje nismo u stanju da
utvrdimo. Jer u sluccaju vandalizma u Narodnoj
Skupsstini postoji joss jedan detalj: ni snage
bezbednosti, koje su bile znatna manjina u odnosu na
rulju koja je opkolila Skupsstinu, nisu zzelele da
brane drzzavnu imovinu.
3. Sramno izruccenje bivsseg predsednika zloccincima
koji su nas ubijali 1999. Joss jednom isto: vechina je
sve vreme bila uz bivsseg predsednika, ali kada
ssargarepa postane dovoljno velika i
neodoljiva("ulazak u Evropu" ili "zziveti kao sav
normalni svet")
magarci namerno brissu svoju memoriju, i okrechu novi
list (svoje istorije).
Naravno, ima tu i mnogih drugih detalja. Jer ne treba
zaboraviti ni to da se i bivssi predsednik savrsseno
uklapa u taj mozaik: ccak ni sina nije poslao na
Kosovo za koje se vodila bitka.
Sve ovo zajedno daje nam sliku o nama samima. Kako
posle svega toga mozzemo da bacamo krivicu na Srbe sa
Kosova i optuzzujemo ih za SLUGARENJE I MAZOHIZAM.
SRPSKU NACIJU KAO CELINU, nju treba optuzziti, a ne
jedan njen MAJUSSNI I ZANEMARLJIVI DELICH, koji
zapravo i nema drugog izbora; osim ukoliko KOLEKTIVNO
SAMOUBISTVO NE ISKLJUCCIMO iz arsenala moguchih
ressenja.
2. Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM
=== 1 ===
Informativna sluzba
Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve
30. maj 2003. godine
VAPAJ SRPSKOG NARODA IZ VITINE
Srpsko nacionalno vece Kosova i Metohije je poslalo tekst vapaja -
apela srpskog naroda iz Vitine u kome je popis nasilnickih dogadjaja
u Kosovskom Pomoravlju. Nakon porasta nasilja i pritisaka na srpsko
stanovnistvo ovog kraja, uz uporno negiranje pogorsanja bezbednosne
situacije od predstavnika americkog KFOR-a i UNMIK-a, narodu Kosovskog
Pomoravlja nije nista drugo preostalo nego da se javnim apelom obrati
srpskom narodu i vlastima u Beogradu i zatrazi njihovu pomoc.
VAPAJ PREOSTALOG SRPSKOG ZIVLJA NA TERITORIJI OPSTINE VITINA
Opet su nas po koji put ubili, opet smo po ko zna koji put postali
mete, tek sto smo se ponadali da je ubijanju kraj, da cemo moci barem
u svojim domovima, na svojim imanjima biti mirni. Ali mira i dalje
nema:
14. maja 2003. godine, na izlasku iz srpskog sela Vrbovac Albanci
pucnjevima zastrasuju zitelje tog sela.
15. maja 2003. godine u selu Mogila, inace mesovitog sastava,
uzvikivanjem antisrpskih parola po srpskim ulicama i klicanjem Ademu
Jasariju, Albanci provociraju Srbe i tokom noci su jednom Srbinu iz
pomenutog sela ukrali stoku.
16. maja 2003. godine albanski ucenici, dok slobodno prolaze kroz
srpsko selo Vrbovac, na albanskom jeziku pevaju provokativne pesme, u
smislu «Sve smo Srbe proterali i vas cemo uskoro». Vec istog dana od
strane Albanaca stizu glasine da ce ubiti sedmoro Srba iz ovih
krajeva.
17. maja 2003. godine, Albanci ostvaruju svoju pretnju ubivsi na
zverski nacin Zorana Mirkovica, starog 44 godine, pored njegovog tela
ostavljajuci poruku u kojoj stoji u naslovu: Albanska nacionalna
armija, a tekst pretece sadrzine potpisao je tzv. ''komandant Celi''.
Nastradali Zoran, profesor ruskog jezika, otac troje maloletne dece,
veliki covek i dobar domacin, krenuo je biciklom u obilazak svog
imanja. Ubivsi njega, ubili su jos jedan deo nase ranjene,
raskrvavljene i bespomocne duse.
19. maja 2003. godine, u srpskom selu Klokot pokusavaju da kidnapuju
Srbina iz tog sela, Stanka Misica, koji je takodje posao da obidje
svoje imanje u blizini sela, ali uspeva da se nekako izvuce, najvise
zahvaljujuci blizini crkve i punktu KFOR-a, gde je i pobegao.
21. maja 2003. godine, u Vitini, u sopstvenom dvoristu je pretucen
90-godisnjeg starac Slavko Stamenkovic, naocigled njegove zene kojoj
su rukom zatvorili usta kako ne bi dozivala u pomoc.
22. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokotu je pretucen ucenik drugog razreda
Srednje ekonomske skole Milan Pavic, u blizini svoje kuce, dok je na
autobuskoj stanici cekao skolski autobus.
25. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokot zapaljena je kuca Momcila Savica.
Skrhani bolom, kad nas beznadje i bespomocnost olicena u 45 nevino
ubijenih dusa i deset zivota za koje se neizvesnost sve vise pretvara
u strasnu izvesnost, bez potvrde, po ko zna koji put dizemo svoj glas.
Ne znamo da li da ove reci nazovemo apelom, jer smo apelima i Bogu
dosadili, ili protestom - protestom protiv sveopsteg zla koje na
ogromnu zalost lezi tu pored nas i oko nas, ali ga niko ne vidi, a
posebno oni koji su za to zaduzeni i za to placeni; i ne znamo dokle
cemo jos biti mete za odstrel, samo zato sto smo Srbi i sto jos uvek
zivimo u svojim ognjistima.
Svaka zrtva koju smo u koraku, u snu, u poslu, u strahu dali, rana je
koja nikada nece zaceliti. Od oko 11.000 koliko nas je bilo na
podrucju opstine Vitina, od dolaska KFOR-a ostalo nas je nekih 3.000,
u dva srpska sela, jedno koje je to bilo do pre godinu dana, od 15
mesovitih sela ostala su jos samo dva, a opstinski centar Vitina od 70
procenata srpskog sastava postao je tamnica za stotinak staraca i onih
koji nemaju gde.
Zivot u tim getoiziranim mestima, gde je prividno sve u nekoj normali,
gde god da se nalazis, sa svakog drveta, iz svakog jarka, iz svakog
automobila, vreba te potencijalna opasnost, jer su se sva stradanja
desavala u slicnim situacijama, mucki, bez izazova i znanja. Takvo
stanje neminovno donosi pitanje - ko je sledeca zrtva?
I pored svakog napora da ostanemo prisebni i ubedimo ljude oko sebe da
postoji neko ko o nama misli, ne mozemo da ubedimo sebe, jer nas
stvarnost demantuje, pa smo postali sumnjicavi i na Boziju pomoc.
17. maja pala je poslednja zrtva, Boze daj! Nas veliki prijatelj i
veliki, veliki covek, s obzirom koliko smo mi mali i nejaki. Jos jedna
porodica je ostala ucveljena, bez hranioca, sa neizvesnom buducnoscu.
Necemo Vas kritikovati, jer Vas ne boli, i mozda ce ovo pismo biti tek
puki tekst koji ce zavrsiti u korpi, ali ako ste poceli, procitajte ga
do kraja, misleci na svoje porodice koje su, nadamo se, srecne i
daleko od zla koje je nasa svakodnevica, i koje nas unistava samo zato
sto smo pravoslavni Srbi.
OVO JE PROTEST NASE DUSE SVIMA KOJI SU ZA TO ODGOVORNI:
PROTIV UBIJANjA koje nas prati i preti nasem istrebljenju, jer se za
to ne bira ni mesto, niti vreme, ni oruzje, niti nacin, ni ime, niti
prezime, ni uzrast, niti starost, samo je bitno da je zrtva
pravoslavni Srbin i da je cilj ostvaren: jos jedan Srbin manje, jos
jedno oruzje koje ubija razloge opstajanja na rodnom ognjistu.
PROTIV FIZICKOG UGNjETAVANjA koje se svakodnevno manifestuje kroz
ranjavanja, prebijanja, kamenovanja, i druge vidove represija, sto
uslovljava strah za odrzavanjem golog zivota, strah za slobodnim
kretanjem i radom, a zavrsava najcesce napustanjem svojih vekovnih
ognjista i strahom za povratkom na njih.
PROTIV DUHOVNOG GENOCIDA koje se manifestuje kroz unistavanje
visevekovnog nasledja jednog naroda, kroz rusenje njegovih svetinja
(crkava i manastira), skrnavljenje grobalja i unistavanje tragova
postojanja i kulture jednog hriscanskog naroda koji se civilizacijski
izvorno identifikuje na podrucju Kosmeta.
PROTIV SVAKOG OBLIKA INSTITUCIONALNE DISKRIMINACIJE koja nazalost samo
zamenjuje fizicke oblike pritisaka i u kombinaciji s njima unistava
svaki vid perspektive za blisku, a jos vise za dalju buducnost
zajednickog zivljenja.
PROTIV MRZNjE I GOVORA ORUZJA UMESTO RAZUMA.
PROTIV NARUSAVANjA SVOJINSKIH PRAVA kroz razne oblike unistavanja,
prisvajanja, otudjivanja: kuca, stanova, zemljista, poljoprivredne
mehanizacije, stoke i ostalog. Za navedene pojave zaduzeni subjekti
medjunarodne zajednice imaju milione podataka i dokaza, ali problemi
vec cetiri godine ostaju nereseni, sto kod preostalih Srba radja
osecaj konstantne bespomocnosti i nezainteresovanosti za
institucionalnu borbu za ostvarivanje svojih prava.
PROTIV SOCIJALNE BEDE koja je uslovljena proterivanjem sa radnih mesta
hiljada radnika, cime je bez sredstava za egzistenciju ostao veliki
broj porodica, sto je dodatno uslovilo odlazak sa svojih ognjista.
PROTIV SMANjENjA PRISUSTVA SNAGA KFOR-A sto uslovljava i otvara siri
prostor za delovanje terorizma.
PROTIV DELOVANjA ALBANSKE TERORISTICKE ORGANIZACIJE «ANA» NA OVIM
PROSTORIMA
U IME BESPOMOCNIH SRBA OPSTINE VITINA
SRPSKO NACIONALNO VECE ZA KOSOVO I METOHIJU, OPSTINA VITINA
Slede potpisi clanova SNV KIM opstine Vitina
=== 2 ===
[O polemike oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM procitaj:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2520 ]
Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/glas_dijaspore/2003-05-19_1.html
Slobodan R. Stojanovic
Brazil, 19. maja 2003. godine
Posstovana gospodo,
ZZelim da se ukljuccim u ovu diskusiju ne bih li
doprineo pojassnjavanju nekih vazznih taccaka.
Najvechi problem u ovom sluccaju je taj ssto su oba
sagovornika u pravu. I Emil Vlajki i SNV Kosova i
Metohije. Ipak postoje detalji koji su po meni vrlo
vazzni za sagledavanje problema. Evo o ccemu se radi:
Ako nekoga treba kriviti za MAZOHISTICKO SLUGANSTVO
onda to nisu organizacije Srba sa Kosova i Metohije,
vech vlada drzzave Srbije. Odgovornost te vlade za
buduchnost srpskog naroda, kako materijalnu tako i
duhovnu, neuporedivo je vecha od odgovornosti svih
organizacija Srba sa Kosova zajedno.
Ali ni to nije najvechi problem. Najvechi problem je
stav vechinskog dela srpskog naroda prema Kosovu i
Metohiji i svojih trenutnim nedachama. Jer ne traba da
gubimo iz vida da vlada jedne drzzave kako-tako ipak
predstavlja vechinu naroda. Dakle, pravo pitanje je:
Koja je to volja vechine srpskog naroda?
Na ovo pitanje odgovor smo dobili u visse navrata.
1. Neposredno po zakljuccenju primirja, kojim su
Kosovo i Metohija postali strani protektorat, u
Beogradu se mogao ccitati ccuveni grafit: "Imass
mostove, jebess Kosovo." Ljudi su se tada radovali
kraju rata, i nisu tugovali zbog gubitka Kosova.
Ustvari mnogi jesu, ali ono ssto je tada moglo da se
vidi, dakle ono ssto se nametalo kao vechina, bila je
radost i slavlje zbog kraja rata.
2. Iako je ta ista vechina sve vreme stajala uz svoga
vodju - najpre su mu na referendumu dali ovlasschenja
da brani Kosovo, a zatim su slavljenjem okonccanja
rata podrzzali njegov potpis kapitulacije -, ta ista
magarecha vechina ga je srussila s vlasti, vodjena i
navodjena ssargarepom od 70-90 miliona dolara. I ne
samo to. Da ne bi bilo nikakve sumnje na ccijoj su
strani, oni su na juriss zauzeli Narodnu Skupsstinu,
unusstili dokaze o prethodnim izborima, pokrali mnoge
vredne umetniccke predmete, unisstili mnoge koje nisu
mogli da ponesu, i ZAPALILI SKUPSSTINU.
Neki mogu da kazzu kako se nije radilo o vechini. Ali
ja o tim podacima sudim prema stvarnom efektu, a ne
prema teoretskim brojevima koje nismo u stanju da
utvrdimo. Jer u sluccaju vandalizma u Narodnoj
Skupsstini postoji joss jedan detalj: ni snage
bezbednosti, koje su bile znatna manjina u odnosu na
rulju koja je opkolila Skupsstinu, nisu zzelele da
brane drzzavnu imovinu.
3. Sramno izruccenje bivsseg predsednika zloccincima
koji su nas ubijali 1999. Joss jednom isto: vechina je
sve vreme bila uz bivsseg predsednika, ali kada
ssargarepa postane dovoljno velika i
neodoljiva("ulazak u Evropu" ili "zziveti kao sav
normalni svet")
magarci namerno brissu svoju memoriju, i okrechu novi
list (svoje istorije).
Naravno, ima tu i mnogih drugih detalja. Jer ne treba
zaboraviti ni to da se i bivssi predsednik savrsseno
uklapa u taj mozaik: ccak ni sina nije poslao na
Kosovo za koje se vodila bitka.
Sve ovo zajedno daje nam sliku o nama samima. Kako
posle svega toga mozzemo da bacamo krivicu na Srbe sa
Kosova i optuzzujemo ih za SLUGARENJE I MAZOHIZAM.
SRPSKU NACIJU KAO CELINU, nju treba optuzziti, a ne
jedan njen MAJUSSNI I ZANEMARLJIVI DELICH, koji
zapravo i nema drugog izbora; osim ukoliko KOLEKTIVNO
SAMOUBISTVO NE ISKLJUCCIMO iz arsenala moguchih
ressenja.
Subject: [yugoslaviainfo] Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 07:21:30 +0200
From: "Darka"
To: <This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.>
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m052803.html
Antiwar.com
May 28, 2003
Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
How the US 'Ended' the Bosnian War
To End A War, by Richard Holbrooke
New York, Random House, June 1998, 432 pages (hardcover)
Few things have been as grossly misunderstood as the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known by its
birthplace as "Dayton." Agreed at the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton,
Ohio and initialed in Paris, France on 21 November
1995, the Dayton Agreement finally established
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, after a three-year
interethnic war following its 1992 international
recognition. It also completely failed to resolve any of
issues that caused the war.
Instead, it was a feat of social engineering
unprecedented at the time, attempting through force
and bluster to forge a nation out of bitter enmities.
That should not have surprised anyone, given that
force and bluster were the main character traits of
Dayton's chief creator, rogue American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke.
Proud 'Peacemaker'
Holbrooke had a long and distinguished career in
foreign affairs, starting from his Foreign Service job
in Vietnam in 1962. He also edited the Foreign
Policyjournal (1972-76), served as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
(1977-1981), US Ambassador to Germany (1993-94),
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (1994-96). It was in this last
capacity that he came to preside over the "peace
process" in Bosnia.
To End A War is an extraordinary book documenting
not just his endeavors in Bosnia, but the underlying
logic, emotions and politics behind them. For all his
failings - arrogance, ignorance and vanity easily
spring to mind - Holbrooke is also earnest. Though
his memoir is as self-serving as, say, Lord David
Owen's Balkan Odyssey, unlike Owen, Holbrooke is
not trying to make excuses: he is actually proud of his
actions, thoughts and opinions. There is not one hint
of modesty - false or otherwise - in Holbrooke, and
for that one must be grateful. For in chronicling his
efforts to badger, bully and beat the Bosnians into
ending their war - on American terms, of course - he
offers surprisingly clear insights into the U.S.
Balkans policy at the time, and his own role therein.
Reading Holbrooke's memoir, one needs to keep in
mind that this man is the chief creator of the current
Bosnian state, a paradox protectorate continuing to
exist in spite of itself.
'I Am The Empire'
Anyone who even slightly doubts the Official Truth
about the Balkans wars will be struck by Holbrooke's
cavalier dismissal of any pretense of civility when
dealing with the locals - especially the Serbs, for
whom he had only disdain dangerously bordering on
hatred. To him, prejudices, deceptions and
fabrications represent fully justified means to the
goal. Cautioned by his British colleague to treat Serbs
with some consideration, Holbrooke replied:
"The Serb view of history was their problem. ours
was to end a war." (110)
One is tempted to wonder if that was a royal "we."
Holbrooke not only represented the United States, he
literally made American policy concerning Bosnia,
often on the spot. He was no mere emissary, but an
avatar of the entire American government in the eyes
of the warring factions. When Secretary of State
Warren Christopher told him, "I'm not always sure
what you are doing, or why. but you always seem to
have a reason, and it seems to work," (239) it was
abundantly clear that Holbrooke had a carte blanche
from his superiors.
Bombs for Peace
One thing Holbrooke used this power for was to
orchestrate Imperial intervention and support certain
combatants in actions that would normally be
condemned as despicable and even atrocious. For
example, the greatest ethnic cleansing of the entire
war, the August 1995 Croat offensive against the
Serbian Krajina, is put into perspective in Chapter 6.
During one meeting with Croatian officials, Robert
Frasure, a senior US diplomat who soon thereafter
died on the road to Sarajevo, handed Holbrooke a
note:
Dick: We "hired" these guys to be our junkyard dogs
because we were desperate. We need to try to
"control" them. But it is no time to get squeamish
about things. (73)
Holbrooke's sympathies for the official Bosnian
Muslim cause (as opposed to the real cause) are
revealed as early as Chapter 3. In a 1992 policy
proposal to the Clinton administration, he advocated
"direct use of force against the Serbs," (52) something
he finally had a chance to do in 1995. After an
explosion in Sarajevo killed a dozen people in the
marketplace, NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb
targets determined months in advance (102).
The bombing helped establish NATO - and the
Americans - as the strongest party in the conflict.
Peace took a back seat to power: "It is now essential to
establish that we are negotiating from a position of
strength. if the air strikes resume and hurt the
negotiations, so be it." (119)
There was also no doubt as to whose side the US
supported: "It helped that Izetbegovic saw I was
fighting hard for something he desperately wanted -
the resumption of the bombing." (131)
Holbrooke's determination resulted in a plea to
Washington: "Give us bombs for peace." (132) And a
strategy was born.
Holbrooke and Milosevic
By the time the bombing, cajoling, badgering, and
"shuttle diplomacy" gathered the representatives of
three warring parties at the airbase near Dayton -
deliberately chosen as a display of American air
power (233) - Holbrooke was almost completely in
control of orchestrating the end the Bosnian War. His
greatest coup was managing to maneuver Serbian
president Milosevic into representing the Bosnian
Serbs, thus making it appear Belgrade was always
behind their actions - just what the Muslim and
western propaganda had alleged all along.
Those especially interested in better understanding
Milosevic can find much useful information in
Holbrooke's memoir. Even though he worked
relentlessly against the "Serb aggression," (42) and
tried to trick, bully and double-cross the Serbian
leader, Holbrooke cannot help but describe Milosevic
with a mixture of grudging admiration and respect:
"Watching Milosevic turn on his charm, Warren
Cristopher observed that had fate dealt him a
different birthplace and education, he would have
been a successful politician in a democratic country."
(235)
No wonder that Milosevic wants to call Holbrooke as
a defense witness before the Hague Inquisition.
Liar, Cheat and Bully
Holbrooke's own accounts of Dayton indicate that his
team was literally negotiating on behalf of the
Muslims, whose role was limited to petulantly
rejecting all solutions in the hope that better (i.e. more
favorable) ones would be produced next. At one point,
the Americans succeeded in securing 55% of the
territory for the Muslim-Croat Federation - until
Milosevic accidentally saw the charts aimed to
persuade the Muslims and angrily accused Holbrooke
of cheating him (295).
Realizing the Americans were not honest brokers,
Milosevic then tried to strike a deal with the Muslims
directly, and signed away territory after territory to
make that possible:
"It was clear: Milosevic wanted an agreement then
and there. But he insisted, at all times, to 51-49."
(299)
But even as Milosevic and Izetbegovic's foreign
minister Silajdzic agreed on a map (though with much
protestations from the Croats), Izetbegovic himself
refused to accept it! Here is Holbrooke's reaction:
"At 11:00 a.m., [EU envoy Carl] Bildt came to my
room to ask how we were doing. 'We are deeply
concerned,' I said, that even if Milosevic makes more
concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.'
'Do you think Izetbegovic even wants a deal?' Carl
asked. It was a question that Warren Christopher had
also been asking. 'I'm never quite sure,' I replied.
'Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than
peace - but he can't have both.' Chris Hill, normally
highly supportive of the Bosnians, exploded in
momentary anger and frustration. 'These people are
impossible to help,' he said. It was a telling statement
from a man who had devoted years of his life to the
search for ways to help create a Bosnian state." (302)
Note that "Bosnian" here is used interchangeably with
"Muslim." Policy was made based on such ignorant
assumptions. But were they ignorant, or deliberately
malicious? For Holbrooke himself uses the term
"Muslims" often enough. For example, when
discussing the status of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo,
which both he and Izetbegovic insisted on reuniting
under Muslim rule:
"[Milosevic] still sought political equality among
ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected
because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who
would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb
obstructionism." (259)
As a result, Sarajevo is over 90% Muslim today.
A Call to Empire
As a direct result of Dayton, Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia are again increasingly vulnerable to political
domination by the Muslims - the very issue which
sparked the war in 1992. But Holbrooke could care
less - when the Dayton agreement was signed, it
accomplished a much greater purpose than ending the
Bosnian War: "Suddenly, the war was over - and
America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined."
(358)
Indeed, it was Holbrooke who most clearly articulated
the Imperial argument that intervention in the
Balkans helped shape the post-Cold War course of
U.S. foreign policy:
"Criticism of President Clinton as a weak leader
ended abruptly, especially in Europe and among the
Muslim nations. [.] [E]ven those who chafed at the
reassertion of American power conceded, at least
implicitly, its necessity. [.] After Dayton, American
foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular.
This may have been as much perception as reality, but
the perception mattered." (359)
It began with Bosnia, continued in Kosovo, and went
on to Afghanistan and Iraq, each intervention more
brazen than the one before, each accepted because of
the precedent of the one before. That Bush escalated
the policy initiated under Clinton only shows that
Empire transcends party lines.
Holbrooke concluded To End A War with a call to
Empire:
"There will be other Bosnias in our lives - areas
where early outside involvement can be decisive, and
American leadership will be required. The world's
richest nation, one that presumes to great moral
authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to
conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The
world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric
the next time we face a challenge to peace." (369)
Even though he is no longer a major player, his call
has been heeded. So much for the "day everything
changed."
From Star to Footnote
Crafting the Dayton Accords may have been the
pinnacle of Holbrooke's career. After a two-year
stint as an investment banker, he re-entered
diplomatic waters with mixed results. In late 1998, he
tried to repeat his work in Bosnia by persuading
Yugoslav president Milosevic to surrender Kosovo.
But the same trick could not work on Milosevic
twice. Holbrooke returned home in defeat.
The following year, he was nominated as the US
Ambassador to the UN, but the appointment stalled
when he was accused of violating federal ethics
guidelines. He admitted no wrongdoing but paid the
fine. After the UN stint, he was tapped to become
Secretary of State in Gore's administration. The
scandal-ridden election of 2000 extinguished that
hope. Richard Holbrooke thus passed from the
diplomatic stage, and it is unclear whether he will
ever step into the limelight again. But even as he
becomes a footnote in American politics, the effects
of his 1995 campaign in Bosnia remain, lingering on
as a reminder of what one arrogant, unscrupulous man
can do with Imperial power.
And if that is not the best argument against the
existence of Imperial power, what is?
-Nebojsa Malic
Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 07:21:30 +0200
From: "Darka"
To: <This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.>
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m052803.html
Antiwar.com
May 28, 2003
Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
How the US 'Ended' the Bosnian War
To End A War, by Richard Holbrooke
New York, Random House, June 1998, 432 pages (hardcover)
Few things have been as grossly misunderstood as the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known by its
birthplace as "Dayton." Agreed at the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton,
Ohio and initialed in Paris, France on 21 November
1995, the Dayton Agreement finally established
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, after a three-year
interethnic war following its 1992 international
recognition. It also completely failed to resolve any of
issues that caused the war.
Instead, it was a feat of social engineering
unprecedented at the time, attempting through force
and bluster to forge a nation out of bitter enmities.
That should not have surprised anyone, given that
force and bluster were the main character traits of
Dayton's chief creator, rogue American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke.
Proud 'Peacemaker'
Holbrooke had a long and distinguished career in
foreign affairs, starting from his Foreign Service job
in Vietnam in 1962. He also edited the Foreign
Policyjournal (1972-76), served as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
(1977-1981), US Ambassador to Germany (1993-94),
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (1994-96). It was in this last
capacity that he came to preside over the "peace
process" in Bosnia.
To End A War is an extraordinary book documenting
not just his endeavors in Bosnia, but the underlying
logic, emotions and politics behind them. For all his
failings - arrogance, ignorance and vanity easily
spring to mind - Holbrooke is also earnest. Though
his memoir is as self-serving as, say, Lord David
Owen's Balkan Odyssey, unlike Owen, Holbrooke is
not trying to make excuses: he is actually proud of his
actions, thoughts and opinions. There is not one hint
of modesty - false or otherwise - in Holbrooke, and
for that one must be grateful. For in chronicling his
efforts to badger, bully and beat the Bosnians into
ending their war - on American terms, of course - he
offers surprisingly clear insights into the U.S.
Balkans policy at the time, and his own role therein.
Reading Holbrooke's memoir, one needs to keep in
mind that this man is the chief creator of the current
Bosnian state, a paradox protectorate continuing to
exist in spite of itself.
'I Am The Empire'
Anyone who even slightly doubts the Official Truth
about the Balkans wars will be struck by Holbrooke's
cavalier dismissal of any pretense of civility when
dealing with the locals - especially the Serbs, for
whom he had only disdain dangerously bordering on
hatred. To him, prejudices, deceptions and
fabrications represent fully justified means to the
goal. Cautioned by his British colleague to treat Serbs
with some consideration, Holbrooke replied:
"The Serb view of history was their problem. ours
was to end a war." (110)
One is tempted to wonder if that was a royal "we."
Holbrooke not only represented the United States, he
literally made American policy concerning Bosnia,
often on the spot. He was no mere emissary, but an
avatar of the entire American government in the eyes
of the warring factions. When Secretary of State
Warren Christopher told him, "I'm not always sure
what you are doing, or why. but you always seem to
have a reason, and it seems to work," (239) it was
abundantly clear that Holbrooke had a carte blanche
from his superiors.
Bombs for Peace
One thing Holbrooke used this power for was to
orchestrate Imperial intervention and support certain
combatants in actions that would normally be
condemned as despicable and even atrocious. For
example, the greatest ethnic cleansing of the entire
war, the August 1995 Croat offensive against the
Serbian Krajina, is put into perspective in Chapter 6.
During one meeting with Croatian officials, Robert
Frasure, a senior US diplomat who soon thereafter
died on the road to Sarajevo, handed Holbrooke a
note:
Dick: We "hired" these guys to be our junkyard dogs
because we were desperate. We need to try to
"control" them. But it is no time to get squeamish
about things. (73)
Holbrooke's sympathies for the official Bosnian
Muslim cause (as opposed to the real cause) are
revealed as early as Chapter 3. In a 1992 policy
proposal to the Clinton administration, he advocated
"direct use of force against the Serbs," (52) something
he finally had a chance to do in 1995. After an
explosion in Sarajevo killed a dozen people in the
marketplace, NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb
targets determined months in advance (102).
The bombing helped establish NATO - and the
Americans - as the strongest party in the conflict.
Peace took a back seat to power: "It is now essential to
establish that we are negotiating from a position of
strength. if the air strikes resume and hurt the
negotiations, so be it." (119)
There was also no doubt as to whose side the US
supported: "It helped that Izetbegovic saw I was
fighting hard for something he desperately wanted -
the resumption of the bombing." (131)
Holbrooke's determination resulted in a plea to
Washington: "Give us bombs for peace." (132) And a
strategy was born.
Holbrooke and Milosevic
By the time the bombing, cajoling, badgering, and
"shuttle diplomacy" gathered the representatives of
three warring parties at the airbase near Dayton -
deliberately chosen as a display of American air
power (233) - Holbrooke was almost completely in
control of orchestrating the end the Bosnian War. His
greatest coup was managing to maneuver Serbian
president Milosevic into representing the Bosnian
Serbs, thus making it appear Belgrade was always
behind their actions - just what the Muslim and
western propaganda had alleged all along.
Those especially interested in better understanding
Milosevic can find much useful information in
Holbrooke's memoir. Even though he worked
relentlessly against the "Serb aggression," (42) and
tried to trick, bully and double-cross the Serbian
leader, Holbrooke cannot help but describe Milosevic
with a mixture of grudging admiration and respect:
"Watching Milosevic turn on his charm, Warren
Cristopher observed that had fate dealt him a
different birthplace and education, he would have
been a successful politician in a democratic country."
(235)
No wonder that Milosevic wants to call Holbrooke as
a defense witness before the Hague Inquisition.
Liar, Cheat and Bully
Holbrooke's own accounts of Dayton indicate that his
team was literally negotiating on behalf of the
Muslims, whose role was limited to petulantly
rejecting all solutions in the hope that better (i.e. more
favorable) ones would be produced next. At one point,
the Americans succeeded in securing 55% of the
territory for the Muslim-Croat Federation - until
Milosevic accidentally saw the charts aimed to
persuade the Muslims and angrily accused Holbrooke
of cheating him (295).
Realizing the Americans were not honest brokers,
Milosevic then tried to strike a deal with the Muslims
directly, and signed away territory after territory to
make that possible:
"It was clear: Milosevic wanted an agreement then
and there. But he insisted, at all times, to 51-49."
(299)
But even as Milosevic and Izetbegovic's foreign
minister Silajdzic agreed on a map (though with much
protestations from the Croats), Izetbegovic himself
refused to accept it! Here is Holbrooke's reaction:
"At 11:00 a.m., [EU envoy Carl] Bildt came to my
room to ask how we were doing. 'We are deeply
concerned,' I said, that even if Milosevic makes more
concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.'
'Do you think Izetbegovic even wants a deal?' Carl
asked. It was a question that Warren Christopher had
also been asking. 'I'm never quite sure,' I replied.
'Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than
peace - but he can't have both.' Chris Hill, normally
highly supportive of the Bosnians, exploded in
momentary anger and frustration. 'These people are
impossible to help,' he said. It was a telling statement
from a man who had devoted years of his life to the
search for ways to help create a Bosnian state." (302)
Note that "Bosnian" here is used interchangeably with
"Muslim." Policy was made based on such ignorant
assumptions. But were they ignorant, or deliberately
malicious? For Holbrooke himself uses the term
"Muslims" often enough. For example, when
discussing the status of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo,
which both he and Izetbegovic insisted on reuniting
under Muslim rule:
"[Milosevic] still sought political equality among
ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected
because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who
would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb
obstructionism." (259)
As a result, Sarajevo is over 90% Muslim today.
A Call to Empire
As a direct result of Dayton, Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia are again increasingly vulnerable to political
domination by the Muslims - the very issue which
sparked the war in 1992. But Holbrooke could care
less - when the Dayton agreement was signed, it
accomplished a much greater purpose than ending the
Bosnian War: "Suddenly, the war was over - and
America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined."
(358)
Indeed, it was Holbrooke who most clearly articulated
the Imperial argument that intervention in the
Balkans helped shape the post-Cold War course of
U.S. foreign policy:
"Criticism of President Clinton as a weak leader
ended abruptly, especially in Europe and among the
Muslim nations. [.] [E]ven those who chafed at the
reassertion of American power conceded, at least
implicitly, its necessity. [.] After Dayton, American
foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular.
This may have been as much perception as reality, but
the perception mattered." (359)
It began with Bosnia, continued in Kosovo, and went
on to Afghanistan and Iraq, each intervention more
brazen than the one before, each accepted because of
the precedent of the one before. That Bush escalated
the policy initiated under Clinton only shows that
Empire transcends party lines.
Holbrooke concluded To End A War with a call to
Empire:
"There will be other Bosnias in our lives - areas
where early outside involvement can be decisive, and
American leadership will be required. The world's
richest nation, one that presumes to great moral
authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to
conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The
world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric
the next time we face a challenge to peace." (369)
Even though he is no longer a major player, his call
has been heeded. So much for the "day everything
changed."
From Star to Footnote
Crafting the Dayton Accords may have been the
pinnacle of Holbrooke's career. After a two-year
stint as an investment banker, he re-entered
diplomatic waters with mixed results. In late 1998, he
tried to repeat his work in Bosnia by persuading
Yugoslav president Milosevic to surrender Kosovo.
But the same trick could not work on Milosevic
twice. Holbrooke returned home in defeat.
The following year, he was nominated as the US
Ambassador to the UN, but the appointment stalled
when he was accused of violating federal ethics
guidelines. He admitted no wrongdoing but paid the
fine. After the UN stint, he was tapped to become
Secretary of State in Gore's administration. The
scandal-ridden election of 2000 extinguished that
hope. Richard Holbrooke thus passed from the
diplomatic stage, and it is unclear whether he will
ever step into the limelight again. But even as he
becomes a footnote in American politics, the effects
of his 1995 campaign in Bosnia remain, lingering on
as a reminder of what one arrogant, unscrupulous man
can do with Imperial power.
And if that is not the best argument against the
existence of Imperial power, what is?
-Nebojsa Malic
Ciao,
desideriamo farti sapere che, nella sezione File del gruppo
crj-mailinglist, troverai un nuovo file appena caricato.
File : /BimbiXPace.jpg
Caricato da : jugocoord <jugocoord@...>
Descrizione : Iniziativa per Kragujevac al Teatro Stabile Sloveno di Trieste, 7 giugno 2003
Puoi accedere al file dal seguente indirizzo:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/BimbiXPace.jpg
Per ulteriori informazioni su come condividere i file con gli altri
iscritti al tuo gruppo, vai invece alla sezione di Aiuto al seguente
indirizzo:
http://help.yahoo.com/help/it/groups/files
Cordiali saluti,
jugocoord <jugocoord@...>
desideriamo farti sapere che, nella sezione File del gruppo
crj-mailinglist, troverai un nuovo file appena caricato.
File : /BimbiXPace.jpg
Caricato da : jugocoord <jugocoord@...>
Descrizione : Iniziativa per Kragujevac al Teatro Stabile Sloveno di Trieste, 7 giugno 2003
Puoi accedere al file dal seguente indirizzo:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/BimbiXPace.jpg
Per ulteriori informazioni su come condividere i file con gli altri
iscritti al tuo gruppo, vai invece alla sezione di Aiuto al seguente
indirizzo:
http://help.yahoo.com/help/it/groups/files
Cordiali saluti,
jugocoord <jugocoord@...>
