Informazione

1. Il confronto con Kucan e lo stato di salute di Milosevic.
(Dispacci ANSA dal sito: http://www.ansa.it/balcani/)

2. EX-SLOVENIAN PRESIDENT MILAN KUCAN TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE
Written By: Vera Martinovic - May 24, 2003 -
www.slobodan-milosevic.org

3. MILOSEVIC RECOVERS FROM ILLNESS: "TRIAL" TO RESUME THURSDAY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - May 28, 2003


=== 1 ===


Dispacci ANSA dal sito: http://www.ansa.it/balcani/


TPI: MILOSEVIC; SOSPESO PROCESSO, SLOBO AMMALATO

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 27 MAG - Nuova sospensione all'Aja del processo
contro Slobodan Milosevic per i problemi di salute dell'ex-uomo forte
dei Baslcani. La Corte giudicante ha annunciato questa mattina un
rinvio dell'udienza: Milosevic ''ha la febbre'' ha precisato un
portavoce del Tribunale Penale Internazionale. Il processo, iniziato
nel febbraio 2002, e' gia' stato sospeso otto volte a causa delle
precarie condizioni di salute dell'ex-presidente jugoslavo, che ha in
particolare problemi cardio-vascolari. Milosevic e' accusato di
presunti crimini di guerra e contro l'umanita' per le guerre in
Kosovo, Bosnia e Croazia. (ANSA). CEF 27/05/2003 10:55


MILOSEVIC: TPI, SCINTILLE A UDIENZA CON EX PRESIDENTE SLOVENO

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 21 MAG - Slobodan Milosevic all'attacco
nell'udienza di oggi al processo all'Aja del Tpi: l'ex uomo forte di
Belgrado ha accusato l'ex presidente della Slovenia, Milan Kucan, di
essere responsabile della disintegrazione dell'ex Jugoslavia avvenuta
nel 1991. ''Perche' ha scelto la guerra? Per quale ragione ha
attaccato l'esercito federale jugoslavo in Slovenia?'', ha chiesto
Slobo nel suo controinterrogatorio a Kucan, che ha testimoniato contro
l'ex presidente durante l'udienza di oggi nel processo in corso al
Tribunale penale internazionale sull'ex Jugoslavia dell'Aja. Kucan ha
a sua volta ''rifiutato'' energicamente le dichiarazioni di Milosevic,
il cui ''messaggio'' di fronte all'implosione jugoslava - ha detto
l'ex capo dello stato sloveno - era che ''non avrebbe mai accettato
che i serbi residenti fuori dalla Serbia non rientrassero sotto
l'autorita' di Belgrado''. Kucan, 62 anni, e' stato dal 1986 capo del
partito comunista sloveno che si oppose alla politica del partito
serbo di Milosevic. Nel 1990 divenne presidente della Slovenia che un
anno dopo proclamo' l'indipendenza dalla federazione jugoslava.
Nell'estate del 1991 le forze armate jugoslave cercarono di prendere
il controllo della repubblica secessionista, ma si ritirarono dopo due
mesi di resistenza slovena. (ANSA) RIG 21/05/2003 16:04


MILOSEVIC: DUBBI SU MEDICINE DATEGLI IN CARCERE TPI, STAMPA

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 23 NOV - Un quotidiano olandese ha oggi sollevato
dubbi sulla cura medica seguita in carcere all'Aja dall'ex-presidente
jugoslavo Slobodan Milosevic, il cui non buono stato di salute ha
costretto il tribunale dell'Onu a interrompere piu' volte il processo
dall'estate scorsa.
Stando a 'Nrc Handelsblad', che cita ''fonti del tribunale'',
a Milosevic, che soffre fra l'altro di ipertensione, sarebbero stati
somministrati negli ultimi tempi farmaci sbagliati, che avrebbero
provocato anzi un incremento dei problemi di pressione arteriosa.
Questa, secondo le fonti citate dal quotidiano, sarebbe stata la causa
del nuovo deterioramento della salute di Milosevic, il cui processo e'
stato interrotto per due settimane nell'ultimo mese a causa
dell'affaticamento eccessivo e di una crisi ipertensiva dell'imputato.
Slobo e' sotto processo all'Aja dal 2 febbraio scorso: e' accusato
davanti al Tpi di crimini di guerra, contro l'umanita' e genocidio per
le sue presunte responsabilita' nelle atrocita' perpetrate nelle
guerre in Bosnia, Croazia e Kosovo. Un portavoce del Tpi ha pero'
contestato questo pomeriggio le informazioni riportate dal quotidiano
olandese. ''Le medicine somministrate a Milosevic non sono
assolutamente cambiate negli ultimi mesi'' ha detto Christian
Chartier. Secondo il portavoce la cura seguita dall'ex-presidente
jugoslavo e' stata approvata anche dal cardiologo di famiglia
di Milosevic a Belgrado. ''Ci ha detto che non poteva seguire una cura
migliore'', ha affermato Chartier. Nei giorni scorsi due giuristi
internazionali che assistono il Tpi nel caso Milosevic hanno
consigliato alla Corte di disporre la scarcerazione dell'imputato per
ragioni di salute per un anno, in modo da consentirgli di seguire il
processo in migliori condizioni. Ma il procuratore capo del Tpi Carla
Del Ponte si e' opposta alla richiesta. (ANSA). CEF 23/11/2002 15:11


=== 2 ===


http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/martinovic052403.htm

EX-SLOVENIAN PRESIDENT MILAN KUCAN TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE

Written By: Vera Martinovic - May 24, 2003


On Wednesday, May 21, 2003 former Slovenian President, Milan Kucan
testified at the so-called "trial" of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague.

Milan Kucan, the former President of Slovenia, made a huge mistake by
testifying at the Hague Tribunal. The only excuse for him would be if
he was actually summoned, and therefore unable to refuse, but, if he
did volunteer, it was the wrong thing to do, because he contributed
nothing to the Prosecution's case and only brought the limelight onto
the 10-day 'war' in Slovenia.

Equally questionable were the motives of the Prosecution to have Kucan
as a witness at all: gaining nothing from him, and addressing by his
testimony a time-span and topics never covered by any of the ICTY
indictments.

Be that as it may, as Kucan testified, and contributed nothing, he
enabled Milosevic to shed light onto Slovenia's dirty little war with
its financial and political motives, and its own war crimes. The role
of Slovenia in the breaking up of Yugoslavia, aiding and abetting of
other separatisms, breaking the UN arms embargo etc. etc.

Kucan on the other hand did manage to tarnish his own personal
reputation of a well-spoken, well-informed politician.

Kucan proved insufficient, in spite of the dedicated work done by his
team of advisors, lawyers, and top members of the Slovenian military,
who all frantically worked to prepare their ex-president for his day
in The Hague. Kucan's advisers rehearsed all kinds of possible
questions with him, but the result was that the not-so-well-spoken
"Balkan ruffian", Milosevic, was wittier and far better informed.

All that Kucan managed to do was exude the exaggerated rhetoric of
'democratic community of peoples', 'democratization of life',
'European solutions' and 'different concepts' etc...

It was just as a Slovenian journalist in front of the Tribunal
building said when she was interviewed by the TV B92 correspondent the
morning before the trial transmission began: 'He's well prepared,
he'll explain why Slovenia went its own way, he's a good speaker, very
intelligent; if he comes across gentlemanly [gospodski], he'll show
that Slovenia has nothing to hide; but, all depends on what kind of
questions will Milosevic ask...'

Kucan did indeed behave like a gentleman, unfortunately he was an
ill-informed, and at times confused gentleman; surely regretting now
that he was involved in this at all.

True to form Milosevic asked the expected unpleasant and to-the-point
questions, but more significantly, he had all the possible information
and documents, unlike Kucan, who at times made some serious blunders.

Prosecutor Nice tried to press Kucan for the background of the
Yugoslav breakdown, and the "sinister role" that Milosevic played in
it, but all he managed to get was bits and pieces from two of
Milosevic's speeches, taken totally out of context. Some of the
excerpts he used were not even whole sentences, but parts of sentences
and even individual words that were highlighted with a marker on the
overhead projector. Then the prosecutor asked Kucan to comment on
those excerpts.

The case in point was the 'non-institutional means', which Kucan
interpreted as the 'non-constitutional means for changing things in
Yugoslavia'. However, it was obvious from the context that the excerpt
actually meant that the institutions in Kosovo in 1989 were not
responding to the problems, so the Serbs had to protest peacefully in
the streets against the abuses of the local Albanian government,
outside the institutions, forcing those the institutions to act, which
is the legitimate right of any citizen. It must have been embarrassing
for Kucan to be publicly instructed by Milosevic in his
cross-examination about the definitions of the words 'institutional'
and 'constitutional'.

Would you believe that Prosecutor Nice even pulled out that
unfortunate Kosovo Polje speech again, wanting Kucan to 'make a
connection', so Kucan joined the club of those who vaguely misquoted
and took out of context from that overly-misused speech.

Even May was sick of that threadbare 'trump card', so he quite rudely
interrupted Kucan, saying that the Chamber has already heard enough on
that speech from others.

Kucan got a bit offended, saying: 'Let me finish my thought' and
proceeded with his broad misquote: 'It was said that the Serb people
is not yet in armed battles, but that this could not be excluded and
that the changes will be made by any means.' (?!) That was NOT said
anywhere in this famous speech.

By the way, Kucan 'explained' that the speech was given at the 500th
anniversary of the Kosovo Polje Battle, missing it by only a 100 years
(the battle happened in 1389, the speech in 1989, so simple arithmetic
tells you that it was in fact the 600th anniversary).

Milosevic, of course, took the opportunity to quote whole paragraphs
from both speeches later on, demonstrating that the false
interpretations and misrepresentations made by the other side simply
don't stand.

The other tackle by Nice was to urge Kucan to give his opinions and
interpretations on the 'real' meaning of certain events. So, many of
his answers boiled to 'it actually means', 'Serbia actually opted
for', 'nobody believed that', 'this is how we understood that'. Again,
such interpretations were either exaggerated or totally opposite to
the true meaning. At times, he even went wild in his assumptions, like
when he read the intentions of 'the Serbs', who refused the Slovenian
'concept of dissolution' of Yugoslavia. 'This is how I understood it',
Kucan bravely plunged in: Since the Serbs thought the internal borders
of the republics to be merely administrative; they 'implied that the
borders could be altered by force'.

Quite a broad implication indeed, nobody said that, or wrote that
anywhere, yet Kucan knows that they actually meant that. Could it be
that they meant the administrative borders should be simply
renegotiated? No, those barbarians are incapable of such a gentlemanly
concept, so the gentleman assumed they actually implied violence.
Still, I don't understand how assumptions can constitute any sort of
evidence given by a witness at a trial.

Prosecutor Nice then resorted to his favorite illustration for
practically everything - the BBC documentary 'The Death of
Yugoslavia.' This time he played the video of that notorious 14th
Congress of the League of Communists from January 1990, when the
Slovenian delegation walked out of the meeting after 'almost
all' of their amendments were rejected 'because we had been outvoted.'
Kucan explained that had been deliberately done to oust them, and 'the
accused (Milosevic) was the first, or among those who first lifted his
voting card and the others followed'.

Kucan is aware that he's talking to Westerners here, who know zilch
about the Communist Party apparatus and could easily swallow such an
explanation. But, Kucan is an old Communist cadre, so he should know
better.

In brief: at the full meeting, the plenum, where all the Congress
delegates are present (3-4,000 of them), nothing was ever decided, and
nothing ever happened that was not previously prepared and agreed
upon. So, if the Slovenian delegation started, out of the blue, to put
to vote outrageous proposals, which were a surprise to everybody, not
discussed and agreed upon previously in the inner Party circles, this
could only mean that Slovenia deliberately organized such a coup
de theatre to force the unprepared delegates to vote against their
proposals and in that manner form a pretext for their walking out of
the meeting, thus signifying the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia.

Instead of such a perfectly logical explanation, consistent with the
functioning of the Party mechanism, Kucan concocted a
Westerner-friendly accusation against the Serbian leaders, who
allegedly, deliberately voted against the Slovenian proposals just to
force them out of the party and out of Yugoslavia.

But, how could they possibly vote for such proposals? One of the
proposals was 'to make the connections among the Federal units
different', as Kucan vaguely put it, in other words - confederation.

The other proposal was 'to introduce the political pluralism', or the
multiparty system. And all those 'tiny' changes were proposed in the
form of innocent little amendments to the Party Congress conclusions,
at the plenum, without being previously agreed upon at the top, as is
the Party practice.

AS IF the Slovenes needed to be "forced" to leave Yugoslavia! This was
their intention, and their plan. They were cunning enough and
supported enough to perform it and now they blame others when they did
exactly what they wanted to do in the first place!

Prosecutor Nice dwelled on that Party Congress footage with relish,
while Kucan interpreted, the BBC?s voice-over commentary - a real
testimony indeed.

The remaining 'issues' that Nice raised were even more feeble, or else
already chewed up by others. There were the amendments to the Serbian
Constitution, allegedly depriving Kosovo and Vojvodina of their
autonomy (Milosevic quoted the Constitution, proving that the autonomy
in fact was not revoked, and Kucan was forced to admit that).

Then, there was the grudge of Slovenia that the Slovenian language was
not 'used within the Army', as was allegedly promised them at the end
of World War II. When cross-examined, Kucan had to admit that it was
logical that the Army would need one command language, and it was OK
for them, but that they still wanted the Slovenian language to be used
in the Army somehow. I failed to understand the "well-spoken
gentleman," I have to admit. What other usage of language is there in
any Army, besides to issue commands? You can speak whichever language
you prefer while on your R&R, but when an officer speaks, one language
has to be accepted for everyone. Or, does Mr. Kucan think that the
Army should have hired interpreters?

Then, Nice quoted profusely from the book-journal written by the
former President of the Yugoslav Presidency, Borislav Jovic, asking
Kucan to comment certain highlighted passages. Again, the relevance
and the veracity of the excerpts was dubious, which even Kucan himself
couldn't deny, saying that the description of one meeting where both
he and Jovic were present was 'pretty accurate', but 'for the rest, I
cannot confirm it'.

Nevertheless, Nice continued to quote from the journal, skimming that
way through the tumultuous events in 1990, when the JNA confiscated
all of the weapons from the local TO units, the steps towards the
secession of Slovenia, their elections, referendum for independence,
6-month suspension of its implementation, negotiations between
Presidents of all republics, where Slovenia kept 'seriously' proposing
confederative status after they had already opted and voted for
independence!

The only piece of real testimony from Kucan was when he spoke of his
walk with Milosevic in the lull of one of these futile
traveling-circus meetings. According to Kucan, Milosevic told him that
if Slovenia wants to leave the Federation that Serbia could not and
would not prevent that, but there are some preconditions to be agreed
before that. Croatia is a bigger problem; there everything is an open
issue, even the borders.

Then, Nice skimmed further on through the declared independence of
Slovenia in June 1991 and said: 'We know that a short clash occurred.'

Whereupon Kucan corrected him: 'The aggression occurred, done by the
JNA.' He literally applied only 2-3 short sentences speaking of that
'aggression', stating that it happened 'right after the celebration,
at 2 or 3 a.m.', that the 'units came out of barracks and headed
towards the state border'. He offered a choice of descriptive nouns:
'That clash, aggression, war was ended on 7 July by the talks on the
Brioni Islands, with the participation of the Ministerial EC troika,
led by Van Den Bruck, who intervened in a certain way in that period
between 27 June and 7 July.'

So much about the 'war'. Eloquent and full of detail. Nice glided on
through the final retreat of the JNA from Slovenia on 26 October 1991.

The only remaining issue until the end of the examination-in-chief was
the book by the former JNA Chief of Staff, General Veljko Kadijevic,
again amply but selectively (mis)quoted.

Kucan appeared confused, asked Nice 'What do you mean by that? Yes,
I've read it... but which part of it do you have in mind?' Nice was
really desperate, trying to make Kucan confirm that Kadijevic meant to
divide Yugoslavia along the infamous line Karlobag-Virovitica, the
alleged quotation dragged along before with other witnesses and which
was simply a misquote, because the General wrote in this particular
paragraph about the lines of retreat for the JNA, after it was
attacked in Croatia, and after it had decided to pull out.

Kucan clumsily confirmed that 'this coincides with the borders of the
diminished Yugoslavia, without Slovenia and Croatia and that 'we had
such statements even before'. By whom? When? Which statements? A
precise testimony, indeed. And that was all the evidence Kucan gave,
believe it or not. But, then came the cross-examination and a lot more
was said.

When Milosevic started to cross-examine Kucan, the very first question
brought the 'witness' to stumble, loose voice and stamina to directly
and openly accuse the Accused according to the indictment. This was
how the exchange went. Milosevic mocked Kucan, saying he used three
different expressions, one after another, to describe what happened in
Slovenia: 'clash, aggression, war. Had Serbia anything to do with that
war in Slovenia?'

Instead of promptly repeating the mantra of how Serbia, i.e.
Milosevic, actually ruled the Army (as the indictment would have it),
Kucan got immediately confused, started to mumble, said that Slovenia
'was confronted with the JNA', and the other things 'will be decided
by the Court, there are documents and books... My present
conclusion...' And here Kucan completely stopped talking.

Milosevic prompted him: 'What is your present conclusion?'

May stepped in nervously: 'Please, do not enter into quarrels. His
conclusions are unimportant.' And this was the first sign of how
things would go: Milosevic aggressive and direct, while Kucan was
timid and evasive. But, it got worse.

Milosevic read out two sentences from the minutes of the meeting in
the Federal Government Building in August 1991, after the 10-day war:
Kucan talking to the Federal Prime Minister, arrogantly and
triumphantly, refusing to discuss the possibility that two Slovenian
representatives return to the Federal Government 'because that Federal
Government had attacked Slovenia' and 'there is nothing for me to talk
about with the Federal Prime Minister, who lost the war'.

Kucan had to confirm that he had said that.

Milosevic then turned to the reasons for the war that Slovenia fought
against the Federal Government: the revenues from customs duties.

Kucan denied it, saying that Slovenia was only reacting to being
attacked.

Milosevic then quoted Warren Zimmerman, the former US Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, from his lengthy article in a foreign affairs journal
where it was plainly and brutally written that 'contrary to the
beliefs, the Slovenes had started the war. There were no efforts to
negotiate.' Zimmerman proceeded to explain why: the customs duties
revenue generated from the only border crossings towards the Western
European countries, Italy and Austria, which were in Slovenia, gained
up to 75% of the overall federal budget. The Slovenes simply took over
the customs offices by force, changed the insignia, and started to
collect, depriving the rest of the country of that revenue without
negotiating first. The Federal Government had to react by sending few
light JNA columns to retake the customs offices and re-establish the
status quo ante. Then the JNA was attacked.

Kucan tried to minimize that by saying it is the opinion of the former
US Ambassador.

But, Robinson got interested and asked Kucan to comment on this piece
of information that 'one of the consequences of your declaration of
independence was the take-over of customs offices', so Kucan got mixed
up in a lengthy explanation of money flow, which came to saying that
Slovenia negotiated it at Brioni, but only after the fait accompli.

Milosevic then jumped in by asking: 'Brioni happened after the war.
Why have you opted for violence? Why did you not act like Slovakia
did? [in the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia] Why didn't you
take the issue to the federal bodies?'

Kucan tried to convince everybody that it was impossible, that 'as a
member of a small nation we would have been outvoted'.

Milosevic reminded him that one of the Parliament Chambers voted by
consensus, so there was no outvoting, and that Slovenia actually
prevented the Law on Secession from being enacted, 'and you could have
left peacefully'. He also reminded him that the federal Government
intervened not at the internal borders of republics, but at the
external border.

Kucan got very nervous, and started to answer not to Milosevic, but to
'Your Honours', pleading with them to understand how he 'had
discussions with the Accused over many years' and that 'there were no
reasons to defend the border', but Milosevic cut him short: 'We are
obviously switching the meanings here. I've quoted Zimmerman to you
and the reasons why you did what you did.'

Then, Milosevic pulled out the case of a live TV show in Slovenia a
few years into their independence, with illustrious guests from
Croatia (Mesic, General Spegelj, Tomac), where Kucan also participated
and they answered direct phone questions. Kucan tried to wiggle out,
saying his memory is not that good anymore, but confirmed he was
there. Milosevic proceeded to describe what happened in that show and
how in a celebrative mood Mesic got too relaxed and babbled about
Genscher [the then German Chancellor] and the Pope who crucially
contributed to the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

Kucan confirmed that was said, but he added: 'My experience with these
people was different.'

Milosevic: 'Which people - Genscher and the Pope?'

Kucan tried to play dumb, saying: 'I don't understand what do you want
from me.'

Milosevic then patiently explained: 'Mr. Kucan, for more than a half
of your testimony you have been talking about that book by Mr Jovic.
I'm asking you whether Mesic said that.'

May jumped in: 'He has agreed to that.'

Milosevic: 'Very good.' Then he proceeded to quote Mesic, who said
that 'Genscher and the Pope have given us a strong support in
demolishing Yugoslavia.'
Kucan reluctantly confirmed this was said.

May wanted to know whether these questions were put to Mesic during
his testimony, and Milosevic answered that he only got this
information recently, and so he's asking Kucan, who was there, to
confirm it.

Without the slightest pause and without a warning, Milosevic asked:
'Why did you attack the JNA, killing 44 and seriously wounding 184
soldiers?'
Kucan tried to give slightly smaller figures 'according to our data'
and miserably concluded that 'these are the sad consequences of war'.

Milosevic couldn't be stopped: he proceeded to describe war crimes
perpetrated by the Territorial Defence and the Police of Slovenia
against the JNA and their families (killings, maltreatments, unlawful
arrests, intimidations, expulsions, refusal of medical assistance
causing death, cutting of supplies etc. etc.), quoting from the White
Book made by the JNA, from which he submitted precise lists with
names, dates and descriptions. The Trial Chamber at first admitted one
list into evidence (for identification, as they call it, until
translated and decided upon), but when things became more and more
terrible, they refused to admit the lists anymore.

[For those who want to know a bit about these colorful events, I
managed to locate 2 Reports by the Federal Government submitted to the
UN Commission of Experts in pursuance of the UN Council Resolution No.
780. There were 7 such Reports covering the war crimes perpetrated on
the territory of the whole ex-YU, but these 2 from November 1992 and
May 1994 mention also the Slovenian pretty little war. Here are the
links:
http://www.balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wcts/wcts02.shtml
and
http://balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wcts/wcts04.shtml
These are lengthy reports, containing crimes also from other parts of
ex-YU, so my advice is to use [CTRL + F], and then type 'Slovenia', so
that you can search through these huge documents for the crimes
related to Slovenia. And they are ugly, believe me, and comprise
everything: inhumane treatment of civilians, killing and inhumane
treatment of wounded and sick persons, ethnic cleansing, willful
killing of civilians, willful killing of POWs, inhumane treatment of
POWs - complete with: names, dates, places, the works. And all that in
just 10 days; not bad for "civilized gentlemen" who refuse to be
denominated as a Balkan country.
Just imagine what they could have accomplished if the war had lasted
longer.
For those with even stronger stomach and thirst for info, visit the
site
http://www.balkanpeace.org,
then go to the top left under "WAR CRIMES SECTION", and click on
"WITNESS TESTIMONIES". There you will find all those Reports and
plenty of other stuff.]

Kucan was bombarded with questions about these atrocities perpetrated
by his forces, under his command responsibility, for which questions
he had been specially prepared, and what did he do? He failed
miserably. He first tried to deny: 'Ne, tega nismo storili. = No, we
didn't do that.' Then he admitted that 'perhaps it happened' that the
private trucks in transit had been taken, that 'some civilians had
been hurt'. Then he claimed 'I do not know about that', 'I have no
data about that'.

Milosevic retorted: "I have all the data about that.' When the
atrocities mentioned became more gruesome (killing of wounded and
sick, preventing medical help)

Kucan lost his composure and called the JNA report-book 'a propaganda
brochure' and started to rant: 'I claim that this did not happen. And
even if something like that did happen, it was in some extreme
situations. What happened later on, in Vukovar, Srebrenica,
Dubrovnik... it was a systematic thing...'

Milosevic paid no attention to Kucan anymore, simply leaving him to
let off steam, and spoke to May: 'Very well, Mr May, you do not want
to accept this last list. I have here also the list of 17 violations
of the proper treatment of POWs, I presume that you won't accept this
either'

Then, Milosevic turned to Kucan again, embarking upon the case of
execution of 3 POWs on 28 June 1991 at the Holmec border crossing.

Kucan said: 'If you're asking whether they have been captured and
shot, the answer is no.'

Milosevic then produced a thick swath of documents from the Slovenian
courts and some international NGOs pertaining to that case.

Kucan boldly stated that 'all this only goes to prove that Slovenia
behaved as the lawful state'. May ordered the documents to be given to
Kucan to read them, he briefly skimmed through some of it and timidly
said: 'I've claimed that these soldiers and civilians were not
executed as POWs, but it seems that they were.'
Wow! His advisors must have done a poor job preparing Mr. Kucan for
this. May then admitted the documents into evidence.

Milosevic then summed up: 'I have given only a few examples, but it's
obvious that in this so-called "attack by the JNA," many times more
JNA soldiers were killed than Slovenes. [44 as opposed to 8] Jovic
told you that if you want your independence, go on, but do not kill
our sons. Why was this war necessary to you?'

Kucan denied that Slovenia wanted the war.

Milosevic. insisted: 'Isn't it true that you could have left
Yugoslavia without a war and that you started it only to facilitate
the complete destruction of Yugoslavia?'

May tried to protect the hapless witness by saying he already answered
that.

Milosevic continued by reminding Kucan that Slovenia, while talking
about "legality and democracy" was actually making decisions contrary
to the Yugoslav Constitution. He said that they have promised to
proceed into independence legally, and the Constitutional Court would
be ultimately consulted, but then they acted against its rulings.
Milosevic submitted 27 such rulings of the Federal Constitutional
Court, pronouncing as unconstitutional various resolutions, laws and
Amendments to the Slovenian Constitution that had been passed by the
Slovenian legislature.

May woke up and wanted to know Kucan's opinion on this, and Kucan
tried to persuade him that these rulings were indeed stating these
acts of Slovenia to be incompatible with the Yugoslav Constitution,
but 'there were different opinions by the 2 judges who represented
Slovenia in that Court', and 'the same method of voting was applied'.
May inquired: 'When you say the same method, what do you mean by
that?'

Kucan answered: 'Well, as at the 14th Party Congress.'
May: 'It means, the Slovenes were in the minority?'
Kucan: 'Yes.'
May: 'Were they joined also by some other judges?'
Kucan couldn't confirm that, but he said that he would 'look it up'.
What that man does know? He was the President then, these were the
crucial issues and decisions, and he was supposedly well prepared for
his testimony.

Milosevic ridiculed that comparison of voting at the Party Congress
and at the Court and pointed out this is the common practice in all
courts in the world. He asked: 'Are you claiming that the
Constitutional Court made his rulings in violation of its
regulations?'

Kucan kept on with his lengthy whining of how Slovenia was always in
the minority, how the principle of 'one man, one vote' in the
Parliament could have been amended, but Milosevic insisted the
question being about the legal rulings of the Constitutional Court,
and that the Slovenes expressly said their changes will be done
according to the law and Constitution, offering the Constitutional
Court as a guarantee for that, and 'then you complain about your
rights being violated because the Constitutional Court made his
rulings'.

May admitted these 27 rulings into evidence.

If it was some real judge here, and not "Dick" May, I would be certain
that this legal exchange had reminded him of the recent ruling of the
Trial Chamber in which those 6 coded witnesses, whose trial
transcripts were admitted into the Milosevic trial evidence without
cross-examination, and the voting was 2 to 1, leaving poor Robinson in
the minority just like the poor Slovenes. He could have then cried
foul, taken the ball and gone home, just like the Slovenes did.

The next issue was illegal arms trade between Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. When first generally asked about that by
Milosevic, Kucan denied it existed at all: 'No, as far as I'm aware.'

When Milosevic then produced documents, from Croatia, proving the
opposite Kucan changed his tune, saying that he couldn't see anything
contentious here, these were 'legal channels, with competent
authorities and you spoke of illegal trade.' To that, Milosevic
gently reminded him that at that time the UN arms embargo was in
effect.

Kucan then claimed that this was before the international recognition
of Slovenia, 'therefore it did not apply to us.' But then, he realized
the mistake, saying:
'Excuse me, it was in the period when both states were recognized;
therefore, we took necessary measures to protect ourselves.' [Wow! So,
the new statelets have the right to violate the UN embargo, just
because they need to be able to protect themselves. That is a creative
interpretation.]

When asked whether the embargo applied to Bosnia, Kucan said it only
applied to the arms sale. Milosevic then produced a second document,
this one being from Izetbegovic, proving exactly that.

Both documents were admitted. Milosevic concluded that Slovenia took
part in the arming of the Bosnian Muslims, to which Kucan said that it
is hard for him to accept such a claim and that it has to be seen
first whether the Bosnian Muslims were first capable of defending
themselves on their own.
He said: 'My answer is, why was it necessary?' [Great reasoning: you
do something illegal, and when asked why are you doing it, you answer:
Well, ask yourselves why it was necessary for me to do that?] Even
Milosevic was amused by that, smiling and muttering: 'Good, very
good.'

Milosevic further proved how well informed he is when he asked how
come the Parliamentary commission for investigating UN embargo
violations had been dissolved before reaching any conclusions.

Kucan confirmed they had done this, but claimed that 'this procedure
is still unfinished'. How many years passed - 10, 11, 12 years?
Indeed, a State of law and order.

[The arms trading affairs, with all its dirty political games and
enormous gains by various Slovenian politicians were all over the
Slovenian press at that time. If you want to check one example, here's
the link:
http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/199805/80503-004-trae-lju.htm
This is the article called 'War Diplomacy - Controversial Armament
Trade' from 1998.
Also check what Kucan stated on the subject in 1996 at:
http://www.hri.org/news/Balkans/yds/96-07-03-yds.html#08
'Slovenian President Says European Union Played Big Role in Breaking
Former Yugoslavia'.
You'll be better able to assess how the politicians of Slovenia were
not at all squeamish to grab big bucks peddling arms, while at the
same time preaching to be so much more "civilized and democratic" than
those Balkan "barbarians" to whom they were selling the arms.]

The rest of the cross-examination went on debunking the games of Nice,
with misquoted speeches, which I already mentioned in the earlier.
There were a couple of highly amusing moments when Milosevic found in
the written summary of the talks that Kucan had with the OTP
investigators some incredible and preposterous constructions.

Kucan vehemently denied ever saying something like that. The thing is,
the investigators didn't give his full verbatim answers, but instead
prepared themselves a freely ad-libbed summary, which was at places so
free that after Milosevic quoted from it, Kucan had to say: 'This
claim is incredible, however, I never stated that.'

The first time, it was some minor stupidity, like 'the Serbs needed
Yugoslavia to be able to all live in one state, and the non-Serb
nations saw in Yugoslavia a country protecting its groups (?!).

Milosevic started to lead Kucan through questions about the control of
the Army in 1989, making him to confirm that the Federal Presidency
was in charge, and not Milosevic who was then merely a Party chief,
not even the President of Serbia yet.

Then Milosevic read the second incredible construction from the
Prosecution's summary, which was more sinister: the investigators
wrote that Kucan told them, speaking about the pre-war events in
Kosovo, when the miners went on strike that this was 'connected with
the use of the Army by Milosevic in the events around Stari Trg Mine'.

Kucan denied saying this, and again explicitly confirmed that the
Presidency commanded the Army, and that he 'never claimed otherwise or
that you (Milosevic) were the one to issue orders'.

Milosevic said he was happy that Kucan had said that 'just because of
the manipulations of this Other Side.'

Amicus Curiae, Tapuskovic practically gave up his questions, after
being allotted only 20 min. and warned by interpreters to slow down,
so May recommended that he put his questions in writing.

Kucan had to leave, he came only for one day. But, Tapuskovic
nevertheless managed to establish one important thing by asking Kucan,
and then warned the Chamber that among the following witnesses will be
one Ivan Kristan, who will pose as an expert on constitutional issues,
and this is no other than one of those two Slovenian judges from the
former Federal Constitutional Court who were outvoted regarding the
constitutionality of those 27 secession documents of Slovenia. That
should be one impartial "expert witness," no doubt.

Thus ended the ordeal of Milan Kucan. The only his attempt at repartee
was when he referred to the famous sentence given by Slobodan
Milosevic in front of the angry and frightened Serb peasants in
Kosovo, who had just been clubbed by the Albanian police, where
Milosevic told them that 'Nobody may beat you'.

Kucan said that Milosevic should have said instead: 'Nobody may beat
anyone in Kosovo'. Interesting - sounds a bit like something the UN
might say: 'The violence from both sides must stop.' And what if there
was no violence from both sides at that time, as it actually was the
case? So, the attempt at repartee by Kucan failed miserably, as did
his information management and his usefulness as a witness.


Vera Martinovic is an independent writer based in Belgrade,
Yugoslavia.


=== 3 ===


MILOSEVIC RECOVERS FROM ILLNESS: "TRIAL" TO RESUME THURSDAY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - May 28, 2003

Former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic became ill on
Tuesday. As a result the so-called "trial" had to be canceled on
Tuesday and Wednesday.

The so-called "trial" will resume on Thursday as The Hague Tribunal's
doctors now say that President Milosevic has recovered from his fever.

UNTER
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/aikor29.5.03.txt=

ZU LESEN:

*** JUGOSLAWIEN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAK
WELCHES LAND ALS NÄCHSTES? STOPPT DIE USA!
FREIHEIT FÜR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC!
Internationale Demonstration in Den Haag,
Samstag, 28. Juni, 2003, Beginn: 14 Uhr

*** WARUM DEMONSTRIEREN SIE AM 28. JUNI IN DEN HAAG?
Cathrin Schütz sprach mit Klaus Hartmann,
Vizepräsident des Internationalen
Komitees für die Verteidigung von Slobodan Miloevic

*** GERECHTIGKEIT MADE IN USA
von Ralph Hartmann
Aus: Ossietzky 9/2003
http://www.sopos.org/aufsaetze/3eb2ac0a5184b/1.phtml

*** Nieder mit der NATO Mafia-Regierung in Belgrad!
Demonstration zum Vidovdan
Jugoslawisch-Österreichische Solidaritätsbewegung


DEMO-FLUGBLATT:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/HaagDemo-Flugi.d=
oc


FLUGBLAETTER U. WEITERES AUF ENGLISCH:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/


--- Flugblatt-Text:


JUGOSLAWIEN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAK - WER IST DER NÄCHSTE?

In immer schnellerer Folge wechseln die Kriegsschauplätze - viele
Friedensfreunde verlieren den Über-blick und übersehen die
Zusammenhänge. Wie der Überfall auf den Irak war die NATO-Aggression
1999 gegen Jugoslawien ein völkerrechtswidriger Angriffskrieg. Damals
wie heute ging es den USA um die Durchsetzung globaler
Weltmachtansprüche, die Kontrolle von Rohstoffquellen und
Transportwegen. Mit dem neuen strategischen NATO-Konzept von 1999
wurde die Aggression gegen Jugoslawien zum "Tür-öffnerkrieg", zum
entscheidenden Präzedenzfall für die Missachtung des absoluten
Gewaltverbots des Völkerrechts. Auf dem Balkan wurde die neue
Strategie der selektiven Aufhebung der Staatensouveräni-tät und des
Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker vorexerziert.

Als Symbol des Widerstandes gegen die neue Weltkriegsordnung soll
Slobodan Milosevic exempla-risch in einem Schauprozess abgeurteilt
werden - zur nachträglichen Legitimation der Aggression und
Kriegsverbrechen der NATO, und als warnendes Beipiel zur Abschreckung
aller "Unwilligen", Dissiden-ten und Abweichler, die nicht Vasallen
der neuen Weltordner sein wollen. Hierfür wurde ein
völker-rechtswidriges Sondergericht geschaffen, das keine Institution
des Rechts, sondern eine Kolonialbehörde darstellt. Deshalb ist die
Forderung nach Abschaffung des Haager "Tribunals" und nach Freiheit
für Slo-bodan Milosevic sowie alle politischen Gefangenen der NATO
unverzichtbares Element des Kampfes für eine andere Weltordnung. Dafür
demonstrieren wir in Den Haag:

28. Juni 2003
Auflösung des illegalen YU-Tribunals!
Freiheit für Slobo und alle politischen Gefangenen der NATO !

Nach dem "Regimewechsel" wurden auch in Belgrad willige Lakaien
eingesetzt, die das Land und seine Verteidiger für einen Judaslohn
verkaufen. Ausgerechnet am 28. Juni 2001, dem höchsten serbi-schen
Feiertag, der an die Schlacht auf dem Amselfeld 1389 erinnert, wurde
Slobodan Milosevic vom Djindjic-Regime nach Den Haag entführt.
Symbolträchtig wollten die Kidnapper deutlich machen, dass die
Besiegten nun die Geschichtsdeutung der Sieger zu übernehmen hätten.
Doch immer war und ist der 28. Juni - Tag des Verrats und der
Erniedrigung und zugleich Tag des Widerstandes gegen imperialistische
Fremdherrschaft

Heute agiert in Belgrad eine Marionettenregierung von Gnaden der USA
nach den Direktiven des CIA-Residenten und US-Botschafters William
Montgomery. In Komplizenschaft mit dem Haager Tribu-nal verweigern sie
den "Angeklagten" aus ihrem Land jede Unterstützung, inzwischen selbst
den Zugang zu Beweismitteln. Bisher hat die "Anklage" an jedem
Verhandlungstag ein Fiasko erlebt, trotz nachge-wiesener Versuche der
Zeugenbestechung und -bedrohung. Deshalb ist es nun ihre offenkundige
Absicht, Slobodan Milosevic, der als Ankläger der NATO auftritt,
physisch und psychisch zu brechen - eine "bio-logische Lösung" als
kalkulierter rettender Ausweg für die Veranstalter dieses
Justizverbrechens.

Deshalb demonstrieren wir unter der Losung
STOPPT DIE USA! FREIHEIT FÜR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC!

Demo am Samstag, 28. Juni 2003, 14 Uhr
Congressgebäude Den Haag, Churchillplein 10

Internationales Komitee für die Verteidigung von Slobodan Milosevic -
ICDSM - URL: www.free-slobo.de
Klaus Hartmann, Schillstraße 7, 63067 Offenbach am Main,
Tel/Fax -69-835850, e-mail: vorstand@...

Serbi e tedeschi. Per rinfrescare la memoria
(ITALIANO, SRPSKOHRVATSKI, ENGLISH)


Per rinfrescare la memoria "alla vecchia Europa" ed anche ai vari
nostri professori intellettual-borghesi "ex", quelli a spasso nel
"democratico West".

Dedicato al mese di maggio, mese della vittoria contro il nazifascismo
in tutto il mondo e della fine della guerra di Liberazione della
Jugoslavia.

===

Maggio 1995, trasmissione radiofonica "Stasera insieme" di Radio
Belgrado, primo canale:

<<...In occasione del cinquantenario della vittoria sul nazifascismo,
il signor Maric dalla cittadina di Osnabrueck per gli ascoltatori di
Radio Belgrado ha trasmesso il seguente testo:

"Quando nel maggio 1945 sono stati liberati i prigionieri dal campo di
concentramento tedesco di Osnabrueck, il pastore protestante tedesco
Friedrich Hriesenberg ha recitato per i suoi fedeli una predica, che
sarebbe stata nel contempo anche la sua ultima, prima di andare in
pensione:

"Il nostro paese ha perso la guerra. Hanno vinto i russi, gli
americani, gli inglesi. Forse avevano migliori armi, più soldati,
migliori comandanti.
E' stata una vittoria materiale, quella che hanno conseguito. Ma qui
tra noi si trova un popolo, che ha conseguito un'altra vittoria, molto
più significativa. La vittoria dell'animo, la vittoria del cuore e
dell'onesta'. La vittoria della pace e dell'amore cristiano. Questo
popolo sono i serbi.
Noi prima li conoscevamo superficialmente, ma nello stesso tempo
sapevamo cosa stessimo facendo nella loro patria [vedi ALLEGATO]. Per
ogni nostro soldato morto, rappresentante il potere dell'occupatore,
ammazzavamo centinaia di serbi che difendevano la loro terra. Non
soltanto questo: sapevamo cosa stessero facendo contro i serbi da
tutte le parti i croati, gli arnauti [vecchio nome per gli schipetari,
ndT], gli italiani, gli ungheresi ed i bulgari... e tutto questo lo
approvavamo.
Sapevamo che qui tra di noi [nel campo di concentramento di
Osnabrueck, ndT] si trovavano 5000 ufficiali serbi, i quali una volta
rappresentavano l'elite sociale nel loro paese, e adesso sembravano
solo scheletri viventi, denutriti e malati. Ritenevamo che nei serbi
prevalesse il credo "chi non si vendica non viene consacrato ("Ko se
ne osveti, taj se ne posveti"). Avevamo veramente paura di questi
martiri serbi. Avevamo paura che essi, dopo la nostra capitolazione,
avrebbero fatto quello che noi abbiamo fatto a loro. Pensavamo davvero
a questa tragedia, e già vedevamo i corpi dei nostri figli galleggiare
nei canali, oppure essere bruciati nei forni. Immaginavamo il massacro
della nostra gente, gli stupri, le distruzioni delle nostre case
[dunque, proprio come in tempi recentissimi, questi signori vedevano
se stessi nello specchio ma indicavano i serbi!... ndT]
Invece cosa è successo?
Quando è stato spezzato il filo spinato, e quando i 5000 scheletri
viventi serbi [i prigionieri del campo, ndT] si sono ritrovati in
libertà e tra di noi, questi scheletri viventi hanno accarezzato i
nostri bambini, hanno parlato con noi. I serbi dunque hanno
accarezzato i bambini di quelli che hanno avvolto il loro paese in un
drappo nero...
Appena adesso comprendiamo perché il nostro poeta Goethe studiasse la
lingua serba. Ora capiamo perché l'ultima parola di Bismarck, sul
letto di morte è stata: "Serbia".
Perciò la vittoria serba è più bella, piu' alta, più di qualunque
altra vittoria materiale. Questa vittoria la potevano conseguire
soltanto i serbi, educati nello spirito di San Sava e nella loro epica
eroica, tanto amata da Goethe. Questa vittoria vivrà nei secoli
nell'animo tedesco. Ed e' a questa vittoria ed ai serbi che ho voluto
dedicare questa mia ultima predica pastorale"

[Lo speaker della radio:] Commoventi queste parole oggidì, quando da
tutte le parti si parla dei serbi con tutt'altri toni. Almeno in
generale. Ma naturalmente non sono tutti uguali. Grazie, ancora una
volta per aver ricordato queste parole di questo generoso sacerdote
tedesco. Che risuonino le sue parole anche in tante altre teste...>>

[Trascrizione dalla registrazione da Milena.
Traduzione di Ivan del CNJ per "Voce jugoslava" (trasmissione
radiofonica su Radio Città Aperta), 20 maggio 2003.]


--- SRPSKOHRVATSKI ---

Radio Beograd-I, Maj 1995.

Povodom pedestogodisnjice pobede nad fasizmom i nacizmom, g. Maric iz
Osnabrika, za slusaoce Radio Beograda (u emisiji "Veceras zajedno")
izvestio je sledece:

Kada je 1945. oslobodjen koncetracioni logor u Osnabriku i
zarobljenici pusteni na slobodu, protestantski pastor Fridrih
Hrisenberg, maja 1945. odrzao je svojim vernicima prpoved, koja je
istovremeno bila i njegova poslednja, pred odlazak u penziju. Ova
propoved u prevodu glasi:

"Nasa otadzbina izgubila je rat. Pobedili su Rusi, Amerikanci,
Englezi.
Mozda su imali bolje oruzje, vise vojnika, bolje vocstvo. Ali to je
izrazito materijalna pobeda. Tu pobedu oni su odneli. Ali ovde, medju
nama, ima jedan narod koji je izvojevao jednu drugu i mnogo lepsu
pobedu, pobedu duse, pobedu srca i postenja. Pobedu mira i hriscanske
ljubavi. To su Srbi.
Mi smo ih ranije samo donekle poznavali, ali smo isto tako znali sta
smo cinili u njihovoj otadzbini. Ubijali smo stotinu Srba, koji su
branili zemlju, za jednog naseg vojnika, koji je inace pretstavljao
vlast okupatora nasilnika. Ne samo to da smo cinili, nego smo
blagonaklono gledali kako su tamo na Srbe pucali sa svih strana: i
Hrvati, i Arnauti i Italijani i Madjari i Bugari. Znali smo da se ovde
medju nama nalazi 5000 oficira Srba, koji su nekad u svojoj zemlji
pretstavljali drustvenu elitu, a sada su licili na zive kosture,
iznemogli i malaksali od gladi. Drzali smo da kod Srba tinja verovanje
"Ko se ne osveti, taj se ne posveti", i mi smo se zaista plasili
osvete tih srpskih mucenika. Bojali smo se da ce oni, po nasoj
kapitulaciji, raditi ono sto smo mi sa njima cinili. Zamisljali smo
jasno tu tragfediju i vec videli nasu decu kako plivaju kanalizacijom
ili se peku u gradskoj pekari. Zamisljali smo ubijanje nasih ljudi,
silovanja, rusenja i razaranja nasih domova. Medjutim kako je bilo:
Kada su pukle zarobljenicke zice i kada se 5000 zivih srpskih kostura
naslo na slobodi u nasoj sredini, ti kosturi su milovali nasu decu,
davali im bombone, razgovarali su sa nama. Srbi su dakle milovali decu
onih koji su njihovu otadzbinu u crno zavili.
Tek sada razumemo zasto je nas pesnik Gete ucio srpski jezik. Sada tek
shvatamo zasto je Bizmarku poslednja rec na samrtnoj postelji bila:
Srbija. Ta pobeda Srba je lepsa i uzvisenija od svake druge pobede.
Takvu pobedu cini mi se, mogli su izvojevati i dobiti samo Srbi,
odnegovani u njihovom svetosavskom duhu i junackim srpskim pesmama,
koje je i nas Gete tako voleo. Ova pobeda ce vekovima ziveti u dusama
Nemaca, a toj pobedi i Srbima, koji su je izvojevali, zeleo sam da
posvetim ovu moju poslednju svestenicku propoved".

Spiker:
Dirljive reci, u ovo vreme kad se o Srbima na tim stranama govori
nekim drugacijim tonovima, bar u vecini. Naravno nisu svi isti.
Hvala vam, jos jednom, sto ste potsetili na uzvisene reci plemenitog
pastora. Neka odjeknu i u nekim drugim glavama."

Sa magnetoofnske trake prenela u pisani tekst, Milena


=== ALLEGATO / ANNEX ===


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/antiguer-ops/AG-BALKAN.HTM
German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/balkan/20_260_2.htm

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN THE BALKANS (SPRING 1941): PART II

"III. German Propaganda

German propaganda efforts naturally took full advantage
of this open rift between Serbs and Croats. The
constantly repeated official line was that Germany and
Italy desired the creation of an independent state of
Croatia and that the military operations were being
conducted only against the Serbs. However, when Hitler
was first told of the open animosity among the various
ethnic factions in Yugoslavia, he is said to have remarked:
"That is none of our business. If they want to bash each
others' heads in, let them go ahead."

...

"In a letter Mussolini wrote to Hitler on 29 December
1941, the former stated with reference to Yugoslavia:

Before next spring every nucleus of insurrection must be
wiped out or else we run the risk of having to fight a
subsidiary war in the Balkans. The first territory to be
pacified is Bosnia, then Serbia and Montenegro. The
military operations must be conducted with great
determination and must lead to a real and complete
disarmament of the population, this being the sole
guarantee I for avoiding surprise in the future. For this
purpose our military forces must cooperate according to a
common plan to prevent duplication of effort and achieve
the desired result with a minimum of manpower and
materiel."

1. UNHCHR on Human Rights Violations by the Serbian Police State
"POVERLJIVI MEMORANDUM MINISTARSTVIMA PRAVDE I UNUTRA©NJIH POSLOVA
REPUBLIKE SRBIJE"

2. Unity for freedom!
On the demonstrations in Belgrade and The Hague, on the activities of
Sloboda and ICDSM. By Vladimir Krsljanin


=== 1 ===


Subject: UNHCHR on Human Rights Violations by the Serbian Police State
Date: Sun, 18 May 2003 14:51:56 +0200
From: "Vladimir Krsljanin"


English original and Serbian translation (bellow).

The following very polite text contains very serious admissions and
(preliminary) findings. All progressive and democratic forces should
join the battle against these outrageous practices. The message of
President Milosevic is: 'the time of dictatorship is a right time for
action of all honest people and of all the people devoted to
democracy'.

Human rights violation practices are imposed to Serbia by ICTY (the
Hague 'tribunal'). There was never in history an institution under UN
cover whose practices was systematic violation of human rights and
dignity. The malignant anti-Yugoslav grouping of Western intelligence
bureaucracy, facing fiasco in their show-trials find a common language
with the regime that lost all credibility and support of the people.
Both desperately try to justify its existence and lot of money spent
to support their illegal activities. Allying with criminals in Serbia
and abroad they unsuccessfully try to blame for all their dirty work
President Milosevic and Serbian people.

On Tuesday, May 20, at 15:00, in front of the 'Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro' in Belgrade there will be a
demonstration, organized by Sloboda, against the new visit of Carla
del Ponte, already accused in German press for her links with the
criminal circles in Serbia.

We stand for law, justice and truth!

We stand for freedom, sovereignty and democracy!

We invite all the people to the major Vidovdan (June 28)
demonstrations:

At The Hague
organized by a Serbian-International Organizational Committee
(see the inviting leaflet at
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/sloboda051203.htm /English
version/
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/POZIVZAHAG.htm /Serbian
version/
or at
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/ /Both
versions + PDF/)

And of course in Belgrade
organized by SLOBODA

The UNHCHR text bellow was originally circulated by:
news@...
http://www.antic.org/

Support the peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe!
Support democracy and human rights in Serbia!
Free Slobodan Milosevic!

Udruzenje SLOBODA / Freedom Association
Belgrade
Phone: +381 11 630 206 Fax: +381 11 630 549
E-mail slobodavk@...


> UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
> COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
> SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
>
>
>
>
> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
> Mission to Serbia and Montenegro
>
>
>
>
> 24 April 2003
>
> CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE
> AND THE INTERIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
>
> Initial findings and recommendations arising from the visit
> to detainees in Belgrade 14-15 April 2003



[ FOR THE ENGLISH VERSION SEE:
http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm
OR OUR NEXT MESSAGE ON "JUGOINFO":
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/messages ]



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro

POVERLJIVI MEMORANDUM MINISTARSTVIMA PRAVDE I UNUTRA©NJIH POSLOVA
REPUBLIKE SRBIJE

24. april 2003.

Inicijalna zapa¾anja i predlozi koji proistièu iz posete pritvorenim
licima u Beogradu od 14. do 15. aprila 2003. godine

Nakon zajednièke posete mestima pritvora i pritvorenicima u Beogradu
14. i 15. aprila 2003. godine, Kancelarija Visokog komesara
Ujedinjenih nacija za ljudska prava, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji i Crnoj
Gori i OEBS-ova Kancelarija za demokratske institucije i ljudska
prava, utvrdili su devet hitnih preporuka koje ¾ele da prenesu
organima vlasti u Republici Srbiji.

Ove preporuke ne treba smatrati kompletnim nalazima i preporukama ove
tri institucije. Taènije, one predstavljaju odreðen broj hitnih mera
koje bi, ukoliko se sprovedu, po mi¹ljenju Delegacije koja je izvr¹ila
posetu odmah popravile situaciju lica koja su pritvorena nakon
uvoðenja vanrednog stanja. Ove tri organizacije æe u dogledno vreme
objaviti sveobuhvatan zajednièki izve¹taj o svojim nalazima i
preporukama. Ovaj izve¹taj æe detaljno razraditi navedene preporuke i
biæe dopunjen drugima. Tri organizacije ¾ele da skrenu pa¾nju Vlade na
èinjenicu da, po njihovom shvatanju, mnogi od problema ne proistièu
direktno od uslova nastalih usled vanrednog stanja, to su pre svega
problemi Centralnog zatvora u Beogradu koji postoje veæ du¾e vremena
i ustanovljeni su tokom poseta 2001. godine. Vanredno stanje je
pogor¹alo veæinu ovih problema i verovatno je da æe odreðene odrebe
izmenjenog Zakona o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala nastaviti to
da èine ukoliko se odmah ne uvede odgovarajuæa za¹tita.

Tri organizacije pozdravljaju prestanak vanrednog stanja od 22.
aprila. Mada odredbe koje se odnose na pritvor nisu vi¹e na snazi, one
smatraju da su nalazi i preporuke iz ovog memoranduma koje se odnose
na pritvor i dalje relevantne. Ovo zasnivaju na èinjenici da i dalje
postoje pritisci na sistem kriviènog pravosuða Srbije; odredbe o
produ¾enom pritvoru bez sudskog nadzora i dalje ostaju na snazi prema
izmenama i dopunama Zakona o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala; i
dalje postoje sistemski problemi koji su veæ identifikovani nakon
posete iz 2001. radi utvrðivanja stanja u zatvorima, posete Komiteta
protiv muèenja u 2002. i drugih procena.

Uz ni¾e navedena pitanja koja zahtevaju pa¾nju, Delegacija ¾eli da
navede da su konstatovane pozitivne promene u odnosu na situaciju iz
2001. Tu spadaju bolji odnosi izmeðu pritvorenika i zatvorskih èuvara.
Takoðe, Delegacija je tokom poverljivih razgovora sa pritvorenicima
èula dosledno pozitivne ocene o èuvarima. Uz to, Delegacija ¾eli da
konstatuje da su svi dr¾avni slu¾benici bili predusretljivi i otvoreni
prilikom razogovara sa Delegacijom.

Tri organizacije se nadaju da æe poèetni nalazi i preporuke sadr¾ane u
ovom memorandumu biti od pomoæi vladi u njenim naporima u borbi protiv
organizovanog kriminala i podr¾avanju vladavine prava u skladu sa
relevantnim meðunarodnim standardima. Predstavnici tri organizacije
oèekuju da æe uskoro podneti potpuni izve¹taj i imati moguænost da
ponovo posete pritvorske ustanove.

Nalazi i preporuke

Deo A: Pravni osnov za pritvaranje

Nalaz 1: Dalje pravdanja pritvora bez sudskog nadzora

Èlan 4. Meðunarodne konvencije o graðanskim i politièkim pravima
(ICCPR) jasno navodi da odstupanje od prava garantovanih Konvencijom
mora biti strogo ogranièeno na odstupanja koja nala¾u potrebe
situacije. I postupci u vreme vanrednog stanja kao i nedavni amandmani
na Zakon o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala sad¾e odredbe o
produ¾enom pritvoru bez adekvatnog sudskog nadzora. Jasno je da takve
odredbe nisu u saglasnosti sa meðunarodnim standardima o ljudskim
pravima, posebno sa èlanom 9(4). ICCPR-a i èlanom 5(4) Evropske
konvencije za za¹titu ljuskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (ECHR).
Komentari i obièajno pravo ukazuju da pritvorenici mogu biti dr¾ani
samo nekoliko dana kao apsolutni maksimum, èak i za vreme vanredne
situacije.

Delegacija je utvrdila da ne postoji jasno opravdanje za produ¾enje
pritvora pojedinaca bez sudskog nadzora, posebno ¹to mnogi od njih
nisu ispitivani danima i ¹to je dosta vremena proteklo od poèetne
vanredne situacije nakon atentata. Neki, koji su bili u pritvoru
nekoliko dana, izjavili su da uop¹te nisu bili ispitivani.

Sa okonèanjem vanrednog stanja, do èega je do¹lo nakon na¹e poslednje
posete, sva derogiranja od prava, a naroèito od prava da lice bude
izvedeno pred sudiju bez odlaganja treba smatrati neva¾eæim i samim
tim pritvaranje bez podizanja optu¾be nije vi¹e dopustivo. Stoga se
pritvorenici moraju ili optu¾iti za krivièno delo ili pustiti, u
skladu sa èlanom 9. ICCPR.

Delegaciju posebno brine ¹to pritvor bez sudskog nadzora zajedno sa
nekim od drugih ni¾e navedenih nalaza znaèi da se kr¹enje ljudskih
prava jo¹ vi¹e komplikuje ili pogor¹ava kombinacijom ovih dodatnih
faktora.

Preporuka 1: Ponovo ispitati, na osnovu èinjeniènog stanja svakog
predmeta, da li i dalje postoje uslovi za pritvor svakog pojedinca
koji se i dalje nalazi u pritvoru, nakon uvoðenja vanrednog stanja
(ukljuèujuæi i one koji su pritvoreni na osnovu izmenjenog zakona o
borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala). Obezbediti da pritvorene osobe
budu ili osloboðene ili optu¾ene za krivièno delo, a da se dalji
pritvor zasniva na sudskoj odluci. Ove odluke treba da podle¾u
redovnom preispitivanju.

Nalaz 2: Informacije o statusu i pravima pritvorenih lica; pristup
advokatu; postupak za razmatranje ¾albi

Meðunarodni standardi kao i principi utvrðeni Ustavnom poveljom
Dr¾avne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora i Zakonom o kriviènom postupku
nagla¹avaju pravo pritvorenih lica da budu obave¹teni o svom statusu i
pravima, kao i da im se omoguæu pristup braniocu radi za¹tite njihovih
interesa. Vanredno stanje je ukinulo ili organièilo jedan broj prava
koja se odnose na komunikaciju sa spoljnim svetom, ukljuèujuæi i
posete porodice i komunikaciju sa braniocem. Dok neka od ovih
ogranièenja mogu imati opravdanje kao izuzeci izazvani potrebama
situacije, koji se primenjuju od sluèaja do sluèaja i tokom kratkih
perioda èini se, umesto toga, da su ona primenjena zbirno, i to ili na
prozvoljan naèin i èesto tokom du¾eg vremenskog perioda.

Delegacija je utvrdila da mnogim pritvorenicima nije jasan njihov
status i prava. Èini se da nije postojao nikakv sistematski proces
kojim se obezbeðuje da pritvorenici budu upoznati o svom pravu da
ospore pritvor na osnovu Naredbe o vanrednom stanju. Ta konfuzija o
statusu, pravima, i moguænosti za komunikaciju se i dalje nastavlja i
u sluèaju pritvorenika koji su sprovedeni u pritvor na osnovu odluke
suda ili nareðenja specijanog tu¾ioca.

Preporuka 2: Sprovesti sistematski postupak informisanja svih
pritvorenih lica o njihovom statusu i pravima. Ovde se, izmeðu
ostalog, mora pokloniti posebna pa¾nja onim licima koja su prvobitno
pritvorena na osnovu nareðenja koja su izdata na osnovu vanrednog
stanja ali sada prelaze u druge oblike pritvora. Obezbediti da sva
pritvorena lica odmah dobiju pristup advokatu.

Nalaz 3: ®albeni postupak

Delegacija je na¹la da je najmanje jedno pritvoreno lice je obave¹teno
pismenim putem, da ¾albu mora podneti u roku od 12 sati od prijema
odluke o svom pritvaranju. Nikakav rok nije dat za postupanje i
dono¹enje odluka po ¾albi, a najmanje jedno pritvoreno lice je dobilo
negativan odgovor na svoju ¾albu o pritvoru i to oko 30-tog dana svog
tridesetdnevnog pritvora. Postupak komunikacije izmeðu pritvorenih
lica i vlasti nije transparentan u tome da obezbeðuje adekvatno
evidentiranje i izdavanje potvrda o prijemu ¾albi, pritu¾bi itd.
Delegacija takoðe smatra da pravo na ¾albu Ministru unutra¹njih
poslova ne predstavlja nezavisan mehanizam za¹tite prava pritvorenika.
Delegacija izra¾ava zabrinutost zato ¹to ovi problemi i dalje opstaju
za lica pritvorena na osnovu odredbi izmenjenog Zakona o borbi protiv
organizovanog kriminala.

Preporuka 3: Odmah uvesti sudski nadzor nad pritvorenim licima. Uvesti
jasan i dosledan postupak kojim se reguli¹e proces kojim se dopu¹ta
pritvorenim licima da ula¾u ¾albu na pritvaranje, kojim se obezbeðuje
da ne postoje vremenska ogranièenja u pogledu prava pritvorenika da
se ¾ale i da se po svim ¾albama odluèuje, i odluka saop¹tava
podnosiocu u roku od 24 sata.

Nalaz 4: Proizvoljni faktori koji odreðuju uslove pritvora

Delegacija je utvrdila da va¾eæa pravila koja odreðuju uslove pritvora
nisu jasna i da zavise delom od individualnih odluka samih zatvorskih
vlasti. Ovo je posebno problematièno jer se ima utisak da ove odluke i
postupciutièu na pritvorenike razlièito i dovode do nejednakih
moguænosti da dobiju higijenske pakete, lekove i da komuniciraju sa
porodicama ili advokatima.

Preporuka 4: Obezbediti da va¾eæi zakon i propisi ne omoguæavaju
uvoðenje arbitrarnosti koja utièe na moguænost pritvorenika da imaju
pristup advokatu ili koji ogranièavaju druga prava.

Deo B: Pritvorski uslovi

Nalaz 5: Policijski objekti neprikladni za produ¾eni pritvor

Delegacija je utvrdila da su uslovi u policijskoj stanici koju je
posetila neprikladni za bilo ¹ta drugo osim za kratkotrajan pritvor i
da su neprikladni za boravak preko noæi. To je, izmeðu ostalog, zbog
nedostatka kreveta za svakog pritvorenika kao i æebadi i du¹eka;
neodgovarajuæe hrane i lekarske pomoæi; neodgovarajuæeg osvetlenja i
ventilacije. Svi ovi zahtevi su sadr¾ani u Standardnim minimalnim
pravilima o postupanju sa zatvorenicima (SMR) i Evropski zatvorskim
propisima (EPR). Pravilo br. 19 SMR-a i pravilo br. 24 EPR Deo II o
ovome daje precizna uputstva.

Delegacija je sa zabrinuto¹æu primili informaciju da su neka
pritvorena lice boravila u Beogradskoj glavnoj policijskoj stanici pod
ovim uslovima do ¹est ili sedam dana.

Preporuka 5: Obezbediti da pritvorena lica borave u policijskim
pritvorskim objektima ¹to je kraæe moguæe i da se ista ne koriste za
dr¾anje pritvorenih lica preko noæi..

Nalaz 6: Stanje pritvorenika koji su dr¾ani u izolaciji u Centralnom
zatvoru u Beogradu je neprihvatljivo

Delegacija je videla da se veæina zatvorenika koji su dr¾ani u
izolaciji u Centralnom zatvoru u Beogradu nalazila u malim, slabo
osvetljenim æelijama sa slabim osvetlenjem i ventilacijom. Takoðe je
utvrdila da veæini nije bilo dopu¹teno fizièko ve¾banje i da su sve
vreme dr¾ani u æelijama i samo povremeno izvoðeni uglavnom radi
ispitivanja.

Kumulativni i kombinovani efekti spornog produ¾enog pritvora u
sadejstvu sa uslovima pod kojima se vr¹i pritvor, koji su ispod
standarda, za mnoge privorenike predstavljaju poni¾avajuæe ka¾njavanje
ili postupak a ¹to je nespojivo sa èlanom 3. Konvencije protiv muèenja
i drugog okrutnog,neèoveènog ili poni¾avajuæeg postupanja (CAT), i
èlanom 3. ECHR-a i èlanom 7. ICCPR-a.

Delegacija je konstatovala da poveæanje populacije u zatvoru takoðe
umanjuje moguænost fizièkog ve¾banja za sve zatvorenike. Konstatovano
je da je nalazom iz 2001. godine utvrðeno su veæ tada uslovi za
ve¾banje u Centralnom zatvoru u Beogradu bili neadekvatni za oko 400
pritvorenika i da vreme za ve¾bu bilo prekratko. Prema izve¹tajima
trenutna populacija je veæa od 1,000.

Preporuka 6: Obezbediti da svim zatvorenicima bude omoguæeno adekvatno
ve¾banje od najmanje jedan sat dnevno i da se preduzmu druge mere radi
pobolj¹anja uslova u æelijama za izolaciju u Centralnom zatvoru u
Beogradu.

Nalaz 7: Postupci podnosenja ¾albi

Tokom posete Gradskom SUP i Okru¾nom zatvoru u Beogradu, delegacija je
obave¹tena o postupku za podno¹enje ¾albi unutar institucije, kao i
spoljnim organima za kontrolu. Postupci u okviru zatvora, kako su
opisani i utvrðeni od strane delegacije, predstavljaju vrlo
centralizovan pristup za podno¹enje ¾albi. Moglo bi se zakljuèiti da
predstavljaju neadekvatnu garanciju i da ne obezbeðuju nezavisnu i
javnu analizu ¾albi. Neadekvatnost postojeæeg metoda naroèito se
ogledala u slabom poverenju pritvorenih lica u delotvornost unutra¹nje
istrage.

Ova zabrinutost je, izgleda, od naroèitog znaèaja, po¹to je tokom
posete delegacija èula optu¾be ili videla indikacije muèenja ili
zlostavljanja tokom hap¹enja dva pritvorena lica. Bilo je nemoguæe u
potpunosti proveriti istininost ovih optu¾bi, ali delegacija smatra
va¾nim da pritvorena lica imaju moguænost da prijave svaku takvu
optu¾bu sa uverenjem da æe njihove ¾albe biti razmatrane po hitnom
postupku. Delegacija je takoðe obave¹tena o naèinima ispitivanja i
pritiska prilikom isleðivanja, koja se èine neprimerenim, posebno ako
se odnose na mlaðe ¾ene.

Preporuka 7: Pobolj¹ati moguænosti za obraæanje pritvorenih lica
relevantnim organima u vezi uslova u pritvoru i razvijanja dugoroènog
plana revizije sistema unutra¹nje kontrole, kako u policiji, tako i u
zatvoru. Svaka prijava zlostavljanja trebala bi da bude hitno i
ozbiljno istra¾ena uz sprovoðenje odgovarajuæeg kriviènog i/ili
disciplinskog postupka protiv odgovornog slu¾benog lica.

Nalaz 8: Proporcionalnost mera primenjenih protiv svakog pritvorenog
lica

Delegacija je utvrdila da fizièki uslovi u pritvoru i moguænosti za
komunikaciju u okviru zatvora ili sa spoljnim svetom, enormno varira
od sluèaja do sluèaja. Izgleda da nema valjanog razloga za¹to se neke
mere primenjuju prema svima ili samo u pojedinim sluèajevima. Kao ¹to
je naznaèeno u nalazu 4, izgleda da postoje elementi proizvoljnosti i
nedostatka transparentnosti propisa i uputstava.

Preporuka 8: Preispitati na osnovu pojedinacnih sluèajeva da li su
mere primenjene u konkretnom sluèaju, kao ¹to su pritvor u izolaciji,
proporcionalne i odgovarajuæe u svakom od sluèajeva. Uveriti se da su
odluke u vezi primene ovih mera bile proveravane u svakom pojedinaènom
sluèaju.

Nalaz 9: Moguænosti pru¾anja zdravstvene zastite

Jedan broj pritvorenih lica zadr¾anih u izolaciji ¾alio se na
neadekvatnu zdravstvenu za¹titu, ukljuèujuæi te¹koæe u nabavljanju
neophodnih lekova, sredstava za liènu higijenu i èiste odeæe. Takoðe
su se ¾alili i da su bili onemoguæeni da obaveste porodice o svom
zdravstvenom stanju i da dobiju informaciju o zdravstvenom stanju
svojih bli¾njih. Neki od pritvorenih lica nisu bili ubeðeni da im je
omoguæen pravovremen pristup lekarima, ili doktorima koji su upoznati
sa njihovim zdravstvenim stanjem.

Delimiène ili netaène informacije o zdravstvenom stanju ili razvoju
situacije do¹le su do rodbine pritvorenih lica, bilo putem medija ili
usmeno. U nekim sluèajevima navodno su informacije stizale iz
slu¾benih izvora.

Delegacija bi ¾elela da skrene pa¾nju na pravila 25 i 62 "Skupa
minimalnih pravila o postupanju sa zatvorenicima", pravila 29 - 62 iz
Dela II Evropskih Zatvorskih Pravila, koja daju dodatna uputstva u
vezi obezbeðenja zdravstvene za¹tite, kao i pravila 15 "Skupa
minimalnih pravila o postupanju sa zatvorenicima" i pravila 20 Dela II
Evropskih Zatvorskih Pravila u kojima su navedena sredstva neophodna
za liènu higijenu.

Ukoliko se to zatra¾i, organizacija kakva je Meðunarodni komitet
crvenog krsta bi trebala da bude u moguænosti da odgovori ovim
potrebama.

Preporuka 9: Pobolj¹ati dostupnost zdravstvenoj nezi, kao i
obezbeðenju èiste odeæe i sredstava za liènu higijenu. Kao dodatno
obezbeðenje, zatra¾iti pomoæ nezavisne organizacije sposobne da
odgovori zdravstvenim, higijenskim i ostalim sliènim potrebama
pritvorenih lica i omoguæiti komunikaciju sa njihovim porodicama.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro

ENDS

Serbian News Network - SNN

news@...

http://www.antic.org/


=== 2 ===


Subject: Unity for freedom!
Date: Wed, 28 May 2003 02:25:09 +0200
From: "Vladimir Krsljanin"


Unity for freedom!

(On the demonstrations in Belgrade and The Hague,
on the activities of Sloboda and ICDSM)

By Vladimir Krsljanin



The puppet colonial regime in Belgrade is loosing more and
more influence every day. The people is outraged by they're
ruthless dictatorship and obvious links to the criminal circles.

By the first political demonstration after the "State of
Emergency" five days ago Sloboda have opened a season of
protests against the regime in agony.

Before the demonstration, almost 200 people have submitted,
one by one, individually, to the Belgrade District Prosecution
the criminal charges against the "acting president" Natasa
Micic, Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic, all ministers in the
Serbian Government and unknown investigative judge in the
"Stambolic case". They are charged for serious violations of the
Constitution and Low, abuse of power, spread of the false news
aiming to discredit President Milosevic, his family and political
opposition.

The demonstration of several hundred in front of the Foreign
Ministry and Government of Serbia buildings, on the day of the
last visit of Carla del Ponte to Belgrade demanded "end of the
Hague-DOS dictatorship", restoration of democracy and
sovereignty in Serbia.

The speakers pointed the existence of the coalition between the
illegal Hague tribunal and the present rulers in Serbia. It is a
coalition of common despair - both anti Serbian groupings face
total failure in their attempt to suppress the truth and
freedom-loving spirit of the Serbian people.

The patterns of this coalition are seen in the present mass
violation of human rights in Serbia, following the example of
the Hague tribunal. [1]

The atmosphere of fear is still present in Serbia. But President
Milosevic teaches: "Time of the dictatorship is a right time
for the activity of all honest people and of all people devoted
to democracy."

Our duty is to work on the creation of the broadest possible
political front to return freedom, hope, dignity and sovereignty
to the Serbian people, to stop turning the country into a colony.

Serbs in Diaspora demanded to mark this year's Vidovdan by a
demonstration at The Hague. Sloboda supported this demand
immediately [2].

The work of Serbian-International Organizational Committee
of the Hague demonstration is supported up to now by Serb
organizations and groups from Germany, France, Britain,
Austria, Sweden, by progressive and leftist parties, groups and
organizations from several European countries, by many
distinguished personalities, including many ICDSM members.

The situation in Serbia now, for the sake of the future of the
Serbian people require unity, lack of sectarian approaches and
total solidarity with the struggle of an old European people for
its freedom, democracy, sovereignty and equality.

This important and decisive struggle also requires new effective
and more developed forms of organization and mutual support
at home and abroad.

Everyone ready to support or to take part in this struggle should
be aware of its importance for the world peace and destiny of
the mankind.

In that struggle everyone will take a position he is willing or
able to take [3]. The progressive forces today don't need
disputes. The struggle for the freedom of Slobodan Milosevic,
Serbia and Yugoslavia is a cause absolutely clean and
undisputable. We don't have time nor wish to measure our
contributions to that struggle. After we reach the victory, which
is close, the reward for the fighters will be the benefit of the
people.



[1] http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm

[2] see the inviting leaflet at
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/sloboda051203.htm
/English version/
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/POZIVZAHAG.htm
/Serbian version/
or at
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/
/Both versions + PDF/

[3] Honoring all who associated their names with the ICDSM
and our struggle in general, the author of these lines does not
subscribe to making analyses of individual contributions to this
struggle. What I have witnessed is the visit Mr. Ramsey Clark to
Belgrade in 2001, aiming to intervene against the extradition,
but delayed due to manipulation of that time Yugoslav
Ambassador to Washington. Mr. Clark made a speech in the
people's rally in front of the Federal Parliament and two press
conferences in Belgrade. Then, there were two visits (all on his
own expense) to President Milosevic at the Hague, with one
press conference there [4], all the time readiness to give advice,
several written interventions to the Tribunal etc. Ramsey Clark
signed the ICDSM letter to all heads of states:

http://www.icdsm.org/appeal.htm

In his recent interview to Egyptian "Al Ahram" (Weekly
On-Line No.624, February 6-12), Ramsey Clark stated:

"I met Milosevic a few days ago. His health has deteriorated,"
he tells me in Cairo. "He had the strength to hold the people of
his country together in a very difficult situation."

"Only absolute power, unrestrained by any rule of law or
standards of human decency, openly taunts an intended victim as
President George W Bush has taunted Iraq."

Yesterday it was Yugoslavia. Milosevic was struggling to
preserve Yugoslavia, Clark says. "If there was any independent
state in central and eastern Europe it was Yugoslavia. They were
playing off the Soviet Union and the US to maintain their
independence and relative prosperity." That was during the
socialist and non- aligned regime of the country's founder,
Joseph Broz Tito. In Tito's day, Yugoslavs were happily united
-- a rare occurrence in the Balkans.

"In 1991 there were six [constituent] republics with lots of
different peoples in Yugoslavia. And Belgrade had held all these
formerly warring groups together in peace. In 1991 Time
reported that by far the most progressive, and truly the most
successful country in Eastern Europe, was Yugoslavia. And
almost immediately you see foreign powers trying to dismantle
it. First they dismantled Slovenia, then Croatia. Germany comes
in after its deplorable historical record in the Balkans and
encourages Croatian independence. Then Bosnia and
Macedonia."

"We deliberately broke it up. It was US policy to break it up for
economic exploitation and to show other Eastern European
nations not to dare dream of being independent. If you want to
have any economic or political independence you'll be crushed.
That was the brutal message signalled to Yugoslavia's
neighbours."

A public example had to be made of Milosevic's Yugoslavia:
"Within two years of the break up of the Soviet Union Ukraine
became the third largest recipient of US aid. First Israel and
second Egypt and third Ukraine. Can you imagine the old
enemy? And what was the aid for? It was to identify public
facilities for privatisation. And most went to American
companies, and we identified 6,000 properties. We destroyed
their economies and they were obliged to buy our goods. And
you pay our price. And we'll advertise and make you want to
buy our goods just like we make you want McDonald's and blue
jeans. And now what have the people got? They lost their
education system, they've lost their health care system and
they've lost their jobs. [Western investors] came in with big
plans for privatisation and nationalisation. What they did is
unbelievable -- a despicable act of greed," Clark says. And the
same fate awaits a defeated Iraq, he warns.

[4] http://www.icdsm.org/more/clarkm.htm#a