>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Comit. Intern.sta Arco Iris <ale.ramon@...>
> To: <Recipient list suppressed>
> Sent: Thursday, March 02, 2000 4:06 PM
> Subject: FESTIVAL MONDIALE DELLA GIOVENTU' IN ALGERIA (2001)
>
> Riceviamo e Diffondiamo:
>
> Federazione Mondiale della Gioventù Democratica,
> E-mail:"wfdy@..."
>
> Stimati/e Compagni/e ed Amici/che,
>
> Riceviate un affettuoso saluto da parte della vicepresidenza della
> Federazione Mondiale della Gioventù Democratica.
>
> Dall'ultima assemblea generale realizzatasi a Cipro nel gennaio del 1999,
> la nostra amata Federazione ha avuto un anno pieno di attività in tutto il
> mondo. Siamo stati presenti o le nostre organizzazioni hanno rappresentato
> la Federazione in diversi avvenimenti importanti.
>
> Bisogna sottolineare che quest'anno abbiamo organizzato la riunione del
> Consiglio Generale della FMGD, in Vietnam, dove abbiamo approvato che la
> sede del prossimo FESTIVAL MONDIALE DELLA GIOVENTU' E DEGLI STUDENTI sarà,
> nel 2001, ad Algeri (Algeria). Nell'ambito dello stesso, la Federazione
> Mondiale della Gioventù Democratica e tutte le organizzazioni progressiste
> del mondo intero organizzeranno un Festival Antiimperialista, per la
> Autodeterminazione dei Popoli e per la Pace.
>
> L'anno che viene trasformeremo la città di Algeri in una bella
> dimostrazione che i nostri sogni sono più vivi che mai e, al tempo stesso,
> riceveremo la calorosa accoglienza del popolo algerino che ci attenderà.
>
> Vi inviamo informazioni sulle ultime attività alle quali ha preso parte la
> Federazione, come la visita in Palestina, dove abbiamo avuto la possibilità
> di incontrare Yasser Arafat, o come la visita al combattente popolo
> jugoslavo che ha resistito ai bombardamenti della NATO e vi sottolineiamo
> l'accoglienza ricevuta da parte della Gioventù del Partito Socialista Serbo
> (SPS), che ha ricevuto due delle nostre delegazioni della FMGD.
>
> Aggressione contro la Jugoslavia
>
> Durante la guerra contro la Jugoslavia la FMGD ha giocato un ruolo
> importante, dal momento che ha organizzato due visite di solidarietà al
> popolo ed alla gioventù jugoslava.
>
> Abbiamo ricevuto un grande appoggio da parte della Gioventù del Partito
> Socialista Serbo, che ci ha accompagnato in questa visita, dandoci la
> dovuta attenzione. Abbiamo avuto la possibilità di visitare Belgrado e
> altre città della Jugoslavia. In queste abbiamo visto fabbriche, ponti,
> stazioni di radio e televisioni, strade e centinaia di edifici pubblici,
> distrutti dai bombardamenti assassini della NATO.
>
> Abbiamo avuto l'opportunità di vedere anche la resistenza della coraggiosa
> e combattente gioventù jugoslava, che in ogni momento ha resistito ed ha
> denunciato i bombardamenti giornalieri contro il suo territorio.
>
> Con il pretesto di difendere gli jugoslavi del Kosovo, gli Stati Uniti ed i
> loro alleati hanno ucciso migliaia di donne, bambini ed anziani e - con le
> loro bombe giornaliere contro ospedali, scuole, fabbriche di Pristina e di
> altre città del Kosovo Jugoslavo - hanno causato l'evacuazione di tutta la
> regione. A Belgrado abbiamo partecipato a manifestazioni di solidarietà,
> così abbiamo visitato l'ultimo ponte di Belgrado che si è mantenuto in
> piedi grazie alla vigilanza giornaliera del popolo jugoslavo, che voleva
> evitare che il ponte fosse bombardato. In America Latina le nostre
> organizzazioni hanno portato avanti manifestazioni in luoghi pubblici e di
> fronte alle ambasciate dall'Uruguay a Cuba, dal Brasile all'Ecuador.
> Inoltre, il giorno 17 febbraio, la FMGD è stata presente al Congresso del
> Partito Socialista Serbo (SPS) come invitata speciale ed ha partecipato ad
> un seminario in Solidarietà con il Popolo Jugoslavo, organizzato dalla
> Gioventù del Partito Socialista Serbo. Al Congresso hanno partecipato più
> di cento delegazioni internazionali.
>
> Visita in Palestina
>
> Allo stesso modo abbiamo visitato la Palestina. Siamo stati invitati dalla
> Unione Generale degli Studenti Palestinesi (GUPS) e dalla Autorità
> Nazionale Palestinese. E' stata una visita importante dato che abbiamo
> avuto la possibilità di visitare università, scuole e di riunirci con tutti
> i leaders studenteschi e di portare loro il nostro supporto per la
> creazione dello Stato Palestinese. A partire da questo, abbiamo avuto una
> riunione con il Presidente Yasser Arafat che ha dichiarato che continua la
> propria lotta in favore dello Stato Palestinese, manifestando una grande
> riconoscenza per la nostra visita. La FMGD si è impegnata a proseguire il
> suo appoggio alla lotta e alla creazione dello Stato Palestinese,
> organizzando anche attività di appoggio, insieme alle organizzazioni
> aderenti, nei loro rispettivi paesi. Quest'anno si terrà un Seminario
> Internazionale di Appoggio alla creazione dello Stato Palestinese che avrà
> luogo in Palestina ed al quale saremo presenti.
>
> Congressi e Seminari
>
> La FMGD ha anche assistito ad alcuni Congressi organizzati dalle nostre
> organizzazioni, così come al Congresso della Gioventù Comunista del Cile
> (Cile), al Seminario Internazionale di Solidarietà con la Colombia
> (Colombia), al Congresso della Gioventù Comunista Colombiana, la JUCO
> (Colombia), al Congresso della Gioventù Popolare Socialista (Messico), al
> Seminario dell'Anniversario della Organizzazione della Gioventù del Partito
> Nazionale Popolare (Giamaica), al Seminario Internazionale sul
> Neoliberismo, realizzatosi a La Habana (Cuba). Ci sono stati, poi, molti
> altri eventi ai quali, sfortunatamente, non abbiamo potuto assistere, però
> ai quali hanno partecipato le organizzazioni federate alla FMGD.
>
> Riunione del Consiglio Generale della FMGD,
> organizzata nel gennaio del 2000, ad Hanoi
>
> La riunione del Consiglio Generale è stata molto importante dal momento che
> si sono discussi diversi punti come quello del finanziamento, delle
> affiliazioni, il Piano d'Azione e del prossimo Festival Mondiale della
> Gioventù Democratica.
>
> Nuove affiliazioni:
>
> Europa: Lega della Gioventù Comunista della Jugoslavia, Unione della
> Gioventù Comunista della Federazione Russa, Unione Socialista della
> Gioventù Popolare della Slovacchia, Lega della Gioventù Comunista
> dell'Armenia.
>
> Medio Oriente: Unione Nazionale degli Studenti Algerini.
>
> Asia: Lega Generale degli Studenti di Burma.
>
> Dall'America Latina non ci sono state affiliazioni o richieste, però
> bisogna sottolineare che nell'Assemblea Generale si è approvata
> l'affiliazione di varie organizzazioni latinoamericane, come la Gioventù
> del Movimento 26 Marzo (J26M, Uruguay), la Casa della Gioventù del Paraguay
> (CJP, Paraguay), la Gioventù Socialista Brasiliana (JSB, Brasil), la
> Gioventù del Partito del Movimento Democratico Brasiliano (JPMDB Brasil).
>
> Finanziamenti:
>
> Sfortunatamente poche organizzazioni pagano le quote annuali e solo due le
> pagano con regolarità, la Gioventù Rivoluzionaria 8 Ottobre e la Unione dei
> Giovani Comunisti di Cuba (UJC).
>
> Piano d'azione per il 2000
>
> - Campagne Nazionali e Regionali per il 55° Anniversario della FMGD
>
> - Campagna Internazionale per l'estinzione della NATO
>
> - Campagna Internazionale contro il ruolo distruttore del FMI e della Banca
> Mondiale e per la cancellazione dei debiti esteri dei paesi in via di
> sviluppo
>
> - Campagna Internazionale per la fine delle armi nucleari
>
> - Realizzazione di un evento di commemorazione del 55° anniversario dei
> bombardamenti contro Hiroshima e Nagasaki
>
> - Evento Internazionale sui Diritti delle Donne a Nuova Delhi, India
> (ottobre)
>
> - Conferenza Internazionale di Solidarietà con il Popolo del Sahara
> Occidentale e per la sua indipendenza (ottobre)
>
> - Campagna Internazionale di Solidarietà con il Popolo e la Gioventù
> Palestinese e per la creazione del suo Stato
>
> - Il 10 novembre - realizzazione di manifestazioni internazionali per la
> fine della disoccupazione
>
> - Settembre: Manifestazione a Praga contro la riunione del Fondo Monetario
> Internazionale
>
> - Riunione Internazionale Preparatoria per il 15° Festival Mondiale della
> Gioventù a La Habana
>
> - Partecipazione al Congresso della Unione Internazionale degli Studenti in
> Libia
>
> - Partecipazione al Congresso della OCLAE a La Habana
>
> Congresso della OCLAE
>
> La FMGD parteciperà al congresso della OCLAE attraverso il suo presidente e
> le organizzazioni della vicepresidenza per l'America Latina, la Gioventù
> Rivoluzionaria 8 Ottobre (JR8, Brasile) e la UJC (Cuba). Il congresso della
> OCLAE è la principale attività del Continente Latinoamericano quest'anno
> per questo invitiamo tutte le organizzazioni federate ed amiche a
> presenziare questo importante evento.
>
> Festival Mondiale della Gioventù e degli Studenti: ALGERIA 2001
>
> La discussione sulla organizzazione del prossimo Festival Mondiale della
> Gioventù e degli Studenti è stata la più importante durante la Riunione del
> Consiglio Generale. Prima della riunione c'erano tre paesi candidati senza
> menzionare le decine di altri paesi che anche avevano manifestato la loro
> intenzione di dar luogo al Festival.
>
> Dopo un lungo dibattito è stata scelta l'Algeria come sede del 15° Festival
> che si realizzerà nel 2001. Abbiamo approvato che il prossimo Festival deve
> continuare ad essere una manifestazione Antiimperialista, per la Pace e la
> Sovranità dei Popoli e dei Giovani di tutto il mondo.
>
> Abbiamo scelto l'Algeria perché ha mostrato le condizioni necessarie per
> organizzare il Festival nel 2001. L'anno prossimo porteremo il nostro
> appoggio totale al popolo algerino così come il nostro omaggio per la sua
> lotta di Liberazione Nazionale e per l'importante contributo all'Umanità.
> La UNGA - Unione Nazionale della Gioventù Algerina- già stà portando avanti
> i preparativi per l'organizzazione e per la ricezione di tutti i delegati
> partecipanti. Per questo convochiamo tutte le organizzazioni federate ed
> affiliate alla FMGD a partecipare al prossimo Festival Mondiale della
> Gioventù e degli Studenti.
>
> A breve inviaremo le informazioni relative al FESTIVAL. La prima Riunione
> Internazionale preparatoria per il prossimo Festival sarà a La Habana nel
> giugno di quest'anno, pero ancora stiamo fissando la migliore data per tale
> riunione con l'idea di facilitare la presenza delle diverse organizzazioni.
>
> Stimati/e Amici/che e Compagni/e,
> queste sono le principali informazioni che vi invio da Budapest, Ungheria.
> Avremo molte attività per questo chiedo a tutte le organizzazioni di
> informarci sulle loro attività di quest'anno perché possiamo divulgarle a
> tutte le nostre organizzazioni, della FMGD. Avremo il Congresso della OCLAE
> a cui dovremo partecipare per prepararci al prossimo Festival Mondiale
> della Gioventù e degli Studenti, in Algeria nel 2001.
>
> Vi chiediamo di inviare i vostri numeri di telefono, e-mail, indirizzi per
> l'attualizzazione del nostro registro.
>
> Stiamo traducendo i documenti della riunione del Consiglio Generale della
> FMGD in spagnolo e, a breve, li staremo inviando attraverso la posta
> elettronica.
>
> Attentamente,
> Cristiano Aristimunha Pinto
> Vicepresidente FMGD
> (Rappresentante della Gioventù Rivoluzionaria 8 Ottobre- Brasile)
>
> Indirizzi e contatti in Ungheria:
> Telefono/fax: (00361) 350 22 02 (FMGD)
> Telefono/fax: (00361) 209 15 25 (Abitazione)
> E-mail: chris_fmjd@... (personale)
> jr8@... (JR8)
> wfdy@... (FMGD)
>
> -----------------------------
> Federazione Mondiale della Gioventù Democratica
> 1389 Budapest - pob 147 - Ungheria
> Tel/fax: +361 350 22 02 / 350 12 04
> E-Mail: <wfdy@...>
> -----------------------------
> La Federazione Mondiale della Gioventù Democratica è una organizzazione non
> governativa con status consultivo presso l'ONU e relazione operativa presso
> l'UNESCO. Riconosciuta con merito per la pace dal Segretario Generale delle
> Nazioni Unite nel 1987.
> -----------------------------
>
> =============================
> Comitato Internazionalista Arco Iris
> Via don Minzoni 33 - 25082 Botticino Sera (BS)
> Tel/Fax: 030 - 2190006
> E-mail:"ale.ramon@..."
> http://www.presos.org/italia

--

--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------

AUDIZIONI ALLA COMMISSIONE ESTERI DEL PARLAMENTO CANADESE -
SECONDA PARTE

In un precedente messaggio
( http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/79.html? )
abbiamo riportato alcune delle audizioni tenute ad Ottawa, alla Camera
dei Comuni, dinanzi allo Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade da parte di varie personalita' ritenute a vario
titolo "informate sui fatti" riguardo alla aggressione della NATO contro
la Repubblica Federale di Jugoslavia.
Continuiamo ora con la seconda parte del contributo di SERGE TRIFKOVIC,
professore di storia, responsabile per gli esteri di "Chronicles -
Magazine of American Culture", e con il contributo di MICHAEL MANDEL,
professore di diritto alla Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto, che insieme ad altri avvocati ha presentato denuncia contro la
NATO al Tribunale dell'Aia per i crimini commessi sul territorio della
ex-RFSJ. La denuncia giace, tuttora "insabbiata", in qualche cassetto di
Carla dal Ponte.

Tutti i documenti sono stati diffusi dalla lista stopnat-@...



------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Date sent: Thu, 24 Feb 2000 16:00:58 -0500
From: "minja m." <minja@...>
Send reply to: minja@...
To: KPAJ 3A HATO <kpaj-3a-hato@...>
Subject: Srdja Trifkovic in Ottawa House of Commons - Pt.
2

Trifkovic in Ottawa House of Commons - Pt. 2

HOUSE OF COMMONS - CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES

STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE -
COMITE PERMANENT DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES ET DU
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL

UNEDITED COPY - COPIE NON EDITEE
• 0927 EVIDENCE
[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]
Ottawa, Thursday, February 17, 2000
[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Bill Graham (Toronto Centre-Rosedale, Lib.)):

Colleagues, I'm going to call this meeting to order. So I'll ask the
people at the back of the room if they're going to have conversations to
go outside. I'm going to ask Ms. Swann from the Ottawa Serbian Heritage
Society if She could go first. Then we'll put Mr. Trifkovic. Mr. Dyer
hasn't arrived yet. I just want to warn everybody it may be a bit
chaotic
this morning. I'm not saying it isn't always chaotic but it may be more
chaotic than usual because we may be called for votes and this happened
the last time. So I apologize to the witnesses first if we're called out
of the room for votes. It just seems to be a bit- The House seems dans
un
peu de perturbation comme on dirait peut-être dans la langue française,
n'est-ce pas, and so we'll just have to deal with that if it occurs.
Otherwise we'll go on. But I'd ask the witnesses if you keep yourself To
10 minutes each and then we'll move to questions. [...] Mr. Trifkovic...

Mr. Serge Trifkovic (Individual Presentation): [... Text of presentation
as previously distributed... Transcript of ensuing Q&A follows herewith]

The Chairman: Thank you, sir. [... A member asked if it was preferable
to
have a world court to deal with human rights violations, or ad-hoc
tribunals for individual crisis areas...]

Ms. Serge Trifkovic: I was somewhat puzzled by the clear-cut choice
between the WCC [World Criminal Court] and ad hoc tribunals as the only
alternatives we are facing. To me it sounds a bit like the choice
between
cancer and leukemia. I do not believe that bureaucratically structured
and
politically motivated international quasi-judicial bodies are either
desirable or feasible. In any proper sense a "tribunal" is an impartial
forum for administration of justice. If the kangaroo court that goes by
the name of The Hague Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia is any indicator, I
think the lesson of that particular body is that its model of justice is
Moscow 1938, and not Nuremberg in 1946. It was formed on a purely
political agenda by the Security Council, on the basis of Chapter 7. The
way it has acted, in terms of its procedures, its rule of evidence and
finally the selection of people to be indicted and prosecuted - and also
its refusal to indict and prosecute people who at prima facie should be,
such as the leaders of the 19 NATO countries -only indicates that it is
a
political body par excellence. There is no reason at all why a WCC would
be any different because, obviously, if you have the likes of Clinton
and
Blair deciding what is "necessary" and "feasible" in terms of
intervention, ultimately they would be deciding what is "necessary" and
"feasible" in terms of prosecution. The kind of political discipline in
the world that this would impose is eerily reminiscent of the Brave New
World of Huxley or "1984." I suspect that bodies such as the ones that
you
are mentioning will only take us a step further in the direction of
global totalitarianism in which the local and national traditions of law
and justice and jurisprudence- which are meaningful because they have
evolved within the context of a genuine, authentic national culture-
will
be replaced by something that is global, something that is allegedly
universal and, therefore, of necessity, ideological.



The Chair: Okay. I'm sorry, we're going to have to move on. It's a very
fascinating discussion. • 1025 [English] I've got to leave with with the
thought that you've always got to answer alternatives so I'll come to
you
and ask "What's your alternative". My alternative is that there's going
to
be United States imperial courts applying their jurisdiction around the
world to enforce it, so that may be worse for you. Anyway, that's just-

Mr. Serge Trifkovic: My alternative is to rediscover the beauty of a
society of nations in which enlightened national interests, based upon
the
Golden Rule of "I will not deny to anyone what I am asking for myself",
will be the basis of law and the basis of international relations. I am
not claiming that it was a long-lost golden age in Europe between
1815-1914, that we ought to yearn for in terms of reactionary nostalgia.
I'm simply saying that what we are offered as a replacement in the
Blairites' and Clintonistas' brave new world is infinitely worse and
infinitely more frightening.

Mr. Chuck Strahl: Well, you asked.

The Chair: I asked, and that may be.We're going to go to Ms. Augustine
and
then we're going back to Mr. Strahl and Mr. Robinson.

Ms. Jean Augustine (Etobicoke-Lakeshore, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[...]
I am grappling with what is the future of Kosovo, is it going to be an
international protectorate? Is it going to be an entity no longer linked
[to Serbia-Yugoslavia]? [...]

Mr. Serge Trifkovic: I would like to make a few comments about the
future because we keep forgetting the broad picture, what will happen in
the long term. The Kosovo crisis is primarily the result of the U.S.
involvement In the Kosovo situation. Until the moment Dick Holbrooke
decided that this was something they would tackle in a big way, it was -
I
insist - a low-level, unremarkable conflict, the likes of which we see
all
over the world, all of the time. At the moment there is a whole series
of
geopolitical reasons why the Washington administration wants to be
involved in the Balkans. I'm afraid we have no time to go into those in
any detail. But the important thing for the members of this Committee to
remember is that you shouldn't take the "humanitarian" and other alibis
as
face value. You should always assume that there is an agenda behind it.
One of them is to have a U.S. foothold in the European mainland that
will
not be subject to the ups-and-downs of the trans-Atlantic relationship,
so
that if and when the Germans, the French and others decide to create a
European Defence structure that will gradually detach West Europeans
from
NATO, which will ultimately lead to the closure of U.S. bases in Naples
and in Frankfurt and in Munich, there will be the assets in Skopje, and
in
Pristina, and in Tuzla, that will provide both the physical and the
political and military U.S. presence that will not be affected by such a
change in the relationship. When I say there are geopolitical reasons
which have a logic of their own, I am not claiming that in this
particular
case we can establish a definite sequence of events. • 1105 [English]
I'm
simply saying that humanitarian and moralistic claims by themselves are
neither a sufficient nor necessary explanation. In order to look at
Kosovo
in the longer term we have to ask the question: what will happen if and
when the United States administration after Clinton, or even after
whoever
comes after Clinton, loses interest in the Balkans? At the moment
they're
creating the demand for their involvement by creating a whole series of
small, fragmented and unviable units that, by themselves, have neither
the
political, nor cultural, nor historic meaning - such as Dayton-Bosnia,
such as Kosovo, such as, tomorrow maybe, Sanjak or Montenegro, Vojvodina
or whatever. If and when the presence of the underwriters in the Balkans
are removed, we will have another bout of Hobbesian free-for-all. And
that
is the tragedy of it all, because what is being done right now is not
the
foundation for a solid, just and durable peace, but just an
improvization
on an ad-hoc basis. It bears no relation to history, no relation to the
continuity of the political and cultural development in that part of
the
world, but satisfies the needs of the moment. I'm saying this not as
someone born in Serbia, but someone who is trying to look at the
political
essence of the problem - that so far the U.S. administration has
followed
the principle that all of the ethnic groups in the area can be satisfied
at the expense of the Serbs. The result is a sort of Carthaginian peace
imposed upon the Serbian nation that will create a constant source of
revanchist resentment among the Serbs, and determination to turn the
tables once Uncle Sam loses interest. I feel that there will be a war
again: the Serbs will fight to return Kosovo to their own rule, because
they feel Kosovo to have been unjustly detached. And so, whatever
scenario
the people in Brussels, London, Washington, Ottawa, or Bonn decide for
Kosovo today, it will not be worth the paper it's written on if it
doesn't
bear any relation to the geopolitical realities in the long term, and
those realities are fairly simple. You will not be able to impose
something called "multicultural" Kosovo, "multi-ethnic" Kosovo if people
on the ground - and I have primarily the Albanians in mind - are
determined to have a mono-ethnic Kosovo. By including 25% Serbian
members
in any quasi-representative bodies you introduce, you will not re-invent
a
"multi-ethnic Kosovo" in which grannies are able to return to their
apartments. At the moment the only way people in Kosovo will feel safe
and
secure living in their communities is if you have a de facto petition.
Whether it is accompanied by a constitutional and political model that
will sanctify that partition is neither here nor there. But in the long
term you have to realize that an imposed "peace" on the Serb nation that
does not take into account the legitimate interests of the Serbs, that
does not take into account the sort of give and take in which each party
will feel that it has lost something as well as gained something, will
be
unviable, will be unjust, and will be - in the long term - the source of
another conflict.

The Chairman: Okay. [...]
Mr. Chuck Strahl: I'm going to pass to Mr. Robinson, but before I do, I
understand, Prof Trifkovic, you must leave shortly to catch a plane to
Europe- Mr. Serge Trifkovic: Actually, to Chicago- Mr. Chuck Strahl: To
Chicago. Mr. Serge Trifkovic: -and change to the plane for Amsterdam.
Mr.
Chuck Strahl: Right. Mr. Serge Trifkovic: I can stay for another 10
minutes. Mr. Chuck Strahl: Okay. When you're comfortable to leave just
leave. I want to say, then if you just do get up and go- Mr. Serge
Trifkovic: There will be no tears shed. Mr. Chuck Strahl: No. There will
be tears. They may be crocodile. They may be joy, who knows? But
certainly
I just want to say we appreciate very much you taking the time to come.
There's no doubt about it being a very interesting intervention. Please,
when you have to go, just feel free to get up and go and don't think us
rude if we don't properly acknowledge your very important contribution.
Thank you, sir. Mr. Robinson. Mr. Svend Robinson: I'm afraid I'll have
to
leave around the same time. I'm not sure if the tears will be quite as
intense, but- The Chair: If the tears are shed- Some hon. members: Ha,
ha.
The Chair: Mr. Robinson, the tears are shed when you arrive, not when
you
leave.

Mr. Svend Robinson: I just had two questions, I guess for Mr. Trifkovic
and Ms. Swann, in particular. First, I wonder if you could just perhaps
elaborate a bit on some of the concerns around the current situation in
Pancevo and what your knowledge is of the situation in Pancevo. I had
the
opportunity to visit there and

The situation had the potential of being an environmental disaster. I'm
just wondering what the current analysis is of the outcome of the
bombing
in that area and what sort of testing has been done, for example, of the
environment, the water, the air and so on. Because there were serious
concerns about that. My second question, again to both of you. I wonder
if
you could talk a little bit about • 1120 [English] about the
responsibility of Serbs in Kosovo for wrongdoing. The United Nations
High
Commission on Refugees documented quite powerfully a major exodus of
Kosovar Albanians before March 24. I'm sure you're familiar with those
reports. You've seen those reports. Figures as many as 90,000 who had
left
their homes, left their villages. After the bombing started, did the
bombing exacerbate the flow of people. I have no doubt that it did.
Certainly a number of people who I spoke with pointed out how in some
cases Serbs on the ground were pointing up into the sky and saying you
were responsible for NATO. They felt that they were under siege from the
KLA, the NATO bombs and obviously when people are defenceless on the
ground they're totally vulnerable. It was a coward's war in many
respects,
but nevertheless people were driven out in huge numbers. Hundreds of
thousands of people left and were driven out. I was on a road from
Pristina down to the border with Macedonia, went through village after
village which were like ghost towns, houses had been burned to the
ground
in many cases and there's culpability for that and I want to hear from
you, both of you, some acknowledgement that yes we have to deal with
this
as well as part of the reckoning that must come out of this tragic
series
of events.

Mr. Serge Trifkovic: I'll deal with the second one and then I'll have to
go. I think the important thing to bear in mind in the Balkans is there
are no white hats and black hats and that's the fundamental problem that
we have faced with the coverage of the war in the media, and with
quasi-academic analysis, and with political decision-making. Very early
on
in this conflict an overall perception of the culpability of the Serbs
for
the Krajina, Bosnia and Kosovo was created even though very often the
reasons the Serbs reacted in the Krajina are very similar to the reasons
the Albanians reacted in Kosovo and vice versa. In some cases, the Serbs
were de facto separatists, wanting to secede from the separating entity.
In other times, they were the unitarists. In both cases they were deemed
wrong. But if you try to quantify the evil on all sides, it's impossible
to say that the Serbs proved qualitatively, fundamentally worse than
other
groups. Right now the Serbs constitute the largest refugee population
outside sub-Saharan Africa. To say that the Serbs have done evil things
is
almost a truism because in the Balkan imbroglio all sides have done very
evil things. If you want the Serbs to beat their chests and shout mea
culpa, well indeed, maybe they should because the Patriarch warned them
against

adopting some of the techniques and some of the feelings of their
enemies as they experienced them in 1941 to 1945 in the so-called
independent state of Croatia. [...] If this was the war to return the
Albanians, or in the memorable words of the then-British defence
minister
"Serbs out, Albanians back, NATO in", nobody is talking about "Serbs
back"
in Kosovo these days... a quarter of a million displaced Serbs and other
non-Albanians under NATO, in the aftermath of NATO's victory. So I will
be
the first to admit that the Serbs have done bad things just as everybody
else has done bad things; but it doesn't mean we are now going to ask
the
question how deserving are the Croats of being bombed • 1125 [English]
because they contributed "collectively" to the exodus of a quarter of a
million Serbs from the Krajina? How deserving are the Muslims of
castigation and bombing because right now, the whole of Sarajevo-until
1991, the second largest Serbian town after Belgrade - is Serbenfrei?.
If
we are to re-establish a modicum of reality in this debate, we have to
bear in mind that human fallibility and human culpability is not the
exclusive prerogative of anyone single ethnic group. Thank you.

Mr. Svend J. Robinson: Mr. Dyer, were you wanting to comment?

Mr. Gwynn Dyer: I was particularly struck by the use of the word
"Serbenfrei" to describe the Serbian authorities' removal of the Serbian
population of Sarajevo after the Dayton Accords. There were Serbians in
that city who were driven from their homes by the Serbian police. I was
there; I saw it. The idea that the Albanian Muslims and the Bosnian
Muslims and the Croats bear equal responsibility-all of them have done
bad
things. Of course bad things happen in war but neither the total of
refugees nor the total of dead nor the evidence of massacre suggests in
any way that there is shared responsibility equally indistinguishably
among the ethnic groups of the Balkans. Now this may be to some extent
because the Serbs inherited the heavy weapons of the Yugoslav army and
had
the ability to do more damage; I recognize that. The Bosnian Muslims
didn't have heavy artillery to shell Serbian villages as the Serbs did
to
shell Sarajevo. But I do find the line of argument which suggests that
there can be no distinguished distinction between Vukovar and Srebrenica
on the one hand, and the Krajina on the other hand. The Krajina Mark Two
-
when it was the Serbs who lost their homes - rather Mark One, when it
was
the Croatian inhabitants who were driven. I think is a travesty.

Mr. Serge Trifkovic: To claim that the Krajina is less of a crime than
"Srebrenica," even though the Krajina resulted in between 9 thousand and
12 thousand Serbian deaths, is a very curious argument, both morally and

intellectually. But in particular, I find it reprehensible that Kosovo
is
still referred to as a "massacre" because "the Kosovo massacre" is one
of
the biggest lies, media-mediated political lies of the decade, if not
the
century. In perspective, when a few decades pass, it will belong to the
same category as the bayonetted Belgian babies by the Kaiser's army in
1914. [...]


----


House of Commons-Canada
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Tuesday February 22, 2000

Testimony of Professor Michael Mandel

Personal Note

Allow me to tell you a little bit about myself and how I became involved
in this. I am a professor of law at Osgoode Hall Law School where I have
taught for 25 years. I specialize in criminal law and comparative
constitutional law with an emphasis on domestic and foreign tribunals,
including United Nations tribunals such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. I have no personal interest in the
conflict in Yugoslavia – I have no Serbs or Albanians in my family and I
am not being paid by anyone. I became involved in this as a Canadian
lawyer who witnessed a flagrant violation of the law by my government
with unspeakably tragic results for innocent people of all the Yugoslav
ethnicities. I became involved as a Jew appalled by the grotesque and
deliberate misuse of the Holocaust to justify the killing and maiming of
innocent people for what I am convinced were purely self-interested
motives, the farthest thing from humanitarianism, in a cynical attempt
to manipulate the desire of Canadians to help their fellows on the other
side of the world.

Illegality of the War

The first thing to note about NATO's war against Yugoslavia is that it
was flatly illegal both in the fact that it was ever undertaken and in
the way it was carried out. It was a gross and deliberate violation of
international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter
authorizes the use of force in only two situations: self-defence or when
authorized by the Security Council.

The United Nations Charter provides in so far as is relevant:

Article 2
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.

Article 33
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall,
first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article
33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall
refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is
in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to
recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it
may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and
security;

The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice is also clear.
For instance, it stated in its ruling against United States intervention
in Nicaragua:

In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of
the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of
force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such
respect. With regard to the steps actually taken, the protection of
human rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible
with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil installations, or again
with the training, arming and equipping of the contras.

[CASE CONCERNING THE MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES IN AND AGAINST
NICARAGUA (NICARAGUA v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) (MERITS) Judgment of
27 June 1986, I.C.J. Reports, 1986, p.134-135, paragraphs 267 and 268]

It should also be noted that the preliminary decision of the World Court
last year in Yugoslavia's case against 10 NATO countries, including
Canada, does not in the slightest contradict this. As Mr. Matas has
pointed out to you in his statement, this decision was taken on purely
jurisdictional grounds, first the United States' shameful refusal to
recognize the World Court's jurisdiction in general, and second Canada's
objection to jurisdiction in this specific case. But it is worth quoting
some paragraphs from the decision of the Court:

15. Whereas the Court is deeply concerned with the human tragedy, the
loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo which form the
background of the present dispute, and with the continuing loss of life
and human suffering in all parts of Yugoslavia;

16. Whereas the Court is profoundly concerned with the use of force in
Yugoslavia; whereas under the present circumstances such use raises very
serious issues of international law;

17. Whereas the Court is mindful of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations Charter and of its own responsibilities in the
maintenance of peace and security under the Charter and the Statue of
the court;

18. Whereas the Court deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties
appearing before it must act in conformity with their obligations under
the United Nations Charter and other rules of international law,
including humanitarian law.

[CASE CONCERNING LEGALITY OF USE OF FORCE (YUGOSLAVIA V. CANADA)
International Court of Justice, 2 June 1999]

To sum up, in the case of NATO's war on Yugoslavia, neither of the two
exclusive bases for the use of force (Security Council authorization or
self-defence) was even claimed by NATO.

As a violation of the United Nations Charter, the attack on Yugoslavia
was also a violation of the NATO Treaty itself and Canada's own domestic
law.

The NATO Treaty (1949), so far as is relevant, reads as follows:

[Preamble]: The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

Article 1: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be
involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 7: This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as
affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the
Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary
responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security.

The Canada Defence Act, in so far as relevant reads as follows:

31. (1) The Governor in Council may place the Canadian forces or any
component, unit or other element thereof or any officer or
non-commissioned member thereof on active service anywhere in or beyond
Canada at any time when it appears advisable to do so

(a) by reason of an emergency, for the defence of Canada; or

(b) in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United
Nations Charter, the North Atlantic treaty or any other similar
instrument for collective defence that may be entered into by Canada.

The war's illegality is not disputed by any legal scholar of repute,
even those who had some sympathy for the war, for instance Mr. Mendes in
his presentation to this Committee. Of course, Mr. Mendes calls this a
"fatal flaw" in the UN Charter. I don't believe it is a flaw at all, for
reasons I'll elaborate. But I don't think the seriousness of this can be
glossed over one bit: the flagrant violation of the law by our
government is no small thing. Democracy is quite simply meaningless if
governments feel they can violate the law with impunity.

Humanitarian Justification

We all know that the leaders of the NATO countries sought to justify
this war as a humanitarian intervention in defence of a vulnerable
population, the Kosovar Albanians, threatened with mass atrocities.

A lot turns on this claim, but not the illegality of the war. In fact,
the reason why there is such unanimity among scholars on the illegality
of this war is that there is no "humanitarian exception" under
international law or the United Nations Charter. That does not mean that
there are no means for the international community to intervene to
prevent or stop humanitarian disasters, even to use force where
necessary. It just means that the use of force for humanitarian purposes
has been totally absorbed in the UN Charter. A state must be able to
demonstrate the humanity of its proposed intervention to the Security
Council, including, of course, the five permanent members possessing a
veto. Nor has the Security Council shown itself to be incapable of
acting in these situations. It issued numerous resolutions authorizing
action in this conflict (Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203 of 1998 and
Resolutions 1239 and 1244 of 1999, the last of which brought an end to
the bombing). The Security Council has also shown itself capable of
authorizing the use of force, for example its authorization of "all
necessary means" to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait in Resolution 678
of November 29, 1990, which gave Iraq until January 15, 1991 to
withdraw. Bombing by the Americans commenced on January 16.

But NATO did not even move a Resolution before the Security Council over
Kosovo. Nor did it use the alternative means of demonstrating to the
international community the necessity for its use of force in the
General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950), which allows the
General Assembly recommend action to the Security Council if 2/3 of
those present and voting agree:

[The General Assembly] Resolves that if the Security Council, because of
lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall
consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed
force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."

There are two basic reasons why these procedures were not utilized by
NATO in this case. In the first place, the most plausible explanation of
this whole war was that it was, at its foundation, nothing less than an
attempt by the United States, through NATO, to overthrow the authority
of the United Nations. In the second place, NATO could never have
demonstrated a humanitarian justification for what it was doing, because
it had none.

In law, as in morals, it is not enough for a humanitarian justification
to be claimed, it must also be demonstrated. To use an odious example,
but one which makes the point clearly enough, Hitler himself used a
humanitarian justification for invading Poland and unleashing World War
II: he claimed he was doing it to protect the German minority from
oppression by the Poles.

In the case of NATO, what had to be justified as a humanitarian
intervention was a bombing campaign that, in dropping 25,000 bombs on
Yugoslavia, directly killed between 500 and 1800 civilian children,
women and men of all ethnicities and permanently injured as many others;
a bombing campaign that caused 60 to100 billion dollars worth of damage
to an already impoverished country; a bombing campaign that directly and
indirectly caused a refugee crisis of enormous proportions, with about 1
million fleeing Kosovo during the bombing; a bombing campaign that
indirectly caused the death of thousands more, by provoking the brutal
retaliatory and defensive measures that are inevitable when a war of
this kind and intensity is undertaken, and by giving a free hand to
extremists on both sides to vent their hatred. What also has to be
justified is the ethnic cleansing that has occurred in Kosovo since the
entry of the triumphant KLA, fully backed by NATO's might, which has
seen hundreds of thousands of Serb (and Roma and Jewish) Kosovars driven
out and hundreds murdered, a murder rate that is about 10 times the
Canadian rate per capita.

These results were to be expected and they were predicted by NATO's
military and political advisers in their very careful planning of the
war which went back more than a year before the bombing commenced.

A humanitarian justification would have to show that this disaster was
outweighed by a greater disaster that was about to happen and would have
happened but for this intervention. The evidence for this, which must be
carefully scrutinized by this Committee, is meagre to say the least.

Nobody could seriously maintain that the conditions for a repeat of the
Bosnian bloodbath were there: this was not an all out civil war with
well-armed parties of roughly equal strength on each side and huge
ethnic enclaves fighting for their existence. These conditions simply
did not exist in Kosovo.

Nor did the facts indicate a humanitarian disaster would have occurred
but for NATO's bombing. A total of 2,000 people had been killed on both
sides in the prior two years of fighting between the KLA and the Serbs,
and violence was declining with the presence of UN observers. The
alleged massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians at Racak must be regarded with
the greatest suspicion, not only because of the circumstances, but also
because of involvement of the American emissary Mr. William Walker, with
his history of covert and illegal activities on behalf of the Americans
in Latin America.

Nor is the Report recently released by the OSCE of much value in
assessing the situation, since it was written and paid for by the NATO
countries themselves.

Even more importantly, the evidence is overwhelming that NATO did not
make serious efforts at averting a disaster and was not at all serious
about peace.

If we look at the Rambouillet negotiations, a number of perplexing
questions are raised: Why was the irredentist and insurrectionary KLA
preferred as the NATO interlocutor to the only popularly elected leader,
the moderate Ibrahim Rugova? Why, for that matter was Rugova ignored
during the war? Why did the US insist on a secret annex to the
Rambouillet Accord (Annex B) that would have allowed it to occupy all of
Serbia? Why did the final peace agreement look so much like what the
Serbs had agreed to before the bombing? Do we really think that NATO
could not have put the 10 billion dollars of bombs it dropped to working
out and under-writing a peace agreement that would have accommodated and
protected all sides if it were interested in humanity and not war? Why
are NATO countries so unwilling to spend money on reconstruction of
Kosovo, claiming that they have run out of money with less than one
billion dollars spent?

And where, to resolve these enormous doubts about whether NATO acted out
of humanitarian motives this time, is the evidence that these people
have ever acted from humanitarian motives before? With such huge holes
in its argument, we are entitled to cross-examine the leopard on his
spots. What about the failure to intervene with force in Rwanda? What
about the United States' own bankrolling of the repressive Suharto
regime in Indonesia? What about Turkey's violent repression of the
Kurds, a humanitarian disaster that has claimed 30,000 lives, not 2,000?
What about the United States itself? The richest country in the world
which creates social conditions so violent and racist that its normal
murder rate is in the realm of 20,000 per year, almost as high, per
capita as Kosovo right now - a country that puts 2 or 3 of its own
people to death by lethal injection every week. NATO has no humanitarian
lessons to teach the world.

Finally and very importantly, we must ask some serious questions about
the way in which this supposed humanitarian intervention was handled.
With the Kosovars supposedly in the hands of genocidal maniacs, NATO
gave 5 days warning between the withdrawal of the observers and the
launch of the attack. This was followed by seven days of bombing that
mostly ignored Kosovo itself. In other words, an invitation to genocide
that was not accepted, but one that was guaranteed to produce a refugee
flow to legitimate a massive bombing campaign.

As Ambassador Bissett told this committee last week, that NATO leaders
have no respect for the truth should startle no one. What of the claim
by Jamie Shea that it was the Serbs who bombed the Albanian refugee
convoy (until the independent journalists found bomb fragments "made in
U.S.A.")? What of the claim by a NATO general, with video up on the
screen, that the passenger train on the Grdelica bridge was going too
fast to avoid being hit (until somebody pointed out that the video had
been speeded up to three times its real speed)? What of the claim that
the Chinese Embassy was bombed because NATO's maps were out of date? Let
alone the claims by Mr. Clinton (and Mrs. Clinton) and Mr. Cohen that a
"Holocaust" was occurring in which perhaps 100,000 Kosovar men had been
murdered (until the bombing was over and the numbers dwindled to 2,108 -
and we have yet to be told who they were or how they died).

In fact most people in the world simply did not believe NATO's claim of
humanitarianism. A poll taken in mid-April and published by The
Economist shows that this was a very unpopular war, opposed by perhaps
most of the world's population both outside and inside the NATO
alliance.( "Oh what a lovely war!", The Economist, April 24, 1999
showing more than a third opposed in Canada, Poland, Germany, France and
Finland, almost an even split in Hungary, an even split in Italy and a
majority opposed in the Czech Republic, Russia and Taiwan) A poll taken
in Greece between April 29th and May 5th showed 99.5% against the war,
85% believing NATO's motives to be strategic and not humanitarian, and,
most importantly, 69% in favour of charging Bill Clinton with war
crimes, 35.2% for charging Tony Blair and only 14% for charging Slobodan
Milosevic, not far from the 13% in favour of charging NATO General
Wesley Clark and the 9.6% for charging NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana.( "Majority in Greece wants Clinton tried for war crimes", The
Irish Times, May 27, 1999).

Much more plausible than the humanitarian thesis is the one that the
United States deliberately provoked this war, that it deliberately
exploited and exacerbated another country's tragedy - a tragedy partly
of its own creation (we should not forget that the West's aggressive and
purely selfish economic policies that have beggared Yugoslavia over the
last ten years). NATO exists to make war, not peace. The arms industry
exists to make profits from dropping bombs. And the United States, by
virtue of its military might dominates NATO the way it does not dominate
the United Nations. The most plausible explanation then is that this
attack was not about the Balkans at all. It was an attempt to overthrow
the authority of the United Nations and make NATO, and therefore the
United States, the world's supreme authority, to establish the
"precedent" that NATO politicians have been talking about since the
bombing stopped. To give the United States the free hand that the United
Nations does not, in its conflicts with the Third World and its
rivalries with Russia, China and even Europe.

In other words, this was not a case of the United Nations being an
obstacle to humanitarianism. It was a case of using a flimsy pretext of
humanitarianism to overthrow the United Nations.

Not only was this an illegal war that had no humanitarian justification.
It was a war pursued by illegal means. According to admissions made in
public throughout the war (for instance during NATO briefings),
according to eye-witness reports and according to powerful
circumstantial evidence displayed on the world's television screens
throughout the bombing campaign -- evidence good enough to convict in
any criminal court in the world - these NATO leaders deliberately and
illegally made targets of places and things with only tenuous or slight
military value or no military value at all. Places such as city bridges,
factories, hospitals, marketplaces, downtown and residential
neighbourhoods, and television studios. The same evidence shows that, in
doing this, the NATO leaders aimed to demoralize and break the will of
the people, not to defeat its army.

The American group Human Rights Watch has just issued a lengthy report
documenting a systematic and massive violation of international
humanitarian law by NATO in Yugoslavia. They estimate the civilian
victims to be about 500. This figure should be taken as a minimum
because it is a number Human Rights watch says it can independently
confirm and that can be attributed directly to the bombing. It excludes
persons known to be killed as an indirect result of the bombing. Every
benefit of the doubt is given to NATO, a fact exemplified by the
Report's puzzling and actually undefended distinction between these
grave "violations of humanitarian law" and "war crimes". Human rights
Watch has also documented the use of anti-personnel cluster bombs in
attacks on civilian targets.

The reason these civilian targets are illegal is that civilians are very
likely to be killed or injured when such targets are hit. And all of the
NATO leaders knew that. They were carefully told that by their military
planners. And they still went ahead and did it.

And they did it without any risk to themselves or to their soldiers and
pilots. That's why this war was called a "coward's war". The cowardice
lay in fighting the civilian population and not the military, in bombing
from altitudes so high that the civilians, Serbians, Albanians, Roma,
and anybody else on the ground, bore all the risks of the "inevitable
collateral damage".

War Crimes Charges before the International Tribunal

But the fact that this war was illegal and unjustified has further very
serious implications. Mr. Chretien, Mr. Axworthy and Mr. Eggleton, along
with all the other NATO leaders, planned and executed a bombing campaign
that they knew was illegal and that they knew would cause the death and
permanent injury of thousands of civilian children women and men. Hard
as it is for us to accept, or even to say, killing hundreds or thousands
of civilians knowingly and without lawful excuse is nothing less than
mass murder. Milosevic was indicted in The Hague for 385 victims. The
total victims of the 98 people executed for murder in the United States
in 1999 was 129. Our leaders killed between 500 and 1800.

That is why, starting in April of last year and continuing to the
present day, dozens of lawyers and law professors, a pan-American
association representing hundreds of jurists, some elected legislators,
and thousands of private citizens from around the world, have lodged
formal complaints with the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague
charging NATO leaders with war crimes.

The particular complaint I am involved in was filed in May, 1999 and
names 68 individuals, including all the heads of government, foreign
ministers and defense ministers of the 19 NATO countries (including US
President Clinton, Secretaries Cohen and Albright, Canadian Prime
Minister Chretien, Ministers Axworthy and Eggleton and so on down the
list), and the highest ranking NATO officials, from then Secretary
General Javier Solana, through Generals Wesley Clark, Michael Short, and
official spokesman Jamie Shea.

The charges against them include the following:

Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, contrary to
article 2 of the Statue of the Tribunal, namely the following acts
against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention: (a) wilful killing; (c) wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health; (d) extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

Violations of the laws or customs of war, contrary to Article 3 namely:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons to cause
unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; (c)
attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns,
villages, dwellings, or buildings;(d) seizure of, destruction or willful
damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art
and science.

Crimes against humanity contrary to Article 5, namely: (a) murder; (i)
other inhumane acts.

Article 7 of the Statute provides for "individual criminal
responsibility" thus:

1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime
referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be
individually responsible for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State
or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.

3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his
superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.

We have been in frequent contact with the Tribunal, travelling to the
Hague twice to argue our case with Chief Prosecutors Louise Arbour and
Carla Del Ponte and their legal advisers, filing evidence, legal briefs
and arguments in support of the case. I am filing with this Committee a
book of the evidence we have filed with the tribunal. I understand that
you already have the two volumes prepared by the government of
Yugoslavia. I would point out that these volumes have been confirmed as
"largely credible" by the Human Rights Watch Report.

Recently, Justice Del Ponte disclosed that she was studying an internal
document analyzing the many claims that have been made against NATO. My
latest word from her (February 8) is that she is still studying the
case.

Justice Del Ponte has said that if she is not prepared to prosecute NATO
she should pack up and go home, and I have to agree with her, because,
in that case, the Tribunal would be doing far more harm than good, only
legitimating NATO's violent lawlessness against people unlucky enough to
be ruled by "indicted war criminals", as opposed to the un-indicted kind
that govern the NATO countries.

This was the very purpose for which the United States sponsored this
tribunal in the first place, at least according to Michael Scharf,
Attorney-Advisor with the U.S. State Department, who, under Madeleine
Albright's instructions, actually drafted the Security Council
resolution establishing the Tribunal.

"the tribunal was widely perceived within the government as little more
than a public relations device and as a potentially useful policy
tool...Indictments also would serve to isolate offending leaders
diplomatically, strengthen the hand of their domestic rivals and fortify
the international political will to employ economic sanctions or use
force" (The Washington Post, October 3, 1999)

I must confess to you that my colleagues and I and the thousands of
others who have complained to the Tribunal have grave doubts about its
impartiality. We have given it the benefit of every doubt even in the
face of mounting evidence that it didn't deserve it: when, in January,
1999, then prosecutor Judge Louise Arbour made a rather dramatic
appearance at the border of Kosovo, lending credibility to contested
American accounts of atrocities at Racak, a precipitating justification
of the war itself; when, only days after the bombing had commenced, she
made an announcement of the Arkan indictment that had been secret from
1997; when she made television appearances with NATO leader Robin Cook,
already the subject of numerous complaints during the war to receive war
crimes dossiers; when she met with Madeleine Albright, herself by then
the subject of well-grounded complaints before the tribunal, and
Albright took the opportunity to announce that the United States was the
major provider of funds to the Tribunal; when, two weeks later, in the
midst of bombing, Judge Arbour announced the indictment of Milosevic, on
the basis of undisclosed evidence, for Racak and events which had
occurred only six weeks earlier in the middle of a war zone – on what,
in other words, must have been very flimsy and suspicious evidence; and
when, at the conclusion of the bombing Judge Arbour handed over the
investigation of war crimes in Kosovo to NATO countries' police forces
themselves - notwithstanding that they had every motive to falsify the
evidence.

I am sad to say, because the former prosecutor is now a judge of the
Supreme Court of Canada and an old colleague and friend of mine, of whom
we all want to be proud, that these could not be regarded as the acts of
an impartial prosecutor. Not when NATO was in the midst of a disastrous
war in flagrant violation of international law.

We sincerely hoped for better things from Judge Del Ponte coming as she
did from a country outside of the NATO alliance. But our expectations
have been progressively lowered. First, when she declared, immediately
upon taking the job, that her priorities were the prosecution of
Milosevic, something which clearly suited the NATO countries but which,
as we told her in November, could in no way be compatible with her sworn
duties. A prosecutor cannot declare that she is going to concentrate
only on some crimes and grant effective immunity to other criminals.
Then, when she made the observation that she was indeed investigating
complaints against NATO, and NATO reacted in its typically outrageous
fashion by attacking the Tribunal, Judge Del Ponte quickly issued
unseemly appeasing statements and went on a conciliatory mission to
Brussels.

I am saying all this to put the Committee on guard against delegating
its own judgment to this Tribunal which was set up as an instrument of
United States foreign policy and has given us so many grounds to suspect
that it sees itself the same way. Whatever this Tribunal decides to do
or not to do, it is incumbent on this Committee to scrutinize its
reasons and the evidence with the utmost care.

Let me end by citing to you the words of Justice Robert Jackson from his
opening statement to the Nurnberg Tribunal on November 21, 1945:

"But the ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable
in
a system of international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible
to law. And let me make clear that while this law is first applied
against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a
useful purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations,
including those which sit here now in judgment. We are able to do away
with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power
against the rights of their own people only when we make all men
answerable to the law." (The Nurnberg Case As Presented by Robert H.
Jackson, Chief Counsel for the United States (New York: Cooper Square
Publishers Inc, 1971) at page 93)



--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
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Da "Il manifesto" del 18 Febbraio 2000:

VATICANO
A SAN PIETRO L'ORO DI PAVELIC

Duemila sopravvissuti al genocidio del regime ustascia fanno causa allo
Ior: rivendicano il tesoro depositato, o donato per grazia ricevuta, da
Pavelic al Vaticano

- MARCO AURELIO RIVELLI -

U na bomba che esplode scuotendo il Vaticano: George Zivkovich, classe
1937, serbo di religione ortodossa, residente in California, si è
recentemente rivolto ai tribunali americani citando in giudizio la Santa
Sede, e più precisamente l'Istituto per le opere di religione, lo Ior, cioè
la banca vaticana già protagonista di numerosi scandali negli ultimi
decenni. Zivkovich, che, ragazzo, era scampato al genocidio serbo
perpetrato dagli ustascia croati negli anni 1941-1945, rivendica il tesoro
che l'ex dittatore Ante Pavelic aveva lasciato in custodia, o donato per
grazia ricevuta, al Vaticano nel '45. Lo affiancano nell'azione giudiziaria
circa 2.000 compatrioti.

Il regime ustascia, portato al governo in Croazia in quegli anni, grazie
all'invasione delle forze dell'Asse, fu il più feroce espresso dai
nazifascisti. Più feroce ancora di quello hitleriano, ed è tutto dire: in
quello stato che contava poco più di sei milioni di abitanti, un terzo dei
quali serbi di religione ortodossa, gli ustascia massacrarono un milione di
questi unitamente a 50 mila ebrei e 30 mila zingari, cioè il 20 per cento
della popolazione. All'eccidio parteciparono numerosi sacerdoti e frati
cattolici con la complicità di vescovi, con la connivenza del Primate,
arcivescovo Stepinac, recentemente beatificato, il tutto con l'implicito
beneplacito di Pio XII.

Crollato il suo regno, Pavelic scappò insieme ai suoi gerarchi e a 500
religiosi cattolici fra i più compromessi nell'eccidio, trovando rifugio a
Roma dove visse per tre anni nascosto nel Collegio di San Girolamo degli
Illirici, in Via Tomacelli, edificio protetto dalla extraterritorialità
vaticana. Non giunse a mani vuote, ma, come tutti gli ospiti che si
rispettino, portò un dono: l'oro, i gioielli e i titoli rapinati alle
vittime. Anche a Stepinac aveva lasciato un presente, trentasei casse
d'oro, che l'arcivescovo si fece incautamente scoprire un anno dopo dal
governo di Tito. Il Vaticano ricambiò il munifico omaggio facendo fuggire
questo criminale in Argentina nel 1949, vestito in abiti talari e munito di
adeguato passaporto. Con le stesse modalità la Santa Sede aiutò a fuggire
duecento ustascia e cinquemila delinquenti nazisti, l'aristocrazia del
crimine, fra i quali il Dottor Mengele, Walter Rauff, Adolf Eichmann, Erick
Priebke, Franz Stangl. A capo dell'Organizzazione di soccorso vaticana, che
attivò quella che gli alleati denominarono rat line, la via dei topi, vi
erano Draganovic, monsignore ed ex colonnello ustascia, e il vescovo Alois
Hudal, titolare in Roma della chiesa di Santa Maria dell'Anima, uomo di
fiducia di papa Pacelli. Le memorie di Hudal pubblicate in tedesco dopo la
sua morte, rappresentano la più dettagliata documentazione della via dei
topi: "compito svolto per incarico del Vaticano", come egli afferma.

Dell'oro croato nascosto in Vaticano correvano voci fin dall'immediato
dopoguerra nell'ambiente dei servizi segreti. Gli ustascia emigrati in
Argentina si confidarono con le autorità di quel paese, attivando la stessa
Evita Peron, subito partita per l'Italia allo scopo di convincere Pio XII a
rispettare gli impegni presi con Pavelic di restituirgli una parte del
bottino. Evita tornò a Buenos Aires a mani vuote perché l'oro non era stato
restituito, ma affidato in gestione al vescovo Alberto di Jorio, presidente
dello Ior, e al suo alter ego Bernardino Nogara.

La regia vaticana nella via dei topi viene documentata per la prima volta
da un rapporto - top secret - inviato il 15 maggio 1947 dall'addetto
militare Usa a Roma Vincent LaVista, al Segretario di Stato americano
George Marshall, che dettaglia le responsabilità vaticane e la
partecipazione di numerosi sacerdoti all'attività illegale e clandestina.
LaVista informa che grossi quantitativi di oro, trafugato alle vittime,
sarebbero stati occultati nei Palazzi Apostolici. Questo documento segue di
poco quello dell'agente speciale del Tesoro Usa Emerson Bigelow, che
documenta come nelle casse vaticane sia finito un quantitativo d'oro per un
valore di 200 milioni di franchi svizzeri, depredato dagli ustascia.
Analoga affermazione viene dalle memorie di James V. Milano, comandante del
430 distaccamento del controspionaggio dell'Us Army's Counter Intelligence
Corps, il quale aggiunge altri particolari a quelli già noti.

Il 22 luglio 1997 il quotidiano francese Nice Matin, pubblica un articolo
intitolato "Oro croato al Vaticano?" L'amministrazione americana indaga su
un trasferimento di ottocento milioni di franchi francesi", nel quale è
scritto: "Bill Clinton ha annunciato ieri che il Dipartimento del Tesoro
sta studiando il documento d'archivio che rivela che la Santa Sede ha
conservato dell'oro dell'antico regime fascista di Croazia. Secondo il
documento, diffuso da una rete televisiva americana, una parte rilevante
delle riserve d'oro del regime fascista croato, del valore di circa
ottocento milioni di franchi, sotto forma di lingotti d'oro, sarebbe stato
immagazzinato presso il Vaticano, verso la fine della Seconda guerra
mondiale, per evitare che venisse sequestrato dagli alleati... Secondo voci
insistenti queste riserve, essenzialmente costituite da lingotti d'oro, in
seguito sarebbero state dirottate, a cura del Vaticano, verso la Spagna e
l'Argentina. L'estensore del documento afferma comunque di ritenere che
queste voci siano state diffuse dal Vaticano per nascondere la verità:
secondo lui quese riserve non hanno mai lasciato la cttà pontificia". La
Santa Sede, attraverso il portavoce del ppa, Joaquin Navarro Valls,
smentisce tutto, definendo le notizie riportate dal quotidiano francese
"informazioni senza alcun fondamento".

La certezza che il tesoro ustascia si trovi ancora in Vaticano riceve il
crisma dell'ufficialità il 2 giugno 1998 dal Rapporto Usa stilato dal
sttosegretario di Stato Usa Stuart Eizenstat, che afferma, fra l'altro, che
gli archivi ustascia furono portati in Vaticano, così come oro e gioielli.
Aggiunge che "anche se non ci sono prove dell'implicazione diretta del papa
e dei suoi consiglieri, sembra inverosimile che essi abbiano del tutto
ignorato ciò che stava accadendo. Le autorità vaticane hanno affermato di
non avere trovato alcun documento suscettibile di fare luce sulla questione
dell'oro ustascia". La reazione ufficiale di parte vaticana, espressa dal
portavoce pontificio Joaquin Navarro Valls è: "il segretario dell'Istituto
San Girolamo, che era all'epoca Krunoslav Draganovic, ha forse utilizzato
quest'oro unicamente a proprio titolo, senza l'autorizzazione dell'Istituto
e senza che il Vaticano lo sapesse".

L'avvocata americana Keelyn Friesen, che coordina l'azione giudiziaria
contro lo Ior e gli altri accusati di complicità nell'imboscamento del
tesoro ustascia promossa da Zivkovic e dai suoi compagni, promette
battaglia dura ed esige giustizia. Una giustizia, che se deve suonare
condanna per l'indegno agire di uomini della Chiesa, chiama anche in causa
tutti i successori di Pio XII.


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
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The Economist January 29, 2000

Sins of the secular missionaries

Aid and campaign groups, or NGOs, matter more and more in world
affairs. But they are often far from being "non-governmental",
as they claim. And they are not always a force for good



A YOUNG man thrusts his crudely printed calling card at the
visitor. After his name are printed three letters: NGO. "What do you
do?" the visitor asks."I have formed an NGO.""Yes, but what does it
do?""Whatever they want. I am waiting for some funds and then I will
make a project."

Once little more than ragged charities, non-governmental
organisations
(NGOs) are now big business. Somalia, where that exchange took place,
is heaven for them. In large parts of the country, western
governments,
the United Nations and foreign aid agencies cannot work directly; it
is
too dangerous. So outsiders must work through local groups, which
become a powerful source of patronage. "Anybody who's anybody is an
NGO
these days," sighs one UN official.

And not just in Somalia. NGOs now head for crisis zones as fast as
journalists do: a war, a flood, refugees, a dodgy election, even a
world trade conference, will draw them like a honey pot. Last spring,
Tirana, the capital of Albania, was swamped by some 200 groups
intending to help the refugees from Kosovo. In Kosovo itself, the
ground is now thick with foreign groups competing to foster
democracy,
build homes and proffer goods and services. Environmental activists
in
Norway board whaling ships; do-gooders gather for the Chiapas rebels
in
Mexico.

In recent years, such groups have mushroomed. A 1995 UN report on
global governance suggested that nearly 29,000 international NGOs
existed. Domestic ones have grown even faster. By one estimate, there
are now 2m in America alone, most formed in the past 30 years. In
Russia, where almost none existed before the fall of communism, there
are at least 65,000. Dozens are created daily; in Kenya alone, some
240
NGOs are now created every year.

Most of these are minnows; some are whales, with annual incomes of
millions of dollars and a worldwide operation. Some are primarily
helpers, distributing relief where it is needed; some are mainly
campaigners, existing to promote issues deemed important by their
members. The general public tends to see them as uniformly
altruistic,
idealistic and independent. But the term "NGO", like the activities
of
the NGOs themselves, deserves much sharper scrutiny.

Governments' puppets?

The tag "Non-Governmental Organisation" was used first at the
founding
of the UN. It implies that NGOs keep their distance from officialdom;
they do things that governments will not, or cannot, do. In fact,
NGOs
have a great deal to do with governments. Not all of it is healthy.
Take the aid NGOs. A growing share of development spending, emergency
relief and aid transfers passes through them. According to Carol
Lancaster, a former deputy director of USAID, America's development
body, NGOs have become "the most important constituency for the
activities of development aid agencies". Much of the food delivered
by
the World Food Programme, a UN body, in Albania last year was
actually
handed out by NGOs working in the refugee camps. Between 1990 and
1994,
the proportion of the EU's relief aid channelled through NGOs rose
from
47% to 67%. The Red Cross reckons that NGOs now disburse more money
than the World Bank.

And governments are happy to provide that money. Of Oxfam's #98m
($162m) income in 1998, a quarter, #24.1m, was given by the British
government and the EU. World Vision US, which boasts of being the
world's "largest privately funded Christian relief and development
organisation", collected $55m-worth of goods that year from the
American government. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), the winner of
last
year's Nobel peace prize, gets 46% of its income from government
sources. Of 120 NGOs which sprang up in Kenya between 1993 and the
end
of 1996, all but nine received all their income from foreign
governments and international bodies. Such official contributions
will
go on, especially if the public gets more stingy. Today's young,
educated and rich give a smaller share of their incomes away than did
-- and do -- their parents.

In Africa, where international help has the greatest influence,
western governments have long been shifting their aid towards NGOs.
America's help, some $711m last year, increasingly goes to approved
organisations, often via USAID. Europe's donors also say that
bilateral
aid should go to NGOs, which are generally more open and efficient
than
governments. For the UN, too, they are now seen as indispensable. The
new head of the UN's Development Programme says the body "will put a
lot more emphasis on relations with NGOs". Most such agencies now
have
hundreds of NGO partners.

So the principal reason for the recent boom in NGOs is that western
governments finance them. This is not a matter of charity, but of
privatisation: many "non-governmental" groups are becoming
contractors
for governments. Governments prefer to pass aid through NGOs because
it
is cheaper, more efficient -- and more at arm's length -- than direct
official aid.

Governments also find NGOs useful in ways that go beyond the
distribution of food and blankets. Some bring back useful
information,
and make it part of their brief to do so. Outfits such as the
International Crisis Group and Global Witness publish detailed and
opinionated reports from places beset by war or other disasters. The
work of Global Witness in Angola is actually paid for by the British
Foreign Office.

Diplomats and governments, as well as other NGOs, journalists and the
public, can make good use of these reports. As the staff of foreign
embassies shrink, and the need to keep abreast of events abroad
increases, governments inevitably turn to private sources of
information. In some benighted parts of the world, sometimes only
NGOs
can nowadays reveal what is going on.

Take, for example, human rights, the business of one of the biggest
of
the campaigning NGOs, Amnesty International. Amnesty has around 1m
members in over 162 countries, and its campaigns against political
repression, in particular against unfair imprisonment, are known
around
the world. The information it gathers is often unavailable from other
sources.

Where western governments' interests match those of campaigning NGOs,
they can form effective alliances. In 1997, a coalition of over 350
NGOs pushed for, and obtained, a treaty against the use of landmines.
The campaign was backed by the usual array of concerned governments
(Canada, the Scandinavians) and won the Nobel peace prize.

NGOs are also interesting and useful to governments because they work
in the midst of conflict. Many were created by wars: the Red Cross
after the Battle of Solferino in 1859, the Save the Children Fund
after
the first world war, MSF after the Biafran war. By being "close to
the
action" some NGOs, perhaps unwittingly, provide good cover for spies
--
a more traditional means by which governments gather information.

In some cases, NGOs are taking over directly from diplomats: not
attempting to help the victims of war, but to end the wars
themselves.
Some try to restrict arms flows, such as Saferworld, which is against
small arms. Others attempt to negotiate ceasefires. The Italian
Catholic lay community of Sant' Egidio helped to end 13 years of
civil
war in Mozambique in 1992. International Alert, a London-based peace
research group, tried the same for Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s.
Last
year, Unicef (a part of the UN) and the Carter Centre, founded by
ex-President Jimmy Carter, brought about a peace deal of sorts
between
Uganda and Sudan. There are now roughly 500 groups registered by the
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. "Civil
war demands civil action," say the organisers.

Larger NGOs have pledged not to act as "instruments of government
foreign policy". But at times they are seen as just that. Governments
are more willing to pay groups to deliver humanitarian aid to a war
zone than to deliver it themselves. Last autumn, America's Congress
passed a resolution to deliver food aid to rebels in southern Sudan
via
USAID and sympathetic Christian groups (religious NGOs earn the label
RINGOs, and are found everywhere).

Perhaps the most potent sign of the closeness between NGOs and
governments, aside from their financial links, is the exchange of
personnel. In developing countries, where the civil service is poor,
some governments ask NGOs to help with the paperwork requested by the
World Bank and other international institutions. Politicians, or
their
wives, often have their own local NGOs. In the developed world,
meanwhile, increasing numbers of civil servants take time off to work
for NGOs, and vice versa: Oxfam has former staff members not only in
the British government, but also in the Finance Ministry of Uganda.
This symbiotic relationship with government (earning some groups the
tag GRINGO) may make the governments of developing countries work
better. It may also help aid groups to do their job effectively. But
it
hardly reflects their independence.

NGOS can also stray too close to the corporate world. Some, known to
critics as "business NGOs", deliberately model themselves on, or
depend
greatly on, particular corporations. Bigger ones have commercial
arms,
media departments, aggressive head-hunting methods and a wide array
of
private fund-raising and investment strategies. Smaller ones can be
overwhelmed by philanthropic businesses or their owners: Bill Gates,
the head of Microsoft, gave $25m last year to an NGO that is looking
for a vaccine for AIDS, transforming it overnight from a small group
with a good idea to a powerful one with a lot of money to spend.

The business of helping

In 1997, according to the OECD, NGOs raised $5.5 billion from private
donors. The real figure may well be higher: as leisure, travel and
other industries have grown, so too have charities. In 1995
non-profit
groups (including, but not only, NGOs) provided over 12% of all jobs
in
the Netherlands, 8% in America and 6% in Britain.

Many groups have come to depend on their media presence to help with
fund-raising. This is bringing NGOs their greatest problems. They are
adapting from shoebox outfits, stuffing envelopes and sending off
perhaps one container of medicines, to sophisticated
multi-million-dollar operations. In the now-crowded relief market,
campaigning groups must jostle for attention: increasingly, NGOs
compete and spend a lot of time and money marketing themselves.
Bigger
ones typically spend 10% of their funds on marketing and
fund-raising.
The focus of such NGOs can easily shift from finding solutions and
helping needy recipients to pleasing their donors and winning
television coverage. Events at Goma, in Congo, in 1994 brought this
problem home. Tens of thousands of refugees from Rwanda, who had
flooded into Goma, depended on food and shelter from the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and from NGOs. Their dramatic plight drew
the
television cameras and, with them, the chance for publicity and huge
donations. A frantic scramble for funds led groups to lie about their
projects. Fearful that the media and then the public might lose
confidence in NGOs, the Red Cross drew up an approved list of NGOs
and
got them to put their names to a ten-point code of conduct,
reproduced
above.

Since then, NGOs have been working hard to improve. More than 70
groups and 142 governments backed the 1995 code of conduct, agreeing
that aid should be delivered "only on a basis of need". "We hold
ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources," they pledged. Yet in Kosovo last year
there
was a similar scramble, with groups pushing to be seen by camera
crews
as they worked. Personnel and resources were even shifted there from
worse wars and refugee crises in Africa.

As they get larger, NGOs are also looking more and more like
businesses themselves. In the past, such groups sought no profits,
paid
low wages -- or none at all -- and employed idealists. Now a whole
class of them, even if not directly backed by businesses, have taken
on
corporate trappings. Known collectively as BINGOs, these groups
manage
funds and employ staff which a medium-sized company would envy. Like
corporations, they attend conferences endlessly. Fund-raisers and
senior staff at such NGOs earn wages comparable to the private
sector.
Some bodies, once registered as charities, now choose to become
non-profit companies or charitable trusts for tax reasons and so that
they can control their spending and programmes more easily. Many big
charities have trading arms, registered as companies. One
manufacturing
company, Tetra Pak, has even considered sponsoring emergency food
delivery as a way to advertise itself. Any neat division between the
corporate and the NGO worlds is long gone. Many NGOs operate as
competitors seeking contracts in the aid market, raising funds with
polished media campaigns and lobbying governments as hard as any
other
business. Governments and UN bodies could now, in theory, ask for
tenders from businesses and NGOs to carry out their programmes. It
seems only a matter of time before this happens. If NGOs are cheap
and
good at delivering food or health care in tough areas, they should
win
the contracts easily.

Good intentions not enough

It could be argued that it does not matter even if NGOs are losing
their independence, becoming just another arm of government or
another
business. GRINGOs and BINGOs, after all, may be more efficient than
the
old sort of charity.

Many do achieve great things: they may represent the last hope for
civilians caught in civil wars, for those imprisoned unfairly and for
millions of desperate refugees. There are many examples of small,
efficient and inspirational groups with great achievements: the best
will employ local people, keep foreign expertise to a minimum,
attempt
precise goals (such as providing clean water) and think deeply about
the long-term impact of their work. Some of these grow into large,
well-run groups.

But there are also problems. NGOs may be assumed to be less
bureaucratic, wasteful or corrupt than governments, but
under-scrutinised groups can suffer from the same chief failing: they
can get into bad ways because they are not accountable to anyone.
Critics also suspect that some aid groups are used to propagate
western
values, as Christian missionaries did in the 19th century. Many NGOs,
lacking any base in the local population and with their money coming
from outside, simply try to impose their ideas without debate. For
example, they often work to promote women's or children's interests
as
defined by western societies, winning funds easily but causing social
disruption on the ground.

Groups that carry out population or birth-control projects are
particularly controversial; some are paid to carry out sterilisation
programmes in the poor parts of the world, because donors in the rich
world consider there are too many people there. Anti-"slavery"
campaigns in Africa, in which western NGOs buy children's freedom for
a
few hundred dollars each, are notorious. Unicef has condemned such
groups, but American NGOs continue to buy slaves -- or people they
consider slaves -- in southern Sudan. Clearly, buying slaves, if that
is what they are, will do little to discourage the practice of
trading
them.

NGOs also get involved in situations where their presence may prolong
or complicate wars, where they end up feeding armies, sheltering
hostages or serving as cover for warring parties. These may be the
unintended consequences of aid delivery, but they also complicate
foreign policy.

Even under calmer conditions, in non-emergency development work, not
all single-interest groups may be the best guarantors of long-term
success. They are rarely obliged to think about trade-offs in policy
or
to consider broad, cross-sector approaches to development. NGOs are
"often organised to promote particular goals...rather than the
broader
goal of development," argues Ms Lancaster. In Kosovo last spring,
"many
governments made bilateral funding agreements with NGOs, greatly
undermining UNHCR's ability to prioritise programmes or monitor
efficiency," says Peter Morris of MSF. This spring in Kosovo, "there
were instances of several NGOs competing to work in the same camps,
duplication of essential services," complains an Oxfam worker. And
whatever big international NGOs do in the developing world, they
bring
in western living standards, personnel and purchasing power which can
transform local markets and generate great local resentment. In
troubled zones where foreign NGOs flourish, weekends bring a line of
smart four-by-fours parked at the best beaches, restaurants or
nightclubs. The local beggars do well, but discrepancies between
expatriate staff and, say, impoverished local officials trying to do
the same work can cause deep antipathy. Not only have NGOs diverted
funds away from local governments, but they are often seen as
directly
challenging their sovereignty.

NGOs can also become self-perpetuating. When the problem for which
they
were founded is solved, they seek new campaigns and new funds. The
old
anti-apartheid movement, its job completed, did not disband, but
instead became another lobby group for southern Africa. As NGOs
become
steadily more powerful on the world scene, the best antidote to
hubris,
and to institutionalisation, would be this: disband when the job is
done. The chief aim of NGOs should be their own abolition.



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