[ Questo saggio del 1997 descrive per filo e per segno l'operazione
statunitense di sostegno alla tendenza islamista radicale in
Bosnia-Erzegovina in funzione antijugoslava. Si tratta di vicende ed
aspetti da tenere sempre ben presenti, diversamente da quanto
continuano a fare tutta la stampa, le ONG ed enti para-istituzionali
quali l'"Osservatorio Balcani", i quali preferiscono minimizzare sulla
presenza di mujaheddin nei Balcani e continuano a spacciare alla
pubblica opinione la ben nota favoletta manichea su aggrediti ed
aggressori. Fatti da tenere ben presenti anche nella analisi della
"guerra globale" scatenata da Bush e soci - contro l'Afghanistan,
l'Iraq, ed altri Stati a venire - usando lo spauracchio di Al Qaida: ma
Al Qaida altro non e' che uno dei nomi della CIA ... ]

http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/DCH109A.print.html

Centre for Research on Globalisation


Clinton Administration supported the "Militant Islamic Base"


Editorial note

Posted at globalresearch.ca 21 September 2001

Since the Soviet-Afghan war, recruiting Mujahedin ("holy warriors") to
fight covert wars on Washington's behest has become an integral part of
US foreign policy. A 1997 document of the US Congress reveals how the
Clinton administration --under advice from the National Security
Council headed by Anthony Lake-- had "helped turn Bosnia into a
militant Islamic base" leading to the recruitment through the so-called
"Militant Islamic Network," of thousands of Mujahedin from the Muslim
world.

The "Bosnian pattern" has since been replicated in Kosovo, Southern
Serbia and Macedonia. Among the foreign mercenaries now fighting with
the Kosovo Liberation Army(KLA) in Macedonia are Mujahedin from the
Middle East and the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union.
Also within the ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army are senior US
military advisers from a private mercenary outfit on contract to the
Pentagon as well as "soldiers of fortune" from Britain, Holland and
Germany.

"Americans have many questions tonight. Americans are asking, 'Who
attacked our country?'" said George W. Bush in his address to the US
Congress on 20 September. "This group and its leader, a person named
Osama bin Laden are linked to many other organizations in different
countries."

What the President fails to mention in his speech is the complicity of
agencies of the US government in supporting and abetting Osama bin
Laden.

The Bush Administration has misled the American people. What is the
hidden agenda? The largest military operation since the Vietnam War is
being launched against Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network, when
the evidence amply confirms that Osama has been "harbored" since the
Soviet-Afghan war by agencies of the US government.

We are reproducing below the 1997 Congressional Press release, which
provides detailed evidence from official sources of the links between
the Islamic Jihad and the US government during the Clinton
Adminstration. The CRG does not necessarily share or endorse the
conclusions of the document which emanates from the Republican Party.

Michel Chossudovsky, 21 September 2001


---

Clinton-Approved Iranian Arms Transfers Help Turn Bosnia into Militant
Islamic Base


Congressional Press Release, US Congress, 16 January 1997 Posted at
globalresearch.ca 21 September 2001

---

Help Turn Bosnia into Militant Islamic Base "'There is no question
that the policy of getting arms into Bosnia was of great assistance in
allowing the Iranians to dig in and create good relations with the
Bosnian government,' a senior CIA officer told Congress in a classified
deposition. 'And it is a thing we will live to regret because when
they blow up some Americans, as they no doubt will before this ...
thing is over, it will be in part because the Iranians were able to
have the time and contacts to establish themselves well in Bosnia."'
"Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $ ["Iran Gave Bosnia Leader $ 500,000, CIA
Alleges: Classified Report Says Izetbegovic Has Been 'Co-Opted,'
Contradicting U.S. Public Assertion of Rift," Los Angeles Times,
12/31/96. Ellipses in original. Alija Izetbegovic is the Muslim
president of Bosnia.] "'If you read President Izetbegovk's writings, as
I have, there is no doubt that he is an Islamic fundamentalist,' said a
senior Western diplomat with long experience in the region. 'He is a
very nice fundamentalist, but he is still a fundamentalist. This has
not changed. His goal is to establish a Muslim state in Bosnia, and
the Serbs and Croats understand this better than the rest of us."'
["Bosnian Leader Hails Islam at Election Rallies," New York Times,
9/2/96]

---

Introduction and Summary

In late 1995, President Bill Clinton dispatched some 20,000 U.S. troops
to Bosnia-Hercegovina as part of a NATO-led "implementation force"
(IFOR) to ensure that the warning Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian
factions complied with provisions of the Dayton peace plan. [NOTE:
This paper assumes the reader is acquainted with the basic facts of the
Bosnian war leading to the IFOR deployment. For background, see RPC's
"Clinton Administration Ready to Send U.S. Troops to Bosnia, "9/28/95,"
and Legislative Notice No. 60, "Senate to Consider Several Resolutions
on Bosnia," 12/12/95] Through statements by Administration spokesmen,
notably Defense Secretary Perry and Joint Chiefs Chairman General
Shalikashvili, the president firmly assured Congress and the American
people that U S. personnel would be out of Bosnia at the end of one
year. Predictably, as soon as the November 1996 election was safely
behind him, President Clinton announced that approximately 8,5 00 U.S.
troops would be remaining for another 18 months as part of a
restructured and scaled down contingent, the "stabilization force"
(SFOR), officially established on December 20, 1996.

SFOR begins its mission in Bosnia under a serious cloud both as to the
nature of its mission and the dangers it will face. While IFOR had
successfully accomplished its basic military task - separating the
factions' armed forces - there has been very little progress toward
other stated goals of the Dayton agreement, including political and
economic reintegration of Bosnia, return of refugees to their homes,
and apprehension and prosecution of accused war criminals. It is far
from certain that the cease-fire that has held through the past year
will continue for much longer, in light of such unresolved issues as
the status of the cities of Brcko (claimed by Muslims but held by the
Serbs) and Mostar (divided between nominal Muslim and Croat allies,
both of which are currently being armed by the Clinton Administration).
Moreover, at a strength approximately one-third that of its
predecessor, SFOR may not be in as strong a position to deter attacks
by one or another of the Bosnian factions or to avoid attempts to
involve it in renewed fighting: "IFOR forces, despite having suffered
few casualties, have been vulnerable to attacks from all of the
contending sides over the year of the Dayton mandate. As a second
mandate [Dayton mandate. As a second mandate [i.e., SFOR] evolves,
presumably maintaining a smaller force on the ground, the deterrent
effect which has existed may well become less compelling and
vulnerabilities of the troops will increase." ["Military Security in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Present and Future," Bulletin of the Atlantic
Council of the United States, 12/18/96]

The Iranian Connection

Perhaps most threatening to the SFOR mission - and more importantly, to
the safety of the American personnel serving in Bosnia - is the
unwillingness of the Clinton Administration to come clean with the
Congress and with the American people about its complicity in the
delivery of weapons from Iran to the Muslim government in Sarajevo.
That policy, personally approved by Bill Clinton in April 1994 at the
urging of CIA Director-designate (and then-NSC chief) Anthony Lake and
the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, has, according to the
Los Angeles Times (citing classified intelligence community sources),
"played a central role in the dramatic increase in Iranian influence
in Bosnia." Further, according to the Times, in September 1995
National Security Agency analysts contradicted Clinton Administration
claims of declining Iranian influence, insisting instead that "Iranian
Revolutionary Guard personnel remain active throughout Bosnia."
Likewise, "CIA analysts noted that the Iranian presence was expanding
last fall," with some ostensible cultural and humanitarian activities
"known to be fronts" for the Revolutionary Guard and Iran's
intelligence service, known as VEVAK, the Islamic revolutionary
successor to the Shah's SAVAK. [[LAT, 12/31/96] At a time when there is
evidence of increased willingness by pro-Iranian Islamic militants to
target American assets abroad - as illustrated by the June 1996
car-bombing at the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, that killed
19 American airmen, in which the Iranian government or pro-Iranian
terrorist organizations are suspected ["U.S. Focuses Bomb Probe on
Iran, Saudi Dissident," Chicago Tribune, 11/4/96] - it is irresponsible
in the extreme for the Clinton Administration to gloss over the extent
to which its policies have put American personnel in an increasingly
vulnerable position while performing an increasingly questionable
mission.

Three Key Issues for Examination

This paper will examine the Clinton policy of giving the green light to
Iranian arms shipments to the Bosnian Muslims, with serious
implications for the safety of U.S. troops deployed there. (In
addition, RPC will release a general analysis of the SFOR mission and
the Clinton Administration's request for supplemental appropriations to
fund it in the near future.) Specifically, the balance of this paper
will examine in detail the three issues summarized below:

1. The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments (page 3): In April
1995, President Clinton gave the government of Croatia what has been
described by Congressional committees as a "green light" for shipments
of weapons from Iran and other Muslim countries to the Muslim-led
government of Bosnia. The policy was approved at the urging of NSC
chief Anthony Lake and the U.S. ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith.
The CIA and the Departments of State and Defense were kept in the dark
until after the decision was made.

2. The Militant Islamic Network (page 5): Along with the weapons,
Iranian Revolutionary Guards and VEVAK intelligence operatives entered
Bosnia in large numbers, along with thousands of mujahedin ("holy
warriors") from across the Muslim world. Also engaged in the effort
were several other Muslim countries (including Brunei, Malaysia,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Turkey) and a number of radical
Muslim organizations. For example, the role of one Sudan-based
"humanitarian organization," called the Third World Relief Agency, has
been well documented. The Clinton Administration's "hands-on"
involvement with the Islamic network's arms pipeline included
inspections of missiles from Iran by U.S. government officials.

3. The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime (page 8):
Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided green light policy is
a complete misreading of its main beneficiary, the Bosnian Muslim
government of Alija Izetbegovic. Rather than being the tolerant,
multiethnic democratic government it pretends to be, there is clear
evidence that the ruling circle of Izetbegovic's party, the Party of
Democratic Action (SDA), has long been guided by the principles of
radical Islam. This Islamist orientation is illustrated by profiles of
three important officials, including President Izetbegovic himself;
the progressive Islamization of the Bosnian army, including creation of
native Bosnian mujahedin units; credible claims that major atrocities
against civilians in Sarajevo were staged for propaganda purposes by
operatives of the Izetbegovic government; and suppression of enemies,
both non-Muslim and Muslim.

The Clinton Green Light to Iranian Arms Shipments

Both the Senate Intelligence Committee and the House Select
Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms
Transfers to Croatia and Bosnia issued reports late last year. (The
Senate report, dated November 1996, is unclassified. The House report
is classified, with the exception of the final section of conclusions,
which was released on October 8, 1996; a declassified version of the
full report is expected to be released soon.) The reports, consistent
with numerous press accounts, confirm that on April 27, 1994, President
Clinton directed Ambassador Galbraith to inform the government of
Croatia that he had "no instructions" regarding Croatia's decision
whether or not to permit weapons, primarily from Iran, to be
transshipped to Bosnia through Croatia. (The purpose was to facilitate
the acquisition of arms by the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo
despite the arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia by the U.N. Security
Council.) Clinton Administration officials took that course despite
their awareness of the source of the weapons and despite the fact that
the Croats (who were themselves divided on whether to permit arms
deliveries to the Muslims) would take anything short of a U.S.
statement that they should not facilitate the flow of Iranian arms to
Bosnia as a "green light."

The green light policy was decided upon and implemented with unusual
secrecy, with the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense only
informed after the fact. ["U.S. Had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms,
Avoid Iran," Los Angeles Times, 7/14/96] Among the key conclusions of
the House Subcommittee were the following (taken from the unclassified
section released on October 8):

- "The President and the American people were poorly served by the
Administration officials who rushed the green light decision without
due deliberation. full information and an adequate consideration of the
consequences." (page 202)

- "The Administration's efforts to keep even senior US officials from
seeing its 'fingerprints' on the green light policy led to confusion
and disarray within the government." (page 203)

- "The Administration repeatedly deceived the American people about its
Iranian green light policy." (page 204)

Clinton, Lake, and Galbraith Responsible

Who is ultimately accountable for the results of his decision - two
Clinton Administration officials bear particular responsibility:
Ambassador Galbraith and then-NSC Director Anthony Lake, against both
of whom the House of Representatives has referred criminal charges to
the Justice Department. Mr. Lake, who personally presented the
proposal to Bill Clinton for approval, played a central role in
preventing the responsible congressional committees from knowing about
the Administration's fateful decision to acquiesce in radical Islamic
Iran's effort to penetrate the European continent through arms
shipments and military cooperation with the Bosnian government." ["'In
Lake We Trust'? Confirmation Make-Over Exacerbates Senate Concerns
About D.C.I.-Desipate's Candor, Reliability," Center for Security
Policy, Washington, D.C., 1/8/97] His responsibility for the operation
is certain to be a major hurdle in his effort to be confirmed as CIA
Director: "The fact that Lake was one of the authors of the duplicitous
policy in Bosnia, which is very controversial and which has probably
helped strengthen the hand of the Iranians, doesn't play well," stated
Senate Intelligence Chairman Richard Shelby. ["Lake to be asked about
donation," Washington Times, 1/2/97]

For his part, Ambassador Galbraith was the key person both in
conceiving the policy and in serving as the link between the Clinton
Administration and the Croatian government; he also met with Imam Sevko
Omerbasic, the top Muslim cleric in Croatia, "who the CIA says was an
intermediary for Iran." ["Fingerprints: Arms to Bosnia, the real
story," The New Republic, 10/28/96; see also LAT 12/23/96] As the House
Subcommittee concluded (page 206): "There is evidence that Ambassador
Galbraith may have engaged in activities that could be characterized
as unauthorized covert action." The Senate Committee (pages 19 and 20
of the report) was unable to agree on the specific legal issue of
whether Galbraith's actions constituted a "covert action" within the
definition of section 503(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. Sec. 413(e)), as amended, defined as "an activity or activities
... to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad,
where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will
not be apparent or acknowledged publicly."

The Militant Islamic Network

The House Subcommittee report also concluded (page 2): "The
Administration's Iranian green light policy gave Iran an unprecedented
foothold in Europe and has recklessly endangered American lives and US
strategic interests." Further - " ... The Iranian presence and
influence [" ... The Iranian presence and influence [in Bosnia] jumped
radically in the months following the green light. Iranian elements
infiltrated the Bosnian government and established close ties with the
current leadership in Bosnia and the next generation of leaders.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards accompanied Iranian weapons into Bosnia
and soon were integrated in the Bosnian military structure from top to
bottom as well as operating in independent units throughout Bosnia.
The Iranian intelligence service [intelligence service [VEVAK] ran wild
through the area developing intelligence networks, setting up terrorist
support systems, recruiting terrorist 'sleeper' agents and agents of
influence, and insinuating itself with the Bosnian political
leadership to a remarkable degree. The Iranians effectively annexed
large portions of the Bosnian security apparatus [known as the Agency
for Information and Documentation (AID)] to act as their intelligence
and terrorist surrogates. This extended to the point of jointly
planning terrorist activities. The Iranian embassy became the largest
in Bosnia and its officers were given unparalleled privileges and
access at every level of the Bosnian government." (page 201)

Not Just the Iranians

To understand how the Clinton green light would lead to this degree of
Iranian influence, it is necessary to remember that the policy was
adopted in the context of extensive and growing radical Islamic
activity in Bosnia. That is, the Iranians and other Muslim militants
had long been active in Bosnia; the American green light was an
important political signal to both Sarajevo and the militants that the
United States was unable or unwilling to present an obstacle to those
activities - and, to a certain extent, was willing to cooperate with
them. In short, the Clinton Administration's policy of facilitating
the delivery of arms to the Bosnian Muslims made it the de facto
partner of an ongoing international network of governments and
organizations pursuing their own agenda in Bosnia: the promotion of
Islamic revolution in Europe. That network involves not only Iran but
Brunei, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan (a key ally of Iran),
and Turkey, together with front groups supposedly pursuing humanitarian
and cultural activities.

For example, one such group about which details have come to light is
the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a Sudan-based, phoney
humanitarian organization which has been a major link in the arms
pipeline to Bosnia. ["How Bosnia's Muslims Dodged Arms Embargo: Relief
Agency Brokered Aid From Nations, Radical Groups," Washington Post,
9/22/96; see also "Saudis Funded Weapons For Bosnia, Official Says: $
300 Million Program Had U.S. 'Stealth Cooperation'," Washington Post,
2/2/96] TWA is believed to be connected with such fixtures of the
Islamic terror network as Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (the convicted
mastermind behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing) and Osama
Binladen, a wealthy Saudi emigre believed to bankroll numerous militant
groups. [WP, 9/22/96] (Sheik Rahman, a native of Egypt, is currently
in prison in the United States; letter bombs addressed to targets in
Washington and London, apparently from Alexandria, Egypt, are believed
connected with his case. Binladen was a resident in Khartoum, Sudan,
until last year; he is now believed to be in Afghanistan, "where he has
issued statements calling for attacks on U.S. forces in the Persian
Gulf." [on U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf." [WP, 9/22/96])

The Clinton Administration 's "Hands-On " Help

The extent to which Clinton Administration officials, notably
Ambassador Galbraith, knowingly or negligently, cooperated with the
efforts of such front organizations is unclear. For example, according
to one intelligence account seen by an unnamed U.S. official in the
Balkans, "Galbraith 'talked with representatives of Muslim countries on
payment for arms that would be sent to Bosnia,' ... [would be sent to
Bosnia,' ... [T]he dollar amount mentioned in the report was $ 500
million-$ 800 million. The U.S. official said he also saw subsequent
'operational reports' in 1995 on almost weekly arms shipments of
automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, anti-armor
rockets and TOW missiles." [TNR, 10/28/96] The United States played a
disturbingly "hands-on" role, with, according to the Senate report
(page 19), U.S. government personnel twice conducting inspections in
Croatia of missiles en route to Bosnia. Further -- "The U.S. decision
to send personnel to Croatia to inspect rockets bound for Bosnia is ...
subject to varying interpretations. It may have been simply a
straightforward effort to determine whether chemical weapons were
being shipped into Bosnia. It was certainly, at least in part, an
opportunity to examine a rocket in which the United States had some
interest. But it may also have been designed to ensure that Croatia
would not shut down the pipeline." (page 21)

The account in The New Republic points sharply to the latter
explanation: "Enraged at Iran's apparent attempt to slip super weapons
past Croat monitors, the Croatian defense minister nonetheless sent the
missiles on to Bosnia 'just as Peter [i.e., Ambassador Galbraith] told
us to do,' sources familiar with the episode said." [episode said."
[TNR, 10/28/96] In short, the Clinton Administration's connection with
the various players that made up the arms network seems to have been
direct and intimate.

The Mujahedin Threat

In addition to (and working closely with) the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards and VEVAK intelligence are members of numerous radical groups
known for their anti-Western orientation, along with thousands of
volunteer mujahedin ("holy warriors") from across the Islamic world.
From the beginning of the NATO- led deployment, the Clinton
Administration has given insufficient weight to military concerns
regarding the mujahedin presence in Bosnia as well as the danger they
pose to American personnel. Many of the fighters are concentrated in
the so-called "green triangle" (the color green symbolizes Islam)
centered on the town of Zenica in the American IFOR/SFOR zone but are
also found throughout the country.

The Clinton Administration has been willing to accept Sarajevo's
transparently false assurances of the departure of the foreign fighters
based on the contention that they have married Bosnian women and have
acquired Bosnian citizenship --- and thus are no longer "foreign"! or,
having left overt military units to join "humanitarian," "cultural," or
"charitable" organizations, are no longer "fighters." [See "Foreign
Muslims Fighting in Bosnia Considered 'Threat' to U.S. Troops,"
Washington Post, 11/30/95; "Outsiders Bring Islamic Fervor To the
Balkans," New York Times, 9/23/96; "Islamic Alien Fighters Settle in
Bosnia," Pittsburgh PostGazette, 9/23/96; "Mujahideen rule Bosnian
villages: Threaten NATO forces, non-Muslims," Washington Times,
9/23/96; and Yossef Bodansky, Offensive in the Balkans (November 1995)
and Some Call It Peace (August 1996), International Media Corporation,
Ltd., London. Bodansky, an analyst with the House Republican Task
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, is an internationally
recognized authority on Islamic terrorism.] The methods employed to
qualify for Bosnian citizenship are themselves problematic: "Islamic
militants from Iran and other foreign countries are employing
techniques such as forced marriages, kidnappings and the occupation of
apartments and houses to remain in Bosnia in violation of the Dayton
peace accord and may be a threat to U.S. forces." ["Mujaheddin
Remaining in Bosnia: Islamic Militants Strongarm Civilians, Defy Dayton
Plan," Washington Post, 7/8/96]

The threat presented by the mujahedin to IFOR (and now, to SFOR) -
contingent only upon the precise time their commanders in Tehran or
Sarajevo should choose to activate them has been evident from the
beginning of the NATO-led deployment. For example, in February 1996
NATO forces raided a terrorist training camp near the town of Fojnica,
taking into custody 11 men (8 Bosnian citizens - two of whom may have
been naturalized foreign mujahedin and three Iranian instructors); also
seized were explosives "built into small children's plastic toys,
including a car, a helicopter and an ice cream cone," plus other
weapons such as handguns, sniper rifles, grenade launchers, etc. The
Sarajevo government denounced the raid, claiming the facility was an
"intelligence service school"; the detainees were released promptly
after NATO turned them over to local authorities. ["NATO Captures
Terrorist Training Camp, Claims Iranian Involvement," Associated Press,
2/16/96; "Bosnian government denies camp was for terrorists," Reuters,
2/16/96; Bodansky Some Call It Peace, page 56] In May 1996, a
previously unknown group called "Bosnian Islamic Jihad" (Jihad means
"holy war",) threatened attacks on NATO troops by suicide bombers,
similar to those that had recently been launched in Israel. ["Jihad
Threat in Bosnia Alarms NATO," The European, 5/9/96]

Stepping-Stone to Europe

The intended targets of the mujahedin network in Bosnia are not limited
to that country but extend to Western Europe. For example, in August
1995, the conservative Paris daily Le Figaro reported that French
security services believe that ,Islamic fundamentalists from Algeria
have set up a security network across Europe with fighters trained in
Afghan gerrilla camps and [[in] southern France while some have been
tested in Bosnia." [[(London) Daily Telegraph, 8/17/95] Also, in April
1996, Beligan security arrested a number of Islamic militants,
including two native Bosnians, smuggling weapons to Algerian
guerrillas active in France. [in France. [Intelligence Newsletter,
Paris, 5/9/96 (No. 287)] Finally, also in April 1996, a meeting of
radicals aligned with HizbAllah ("Party of God"), a pro-Iran group
based in Lebanon, set plans for stepping up attacks on U.S. assets on
all continents; among those participating was an Egyptian, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, who "runs the Islamist terrorist operations in Bosnia-
Herzegovina from a special headquarters in Sofa, Bulgaria. His forces
are already deployed throughout Bosnia, ready to attack US and other
I-FOR (NATO Implementation Force) targets." ["States- Sponsored
Terrorism and The Rise of the HizbAllah International," Defense and
Foreign Affairs and Strategic Policy, London, 8/31/96 Finally, in
December 1996, French and Belgain security arrested several would-be
terrorists trained at Iranian-run camps in Bosnia.["Terrorism: The
Bosnian Connection," (Paris) L'Express, 12/26/96]

The Radical Islamic Character of the Sarajevo Regime

Underlying the Clinton Administration's misguided policy toward Iranian
influence in Bosnia is a fundamental misreading of the true nature of
the Muslim regime that benefited from the Iran/Bosnia arms policy.
"The most dubious of all Bosniac [i.e., Bosnian Muslim] claims pertains
to the self-serving commercial that the government hopes to eventually
establish a multiethnic liberal democratic society. Such ideals may
appeal to a few members of Bosnia's ruling circles as well as to a
generally secular populace, but President Izethbegovic and his cabal
appear to harbor much different private intentions and goals."
["Selling the Bosnia Myth to America: Buyer Beware," Lieutenant Colonel
John E. Sray, USA, U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort
Leavenworth, KS, October 1995]

The evidence that the leadership of the ruling Party of Democratic
Action (SDA), and consequently, the Sarajevo-based government, has long
been motivated by the principles of radical Islam is inescapable. The
following three profiles are instructive:

Alija Izetbegovic: Alija Izetbegovic, current Bosnian president and
head of the SDA, in 1970 authored the radical "Islamic Declaration,"
which calls for "the Islamic movement" to start to take power as soon
as it can Overturn "the existing non- Muslim government...[Muslim
government...[and] build up a new Islamic one," to destroy non-Islamic
institutions ("There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the
Islamic religion and non-Islamic social institutions'), and to create
an international federation of Islamic states. [The Islamic
Declaration: A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim
Peoples, Sarajevo, in English, 19901 Izetbegovic's radical pro-Iran
associations go back decades: "At the center of the Iranian system in
Europe is Bosnia-Hercegovina." President, Alija Izetbegovic, . . . who
is committed to the establishment Of an Islamic Republic in Bosnia-
Hercegovina." ["Iran's European Springboard?", House Republican Task
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 9/1/92 The Task Force
report further describes Izetbegovic's contacts with Iran and Libya in
1991, before the Bosnian war began; he is also noted as a
"fundamentalist Muslim" and a member of the "Fedayeen of Islam"
organization, an Iran-based radical group dating to the 1930s and which
by the late 1960s had recognized the leadership of the Ayatollah
Khomeini (then in exile from the Shah). Following Khomeini's accession
to power in 1979, Izetbegovic stepped-up his efforts to establish
Islamic power in Bosnia and was jailed by the communists in 1983.
Today, he is open and unapologetic about his links to Iran: "Perhaps
the most telling detail of the [detail of the [SDA's September 1, 1996]
campaign rally ... was the presence of the Iranian Ambassador and his
Bosnian and Iranian bodyguards, who sat in the shadow of the huge
birchwood platform.... As the only foreign diplomat [platform.... As
the only foreign diplomat [present], indeed the only foreigner
traveling in the President's [only foreigner traveling in the
President's [i.e., Izetbegovic's] heavily guarded motorcade of bulky
four-wheel drive jeeps, he lent a silent Islamic imprimatur to the
event, one that many American and European supporters of the Bosnian
Government are trying hard to ignore or dismiss." [trying hard to
ignore or dismiss." [NYT, 9/2/96] During the summer 1996 election
campaign, the Iranians delivered to him, in two suitcases, $ 500,000 in
cash; Izetbegovic "is now 'literally on their [on their [i.e., the
Iranians'] payroll,' according to a classified report based on the
CIA's analysis of the issue." LAT, 12/31/96. See also "Iran
Contributed $ [LAT, 12/31/96. See also "Iran Contributed $ 500,000 to
Bosnian President's Election Effort, U.S. Says," New York Times,
1/l/97, and Washington Times, 1/2/97] Adil Zulfikarpasic, a Muslim co-
founder of the SDA, broke with Izetbegovic in late 1990 due to the
increasingly overt fundamentalist and pro-Iranian direction of the
party. [See Milovan Djilas, Bosnjak: Adil Zulfikarpasic, Zurich, 1994]

Hassan (or Hasan) Cengic: Until recently, deputy defense minister (and
now cosmetically reassigned to a potentially even more dangerous job in
refugee resettlement at the behest of the Clinton Administration),
Cengic, a member of a powerful clan headed by his father, Halid Cengic,
is an Islamic cleric who has traveled frequently to Tehran and is
deeply involved in the arms pipeline. ["Bosnian Officials Involved in
Arms Trade Tied to Radical States," Washington Post, 9/22/96] Cengic
was identified by Austrian police as a member of TWRA's supervisory
board, "a fact confirmed by its Sudanese director, Elfatih Hassanein,
in a 1994 interview with (lazi Husrev Beg, an Islamic affairs magazine.
Cengic later became the key Bosnian official involved in setting up a
weapons pipeline from Iran.... Cengic ... is a longtime associate of
Izetbegovic's. He was one of the co- defendants in Izetbegovic's 1983
trial for fomenting Muslim nationalism in what was then Yugoslavia.
Cengic was given a 10- year prison term, most of which he did not
serve. In trial testimony Cengic was said to have been traveling to
Iran since 1983. Cengic lived in Tehran and Istanbul during much of
the war, arranging for weapons to be smuggled into Bosnia." [WP,
9/22/961 According to a Bosnian Croat radio profile: "Hasan's father,
Halid Cengic ... is the main logistic expert in the Muslim army. All
petrodollar donations from the Islamic world and the procurement of
arms and military technology for Muslim units went through him. He
made so much money out of this business that he is one of the richest
Muslims today. Halid Cengic and his two sons, of whom Hasan has been
more in the public spotlight, also control the Islamic wing of the
intelligence agency AID [Agency for Information and Documentation].
Well informed sources in Sarajevo claim that only Hasan addresses
Izetbegovic with 'ti' [second person singular, used as an informal form
of address] while all the others address him as 'Mr. President,"' a
sign of his extraordinary degree of intimacy with the president. [BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 10/28/96, "Radio elaborates on Iranian
connection of Bosnian deputy defense minister," from Croat Radio
Herceg-Bosna, Mostar, in Serbo-Croatian, 10/25/96, bracketed text in
original] In late 1996, at the insistence of the Clinton
Administration, Hassan Cengic was reassigned to refugee affairs.
However, in his new capacity he may present an even greater hazard to
NATO forces in Bosnia, in light of past incidents such as the one that
took place near the village of Celic in November 1996. At that time,
in what NATO officers called part of a pattern of "military operations
in disguise," American and Russian IFOR troops were caught between
Muslims and Serbs as the Muslims, some of them armed, attempted to
encroach on the cease-fire line established by Dayton; commented a NATO
spokesman: "We believe this to be a deliberate, orchestrated and
provocative move to circumvent established procedures for the return of
refugees." ["Gunfire Erupts as Muslims Return Home," Washington Post,
11/13/96]

Dzemal Merdan: "The office of Brig. Gen. Dzemal Merdan is an ornate
affair, equipped with an elaborately carved wooden gazebo ringed with
red velvet couches and slippers for his guests. A sheepskin prayer mat
lies in the comer, pointing toward Mecca. The most striking thing in
the chamber is a large flag. It is not the flag of Bosnia, but of
Iran. Pinned with a button of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's
late Islamic leader, the flag occupies pride of place in Merdan's digs
-- displayed in the middle of the gazebo for every visitor to see. Next
to it hangs another pennant that of the Democratic Action Party, the
increasingly nationalist Islamic organization of President Alija
Izetbegovic that dominates Bosnia's Muslim region.... Merdan's position
highlights the American dilemma. As head of the office of training and
development of the Bosnian army, he is a key liaison figure in the U.S.
[liaison figure in the U.S. [arm and train] program.... But Merdan,
Western sources say, also has another job -- as liaison with foreign
Islamic fighters here since 1992 and promoter of the Islamic faith
among Bosnia's recruits. Sources identified Merdan as being
instrumental in the creation of a brigade of Bosnian soldiers, called
the 7th Muslim Brigade, that is heavily influenced by Islam and trained
by fighters from Iran's Revolutionary Guards. He has also launched a
program, these sources say, to build mosques on military training
grounds to teach Islam to Bosnian recruits. In addition, he helped
establish training camps in Bosnia where Revolutionary Guards carried
out their work." ["Arming the Bosnians: U.S. Program Would Aid Force
Increasingly Linked to Iran," Washington Post, 1/26/96, emphasis
added] General Merdan is a close associate of both Izetbegovic and
Cengic; the central region around Zenica, which was "completely
militarized in the first two years of the war" under the control of
Merdan's mujahedin, is "under total control of the Cengic family."
["Who Rules Bosnia and Which Way," (Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 11/17/96,
FBIS translation; Slobodna Bosna is one of the few publications in
Muslim-held areas that dares to criticize the policies and personal
corruption of the ruling SDA clique.] Merdan's mujahedin were accused
by their erstwhile Croat allies of massacring more than 100 Croats near
Zenica in late 1993. ["Bosnian Croats vow to probe war crimes by
Moslems," Agence France Presse, 5/12/95]

The Islamization of the Bosnian Army

In cooperation with the foreign Islamic presence, the Izetbegovic
regime has revamped its security and military apparatus to reflect its
Islamic revolutionary outlook, including the creation of mujahedin
units throughout the army; some members of these units have assumed
the guise of a shaheed (a "martyr," the Arabic term commonly used to
describe suicide bombers), marked by their white garb, representing a
shroud. While these units include foreign fighters naturalized in
Bosnia, most of the personnel are now Bosnian Muslims trained and
indoctrinated by Iranian and other foreign militants - which also makes
it easier for the Clinton Administration to minimize the mujahedin
threat, because few of them are "foreigners."

Prior to 1996, there were three principal mujahedin units in the
Bosnian army, the first two of which are headquartered in the American
IFOR/SFOR zone: (1) the 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 3rd Corps,
headquartered in Zenica; (2) the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the
2nd Corps, headquartered in Travnik (the 2nd Corps is based in Tuzla);
and (3) the 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps,
headquartered in Konjic (in the French zone). [Bodansky, Some Call It
Peace, page 401 Particularly ominous, many members of these units have
donned the guise of martyrs, indicating their willingness to sacrifice
themselves in the cause of Islam. Commenting on an appearance of
soldiers from the 7th Liberation Brigade, in Zenica in December 1995,
Bodansky writes: "Many of the fighters ... were dressed in white
coveralls over their uniforms. Officially, these were 'white winter
camouflage,' but the green headbands [bearing Koranic verses] these
warriors were wearing left no doubt that these were actually Shaheeds'
shrouds." [Some Call It Peace, page 12] The same demonstration was
staged before the admiring Iranian ambassador and President
Izethbegovic in September 1996, when white winter garb could only be
symbolic, not functional. [[NYT, 9/2/96] By June 1996, ten more
mujahedin brigades had been established, along with numerous smaller
"special units' dedicated to covert and terrorist operations; while
foreigners are present in all of these units, most of the soldiers are
now native Bosnian Muslims. [native Bosnian Muslims. [Some Call It
Peace, pages 42-46]

In addition to these units, there exists another group known as the
Handzar ("dagger" or 94 scimitar") Division, described by Bodansky as a
"praetorian guard" for President Izetbegovic. "Up to 6000-strong, the
Handzar division glories in a fascist culture. They see themselves as
the heirs of the SS Handzar division, formed by Bosnian Muslims in 1943
to fight for the Nazis. Their spiritual model was Mohammed Amin
al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem who sided with Hitler.
According to LJN officers, surprisingly few of those in charge of the
Handzars ... seem to speak good Serbo-Croatian. 'Many of them are
Albanian, whether from Kosovo [the Serb province where Albanians are
the majority] or from Albania itself.' They are trained and led by
veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, say LTN sources." ["Albanians
and Afghans fight for the heirs to Bosnia's SS past," (London) Daily
Telegraph, 12/29/93, bracketed text in original]

Self-Inflicted Atrocities

Almost since the beginning of the Bosnian war in the spring of 1992,
there have been persistent reports -- readily found in the European
media but little reported in the United States -- that civilian deaths
in Muslim-held Sarajevo attributed to the Bosnian Serb Army were in
some cases actually inflicted by operatives of the Izetbegovic regime
in an (ultimately successful) effort to secure American intervention on
Sarajevo's behalf. These allegations include instances of sniping at
civilians as well as three major explosions, attributed to Serbian
mortar fire, that claimed the lives of dozens of people and, in each
case, resulted in the international community's taking measures against
the Muslims' Serb enemies. (The three explosions were: (1) the May 27,
1992, "breadline massacre." which was reported to have killed 16 people
and which resulted in economic sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs and rump
Yugoslavia; (2) the February 5, 1994, Markale "market massacre,"
killing 68 and resulting in selective NATO air strikes and an ultimatum
to the Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons from the area near
Sarajevo; and (3) the August 28, 1995 "second market massacre,"
killing 37 and resulting in large-scale NATO air strikes, eventually
leading to the Dayton agreement and the deployment of IFOR.) When she
was asked about such allegations (with respect to the February 1994
explosion) then-U.N. Ambassador and current Secretary of
State-designate Madeleine Albright, in a stunning non sequitur, said:
"It's very hard to believe any country would do this to their own
people, and therefore, although we do not exactly know what the facts
are, it would seem to us that the Serbs are the ones that probably have
a great deal of responsibility." ["Senior official admits to secret
U.N. report on Sarajevo massacre," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 6/6/96,
emphasis added]

The fact that such a contention is difficult to believe does not mean
it is not true. Not only did the incidents lead to the result desired
by Sarajevo (Western action against the Bosnian Serbs), their staging
by the Muslims would be entirely in keeping with the moral outlook of
Islamic radicalism, which has long accepted the deaths of innocent
(including Muslim) bystanders killed in terrorist actions. According
to a noted analyst: "The dictum that the end justifies the means is
adopted by all fundamentalist organizations in their strategies for
achieving political power and imposing on society their own view of
Islam. What is important in every action is its niy 'yah, its motive.
No means need be spared in the service of Islam as long as one takes
action with a pure niy' Yah." [Amir Taheri, Holy Terror, Bethesda, MD,
1987] With the evidence that the Sarajevo leadership does in fact have
a fundamentalist outlook, it is unwarranted to dismiss cavaliery the
possibility of Muslim responsibility. Among some of the reports:

Sniping: "French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations unit trying
to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo have concluded
that until mid-June some gunfire also came from Government soldiers
deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what it called a
'definitive' investigation, a French marine unit that patrols against
snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally occupied by
Bosnian [i.e., Muslim] soldiers and other security forces. A senior
French officer said, 'We find it almost impossible to believe, but we
are sure that it is true."' ["Investigation Concludes Bosnian
Government Snipers Shot at Civilians," New York Times, 8/l/951

The 1992 "Breadline Massacre": "United Nations officials and senior
Western military officers believe some of the worst killings in
Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread
queue, were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders -- not
Serb besiegers -- as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and
military intervention.... Classified reports to the UN force
commander, General Satish Nambiar, concluded ... that Bosnian forces
loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb. 'We
believe it was a command-detonated explosion, probably in a can,' a UN
official said then. 'The large impact which is there now is not
necessarily similar or anywhere near as large as we came to expect with
a mortar round landing on a paved surface." ["Muslims 'slaughter their
own people'," (London) The Independent, 8/22/92] "Our people tell us
there were a number of things that didn't fit. The street had been
blocked off just before the incident. Once the crowd was let in and
had lined up, the media appeared but kept their distance. The attack
took place, and the media were immediately on the scene." [Major
General Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, Vancouver,
BC, 1993, pages 193-4; Gen. MacKenzie, a Canadian, had been commander
of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Sarajevo.]

The 1994 Markale "Market Massacre": "French television reported last
night that the United Nations investigation into the market-place
bombing in Sarajevo two weeks ago had established beyond doubt that
the mortar shell that killed 68 people was fired from inside Bosnian
[Muslim lines." [people was fired from inside Bosnian [Muslim] lines."
["UN tracks source of fatal shell," (London) The Times, 2/19/94] "For
the first time, a senior U.N. official has admitted the existence of a
secret U.N. report that blames the Bosnian Moslems for the February
1994 massacre of Moslems at a Sarajevo market.... After studying the
crater left by the mortar shell and the distribution of shrapnel, the
report concluded that the shell was fired from behind Moslem lines."
The report, however, was kept secret; the context of the wire story
implies that U.S. Ambasador Albright may have been involved in its
suppression. [DPA, 6/6/961 For a fuller discussion of the conflicting
claims, see "Anatomy of a massacre," Foreign Policy, 12/22/94, by David
Binder; Binder, a veteran New York Times reporter in Yugoslavia, had
access to the suppressed report. Bodansky categorically states that
the bomb "was actually a special charge designed and built with help
from HizbAllah ["Party of God," a Beirut-based pro-Iranian terror
group] experts and then most likely dropped from a nearby rooftop onto
the crowd of shoppers. Video cameras at the ready recorded this
expertly-staged spectacle of gore, while dozens of corpses of Bosnian
Muslim troops killed in action (exchanged the day before in a 'body
swap' with the Serbs) were paraded in front of cameras to raise the
casualty counts." [Offensive in the Balkans, page 62]

The 1995 "Second Market Massacre": "British ammunition experts serving
with the United Nations in Sarajevo have challenged key 'evidence' of
the Serbian atrocity that triggered the devastating Nato bombing
campaign which turned the tide of the Bosnian war." The Britons'
analysis was confirmed by French analysts but their findings were
"dismissed" by "a senior American officer" at U.N. headquarters in
Sarajevo. ["Serbs 'not guilty' of massacre: Experts warned US that
mortar was Bosnian," (London) The Times, 10/i/95 A "crucial U.N. report
[(London) The Times, 10/i/95] A "crucial U.N. report [stating Serb
responsibility for] the market massacre is a classified secret, but
four specialists - a Russian, a Canadian and two Americans - have
raised serious doubts about its conclusion, suggesting instead that the
mortar was fired not by the Serbs but by Bosnian government forces." A
Canadian officer "added that he and fellow Canadian officers in Bosnia
were 'convinced that the Muslim government dropped both the February 5,
1994, and the August 28, 1995, mortar shells on the Sarajevo markets."'
An unidentified U.S. official "contends that the available evidence
suggests either 'the shell was fired at a very low trajectory, which
means a range of a few hundred yards - therefore under [a range of a
few hundred yards - therefore under [Sarajevo] government control,' or
'a mortar shell converted into a bomb was dropped from a nearby roof
into the crowd."' ["Bosnia's bombers," The Nation, 10/2/95 ]. At least
some high-ranking French and perhaps other Western officials believed
the Muslims responsible; after having received that account from
government ministers and two generals, French magazine editor Jean
Daniel put the question directly to Prime Minister Edouard Balladur:
"'They [i.e., the Muslims] have committed this carnage on their own
people?' I exclaimed in consternation. 'Yes,' confirmed the Prime
Minister without hesitation, 'but at least they have forced NATO to
intervene. "' ["No more lies about Bosnia," Le Nouvel Observateur,
8/31/95, translated in Chronicles - A Magazine of American Culture,
January 1997]

Suppression of Enemies

As might be expected, one manifestation of the radical Islamic
orientation of the Izetbegovic government is increasing curtailment of
the freedoms of the remaining non-Muslims (Croats and Serbs) in the
Muslim-held zone. While there are similar pressures on minorities in
the Serb- and Croat-held parts of Bosnia, in the Muslim zone they have
a distinct Islamic flavor. For example, during the 1996-1997 Christmas
and New Year holiday season, Muslim militants attempted to intimidate
not only Muslims but Christians from engaging in what had become common
holiday practices, such as gift-giving, putting up Christmas or New
Year's trees, and playing the local Santa Claus figure, Grandfather
Frost (Deda Mraz). ["The Holiday, All Wrapped Up; Bosnian Muslims Take
Sides Over Santa," Washington Post, 12/26/96] hi general: "Even in
Sarajevo itself, always portrayed as the most prominent multi-national
community in Bosnia, pressure, both psychological and real, is
impelling non-Bosniaks [i.e., non- Muslims] to leave. Some measures
are indirect, such as attempts to ban the sale of pork and the growing
predominance of [to ban the sale of pork and the growing predominance
of [Bosniak] street names. Other measures are deliberate efforts to
apply pressure. Examples include various means to make nonBosniaks
leave the city. Similar pressures, often with more violent expression
and occasionally with overt official participation, are being used
throughout Bosnia." ["Bosnia's Security and U.S. Policy in the Next
Phase A Policy Paper, International Research and Exchanges Board,
November 1996]

In addition, President Izetbegovic's party, the SDA, has launched
politically-motivated attacks on moderate Muslims both within the SDA
and in rival parties. For example, in the summer of 1996 former Prime
Minister Haris Silajdzic. (a Muslim, and son of the former imam at the
main Sarajevo mosque) was set upon and beaten by SDA militants.
Silajdzic claimed Izetbegovic himself was behind the attacks. [was
behind the attacks. [NYT, 9/2/96] h-fan Mustafic, a Muslim who
cofounded the SDA, is a member of the Bosnian parliament and was
president of the SDA's executive council in Srebrenica when it fell to
Bosnian Serb forces; he was taken prisoner but later released. Because
of several policy disagreements with Izetbegovic and his close
associates, Mustafic was shot and seriously wounded in Srebrenica by
Izetbegovic loyalists. [[(Sarajevo) Slobodna Bosna, 7/14/96] Finally,
one incident sums up both the ruthlessness of the Sarajevo
establishment in dealing with their enemies as well as their
international radical links: "A special Bosnian army unit headed by
Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosnian president's son, murdered a Bosnian
general found shot to death in Belgium last week, a Croatian newspaper
reported ... citing well-informed sources. The Vjesnik newspaper,
controlled by the government, said the assassination of Yusuf Prazina
was carried out by five members of a commando unit called 'Delta' and
headed by Ismet Bajramovic also known as Celo. The paper said that
three members of the Syrian-backed Palestinian movement Saika had
Prazina under surveillance for three weeks before one of them, acting
as an arms dealer, lured him into a trap in a car park along the main
highway between Liege in eastern Belgium and the German border town of
Aachen. Prazina, 30, nicknamed Yuka, went missing early last month.
He was found Saturday with two bullet holes to the head. 'The
necessary logistical means to carry out the operation were provided by
Bakir Izetbegovic, son of Alija Izetbegovic,, who left Sarajevo more
than six months ago,' Vjesnik said. It added that Bakir Izetbegovic
'often travels between Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt, Baghdad, Tehran and
Ankara, by using Iraqi and Pakistani passports,' and was in Belgium at
the time of the assassination. Hasan Cengic, head of logistics for the
army in Bosnia- Hercegovina, was 'personally involved in the
assassination of Yuka Prazina,' the paper said." [Yuka Prazina,' the
paper said." [Agence France Presse, 1/5/94]

Conclusion

The Clinton Administration's blunder in giving the green light to the
Iranian arms pipeline was based, among other errors, on a gross
misreading of the true nature and goals of the Izetbegovic regime in
Sarajevo. It calls to mind the similar mistake of the Carter
Administration, which in 1979 began lavish aid to the new Sandinista
government in Nicaragua in the hopes that (if the United States were
friendly enough) the nine comandantes would turn out to be democrats,
not communists, despite abundant evidence to the contrary. By the time
the Reagan Administration finally cut off the dollar spigot in 198 1,
the comandantes -- or the "nine little Castros," as they were known
locally -- had fully entrenched themselves in power.

To state that the Clinton Administration erred in facilitating the
penetration of the Iranians and other radical elements into Europe
would be a breathtaking understatement. A thorough reexamination of
U.S. policy and goals in the region is essential. In particular,
addressing the immediate threat to U.S. troops in Bosnia, exacerbated
by the extention of the IFOR/SFOR mission, should be a major priority
of the of the 105th Congress.


RPC staff contact: Jim Jatras, 224-2946

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