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[Emperor's Clothes]
UNJUST FROM THE START, PART IV: LEARNING FROM THE INQUISITION
By Dr. Kosta Cavoski
[Part IV concludes this series of articles on the War Crimes Tribunal by
Professor Cavoski, the distinguished Yugoslav law scholar.]
MASKED WITNESSES
When in the medieval age the Inquisition wanted to protect an important
witness who was ready to testify that he/she had seen a suspect
communicating with the devil the witness was allowed to appear in court
with a mask, or hood, over the face. This was how the court heard the
"truth", and the witness was protected from the evil eye of the witch
who might take revenge after being burned at the stake.
In its fervent desire to protect the victims and witnesses of war crimes
in the former Yugoslavia from the [Serbian] devil, the makers of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence similarly undertook to disguise the
identity of these victims and witnesses.
Thus, according to Rule 69 "in exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor
may apply to a Trial Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the identity
of a victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such a
person is brought under the protection of the Tribunal. This type of
temporary concealment of a victim's or witnesses' identity can be
understood, especially as paragraph (C) of this Rule stipulates that
"the identity of the victim or witness shall be disclosed in sufficient
time prior to the trial to allow adequate time for preparation of the
defense".
What should not have been allowed under any circumstances was the
permanent concealment of the identity of victims or witnesses, neither
the allowing of a witness to refuse to answer a question on "grounds of
confidentiality". This is foreseen in Rule 70 paragraphs (B), (C) and
(D). Inasmuch as the Prosecutor obtains information given to him on
condition it remains confidential he can not disclose its source without
the agreement of the person or entity (15) who supplied it. This would
not be so unusual if such information were not used as evidence at the
trial. But the Prosecutor, with the consent of the person or
representative of an entity, may decide to use documents and other
material obtained in this way as evidence at the trial. In this case -
and this is indeed something very new - "the Trial Chamber may not order
either party to produce additional evidence received from the person or
entity providing the initial information, nor may the Trial Chamber, for
the purpose !
of obtaining such additional evidence itself summon that person or a
representative of that entity as a witness or order their attendance".
Still, the Prosecutor may call as a witness a person or entity that has
offered confidential information, but the Trial Chamber may not compel
the witness to answer any question the witness declines to answer on the
grounds of confidentiality.
One can ask what kind of witness gives the Prosecutor confidential
information and then refuses to answer further questions as to how such
information was obtained when the Trial Chamber has no right to insist.
As a rule they are undercover agents who have been operating illegally
in foreign countries in order to collect information that can not be
obtained by regular means. They are also governmental representatives
who have provided The Hague Tribunal with confidential information on
condition that it conceal the source of the information as well as the
manner in which it was obtained. The only remaining question is whether
such "evidence" can be accepted as valid or such clandestine "witnesses"
believed at all.
Another innovation that was introduced by the makers of the Rules was
testimony without the obligation to appear at the trial. According to
Rule 71, at the request of either party, the Trial Chamber "may, in
exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice, order a
deposition be taken for use at trial and appoint for that purpose, a
Presiding Officer". Naturally, it sometimes happens that an important
witness, for health reasons, is unable to leave his home or hospital to
attend a trial. But in such cases a hearing, under the presidency of the
judge, is held in the witness' room where the witness answers the
questions of the prosecution and defense. Allowing a court officer to
take a deposition on his own whenever the Trial Chamber considers it to
be "in the interest of justice", increases the possibility of abuse and
prevents the confrontation of witnesses testifying differently about the
same subject.
The greatest "innovations" introduced by the Rules was the permanent
concealment of the identity of witnesses, victims or anyone related to
or associated with them. Under the guise of preserving privacy and
protecting a witness or victim, according to Rule 75 a judge or trial
chamber can, at a session in camera [i.e., a closed session], take:
"measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the
identity or whereabouts of a victim or a witness, or of persons related
to or associated with him by such means as:
a) expunging names and identifying information from the Chamber's public
record;
b) non-disclosure to the public of any records identifying the victim;
c) giving the testimony through image - or voice-altering devices or
closed circuit television and
d) assignment of a pseudonym."
Even this was not enough for the makers of these Rules and so they added
the possibility of closed sessions and appropriate measures to
facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims and witnesses, such as
one-way closed circuit television.
JUDICATURE WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY
There is no doubt whatsoever that the measures for the protection of a
witness which the Holy Inquisition was capable of offering were a
child's game compared to those provided by the Ruler of The Hague
Tribunal. The Inquisition was only able to offer a frightened witness
the possibility to enter the court by a side door under cover of night
and with a hood over the head. Possibly, and very probably, the
Inquisition would have taken the same measures as The Hague Tribunal
Rules had it been able to use the technology at the disposal of The
Hague judges today.
So as to understand more easily the "singularity" and also the
exceptional possibilities of violation of the aforementioned measures
for protecting a victim or witness, we will present a hypothetical
example. Let us suppose that in an American city with disturbed and very
strained inter-racial relations the sexual assault of a member of one
race group by a member of another takes place. Terrified by the possible
revenge of the relations and neighbors of the attacker, the victim asks
the court to be allowed to testify under a pseudonym using image- and
voice- altering devices. Would the American court allow this? Certainly
not. And one of the reasons would be that such "testimony" would prevent
a fair trial.
After such a convincing example, it is necessary to ask the following
question. Why can American courts refuse this type of testimony and The
Hague Tribunal accepts it when both are concerned with the protection of
a victim or witness from possible reprisal by the accused, his relatives
or friends? The answer is surprising: the American court firmly believes
that the American judicature, including the police, is capable of
offering such protection. And as a rule it is, except in the rare cases
of organized crime. The Hague Tribunal is well aware that it is not up
to this and justifiably assumes that the so-called international
community, as embodied by the Security Council, has no intention
whatsoever of protecting any victim or witness from the Balkan cauldron.
So, if no-one is ready to protect the victims or witnesses, then at
least their identity can be hidden.
Had they taken one more step in forming this judgment, the Hague judges
would have had to ask themselves whether, under such conditions, they
should have taken on the job of judging at all if in order to protect
victims and witnesses they had to use measures that were implemented by
the Holy Inquisition. Had they any idea of the concept of sovereignty,
they would have asked the Security Council how it thought they could
take to court anyone if they were unable to provide the conditions
necessary for the execution of judicature. When in his famous work
"Leviathan" Thomas Hobbes demonstrated the essential traits of
sovereignty, he included
"the Right of Judicature, that is to say, of hearing and deciding all
Controversies which may arise concerning Law, either Civil or Natural or
concerning Fact".(16)
In the execution of judicature it is most important that sovereignty
provides general and complete protection of all subjects from injustice
by others. Because otherwise
"to every man remainth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his
own conservation, the right of protecting himself by his private
strength, which is the condition of War, and contrary to the end for
which every Common-wealth is instituted".(17)
In other words, he who would judge and is able to do so, is sovereign;
and as sovereign is bound to offer all subjects staunch protection from
violence and the injustice of others. Who is unable of offering the
second should not stand in judgment because he is not sovereign. The
members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members,
wanted the first - to judge - without being capable of providing the
second - reliable protection. This resulted in the concealment of the
victims' and witnesses' identities and other measures as a clumsy
attempt to achieve what must be provided by a well instituted and
effective sovereign power.
Due to these important failings on the part of the Security Council and
The Hague Tribunal, a whole series of other unusual regulations to the
ridicule and shame of this Tribunal and its founders were created.
Particularly characteristic is Rule 99 which allows the arrest of a
suspect who has been acquitted. Truly a contradiction! However, this
contradiction came about for practical reasons. When the jury of an
American court of first instance brings a verdict of not guilty the
accused leaves the court room a free man, able to go where he will. The
prosecution can, of course, appeal against the first instance verdict
but it can not demand that an acquitted person stay in detention until a
second instance verdict is given. Sometimes the second instance court
revokes the first instance verdict and demands a retrial. Since the
suspect is free it may happen that he will not answer a summons by the
first instance court This, however, does not cause much worry as it is
assumed that !
the police, as an organ of sovereignty, must be capable of carrying out
every court order and bringing the person in question to trial.
The judges of The Hague Tribunal know very well although they are unable
to admit this publicly, that their sovereignty applies only to the court
room in which they judge and the prison where witnesses, suspects and
the accused are held. This forced them to make these contradictory
rules. In paragraph (A) of Rule 99, they stipulate that "in case of
acquittal the accused shall be released immediately". Then in paragraph
(B) they recant this rule by allowing the Trial Chamber, at the mere
hint of the Prosecutor submitting an appeal to "issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused to take effect immediately". Thanks to this
sophistry, the accused can be freed and arrested at one stroke. Had The
Hague judges the ability to think logically, they would have otherwise
formulated the rule applied here: the Prosecutor shall decide on the
freeing or detaining of a person acquitted by a first instance Trial
Chamber. Truly in the spirit of the aforesaid Ottoman proverb: "The Cadi
prosecu!
tes, and the Cadi sentences".
To those well acquainted with constitutional and criminal law the rule
that allows for a witness to testify against himself is a real surprise.
Modern criminal law explicitly forbids this and a witness can refuse to
answer incriminating questions. For a long time this important legal
guarantee has been represented by the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution of 1787 whereby "no person .... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ".
The authors of The Hague Tribunal Rules did not pay much attention to
this great example and wrote Rule 90 paragraph (E) which allows for
forced self-incrimination:
"A witness may object to making any statement which might tend to
incriminate him. The Chamber may, however, compel the witness to answer
the question. Testimony compelled in this way shall not be used as
evidence in a subsequent prosecution against the witness for any offense
other than perjury".
It is worthwhile asking why the rule makers allowed for the forced
self-incrimination of a witness if such evidence would not be used
against him. They were probably presuming that war crimes are most often
carried out by groups of people who, if they are forced to do so, will
implicate each other. Supposing The Hague Tribunal had the opportunity
of imprisoning two persons suspected of committing the same war crime
without either knowing the fate of the other. One could be forced to
testify against the other with the assurance that his testimony would
not be used against him, and vice versa. In this way the Prosecutor can
obtain evidence against them both without there formally having been any
self- incrimination. To our great surprise the rule makers were very
perfidious in this matter, with no concern for the fact that their
resourcefulness and ingeniousness was in direct contradiction to the
principle of modern criminal law that self-incriminating cannot be
exacted.
Finally, the above mentioned rules contain a series of undefined
concepts which allow for whimsicality and caprice. A characteristic
example is given by Rule 79 which permits the exclusion of the media and
public from court proceedings or part of the proceedings for the
following reasons:
1) public order or morality;
2) safety, security or non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or
witness, or
3) the protection of the interests of justice.
In a well founded legal system only public order and morality are
considered to be valid reasons for the partial or complete exclusion of
the public from court proceedings, and this only under strictly defined
circumstances. The secrecy of court proceedings through concealment of
the identity of a victim or witness is inadmissible, as already shown,
while the "interests of justice" as a reason for the exclusion of the
public, is yet another innovation whereby The Hague Tribunal "enriched"
legal theory and practice. Justice is the supreme legal value and since
law and judicature exist for the realization of justice, the provision
of "interests of justice" as one of the reasons for the exclusion of the
public was done in order to create a blanket discretionary norm which
would allow the Trial Chamber to do what it wanted under the umbrella of
expediency. The term was also introduced as an excuse for the taking of
depositions for later use at a trial (Rule 71 paragraph A) and acc!
eptance of evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct relevant to
serious violations of international humanitarian law (Rule 93 paragraph
A).
Finally, Prosecutor Richard Goldstone did not want to miss the chance of
possibly using or abusing the very elastic norms containing the loose
term "interests of justice". This is why he included in the regulations
regarding his own power (being his own legislator), the stipulation that
in certain circumstances he could grant any concessions to persons who
participated in alleged offenses in order to secure their evidence in
the prosecution of others (for example, by refraining from prosecuting
an accomplice in return for the testimony of the accomplice against
another offender), and that this "may be appropriate in the interests of
justice".(18) He hereby made it known that he would be acting on his own
will and not in his official capacity, and that certain executors of
alleged crimes could be acquitted in return for cooperation, i.e. if
they were willing to blame their accomplices. This kind of trade-off was
what he called justice.
"THE JUSTICE WHICH IS NOT SEEN TO BE DONE"
Justice is taken to infer a certain type of equality, primarily an
elementary equality before the law. It would appear that the members of
the Security Council knew this when they introduced the following
regulation into the Statute of the International Tribunal:
"All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal" (article
21, paragraph l).
This kind of equality is taken to mean that all detained persons at The
Hague have exactly the same conditions of detention and that no
exceptions will be made. However, The Hague Tribunal judges believed
that justice was what they thought it to be, and so they introduced into
their rules a regulation allowing for important differences in the
conditions of detention. According to Rule 64
"the President of the Tribunal may, on the application of a party,
request modification of the conditions of detention of an accused".
This is as if a Mafia boss in the US were to request of the judge
responsible for trying his case that he be allowed to await trial in his
own villa from where he had previously carried out his "business" on
condition he pay from his own pocket a prison guard to prevent him from
absconding.
However paradoxical this example may seem, this is what happened at The
Hague. While the terminally ill Serb General Djordje Djukic was interned
in a prison cell without adequate medical care, the Croat General
Tihomir Blaskic, through his powerful patrons, made a deal with the
Tribunal President that he await trial in a luxurious villa surrounded
by guards paid by his "friends", instead of in prison. According to
Antonio Cassese this was done in the interests of justice - the kind of
"justice" whereby it is easy "to be a cardinal if your father is the
pope".
There is an English saying: "Justice has not only to be done, but it has
to be seen to be done". What could be seen at The Hague was not justice
but caprice and injustice.
***
Footnotes
(15) Being a state, one of its institutions or some organization.
(16) Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan", edited by C.B. Macpherson,
Harmondsworth. Penguin Books 1982, p. 234
(17) Ibid.
(18) Regulation No. 1 of 1994, as amended 17 May 1995.
***
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------------------------------------------------------------
The URL for this article is
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/cavoski/c-4.htm
www.tenc.net
[Emperor's Clothes]
UNJUST FROM THE START, PART IV: LEARNING FROM THE INQUISITION
By Dr. Kosta Cavoski
[Part IV concludes this series of articles on the War Crimes Tribunal by
Professor Cavoski, the distinguished Yugoslav law scholar.]
MASKED WITNESSES
When in the medieval age the Inquisition wanted to protect an important
witness who was ready to testify that he/she had seen a suspect
communicating with the devil the witness was allowed to appear in court
with a mask, or hood, over the face. This was how the court heard the
"truth", and the witness was protected from the evil eye of the witch
who might take revenge after being burned at the stake.
In its fervent desire to protect the victims and witnesses of war crimes
in the former Yugoslavia from the [Serbian] devil, the makers of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence similarly undertook to disguise the
identity of these victims and witnesses.
Thus, according to Rule 69 "in exceptional circumstances, the Prosecutor
may apply to a Trial Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the identity
of a victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such a
person is brought under the protection of the Tribunal. This type of
temporary concealment of a victim's or witnesses' identity can be
understood, especially as paragraph (C) of this Rule stipulates that
"the identity of the victim or witness shall be disclosed in sufficient
time prior to the trial to allow adequate time for preparation of the
defense".
What should not have been allowed under any circumstances was the
permanent concealment of the identity of victims or witnesses, neither
the allowing of a witness to refuse to answer a question on "grounds of
confidentiality". This is foreseen in Rule 70 paragraphs (B), (C) and
(D). Inasmuch as the Prosecutor obtains information given to him on
condition it remains confidential he can not disclose its source without
the agreement of the person or entity (15) who supplied it. This would
not be so unusual if such information were not used as evidence at the
trial. But the Prosecutor, with the consent of the person or
representative of an entity, may decide to use documents and other
material obtained in this way as evidence at the trial. In this case -
and this is indeed something very new - "the Trial Chamber may not order
either party to produce additional evidence received from the person or
entity providing the initial information, nor may the Trial Chamber, for
the purpose !
of obtaining such additional evidence itself summon that person or a
representative of that entity as a witness or order their attendance".
Still, the Prosecutor may call as a witness a person or entity that has
offered confidential information, but the Trial Chamber may not compel
the witness to answer any question the witness declines to answer on the
grounds of confidentiality.
One can ask what kind of witness gives the Prosecutor confidential
information and then refuses to answer further questions as to how such
information was obtained when the Trial Chamber has no right to insist.
As a rule they are undercover agents who have been operating illegally
in foreign countries in order to collect information that can not be
obtained by regular means. They are also governmental representatives
who have provided The Hague Tribunal with confidential information on
condition that it conceal the source of the information as well as the
manner in which it was obtained. The only remaining question is whether
such "evidence" can be accepted as valid or such clandestine "witnesses"
believed at all.
Another innovation that was introduced by the makers of the Rules was
testimony without the obligation to appear at the trial. According to
Rule 71, at the request of either party, the Trial Chamber "may, in
exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice, order a
deposition be taken for use at trial and appoint for that purpose, a
Presiding Officer". Naturally, it sometimes happens that an important
witness, for health reasons, is unable to leave his home or hospital to
attend a trial. But in such cases a hearing, under the presidency of the
judge, is held in the witness' room where the witness answers the
questions of the prosecution and defense. Allowing a court officer to
take a deposition on his own whenever the Trial Chamber considers it to
be "in the interest of justice", increases the possibility of abuse and
prevents the confrontation of witnesses testifying differently about the
same subject.
The greatest "innovations" introduced by the Rules was the permanent
concealment of the identity of witnesses, victims or anyone related to
or associated with them. Under the guise of preserving privacy and
protecting a witness or victim, according to Rule 75 a judge or trial
chamber can, at a session in camera [i.e., a closed session], take:
"measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the
identity or whereabouts of a victim or a witness, or of persons related
to or associated with him by such means as:
a) expunging names and identifying information from the Chamber's public
record;
b) non-disclosure to the public of any records identifying the victim;
c) giving the testimony through image - or voice-altering devices or
closed circuit television and
d) assignment of a pseudonym."
Even this was not enough for the makers of these Rules and so they added
the possibility of closed sessions and appropriate measures to
facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims and witnesses, such as
one-way closed circuit television.
JUDICATURE WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY
There is no doubt whatsoever that the measures for the protection of a
witness which the Holy Inquisition was capable of offering were a
child's game compared to those provided by the Ruler of The Hague
Tribunal. The Inquisition was only able to offer a frightened witness
the possibility to enter the court by a side door under cover of night
and with a hood over the head. Possibly, and very probably, the
Inquisition would have taken the same measures as The Hague Tribunal
Rules had it been able to use the technology at the disposal of The
Hague judges today.
So as to understand more easily the "singularity" and also the
exceptional possibilities of violation of the aforementioned measures
for protecting a victim or witness, we will present a hypothetical
example. Let us suppose that in an American city with disturbed and very
strained inter-racial relations the sexual assault of a member of one
race group by a member of another takes place. Terrified by the possible
revenge of the relations and neighbors of the attacker, the victim asks
the court to be allowed to testify under a pseudonym using image- and
voice- altering devices. Would the American court allow this? Certainly
not. And one of the reasons would be that such "testimony" would prevent
a fair trial.
After such a convincing example, it is necessary to ask the following
question. Why can American courts refuse this type of testimony and The
Hague Tribunal accepts it when both are concerned with the protection of
a victim or witness from possible reprisal by the accused, his relatives
or friends? The answer is surprising: the American court firmly believes
that the American judicature, including the police, is capable of
offering such protection. And as a rule it is, except in the rare cases
of organized crime. The Hague Tribunal is well aware that it is not up
to this and justifiably assumes that the so-called international
community, as embodied by the Security Council, has no intention
whatsoever of protecting any victim or witness from the Balkan cauldron.
So, if no-one is ready to protect the victims or witnesses, then at
least their identity can be hidden.
Had they taken one more step in forming this judgment, the Hague judges
would have had to ask themselves whether, under such conditions, they
should have taken on the job of judging at all if in order to protect
victims and witnesses they had to use measures that were implemented by
the Holy Inquisition. Had they any idea of the concept of sovereignty,
they would have asked the Security Council how it thought they could
take to court anyone if they were unable to provide the conditions
necessary for the execution of judicature. When in his famous work
"Leviathan" Thomas Hobbes demonstrated the essential traits of
sovereignty, he included
"the Right of Judicature, that is to say, of hearing and deciding all
Controversies which may arise concerning Law, either Civil or Natural or
concerning Fact".(16)
In the execution of judicature it is most important that sovereignty
provides general and complete protection of all subjects from injustice
by others. Because otherwise
"to every man remainth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his
own conservation, the right of protecting himself by his private
strength, which is the condition of War, and contrary to the end for
which every Common-wealth is instituted".(17)
In other words, he who would judge and is able to do so, is sovereign;
and as sovereign is bound to offer all subjects staunch protection from
violence and the injustice of others. Who is unable of offering the
second should not stand in judgment because he is not sovereign. The
members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members,
wanted the first - to judge - without being capable of providing the
second - reliable protection. This resulted in the concealment of the
victims' and witnesses' identities and other measures as a clumsy
attempt to achieve what must be provided by a well instituted and
effective sovereign power.
Due to these important failings on the part of the Security Council and
The Hague Tribunal, a whole series of other unusual regulations to the
ridicule and shame of this Tribunal and its founders were created.
Particularly characteristic is Rule 99 which allows the arrest of a
suspect who has been acquitted. Truly a contradiction! However, this
contradiction came about for practical reasons. When the jury of an
American court of first instance brings a verdict of not guilty the
accused leaves the court room a free man, able to go where he will. The
prosecution can, of course, appeal against the first instance verdict
but it can not demand that an acquitted person stay in detention until a
second instance verdict is given. Sometimes the second instance court
revokes the first instance verdict and demands a retrial. Since the
suspect is free it may happen that he will not answer a summons by the
first instance court This, however, does not cause much worry as it is
assumed that !
the police, as an organ of sovereignty, must be capable of carrying out
every court order and bringing the person in question to trial.
The judges of The Hague Tribunal know very well although they are unable
to admit this publicly, that their sovereignty applies only to the court
room in which they judge and the prison where witnesses, suspects and
the accused are held. This forced them to make these contradictory
rules. In paragraph (A) of Rule 99, they stipulate that "in case of
acquittal the accused shall be released immediately". Then in paragraph
(B) they recant this rule by allowing the Trial Chamber, at the mere
hint of the Prosecutor submitting an appeal to "issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused to take effect immediately". Thanks to this
sophistry, the accused can be freed and arrested at one stroke. Had The
Hague judges the ability to think logically, they would have otherwise
formulated the rule applied here: the Prosecutor shall decide on the
freeing or detaining of a person acquitted by a first instance Trial
Chamber. Truly in the spirit of the aforesaid Ottoman proverb: "The Cadi
prosecu!
tes, and the Cadi sentences".
To those well acquainted with constitutional and criminal law the rule
that allows for a witness to testify against himself is a real surprise.
Modern criminal law explicitly forbids this and a witness can refuse to
answer incriminating questions. For a long time this important legal
guarantee has been represented by the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution of 1787 whereby "no person .... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ".
The authors of The Hague Tribunal Rules did not pay much attention to
this great example and wrote Rule 90 paragraph (E) which allows for
forced self-incrimination:
"A witness may object to making any statement which might tend to
incriminate him. The Chamber may, however, compel the witness to answer
the question. Testimony compelled in this way shall not be used as
evidence in a subsequent prosecution against the witness for any offense
other than perjury".
It is worthwhile asking why the rule makers allowed for the forced
self-incrimination of a witness if such evidence would not be used
against him. They were probably presuming that war crimes are most often
carried out by groups of people who, if they are forced to do so, will
implicate each other. Supposing The Hague Tribunal had the opportunity
of imprisoning two persons suspected of committing the same war crime
without either knowing the fate of the other. One could be forced to
testify against the other with the assurance that his testimony would
not be used against him, and vice versa. In this way the Prosecutor can
obtain evidence against them both without there formally having been any
self- incrimination. To our great surprise the rule makers were very
perfidious in this matter, with no concern for the fact that their
resourcefulness and ingeniousness was in direct contradiction to the
principle of modern criminal law that self-incriminating cannot be
exacted.
Finally, the above mentioned rules contain a series of undefined
concepts which allow for whimsicality and caprice. A characteristic
example is given by Rule 79 which permits the exclusion of the media and
public from court proceedings or part of the proceedings for the
following reasons:
1) public order or morality;
2) safety, security or non-disclosure of the identity of a victim or
witness, or
3) the protection of the interests of justice.
In a well founded legal system only public order and morality are
considered to be valid reasons for the partial or complete exclusion of
the public from court proceedings, and this only under strictly defined
circumstances. The secrecy of court proceedings through concealment of
the identity of a victim or witness is inadmissible, as already shown,
while the "interests of justice" as a reason for the exclusion of the
public, is yet another innovation whereby The Hague Tribunal "enriched"
legal theory and practice. Justice is the supreme legal value and since
law and judicature exist for the realization of justice, the provision
of "interests of justice" as one of the reasons for the exclusion of the
public was done in order to create a blanket discretionary norm which
would allow the Trial Chamber to do what it wanted under the umbrella of
expediency. The term was also introduced as an excuse for the taking of
depositions for later use at a trial (Rule 71 paragraph A) and acc!
eptance of evidence of a consistent pattern of conduct relevant to
serious violations of international humanitarian law (Rule 93 paragraph
A).
Finally, Prosecutor Richard Goldstone did not want to miss the chance of
possibly using or abusing the very elastic norms containing the loose
term "interests of justice". This is why he included in the regulations
regarding his own power (being his own legislator), the stipulation that
in certain circumstances he could grant any concessions to persons who
participated in alleged offenses in order to secure their evidence in
the prosecution of others (for example, by refraining from prosecuting
an accomplice in return for the testimony of the accomplice against
another offender), and that this "may be appropriate in the interests of
justice".(18) He hereby made it known that he would be acting on his own
will and not in his official capacity, and that certain executors of
alleged crimes could be acquitted in return for cooperation, i.e. if
they were willing to blame their accomplices. This kind of trade-off was
what he called justice.
"THE JUSTICE WHICH IS NOT SEEN TO BE DONE"
Justice is taken to infer a certain type of equality, primarily an
elementary equality before the law. It would appear that the members of
the Security Council knew this when they introduced the following
regulation into the Statute of the International Tribunal:
"All persons shall be equal before the International Tribunal" (article
21, paragraph l).
This kind of equality is taken to mean that all detained persons at The
Hague have exactly the same conditions of detention and that no
exceptions will be made. However, The Hague Tribunal judges believed
that justice was what they thought it to be, and so they introduced into
their rules a regulation allowing for important differences in the
conditions of detention. According to Rule 64
"the President of the Tribunal may, on the application of a party,
request modification of the conditions of detention of an accused".
This is as if a Mafia boss in the US were to request of the judge
responsible for trying his case that he be allowed to await trial in his
own villa from where he had previously carried out his "business" on
condition he pay from his own pocket a prison guard to prevent him from
absconding.
However paradoxical this example may seem, this is what happened at The
Hague. While the terminally ill Serb General Djordje Djukic was interned
in a prison cell without adequate medical care, the Croat General
Tihomir Blaskic, through his powerful patrons, made a deal with the
Tribunal President that he await trial in a luxurious villa surrounded
by guards paid by his "friends", instead of in prison. According to
Antonio Cassese this was done in the interests of justice - the kind of
"justice" whereby it is easy "to be a cardinal if your father is the
pope".
There is an English saying: "Justice has not only to be done, but it has
to be seen to be done". What could be seen at The Hague was not justice
but caprice and injustice.
***
Footnotes
(15) Being a state, one of its institutions or some organization.
(16) Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan", edited by C.B. Macpherson,
Harmondsworth. Penguin Books 1982, p. 234
(17) Ibid.
(18) Regulation No. 1 of 1994, as amended 17 May 1995.
***
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[Emperor's Clothes]
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Cent millions pour la démocratie ?
Comment les États-Unis ont créé une opposition corrompue en Serbie
Alors que les résultats des élections en Yougoslavie défraient la
manchette, nous publions des extraits d’un texte sur l’opposition serbe
écrit par Michel Chossudovsky (Canada), Jared Israël (États-Unis), Peter
Maher (États-Unis), Max Sinclair (États-Unis), Karen Talbot (Covert
Action Quarterly des États-Unis) et Niko Varkevisser (Global Reflexion,
Pays-Bas). 15-09-2000
www.tenc.net
[Les nouveaux Habits de l'Empereur]
La coalition de l’opposition yougoslave se proclame « démocratique et
indépendante ». Toutefois, nos recherches démontrent qu’elle est
contrôlée par Washington, par les mêmes personnes qui sont intervenues
au cours des dix dernières années pour tenter de disloquer la
Yougoslavie.
Des audiences révélatrices devant le Sénat américain
En juillet 1999, le Sénat américain a tenu des audiences sur la Serbie.
L’envoyé spécial des États-Unis dans les Balkans, Robert Gelbard, son
assistant, James Pardew, et le sénateur Joseph Biden ont témoigné. Ils
ont affirmé ouvertement que les États-Unis finançaient et contrôlaient
la soi-disant opposition « indépendante et démocratique ».
La journée qui a précédé les audiences, le Sénat américain a voté cent
millions de dollars pour cette opposition. L’envoyé spécial Gelbard a
déclaré : « Au cours des deux années qui ont mené à la crise du Kosovo,
nous avons dépensé 16,5 millions $ dans différents programmes pour
soutenir la démocratisation de la Serbie. » Il a ajouté que plus de 20
millions $ ont été octroyés à Milo Djukanovic qui dirige le gouvernement
de la République yougoslave du Montenegro.
Cet argent a servi à financer, voire même créer, des partis politiques,
des stations de radio et même des syndicats. Si une puissance étrangère
avait agi de la sorte aux États-Unis, leurs agents locaux auraient été
jetés en prison.
Le témoignage de James Pardew, l’assistant de Gelbard
Pardew : « Nous sommes intervenus par le biais d’organisations non
gouvernementales. Nous avons établi un anneau autour de la Serbie
d’émissions internationales, mais nous l’offrons également aux voix
indépendantes de Serbie qui utilisent les installations internationales.
» (Remarquez l’utilisation peu usuelle de l’expression « indépendante »
qui signifie « indépendantes d’eux mais dépendantes des États-Unis ».)
Le sénateur Joseph Biden ne semble pas croire que les mesures décrites
par Pardew soient suffisantes.
Biden : « Nous pouvons rendre des installations disponibles. Mais
sommes-nous prêts à fermer les installations qui répandent de la
propagande ? »
Gelbard essaya de défendre la politique du gouvernement américain, en
soulignant que durant la guerre, l’an dernier, contre la Yougoslavie,
les États-Unis avaient effectivement « fermé » les installations de la
télévision serbe en les bombardant.
Gelbard : « Eh bien, nous avons, sénateur, au cours du conflit du
Kosovo, avec nos alliés... »
Le sénateur Biden l’interrompt, craignant que Gelbard en dise trop.
Biden : « Non, je sais cela. Je veux savoir ce qui se fait maintenant. »
Gelbard : « Eh bien, en autant que je sache, les communications n’ont
pas été rétablies entre la télévision serbe et les installations
Eutelsat et nous nous sommes assurés qu’elles seraient interrompues si
on essayait de les rétablir. »
Le sénateur Biden et l’envoyé spécial Gelbard ont eu cet échange au
sujet de l’« opposition démocratique en Serbie ».
Biden : « Que pouvons-nous faire en Serbie même ? Par exemple, Vuk
Draskovic continue à nier l’accès à Studio B, qui est supposément... »
Gelbard : « Non, il vient de donner accès à Studio B à la Radio B-92,
qui vient de rouvrir sous le nom de Radio B-292. Nous voulons que
Draskovic ouvre Studio B au reste de l’opposition et c’est le message
que nous lui acheminerons au cours des prochains jours. »
Rappelons que Gelbard était le principal conseiller de Clinton à propos
de la Yougoslavie et que Biden fait partie des principaux sénateurs
américains engagés dans l’opposition contre la Serbie. Ces deux hommes
sont tellement impliqués dans le contrôle de l’opposition « indépendante
» de la Serbie qu’ils savent – à la minute près – si Draskovic, Djindjic
et Djukanovic se partagent équitablement espace et temps d’antenne au
Studio B à Belgrade.
Soutenir un seul candidat
L’Agence France-Presse rapportait le 2 août dernier qu’une délégation de
« l’opposition démocratique » avait rencontré les dirigeants du
Montenegro pour les convaincre de soutenir le candidat de l’« opposition
démocratique » à la présidence.
« La délégation serbe comprenait Zoran Djindjic du Parti démocratique et
Vojislav Kostunica du Mouvement démocratique pour la Serbie, le candidat
pressenti pour faire face à Milosevic. »
« La rencontre eut lieu le lendemain de la rencontre de la secrétaire
d’État Madeleine Albright avec le président monténégrin Milo Djukanovic
à Rome, au cours de laquelle elle pressa de façon urgente les groupes
d’opposition à abandonner leurs menaces de boycott des élections et de
s’unir pour vaincre Milosevic. »
D’autres informations nous sont parvenues sur le voyage de Albright à
Rome et sur sa rencontre avec Djukanovic.
« En plus des échéances électorales, Albright a déclaré qu’elle avait
discuté avec Djukanovic des moyens d’accroître l’aide au Montenegro qui
est en proie à une crise économique » (Agence France-Presse, 1er août
2000). Ainsi, Albright a offert des fonds à Milo Djukanovic s’il
acceptait d’apporter son soutien à la soi-disant opposition «
indépendante ».
Au début, Djukanovic refusa. Kostunica le critiqua publiquement de ne
pas se joindre à son équipe. Puis, le 11 septembre, Djukanovic endossa
la candidature de Kostunica. Albright en a eu pour son argent.
C’est un coup de chance pour les agents américains en Yougoslavie
d’avoir réussi, en travaillant avec les gens du National Endowment for
Democracy, de manœuvrer Kostunica dans une alliance avec Djindjic et
Djukanovic et plusieurs autres sous le parapluie américain.
L’organisation de Kostunica est très faible. Sa campagne électorale
dépend des partis, groupes et médias contrôlés par les États-Unis. S’il
remporte la victoire, les marionnettes locales des États-Unis lui
fourniront le personnel étatique requis.
Le programme de l’« opposition démocratique »
L’« opposition démocratique » a fait sienne un programme rédigé par le
G-17, un groupe d’économistes néolibéraux de Belgrade, financé par le
National Endowment for Democracy. Ce programme est disponible sur les
sites web du G-17 et du « groupe étudiant » Otpor. Il comprend un
certain nombre d’items que l’« opposition démocratique » s’est engagée à
mettre en œuvre dans le cas d’une victoire aux élections présidentielles
ou dans d’autres élections. Les principaux points du programme sont les
suivants :
L’adoption du mark allemand comme monnaie pour l’ensemble de la
Yougoslavie, suivant en cela ce qui s’est fait en Bosnie, au Kosovo et
au Montenegro.
Cela aurait pour effet d’appauvrir immédiatement le peuple yougoslave en
transformant le pays en dépendance économique de l’Allemagne.
La fin du contrôle des prix. La fin des subventions pour la nourriture,
la fin des protections sociales.
Le peuple travailleur, y compris le million de réfugiés dont les
conditions sont déjà difficiles, devra acheter la nourriture aux prix
occidentaux, mais sans les salaires occidentaux.
Un traitement de choc pour transformer la Yougoslavie en pays
capitaliste sans d’abord accorder aux Yougoslaves les moyens financiers
nécessaires pour participer à une telle économie. Il en résultera la
transfert en des mains étrangères du contrôle de l’ensemble de
l’économie yougoslave. De telles applications de la soi-disant «
idéologie économique moderne » ont déjà réussi à détruire l’économie
russe.
Curieusement, le programme ne mentionne pas l’agression criminelle de
l’OTAN contre la Yougoslavie.
Le programme appelle à réduire les dépenses publiques, démilitariser et
apporter de radicales transformations au système de taxation. Toutes ces
mesures permettront à la Yougoslavie d’être contrôlée de l’extérieur.
Le programme accepte le diktat américain selon lequel la Yougoslavie
n’existe plus et que la Serbie devra se mettre à genoux devant
Washington pour être reconnue à nouveau sur la scène internationale.
Cela signifie la reddition immédiate de tous les actifs et des droits
historiques de l’État yougoslave. Ces actifs incluent des milliards de
dollars en ambassades, navires, avions, comptes de banque gelés à
travers le monde, actifs à l’étranger et propriétés accumulés par le
peuple yougoslave depuis la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale.
Le National Endowment for Democracy et le mécanisme de la subversion
Dans son témoignage, Gelbard a affirmé que le gouvernement américain
avait distribué de l’argent en Yougoslavie par l’intermédiaire d’une
soi-disant « organisation non-gouvernementale », le National Endowment
for Democracy (Fonds national pour la démocratie). Mais il ne s’agit pas
d’un organisme non-gouvernemental. Il est financé par le Congrès
américain !
Le National Endowment for Democracy a été créé en 1983 pour un but bien
précis. Tout le monde savait à ce moment-là que la CIA poursuivait les
objectifs de la politique américaine en soudoyant des gens et en mettant
sur pied des groupes bidons. Comme le souligne le Washington Post : «
Lorsque ces activités étaient révélées (ce qui était inévitable),
l’effet était dévastateur. » (22 septembre 1991)
Le Congrès américain a alors mis sur pied le National Endowment for
Democracy dans le but de faire ouvertement ce que la CIA avait
l’habitude de faire clandestinement. Il y avait là un grand avantage. La
subversion n’étant plus secrète, elle ne pouvait plus faire l’objet de
révélations !
Bénéficiant de fonds considérables, le National Endowment for Democracy
et ses filières ont commencé à recruter dans les pays ciblés des «
activistes pour la démocratie », des « activistes pour la paix » et des
« économistes indépendants ». Ces gens furent invités à festoyer dans
les plus grands restaurants et reçurent beaucoup d’argent pour leurs
comptes de dépense. On leur octroya des bourses d’études et des stages à
l’étranger. On cultiva chez eux l’idée qu’ils étaient les leaders de
demain de l’empire américain.
Ces « activistes » créèrent des « organisations indépendantes » dans
leur propre pays et sollicitèrent des fonds auprès du National Endowment
for Democracy qui, rappelons-le, les avait lui-même recrutés ! Et le
National Endowment for Democracy leur octroya les fonds demandés !
www.tenc.net
[Les nouveaux Habits de l'Empereur]
---
Bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'"
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only")
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Sito WEB : http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eCircle ti offre una nuova opportunita:
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Organizza on line i tuoi appuntamenti .
E' facile, veloce e gratuito!
Da oggi su
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Cent millions pour la démocratie ?
Comment les États-Unis ont créé une opposition corrompue en Serbie
Alors que les résultats des élections en Yougoslavie défraient la
manchette, nous publions des extraits d’un texte sur l’opposition serbe
écrit par Michel Chossudovsky (Canada), Jared Israël (États-Unis), Peter
Maher (États-Unis), Max Sinclair (États-Unis), Karen Talbot (Covert
Action Quarterly des États-Unis) et Niko Varkevisser (Global Reflexion,
Pays-Bas). 15-09-2000
www.tenc.net
[Les nouveaux Habits de l'Empereur]
La coalition de l’opposition yougoslave se proclame « démocratique et
indépendante ». Toutefois, nos recherches démontrent qu’elle est
contrôlée par Washington, par les mêmes personnes qui sont intervenues
au cours des dix dernières années pour tenter de disloquer la
Yougoslavie.
Des audiences révélatrices devant le Sénat américain
En juillet 1999, le Sénat américain a tenu des audiences sur la Serbie.
L’envoyé spécial des États-Unis dans les Balkans, Robert Gelbard, son
assistant, James Pardew, et le sénateur Joseph Biden ont témoigné. Ils
ont affirmé ouvertement que les États-Unis finançaient et contrôlaient
la soi-disant opposition « indépendante et démocratique ».
La journée qui a précédé les audiences, le Sénat américain a voté cent
millions de dollars pour cette opposition. L’envoyé spécial Gelbard a
déclaré : « Au cours des deux années qui ont mené à la crise du Kosovo,
nous avons dépensé 16,5 millions $ dans différents programmes pour
soutenir la démocratisation de la Serbie. » Il a ajouté que plus de 20
millions $ ont été octroyés à Milo Djukanovic qui dirige le gouvernement
de la République yougoslave du Montenegro.
Cet argent a servi à financer, voire même créer, des partis politiques,
des stations de radio et même des syndicats. Si une puissance étrangère
avait agi de la sorte aux États-Unis, leurs agents locaux auraient été
jetés en prison.
Le témoignage de James Pardew, l’assistant de Gelbard
Pardew : « Nous sommes intervenus par le biais d’organisations non
gouvernementales. Nous avons établi un anneau autour de la Serbie
d’émissions internationales, mais nous l’offrons également aux voix
indépendantes de Serbie qui utilisent les installations internationales.
» (Remarquez l’utilisation peu usuelle de l’expression « indépendante »
qui signifie « indépendantes d’eux mais dépendantes des États-Unis ».)
Le sénateur Joseph Biden ne semble pas croire que les mesures décrites
par Pardew soient suffisantes.
Biden : « Nous pouvons rendre des installations disponibles. Mais
sommes-nous prêts à fermer les installations qui répandent de la
propagande ? »
Gelbard essaya de défendre la politique du gouvernement américain, en
soulignant que durant la guerre, l’an dernier, contre la Yougoslavie,
les États-Unis avaient effectivement « fermé » les installations de la
télévision serbe en les bombardant.
Gelbard : « Eh bien, nous avons, sénateur, au cours du conflit du
Kosovo, avec nos alliés... »
Le sénateur Biden l’interrompt, craignant que Gelbard en dise trop.
Biden : « Non, je sais cela. Je veux savoir ce qui se fait maintenant. »
Gelbard : « Eh bien, en autant que je sache, les communications n’ont
pas été rétablies entre la télévision serbe et les installations
Eutelsat et nous nous sommes assurés qu’elles seraient interrompues si
on essayait de les rétablir. »
Le sénateur Biden et l’envoyé spécial Gelbard ont eu cet échange au
sujet de l’« opposition démocratique en Serbie ».
Biden : « Que pouvons-nous faire en Serbie même ? Par exemple, Vuk
Draskovic continue à nier l’accès à Studio B, qui est supposément... »
Gelbard : « Non, il vient de donner accès à Studio B à la Radio B-92,
qui vient de rouvrir sous le nom de Radio B-292. Nous voulons que
Draskovic ouvre Studio B au reste de l’opposition et c’est le message
que nous lui acheminerons au cours des prochains jours. »
Rappelons que Gelbard était le principal conseiller de Clinton à propos
de la Yougoslavie et que Biden fait partie des principaux sénateurs
américains engagés dans l’opposition contre la Serbie. Ces deux hommes
sont tellement impliqués dans le contrôle de l’opposition « indépendante
» de la Serbie qu’ils savent – à la minute près – si Draskovic, Djindjic
et Djukanovic se partagent équitablement espace et temps d’antenne au
Studio B à Belgrade.
Soutenir un seul candidat
L’Agence France-Presse rapportait le 2 août dernier qu’une délégation de
« l’opposition démocratique » avait rencontré les dirigeants du
Montenegro pour les convaincre de soutenir le candidat de l’« opposition
démocratique » à la présidence.
« La délégation serbe comprenait Zoran Djindjic du Parti démocratique et
Vojislav Kostunica du Mouvement démocratique pour la Serbie, le candidat
pressenti pour faire face à Milosevic. »
« La rencontre eut lieu le lendemain de la rencontre de la secrétaire
d’État Madeleine Albright avec le président monténégrin Milo Djukanovic
à Rome, au cours de laquelle elle pressa de façon urgente les groupes
d’opposition à abandonner leurs menaces de boycott des élections et de
s’unir pour vaincre Milosevic. »
D’autres informations nous sont parvenues sur le voyage de Albright à
Rome et sur sa rencontre avec Djukanovic.
« En plus des échéances électorales, Albright a déclaré qu’elle avait
discuté avec Djukanovic des moyens d’accroître l’aide au Montenegro qui
est en proie à une crise économique » (Agence France-Presse, 1er août
2000). Ainsi, Albright a offert des fonds à Milo Djukanovic s’il
acceptait d’apporter son soutien à la soi-disant opposition «
indépendante ».
Au début, Djukanovic refusa. Kostunica le critiqua publiquement de ne
pas se joindre à son équipe. Puis, le 11 septembre, Djukanovic endossa
la candidature de Kostunica. Albright en a eu pour son argent.
C’est un coup de chance pour les agents américains en Yougoslavie
d’avoir réussi, en travaillant avec les gens du National Endowment for
Democracy, de manœuvrer Kostunica dans une alliance avec Djindjic et
Djukanovic et plusieurs autres sous le parapluie américain.
L’organisation de Kostunica est très faible. Sa campagne électorale
dépend des partis, groupes et médias contrôlés par les États-Unis. S’il
remporte la victoire, les marionnettes locales des États-Unis lui
fourniront le personnel étatique requis.
Le programme de l’« opposition démocratique »
L’« opposition démocratique » a fait sienne un programme rédigé par le
G-17, un groupe d’économistes néolibéraux de Belgrade, financé par le
National Endowment for Democracy. Ce programme est disponible sur les
sites web du G-17 et du « groupe étudiant » Otpor. Il comprend un
certain nombre d’items que l’« opposition démocratique » s’est engagée à
mettre en œuvre dans le cas d’une victoire aux élections présidentielles
ou dans d’autres élections. Les principaux points du programme sont les
suivants :
L’adoption du mark allemand comme monnaie pour l’ensemble de la
Yougoslavie, suivant en cela ce qui s’est fait en Bosnie, au Kosovo et
au Montenegro.
Cela aurait pour effet d’appauvrir immédiatement le peuple yougoslave en
transformant le pays en dépendance économique de l’Allemagne.
La fin du contrôle des prix. La fin des subventions pour la nourriture,
la fin des protections sociales.
Le peuple travailleur, y compris le million de réfugiés dont les
conditions sont déjà difficiles, devra acheter la nourriture aux prix
occidentaux, mais sans les salaires occidentaux.
Un traitement de choc pour transformer la Yougoslavie en pays
capitaliste sans d’abord accorder aux Yougoslaves les moyens financiers
nécessaires pour participer à une telle économie. Il en résultera la
transfert en des mains étrangères du contrôle de l’ensemble de
l’économie yougoslave. De telles applications de la soi-disant «
idéologie économique moderne » ont déjà réussi à détruire l’économie
russe.
Curieusement, le programme ne mentionne pas l’agression criminelle de
l’OTAN contre la Yougoslavie.
Le programme appelle à réduire les dépenses publiques, démilitariser et
apporter de radicales transformations au système de taxation. Toutes ces
mesures permettront à la Yougoslavie d’être contrôlée de l’extérieur.
Le programme accepte le diktat américain selon lequel la Yougoslavie
n’existe plus et que la Serbie devra se mettre à genoux devant
Washington pour être reconnue à nouveau sur la scène internationale.
Cela signifie la reddition immédiate de tous les actifs et des droits
historiques de l’État yougoslave. Ces actifs incluent des milliards de
dollars en ambassades, navires, avions, comptes de banque gelés à
travers le monde, actifs à l’étranger et propriétés accumulés par le
peuple yougoslave depuis la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale.
Le National Endowment for Democracy et le mécanisme de la subversion
Dans son témoignage, Gelbard a affirmé que le gouvernement américain
avait distribué de l’argent en Yougoslavie par l’intermédiaire d’une
soi-disant « organisation non-gouvernementale », le National Endowment
for Democracy (Fonds national pour la démocratie). Mais il ne s’agit pas
d’un organisme non-gouvernemental. Il est financé par le Congrès
américain !
Le National Endowment for Democracy a été créé en 1983 pour un but bien
précis. Tout le monde savait à ce moment-là que la CIA poursuivait les
objectifs de la politique américaine en soudoyant des gens et en mettant
sur pied des groupes bidons. Comme le souligne le Washington Post : «
Lorsque ces activités étaient révélées (ce qui était inévitable),
l’effet était dévastateur. » (22 septembre 1991)
Le Congrès américain a alors mis sur pied le National Endowment for
Democracy dans le but de faire ouvertement ce que la CIA avait
l’habitude de faire clandestinement. Il y avait là un grand avantage. La
subversion n’étant plus secrète, elle ne pouvait plus faire l’objet de
révélations !
Bénéficiant de fonds considérables, le National Endowment for Democracy
et ses filières ont commencé à recruter dans les pays ciblés des «
activistes pour la démocratie », des « activistes pour la paix » et des
« économistes indépendants ». Ces gens furent invités à festoyer dans
les plus grands restaurants et reçurent beaucoup d’argent pour leurs
comptes de dépense. On leur octroya des bourses d’études et des stages à
l’étranger. On cultiva chez eux l’idée qu’ils étaient les leaders de
demain de l’empire américain.
Ces « activistes » créèrent des « organisations indépendantes » dans
leur propre pays et sollicitèrent des fonds auprès du National Endowment
for Democracy qui, rappelons-le, les avait lui-même recrutés ! Et le
National Endowment for Democracy leur octroya les fonds demandés !
www.tenc.net
[Les nouveaux Habits de l'Empereur]
---
Bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'"
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only")
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Sito WEB : http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eCircle ti offre una nuova opportunita:
la tua agenda sul web - per te e per i tuoi amici
Organizza on line i tuoi appuntamenti .
E' facile, veloce e gratuito!
Da oggi su
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GIULIETTO CHIESA: Kostunica come Gorbaciov, o come Jeltzin? (della
serie: quelli con il vezzo di attaccare i parlamenti).
ENZO BETTIZA: Meno male che li abbiamo bombardati, e meno male che
c'e' Kostunica: adesso possiamo finalmente staccare il Kosovo! Il
tripudio del commentatore piu' antijugoslavo ed anticomunista
d'Italia.
---
LETTERA
Gorbaciov e Kostunica
GIULIETTO CHIESA
(da "Il Manifesto")
Osservando l'evolversi della situazione jugoslava (ma ormai di
Jugoslavia non è più il caso di parlare), colgo un parallelo molto
netto tra la parabola, conclusa da tempo, di Mikhail Gorbaciov e
quella, appena iniziata, di Vojislav Kostunica. Lui stesso ha
indicato, qualche giorno fa - prima del suo primo viaggio
all'estero, a Biarritz, per incontrare gli europei - i pericoli
principali ai quali è sottoposto in questa delicatissima
transizione: "i problemi maggiori me li stanno creando i miei
alleati democratici"; e: "mi auguro che dall'esterno ci lascino
tranquilli". Su entrambi i pericoli c'è l'analogia con Gorbaciov.
Dieci anni fa, l'allora presidente sovietico stava combattendo su
due fronti, esattamente come Kostunica sta facendo ora (e temo
dovrà fare sempre di più nei prossimi mesi): il primo fronte era
rappresentato dall'apparato del partito, recalcitrante a ogni
cambiamento, democratico ed economico. Il secondo fronte era
rappresentato dagli "impazienti". Un fronte largo, disorganizzato
ma influente, prevalentemente composto da intellettuali ex
comunisti. Gorbaciov fu sconfitto perché la pressione dei secondi,
affinché egli realizzasse la transizione verso l'Occidente, in
fretta, a tutti i costi, lo espose sul fianco opposto
all'offensiva degli apparati di partito. Ricordiamo che i due
fronti vennero sinteticamente definiti, dalla stampa dell'epoca,
rispettivamente come "riformatori" e "conservatori", sebbene, come
poi si vide, i primi fossero più avidi di potere e di ricchezze
che genuini riformatori. Varrà la pena di ricordare anche, ai
lettori più giovani, che Gorbaciov fu scalzato dal potere da un
colpo di stato organizzato dai "conservatori" il 18 agosto del
1991. Ma anche che - come rivelò uno dei leader "democratici"
dell'epoca, Gavrijl Popov, se non ci fosse stato il golpe di
agosto, Gorbaciov lo avrebbero gettato a mare loro, in settembre o
in ottobre. Anche Kostunica deve ora fronteggiare gli impazienti
interni. I quali sono addirittura più esigenti di quanto non lo
fossero i "democratici" russi, poiché essi ritengono - solo in
parte a ragione - di essere stati gli artefici della vittoria di
Kostunica, e chiedono di essere riconosciuti come tali. Cioè
chiedono posti, influenza, potere. E anche risarcimenti, morali e
materiali. E vogliono che Kostunica faccia i conti, in fretta e
definitivamente, con gli sconfitti, con Milosevic in primo luogo.
E' probabile che Kostunica - come a suo tempo Gorbaciov - voglia
fare molte di queste cose. Ma non tutte e, soprattutto, non in
fretta. Egli sa che la vittoria elettorale c'è stata, e grande, ma
che una parte cospicua del paese ha votato per Milosevic e non può
essere ignorata (proprio in base a considerazioni democratiche).
Egli sa bene di avere vinto le elezioni anche perché nella sua
piattaforma programmatica c'era la condanna dei bombardamenti
della Nato, c'era la difesa dell'integrità territoriale dello
Stato, c'era il rifiuto di consegnare Milosevic al tribunale
internazionale dell'Aja. Non ci fossero stati questi tre punti,
con ogni probabilità Kostunica non avrebbe vinto le elezioni.
Spingerlo a bruciare le tappe, e a smentirsi, non sarà un
suggerimento salutare: né per lui, né per la gente serba, poiché
esaspererà una transizione già di per sé molto difficile e
dolorosa. Eppure è questo che sta avvenendo. Molti interrogativi
restano dunque aperti, anche sul destino di Kostunica. L'altro
pericolo viene dall'esterno. Pochi, in Occidente, hanno fatto
autocritica sulla Russia, sebbene sia ormai evidente a tutti
(coloro che hanno un minimo di onestà intellettuale) che la
ricetta occidentale (leggi, essenzialmente, americana) per la
transizione russa verso il mercato e lo stato di diritto si sia
rivelata un terrificante fallimento. Questo spiega perché si sta
ripetendo, con Kostunica, lo stesso "errore" che si fece con
Gorbaciov, quando si pretese da lui che facesse ciò che non poteva
(e non voleva) e, visto che non seguiva i consigli dell'Occidente,
lo si scaricò e si scelse Eltsin, più corrivo, cedevole e
subalterno, ma anche più corrotto e assai meno democratico. In
base al principio: sia quello che vuole, purché faccia i nostri
interessi. Che poi quelli che Eltsin fece fossero gli interessi
dell'Occidente è ancora tutta da vedere, ma questo è un altro
discorso. Il fatto è che non si vede grande saggezza, per ora, nei
comportamenti dell'Occidente. Gli europei hanno abbracciato
Kostunica, a Biarritz, e hanno fatto bene. Ma non hanno allentato
la pressione su di lui perché concluda senza indugi l'opera di
smantellamento della Jugoslavia. Inespresso, ma tangibile, aleggia
nell'aria un ricatto: aiuti, investimenti, in cambio della resa
finale della Jugoslavia di Milosevic e, s'intende, della consegna
di Milosevic in persona. Una politica europea non c'era e continua
a non esserci dove si tratta di sapere quale sarà il destino della
Bosnia, del Kosovo, del Montenegro. E sarà cosa altamente
rischiosa, per tutti, esigere da Kostunica, semplicemente, di
comunicare ai suoi elettori che quei pezzi di terra e della loro
storia (e con essi i serbi che vi si trovano) debbono andare con
Dio.
---
Il voto nel Kosovo
I frutti di pace della guerra
"La Stampa", 1 novembre 2000
di Enzo Bettiza
Più passa il tempo, tanto più ci si rende conto che l'intervento
Nato contro la Serbia di Milosevic continua a produrre una
sequenza di risultati sempre più positivi ed efficaci. Ci si
accorge insomma che avevano torto sia i pacifisti ideologici, che
condannarono quell'intervento come un sopruso imperialistico, sia
i pacifisti conservatori che, in nome di un sofisticato realismo,
lo condannarono come un errore. Quel "sopruso" e quell'"errore"
non solo bloccarono l'ultimo tentativo di genocidio totale del
ventesimo secolo. Hanno provocato in seguito la caduta dell'ultimo
tiranno comunista europeo, hanno portato al potere a Belgrado un
nuovo presidente che sta ricucendo i legami interrotti con
l'Europa, hanno preparato il terreno per le prime elezioni
democratiche a cielo aperto in Kosovo, infine hanno assicurato la
vittoria del partito moderato di Ibrahim Rugova contro quello
estremista e militarista di Hashim Thaci. Il paventato "effetto
domino" non c'è stato. Ci sarebbe stato se l'Occidente, anziché
impegnarsi, avesse consentito ai serbi di svuotare il Kosovo e di
far esplodere la Macedonia e l'Albania con l'alluvione dei
profughi. Anche i governanti autonomisti di Podgorica stanno
traendo un sospiro, in attesa che Kostunica si decida a cambiare
la forma e la sostanza della "Federazione jugoslava"
trasformandola in una confederazione paritaria serbo-montenegrina.
C'è ancora chi continua a tracciare scenari catastrofici lasciando
immaginare che, da un'eventuale secessione kosovara, potrebbero
dipartirsi a raggiera una serie di cataclismi regionali. Non si
capisce se qui prevalga l'ignoranza o la malafede. La graduale
normalizzazione nella Serbia, nel Montenegro e nel Kosovo avviene
in un quadro generale completamente nuovo, dopo le quattro guerre
scatenate con centinaia di migliaia di morti da Milosevic e dalle
sue bande. La Slovenia è oramai un pezzo della Mitteleuropa in
procinto di superare gli esami di Maastricht. La Croazia, dopo la
scomparsa di Franjo Tudjman, non è più una "democratura" ma una
democrazia avviata a integrarsi anch'essa all'Europa. La
Bosnia-Erzegovina, dopo l'autopensionamento del presidente Alija
Izetbegovic, sta cercando un'uscita di sicurezza da un groviglio
istituzionale che di fatto vede quello Stato posticcio lacerato
tra una componente croata erzegovese, una "etnia" slavo-musulmana,
infine una confusa Repubblica serba che non si sa bene da chi sia
oggi guidata. Quanto alla Macedonia, dopo il ritiro del saggio
presidente Gligorov, essa non rappresenta affatto quel permanente
pericolo di disgregazione agitato dagli sceneggiatori del peggio:
il terzo albanese macedone è lealmente integrato nelle istituzioni
governative, amministrative ed economiche del Paese e dello Stato.
Resta, ovviamente, la questione delle questioni: l'indipendenza di
Pristina. Anche qui l'ottica prevalente è falsa. Non si tratta di
far "convivere" cinquantamila serbi spaventati con una nazione di
due milioni di albanesi la cui potenza demografica è peraltro la
più elevata in Europa. Si tratta di negoziare i ritmi di una
secessione progressiva quanto inevitabile. I balcanici, quando
sono moderati, sono anche maestri in operazioni omeopatiche del
genere. Kostunica e Rugova saranno all'altezza del compito?
------
Bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'"
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only")
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
Sito WEB : http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
eCircle ti offre una nuova opportunita:
Il tuo sondaggio sul web sugli argomenti che preferisci
Facile da gestire e con rappresentazioni grafiche dei risultati.
E' facile, veloce e gratuito!
Da oggi su
http://www.ecircle.it/ad196236/www.ecircle.it
serie: quelli con il vezzo di attaccare i parlamenti).
ENZO BETTIZA: Meno male che li abbiamo bombardati, e meno male che
c'e' Kostunica: adesso possiamo finalmente staccare il Kosovo! Il
tripudio del commentatore piu' antijugoslavo ed anticomunista
d'Italia.
---
LETTERA
Gorbaciov e Kostunica
GIULIETTO CHIESA
(da "Il Manifesto")
Osservando l'evolversi della situazione jugoslava (ma ormai di
Jugoslavia non è più il caso di parlare), colgo un parallelo molto
netto tra la parabola, conclusa da tempo, di Mikhail Gorbaciov e
quella, appena iniziata, di Vojislav Kostunica. Lui stesso ha
indicato, qualche giorno fa - prima del suo primo viaggio
all'estero, a Biarritz, per incontrare gli europei - i pericoli
principali ai quali è sottoposto in questa delicatissima
transizione: "i problemi maggiori me li stanno creando i miei
alleati democratici"; e: "mi auguro che dall'esterno ci lascino
tranquilli". Su entrambi i pericoli c'è l'analogia con Gorbaciov.
Dieci anni fa, l'allora presidente sovietico stava combattendo su
due fronti, esattamente come Kostunica sta facendo ora (e temo
dovrà fare sempre di più nei prossimi mesi): il primo fronte era
rappresentato dall'apparato del partito, recalcitrante a ogni
cambiamento, democratico ed economico. Il secondo fronte era
rappresentato dagli "impazienti". Un fronte largo, disorganizzato
ma influente, prevalentemente composto da intellettuali ex
comunisti. Gorbaciov fu sconfitto perché la pressione dei secondi,
affinché egli realizzasse la transizione verso l'Occidente, in
fretta, a tutti i costi, lo espose sul fianco opposto
all'offensiva degli apparati di partito. Ricordiamo che i due
fronti vennero sinteticamente definiti, dalla stampa dell'epoca,
rispettivamente come "riformatori" e "conservatori", sebbene, come
poi si vide, i primi fossero più avidi di potere e di ricchezze
che genuini riformatori. Varrà la pena di ricordare anche, ai
lettori più giovani, che Gorbaciov fu scalzato dal potere da un
colpo di stato organizzato dai "conservatori" il 18 agosto del
1991. Ma anche che - come rivelò uno dei leader "democratici"
dell'epoca, Gavrijl Popov, se non ci fosse stato il golpe di
agosto, Gorbaciov lo avrebbero gettato a mare loro, in settembre o
in ottobre. Anche Kostunica deve ora fronteggiare gli impazienti
interni. I quali sono addirittura più esigenti di quanto non lo
fossero i "democratici" russi, poiché essi ritengono - solo in
parte a ragione - di essere stati gli artefici della vittoria di
Kostunica, e chiedono di essere riconosciuti come tali. Cioè
chiedono posti, influenza, potere. E anche risarcimenti, morali e
materiali. E vogliono che Kostunica faccia i conti, in fretta e
definitivamente, con gli sconfitti, con Milosevic in primo luogo.
E' probabile che Kostunica - come a suo tempo Gorbaciov - voglia
fare molte di queste cose. Ma non tutte e, soprattutto, non in
fretta. Egli sa che la vittoria elettorale c'è stata, e grande, ma
che una parte cospicua del paese ha votato per Milosevic e non può
essere ignorata (proprio in base a considerazioni democratiche).
Egli sa bene di avere vinto le elezioni anche perché nella sua
piattaforma programmatica c'era la condanna dei bombardamenti
della Nato, c'era la difesa dell'integrità territoriale dello
Stato, c'era il rifiuto di consegnare Milosevic al tribunale
internazionale dell'Aja. Non ci fossero stati questi tre punti,
con ogni probabilità Kostunica non avrebbe vinto le elezioni.
Spingerlo a bruciare le tappe, e a smentirsi, non sarà un
suggerimento salutare: né per lui, né per la gente serba, poiché
esaspererà una transizione già di per sé molto difficile e
dolorosa. Eppure è questo che sta avvenendo. Molti interrogativi
restano dunque aperti, anche sul destino di Kostunica. L'altro
pericolo viene dall'esterno. Pochi, in Occidente, hanno fatto
autocritica sulla Russia, sebbene sia ormai evidente a tutti
(coloro che hanno un minimo di onestà intellettuale) che la
ricetta occidentale (leggi, essenzialmente, americana) per la
transizione russa verso il mercato e lo stato di diritto si sia
rivelata un terrificante fallimento. Questo spiega perché si sta
ripetendo, con Kostunica, lo stesso "errore" che si fece con
Gorbaciov, quando si pretese da lui che facesse ciò che non poteva
(e non voleva) e, visto che non seguiva i consigli dell'Occidente,
lo si scaricò e si scelse Eltsin, più corrivo, cedevole e
subalterno, ma anche più corrotto e assai meno democratico. In
base al principio: sia quello che vuole, purché faccia i nostri
interessi. Che poi quelli che Eltsin fece fossero gli interessi
dell'Occidente è ancora tutta da vedere, ma questo è un altro
discorso. Il fatto è che non si vede grande saggezza, per ora, nei
comportamenti dell'Occidente. Gli europei hanno abbracciato
Kostunica, a Biarritz, e hanno fatto bene. Ma non hanno allentato
la pressione su di lui perché concluda senza indugi l'opera di
smantellamento della Jugoslavia. Inespresso, ma tangibile, aleggia
nell'aria un ricatto: aiuti, investimenti, in cambio della resa
finale della Jugoslavia di Milosevic e, s'intende, della consegna
di Milosevic in persona. Una politica europea non c'era e continua
a non esserci dove si tratta di sapere quale sarà il destino della
Bosnia, del Kosovo, del Montenegro. E sarà cosa altamente
rischiosa, per tutti, esigere da Kostunica, semplicemente, di
comunicare ai suoi elettori che quei pezzi di terra e della loro
storia (e con essi i serbi che vi si trovano) debbono andare con
Dio.
---
Il voto nel Kosovo
I frutti di pace della guerra
"La Stampa", 1 novembre 2000
di Enzo Bettiza
Più passa il tempo, tanto più ci si rende conto che l'intervento
Nato contro la Serbia di Milosevic continua a produrre una
sequenza di risultati sempre più positivi ed efficaci. Ci si
accorge insomma che avevano torto sia i pacifisti ideologici, che
condannarono quell'intervento come un sopruso imperialistico, sia
i pacifisti conservatori che, in nome di un sofisticato realismo,
lo condannarono come un errore. Quel "sopruso" e quell'"errore"
non solo bloccarono l'ultimo tentativo di genocidio totale del
ventesimo secolo. Hanno provocato in seguito la caduta dell'ultimo
tiranno comunista europeo, hanno portato al potere a Belgrado un
nuovo presidente che sta ricucendo i legami interrotti con
l'Europa, hanno preparato il terreno per le prime elezioni
democratiche a cielo aperto in Kosovo, infine hanno assicurato la
vittoria del partito moderato di Ibrahim Rugova contro quello
estremista e militarista di Hashim Thaci. Il paventato "effetto
domino" non c'è stato. Ci sarebbe stato se l'Occidente, anziché
impegnarsi, avesse consentito ai serbi di svuotare il Kosovo e di
far esplodere la Macedonia e l'Albania con l'alluvione dei
profughi. Anche i governanti autonomisti di Podgorica stanno
traendo un sospiro, in attesa che Kostunica si decida a cambiare
la forma e la sostanza della "Federazione jugoslava"
trasformandola in una confederazione paritaria serbo-montenegrina.
C'è ancora chi continua a tracciare scenari catastrofici lasciando
immaginare che, da un'eventuale secessione kosovara, potrebbero
dipartirsi a raggiera una serie di cataclismi regionali. Non si
capisce se qui prevalga l'ignoranza o la malafede. La graduale
normalizzazione nella Serbia, nel Montenegro e nel Kosovo avviene
in un quadro generale completamente nuovo, dopo le quattro guerre
scatenate con centinaia di migliaia di morti da Milosevic e dalle
sue bande. La Slovenia è oramai un pezzo della Mitteleuropa in
procinto di superare gli esami di Maastricht. La Croazia, dopo la
scomparsa di Franjo Tudjman, non è più una "democratura" ma una
democrazia avviata a integrarsi anch'essa all'Europa. La
Bosnia-Erzegovina, dopo l'autopensionamento del presidente Alija
Izetbegovic, sta cercando un'uscita di sicurezza da un groviglio
istituzionale che di fatto vede quello Stato posticcio lacerato
tra una componente croata erzegovese, una "etnia" slavo-musulmana,
infine una confusa Repubblica serba che non si sa bene da chi sia
oggi guidata. Quanto alla Macedonia, dopo il ritiro del saggio
presidente Gligorov, essa non rappresenta affatto quel permanente
pericolo di disgregazione agitato dagli sceneggiatori del peggio:
il terzo albanese macedone è lealmente integrato nelle istituzioni
governative, amministrative ed economiche del Paese e dello Stato.
Resta, ovviamente, la questione delle questioni: l'indipendenza di
Pristina. Anche qui l'ottica prevalente è falsa. Non si tratta di
far "convivere" cinquantamila serbi spaventati con una nazione di
due milioni di albanesi la cui potenza demografica è peraltro la
più elevata in Europa. Si tratta di negoziare i ritmi di una
secessione progressiva quanto inevitabile. I balcanici, quando
sono moderati, sono anche maestri in operazioni omeopatiche del
genere. Kostunica e Rugova saranno all'altezza del compito?
------
Bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'"
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only")
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
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[Emperor's Clothes]
Unjust from the Start, Part III: The Illegal Basis of the War Crimes Tribunal
By Dr. Kosta Cavoski
[In Part III of this series, Professor Cavoski, the distinguished Yugoslav law scholar, brilliantly analyses the legal rationale for the War Crimes Tribunal. The sheer illegality of the Tribunal is of great importance given the news that the ruling politicians in Belgrade have invited the Tribunal to Belgrade and promised to cooperate in its hunt for supposed Serbian war criminals.]
If the start of the case of the Prosecutor vs. Djordje Djukic disgraced the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague, a more serious examination of the manner in which the Tribunal was founded and its working Rules of Procedure and Evidence would also convince us that the failure was not in the least accidental.
Moreover, it could have been expected when the Security Council Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 was issued. In spite of the fact that the Resolution expressed the intention to found an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for committing serious violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, the Security Council did not feel the need to provide a legal basis for its establishment.(10) The reason for this omission is simple: the existing legal system of the UN does not provide a legal basis for it, nor can there ever be one.
Half a century has passed since the founding of the UN, and its main political and executive body, the Security Council, has never assumed the right to found a tribunal since court jurisdiction rests on international treaties as a result of the absence of a universal legislative organ. This was clearly stated by the UN Secretary General in May 1993:
"The approach which in the normal course of events would be followed in establishing an international tribunal would be the conclusion of a treaty by which the member states would establish a tribunal and approve its statute. This treaty would be drawn up and adopted by an appropriate international body (e.g. the General Assembly or a specially convened conference), following which it would be opened for signing and ratification. Such an approach would have the advantage of allowing for a detailed examination and elaboration of all issues pertaining to the establishment of the international tribunal. It would also allow the states participating in the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty to fully exercise their sovereign will in particular whether they wish to become parties to the treaty or not". (UN Secretary General's Report no. S/25704 (section 18) of 3 )
The rule whereby court jurisdiction is based on international treaties has, until now, been strictly adhered to without exception. Then in Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, the Security Council gave itself the right to establish ad hoc a tribunal whose competence was limited in time (beginning on 1 January 1991) as well as capacity (confined to the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Since no such tribunal had ever been established before by the Security Council (11), it would have been appropriate to find some sort of legal basis in order to avoid the inference that "might is right". A legal basis was "found" in a very loose interpretation of a clause in Chapter VII of the UN Charter whereby the Security Council can take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security following the requisite establishment of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or acts of aggression. In other words, the term "tribunal", as th!
e requisite institution, is taken to be a "measure". No doubt the members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members, assumed that "might was right", but also that certain terms can be instilled with certain meanings that they never had before. Thus "measures" became synonymous with "tribunal".
The Secretary General was given the thankless task of justifying the international criminal tribunal as an enforcement measure of the Security Council which Chapter VII of the UN Charter grants it [the right to initiate]. As he was unable to refer to any valid legal basis for this authority, he reverted to the principle of expediency. "This approach," said the Secretary General "would have the advantage of being expeditious and immediately effective as all states would be under a binding obligation to take whatever action is required to carry out a decision taken as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII" (12). Thus the principle of political expediency took precedence over that of legality and legal validity.
The Secretary General knew of course, that the Security Council could not simply "create" a tribunal nor did it have the legislative authority to allow it to "create" international criminal law. He let this slip when he said that "in assigning to the International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be creating or purporting to 'legislate' that law. Rather, the International Tribunal would have the task of applying existing international humanitarian law." (13) Unfortunately this is not true. With Resolution 827 of 25 May, the Security Council implemented its nonexistent legislative powers. It suspended the application of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 with additional Protocols, as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, whereby prosecution is entrusted to national courts. Thus, by awarding the Internati!
onal Tribunal primacy over the prosecution of crimes committed on the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia, it annulled the competence of all national courts worldwide. One has to ask in the name of what principle could the Security Council suspend and then amend international treaties of a legislative nature.
Having assumed the right to legislate, the Security Council ventured to take another step: it delegated its nonexistent legislative competency to its creature - the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague. Under Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal it authorized its judges to adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters. In this way the Security Council not only legislated, but also authorized the Tribunal to be its own legislator with regard to criminal procedural law.
With no hesitation, the International Tribunal accepted the authority to write its own laws, i.e. to issue Rules of Procedure and Evidence that were to be applied to the prosecution of subsequent cases. The Rules were adopted by February 1994, only to be amended six more times - in May and October of 1994, January and June 1995, January and April 1996. In January 1995 alone, 41 of the total 125 rules were amended, and almost half of the original rules were further changed by other amendments. To make matters worse, the Tribunal adjusted the Rules according to which it would pass judgment, having in mind the practical problems that arose in the course of the implementation of the Rules on pending cases.
Unfortunately, this was in breach of its own Rule No. 6, paragraph (C) whereby amendments shall not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case. In this way certain amendments took on the character of ex post facto law. Of special interest is the manner in which the Tribunal amended its rules. Legislative bodies usually do this at public sessions, following long and exhaustive debates over every proposed article or subsequent amendment. The International Tribunal simplified this procedure. Its Rules are adopted at plenary sessions after the decision of seven judges, and according to Rule 6, paragraph (B) this can also be done otherwise, on condition the judges accept the amendment unanimously. One asks oneself what "other way" is there for an amendment to be adopted if not by debate at a plenary session. The answer is simple: the president or some Tribunal official poses an amendment to all the judges world-wide; on the same day they fax back their appro!
val. This is the new way of creating laws by fax that could easily revolutionize the old-fashioned procedure as exercised by the British Parliament.
This was how the Tribunal at The Hague used the legislative competence that was first usurped by the Security Council and subsequently generously delegated to it. To make for even greater paradox, the Tribunal took another step: having become its own legislator it then passed part of its legislative power over to the Prosecutor in order to allow him to draw up the rules he would work by. Hence Rule 37, paragraph (A) stipulates that "the Prosecutor shall perform all the functions provided by the Statute in accordance with the Rules and such Regulations, consistent with the Statute and the Rules, as may be framed by him".
Antonio Cassese, President of the International Tribunal was well aware that never in the history of a civilized country had an individual court drawn up the rules by which it would pass judgment. This would be a dangerous breach of the principle of separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary which, according to Montesquieu, is an essential guarantee of freedom. Thus it could be said that the adoption of the Rules of the Tribunal in May 1995 represented an enterprise "for which there is no precedent at the international level."(14) Had he been less self-confident and egotistic in his unexpected role of being his own legislator, he would have had to ask himself very seriously if there could possibly be a valid reason for this unprecedented breach of a practice inviolable in any civilized country.
There are, of course, countries where judge-made law is applied, e.g. common law in England. However this law is not the fruit of a premeditated and momentary enterprise by a single court but the product of all the courts as a unified system and over a considerable period of time, lasting several centuries. This is why English judges firmly believe that they are judging according to a law that was created by others. They do not have the satisfaction that was granted Antonio Cassese, of creating the general rules according to which they will judge.
If the International Tribunal is only partially responsible for its role as legislator with regard to the adoption of its own Rules due to the fact that this "advantage" vas delegated to it by the Security Council, it is generally responsible for its further delegation to the Prosecutor. This is also an enterprise unprecedented in recent history. Had the International Tribunal appreciated the equality of both parties, it should have gone one step further and authorized the defense counsel to prescribe its own general regulations for the defense of its client. This would also have represented a significant and unexpected innovation to modern criminal procedural law.
The Prosecutor as Organ of the Tribunal and as Privileged Party
The next feature whereby the Security Council and the International Tribunal "enriched" legal theory and practice was the exceptional position that was bestowed on the Prosecutor. In a well structured legal system, e.g. common law, the prosecutor is only one of two equal parties in a court dispute, so that with regards to the status of both sides - the prosecutor and the accused - and the possibility of their reaching a settlement, a criminal dispute assumes some of the aspects of a litigation. Under these circumstances the procedure becomes truly contradictory in that the two sides contest each other on a completely equal basis, whereas the court as a third, independent and unbiased party, resolves the litigation and passes judgment.
The Security Council and the International Tribunal discarded this concept of criminal litigation and the total equality of each party in order to award the Prosecutor a privileged position by making him a part of the court. In Article 11 of the Statute of the International Tribunal it is explicitly stated that the Prosecutor is an organ of the Tribunal. This is followed by a series of regulations that confirm this exceptional and obviously privileged status of the Prosecutor. Rule 33 stipulates that the registrar of the Tribunal serves not only the chambers and plenum of the Tribunal but every judge and the Prosecutor, meaning that the registrar is common to them all. Under Rule 29 the Prosecutor is given the right to summon and question suspects, victims and witnesses, record their statements, collect evidence and conduct on-site investigations. Again, in a well organized judiciary system this is done by the police up until an inquiry is instigated, whereupon it is taken ove!
r by the investigating judge. This is the only way to ensure the contradiction of procedure and the equality of both parties - the Prosecutor and accused.
However, the creators of the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal made an unforgivable mistake. With one stroke they made the Prosecutor part of the Tribunal as well as a party before justice. Rule 2 names the prosecutor and accused as the parties, but then by virtue of a series of other regulations, their equality in the court proceedings comes under serious doubt. Thus, for instance, the Prosecutor, as a litigation party, may propose amendments to the Rules (Rule 6), while the accused and his defense counsel may not. Also, the Trial Chamber (Rule 46) may, after a warning, refuse audience to counsel if, in its opinion, his conduct is offensive, abusive or otherwise obstructive to the proper conduct of the proceedings. It occurred to none of the makers of these Rules to allow for the possible removal of the Prosecutor in the case of his behavior being offensive and abusive to the accused, his defense counsel or indeed the judges themselves. According to Rule 66 para!
graph (C) the Prosecutor may, with the approval of the Trial Chamber, refuse the defense access to books, documents, photographs and tangible objects in his custody if this is considered to be contrary to public interest or affect the security interests of any state. The Trial Chamber debates this request in camera (in the absence of either party or the public) and the Prosecutor is obliged to give his reasons why this evidence (books, documents, photographs and tangible objects) should be confidential only to the Trial Chamber, meaning that the defense counsel does not have to be present.
The creators of this special position of the Prosecutor, who is at the same time part of the court and one of the two contesting parties, probably consider themselves to be very innovative. If they were better acquainted with the history of the Ottoman Empire they would remember that this position was held by Turkish Cadis (civil judges). That is why we [Serbs, who were ruled by the Ottoman Empire] have the saying: "the Cadi prosecutes you, the Cadi sentences you".
The Secrecy of the Indictment and the Unauthorized Collection of Evidence
This exceptional and in many ways unacceptable position of the Prosecutor is just one of the "innovations" by which the makers of the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal "enriched" criminal procedural law. Another was the possibility of keeping secret the indictment trial and testimonies under conditions that spawn arbitrariness and considerable departures from the usual standards of modern procedural law. According to Rule 53 paragraph (B) the judges or the Trial Chamber can, after consulting the Prosecutor, prohibit the "disclosure of an indictment, or part thereof, or of all or any part of any particular document or information" if it is necessary "to protect confidential information obtained by the Prosecutor or is otherwise in the interests of justice". The Rule makers, however, did not deem it necessary to further define "confidential information" or "interests of justice", thereby leaving their interpretation open to the will or arbitrariness of the Prosecut!
or, judges and Trial Chamber.
Apart from facts, documents and information that can be concealed from the general public, there is information that can be denied the defense. This is information whose disclosure, for any reason "may be contrary to public interests or affect the security interests of any state" (Rule 66 paragraph (C)). This can be assumed to concern information collected by the CIA, and that is why such information should be kept secret in order to hide its source, and especially the manner in which it was collected. This involves unauthorized bugging and the recording of telephone conversations, fax messages, wireless messages, filming by satellites and pilotless aircraft unauthorized to overfly the war zones in the former Yugoslavia, as well as data and information collected by secret agents disguised as humanitarian workers or employees of the UN, Red Cross and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.
There is nothing unusual in the illegal collection of information by the US, British or Russian secret services. The trouble lies in the penchant of the Prosecutor and Hague Tribunal not only to use illegally obtained information, but also by denying the public knowledge of the indictment and, trial to conceal the source of the information on which the indictment, evidence and subsequent verdict rest. With the excuse of protecting public interest and/or the security interests of a state, they are no doubt capable of going so far as to refuse the defense counsel the right to study the evidence, data, documents, photographs and tangible objects on whose existence an indictment rests. Were a prosecutor in the US to try to use unauthorized recorded telephone calls against an accused, this would be immediately rejected by the court. Unlike this civilized practice, everything was permitted to The Hague Tribunal including the use of illegally obtained intelligence data and the concea!
lment of its source.
Continued, Unjust, Part IV: The Hunting of the Serbs
---- REFERENCES: -----------
(10) This was noted by the UN Secretary General in his report S/25704 (section 18) of 3 May 1993.
(11)The Statute of the International Court of Justice at The Hague is incorporated into the UN Charter and accepted as such by the member states
(12)Report of the Secretary General S/25704 (see 23) of 3 May 1993
(13) Ibid, sec 29
(14)Preface to a book publishing all the more important document of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.
***
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[Emperor's Clothes]
Unjust from the Start, Part III: The Illegal Basis of the War Crimes Tribunal
By Dr. Kosta Cavoski
[In Part III of this series, Professor Cavoski, the distinguished Yugoslav law scholar, brilliantly analyses the legal rationale for the War Crimes Tribunal. The sheer illegality of the Tribunal is of great importance given the news that the ruling politicians in Belgrade have invited the Tribunal to Belgrade and promised to cooperate in its hunt for supposed Serbian war criminals.]
If the start of the case of the Prosecutor vs. Djordje Djukic disgraced the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague, a more serious examination of the manner in which the Tribunal was founded and its working Rules of Procedure and Evidence would also convince us that the failure was not in the least accidental.
Moreover, it could have been expected when the Security Council Resolution 808 of 22 February 1993 was issued. In spite of the fact that the Resolution expressed the intention to found an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for committing serious violations of international humanitarian law on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, the Security Council did not feel the need to provide a legal basis for its establishment.(10) The reason for this omission is simple: the existing legal system of the UN does not provide a legal basis for it, nor can there ever be one.
Half a century has passed since the founding of the UN, and its main political and executive body, the Security Council, has never assumed the right to found a tribunal since court jurisdiction rests on international treaties as a result of the absence of a universal legislative organ. This was clearly stated by the UN Secretary General in May 1993:
"The approach which in the normal course of events would be followed in establishing an international tribunal would be the conclusion of a treaty by which the member states would establish a tribunal and approve its statute. This treaty would be drawn up and adopted by an appropriate international body (e.g. the General Assembly or a specially convened conference), following which it would be opened for signing and ratification. Such an approach would have the advantage of allowing for a detailed examination and elaboration of all issues pertaining to the establishment of the international tribunal. It would also allow the states participating in the negotiation and conclusion of the treaty to fully exercise their sovereign will in particular whether they wish to become parties to the treaty or not". (UN Secretary General's Report no. S/25704 (section 18) of 3 )
The rule whereby court jurisdiction is based on international treaties has, until now, been strictly adhered to without exception. Then in Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, the Security Council gave itself the right to establish ad hoc a tribunal whose competence was limited in time (beginning on 1 January 1991) as well as capacity (confined to the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Since no such tribunal had ever been established before by the Security Council (11), it would have been appropriate to find some sort of legal basis in order to avoid the inference that "might is right". A legal basis was "found" in a very loose interpretation of a clause in Chapter VII of the UN Charter whereby the Security Council can take measures to maintain or restore international peace and security following the requisite establishment of the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or acts of aggression. In other words, the term "tribunal", as th!
e requisite institution, is taken to be a "measure". No doubt the members of the Security Council, particularly the permanent members, assumed that "might was right", but also that certain terms can be instilled with certain meanings that they never had before. Thus "measures" became synonymous with "tribunal".
The Secretary General was given the thankless task of justifying the international criminal tribunal as an enforcement measure of the Security Council which Chapter VII of the UN Charter grants it [the right to initiate]. As he was unable to refer to any valid legal basis for this authority, he reverted to the principle of expediency. "This approach," said the Secretary General "would have the advantage of being expeditious and immediately effective as all states would be under a binding obligation to take whatever action is required to carry out a decision taken as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII" (12). Thus the principle of political expediency took precedence over that of legality and legal validity.
The Secretary General knew of course, that the Security Council could not simply "create" a tribunal nor did it have the legislative authority to allow it to "create" international criminal law. He let this slip when he said that "in assigning to the International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Security Council would not be creating or purporting to 'legislate' that law. Rather, the International Tribunal would have the task of applying existing international humanitarian law." (13) Unfortunately this is not true. With Resolution 827 of 25 May, the Security Council implemented its nonexistent legislative powers. It suspended the application of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 with additional Protocols, as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, whereby prosecution is entrusted to national courts. Thus, by awarding the Internati!
onal Tribunal primacy over the prosecution of crimes committed on the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia, it annulled the competence of all national courts worldwide. One has to ask in the name of what principle could the Security Council suspend and then amend international treaties of a legislative nature.
Having assumed the right to legislate, the Security Council ventured to take another step: it delegated its nonexistent legislative competency to its creature - the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague. Under Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal it authorized its judges to adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters. In this way the Security Council not only legislated, but also authorized the Tribunal to be its own legislator with regard to criminal procedural law.
With no hesitation, the International Tribunal accepted the authority to write its own laws, i.e. to issue Rules of Procedure and Evidence that were to be applied to the prosecution of subsequent cases. The Rules were adopted by February 1994, only to be amended six more times - in May and October of 1994, January and June 1995, January and April 1996. In January 1995 alone, 41 of the total 125 rules were amended, and almost half of the original rules were further changed by other amendments. To make matters worse, the Tribunal adjusted the Rules according to which it would pass judgment, having in mind the practical problems that arose in the course of the implementation of the Rules on pending cases.
Unfortunately, this was in breach of its own Rule No. 6, paragraph (C) whereby amendments shall not operate to prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case. In this way certain amendments took on the character of ex post facto law. Of special interest is the manner in which the Tribunal amended its rules. Legislative bodies usually do this at public sessions, following long and exhaustive debates over every proposed article or subsequent amendment. The International Tribunal simplified this procedure. Its Rules are adopted at plenary sessions after the decision of seven judges, and according to Rule 6, paragraph (B) this can also be done otherwise, on condition the judges accept the amendment unanimously. One asks oneself what "other way" is there for an amendment to be adopted if not by debate at a plenary session. The answer is simple: the president or some Tribunal official poses an amendment to all the judges world-wide; on the same day they fax back their appro!
val. This is the new way of creating laws by fax that could easily revolutionize the old-fashioned procedure as exercised by the British Parliament.
This was how the Tribunal at The Hague used the legislative competence that was first usurped by the Security Council and subsequently generously delegated to it. To make for even greater paradox, the Tribunal took another step: having become its own legislator it then passed part of its legislative power over to the Prosecutor in order to allow him to draw up the rules he would work by. Hence Rule 37, paragraph (A) stipulates that "the Prosecutor shall perform all the functions provided by the Statute in accordance with the Rules and such Regulations, consistent with the Statute and the Rules, as may be framed by him".
Antonio Cassese, President of the International Tribunal was well aware that never in the history of a civilized country had an individual court drawn up the rules by which it would pass judgment. This would be a dangerous breach of the principle of separation of powers between the legislature and judiciary which, according to Montesquieu, is an essential guarantee of freedom. Thus it could be said that the adoption of the Rules of the Tribunal in May 1995 represented an enterprise "for which there is no precedent at the international level."(14) Had he been less self-confident and egotistic in his unexpected role of being his own legislator, he would have had to ask himself very seriously if there could possibly be a valid reason for this unprecedented breach of a practice inviolable in any civilized country.
There are, of course, countries where judge-made law is applied, e.g. common law in England. However this law is not the fruit of a premeditated and momentary enterprise by a single court but the product of all the courts as a unified system and over a considerable period of time, lasting several centuries. This is why English judges firmly believe that they are judging according to a law that was created by others. They do not have the satisfaction that was granted Antonio Cassese, of creating the general rules according to which they will judge.
If the International Tribunal is only partially responsible for its role as legislator with regard to the adoption of its own Rules due to the fact that this "advantage" vas delegated to it by the Security Council, it is generally responsible for its further delegation to the Prosecutor. This is also an enterprise unprecedented in recent history. Had the International Tribunal appreciated the equality of both parties, it should have gone one step further and authorized the defense counsel to prescribe its own general regulations for the defense of its client. This would also have represented a significant and unexpected innovation to modern criminal procedural law.
The Prosecutor as Organ of the Tribunal and as Privileged Party
The next feature whereby the Security Council and the International Tribunal "enriched" legal theory and practice was the exceptional position that was bestowed on the Prosecutor. In a well structured legal system, e.g. common law, the prosecutor is only one of two equal parties in a court dispute, so that with regards to the status of both sides - the prosecutor and the accused - and the possibility of their reaching a settlement, a criminal dispute assumes some of the aspects of a litigation. Under these circumstances the procedure becomes truly contradictory in that the two sides contest each other on a completely equal basis, whereas the court as a third, independent and unbiased party, resolves the litigation and passes judgment.
The Security Council and the International Tribunal discarded this concept of criminal litigation and the total equality of each party in order to award the Prosecutor a privileged position by making him a part of the court. In Article 11 of the Statute of the International Tribunal it is explicitly stated that the Prosecutor is an organ of the Tribunal. This is followed by a series of regulations that confirm this exceptional and obviously privileged status of the Prosecutor. Rule 33 stipulates that the registrar of the Tribunal serves not only the chambers and plenum of the Tribunal but every judge and the Prosecutor, meaning that the registrar is common to them all. Under Rule 29 the Prosecutor is given the right to summon and question suspects, victims and witnesses, record their statements, collect evidence and conduct on-site investigations. Again, in a well organized judiciary system this is done by the police up until an inquiry is instigated, whereupon it is taken ove!
r by the investigating judge. This is the only way to ensure the contradiction of procedure and the equality of both parties - the Prosecutor and accused.
However, the creators of the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal made an unforgivable mistake. With one stroke they made the Prosecutor part of the Tribunal as well as a party before justice. Rule 2 names the prosecutor and accused as the parties, but then by virtue of a series of other regulations, their equality in the court proceedings comes under serious doubt. Thus, for instance, the Prosecutor, as a litigation party, may propose amendments to the Rules (Rule 6), while the accused and his defense counsel may not. Also, the Trial Chamber (Rule 46) may, after a warning, refuse audience to counsel if, in its opinion, his conduct is offensive, abusive or otherwise obstructive to the proper conduct of the proceedings. It occurred to none of the makers of these Rules to allow for the possible removal of the Prosecutor in the case of his behavior being offensive and abusive to the accused, his defense counsel or indeed the judges themselves. According to Rule 66 para!
graph (C) the Prosecutor may, with the approval of the Trial Chamber, refuse the defense access to books, documents, photographs and tangible objects in his custody if this is considered to be contrary to public interest or affect the security interests of any state. The Trial Chamber debates this request in camera (in the absence of either party or the public) and the Prosecutor is obliged to give his reasons why this evidence (books, documents, photographs and tangible objects) should be confidential only to the Trial Chamber, meaning that the defense counsel does not have to be present.
The creators of this special position of the Prosecutor, who is at the same time part of the court and one of the two contesting parties, probably consider themselves to be very innovative. If they were better acquainted with the history of the Ottoman Empire they would remember that this position was held by Turkish Cadis (civil judges). That is why we [Serbs, who were ruled by the Ottoman Empire] have the saying: "the Cadi prosecutes you, the Cadi sentences you".
The Secrecy of the Indictment and the Unauthorized Collection of Evidence
This exceptional and in many ways unacceptable position of the Prosecutor is just one of the "innovations" by which the makers of the Statute and Rules of the International Tribunal "enriched" criminal procedural law. Another was the possibility of keeping secret the indictment trial and testimonies under conditions that spawn arbitrariness and considerable departures from the usual standards of modern procedural law. According to Rule 53 paragraph (B) the judges or the Trial Chamber can, after consulting the Prosecutor, prohibit the "disclosure of an indictment, or part thereof, or of all or any part of any particular document or information" if it is necessary "to protect confidential information obtained by the Prosecutor or is otherwise in the interests of justice". The Rule makers, however, did not deem it necessary to further define "confidential information" or "interests of justice", thereby leaving their interpretation open to the will or arbitrariness of the Prosecut!
or, judges and Trial Chamber.
Apart from facts, documents and information that can be concealed from the general public, there is information that can be denied the defense. This is information whose disclosure, for any reason "may be contrary to public interests or affect the security interests of any state" (Rule 66 paragraph (C)). This can be assumed to concern information collected by the CIA, and that is why such information should be kept secret in order to hide its source, and especially the manner in which it was collected. This involves unauthorized bugging and the recording of telephone conversations, fax messages, wireless messages, filming by satellites and pilotless aircraft unauthorized to overfly the war zones in the former Yugoslavia, as well as data and information collected by secret agents disguised as humanitarian workers or employees of the UN, Red Cross and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.
There is nothing unusual in the illegal collection of information by the US, British or Russian secret services. The trouble lies in the penchant of the Prosecutor and Hague Tribunal not only to use illegally obtained information, but also by denying the public knowledge of the indictment and, trial to conceal the source of the information on which the indictment, evidence and subsequent verdict rest. With the excuse of protecting public interest and/or the security interests of a state, they are no doubt capable of going so far as to refuse the defense counsel the right to study the evidence, data, documents, photographs and tangible objects on whose existence an indictment rests. Were a prosecutor in the US to try to use unauthorized recorded telephone calls against an accused, this would be immediately rejected by the court. Unlike this civilized practice, everything was permitted to The Hague Tribunal including the use of illegally obtained intelligence data and the concea!
lment of its source.
Continued, Unjust, Part IV: The Hunting of the Serbs
---- REFERENCES: -----------
(10) This was noted by the UN Secretary General in his report S/25704 (section 18) of 3 May 1993.
(11)The Statute of the International Court of Justice at The Hague is incorporated into the UN Charter and accepted as such by the member states
(12)Report of the Secretary General S/25704 (see 23) of 3 May 1993
(13) Ibid, sec 29
(14)Preface to a book publishing all the more important document of the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague.
***
We get by with a little help from our friends...
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[Emperor's Clothes]
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