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Observer Worldview Extra
Iraq after Saddam - the next Yugoslavia?
Online commentary: Will the model for
post-Saddam Iraq be post-war Japan or Yugoslavia
after 1992? A former US Ambassador argues that
too little is being done to ensure that the right
choices are made after a war
Robert L Barry
Sunday February 9, 2003
The Observer
Following Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security
Council, war with Iraq seems virtually inevitable. This could
be done without a new Security Council resolution - but the
United States and the United Kingdom would own the
problem of what to do with Iraq on the morning after
Saddam goes. Our publics are not prepared to take on this
burden, and more time is needed to develop support for a
large scale multilateral effort at nation-building.
The central question concerning post-Saddam Iraq is
whether we will be looking at Yugoslavia in 1992 or Japan
in 1945. Based on my years in post-war Bosnia, the
Yugoslav parallel seems compelling. There are strong
separatist movements in both countries. Both have
neighbours which would pull it in different directions, both
are awash in arms, and bloody reprisals will likely take place
in Iraq as they have in the former Yugoslavia. Political
parties care more about gaining control of resources and state
industries than about introducing democracy. Corruption and
a weak justice system discourage foreign investment. The
military and police and judiciary need to be rebuilt from the
ground up. And outside help is urgently needed to repair war
damage and deteriorated infrastructure.
In the former Yugoslavia we have dealt with these problems
through a major effort at nation-building, involving tens of
thousands of peacekeeping troops, thousands of civilian
experts from the UN, NATO, the EU, OSCE, the World
Bank, the IMF and more than 50 nations around the world.
Yet a decade later the job is far from done, despite the
expenditure of somewhere close to $100 billion. There is
little sign that serious preparations are under way to deal
with post-Saddam Iraq.
The first question to face on the morning after is who is in
charge. If Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post is correct,
President Bush has decided to assign responsibility to the US
Department of Defense, with US Central Command
commander General Tommy Franks in command, assisted by
a civilian political adviser.
If the past is any guide, the US Defense Department will be
eager to get out of the business of running Iraq, especially
since the one thing all Iraqi exile groups oppose is a US
military government. The idea of a UN civil administration
has been mentioned, but no planning for this, or even UN
relief operations, can begin without the backing of the
Security Council. A UN administration would also be
unpopular with many Iraqis and would be slow to mobilize
and expensive to maintain. Another option is the
appointment of a High Representative of the international
community, drawn from among the "coalition of the
willing". Lord Paddy Ashdown, who fills this role in Bosnia,
has learned that this model fosters dependence, is very
expensive, and is difficult to end.
Another urgent question concerns the size of the occupation
force and the duration of their mandate. Most reporting
points to the need for some 75,000-100,000 troops. The US
and the UK could not sustain a force of this size, given the
need to rotate units to their home bases and maintain
readiness elsewhere. So a new coalition of the willing would
have to be created to maintain the peace - or the US and UK
standing armies would have to be increased significantly to
meet the demand. Based on NATO's experience in Bosnia
and Kosovo, peacekeepers will have to remain on the ground
for at least five years.
On the morning after Saddam goes, there will be an
immediate need for large-scale international assistance, to
rebuild and provide relief. The costs of rebuilding the
infrastructure, even in the absence of major war damage, are
likely to be huge. A donors' conference, such as followed the
victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan, is the usual first
resort of the international community. But the Afghan
donors' conference was notable for pledges that were never
redeemed, and given resentment in Europe over US and
British policies in Iraq, a major contribution by the EU
would be a surprise.
If war comes, it will not be about oil, but what to do with the
oil fields which will be occupied in the opening days of war
will be a major headache. Rival Kurdish groups and the
Turks may come to blows over the rich fields around Kirkuk,
an area which Saddam has "cleansed" of its original Kurdish
and Turkmen population. Much has been made of the
possibility of using Iraqi oil revenues to finance rebuilding
the economy, but increasing production or even restoring
production will be slow, and will depend on foreign
investment. Who will decide what to do about Iraq's billions
in external debts, for example to Russia and France?
Faced with these alternatives and given the US Defense
Department's distaste for nation building, a possible "exit
strategy" would be to toss the ball to Iraqis as soon as
decently possible. This was the course the US aimed at in
Bosnia, believing that elections within a year would enable
NATO forces to withdraw. As we learned to our regret,
premature elections aggravated the problem.
In some quarters in Washington talk of finding a secular
authority figure, possibly a general who might emerge as an
early defector from Saddam, has replaced talk about a
democratic Iraq inside its current borders. This would be a
short-sighted solution.
Secretary Powell made the case that Saddam Hussein is in
material breach of Security Council Resolution 1441, and
that inspections are not the answer. But turning to the our
publics and the international community on the morning
after Saddam goes with a request for help in cleaning up the
mess left behind will not be good for Iraq, the Middle East
or the transatlantic relationship.
Giving diplomacy more time will produce a Security
Council resolution, even if not unanimous, which will be
needed to mobilize the support of governments for a major
effort at nation-building in Iraq. That time can be well used
to win the support of our own publics for taking on a burden
larger than war.
Robert L Barry, a retired US Ambassador, headed the
OSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1998 to 2001
and is a member of the board of the British American
Security Information Council.
Send us your views
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rlbarry796@....
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Guardian Unlimited © Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003
Ivan ha allora scritto una lettera ad alcuni giornali...)
POMIRENJA
Na prostorima bivse Jugoslavije prinudno
je zaveden mir "odozgo", ali nista
nije razjasnjeno ni rijeseno sto se tice
uzroka i posljedica ovog
krvoprolica. Zrtve jos nisu izbrojane,
zrtve jos nisu pronadjene. Mrznja je
jos uvjek prisutna. Samo je ucutkana i ne
dozvoljava se da eksplodira. Sve
je unisteno. I privreda i administracija,
infrstruktura, itd. Jedino sto
funkcionira je kriminal i sverc koji se i
zaceo tijekom razbijanja Jugoslavije.
Krivce jos uvijek trazimo vise na
pogresnom nego na pravom mijestu, a tako
cini (i naredjuje) Medjunarodna zajednica.
U toj situaciji politickog nereda i
socijalne bijede tesko je naci prostora
za uspostavljanje nekih normalnih odnosa.
Dok se ne omoguci da se svako vrati na
svoj prag, ne moze se traziti neko
normaliziranje odnosa medju ljudima, a
pogotovo ne pomirenje i prastanje.
Kolikima jos mozemo postaviti pitanje:
"Gdje su granice izmedju tebe i
tvoga supruga", "Izmedju tebe i tvoje
djece"?
Jedan od velikih uzroka je vjerska
netrpeljivost koja i dan danas postoji,
ne toliko medju samim narodom, vec medju
onima koji ga vode (neznam kuda, a
najpozvaniji vjerski dostojanstvenici nisu
nista ucinili pozitivno u tom
smislu, vec naprotiv. Moze li se
beatifikacija Stepinca prihvatiti kao
jedan od povoda "za pomirenje"?! Ako je
trazen oprostaj za nedjela ucinjena
prije nekoliko vjekova od nekog ondasnjeg
vjerskog poglavara ili
institucije, moze li se vec zaboraviti ono
sto je juce ucinjeno. Uz to,
moze li vise bilo koji Papa pobiti svoju
"nepogresivost" i izviniti se za
beatifikaciju Alojzija Stepinca. Nas
obicne smrtnike zabrinjava vise toliko
klanjanje naroda...
Bilo je jednom pomirenja kad je i receno
NIKAD VISE! Pomirili smo se na
ovozemaljskim cinjenicama, tolerancije,
prosperiteta, a NASA zajednica bila
je citirana, kao primjer, cijelom svijetu.
Stepinac je osudjen, ne zato sto
je bio antikomunista (jer ga Hrvatska
crkva predstavlja kao mucenika
komunizma), vec zato sto je odobravao ono
sto bi trebalo uvrijediti svakog
pravog vjernika i dijelio blagoslove onima
koji su ubijali neduzne ljude.
Na posljednjoj TV emisiji "Latinici", a i
inace dobroj emisiji, koju sam
imao prilike vidjeti, govorilo se o
"Pomirenju". Najumjereniji je bio onaj
svecenik, ali "jedna lastavica ne cini
proljece".
Prvo se mora uciniti nesto dobroga za nas
narod, bez obzira koji vjeri i
nacionalnosti pripadao, a narod ce se sam
pomiriti, pa i na vjerskoj osnovi.
A ni na ovaj nacin ne moze doci do
potpunog pomirenja dok svaki narod ne
prizna i osudi odgovorne politicare pa cak
i crkvene dostojanstvenike, a ne
samo direktne pocinioce zlocina.
Ivan Pavicevac
Qual'è la differenza fra un pessimista e un ottimista?
Il pessimista dice: "Le cose non possono andare peggio."
L'ottimista dice: "Possono, possono."
(P. Graffer)
Il voto del Parlamento Federale Jugoslavo del 4 febbraio scorso, che
ha cancellato la denominazione di "Jugoslavia" dagli atlanti
geografici europei e ha dato vita ad una provvisoria "Unione di Serbia
e Montenegro", e' stato accolto con un misto di rassegnazione e
disapprovazione dalla popolazione jugoslava.
Secondo un sondaggio i cui risultati sono stati diffusi dall'agenzia
di stampa macedone, il 71 per cento degli intervistati rimpiange il
vecchio nome ed il 57 per cento disapprova il cambiamento di nome.
Tutti gli osservatori onesti riconoscono che la creazione di questa
"Nuova Unione", fortemente voluta dal signor Solana, e' un capestro
che di fatto condurra' al distacco totale di Serbia e Montenegro nel
2006, cioe' dopo i tre anni previsti nel testo approvato. Perdipiu',
con la cancellazione del vecchio Stato comune, gli avversari della
pace e della unita' delle popolazioni balcaniche avranno gioco facile
a ritenere non piu' validi tutti gli accordi internazionali stipulati
dalla RF di Jugoslavia, a partire dalla Risoluzione ONU 1244. E'
dunque facile prevedere che il secessionismo kosovaro sfruttera'
subito la nuova situazione determinatasi. Per tacere del Sangiaccato e
della Vojvodina.
Come ha spiegato Jela Jovanovic, il provvedimento e' comunque
incostituzionale poiche' una decisione del genere non si puo' prendere
con la maggioranza semplice dei voti, bensi' servirebbe una
maggioranza di almeno i due terzi. Inoltre, sono stati resi pubblici i
nomi di 12 deputati-fantasma che hanno "partecipato al voto" senza
potervi partecipare. Questo ultimo episodio nella drammatica vicenda
della Jugoslavia conferma dunque per l'ennesima volta il carattere
della attuale leadership politica di Belgrado e Podgorica/Titograd. Ma
svelare queste irregolarita' clamorose non e' mai bastato, e non ci
bastera' nemmeno stavolta, per contrastare la realizzazione di certi
progetti geopolitici, pagati con il sangue dalle popolazioni locali.
Nonostante il perdurante tradimento da parte dei loro indegni
rappresentanti, ne' la Jugoslavia, ne' gli jugoslavi cadranno cosi'
facilmente nell'oblio della Storia, come pure qualcuno vorrebbe. Come
ha giustamente detto Stevan Mirkovic: "non ci sara' la Jugoslavia,
eppure ci sono gli jugoslavi. Una madre muore, ma i figli restano."
Come Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia facciamo seguire
immediatamente a questa documentazione una nostra presa di posizione
sugli avvenimenti (nel prossimo messaggio).
---
Fonti:
1. Serbia: Vast majority of Serbia's citizens regret over
Yugoslavia (Makfax 6/2/2003)
2. Yugoslavia Dissolved? Unconstitutional Change of Constitution in
the New World (Dis)Order (Jela Jovanovic, 6/2/2003)
3. A sentence by Stevan Mirkovic (Centar Josip Broz Tito, Belgrade)
=== 1 ===
http://www.makfax.com.mk/news1-a.asp?br=30806
Makfax (Macedonia)
February 6, 2003
Serbia: Vast majority of Serbia's citizens regret over
Yugoslavia
The recent opinion poll shows that vast majority of
Serbia's citizens regret over the split of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and they disagree with the new
name of their common state.
The opinion poll, conducted by Belgrade's agency
Strategic Marketing, covered 433 respondents with age
of 12 to 65. Some 71 percent of poll respondents
expressed regrets over the old name, whilst some 26
percent of respondents felt no regrets.
Some 57 percent of respondent disagreed with the
change of the name of the new state, 28 percent
presume the change of the name is a positive move,
whilst 15 percent of respondents have no clear
position.
Some 78 percent of the repondents in Vojvodina regret
over the old name. Some 32.4 percent of respondents in
central Serbia regret over the old name.
=== 2 ===
This text is from the Emperor's Clothes Website
The URL is http://emperors-clothes.com/news/illegal.htm
Please forward this text to your friends!
========================================================
Yugoslavia Dissolved?
Unconstitutional Change of Constitution in the New World (Dis)Order
By Jela Jovanovic
[Posted on 6 February 2003]
========================================================
Let us put aside for the moment the contents of the so-called
Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. It proclaims a 'state
community' that nowhere exists because no state could possibly
function based on its principles.
Apart from that, it is necessary to draw the attention of the domestic
and international public and relevant institutions to the
unconstitutional way this act was forced through the Serbian
Parliament.
Contrary to the Constitution of Serbia, which stipulates that a
Constitutional change requires a 2/3 Parliamentary majority, the
deputies supporting Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and his Democratic
Party proclaimed that a simple majority was sufficient to accept this
Charter *dissolving Yugoslavia*.
As if that was not sufficiently illegal, Parliamentary Chairperson
Natasa Micic arbitrarily ruled that two *former* delegates - Goran
Vesic, who resigned in June 2002 and Stevan Lilic, whose resignation
was verified by Parliament, would be counted among the 130 voting for
the Charter.
And more: at a 30 January Press Conference, Dr. Vojisla Seselj,
president of the Serbian Radical Party, revealed the names of ten
people who voted *although they are not deputies*.
The non-deputy voters are: Aleksandra Joksimovic, Jozef Kasa, Nebojsa
Lekovic, Petar Misic, Gorica Mojovic, Visnja Nezic, Branisla
Pomoriski, Zivica Predojev, Alan Selimovic and Goran Ciric.
How could a viable state be founded through such violation of the law?
It is urgent that the Constitutional Court annuls the results of this
latest gangsterism.
-- Jela Jovanovic
art historian Yugoslavia
=== 3 ===
"There will be no Yugoslavia, but there will be Yugoslavs.
A mother dies but the sons live on."
Stevan Mirkovic, 76, former army chief of staff. Cited in:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26338-2003Feb4.html
HANNO "SUICIDATO" LA JUGOSLAVIA
Il voto del Parlamento Federale Jugoslavo del 4 febbraio scorso
rappresenta un compimento simbolico del progetto revanscista
sanguinario messo in atto ai danni del paese balcanico e dei suoi
cittadini a partire dal 1990.
Tale progetto, realizzato su procura delle consorterie occidentali da
indegni rappresentanti politici (quelli oggi al potere in tutte le
Repubbliche ex-federate), si e' articolato in un arco di tempo
simbolicamente collocabile tra il 5 novembre 1990 - quando il
Congresso degli USA approvo' la legge 101/513, che sanciva la
dissoluzione della Jugoslavia attraverso il finanziamento
diretto di tutte le nuove formazioni "democratiche" (nazionaliste e
secessioniste) - al 4 febbraio 2003 - con la nascita di questa formale
"Unione di Serbia e Montenegro" e la cancellazione dello stesso nome
della "Jugoslavia" dalle cartine geografiche dell'Europa.
Pur comprendendo e condividendo la "nostalgia" di cui parla
l'ambasciatore serbomontenegrino in Italia, Lekic, non condividiamo
per nulla la sua opinione secondo cui la nuova "Unione" sara' "piu'
efficiente e meno forte". Viceversa, le dichiarazioni esplicite degli
uomini di governo del Montenegro e dei responsabili politici delle
provincie di Kosovo-Metohija e Vojvodina chiariscono che il nuovo
status e' considerato transitorio ed e' funzionale solo all'ulteriore
disgregazione del paese, dunque alla creazione di nuove frontiere a
dividere gli abitanti di quelle terre.
Il voto del Parlamento Federale viene accolto con grande giubilo
dall'ideatore di questa ennesima "impresa", Xavier Solana, gia' ben
noto alle popolazioni locali per avere comandato la aggressione
militare del 1999. Tutta questa soddisfazione, palese o malcelata, da
parte dei responsabili politici internazionali e locali tradisce
l'ispirazione profonda delle scelte criminali compiute in tutti questi
anni, a partire dal riconoscimento diplomatico delle Repubbliche
secessioniste. Scelte che hanno causato indicibili tragedie umane,
ridisegnando i Balcani secondo protettorati coloniali come ai tempi
dell'occupazione nazifascista, trasformandone i territori in servitu'
militari occidentali e bacini di sfruttamento delle risorse e della
forza-lavoro, devastando le basi della convivenza civile e della
cultura comune di quelle genti.
Per noi del Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia quello che
continua a svolgersi in Jugoslavia e' un immenso e protratto crimine
contro l'umanita', del quale ancora purtroppo non si vede la fine, e
del quale dovranno rispondere quelli che ne portano la
responsabilita'. Per noi, la Jugoslavia non muore il 4 febbraio 2003.
Che viva la Jugoslavia,
che vivano l'unita' e la fratellanza tra i popoli.
Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia
Febbraio 2003
office@...
Datum:07. februar 2003. g.
Goran Matic: Ustavna povelja Srbije i Crne Gore
Izlaganje poslanika Gorana Mati?a u Saveznoj skupstini
prilikom usvajanja Ustavne povelje Dr?avne zajednice
Srbija i Crna Gora.
Beograd, 05. februara 2003. g.
Ja bih odmah na po?etku konstatovao da se sla?em u
potpunosti sa gospodinom Samijem, koji veruje u
mudrost ovog naroda i da ?e mudrost ovog naroda mnoge
od ovih stvari, koje su danas na dnevnom redu, u
budu?nosti postaviti na pravi na?in. Ali, na?alost, mnogi
ne veruju u mudrost tog naroda, i vise veruju u svoju
mudrost, te su Ustavnu povelju i rad oko Ustavne povelje
koncipirali tako da se narod nista ne pita, a da procedura
bude izvan ustavne i pravne, koja je predvidjena za
ovakve akte u Saveznoj Republici Jugoslaviji, dr?avi koja
se ve? dve godine zaklinje da se u njoj sprovodi vladavina
prava
Mi mo?emo o Ustavnoj povelji i proceduri donosenja
Ustavne povelje da ?ujemo najrazli?itije kvalifikacije.
One se kre?u od veoma ozbiljnih i nau?nih, do raznih
narodnih viceva i raznih imena koja se tim povodom
ovde navode i dodaju.
Razli?ite kvalifikacije su u tome da je to sporazum
vladaju?ih oligarhija. da je to po?etak brakorazvodne
parnice dve republike, da se radi o ugovoru o sukcesiji, o
obezbedjivanju medjunarodne pozicije Crne Gore itd.
Verovatno da u velikom delu ovih kvalifikacija ima i deo
istine. Ali, ja smatram da su to sve stvari koje ?ine
formu, a ne sustinu i sadr?aj, u okviru kojih se vrsi
prekompozicija bivse Savezne Republike Jugoslavije u
jednu novu tvorevinu i nastavlja praksa atomiziranja
dr?ava na Balkanu.
Mi ?emo, nakon ove prekompozicije, razbijanja Savezne
Republike Jugoslavije, u?i u proces komadanja Srbije. Ja
se bojim da ?e Srbija sada ostati bez tog stita koji je do
sada bio ispred nje, da ?e Srbija u budu?nosti sve vise
postajati geografski pojam polivalentnih regiona, kao sto
se pojavljuje u raznim opcijama koje prakti?no treba da
startuju ?im se okon?a ova politi?ka aktivnost.
Procedura, postupak i na?in usvajanja i aktivnosti u radu
Ustavne povelje, neodoljivo vra?aju na balkansku scenu
jedan pojam, koji je u poslednja dva veka bio izuzetno
aktuelan na Balkanu. To je protektorat. Pojam
protektorata jako je dobro poznat narodima Balkana.
Vekovima se razni pokrivitelji, zastitnici, velike i
regionalne sile, jednostavno takmi?e u tome kako da
upravljaju dr?avama ili dr?avnim tvorevinama
balkanskih naroda. Po pravilu, uvek se navode, kao i
danas, plemeniti ciljevi i ?rtve koje ?ini protektor, kako
bi civilizovao ili priveo zapadnoj civilizaciji ili kulturi
zaostale balkanske narode, koji su maltene na plemenskoj
razvojnom nivou.
Takva ssaopstenja ?esto slusamo ve? vise od pola godine
iz raznih evropskih institucija. Ja sam izbrojao 48
saoppstenja, izjava, kvalifikacija, izvesne gospodje
Galjak, koja sebi uzima za pravo da tretira oivaj potez
dobrim, ovaj potez losim, ovo usporava, ovo omogu?ava
integraciju, ili gospodine Solane, koji je ushi?en sto je
doslo do usvajanja ove poveolje.
Sve ove izjave na najbolji na?in govore o protektorskim
aktivnostima koje se sprovode u ovom trenutku, ne samo
prema nasoj zemlji. Nije u pitanju samo Savezna
Republike Jugoslavija. Sve bivse republike, izuzev
mo?da Slovenije koja je u malo druga?ijem statusu,
nastale iz prethodne Jugoslavije, kao nove dr?ave, su
prakti?no u istom statusu, a takodje i neke druge dr?ave
na Balkanu.
Politi?ki smisao pomo?i medjunarodne zajednice ili
njihovih ?inovnika u kreaciji nove tvorevine na Balkanu,
isti je kao sto je uvek i bio u prethodna dva veka. On se
sastoji u pot?injavanju teritorije i dr?avne organizacije
balkanskih naroda velikim silama i regionalnim
hegemonima. Iza re?i "proitektorat" uvek stoji
ekspanzionizam, koji mi danas mo?emo tretirati, pod
plastom "integracije" ove nove tvorevine u evropsku
zajednicu naroda, ili kako ve? nazivamo te medjunarodne
organizacije i institucije, prema kojima te?imo.
Paralelno sa uvodjenjem temina "protektorat" - on se
uvek obavljao kroz uspostavljanje razli?itih modela i
nivoa zavisnosti, uvodi se i pojam"ograni?eni
suverenitet". Ti pojmovi su se ovde, na Balkanu,
definisali javno ili tajno, individualno ili kolektivno.
Narodi Balkanskog poluostrva, kao retko koje podru?je
na svetu, iskusili su izuzetno bogat repertoar
medjunarodnog mesanja, pokriviteljstva ili direktnog
stranog upravljanja njihovim teritorijama i dr?avama. U
tom smislu je Ustavna povelja, i tvorevina koja na osnovu
nje nastaje, jos jedan novi teorijski i prakti?ni dopirnos
ovom repertoaru.
Ipak teoreti?ari prava ka?u da ona mo?e dda se poredi
jedino sa Austro-Ugarskom unijom iz 1867. godine, po
svom konceptu. Mo?da mo?e da se poredi, ali predstavlja
autenti?an i novi doprinos razvoju pravne prakse, kada
govorimo o oblikovanju dr?ava i udru?ivanju dr?ava, na
ovakav na?in.
Ve?ina dr?avnih tvorevina na Balkanu u poslednja dva
veka imala je svoje strane zastitnike. Uostalom,
Balkansko poluostrvo, kao stratesko geopoliti?ko
raskrs?e, uvek je bilo predmet posebne pa?nje velikih
sila. O tome svedo?e mnogi medjunarodni ugovori,
dokumenti i ?injenice. Ja bih dodao da su sve prethodne
Jugoslavije, od 1919. godine pa nadalje, bile gradjene i da
je njihova pozicija u medjunarodnim okvirima bila
garantovana, odgovaraju?im sporazumima velikih sila.
Mi znamo koji su to sporazumi , i koje sile.
Ono sto danas treba da se proglasi kao nova tvorevina,
bojim se da je napravljena kao nesprazum velikih sila i da
?e zahvaljuju?i toj konstrukciji, koja je izgradjena na
nesporazumu velikih sila, kada je Balkan u pitanju, biti
kratkog daha i osudjena na nove prekompozicije koje,
na?alost, ne?e zavisiti niti od nase dobre volje, niti od
gradjana ove zemlje, pa niti najboljih ?elja ove vlasti.
?injenica je takodje da na Balkanu postoji, na izvestan
na?in, bogata tradicija prikrivanja realnog stepena i
oblika povezanosti dr?avnih tvorevina sa velikim silama.
Neki od istorijskih oblika dr?ava, tretiraju se u pojedinim
periodima kao doba slobode i nezavisnosti, iako su imali
sna?ne medjunarodne garante ove pozicije. Ja bih rekao
da je ?ak i Socijalisti?ka Federativna Republika
Jugoslavija, koju tretiramo kao nezavisnu i nesvrstanu,
imala sna?ne garante te svoje pozicije, koji nisu bili
zasnovani samo na balansu snaga u hladnom ratu. Na
osnovu dokumenata, koji su tek pre dve godine dospeli u
javnost iz ameri?kih arhiva, na osnovu zastarevanja od 50
godina, doslo se u posed sporazuma koji je bivsa
Jugoslavija, odnosno Tito, potpisala sa NATO Paktom.
Jugoslavija je, na izvestan na?in, bila preko odredjenih
vojnih sporazuma sa Gr?kom i Turskom, iz 1952. godine,
aktivni pridru?eni ?lan NATO pakta koji je garantovao
milion vojnika za potrebe NATO pakta u ovom delu
sveta.
Mi danas imamo obra?un sa medjunarodnom pozicijom i
prethodne SFRJ i prethodne SRJ. U tom obra?unu
previdjamo sta je bilo pozitivno u tom periodu. Danas za
ovom govornicom mnogi dr?e tirade o tome kako je
neophodno sto pre u NATO, sto pre u Partnerstvo za mir,
sto pre u institucije koje garantuju nas medjunarodni
polo?aj. Zaboravljaju da je Jugoslavija bila ?lan NATO'a
ali se to sakrivalo od njene javnosti. Jugoslavija "ne bi
trebal da silazi sa konja na magarca" kako to neki ka?u,
nego da pokusa da reaktivira svoj polo?aj u NATO'u.
Nisu bezazlene ni ocene koje danas ima Hrvatske kada
pokusava u Partnerstvo za mir i kada joj Robertson
ka?e:"Vi ne mo?ete u Partnerstvo za mir samostalno -
mo?ete preko vojnog saveza sa Jugoslavijom". To je zbog
toga sto NATO tretira bivsu SFRJ ili njen najve?i deo,
kao jedinstvenu operativnu zonu u koju je godinama
ulagao. Sve ovo sto mi tretiramo kao dr?avne tvorevine
na ovom podru?ju, to su za njih prolazne teritorije. Za
njih je vojno prisustvo na osnovu Spajkmanove doktrine
"periferne odbrane Evrope" jedina konstantna kategorija.
Oni ?e se za to boriti. Oni ?e to ostvariti kroz novu
integraciju na Balkanu, bez obzira kako mi to ovde
tretirali, eksponirali i zagovarali.
Na?alost, disolucija Balkana jos nije zavrsena. Dok se
vode rasprave o integraciji i stabilnosti, i dalje se
realizuju elementi nekadasnjeg plana o komadanju
Jugoslavije i Srbije. Ciljevi su veoma jednostavni: da se
Jugoslaviji otkine Kosovo, izlaz na more Crna Gora,
?itnica Vojvodina, a da Sand?ak, tri li ?etiri opstine na
Jugu Srbije, kao i Dimitrovgrad, Bosilegrad i druga
podru?ja prema Bugarskoj, dobiju jedan polivalentan
status, u kome ?e Srbija postati geografski pojam, i u
kome ?e sve izgledati druga?ije. Uostalom, to
medjunarodna zajednica na krije. Karl Bilt u februaru
1999. godine govori o integraciji balkanskih zemalja:
"Sti?e se utisak da se politika medjunarodne zajednice u
odnosu na Balkan sastaji u stvaranju mozaika sa?injenog
od protektorata. To bi podrazumevalo transfer
suvereniteta u ekonomskim i strukturnim pitanjima na
institucije Evropske Unije."
Da li Evropska Unija ima moralno pravo i kredibilitet da
suvereno upravlja balkanskim prostoro9m, tretiraju?i
ovaj prostor kao neku perifernu zonu, preko koje ?se
resavati svoje probleme i svoje pitanja, a ne tretiraju?i
ovaj prostor kao prostor koji treba ravnopravno
integrisati u Evropsku Uniju, odnosno u zajednicu
evropskih naroda?
Podsetio bih da evropska kultura ne samo da nije bila u
stanju da spre?i razbuktavanje sukoba u bivsoj
Jugoslaviji, nego je obezbedila ideolosku osnovu na kojoj
su ovi sukobi nastali. Evropska politika, demokratija,
religija i humanizam, nisu pomogli spre?avanju sukoba
ve? su dopirneli njihovom razbuktavanju.
Na?alost, i danas na sceni imamo one elemente koji svoje
interese na Balkanu vide tako sto Jugoslavija treba da
nestane, sto ?e Srbija biti dalje komadana i tako sto ?e se
ovde realizovati njihova pozicija. Najbolji svedok za to je
Ralf Hartman, ?ovek koji je u knjizi "?asni mesetari"
analizirao sednice Bundestaga i koji je preneo delove
stenograma u kojima se u poslednjih deset godina ?uje
ratni pokli? velikog broja poslanika Bundestaga, od
Svarca pa nadalje, da se Srbima osvete za nema?ki poraz
na Balkanu u dva svetska rata. Taj pokli? bi mogao da se
tuma?i kao revansisti?ak retorika ali samo pod uslovom
da se ta retorika nije zaista i sprovela, i to na
najmilitantniji na?in, onako kako su oni zagovarali
prema Srbiji i ovom podru?ju.
Satanizovanje srpskog nacionalnog korpusa i forsiranje
kolektivne krivice mo?e se pratiti i istorijski. Nije nista
novo. To je deo kontinuiteta od formiranja ujedinjene
nema?ke dr?ave, kako u pretproslom veku, tako i u
proslom. Eksponent ove politike je bila i
ekspanzionist?ka politika umiru?eg Austrougarskog
carstva, koje prodiru?i na Balkan, pokusava da produ?i
?ivot, osiguravaju?i istovremeno Nema?koj ?uveni
prodor na Iatok. Prepreka na tom putu je i danas , kao i
nekada ' srpska dr?ava, sto ve?a' to ja?a. Zato se i dalje sa
istog mesta kre?u nastojanja za sto manjom i slabojom
srpskom dr?avom, za ponistenjem svakog oblika
integracije u okviru koga Srbi i narodi ovog regiona
mogu da ?ive slobodno, na svoj autenti?an na?in.
Za narode i gradjane Balkana, od svih ovih velikih igara,
je zato mnogo bitnije da se pitisnu elementi na osnovu
kojih se vrse nasilne prekompozicije Balkana, kao sto su:
istorijska izvornost, nacionalno samoopredeljenje i
kategorije koje pripadaju XIX veku i romantizmu.
Za gradjane Balkana je mnogo va?nije da ta?no zanaju
kako se na njihove pojedina?ne sudbine i kvalitet ?ivota
odnosi ovaj ili onaj akt njihove vlasti ili medjunarodnih
institucija, a ne gde su granice obele?avali car Dusan,
kralj Tomislav, Tvrtko ili kraljiva Teuta. To je posao za
nauku i istori?are, a ne za politi?ku borbu. Kada bi se
Balkan istinski integrisao u miru, slobodi i
ravopravnosti, tada bi sve ove virtuelne dr?ave mogle da
se nadju na jednom mestu. Nestao bi nacionalni
rimantizam u pratki?nom smislu kao potencijlani
pokreta? bilo kakve dezintegracije i destrukcije. Gubile
bi se granice izmedju dr?ava i gradjani Balkana mogli bi
da ?ive mirno i da grade svoj put, bez spornih
nacionalnih i teritorijalnih pitanja.
Jedina alternativa podeljenom i atomiziranom Balkanu je
istinska demokratija i saradnja i integracije, potiskivanje
i pacificiranje projekata nacionalnog romantizma, kada
se uspostave gradjanska i politi?ka prava, ali i drustvena
svest na tom nivou, da se ostvaruje i nacionalna i ljudska
emancipacija, a da niko nikoga ne ugro?ava. Alternativa
nacionalnoj kcenofobiji je da granice budu otvorene, a da
se svaki gradjanin Balkana ose?a bezbedno na bilo kojoj
ta?ki balkanskog prostora.
I na kraju samo, dozvolite mi jos jedan stav, brzo ?u
zavrsiti izlaganje. Mi znamo da dr?ava , po pravilu, ima
uvek istu funkciju. Ona pokusava da izvrsi
homogenizaciju stanovnistva, kroz na?ela vladaju?eg
drustvenog poretka. Zbog toga, organaizacija Evrope
mirovnim ugovorima ne predstavlja pacifisti?ku
koncepciju, kako je to verovao Vilson, idejni nosilac
koncepcije nacionalnog samoopredeljenja, na rusevinama
evropskih carevina, ?ije je opredeljenje bilo
ujedna?avanje i asimilacija naroda. Bilo je to uvod u novu
nestbilnost, jer svaka nova dr?ava je bila sastavljena od
raznorodnog stanovnistva.
Tako i danas, i Srbija i Crna Gora - u pravom dr?avnom
i sustinskom smislu - pojedina?no i zajedni?iki
preuzimaju sve one elemnete koji su bili sporni u
prethodnoj Jugoslaviji, pa i u Saveznoj Republici
Jugoslaviji.
Elementi i poluge za destrukciju ovih dr?ava postoje i
danas. Srbija i Crna Gora imaju obe , i svoju Vojvodinu, i
svoje Kosovo, i svoj Sand?ak, i mnoga sporna pitanja, i
bez ove dr?ave koju danas pravimo.
Ja bih voleo da sve protekne u najboljem redu i miru, da
postanemo deo Evrope ' na na?in kako to mi vidimo
Evropu. Na?alost, Evropa nas ne vidi na taj na?in, vidi
nas na drugi na?in, i zato bih voleo da se narodi i gradjani
Balkana integrisu oko pitanja svog ?ivota autenti?no, na
nasim interesima, a ne na interesima bilo ?ijeg i bilo
kakvog ekspanzionizma, ?iji rezultat je i ova Ustavna
povelja.
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2003 10:36:52 -0800 (PST)
From: Rick Rozoff
Subject: NATO's Next Round: FYROM, Bosnia, Croatia To Aid War
1) US Orders Macedonia To Provide Military And
Logisitical Support For War Against Iraq
2) Bosnia Backs US War Stance
3) Croatia Offers US Assistance With War
http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2003/02/4-SEE/see-070203.asp
Radio Free Europe/Radio LIberty
February 7, 2003
MACEDONIA REPORTEDLY RECEIVES U.S. REQUEST FOR
MILITARY SUPPORT
The U.S. government has formally asked Macedonia for
military and logistical support, RFE/RL's Macedonian
broadcasters reported on 5 February, quoting
unspecified government sources. The request, which was
sent the army's commander in chief, President Boris
Trajkovski, is said to be similar to the ones received
by the Bulgarian and Turkish governments. It
reportedly includes overflight rights as well as
allowing the presence of U.S. troops on Macedonian
territory. UB
BOSNIA SUPPORTS PRO-U.S. DECLARATION ON IRAQ
Among the signatories of the Vilnius 10 declaration
were Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia, the "Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung" reported on 7 February. Bosnia and
Serbia and Montenegro, which are not part of the
Vilnius group, did not have an opportunity to be
included. The Bosnian Foreign Ministry issued a
statement of its own on 6 February in which it backed
the U.S. stand on Iraq as presented by Secretary of
State Colin Powell before the UN Security Council the
previous day, dpa reported. The statement called on
Iraq to implement all relevant Security Council
resolutions and expressed Bosnia's support for the
role of that body in dealing with the crisis. PM
CROATIA OFFERS THE U.S. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
Defense Minister Zeljka Antunovic said in Zagreb on 6
February that Croatia is prepared to provide the
United States with logistical support in the event of
a conflict in Iraq but did not elaborate. Local media
reports suggested that such support could involve
overflight and refueling rights for U.S. aircraft.
Elsewhere, President Stipe Mesic expressed support for
efforts to disarm Iraq but stressed that peace should
be "given a chance." PM
PANCEVO: NEMMENO I NAZISTI AVEVANO OSATO TANTO
Ecco come il "New York Times" racconto' il bombardamento chimico
contro la popolazione civile di Pancevo, poche settimane dopo gli
eventi. La NATO miro' intenzionalmente sui depositi di cloruro di
vinile monomero ed altre sostanze venefiche e cancerogene, per
garantirsi un effetto genocida di lunga durata, causando anche la
contaminazione del Danubio. Questo su di una citta' governata dai
partiti della (allora) opposizione. Il "Tribunale" dell'Aia non ha mai
aperto ne' aprira' mai alcuna inchiesta per questi crimini contro
l'umanita' commessi dai responsabili politici dei paesi della NATO.
Complice degli assassini della NATO e' oggi la classe dirigente serba,
che nasconde le statistiche e le ricerche epidemiologiche sulle
conseguenze della guerra chimica contro i civili scatenata nel 1999.
(I.S.)
---
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/pancevo.htm
www.tenc.net [emperors-clothes]
Toxic aftermath of war
From the NY Times News Service
Petar Makara, who is from Pancevo in Serbia and now works
as a computer scientist in the US, wrote the following
comments:
#1: The Pancevo chemical industry was built by NATO
countries. They knew exactly what they were hitting.
#2: It is clear from the NATO spokeswoman quoted
below that the war crime was deliberate and well
calculated: ""There were tactical and strategic targets.
The oil refinery in Pancevo was considered a strategic
target..."
And she adds: "When targeting is done we take into
account all possible collateral damage," she said, "be it
environmental, human or to the civilian infrastructure..."
As someone who was born and lived in Pancevo for 33 years I
must add that even though bombing of my home town
happened 8,000 miles away I have experienced some of the
same symptoms as my Pancevo neighbours. The symptoms
are vomiting and stomach cramps.
- Petar Makara
The New York Times
July 14, 1999, Wednesday, Late Edition - Final
Section A; Page 1; Column 5; Foreign Desk
Serbian Town Bombed by NATO Fears Effects of Toxic Chemicals
By CHRIS HEDGES
PANCEVO, Serbia, July 12
On the edge of town, in a sprawling industrial park that held an oil
refinery, a petrochemical plant and a fertilizer factory, lie the
twisted pipes, scorched storage tanks, crumbled roofs and jagged
detritus left by NATO bombs.
Yet it is not these ruined factories that are the worst scourges of
war in this river town, many people here say, but the tons of toxic
material that poured out of them. Farm workers, plunging their fingers
into the earth, say they come away with rashes that burn and blister.
Those who eat the river fish and vegetables or drink the tap water,
which trickles out of faucets because of the damage to the
purification plant, come down with diarrhea, vomiting and stomach
cramps.
Children, many of whom were sent away to Slovakia by local Red Cross
officials for several weeks to escape the clouds of noxious gasses
that hovered for days over Pancevo, still suffer headaches and
dizziness. The war's lingering, ghoulish touch could be affecting even
the unborn. There are twice as many miscarriages as there were during
the comparable period last year, doctors here say.
There is no independent assessment of the medical effects of the
exposure to chemicals that the bombing caused. The scientific studies
conducted by the Yugoslavs in Pancevo, by their own admission, have
been carried out with outdated methods and inferior, antiquated
equipment.
The results of such testing, said Dr. Predrag S. Polic, the chemist
who conducted many of the tests, are three or four weeks away.
The United Nations Environment Program has formed a Balkans Task
Force, headed by Pakka Haavisto, who was the Environment Minister of
Finland.
The task force will send a team of international experts to Pancevo,
and about half a dozen other damaged industrial sites, next Tuesday to
take air, water and soil samples for three or four weeks. It expects
to publish its findings and make recommendations in September.
"The most dangerous moment probably occurred during the fires, when
the smoke was in the air," said Mr. Haavisto, who briefly visited
Pancevo two weeks ago and was reached by phone in Geneva. "A large
amount of chemicals burned during this time. It remains unclear how
much is in the soil, but when you walk in Pancevo you can smell
chemical substances.
"The biggest danger now is that the ground water and the Danube have
been directly polluted, something that will affect the drinking water.
There are towns in Romania and Bulgaria that use the Danube for
drinking water. In my estimation the most damaged sites will need a
cleaning process, as in places where the soil and water have been
contaminated with toxic materials, before we can talk about
rebuilding."
Government officials, doctors and residents in the town report a
surge of unexplained symptoms.
"The effects of the bombing on these industrial sites have been
enormous," said Simon Bancov, the Government health inspector for the
region. "More than 100,000 tons of carcinogenics were unleashed into
the air, the water and the soil. The produce is not safe to eat. The
long-term damage to the water table and riverbeds is severe. People
complain constantly of stomach pain but have no viral or bacterial
symptoms. We have all been poisoned."
The repeated air strikes on the industrial complex, which covers
several acres, culminated in three huge hits at 1 A.M. on April 18.
The bombs sent fireballs into the air and enveloped Pancevo in clouds
of black smoke and milky white gases. Flames leapt from the site for
10 days.
The air strikes unleashed tons of chemicals into the air and water.
An estimated 1,500 tons of vinyl chloride, the building block of a
type of plastic, 3,000 times higher than permitted levels, burned into
the air or poured into the soil and river, said municipal officials in
Pancevo, which is controlled by opposition parties hostile to
President Slobodan Milosevic.
The chemical, which has left the banks of the river edged with white
foam, still clogs the canals around the town. Huge quantities of other
noxious chemicals burned or gushed out of storage tanks, said town
officials and Yugoslav scientists.
Those chemicals included an estimated 15,000 tons of ammonia, used to
make fertilizer; 800 tons of hydrochloric acid and 250 tons of liquid
chlorine, used for several industrial products; vast quantities of
dioxin, a component of Agent Orange and other defoliants, and 100 tons
of mercury, the officials said.
By dawn after the night of the attack, dozens of people were
hospitalized gasping for air, struggling to see and unable to digest
food, witnesses said.
The sun was blotted out for nearly a day as people moved with rags
over their noses and mouths through the fog.
NATO officials, reached by phone in Mons, Belgium, said the
industrial site had been a key target in the drive to deny fuel and
other resources to the Yugoslav Army.
"NATO had two types of targets," said a NATO spokeswoman. "There were
tactical and strategic targets. The oil refinery in Pancevo was
considered a strategic target. It was a key installation that provided
petrol and other elements to support the Yugoslav Army. By cutting off
these supplies we denied crucial material to the Serbian forces
fighting in Kosovo."
The official said the environmental damage caused by the attack had
been taken into consideration.
"When targeting is done we take into account all possible collateral
damage," she said, "be it environmental, human or to the civilian
infrastructure. Pancevo was considered to be a very, very important
refinery and strategic target, as important as tactical targets inside
Kosovo."
Three months later, anxious families are coping with illnesses no one
seems able to explain. Mothers, clutching the hands of small children,
along with people whose bodies are covered in rashes, clog the small
waiting rooms of local doctors hoping for explanations and treatment.
The doctors say there is little they can do but wait to see if the
exposure leads to cancer, blood contamination and serious respiratory
ailments.
Chemical exposure can produce immediate and longer-term effects,
causing different kinds of damage to the body, experts say. Some may
be clear to the eye and painful, but other effects could be silent and
only show up years later.
It is difficult to pinpoint the cause of the symptoms that people in
Pancevo report without scientific tests. Neither Dr. Polic nor
officials of the United Nations Environment Program said they were
ready to speculate on the possible health risks.
"What can we tell people?" said Dr. Dobrosav Pavlovic, a
gynecologist. "We have not advised expectant mothers to have
abortions, but we are seeing more and more miscarriages.
"I can't say how much the bombing has contributed to this increase. I
can't say what the results of the bombing will be over the long term.
It will be over a year, when we can begin to look for birth defects
and can detect serious illnesses, that we will start to understand
what has happened."
The bombing left most of the 8,761 people who worked in the plants,
10 miles northwest of Belgrade, out of work. The Government, which was
months late with salaries before the bombing, has reduced incomes from
$100 to $15 a month until the factories are repaired, something
workers say will never happen without foreign investment. The damage
is estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Three United States companies and a German company built the
petrochemical plant, used to make plastics, in 1978. Two American
corporations and a French concern constructed the oil refinery in
1969. The fertilizer plant, which began operation in 1958, was a joint
venture by companies from the United States, Spain and the
Netherlands.
The loss of income in the town has made it difficult for those who
would like to move or take precautions against the pollutants. There
is now 70 percent unemployment.
"My son and I have constant headaches," said Radmila Vukelic, 52. "We
feel dizzy, as if we were going to faint. No one has told us anything.
We have no information about what has happened or what we should do.
"I do not eat the fish from the river. I am afraid. We would like to
eat frozen or canned vegetables, but we do not have this kind of
money. We must eat what is in the markets."
Srdjan Mikovic, 38, the Mayor of Pancevo, said he was bewildered by
the extent of the air strikes, especially since his town of 130,000,
with a mixture of people of Hungarian and Croatian ancestry, has long
been one of the centers of the opposition.
It is one of the few places in Serbia where the radio and television
stations are free from party control, either by Mr. Milosevic's ruling
Socialists or the parties that oppose him.
"We have heard nothing from the Government," the Mayor said. "We have
never supported the regime, and for this reason I fear we will be
sacrificed.
"NATO had to understand what they were doing to us, because these
factories were built by American and European firms. They could not
have been ignorant of the environmental damage. I have given up. I eat
the fish. How much more can I be poisoned after living in clouds of
this stuff?"
Pancevo was once a frontier town, manned by Hungarian, Serbian and
Austrian soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian empire. The pink facade of
the former imperial army barracks lies in the center of Pancevo. It
was from here that the European troops faced the Ottoman Turks across
the river from 1716, when Vienna captured Pancevo, until the end of
World War I.
The buildings, although in bad repair, look as if they were lifted
from Austria, with stuccoed block exteriors, onion domed towers,
arched windows and delicate wrought iron staircases.
This part of Serbia has never embraced Mr. Milosevic's nationalist
movement. Pancevo played host to a women's water polo tournament last
year, and the American swimmers won. The spectators cheered the
athletes as "The Star-Spangled Banner" was played during the awards
ceremony.
"The bombing has changed how we feel about the outside world," Mr.
Mikovic said. "People have lost their desire to fight, to reach out.
They only want to survive. The Americans can come back, but they will
not have any applause from us."
(c) NY Times * Reprinted for Fair Use Only
www.tenc.net [emperors-clothes]
Apprendiamo nello stesso giorno che, mentre la "Procura" del
"tribunale" dell'Aja ha deciso di rinunciare a chiedere la consegna
del generale croato Janko Bobetko, un gruppo di squadristi croati si
e' introdotto nella Repubblica Serba di Bosnia per devastare il
villaggio di Jablan Do, demolendo 10 case e lasciando come "firma" i
simboli del nazismo.
Bobetko, responsabile della carneficina della sacca di Medak (1993),
e' stato graziato "a causa delle sue condizioni di salute". La
Croazia, nel frattempo, impedisce anche l'estradizione del criminale
di guerra Ante Gotovina. Ciononostante, la Croazia e' al centro di
generose iniziative diplomatiche berlusconiane e statunitensi per un
veloce accoglimento nella UE e nella NATO.
Fonti:
CROAZIA: TPI,PROCURA NON CHIEDERA' CONSEGNA GENERALE BOBETKO
http://www.ansa.it/balcani/croazia/20030205161832465478.html
+++ÜBERFALL KROATISCHER FASCHISTEN
TREBINJE. Eine Gruppe kroatischer Faschisten aus Dubrovnik hat ein
nahe gelegenes serbisches Dorf Jablan Do in der Republik Srpska
überfallen. Dabei wurden 10 Familienhäuser demoliert und mit
faschistischen Zeichen beschmutzt. Es ist unklar ob die kroatischen
Behörden etwas gegen solche Untaten unternehmen werden. TANJUG+++
Balkan-Telegramm, 5 Feb 2003 - http://www.amselfeld.com
l'appello "contro il razzismo di guerra", ed invita tutti i
progressisti a fare altrettanto.
Per la pace e la solidarieta' internazionalista!
CNJ
---------- Initial Header -----------
From : "dino frisullo"
Date : Fri, 7 Feb 2003 11:20:59 +0100
Subject : RAZZISMO DI GUERRA appello - aggiornamento firme - con
preghiera diffusione e pubblicazione
CONTRO IL RAZZISMO DI GUERRA
In un mondo sempre più interdipendente, la guerra moderna alimenta e
si alimenta di pulsioni razziste e segregazioniste. Tanto più una
guerra infinita contro un nemico indefinito, come la "guerra
preventiva al terrorismo", comporta la crescente criminalizzazione e
segregazione dei diversi, identificati come potenziali nemici, anche
con il ricorso agli strumenti di una giustizia sommaria e preventiva.
Per questo il movimento contro la guerra in Iraq è anche contestazione
delle campagne mediatiche, delle montature giudiziarie e degli atti
legislativi e amministrativi che, in Italia come negli Usa e in tutto
l'Occidente, tendono da un lato a criminalizzare e segregare i
migranti e specialmente i musulmani, dall'altro ad appiattire sulla
categoria del "terrorismo" e sulla logica di guerra amico-nemico il
giudizio sui movimenti di opposizione e di liberazione e il diritto
d'asilo degli esuli, come nel caso della diaspora kurda.
In Italia sono già centinaia i cittadini stranieri di religione
musulmana inquisiti per reati associativi, additati sulla stampa e dai
massimi esponenti del governo come "terroristi" e incarcerati in base
a indagini puramente indiziarie o basate su informative di servizi
italiani o stranieri, e ultimamente su interrogatori extralegali di
detenuti nell'inferno extragiuridico di Guantanamo. Oltre a colpire la
presunzione d'innocenza e possibili innocenti, queste campagne
giudiziario-mediatiche alimentano le tensioni razziste nei confronti
dei luoghi di culto islamici cavalcate da esponenti di governo
nazionale e locale.
Questi processi rischiano di moltiplicarsi con la guerra e con il
prevedibile immenso esodo di profughi che essa provocherà, a fronte di
una forte restrizione del diritto d'asilo e delle vie d'accesso legali
che già comporta un pesante prezzo di vite umane nei mari e alle
frontiere d'Italia e d'Europa. Oltre alle basi e alle portaerei, in
Medio oriente e nelle regioni frontaliere si stanno allestendo i lager
per profughi.
Contro questi processi di "guerra interna", che imbarbariscono la
nostra società prima ancora della barbarie della guerra aperta,
facciamo appello a una grande mobilitazione del pensiero giuridico
garantista e delle coscienze, ad un'attenta ricognizione e denuncia
dell'intreccio fra razzismo e guerra, e alla presenza a pieno titolo
dei migranti e degli esuli nelle manifestazioni e iniziative contro la
guerra in Iraq, a partire dalla giornata del 15 febbraio a Roma.
Adesioni:
Senzaconfine, Antigone, Azad, Giuristi democratici, Cgil naz.le, Arci
naz.le, Un ponte per., Mov. delle/dei disobbedienti, Prc naz.le,
Aprile, Sinistra giovanile, Conf.ne Cobas, Legambiente, red. Carta,
Assopace, Rete Lilliput, Lunaria, SinCobas, red. Guerre e Pace, Conv.
permanente Donne contro la guerra, red. Giano, Naga, Fondaz. Luigi
Cipriani, Rete Ebrei contro l'occupazione, Mov. palestinese per la
cultura e la democrazia, Avamp. Incompatibili,
wwwInformationGuerrilla, Com. Piazza Carlo Giuliani, Ass. Iemanja',
Osserv. lavoro donne (Mi), Circolo B. Russell (Tv), Ass. donne Trama
di terre (Imola), Ass. Mediterranea (Rm), Prc Grosseto, Giov.
comunisti Oristano, Ciss-Cepir (Pa), Attac Catania, Attac Como, Centro
solid. internaz. Alta Maremma, Ciac e Coord. pace e solidarietà (Pr)
Ettore Masina, Fiamma Bianchi Bandinelli (Si), Annamaria Rivera (Univ.
Ba), Mario Ruffin (Tv), Elisa Longoni, Gabriella Gagliardo, Radi
Pagani, Lidia Menapace, Angelo Zappoli (cons. Va), Margherita
Turchetto (Univ. Pd), Simone Piazzesi (Pt), Rosa Capozzi (Cnr Ba),
Stefano Longagnani (Re), Angelo Baracca (IUniv. Fi), Fulvio Grimaldi,
M. Gloria Troncon (Bo), Saverio Aversa, Sandra Cangemi (giorn. Mi),
Luisa Acerbi (Mi), Milena Valli (So), M. Grazia Campari (Mi), Grazia
Naletto (Rm), Dino Frisullo (Rm)
Per ulteriori adesioni: dirittoalfuturo@...
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/nothing.htm
=======================================
Nothing is Forever
U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman interviewed Jan. 21,
1992 in the Croatian daily 'Danas' ('Today')
Translated by www.emperors-clothes.com (6-1-00)
Comments by Jared Israel, editor, Emperor's Clothes
=======================================
"We are aiming for a dissolution of Yugoslavia
into independent states peacefully." (Warren
Zimmerman, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Jan.,
1992)
The following interview is very important. Many have
argued that the U.S. opposed the breakup of Yugoslavia.
Warren Zimmerman was US Ambassador to Yugoslavia
during the key period, when Slovenia and Croatia were
fighting to secede. In this interview he makes the real U.S.
position quite clear.
A week before the interview a key event occurred. Europe
recognized secessionist Croatia and Slovenia as independent
states. Balkans scholar Raju Thomas refers to this as "a new
method of aggression: Diplomatic Recognition."
"Surely then the real aggression in Yugoslavia began
with the western recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
The territorial integrity of a state [Yugoslavia] that was
voluntarily created and which had existed since
December 1918 was swept aside. In 1991, new state
recognition policy proved to be an inventive method of
destroying long-standing sovereign independent states.
When several rich and powerful states decide to take a
sovereign independent state apart through the policy of
recognition, how is this state supposed to defend itself?
There can be no deterrence or defense against this form
of destruction." (Raju Thomas, "Nationalism, Secession
and Conflict: Legacies from the Former Yugoslavia.")
The U.S. did not immediately endorse the European move.
Does this mean the U.S. opposed secession? I think the U.S.
policy was two-faced. The U.S. government paid lip service
to peaceful solutions and withheld recognition of Slovenia
and Croatia, but at the same time, US officials and covert
agencies worked to dismember Yugoslavia in a manner
aimed at producing a Bosnian nation-state run by Islamic
Fundamentalist proxies under the thumb of the US.
Zimmerman's interview in 'Danas' supports this view. Is the
interview accurate? If an Ambassador is seriously misquoted
he would respond in order to correct the record; but
Zimmerman never denied or corrected any part of the
interview. There is no known reason to question its accuracy.
Moreover, subsequent US actions dovetail with the views
expressed here. For example, consider this from Zimmerman:
"It appears to us that he [Bosnian Islamic
Fundamentalist leader Izetbegovic] needs help in his
effort to resist the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
I believe it would be tragic if someone from the
Croatian side would try cooperating with Serbia in the
dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Later, when the Bosnian Islamist leader Izetbegovic signed
an agreement with Croatian and Serbian leaders to
peacefully partition Bosnia, Zimmerman met with
Izetbegovic and 'helped' by persuading him to renege on the
deal and demand instead a unitary Bosnian state under
Islamist control. Izetbegovic did renege, as Zimmerman
asked, and this launched the Bosnian civil war.
It is important to remember when reading this interview that
Zimmerman was speaking for the world's only Superpower.
Whatever Zimmerman said would be read carefully by all
sides. As you shall see, he used the interview to encourage
Croatian chauvinism, Kosovo Albanian secessionism and, in
Bosnia, Islamic Fundamentalism, the very forces that Nazi
Germany allied with in Yugoslavia during World War II.
Zimmerman said he was against destabilization but talk is
cheap and every diplomat knew that a united Yugoslavia was
the key to stability in the Balkans. He said pretty things
about peace but he unleashed the forces of war.
My comments, which appear frequently, begin with the
phrase [Jared comments] and end with [End Jared's
comments].
Here is the interview.
'DANAS', 21 January 1992
Nothing is Forever
An Interview with Warren Zimmerman
Zimmerman: First of all, I have to point out that the US and
the American people exceptionally appreciate the Croatian
people and sympathize with you for all you have been
through in the past few months. We know you have been a
victim of a Serbian and Army aggression, and in that
situation you reacted with great courage and dignity. I am not
saying this as a compliment to the fighting abilities of Croatia
- though they are considerable - but I wish to point out that
a great deal of restraint was demanded of Croatia. I refer to
the lifting of the siege of military barracks, which was in our
opinion one of the keys to the possibility of a stable peace.
This also goes for honoring the cease-fires, which is always a
critical issue. I would also point out the agreement to the UN
peace plan, which all the sides have accepted. In all these
matters, the people and government of Croatia showed its
extraordinary worth.
[Jared comments] Zimmerman's reference to the
secessionists' "restraint" is false. While pretending
to observe a cease fire, the secessionists provoked
and attacked Yugoslav troops in their barracks.
Zimmerman lies throughout the interview. His
words are best read not as accurate information
but as evidence of US intentions. [End Jared's
comments]
DANAS: Still, everyone wonders why the recognition has
been delayed?
Zimmerman: I have to admit that at this moment the
recognition of Croatia is not on our agenda. But this does not
mean that this temporary American approach will be around
forever. We have always tried to approach recognition in a
way that would contribute most to a permanent peace, and
that same approach has been taken by Cyrus Vance and Lord
Carrington.
[Jared comments] Obviously he is promising US
recognition - just not yet. [End Jared's comments]
DANAS: What does that mean in terms of time?
Zimmerman: I cannot tell you the exact date. But that is
certainly something to be kept in mind, and something we are
thinking of, but we are also always wondering what kind of
benefit that would bring Croatia while the war is still going
on and while Croatia is still being occupied by enemy troops.
We thought the best way for the JNA [Yugoslav Army] to
leave Croatia was the one proposed by the UN, as it
specifically states that the JNA must leave Croatia. We also
believe that we can do the most to make this plan work is if
we keep the possibility to pressure Serbia, Serbian and JNA
leadership as much as possible. We are doing that decisively,
and I believe we are in a much better position to do that now,
as we have not recognized Croatia yet. That way, we have
preserved authority and credibility with Serbia and the Army
that we would not have if we had followed Germany and
recognized Croatia. I believe what we are doing is beneficial
to achieving true Croatian independence.
[Jared comments] The US was withholding formal
recognition not out of a desire to hold Yugoslavia
together but out of a desire to destroy it in the most
efficient and profitable way. [End Jared's
comments]
DANAS: So you wish to preserve your influence?
Zimmerman: Yes, but I also want to add that this does not
mean in any way that Serbia or the JNA have any right of
veto in the American recognition policy. This is not the case.
DANAS: Many claim that you generally support Europe, but
at the same time aren't too confident about the European
policy?
Zimmerman: I wouldn't say so. I know that Lord Carrington
believes that recognition of Yugoslav republics that have
requested it could be premature in these circumstances. We
have tried to clear a path that I believe could lead to the result
you want, which is a truly independent Croatia, free of
occupation and enemy forces.
[Jared comments] Zimmerman refers to the Army
of Yugoslavia, a country to whom he was U.S.
Ambassador, a country which included Croatia, as
an enemy force. Amazing.
The "enemy" Army did not invade Croatia. It was
present in Croatia just as it was present in other
parts of Yugoslavia. It was just as illegal for
Croatia to secede from Yugoslavia as it was for the
southern states to secede from the U.S. 140 years
ago. The JNA would have been justified in waging
total war, just as President Abraham Lincoln
waged total war; but the JNA did not. [End Jared's
comments]
Zimmerman: We very decisively told the Serbian and Army
leadership that they have to honor the obligations they
accepted and completely leave Croatia. We also said - and I
think we have been able to do it with more authority since we
have not recognized Croatia - that the recognition of Croatia
by European countries cannot be the reason for Serbia or the
Army to try reversing Croatia's independence or imposing
solutions on Croatia by force.
DANAS: This is maybe a personal question. You are the
American Ambassador, but it is hard to say which country
you are the Ambassador to. Does Yugoslavia still exist?
Zimmerman: That is a very good question, and a question
that is very hard to answer. We are now precisely in that
situation where a world is dying and another, different world
is struggling to be born. In other words, it is a transition and
as I said many times before, our main concern in it is peace.
While these changes are going on, our foremost task is to
contribute that they happen in a peaceful, rather than violent,
environment.
[Jared comments] As subsequent events
demonstrated, 'Peace' meant the US and its proxy
forces could do whatever they liked but the
Yugoslav Army was not allowed to fight back.
[End Jared's comments]
Zimmerman: It is inevitable that these changes are
accompanied with uncertainties. I am an Ambassador
accredited with the government of Yugoslavia. But at the
same time, it is completely clear that we do not recognize
Branko Kostic, who usurped the right to speak on behalf of
the Yugoslav Presidency. Since he made that attempt I have
not had any contacts with him, nor do I intend to ever contact
him. Most of the duties I perform in Belgrade and Yugoslavia
are reduced to relations with the Republics, which my
government considers extremely useful. There are many gray
areas from a legal standpoint, but this is natural in times of
transition.
DANAS: Are you encountering the same difficulties while
meeting with the military leaders?
Zimmerman: I recently met with General Adzic, and I met
with General Kadijevic right before he resigned. I believe it is
exceptionally important to maintain contact with the
Yugoslav military leadership, as they have to know our
position. And our position is clear: we believe that the Army
is primarily responsible for the war in Croatia.
Hence they have an enormous obligation to honor the UN
peace plan, and to show restraint in Croatia. And in
Bosnia-Herzegovina as well, which is turning into a
dangerous place. If we weren't talking to them, we would not
be able to tell them all these things.
DANAS: Many unconfirmed stories indicate that you
prevented total war on several occasions, using this type of
influence?
Zimmerman: There is exaggeration in that. But I can say that
the US has always used the measure of influence it has to
promote peace, not war. That is why I say that we are most
concerned with the possibility of a war breaking out in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We think it would be a horrible tragedy
which could have consequences on the situation in Croatia,
which at the present time looks promising.
DANAS: Does that mean you support Izetbegovic's plan?
Zimmerman: Let me try to elaborate on our policy towards
Bosnia-Herzegovina. We firmly believe that the territorial
integrity of every republic must be preserved, and we clearly
said to the Serbian government and the Army leadership that
we will never recognize any conquest in Croatia. Equally
important is the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which is most threatened at this moment by the Bosnian Serb
leadership, which is attempting to tear away a piece of it. We
consider that extremely dangerous, and we said so to the
Army and the Serbian leadership.
[Jared comments] Note how Zimmerman places
matters upside down.
He speaks of maintaining the integrity of 'Bosnia'
as if it were a national entity. But historically a
country called 'Bosnia' never existed. An
administrative unit called 'Bosnia' (similar to
Rhode Island or South Dakota) was created by the
Tito government. That's it.
With this in mind, consider his statement that the
US supports "the territorial integrity of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is most threatened at
this moment by the Bosnian Serb leadership, which
is attempting to tear away a piece of it."
In fact, the Islamic Fundamentalist forces in
Bosnia were trying to tear a piece away from a real
nation, recognized for 70 years - Yugoslavia. This
violated international law. The Islamists wanted to
justify their secession (that is, theft of territory) by
holding a referendum. The Serbs boycotted the
referendum. The Islamists held it anyway, and
won; but this violated the Yugoslav constitution
which required the approval of the three major
ethnic groups before extreme action could be taken.
Moreover the secessionist movement only existed
based on foreign intrigue, personified by Mr.
Zimmerman. The Islamists would never have dared
to push for secession without the promise of
outside (U.S.) help and in practice Mr.
Zimmerman prodded Islamist leader Izetbegovic
into starting the Bosnian civil war.
The Bosnian Serbs had had grim experience with
Islamic Fundamentalism during W.W. II. Islamic
Fundamentalists were important supporters of the
Nazis in Bosnia. They formed their own SS
Division. They helped slaughter hundreds of
thousands of Serbs. The Islamist leader Elija
Izetbegovic was a pro-Nazi Islamic
Fundamentalist youth organizer during the War.
Knowing the horror that would follow if
foreign-backed Islamists once again ruled Bosnia,
the local Serbs wanted to stay with Yugoslavia.
These Serbs, mainly farmers, owned the majority
of land in Bosnia. The Serbs wanted to make sure
that if Bosnian Islamists seceded the Serbs would
not be forced to live under their rule. [End Jared's
comments]
Zimmerman: As for Mr. Izetbegovic, we heard that some call
him a Muslim fundamentalist. We know what
fundamentalism really does, as we were its victims in Iran.
That is why we do not believe that Izetbegovic is some sort of
fundamentalist. Actually, it seems like he is a moderate
politician who is trying to do the best in a difficult situation.
[Jared comments] The reasoning here is
charmingly ostrich-like: Proof by Rejection of
Negative Consequence. 1) Fundamentalists are
terrible. 2) It would be terrible if Izetbegovic were a
fundamentalist. 3) Therefore Izetbegovic is not a
fundamentalist.
Fortunately Izetbegovic wrote a book about his
beliefs. It is called "The Islamic Declaration"
("Islamska deklaracija"). Here's an excerpt:
"... The first and foremost of such conclusions
is surely the one on the incompatibility of
Islam and non-Islamic systems. There can be
no peace or coexistence between the "Islamic
faith" and non-Islamic societies and political
institutions. ... Islam clearly excludes the right
and possibility of activity of any strange
ideology on its own turf. Therefore, there is
no question of any laicistic principles, and the
state should be an expression and should
support the moral concepts of the religion. ..."
(p. 22)
It is ironic that Zimmerman uses Iran as the
example of what Izetbegovic is not. Actually,
Izetbegovic was especially fond of the Iranian
Fundamentalists. Moreover, the US encouraged
Iran to smuggle arms and terrorist trainers into
Bosnia during the fighting, despite an embargo on
importing arms. When challenged about this at a
Congressional hearing, Ambassador to Croatia
Peter Galbraith confirmed that the US had indeed
approved the shipments.
[End Jared's comments]
Zimmerman: It appears to us that he needs help in his effort
to resist the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I believe it
would be tragic if someone from the Croatian side would try
cooperating with Serbia in the dismemberment of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. That would mean that Croatia is
destroying the very principle on the basis of which it won
international support for its struggle.
DANAS: There are some very clear desires to that extent in
Croatia.
Zimmerman: I read some hints to that effect in the Croatian
press, so I have to say that the dismemberment of Bosnia -
no matter who does it - cannot win the support of the United
States. We would consider that a policy of destabilization and
a violation of international principles that could lead to very
unpleasant consequences in our relations.
[Jared comments] This is Theater of the Absurd.
International law says nothing about alteration of
borders within a state. It only forbids the
destabilization inherent in altering national
boundaries - which is precisely what Zimmerman
is supporting by insisting on the unimpeded
creation of a new state of Bosnia.
[End Jared's comments]
Zimmerman: I believe, therefore, that if there is a tendency in
Croatia to team up with Serbia in a break-up of Bosnia, that
tendency must be overcome.
DANAS: American foreign policy is often based on two
interlocking principles - a carrot and a stick. What would be
a carrot and what would be the stick in this situation?
Zimmerman: That is a good question, and I will try to give a
very specific answer in regard to the war in Croatia. When
the war is over and when Croatia restores its full sovereignty
upon the Army's withdrawal, that carrot and that stick have
to exist for the other side as well.
[Jared comments] This is one of the best examples
of the Orwellian rewriting of reality, a special
feature of the New World Order of which
Zimmerman was a key architect. Croatia had 'full
sovereignty' only one time in history: that was as
the (Fascist-Clerical) Independent State of Croatia
during the German occupation of Yugoslavia.
[End Jared's comments]
Zimmerman: The stick would be that the United States or
any other Western country - to the best of my knowledge -
will never recognize any violation of Croatia's territorial
integrity. In other words, the Croatian borders will remain as
they were before the war, there will be no changes of borders
by conquest. That stick would also be what I mentioned a
moment ago. No one will support any violent
re-establishment of Yugoslavia.
[Jared comments] Does this sound like the man is
opposing the breakup of Yugoslavia? [End Jared's
comments]
DANAS: Any Yugoslavia?
Zimmerman: Any kind of Yugoslavia.
DANAS: Even the smallest one?
Zimmerman: We told Serbia and the Army clearly that we
will not recognize Serbia as Yugoslavia's successor, that we
will not recognize any so-called Yugoslav government that is
in fact just another Serb government.
That is why I do not wish to have any contact with Mr.
Kostic, and why the American government challenged the
credentials of the Yugoslav delegation a few days ago at the
OSCE conference in Prague. But allow me to finish my
previous answer about sticks. Carrots are important, too, they
form a part of this reality. There are some problems with the
rights of the Serb population in Croatia. We do not think the
way Serbia and the Army approached those issues was
justified, they went about it in a completely wrong way. But
the problem exists and I think that Croatia, if it wants a
stable peace, should be ready to grant a significant political
autonomy to the Serb areas in Croatia. We welcome as a
good sign the fact that the Croatian assembly passed the
Minority Law, which is a great step along that road. I hope
that Croatian government will continue being so flexible, as it
seems to me that a maximum degree of political autonomy on
the local level in Serb-inhabited areas will be necessary. This
is already a part of the UN peace plan on a provisional basis,
as well as Lord Carrington's plan, which counts on a longer
time frame. We think that every Serb leadership needs to be
able to say that Serb rights in Croatia are completely
protected with international guarantees. That would be in the
interest of Croatia as well, as it would take a significant
problem off the agenda.
[Jared comments] A number of points about this.
First, as we shall see below, the Croatian regime
had launched a massive campaign of terror against
Serbian residents. Zimmerman is suggesting that
Serbia be induced to accept the breakup of
Yugoslavia by dangling the carrot of less violence
towards Serbs in Croatia.
Second, Zimmerman avoids a discussion of the
actual, day to day terror that was being directed
against Serbs in Croatia. Instead he expresses
concern and wishes and hopes for better treatment.
The value of such US expressions of concern
became clear three years later when the US
planned, led and provided air cover for the eviction,
carried out by the Croatian Army, of over 250,000
Serbs, mainly farmers, from the Krajina, which
was claimed by Croatia. This was the worst act of
genocide in Europe since W.W.II.
To get an idea of the anti-Serb hatred whipped up
by the Croatian government throughout this
period, read the following excerpt from a speech
delivered by Croatian President Tudjman after the
anti-Serb campaign culminated in the violent
eviction of the Serbian population of the Krajina
section. Here's Tudjman:
"There can be no return to the past, to the
times when [Serbs] were spreading cancer in
the heart of Croatia, a cancer that was
destroying the Croatian national being." He
[that is, Tudjman] then went on to speak of
the "ignominious disappearance" of the Serbs
from Krajina "so it is as if they have never
lived here... They didn't even have time to
take with them their filthy money or their
filthy underwear!" ('The invasion of Serbian
Krajina' by Greg Elich at
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/elich/krajina.html)
[End Jared's comments]
DANAS: Washington used to firmly advocate human rights
in Kosovo, but now there is only mention of Croatia.
[Jared comments] This is hyperbole. Washington's
real concern about Croatia was that it not work
against the Islamists in Bosnia. Indeed,
Washington hired the MPRI, a semi-private
military outfit made up of 'retired' officers and
CIA types to train the Croatian army which
continued to be used primarily against Serbian
civilians. [End Jared's comments]
Zimmerman: I am glad you asked that question, so I can
clarify things. The violation of rights of Albanians in Kosovo
in my opinion is the worst violation of human rights, and at
this moment, there is none worse in Europe. It was somewhat
peaceful in Kosovo last year, but the basic colonial nature of
Serbian control has not changed. We have not lost interest in
that issue, and we will not lose interest until it is solved. I
cannot imagine a final political solution coming out of The
Hague and Brussels that would only deal with Croatia. It has
to encompass the rights of everyone; thus also the problems in
Kosovo.
[Jared comments] Zimmerman was the
Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Coming from him, this
is a clear statement of support for Kosovo
secessionism. Why? Because a) there was a strong
secessionist movement in Kosovo at the time; b)
international law, expressed the Helsinki Final Act,
which the U.S. signed, forbids the redrawing of
national borders. However, international law does
allow for self-determination for colonies. So by
misdescribing Kosovo as a colony, Zimmerman
was endorsing secession.
Why was Zimmerman's statement false?
First, Albanians were not oppressed in Yugoslavia.
Ethnic Albanian unrest was based on beliefsand
instigation: some ethnic Alb anians wanted to
recreate the World War II entity, Greater Albania
and wanted Kosovo to be Serb-and-"Gypsy"-free.
In this sense their attitude had much in common
with some whites in the segregationist south. Many
news articles during the 1980s report that it was
Serbs, not Albanians, who were oppressed in
pre-1989 Kosovo. (2)
Colonialism means exploitation: the Colony is
organized to serve the needs of the Imperial Power.
Thus in the African colonies, railroad lines were
built fanning out from coastal ports so that raw
materials could easily be taken out of the country.
Everything is best in the Imperial country.
Everything is worst in the Colony.
This was dramatically not the case in Kosovo;
Kosovo was poor, but not due to exploitation. As
engineers Tika Jankovic and Petar Makara point
out, the engineering school in Pristina (Kosovo)
had the finest modern equipment, whereas the
engineering school in Belgrade (inner Serbia) had
to make do with pre-World War II equipment as
late as the 1970s. (3)
Such anecdotal evidence is supported by the NY
Times. The following was written in 1984, before
the Times adopted an anti-Serbian policy:
"Yugoslavia's Albanians: Poor,
Proud and Prolific
By Michael T. Kaufman
..."The thrust toward republic status, for
example, is in large measure motivated by the
clause in the Yugoslav Constitution that
technically permits any republic to secede.
"As explained by a knot of [Albanian]
students in Pristina, this right to withdraw
could pave way for creating a greater
Albania, linking Kosovo with the present
Albania... with the capital shifting from
Tirana to Pristina...
"The students had no answers as to how such
a nation could support itself...
"[U]nder the complicated transfer
arrangement, Kosovo receives
70 percent of its budget from the richer
components of the Yugoslav union...." ('New
York Times', October 5, 1984)
[End Jared's comments]
DANAS: Croatia and Slovenia offered a year ago the
confederacy solution akin to what Izetbegovic is proposing
today. But the clock cannot be turned back.
Zimmerman: Obviously, it is too late for that now. We are
aiming for a dissolution of Yugoslavia into independent states
peacefully, and when any new union is constructed - if it is
constructed - it would have to be founded on sovereign
decisions. In other words, it has to be built from the bottom
up, rather than from top to the bottom.
DANAS: All Croatian politicians agree that it is necessary
first to secure independence and sovereignty, and only then
decide on future links.
Zimmerman: I recall the words of Pierre Lavalle, prime
minister of the Vichy government who made a tremendous
mistake by collaborating with the Germans but still said
something very wise: "Governments come and go, but the
geography is eternal. France will forever remain Germany's
neighbor." Croatia will remain a neighbor of Serbia, and I
hope it will be possible to soon normalize the relations that
geography makes inevitable.
DANAS: De Gaulle thought otherwise. Many were surprised
by the news that you spent the New Year's eve at a peace
demonstration with the Serbian opposition. Some said
immediately that this is the sign that both sides - the UN and
the US - want a different Serbia and different Serbian
leaders.
Zimmerman: I went to this vigil to show our strong support
to cessation of hostilities, and I think Mr. Vance had the same
reasons. The peace movement in Serbia is a sort of an
opposition. It does not accept war. It opposes the government
responsible for that war. We support them in their demands
for peace. We consider it especially important - not only in
Serbia - that the political opposition is free to act. But in
Serbia, this is not the case. Opposition leader Vuk Draskovic
was just indicted for some things that happened at the March
9 demonstrations last year. The media, especially television,
are hostile to all opponents of the government, and that will
have to change if Serbia has any aspirations towards
democracy. On that occasion, we did not support any specific
party [except for being against the one chosen by the people -
PM] but we advocated democratic norms and values, values
of peace and free press.
[Jared comments] Zimmerman's support for Vuk
Draskovic is interesting. Before the Croatian and
Slovenian secession, Draskovic was a Tarzan
Nationalist - a real chest beater and it was in this
guise that he opposed Milosevich who was for the
continuation of Yugoslavia. But then Draskovic
advocated a policy of non-resistance when the
Yugoslav Army was attacked in its barracks, and
when Serbs were attacked as well.
Note also how Zimmerman uses his continued
presence in Belgrade: he encourages the breakup of
Yugoslavia and threatens Belgrade if it tries to stop
it. [End Jared's comments]
DANAS: Your statements have been frequently attacked in
Belgrade and in Croatia...
Zimmerman: And Slovenia and Montenegro...
DANAS: But which one of your critical remarks would you
say again in regard to Croatia?
Zimmerman: Croatia is a democratic state, but it is a young
democracy tempted by war.
[Jared comments] This is amazing.
This new 'democratic' state was a conscious
imitation of the Independent State of Croatia,
notorious in World War II for creating Jasenovac,
the first death camp, in which about a million
Serbs, 'Gypsies', Jews and antifascists were killed
using the most horrifying methods.
The new Independent State of Croatia, under
Franjo Tudjman, a holocaust denier, brought back
the Fascist Croatian flag, the currency, the army
uniforms, and the straight-arm salute. It renamed
streets after leaders of the Ustashi fascists; its
constitution defined Croatia as a racial state (a
state of ethnic Croats, not, like Serbia, a state of all
its citizens, regardless of ethnicity.)
The 'democratic elections' took place in an
atmosphere of terror and with vast sums pumped
in from Germany and other Western sources and
from pro-fascist Croatians abroad. The HOS
(Croatian Military Group) harassed and killed
Serbs and opponents of the regime. The method of
identification was straightforward. First, everyone
was ordered to sign a pledge of allegiance. Serbs
and antifascists who refused to sign this pledge to
the resurrected Ustashi state were first fired from
their jobs, then fired at.
The loyalty oath did not ferret out all the
undesirable elements. So the HOS ordered
everyone to display the Croatian (fascist)
checkerboard flag in their window. This flag is the
Croatian equivalent of the swastika. Then the HOS
went from street to street and harassed or beat up
or killed those (whether Serbian or Croatian) who
refused to display the flag.
The HOS dynamited the homes of undesirables,
often with the people inside. Jews lived in fear.
Tens of thousands of Serbs were driven out -
perhaps 300,000 even before the forced exodus from
the Krajina in 1995.
By referring to this terrorized territory as a "young
democratic state" Zimmerman made perfectly clear
that he approved of the HOS actions. His mild
rebukes were cosmetic: made for the sake of
appearance.
The American media suppressed the the news
about Croatia. Most people never learned there was
an anti-Serbian terror.
There were a few exceptions to the press blackout.
One was an article in the 'New York Times' which
I have posted after the interview. It appeared rather
late, in 1997, well after Croatia had finished
purging 600,000 Serbs. The article is a bit odd. The
writer, Chris Hedges, suggests that fascists were
just then becoming powerful in Croatia, whereas
this had actually happened years earlier, in 1990,
'91 and '92. Perhaps Hedges wrote the article in the
early 1990s and the Times editors held it back until
the fascists had completed their Western-assigned
tasks: declaring independence and driving out the
Serbs. In the article Hedges fails to mention the
600,000 or so Serbs driven out of Croatia during
the first half of the decade. An oversight.
Most of these people live as destitute refugees in
Serbia.
Take a look at the pictures I've posted below and
then we'll return to Zimmerman and see how he
offers criticisms which whitewash Croatia's
terrorist purge of Serbs and government critics.
This is Ante Pavelic, Ustashi [Fascist-Clerical]
leader of World War II Nazi Croatia shown with
his Fascist flag `
Here is the committee that ruled Croatia at the
time Zimmerman gave his interview. Notice that
the old Ustashi flag is above them, on the left, and
the re-issue is on the right. The men are: General
Josip Boljkovac; General Martin Spegelj, who
made the remark that "[The Serbian city of] Knin
must be butchered...including children in the
cradle;" Stipe Mesic, whom the European
Community imposed on Yugoslavia as its last
President. (Though Mesic was part of Franjo
Tudjman's fascist machine, he has been recycled as
the much hailed "liberal" President of Croatia. His
uncle was SS Officer Marko Mesic) and General
Franjo Tudjman, then President of neo-fascist
Croatia. Tudjman's book 'Wasteland' suggested
that Jews, not the Ustashi, slaughtered the Serbs at
the Jasenovac concentration camp complex.
In 1943 Tito, head of the Yugoslav partisans,
proclaimed an unusual policy: any Croatian
Ustashi (Fascist) officer who came over to the
Partisan side would keep his rank. Seeing that Italy
had crumbled and that their beloved Nazi Germany
was destined to lose, large numbers of Ustashi
made the switch to the Partisans between 1943 and
1945, thus joining the winning side. There is
evidence that Franjo Tudjman forged papers,
making it appear that he had been an anti-fascist
during the war, when in fact he was a fascist, from
a fascist family.
Now back to Zimmerman. [End Jared's comments]
Zimmerman: That is why it is difficult to be overtly critical.
But as you will soon become a universally recognized state, it
seems that the issues of free press, political opposition and
minority rights will come under closer scrutiny than they
have been until now. War can be an excuse for limiting the
freedom of expression, though I personally think it is hard to
find circumstances that would justify such actions. Once the
war is over, that excuse will no longer exist, and it will be
very important for Croatia to re-examine all its standards
against the international and European principles and then
firmly adhere to them. Allow me to mention two examples
where I was disappointed. It seems that a certain number of
Serbs living in Zagreb and Croatia are leaving the city and
the country, including those who have advocated moderate
policies and were not nationalists. They could be a significant
part of Croatian democracy, and if they are leaving due to
intolerance I hope that will soon be overcome. The other case
has already been solved, but I mention it because it was very
important both to me and to Cyrus Vance. It regards the siege
of the barracks, when the families of JNA soldiers were
treated in an unfair manner. But personally, I have full
confidence that the Croatian democracy will grow and
expand. The United States has a very positive opinion about
the current developments.
[Jared comments] So after the fascist regime has
done its job - driven out the Serbs and intimidated
pro-Yugoslav forces - it will have to adopt a
slicker appearance so as to fit the look of European
'democracies.' But as for 1992: "The United States
has a very positive opinion about the current
developments." That says it all. [End Jared's
comments]
DANAS: You mentioned Mr. Cyrus Vance. He was a US
Secretary of State, so some claim he is only the extended arm
of Washington right now.
Zimmerman: He is, of course, a representative of the UN
Secretary-General, but also a very respectable American and
a former official of the American government, which I think
all the leaders of the Republics that he had met understand
very well. This does not sound like a bad thing to me.
DANAS: Some sort of dual guarantee?
Zimmerman: I wouldn't use that term, but I would say that
the US government completely supports everything Vance
does on behalf of the UN. The Yugoslav crisis is a great
challenge for the UN. If the peacekeepers come - and we
hope they will - that would be the largest endeavor the UN
have ever undertaken. I don't even have to mention the
challenges and complexities they will face. Let us hope this
endeavor will be successful, but in order for that to happen,
all sides must honor their obligations.
***
(1) The invasion of Serbian Krajina by Greg Elich at
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/elich/krajina.html
(2) Kosovo Before 1989 - What Really Happened? at
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/tika.htm
(3) 1980's news stories about Kosovo at
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/benworks/1980news.html
(4) The 'NY Times' article on Croatia is posted after the
fund-raising appeal.
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The following from the 'N.Y. Times' is a pretty
accurate report on Croatia - just published 7
years late.
"Fascists Reborn as Croatia's Founding Fathers
By CHRIS HEDGES
The old fascist marching songs were sung, a moment of
silence was observed for all who died defending the
fatherland, and the gathering was reminded that today was
the 57th anniversary of the founding of Croatia's Nazi-allied
wartime government. Then came the most chilling words of
the afternoon.
"For Home!" shouted Anto Dapic, surrounded by bodyguards
in black suits and crew cuts.
"Ready!" responded the crowd of 500 supporters, their arms
rising in a stiff Nazi salute.
The call and response -- the Croatian equivalent of "Sieg!"
"Heil!" -- was the wartime greeting used by supporters of the
fascist Independent State of Croatia, which governed the
country for most the Second World War and murdered
hundreds of thousands of Jews, Serbs and Croatian resistance
fighters.
Today, in the final day of campaigning before local elections
on Sunday, supporters of Croatia's Party of Rights used the
chant as a rallying cry. But the shouts of the black-shirted
young men -- and the indifferent reactions of passersby --
illustrated a broader aspect of this country's self-image.
President Franjo Tudjman and his Croatian Democratic
Union party rose to popularity and power on the strength of
its appeals to Croatians' national pride. Now, six years after
the war that won Croatia its independence from Yugoslavia,
Mr. Tudjman's party continues to cast the World War II
fascist fighters as patriots and precursors of the modern
Croatian state.
The Party of Rights took only 7 percent of the vote in the last
election, but it is the closest ally of Mr. Tudjman, who is
reported to be suffering from cancer but who has still
campaigned actively.
Perhaps no other country has failed as openly as Croatia to
come to terms with its fascist legacy. While the French
celebrate a resistance movement that was often dwarfed by
the widespread collaboration with the Vichy regime, and
while the Austrians often act as if the war never happened,
the Croats have rehabilitated the Croatian fascist
collaborators, known as the Ustashe.
The Ustashe was led by Ante Pavelic, the wartime dictator
whose picture was plastered on walls in Split in preparation
for the rally.
"A majority of the Croats oppose this rehabilitation," said
Viktor Ivancic, editor in chief of the opposition weekly, The
Feral Tribune. "But they are afraid. These neo-fascist groups,
protected by the state, are ready to employ violence against
their critics."
Ustashe veterans receive larger pensions than old Partisan
fighters, who waged a savage fight against the German and
Croatian fascist armies. Former Ustashe soldiers are invited
to state celebrations, like the annual army day, while Partisan
fighters are ignored. And state authorities have stood by as
pro-Ustashe groups have dismantled or destroyed 2,964 of
4,073 monuments to those who died in the resistance struggle,
according to veteran Partisan groups.
The identification with the quisling regime does not stop
there. The Croatian currency is the kuna, the same instituted
by the fascists. And the red and white checkerboard on the
flag, taken from medieval Croatian emblems, previously
adorned the Ustashe uniform. The President recently
proposed bringing Mr. Pavelic's remains from Spain, where
he died in exile in 1959, for burial in Croatia, a move rejected
by Mr. Pavelic's family. And Vinko Nikolic, an 85-year-old
former high-ranking Ustashe official who fled into exile after
the war, was appointed by the President to the Croatian
Parliament.
The transformation is all the more noticeable because of
widespread participation by many Croats in the Partisan
guerrilla movement led by Josip Broz Tito, himself a Croat.
"A huge number of Croats fought the Nazis and the
Ustashe," said 77-year-Partisan veteran Milivoj Borosa, who
defected in his bomber in 1942 from the Ustashe air force and
dropped his payload on a German unit during his escape to
the Soviet Union. "But today, those who should hold their
heads in shame, are national heroes."
The Partisans, who included among their ranks the young
Franjo Tudjman, committed what today is viewed as an
unforgivable sin. They built a united, Communist Yugoslavia.
And while the Ustashe state may have been a Nazi puppet, it
had as its stated aim the establishment of an independent
Croatia, although it was forced by the Axis to turn over large
parts of Croatia, including much of the Dalmatian coast, to
the Italians.
In the current campaign, President Tudjman sought to
reconcile the country's wartime divisions by arguing that the
fascist and anti-fascist Croatians performed equally valuable
service for their country. A general who became a historian
after leaving the Yugoslav Army, Mr. Tudjman is among the
leaders of a revisionist school of history that has sought to
counterbalance the Communists' relentlessly dark view of the
fascist years.
But many Croats, especially those who had relatives killed by
the fascists, smolder with indignation over the glorification of
a regime that massacred opponents with a ferocity that often
shocked its Italian and German allies.
"You cannot reconcile victims and butchers," said Ognjen
Kraus, the head of Zagreb's small Jewish community. "No
one has the right to carry out a reconciliation in the name of
those who vanished."
The climate has become so charged that those who oppose the
rehabilitation of the Ustashe do not dare raise their voices.
And there have been several attacks carried out against
members of the Social Democratic Party, the old Communist
party, currently fielding candidates for the municipal
elections. Many of the black-uniformed bodyguards at the
rally here fought against the Serbs as members of The
Croatian Liberation Forces, a brutal right-wing paramilitary
unit formed by the party.
The Ustashe supporters also have a powerful ally in the
Catholic Church in Croatia. The church, led during the war
by Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, was a prominent backer of
the Ustashe regime. It forcibly converted tens of thousands of
Orthodox Serbs and did not denounce the government's
roundup and massacre of Jews and Serbs.
During the war, Jews and Orthodox Serbs were subject to
racial laws. The Serbs had to wear blue arm bands with the
letter "P" for "Pravoslav" -- Orthodox -- before being
deported to death camps like Jasenovac.
After the war, many priests, rather than condemn the
brutality of the fascist regime, went on to set up an
underground network know as "the rat line" to smuggle
former Ustashe leaders, including Mr. Pavelic, to countries
like Argentina.
The church, persecuted by the Communists, has now
re-emerged as one of the most powerful institutions in the
country, in large part because religion is the only tangible
difference separating Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Several
priests have enthusiastically joined the rehabilitation
campaign, portraying Mr. Pavelic as a pious leader who
championed Christian values.
"Ante Pavelic was a good Catholic," said Father Luka Prcela,
who has held a memorial Mass for the former dictator in
Split for the last four years. "He went to mass daily in his
own chapel. Many of the crimes alleged to have been
committed by his Government never happened. These stories
were lies spread by the communists. He fought for a free,
Catholic Croatia. We have this state today because of him."
((c) The New York Times, April 12, 1997)
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MONTHLY REVIEW (WEBPAGE ONLY)
February, 2003
http://www.monthlyreview.org/0203herman.htm
*** Diana Johnstone on the Balkan Wars ***
by Edward S. Herman
Diana Johnstone's Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western
Delusions (Monthly Review Press, 2002) is essential reading for
anybody who wants to understand the causes, effects, and
rights-and-wrongs of the Balkan wars of the past dozen years. The book
should be priority reading for leftists, many of whom have been
carried along by a NATO-power party line and propaganda barrage,
believing that this was one case where Western intervention was
well-intentioned and had beneficial results. An inference from this
misconception, by "cruise missile leftists" and others, is that
imperialism can be constructive and its power projections must be
evaluated on their merits, case by case. But that the Western
intervention in the Balkans constitutes a valid special case is false;
the conventional and obvious truths on the Balkan wars that sustain
such a view disintegrate on close inspection.
Johnstone provides that close inspection, with impressive results. It
is a pleasure to watch her dismantle the claims and expose the methods
of David Rieff, a literary and media favorite, as well as Roy Gutman,
John Burns, and David Rohde, three reporters whose close adherence to
the party line in Bosnia was rewarded with the Pulitzer prize-all
fueling the "humanitarian bombing" bandwagon. While critics of the
party line risk being tagged and dismissed as apologists for the
Serbs, even the most fervent partisan of an idealized "Bosnia" and
campaigner for NATO military intervention such as Rieff, or the novice
journalist Rohde, who wrote on Srebrenica in a semi-fictional mode,
with U.S. intelligence guidance, has never had to fear being
criticized as an apologist for the Muslims or NATO. Michael Ignatieff,
another media favorite, acknowledges the help he has received from
U.S. officials like Richard Holbrooke, General Wesley Clark and former
Tribunal prosecutor Louise Arbour, and Rieff lauded him for his "close
relations" with these "important figures in the West's political and
military leadership." [1]
The widespread acceptance of the official connections, open advocacy,
and spectacular bias displayed by these authors has rested in part on
the usual media and intellectual community subservience to official
policy positions, but it was also a result of the rapid and
thoroughgoing demonization of the Serbs as the "new Nazis" or "last of
the Communists." Given that NATO was good, combatting evil, the close
relationship with officials was not seen as involving any conflict of
interest or compromise with objectivity; they were all on the same
"team"-a phalanx seeking justice. Thus even the uncritical conduiting
propaganda-including unverified rumors and outright disinformation-was
not only acceptable, it was capable of yielding journalistic honors.
On the other hand, any attempt to counter the official/media team's
claims and supposed evidence was quickly interpreted as apologetics.
This is hardly new. In each U.S. war critics of U.S. policy are
charged with being apologists for the demonized enemy-Ho Chi Minh and
communism; Pol Pot; Saddam Hussein; Arafat; Daniel Ortega; Bin Laden,
etc. The demonization of Milosevic was in accord with longstanding
practice, and the charge of apologist for challenging the official
line on the demon was inevitable for a forceful challenger. What is
perhaps exceptional has been the extensive acceptance of the party
line among people on the left, with, among others, Christopher
Hitchens, [2] Ian Williams and the editors of The Nation in its grip.
In These Times rejected first hand reporting from Kosovo by Johnstone,
their longtime European Editor, when it diverged from the line of
their more recent correspondent, Paul Hockenos, whose connections with
the establishment included a stint as the spokesperson and media
officer for the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting as an occupying power in
northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, and an affiliation with the American
Academy in Berlin, whose chairman and co-chairman are Richard
Holbrooke and Henry Kissinger. [3]
What makes the double standard in treatment of Johnstone and the
"journalists of attachment" especially laughable is that Johnstone is
a serious investigative journalist, very knowledgeable about Balkan
history and politics, whose work in Fools' Crusade sets a standard in
cool examination of issues that is several grades higher than that in
Rieff, Gutman, Rohde, Burns (and for that matter, Ignatieff, Timothy
Garton Ash, Noel Malcolm, Hitchens, Williams, and Hockenos). On issue
after issue she discusses both the evidence and counter-evidence,
weighs them, gives them a historical and political context, and comes
to an assessment, which is sometimes that the verifiable evidence
doesn't support a clear conclusion. She does this convincingly, and in
the process lays waste to the established version.
For example, Johnstone notes that in late September, 1991, some 120
Serbs in the Croatian town of Gospic were abducted and massacred in
what Croatian human rights activists called the first major massacre
of civilians in the Yugoslav civil wars. Although this was clearly
designed to frighten the Serbs into moving, the term "ethnic
cleansing" was only taken up by the Western media months later in
reference to Serb treatment of Muslims in Bosnia. The Gospic slaughter
was barely noticed, and only hit the news in 1997 when a disgruntled
former policeman, Miro Bajramovic went public, claiming that the
Gospic massacre was done on orders from the Croatian Interior Ministry
to spread terror among the Serbs. Bajramovic was quickly imprisoned in
Croatia and tortured, and no moves were taken to deal with the crimes
he named either within Croatia or by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY, or Tribunal).
Shortly thereafter three other Croatian soldiers risked their lives to
take videotapes and documents on this massacre to the Hague, but the
Tribunal refused to offer them protection; one was murdered, the
others fled Gospic, and while Tribunal prosecutor Carla Del Ponte
insisted that the Tribunal must have priority over Serb courts in
dealing with Serbs, she waived priority in dealing with Croats. Thus,
nothing was done regarding Gospic except the harassment, torture and
killing of witnesses. [4]
One of the Croatian officers leading the attacks on Serbs, an
Albanian, Agim Ceku, was subsequently trained by "retired" U.S. army
officers on contract to Croatia, and he helped command "Operation
Storm" in 1995, in which hundreds of Serb civilians were killed and
Krajina was ethnically cleansed of several hundred thousand Serbs in
what was probably the largest single ethnic cleansing operation in the
Balkan wars. Ceku later returned to Kosovo to join the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and worked with them during the 1999 bombing
war. Ceku has not only never been indicted by the Tribunal, in January
2000 he was sworn in by NATO's proconsul in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner,
as chief of the "Kosovo Protection Corps," the new look KLA.
You may not have heard of Gospic or Ceku, and Nasir Oric is also not a
name featured by Rieff, the media, or the Tribunal. Arkan is a more
familiar name. Arkan was a Serb paramilitary leader, eventually
indicted by the Tribunal, just as NATO started to bomb Yugoslavia in
March 1999, no doubt coincidentally providing exemplary public
relations service to NATO. Nasir Oric was a Bosnian Muslim officer
operating out of Srebrenica, from which "safe haven" Oric ventured out
to attack nearby Serb villages, burning homes and killing over a
thousand Serbs between May 1992 and January 1994. Oric even invited
Western reporters to his apartment to see his "war trophies":
videocassettes showing cut- off Serb heads, burnt houses, and piles of
corpses. [5]
You thought that Srebrenica was a "safe haven" only for civilians and
that it could hardly be a UN cover for Bosnian Muslim military
operations? You were misinformed. [6] You hadn't heard of the 1992
pushing out of Serbs from Srebrenica and the multiyear attacks on
nearby Serb towns and massacres that preceded the Srebrenica massacre
(discussed further below)? In fact, it has been an absolute rule of
Rieff et al./media reporting on the Bosnian conflict to present
evidence of Serb violence in vacuo, suppressing evidence of prior
violence against Serbs, thereby falsely suggesting that Serbs were
never responding but only initiated violence (this applies to Vukovar,
Mostar, Tuzla, Gorazde, and many other towns). [7]
You hadn't heard of Nasir Oric and can't understand why he has never
been indicted by the Tribunal although doing the same sort of thing as
Arkan, but perhaps on a somewhat larger scale? It is not puzzling at
all if you realize that the "phalanx" I mentioned above which includes
Rieff et al., the media, and the Tribunal, also includes the NATO
powers and is serving their ends, which did not include justice (see
below).
Johnstone provides many examples of how the phalanx twisted facts for
political ends, including an extensive and compelling analysis of the
various non-proofs of "systematic rape" as Serb policy. [8] But the
choicest morsel showing how the propaganda system works was the
Nazi-style "death camp" with its picture of the "thin man" Fikret Alic
behind barbed wire. As Johnstone notes, the Bosnian Muslims and
Croatians also had prison camps during the Bosnian wars, but Radovan
Karadzic, the "indicted war criminal," was not as smart as they
were-he allowed the Western media to visit his camps.
It is now well established as truth, if not permitted to surface in
the mainstream media, that: (1) the thin man was not behind barbed
wire-the barbed wire was around a small unused compound from which the
photographers from Britain's Independent Television Network took their
pictures; (2) he was not even in a prison camp, let alone a death
camp, but was in transit through a refugee center, on his way to exile
in Scandinavia; (3) the thinness of Fikret Alic was not typical of
people in the camp, but was highlighted to fit the "Auschwitz" image.
Nevertheless, "in August 1992, the 'thin man behind barbed wire'
photos made the tour of the front pages of virtually every tabloid
newspaper in the Western world and appeared on the cover of Time,
Newsweek, and other mass circulation magazines." [9] The U.S. proposal
for a war crimes tribunal followed in the same month, and German
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, featuring the evidence of the "thin
man" photo, made it clear that the Tribunal's function was to
prosecute Serbs, who were ethnic cleansing "to achieve their national
goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina [which] is genocide." This was only one of
many frauds based on disinformation, but it was a major one, helping
make the Serbs-as- Nazis a given for the phalanx and much of the
Western public.
Milosevic Started It All
Central to the party line of NATO and the phalanx has been the theme
that Milosevic is the demon who started it all by his nationalist
quest for a "Greater Serbia" and his (and Serbia's) view that
non-Serbs "had no place in their country, and even no right to live"
(Clinton). According to David Rieff, Milosevic "had quite correctly
been described by U.S. officials ...as the architect of the
catastrophe," [10] and Tim Judah referred to Milosevic's
responsibility for wars in "Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo: four
wars since 1991 and the result of these terrible conflicts, which
began with the slogan 'All Serbs in One State' is the cruelest of
ironies." [11]
On its face this perspective seems simple-minded, and is even referred
to by a more sophisticated analyst than Rieff or Judah, Lenard Cohen,
a bit sardonically, as the "paradise lost/loathsome leaders
perspective" on history. [12] Johnstone's book destroys this party
line by a convincing analysis of the dynamics of the conflict
observable in the actions and interests of all the parties involved,
extending even to expatriate lobbying groups of the Croatians and
Albanians.
In her enlightening chapter on Germany, Johnstone describes its
hostility to Serbia and contacts with Croatian emigre groups long
before the arrival of Milosevic. Germany had attacked Serbia during
World War I and then again under the Nazis; whereas the Croatians and
Kosovo Albanians had been German allies. Germany under the Nazis had
regularly used the gambit of siding with "ethnic minorities" as a
means of weakening rival or target states, and with the death of the
Soviet Union and the end of Western support of a unified and
independent Yugoslavia, and German reunification, Germany renewed that
gambit as it aimed to consolidate its power in Eastern Europe. Germany
encouraged the unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia and
pressured her Maastricht allies to go along with supporting this
secession, although it was unnegotiated and in violation of
international law.
At the same time as the Europeans encouraged the secession of Slovenia
and Croatia, and the United States threatened Yugoslavia if it tried
to maintain its borders by use of its army, the NATO alliance failed
to deal with the threat to the stranded minorities in the seceding
territories. The EU-appointed Badinter commission even announced in
November 1991 that Yugoslavia was "in a process of dissolution," which
helped accelerate the dissolution; and by giving recognition to the
artificial boundaries of the "Republics," while refusing to consider
the demands of the large groups within those Republics that wanted to
stay in Yugoslavia, Badinter provided an ideal formula for producing
ethnic warfare. This was not Milosevic causing trouble, it was the
Germans and other NATO powers who encouraged dissolution without
offering any constructive solution to minority demands (Johnstone
discusses some of the ignored possibilities).
Their obvious bias against the Serbs, and encouragement to the
national groups opposed to the Serbs, also maximized the threat to
peace, as it made the Serbs justly suspicious of NATO intentions and
encouraged the other groups to resist a negotiated settlement and
provoke the Serbs into actions that would increase NATO intervention
on their behalf. This was dramatically evident in Bosnia, where the
European powers arranged for an independence vote in 1992, despite the
fact that the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution required that such a
vote be taken only upon agreement among the republic's three
"constituent peoples" (Muslims, Croats and Serbs). The Bosnian Serbs
boycotted this election, and the creation of this artificial and badly
divided state assured war and ethnic cleansing. This again was a
catastrophic decision made by the NATO powers, not by Milosevic.
Johnstone has an extensive discussion of the brutal historical
background of Bosnia- Herzegovina (and Croatia), which had been the
scene of massive inter-group crimes during World War II. [13] She also
demonstrates clearly that Bosnia was no multiethnic paradise upset by
Serb violence, in the myth perpetrated by Rieff et al. and the NATO
media. Johnstone points out that even as early as December 1990, in
elections in Bosnia the nationalist parties won easily, capturing 90
percent of the votes, suggesting something other than a
non-nationalistic society. She also provides solid evidence that Alija
Izetbegovic, the Muslim leader of Bosnia in the war years, was a
committed believer in an Islamic-not a multiethnic-state, and a man
who regarded Turkey as too advanced and modernist, preferring Pakistan
as his Islamic model. The thousands of Mujahidden fighters, including
Al Qaeda militants, that he welcomed to fight for his cause, and the
massive aid given him by Saudi Arabia, were not supplied in the cause
of multi-ethnicity.
Johnstone shows that with U.S. aid and encouragement Izetbegovic
fought any settlement that would result in autonomy for the major
national groups. He, like the KLA, realized that he could pursue a
maximalist strategy by getting the more-than-willing United States to
support him both diplomatically and, increasingly, by military means.
Milosevic, and to a lesser extent the Bosnian Serbs, were repeatedly
willing to sign compromise agreements, but Izetbegovic repeatedly
refused, with U.S. support-most importantly, in the case of the
"Lisbon Accord" of March 1992, which was signed by all three parties,
but from which Izetbegovic withdrew, on U.S. advice. Milosevic also
supported the Owen-Vance plan of 1992, vetoed by the Bosnian Serbs, to
Milosevic's disgust. This diplomatic history is well documented in
Lord David Owen's memoir, Balkan Odyssey, which is why this
Britisher's work is not well regarded by the party liners. Richard
Holbrooke acknowledges Milosevic's efforts to save the Dayton accord
from Izetbegovic's foot-dragging, and the 1995 U.S. bombing of Bosnian
Serbs may have been part of the price paid to get Izetbegovic, not
Milosevic, to negotiate at Dayton. [14]
Johnstone's detailed account of Croatia stresses the genocidal
behavior of the Croats toward the Serbs in World War II; the long-
standing backing of the nationalist movement in Croatia by Germany,
Austria, and the Vatican; the importance of the Croatian lobby in the
United States and elsewhere in mobilizing support for their breakaway
from Yugoslavia; and Croatia's skilled propaganda efforts, helped
along by their employment of public relations firm Ruder Finn. "News"
about Croatia and its victimization by Serbia flowed from Zagreb and
Ruder Finn. Quite independently of Milosevic the Croatian
nationalists, led by Franjo Tudjman from 1990, were clearly aiming at
a "Greater Croatia" that would include a part of Bosnia, as well as
the Serb- inhabited Krajina area. As convincingly described by
Johnstone, it was a masterpiece of effective propaganda that Croatia's
war in Bosnia and expulsion of a quarter million Serbs from Krajina
(with active U.S. assistance) was portrayed in the West not as part of
a quest for a Greater Croatia, but as a resistance to Milosevic's
striving for a Greater Serbia.
According to Clinton and mainstream commentary, Milosevic's drive for
a Greater Serbia and nationalism was demonstrated by his inflammatory
nationalistic speeches of 1987 and 1989. This is a perfect
illustration of the profound role of disinformation in the
demonization process. The two famous speeches DENOUNCE nationalism:
Milosevic actually said that "Yugoslavia is a multinational community,
and it can survive only on condition of full equality of all nations
that live in it." Nothing in the two speeches contradicts this
sentiment.
In dispelling the "myth" of Milosevic, Johnstone hardly puts him on a
pedestal. He was an opportunistic politician, "whose 'ambiguity'
allowed him to win elections, but not to unite the Serbs." Milosevic
gained popularity by condemning both Serbian nationalism and Communist
bureaucracy, and by promising economic reforms in line with the
demands of the Western financial community. In Johnstone's view,
Milosevic can be regarded as a criminal "if using criminals to do
dirty tasks makes him a criminal," but on this count he was "no more
[guilty] (or rather less) than the late President Tudjman of Croatia
or President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, widely regarded as a saint."
He was less a nationalist than Tudjman and Izetbegovic, and claims
that he had "dehumanizing beliefs" and an "eliminationist project" are
taken out of the whole cloth. [15]
Milosevic's alleged pursuit of a Greater Serbia was also a misreading
of his actual policies, which were, first, to prevent the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, and second, as that disintegration
occurred to protect the Serb minorities in the new states and allow
them either to remain in Yugoslavia or obtain autonomy in the new rump
states. In fact, he was considered by the Bosnian Serbs and Krajina
victims of Operation Storm to be a sell- out, eager to bargain away
their interests in exchange for a possible lifting of sanctions on
Yugoslavia. He did support the Bosnian Serbs, sporadically, but it is
rarely mentioned that all the NATO powers and Saudia Arabia and Al
Qaeda were supporting the Bosnian Muslims (and Croatia was supporting
its allies in Bosnia).
So Milosevic was guilty of pursuing a Greater Serbia by trying to
prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia and feebly seeking to give
stranded and threatened Serb populations protection! His "war" against
Slovenia-one of those "terrible conflicts" Tim Judah attributes to
Milosevic-was a half-hearted ten-day effort to prevent an illegal
secession of that Republic, quickly terminated with minimal (and
mainly Yugoslav army) casualties. Meanwhile, Tudjman, quite openly
seeking a Greater Croatia, and Izetbegovic, trying to leverage U.S.
and other NATO hostility to Yugoslavia into a means of compelling
unwanted Greater Muslim rule in Bosnia, were just victims of the bad
man! This is Orwell written into mainstream truth.
The same is true of the Kosovo struggle. There is no question but that
Milosevic's crackdown in 1989 was brutal, and that police and army
actions against the KLA in later years were sometimes ruthless, but
the phalanx has ignored a number of key facts. One is that Kosovo was
largely run by Albanians before 1989, and the first target of the 1989
crackdown was the old bureaucracy run by Albanian communists. Second,
under their rule it was Serbs who were discriminated against and
driven out of Kosovo. In the 1980s and earlier Kosovo Albanian
nationalists were openly engaging in "ethnic cleansing" in the
interests of a homogenous Albanian state, and in the 1990s the
movement became strictly irredendist, aiming not at reform but exit
from Yugoslavia. The movement's leaders were also more openly
interested in a "Greater Albania." As in the case of the Izetbegovic
faction of the Bosnian Muslims, the KLA soon saw that by provocation
and effective propaganda it would be possible to get NATO to serve as
its military arm.
Johnstone describes the Yugoslav efforts to compromise and give the
Albanians greater autonomy, and she notes the complete failure of the
NATO powers to seek any kind of mediated solution (including a
division of the Kosovo territory). The war engineered by the KLA and
United States then ensued, with disastrous results. In Kosovo it
produced great destruction, an immense flight of refugees, with
thousands of casualties and a fresh injection of hatred on all sides
that contradicted the alleged NATO aim of producing a genuine
multiethnic community. This was followed by a massive ethnic cleansing
of Serbs, Roma, Turks and Jews by the NATO-supported KLA, and Kosovo
was left "without a legal system, ruled by illegal structures of the
Kosovo Liberation Army and very often by competing mafias" (quoting
Jiri Dienstbier, UN human rights rapporteur in Kosovo). Under NATO
auspices, and helped along by leaders of Albania, a new advance was
made in the aim of a "Greater Albania" in Macedonia and possibly
elsewhere. Finally, Serbia was very badly damaged by the war, reduced
to penury and dependency, conflict ridden and with a sham democracy in
place.
Of course, there was Srebrenica. But since so much in this
establishment Balkan story consists of lies and half-truths, is it
possible that the establishment version of this story is also
misleading? Johnstone examines the various sources and finds
considerable uncertainty regarding two issues: the number of victims,
and the motives of the combatants. [16] It is true that 199 bodies
were found bound or blindfolded following the Bosnian Serb occupation
of the town in July 1995, almost surely slaughtered by the Bosnian
Serb attackers. But what about the alleged 8,000 killed? The figure of
8,000 seems to have been arrived at by adding a Red Cross estimate of
3,000 that "witnesses" said were detained by the Bosnian Serbs to the
figure of 5,000 who the Red Cross said "fled Srebrenica, some of whom
reached Central Bosnia." Although there was no reason from this
accounting to add the 5,000 as killed, this became conventional truth.
The Bosnian Muslims shrewdly refused to tell the Red Cross how many
had survived, helping suggest that they were all dead.
Six years later, Tribunal forensic teams had uncovered 2,361 bodies in
this region of heavy fighting, many almost surely fallen soldiers on
both sides. Recall also that the United States had engaged in
intensive satellite imaging of this area, and Madeleine Albright had
even promised to keep watching to see if the Bosnian Serbs disturbed
the graves. But she never produced for public view any satellite photo
showing bodies being deposited in or removed from graves.
As to motive for the killings that took place, it is interesting that
the significant killings (and expulsions) of Serbs (and Roma) in (and
from) Kosovo after the NATO takeover were regularly treated in the
West as "revenge," whereas the killings in and around Srebrenica,
plausibly attributable to Bosnian Serb anger at the prior murderous
operations of Nasir Oric against Serbs in the Srebrenica vicinity,
were not "revenge" but "genocide" in the Western system of double
standards. As noted, this rests in good part on the blackout of the
prior events associated with Nasir Oric and his Bosnian Muslim forces.
Johnstone has a devastating account of the work of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, showing its political origin,
purpose and service, as well as its violation of all Western judicial
norms (including its use of "indictments" to condemn and ostracize
without trial). Among many other points featured is the fact that the
Tribunal has only sought to establish responsibility at the top for
Serbs, never for Croatian or Bosnian Muslim leaders. Johnstone also
notes the unwillingness to indict any NATO personnel or officials for
readily documented war crimes. She also points out that the indictment
of Milosevic on May 27, 1999, based on unverified information provided
by U.S. intelligence one day earlier, was needed by NATO to cover over
its intensifying bombing of Serbian civilian sites, in straightforward
violation of international law. As Clinton said, "The indictment
confirms that our war is just," but it much more clearly confirmed
that the Tribunal was a political, not a judicial institution.
A further illustration is afforded in her enlightening account of the
novel "hearing" on the Karadzic case in July 1996, where the Tribunal
innovated a judicial rule whereby Karadzic's attorney was not allowed
to offer a defense of his client; he could merely observe. The main
evidence of Karadzic's "genocidal intent" was a phrase he uttered in
1991 while calling on Izetbegovic to recognize the Bosnian Serbs
desire to remain in Yugoslavia, saying that "do not think that you
will not perhaps make the Muslim people disappear, because the Muslims
cannot defend themselves if there is a war-How will you prevent
everyone from being killed in Bosnia- Herzegovina?" Although this
muddled sentence issued in the heat of debate could be interpreted as
a warning of the dangers of war, and comparable statements were made
by Izetbegovic and many others, this was presented by the Tribunal as
serious evidence of genocidal intent.
Johnstone contends that the United States was a participant in the
Balkan wars for a number of reasons, including the desire to maintain
its role as leader of NATO and to help provide it with a function on
its 50th anniversary year (celebrated in the midst of the 78-day
bombing war in April 1999); if Germany and others were going to
intervene in Yugoslavia, the United States would have to enter and
play its role, and incidentally show that in the use of force it was
still champion. The United States was also helping itself in its
Bosnian intervention by demonstrating its willingness to aid Muslims,
contradicting its image as anti-Muslim, and solidifying its
relationship with Turkey and other Muslim countries helping in the
Bosnian war. It was also positioning itself for further advances in
the region with a major military base in Kosovo and new clients in an
area of increasing interest with links to the Caspian basin. The
humanitarian motive was contradicted by inherent implausibility and by
the nature and inhumanitarian results of the U.S. and NATO
intervention.
All-in-all the United States did well from its intervention, but the
people of the area did poorly. The policies of it and its European
allies were primary causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the
failure to manage any split peaceably. Their intervention was not "too
late," but early, destructive, and well designed to encourage the
ethnic cleansing that followed. Subsequently, they failed to mediate
the conflict in Kosovo and collaborated with the KLA in producing a
highly destructive war, followed by an occupation in which REAL ethnic
cleansing took place, with NATO acquiesence and even cooperation.
Bosnia and Kosovo are under colonial occupation. The remnant
Yugoslavia, once a vibrant and truly multiethnic state, is poor,
crowded with refugees, dependent on a hostile West, conflict-ridden,
and rudderless. The Balkans are neither stable nor free; their future
as NATO clients does not look promising.
Diana Johnstone has written up this story in a readable, scholarly,
and convincing way that I have been able to summarize all to briefly
here. It is an important book, especially for a left that has been
confused by the outpourings of a very powerful propaganda system.
--------------------------------------------------
Endnotes:
1.David Rieff, "Virtual War: Kovoso and Beyond," Los Angeles
Times, September 3, 2000; Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo
and Beyond (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), p. 6.
2.Christopher Hitchens is properly referred to as an ex-leftist, who
is now a reliable apologist for imperial wars. However, his
furiously anti-Serb and pro-Bosnian Muslim and pro-NATO war biases
date back to the early 1990s when he joined the "Potemkin Sarejevo"
groupies in a new cult idealizing and misreading the facts on
Izetbegovic and the allegedly multiethnic paradise now being upset by
the Serbs. For an excellent account, Johnstone, Fools' Crusade, pp.
40-64.
3.See my Open Letter Reply to Paul Hockenos and In These Times on
Their Coverage of the Balkans: http://www.zmag.org/openhermanitt.htm
4.Johnstone, pp. 27-32.
5.John Pomfret reported on Nasi Oric's trophies in a unique article on
"Weapons, Cash and Chaos Lend Clout to Srebrenica's Tough Guy,"
Washington Post, February 16, 1994.
6.Johnstone, p. 110.
7.Among the sources on this point, providing documentation that
included numerous personal affidavits, all ignored by Rieff et al.
and the Western media: S. Dabic et al., "Persecution of Serbs And
Ethnic Cleansing in Croatia 1991-1998, Documents and Testimonies,"
Serbian Council Information Center, Belgrade, 1998; "Memoradum on War
Crimes and Crimes and Genocide in Eastern Bosnia (Communes of
Bratunac, Skelani and Srebrenica) Committed Against the Serbian
Population From April 1992 to April 1993," sent by Ambassador Dragomir
Djokic to the General Assembly and Security Council, June 2, 1993;
Milovoje Ivanisevic, "Expulsion of the Serbs From Bosnia and
Herzogovina, 1992-1995," Edition WARS, Book II, Belgrade, 2000. See
also Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, New York: M.
E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 178-180; Raymond K. Kent, "Contextualizing Hate:
The Hague Tribunal, the Clinton Administration and the Serbs":
http://www.beograd.com/nato/texts/english/c/contextualizing_hate.html
8.Johnstone, pp. 78-90
9.Ibid., p. 73.
10.David Rieff, "A New Age of Liberal Imperialism," World Policy
Journal, Summer 1999.
11.Tim Judah, "Is Milosevic Planning Another Balkan War?,"
Scotland on Sunday, March 19, 2000.
12.Lenard Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan
Milosevic (Boulder. Col.: Westview Press, 2001), p.380.
13.Johnstone, pp. 23-32, 144-156.
14.Ibid., pp. 60-61
15.Ibid., pp. 16-23.
16.Ibid., pp. 109-118.