Informazione
Il seguente articolo e' apparso sul quotidiano giuridico online
"Diritto e giustizia" del 2.2.2002. Ringraziamo l'Avv. Ricci Bitti
per la segnalazione
____________________________________________________________
Tipologia: Commenti - Data pubblicazione
su Diritto e Giustizia: 2/2/2002
Non sempre la guerra «offre» giurisdizione
extraterritoriale: l'occasione mancata del caso Bankovic
La sentenza di inammissibilità della causa «Bankovic ed altri
contro Belgio ed altri sedici Stati parte dell'Organizzazione
dell'Atlantico del Nord», emessa dalla Gran Camera della Corte
dei diritti dell'uomo il 12 dicembre scorso rappresenta un
passaggio importante nella giurisprudenza della Corte e della
sua evoluzione. Anche per questo, la pronuncia è stata ampiamente
citata dal presidente della Corte, Luzius Wildhaber, nel suo
discorso in occasione dell'inaugurazione dell'Anno giudiziario
2002, svoltasi il 31 gennaio scorso. Presentiamo qui un ampio
commento della sentenza - a firma Guiiampiero Buonomo - che ne
illustra il contesto e le principali motivazioni.
di Giampiero Buonomo
La possibilità di ricorso dinanzi alla Corte europea dei diritti
umani, quando coinvolge scelte di politica estera o militare degli
Stati, ha sempre sollevato delicatissimi profili di interferenza
col diritto internazionale generale (e con la giurisdizione della
Corte internazionale di giustizia), dinanzi ai quali i giudici di
Strasburgo hanno di norma scelto di agire con la massima cautela.
Non si sottrae a tale prassi la sentenza di inammissibilità nel
caso Bankovic ed altri contro Belgio ed altri sedici Stati parte
dell'Organizzazione dell'Atlantico del Nord, emessa dalla Gran
Camera il 12 dicembre scorso: in essa alcuni cittadini della
repubblica di Jugoslavia hanno accampato l'assassinio dei loro
cari (in violazione degli articoli 2, 10 e 13 della Convenzione
europea dei diritti umani) - ed il sesto ricorrente ha addotto
il proprio ferimento - in occasione della distruzione della stazione
radiofonica di Belgrado nel quadro della campagna di bombardamenti
aerei avvenuta nella primavera del 1999 sulla Yugoslavia.
Invero, non si tratta dell'unica sentenza di un'assise internazionale
che prende le mosse da quegli eventi: già il 29 aprile 1999,
a bombardamenti ancora in corso, la Repubblica federale di Yugoslavia
aveva presentato un ricorso alla Corte internazionale di
Giustizia contro i membri della NATO partecipanti alle operazioni
militari, accusandoli di aver violato il diritto internazionale
coll'impiego illegittimo della forza e chiedendo, come misura
provvisoria, la cessazione immediata dei bombardamenti. I giudici
dell'Aja furono in grado di cavarsela assai elegantemente sul rito,
visto che la Yugoslavia aveva sì riconosciuto la giurisdizione
obbligatoria della Corte appena tre giorni prima del ricorso (il 26
aprile 1999) ma oramai quando i fatti contro cui si reagiva
erano già iniziati da un mese (i raid sul Kosovo e la Yugoslavia
ebbero origine il 24 marzo e cessarono l'8 giugno, mentre
l'ultimatum della Nato risaliva addirittura al 30 gennaio 1999).
Nell'ordinanza del 2 giugno 1999, quindi, la Corte, dopo aver
stabilito la mancanza di competenza prima facie sull'affare,
non entrò nel merito, e non ordinò alcuna misura provvisoria.
Tuttavia la Corte non si sottrasse da alcune considerazioni
di merito: essa si dichiarò «deeply concerned with the human
tragedy, the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo...
and with the continuing loss of life and human suffering in all
parts of Yugoslavia». Aggiunse che era «profoundly concerned
with the use of force in Yugoslavia» e affermò che «all parties
appearing before it must act in conformity with their
obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of
international law, including humanitarian law». Avendo affermato
di essere «deeply concerned » sia per la tragedia del Kosovo
sia per l'uso della forza in Yugoslavia, la Corte osservò, con
un trasparente riferimento all'azione Nato, che «under present
circumstances such use [cioè l'uso della forza] raises very
serious issues of international law».
L'Aja era indubbiamente la sede più propria per affrontare la
scabrosa questione dell'uso della forza esercitato da un gruppo di
Stati (parte di un'alleanza che si definisce organizzazione
regionale delle Nazioni Unite, ma che era nata come ente di
autodifesa collettiva ai sensi dell'articolo 51 della Carta) nei
confronti di un altro Stato membro delle Nazioni Unite, al di fuori
della decisione del Consiglio di sicurezza di disporre misure
coercitive ai sensi del capo VII. Infatti il Consiglio, pur avendo
definito una "minaccia alla pace" la situazione nel Kosovo
(risoluzioni 1.199 e 1.203 del 1998), non aveva indicato l'esistenza
di un aggressione né aveva autorizzato alcuno a reagire contro di
essa: in dottrina (risoluzione del 1989 dell'Istituto di diritto
internazionale a Santiago di Compostela) non si esclude che la
violazione dei diritti umani possa giustificare una serie di
iniziative ("passi" diplomatici, distribuzione di aiuti senza passare
per il sovrano territoriale, ritorsioni e contromisure che non
comportino l'uso della forza) che in linea di principio rientrerebbero
nella nozione di "intervento" (vietato dall'articolo 2
paragrafo 7 della Carta delle Nazioni Unite); ma la giurisprudenza
della Corte internazionale di Giustizia, nel caso del minamento
statunitense dei porti del Nicaragua del 1986, escluse espressamente
che la minaccia o l'uso della forza (minamento di porti,
distruzione di installazioni petrolifere, addestramento, armamento
ed equipaggiamento di guerriglieri contro il sovrano
territoriale) rientrassero tra le possibilità degli Stati, singoli o
associati, essendovi nella Carta delle Nazioni Unite un sistema
centralizzato di uso della forza (capo VII) che ne vieta
l'esercizio autonomo non di autodifesa.
Se quindi le risoluzioni del 1998 legittimavano la comunità
internazionale (ed i suoi componenti, singoli od associati) ad
interessarsi del Kosovo e ad "intervenire" nella concreta gestione
della faccenda da parte di Belgrado senza che questa
potesse opporre la domestic jurisdiction, esse non impedivano
però di considerare i bombardamenti della Nato come una
violazione dell'articolo 2 paragrafo 4 della Carta: tanto più che,
sin dal precedente ultimatum lanciato dal Consiglio atlantico,
l'azione condotta era chiaramente rivolta (a dispetto di quanto
sostenuto dal Belgio nella memoria difensiva all'Aja) ad alterare
l'indipendenza politica - se non l'integrità territoriale,
formalmente mantenuta - della Yugoslavia, la cui scelta di mantenere i
kosovari in situazione di inferiorità politica (pur essendo, più che
discutibile, moralmente ignobile) era stata legittimamente
assunta oltre ad essere coperta dal principio di sovranità (che
difende da situazioni analoghe i decisori politici di decine di altri
Stati).
La tutela dell'esercizio centralizzato della forza da parte del
Consiglio di sicurezza è apprestata, nei confronti delle
organizzazioni regionali, dall'articolo 53 della Carta, per il quale
"nessuna azione coercitiva potrà essere intrapresa in base ad
accordi regionali o da parte di organizzazioni regionali senza
l'autorizzazione del Consiglio di sicurezza": questa norma - che in
via di fatto è stata interpretata come legittimante le "lettere di
corsa" che a partire dalla crisi kuwaitita hanno visto le Nazioni
Unite delegare a singoli Stati l'applicazione delle misure del
capo VII, nell'inattuazione pressoché totale dello Stato maggiore
congiunto - non contempla alcuna deroga motivata da "esigenze
umanitarie" o di difesa dei diritti umani, per cui nel caso di
specie c'è chi, come L. Condorelli, ha correttamente concluso
che «la legalità della Carta è stata flagrantemente violata».
Ma una sentenza dell'Aja sarebbe stata interessante, nel merito,
anche per una questione più sottile delle eterne controversie
sul ius ad bellum (liceità o meno dell'uso della forza nelle relazioni
internazionali); se cioè - stante, nell'attuale stadio delle
relazioni internazionali, l'impossibilità di derogare al divieto di
cui all'articolo 2 paragrafo 4 della Carta, neppure sub specie di
"intervento umanitario" - si dia il caso di "sanatoria" ex post
per l'illecito internazionale compiuto. E' questa infatti la
prevalente chiave interpretativa di chi non voglia ammettere che -
per la sola dissociazione in un caso di una componente della
comunità internazionale, quella occidentale, a partire dal 1999 -
si sia già verificata la desuetudine della norma dell'articolo 2
paragrafo 4 della Carta delle Nazioni Unite in rapporto agli
(autoproclamati) "interventi umanitari".
Orbene, la tesi che vede nella risoluzione del Consiglio di
sicurezza n. 1244 del 1999 la sanatoria dell'intervento della Nato-
pur fondata sull'incorporazione per relationem che il paragrafo 10
del suo annesso 2 fa degli accordi armistiziali tra Nato e
governo iugoslavo - ha un senso soltanto nella misura in cui si
ritenga la derogabilità della fonte dell'obbligo di cui all'articolo
2 paragrafo 4. Se, come la dottrina e la giurisprudenza ritengono,
quella disposizione pattizia della Carta Onu in realtà
incorpora una norma di diritto internazionale consuetudinario
(e la Corte internazionale di Giustizia l'ha sostenuto sin dal
1949, sul caso dello stretto di Corfù), non basta sostenere che il
Consiglio di sicurezza è arbitro di ratificare a posteriori ciò
che poteva autorizzare a priori. La legittimità della stessa
ratifica del Consiglio di sicurezza (laddove così si interpreti la
risoluzione n. 1244) sarebbe dubbia se si annoverasse il divieto
di uso della forza tra quelle norme di diritto cogente che
istituscono obblighi solidali tra gli Stati, ed in tale caratteristica
si distanziano dalle altre norme di diritto internazionale che
istituiscono solo un fascio di vincoli bilaterali; tale caratteristica
fu proclamata - per alcune norme cogenti, né si ritiene sia
generalizzabile a tutto il ius cogens - dalla sentenza del 1980
della Corte internazionale di giustizia (nel caso degli ostaggi
statunitensi in Iran), secondo cui per tale tipo di vincolo solidale
uno Stato è obbligato verso tutti i membri di una certa alleanza
od organizzazione o della stessa comunità internazionale. Di
conseguenza, essendo il divieto di aggressione (e quello di
annessione territoriale durante la guerra) norma di diritto cogente,
in tal caso l'acquiescenza degli Stati terzi è priva di effetti
giuridici, in deroga al principio di effettività.
Pertanto, se la Corte dell'Aja non si fosse fermata al rito,
avremmo potuto trarre interessantissimi spunti di fatto e di diritto
sullo stato delle seguenti questioni:
- se l'intervento armato della Nato - con tutte le sue premesse,
in termini di riconoscimento della gravità della situazione
kosovara, da parte delle Nazioni Unite - si potesse annoverare
tra gli atti di "aggressione" (che non consistono in un uso
qualsiasi della forza nelle relazioni internazionali in violazione
della Carta, ma sono particolarmente qualificati, secondo la
definizione offerta dalla risoluzione 3314-XXIX dell'Assemblea
generale delle Nazioni Unite);
- se, in tale eventualità, la conseguente violazione di ius cogens
fosse sanabile da un procedimento uguale e contrario a quello
di sua formazione (che, ai sensi dell'articolo 53 della Convenzione di
Vienna sul diritto dei trattati, deriva dall'accettazione e
riconoscimento da parte della comunità degli Stati, come norma alla
quale non può essere apportata nessuna deroga), secondo
la tesi applicata dal Brownlie all'invasione dell'Uganda da parte
della Tanzania nel 1979 (l'effettività ha trionfato sulla
solidarietà dell'obbligazione che comporta il divieto di aggressione,
perché vi fu l'acquiescenza di pressoché tutti gli Stati della
comunità internazionale);
- se la ratifica del Consiglio di sicurezza (proprio in virtù della
massima rappresentatività che in esso hanno tutte le componenti
essenziali della comunità internazionale) debba considerarsi
l'indizio qualificato di tale acquiescenza, nonostante la natura
decentrata della produzione del ius cogens presupponga natura analoga
per l'actus contrarius (in particolare, soltanto il veto di
una delle cinque Potenze potrebbe ostacolare la sanatoria
dell'aggressione, mentre in una deliberazione a maggioranza la
mancata acquiescenza di una componente essenziale della comunità
internazionale non rappresentata tra i cinque Grandi
potrebbe non essere decisiva ad impedire la sanatoria).
Al contrario, a tale funzione ermeneutica si sarebbe potuta prestare
indirettamente la Corte di Strasburgo, per le ricadute che la
definizione di guerra e la normativa del diritto umanitario possono
avere sulla disciplina europea dei diritti umani: ma la Corte
europea ha scelto anch'essa di cavarsi d'impaccio con una pronuncia
di stretto rito.
La premessa, condivisa dai ricorrenti e dai convenuti, è che la
Repubblica federale della Yugoslavia non era parte della
Convenzione europea dei diritti umani. Pertanto, il ricorso invoca
il rispetto della Convenzione "dalla parte dei convenuti": in
altri termini è il loro essersi impegnati con la firma della
Convenzione a venire in rilievo, nella prospettazione accusatoria,
che nella Convenzione vede uno strumento costituzionale dell'«ordine
pubblico europeo per la protezione degli esseri umani». Ma
la Corte - che pure s'era dimostrata incline ad avallare questa
visione, quando (sulle eccezioni preliminari dell'affare Loizidou, §
93) dall'articolo 19 della Convenzione aveva fatto discendere un
proprio ruolo volto ad assicurare il rispetto "degli impegni"
sottoscritti dalle parti contraenti - ha reagito ricordando il
"contesto essenzialmente regionale, e più particolarmente nello
spazio giuridico degli Stati contraenti" in cui opera la Convenzione:
ribadendo la sentenza Soering, la Corte ha accampato l'articolo 1, che
"fissa un limite, segnatamente territoriale, all'operatività della
Convenzione. In particolare, l'impegno degli Stati parte si spinge ad
assicurare alle persone che ricadono nella loro giurisdizione i
diritti e le libertà enumerate. Inoltre, la Convenzione non regola gli
atti di uno Stato terzo, né pretende che gli Stati parte impongano le
sue norme a tale Stato".
In realtà, la giurisprudenza della Corte in più d'un caso ha giudicato
come «atti rientranti nella giurisdizione degli Stati parte» -
e, pertanto, assoggettati al suo controllo - condotte verificatesi al
di fuori del territorio dello Stato parte: "circostanze eccezionali"
legittimano tale estensione, ed esse sono tutte riconducibili
all'esercizio effettivo (da parte dello Stato contraente)
del controllo su una zona situata al di fuori del suo territorio
nazionale. Molteplici titoli giuridici sono stati addotti per
giustificare questo tipo di pronunce: nel caso Xhavara ci fu un
accordo italo-albanese che legittimava il pattugliamento italiano al
di fuori delle acque territoriali e fino a quelle dello Stato
frontista; ma ci sono stati casi in cui il titolo era assai flebile e
la Corte non s'è sottratta a pronunciare almeno l'ammissibilità (casi
Issa, Öcalan ed Ilascu).
Eppure, anche in assenza di titoli giuridici la Corte s'era talvolta
spinta fino ad annettere valore alla stessa mera effettività: il
più rimarchevole precedente deciso in tal senso è quello di Cipro del
Nord, dove per due volte (casi Loizidou e Cipro contro
Turchia) i giudici strasburghesi hanno riconosciuto che le condotte
oggetto di ricorso erano state compiute all'interno della
giurisdizione turca. Il dictum di queste sentenze recita che la
responsabilità dello Stato parte è coinvolta allorché - a seguito di
un'azione militare, legale o meno non importa - esso esercita il suo
controllo direttamente (mediante le proprie forze armate) o
indirettamente (per mezzo di un'amministrazione locale subordinata,
che sopravvive grazie al sostegno dello Stato parte). Il
passo ulteriore che i ricorrenti iugoslavi chiedevano era
effettivamente un po' azzardato, proponendosi il "frazionamento" di
questa responsabilità in corrispondenza di atti di controllo non
globale da parte degli Stati impegnati nella campagna militare
contro la Yugoslavia: la "supremazia aerea" dispiegata durante i
bombardamenti sarebbe stata indizio di una giurisdizione
estesa dagli Stati parte della Nato al territorio da essi assoggettato
a controllo aereo, seppure per la sola durata del bombardamento.
La Corte, nel respingere ora tale prospettazione dei ricorrenti, ha
escluso che la guerra di per sé sola cagioni un'estensione
della giurisdizione dello Stato contraente ai luoghi oggetto del
conflitto: la guerra rientra nel novero degli eventi che in certe
circostanze sono fonte di giurisdizione extraterritoriale, ma ciò non
significa che tutte le guerre lo siano. Il discrimine sta nella
globalità del controllo e non nella natura legittima o meno dell'atto
di guerra, né nella sua riconducibilità alla nozione più lata di
"conflitto armato" (secondo la norma consuetudinaria incorporata nelle
Convenzioni di Ginevra, che applicano il diritto
umanitario di guerra in tutte le circostanze di conflitto armato,
interstatale od interno). Per i giudici strasburghesi il limitato
esercizio della facoltà di deroga ad alcuni obblighi convenzionali (ex
articolo 15 della Convenzione) dimostra semmai che la prassi degli
Stati era univocamente nel senso di considerare vigente, in caso di
azioni militari fuori dello Stato parte, il principio di stretta
territorialità: nessuno degli Stati europei della Nato ha infatti
pensato di notificare la deroga, proprio perché l'opinio unanime era
nel senso che non fosse necessario per atti bellici condotti su
territorio altrui; viceversa, tutti i casi di deroga (irlandese nel
caso Lawless; britannica nel caso Irlanda contro Regno Unito; turca
nel caso del Curdistan) hanno riguardato conflitti condotti sul
territorio dello stesso Stato parte.
Ergere questa prassi degli Stati a criterio ermeneutico dirimente
(ammantandola come esigenza di interpretare la Convenzione
"in armonia con le altre regole di diritto internazionale, delle quali
essa è parte") significa disconoscere le potenzialità derogatorie del
diritto consuetudinario, da parte della normativa pattizia sui diritti
umani. In un'epoca in cui la spinta evolutiva del diritto
internazionale s'è espressa nel caso Pinochet dinanzi alla Camera dei
Lord, è singolare che la Corte europea abbia scelto di attenersi alla
più rigida interpretazione letterale: essa però s'inserisce in un
filone di ritorno alla rigorosa salvaguardia dell'immunità degli
Stati, che proprio recentemente la Gran Camera ha affermato con le tre
decisioni di rigetto del 21 novembre 2001 sui casi McElhinney contro
Irlanda, Al-Adsani contro Regno Unito e Fogarty contro Regno Unito.
Dal rispetto del principio par in parem non habet iurisdictionem (da
parte dello Stato contraente della Convenzione) è stata fatta
discendere, mediante l'obbligo di previo esperimento dei ricorsi
interni, l'impossibilità per la Corte europea di considerare
violate le prescrizioni del giusto processo (nei confronti dei
cittadini incapaci di ottenere ragione nei singoli ordinamenti
nazionali, nei confronti di Stati sovrani): quando poi, come è stato
nel secondo caso, lo Stato contraente s'è dimostrato incapace di
apprestare un rimedio giurisdizionale per un atto (tortura) avvenuto
al di fuori del suo territorio e del suo controllo (cioè in territorio
kuwaitita), la Corte ha confermato la legittimità della posizione
britannica dichiarando inesigibile dall'ordinamento nazionale una
sanzione della violazione avvenuta fuori del territorio nazionale.
Eppure, le potenzialità della giurisdizione della Corte europea erano
insite proprio nell'articolo 15: senza una deroga legittimamente
espressa dallo Stato parte, infatti, la Corte avrebbe potuto
pronunciarsi su atti extraterritoriali se li avesse considerati
rientranti all'interno della giurisdizione dello Stato parte. Il
quesito è lungi dall'essere ozioso, visto che dal 21 dicembre 2001
risulta apposta un'altra deroga ai sensi dell'articolo 15 della
Convenzione: è di fonte britannica e riguarda le procedure di arresto
senza processo a tempo indefinito previste dall'Anti-terrorism, Crime
and security Act a carico degli stranieri sospettati di terrorismo
internazionale (in base ad accuse segrete, valutate da un organo
giudiziario appositamente costituito dalle cui udienze la difesa può
essere esclusa). In un momento in cui la giurisdizione penale
ordinaria statunitense è "scavalcata" con decisione dell'Esecutivo -
di detenzione nella base di Guantanamo di sospetti complici nelle
stragi dell'undici settembre 2001, deferiti a tribunali militari
neocostituiti - un'analoga decisione di fonte britannica non potrebbe
valersi dell'eccezione di extraterritorialità delle azioni belliche o
di intelligence condotte in Afghanistan, proprio perché (almeno fino
all'insediamento del governo Karzai) il determinante appoggio
anglo-americano all'Alleanza del Nord ha rappresentato proprio quel
"controllo" globale (seppure indiretto) che per la sentenza Loizidou
attiva la giurisdizione dello Stato parte e ne rende le condotte
suscettibili di sindacato a Strasburgo.
La deroga apposta dal Governo Blair, quindi, non capita a caso, così
come non capita a caso la "svolta" della Corte in direzione del
maggior ossequio verso le determinazioni degli Stati. Vien quasi da
rimpiangere il periodo in cui l'aborrita "giurisdizione degli
esecutivi" (cioè la Commissione del Consiglio d'Europa, che prima del
1998 esercitava funzioni paragiurisdizionali) portò ad invalidare la
deroga espressa dalla Grecia dei colonnelli, negando che nel 1967 essa
versasse nel "pericolo pubblico che minacci la vita della nazione".
Nell'esprimersi sulla recentissima deroga britannica, è difficile che
la Corte si spinga con altrettanto coraggio a valutare l'esistenza in
concreto di codesto prerequisito, che (con la guerra) rappresenta la
condizione alla quale l'articolo 15 comma 1 ammette la facoltà di
prendere misure derogatorie della Convenzione, "nella stretta
misura in cui la situazione lo richieda ed a condizione che tali
misure non siano in contraddizione con gli altri obblighi derivanti
dal diritto internazionale".
E' questo il vero legame con il sistema dello ius gentium al quale la
Corte dovrebbe tendere: visto che tra l'altro il rinvio al diritto
umanitario di guerra rappresenta tutt'altro che una guarentigia
accordata unilateralmente per aumentare la possibilità che nemici
irriducibili e feroci la facciano franca. Proprio il comma 2
dell'articolo 15 della Convenzione fa salve le deroghe all'articolo 2
(diritto alla vita) che coprano decessi causati da "legittimi atti di
guerra": il timore che induce d'Oltreoceano a guardare con estremo
sospetto al Tribunale penale internazionale è, almeno per quanto
riguarda il sistema europeo di salvaguardia dei diritti umani, già
fugato da questa previsione. Gli è che le diplomazie degli Stati
paiono tornate ad un Ottocento unilateralista che le induce a
rifiutare di assoggettarsi allo scrutinio di un organo giurisdizionale
internazionale per dimostrare la legittimità di un atto di guerra: è
più facile apporre una riserva all'operatività della Convenzione
europea, o frapporre ostacoli all'entrata in funzione del Tribunale
penale internazionale, che rendere conto del motivo per il quale s'è
scelto di non passare per il Consiglio di sicurezza per adottare
misure coercitive che si sarebbero agevolmente potute autorizzare ai
sensi del capo VII della Carta delle Nazioni Unite.
"Diritto e giustizia" del 2.2.2002. Ringraziamo l'Avv. Ricci Bitti
per la segnalazione
____________________________________________________________
Tipologia: Commenti - Data pubblicazione
su Diritto e Giustizia: 2/2/2002
Non sempre la guerra «offre» giurisdizione
extraterritoriale: l'occasione mancata del caso Bankovic
La sentenza di inammissibilità della causa «Bankovic ed altri
contro Belgio ed altri sedici Stati parte dell'Organizzazione
dell'Atlantico del Nord», emessa dalla Gran Camera della Corte
dei diritti dell'uomo il 12 dicembre scorso rappresenta un
passaggio importante nella giurisprudenza della Corte e della
sua evoluzione. Anche per questo, la pronuncia è stata ampiamente
citata dal presidente della Corte, Luzius Wildhaber, nel suo
discorso in occasione dell'inaugurazione dell'Anno giudiziario
2002, svoltasi il 31 gennaio scorso. Presentiamo qui un ampio
commento della sentenza - a firma Guiiampiero Buonomo - che ne
illustra il contesto e le principali motivazioni.
di Giampiero Buonomo
La possibilità di ricorso dinanzi alla Corte europea dei diritti
umani, quando coinvolge scelte di politica estera o militare degli
Stati, ha sempre sollevato delicatissimi profili di interferenza
col diritto internazionale generale (e con la giurisdizione della
Corte internazionale di giustizia), dinanzi ai quali i giudici di
Strasburgo hanno di norma scelto di agire con la massima cautela.
Non si sottrae a tale prassi la sentenza di inammissibilità nel
caso Bankovic ed altri contro Belgio ed altri sedici Stati parte
dell'Organizzazione dell'Atlantico del Nord, emessa dalla Gran
Camera il 12 dicembre scorso: in essa alcuni cittadini della
repubblica di Jugoslavia hanno accampato l'assassinio dei loro
cari (in violazione degli articoli 2, 10 e 13 della Convenzione
europea dei diritti umani) - ed il sesto ricorrente ha addotto
il proprio ferimento - in occasione della distruzione della stazione
radiofonica di Belgrado nel quadro della campagna di bombardamenti
aerei avvenuta nella primavera del 1999 sulla Yugoslavia.
Invero, non si tratta dell'unica sentenza di un'assise internazionale
che prende le mosse da quegli eventi: già il 29 aprile 1999,
a bombardamenti ancora in corso, la Repubblica federale di Yugoslavia
aveva presentato un ricorso alla Corte internazionale di
Giustizia contro i membri della NATO partecipanti alle operazioni
militari, accusandoli di aver violato il diritto internazionale
coll'impiego illegittimo della forza e chiedendo, come misura
provvisoria, la cessazione immediata dei bombardamenti. I giudici
dell'Aja furono in grado di cavarsela assai elegantemente sul rito,
visto che la Yugoslavia aveva sì riconosciuto la giurisdizione
obbligatoria della Corte appena tre giorni prima del ricorso (il 26
aprile 1999) ma oramai quando i fatti contro cui si reagiva
erano già iniziati da un mese (i raid sul Kosovo e la Yugoslavia
ebbero origine il 24 marzo e cessarono l'8 giugno, mentre
l'ultimatum della Nato risaliva addirittura al 30 gennaio 1999).
Nell'ordinanza del 2 giugno 1999, quindi, la Corte, dopo aver
stabilito la mancanza di competenza prima facie sull'affare,
non entrò nel merito, e non ordinò alcuna misura provvisoria.
Tuttavia la Corte non si sottrasse da alcune considerazioni
di merito: essa si dichiarò «deeply concerned with the human
tragedy, the loss of life, and the enormous suffering in Kosovo...
and with the continuing loss of life and human suffering in all
parts of Yugoslavia». Aggiunse che era «profoundly concerned
with the use of force in Yugoslavia» e affermò che «all parties
appearing before it must act in conformity with their
obligations under the United Nations Charter and other rules of
international law, including humanitarian law». Avendo affermato
di essere «deeply concerned » sia per la tragedia del Kosovo
sia per l'uso della forza in Yugoslavia, la Corte osservò, con
un trasparente riferimento all'azione Nato, che «under present
circumstances such use [cioè l'uso della forza] raises very
serious issues of international law».
L'Aja era indubbiamente la sede più propria per affrontare la
scabrosa questione dell'uso della forza esercitato da un gruppo di
Stati (parte di un'alleanza che si definisce organizzazione
regionale delle Nazioni Unite, ma che era nata come ente di
autodifesa collettiva ai sensi dell'articolo 51 della Carta) nei
confronti di un altro Stato membro delle Nazioni Unite, al di fuori
della decisione del Consiglio di sicurezza di disporre misure
coercitive ai sensi del capo VII. Infatti il Consiglio, pur avendo
definito una "minaccia alla pace" la situazione nel Kosovo
(risoluzioni 1.199 e 1.203 del 1998), non aveva indicato l'esistenza
di un aggressione né aveva autorizzato alcuno a reagire contro di
essa: in dottrina (risoluzione del 1989 dell'Istituto di diritto
internazionale a Santiago di Compostela) non si esclude che la
violazione dei diritti umani possa giustificare una serie di
iniziative ("passi" diplomatici, distribuzione di aiuti senza passare
per il sovrano territoriale, ritorsioni e contromisure che non
comportino l'uso della forza) che in linea di principio rientrerebbero
nella nozione di "intervento" (vietato dall'articolo 2
paragrafo 7 della Carta delle Nazioni Unite); ma la giurisprudenza
della Corte internazionale di Giustizia, nel caso del minamento
statunitense dei porti del Nicaragua del 1986, escluse espressamente
che la minaccia o l'uso della forza (minamento di porti,
distruzione di installazioni petrolifere, addestramento, armamento
ed equipaggiamento di guerriglieri contro il sovrano
territoriale) rientrassero tra le possibilità degli Stati, singoli o
associati, essendovi nella Carta delle Nazioni Unite un sistema
centralizzato di uso della forza (capo VII) che ne vieta
l'esercizio autonomo non di autodifesa.
Se quindi le risoluzioni del 1998 legittimavano la comunità
internazionale (ed i suoi componenti, singoli od associati) ad
interessarsi del Kosovo e ad "intervenire" nella concreta gestione
della faccenda da parte di Belgrado senza che questa
potesse opporre la domestic jurisdiction, esse non impedivano
però di considerare i bombardamenti della Nato come una
violazione dell'articolo 2 paragrafo 4 della Carta: tanto più che,
sin dal precedente ultimatum lanciato dal Consiglio atlantico,
l'azione condotta era chiaramente rivolta (a dispetto di quanto
sostenuto dal Belgio nella memoria difensiva all'Aja) ad alterare
l'indipendenza politica - se non l'integrità territoriale,
formalmente mantenuta - della Yugoslavia, la cui scelta di mantenere i
kosovari in situazione di inferiorità politica (pur essendo, più che
discutibile, moralmente ignobile) era stata legittimamente
assunta oltre ad essere coperta dal principio di sovranità (che
difende da situazioni analoghe i decisori politici di decine di altri
Stati).
La tutela dell'esercizio centralizzato della forza da parte del
Consiglio di sicurezza è apprestata, nei confronti delle
organizzazioni regionali, dall'articolo 53 della Carta, per il quale
"nessuna azione coercitiva potrà essere intrapresa in base ad
accordi regionali o da parte di organizzazioni regionali senza
l'autorizzazione del Consiglio di sicurezza": questa norma - che in
via di fatto è stata interpretata come legittimante le "lettere di
corsa" che a partire dalla crisi kuwaitita hanno visto le Nazioni
Unite delegare a singoli Stati l'applicazione delle misure del
capo VII, nell'inattuazione pressoché totale dello Stato maggiore
congiunto - non contempla alcuna deroga motivata da "esigenze
umanitarie" o di difesa dei diritti umani, per cui nel caso di
specie c'è chi, come L. Condorelli, ha correttamente concluso
che «la legalità della Carta è stata flagrantemente violata».
Ma una sentenza dell'Aja sarebbe stata interessante, nel merito,
anche per una questione più sottile delle eterne controversie
sul ius ad bellum (liceità o meno dell'uso della forza nelle relazioni
internazionali); se cioè - stante, nell'attuale stadio delle
relazioni internazionali, l'impossibilità di derogare al divieto di
cui all'articolo 2 paragrafo 4 della Carta, neppure sub specie di
"intervento umanitario" - si dia il caso di "sanatoria" ex post
per l'illecito internazionale compiuto. E' questa infatti la
prevalente chiave interpretativa di chi non voglia ammettere che -
per la sola dissociazione in un caso di una componente della
comunità internazionale, quella occidentale, a partire dal 1999 -
si sia già verificata la desuetudine della norma dell'articolo 2
paragrafo 4 della Carta delle Nazioni Unite in rapporto agli
(autoproclamati) "interventi umanitari".
Orbene, la tesi che vede nella risoluzione del Consiglio di
sicurezza n. 1244 del 1999 la sanatoria dell'intervento della Nato-
pur fondata sull'incorporazione per relationem che il paragrafo 10
del suo annesso 2 fa degli accordi armistiziali tra Nato e
governo iugoslavo - ha un senso soltanto nella misura in cui si
ritenga la derogabilità della fonte dell'obbligo di cui all'articolo
2 paragrafo 4. Se, come la dottrina e la giurisprudenza ritengono,
quella disposizione pattizia della Carta Onu in realtà
incorpora una norma di diritto internazionale consuetudinario
(e la Corte internazionale di Giustizia l'ha sostenuto sin dal
1949, sul caso dello stretto di Corfù), non basta sostenere che il
Consiglio di sicurezza è arbitro di ratificare a posteriori ciò
che poteva autorizzare a priori. La legittimità della stessa
ratifica del Consiglio di sicurezza (laddove così si interpreti la
risoluzione n. 1244) sarebbe dubbia se si annoverasse il divieto
di uso della forza tra quelle norme di diritto cogente che
istituscono obblighi solidali tra gli Stati, ed in tale caratteristica
si distanziano dalle altre norme di diritto internazionale che
istituiscono solo un fascio di vincoli bilaterali; tale caratteristica
fu proclamata - per alcune norme cogenti, né si ritiene sia
generalizzabile a tutto il ius cogens - dalla sentenza del 1980
della Corte internazionale di giustizia (nel caso degli ostaggi
statunitensi in Iran), secondo cui per tale tipo di vincolo solidale
uno Stato è obbligato verso tutti i membri di una certa alleanza
od organizzazione o della stessa comunità internazionale. Di
conseguenza, essendo il divieto di aggressione (e quello di
annessione territoriale durante la guerra) norma di diritto cogente,
in tal caso l'acquiescenza degli Stati terzi è priva di effetti
giuridici, in deroga al principio di effettività.
Pertanto, se la Corte dell'Aja non si fosse fermata al rito,
avremmo potuto trarre interessantissimi spunti di fatto e di diritto
sullo stato delle seguenti questioni:
- se l'intervento armato della Nato - con tutte le sue premesse,
in termini di riconoscimento della gravità della situazione
kosovara, da parte delle Nazioni Unite - si potesse annoverare
tra gli atti di "aggressione" (che non consistono in un uso
qualsiasi della forza nelle relazioni internazionali in violazione
della Carta, ma sono particolarmente qualificati, secondo la
definizione offerta dalla risoluzione 3314-XXIX dell'Assemblea
generale delle Nazioni Unite);
- se, in tale eventualità, la conseguente violazione di ius cogens
fosse sanabile da un procedimento uguale e contrario a quello
di sua formazione (che, ai sensi dell'articolo 53 della Convenzione di
Vienna sul diritto dei trattati, deriva dall'accettazione e
riconoscimento da parte della comunità degli Stati, come norma alla
quale non può essere apportata nessuna deroga), secondo
la tesi applicata dal Brownlie all'invasione dell'Uganda da parte
della Tanzania nel 1979 (l'effettività ha trionfato sulla
solidarietà dell'obbligazione che comporta il divieto di aggressione,
perché vi fu l'acquiescenza di pressoché tutti gli Stati della
comunità internazionale);
- se la ratifica del Consiglio di sicurezza (proprio in virtù della
massima rappresentatività che in esso hanno tutte le componenti
essenziali della comunità internazionale) debba considerarsi
l'indizio qualificato di tale acquiescenza, nonostante la natura
decentrata della produzione del ius cogens presupponga natura analoga
per l'actus contrarius (in particolare, soltanto il veto di
una delle cinque Potenze potrebbe ostacolare la sanatoria
dell'aggressione, mentre in una deliberazione a maggioranza la
mancata acquiescenza di una componente essenziale della comunità
internazionale non rappresentata tra i cinque Grandi
potrebbe non essere decisiva ad impedire la sanatoria).
Al contrario, a tale funzione ermeneutica si sarebbe potuta prestare
indirettamente la Corte di Strasburgo, per le ricadute che la
definizione di guerra e la normativa del diritto umanitario possono
avere sulla disciplina europea dei diritti umani: ma la Corte
europea ha scelto anch'essa di cavarsi d'impaccio con una pronuncia
di stretto rito.
La premessa, condivisa dai ricorrenti e dai convenuti, è che la
Repubblica federale della Yugoslavia non era parte della
Convenzione europea dei diritti umani. Pertanto, il ricorso invoca
il rispetto della Convenzione "dalla parte dei convenuti": in
altri termini è il loro essersi impegnati con la firma della
Convenzione a venire in rilievo, nella prospettazione accusatoria,
che nella Convenzione vede uno strumento costituzionale dell'«ordine
pubblico europeo per la protezione degli esseri umani». Ma
la Corte - che pure s'era dimostrata incline ad avallare questa
visione, quando (sulle eccezioni preliminari dell'affare Loizidou, §
93) dall'articolo 19 della Convenzione aveva fatto discendere un
proprio ruolo volto ad assicurare il rispetto "degli impegni"
sottoscritti dalle parti contraenti - ha reagito ricordando il
"contesto essenzialmente regionale, e più particolarmente nello
spazio giuridico degli Stati contraenti" in cui opera la Convenzione:
ribadendo la sentenza Soering, la Corte ha accampato l'articolo 1, che
"fissa un limite, segnatamente territoriale, all'operatività della
Convenzione. In particolare, l'impegno degli Stati parte si spinge ad
assicurare alle persone che ricadono nella loro giurisdizione i
diritti e le libertà enumerate. Inoltre, la Convenzione non regola gli
atti di uno Stato terzo, né pretende che gli Stati parte impongano le
sue norme a tale Stato".
In realtà, la giurisprudenza della Corte in più d'un caso ha giudicato
come «atti rientranti nella giurisdizione degli Stati parte» -
e, pertanto, assoggettati al suo controllo - condotte verificatesi al
di fuori del territorio dello Stato parte: "circostanze eccezionali"
legittimano tale estensione, ed esse sono tutte riconducibili
all'esercizio effettivo (da parte dello Stato contraente)
del controllo su una zona situata al di fuori del suo territorio
nazionale. Molteplici titoli giuridici sono stati addotti per
giustificare questo tipo di pronunce: nel caso Xhavara ci fu un
accordo italo-albanese che legittimava il pattugliamento italiano al
di fuori delle acque territoriali e fino a quelle dello Stato
frontista; ma ci sono stati casi in cui il titolo era assai flebile e
la Corte non s'è sottratta a pronunciare almeno l'ammissibilità (casi
Issa, Öcalan ed Ilascu).
Eppure, anche in assenza di titoli giuridici la Corte s'era talvolta
spinta fino ad annettere valore alla stessa mera effettività: il
più rimarchevole precedente deciso in tal senso è quello di Cipro del
Nord, dove per due volte (casi Loizidou e Cipro contro
Turchia) i giudici strasburghesi hanno riconosciuto che le condotte
oggetto di ricorso erano state compiute all'interno della
giurisdizione turca. Il dictum di queste sentenze recita che la
responsabilità dello Stato parte è coinvolta allorché - a seguito di
un'azione militare, legale o meno non importa - esso esercita il suo
controllo direttamente (mediante le proprie forze armate) o
indirettamente (per mezzo di un'amministrazione locale subordinata,
che sopravvive grazie al sostegno dello Stato parte). Il
passo ulteriore che i ricorrenti iugoslavi chiedevano era
effettivamente un po' azzardato, proponendosi il "frazionamento" di
questa responsabilità in corrispondenza di atti di controllo non
globale da parte degli Stati impegnati nella campagna militare
contro la Yugoslavia: la "supremazia aerea" dispiegata durante i
bombardamenti sarebbe stata indizio di una giurisdizione
estesa dagli Stati parte della Nato al territorio da essi assoggettato
a controllo aereo, seppure per la sola durata del bombardamento.
La Corte, nel respingere ora tale prospettazione dei ricorrenti, ha
escluso che la guerra di per sé sola cagioni un'estensione
della giurisdizione dello Stato contraente ai luoghi oggetto del
conflitto: la guerra rientra nel novero degli eventi che in certe
circostanze sono fonte di giurisdizione extraterritoriale, ma ciò non
significa che tutte le guerre lo siano. Il discrimine sta nella
globalità del controllo e non nella natura legittima o meno dell'atto
di guerra, né nella sua riconducibilità alla nozione più lata di
"conflitto armato" (secondo la norma consuetudinaria incorporata nelle
Convenzioni di Ginevra, che applicano il diritto
umanitario di guerra in tutte le circostanze di conflitto armato,
interstatale od interno). Per i giudici strasburghesi il limitato
esercizio della facoltà di deroga ad alcuni obblighi convenzionali (ex
articolo 15 della Convenzione) dimostra semmai che la prassi degli
Stati era univocamente nel senso di considerare vigente, in caso di
azioni militari fuori dello Stato parte, il principio di stretta
territorialità: nessuno degli Stati europei della Nato ha infatti
pensato di notificare la deroga, proprio perché l'opinio unanime era
nel senso che non fosse necessario per atti bellici condotti su
territorio altrui; viceversa, tutti i casi di deroga (irlandese nel
caso Lawless; britannica nel caso Irlanda contro Regno Unito; turca
nel caso del Curdistan) hanno riguardato conflitti condotti sul
territorio dello stesso Stato parte.
Ergere questa prassi degli Stati a criterio ermeneutico dirimente
(ammantandola come esigenza di interpretare la Convenzione
"in armonia con le altre regole di diritto internazionale, delle quali
essa è parte") significa disconoscere le potenzialità derogatorie del
diritto consuetudinario, da parte della normativa pattizia sui diritti
umani. In un'epoca in cui la spinta evolutiva del diritto
internazionale s'è espressa nel caso Pinochet dinanzi alla Camera dei
Lord, è singolare che la Corte europea abbia scelto di attenersi alla
più rigida interpretazione letterale: essa però s'inserisce in un
filone di ritorno alla rigorosa salvaguardia dell'immunità degli
Stati, che proprio recentemente la Gran Camera ha affermato con le tre
decisioni di rigetto del 21 novembre 2001 sui casi McElhinney contro
Irlanda, Al-Adsani contro Regno Unito e Fogarty contro Regno Unito.
Dal rispetto del principio par in parem non habet iurisdictionem (da
parte dello Stato contraente della Convenzione) è stata fatta
discendere, mediante l'obbligo di previo esperimento dei ricorsi
interni, l'impossibilità per la Corte europea di considerare
violate le prescrizioni del giusto processo (nei confronti dei
cittadini incapaci di ottenere ragione nei singoli ordinamenti
nazionali, nei confronti di Stati sovrani): quando poi, come è stato
nel secondo caso, lo Stato contraente s'è dimostrato incapace di
apprestare un rimedio giurisdizionale per un atto (tortura) avvenuto
al di fuori del suo territorio e del suo controllo (cioè in territorio
kuwaitita), la Corte ha confermato la legittimità della posizione
britannica dichiarando inesigibile dall'ordinamento nazionale una
sanzione della violazione avvenuta fuori del territorio nazionale.
Eppure, le potenzialità della giurisdizione della Corte europea erano
insite proprio nell'articolo 15: senza una deroga legittimamente
espressa dallo Stato parte, infatti, la Corte avrebbe potuto
pronunciarsi su atti extraterritoriali se li avesse considerati
rientranti all'interno della giurisdizione dello Stato parte. Il
quesito è lungi dall'essere ozioso, visto che dal 21 dicembre 2001
risulta apposta un'altra deroga ai sensi dell'articolo 15 della
Convenzione: è di fonte britannica e riguarda le procedure di arresto
senza processo a tempo indefinito previste dall'Anti-terrorism, Crime
and security Act a carico degli stranieri sospettati di terrorismo
internazionale (in base ad accuse segrete, valutate da un organo
giudiziario appositamente costituito dalle cui udienze la difesa può
essere esclusa). In un momento in cui la giurisdizione penale
ordinaria statunitense è "scavalcata" con decisione dell'Esecutivo -
di detenzione nella base di Guantanamo di sospetti complici nelle
stragi dell'undici settembre 2001, deferiti a tribunali militari
neocostituiti - un'analoga decisione di fonte britannica non potrebbe
valersi dell'eccezione di extraterritorialità delle azioni belliche o
di intelligence condotte in Afghanistan, proprio perché (almeno fino
all'insediamento del governo Karzai) il determinante appoggio
anglo-americano all'Alleanza del Nord ha rappresentato proprio quel
"controllo" globale (seppure indiretto) che per la sentenza Loizidou
attiva la giurisdizione dello Stato parte e ne rende le condotte
suscettibili di sindacato a Strasburgo.
La deroga apposta dal Governo Blair, quindi, non capita a caso, così
come non capita a caso la "svolta" della Corte in direzione del
maggior ossequio verso le determinazioni degli Stati. Vien quasi da
rimpiangere il periodo in cui l'aborrita "giurisdizione degli
esecutivi" (cioè la Commissione del Consiglio d'Europa, che prima del
1998 esercitava funzioni paragiurisdizionali) portò ad invalidare la
deroga espressa dalla Grecia dei colonnelli, negando che nel 1967 essa
versasse nel "pericolo pubblico che minacci la vita della nazione".
Nell'esprimersi sulla recentissima deroga britannica, è difficile che
la Corte si spinga con altrettanto coraggio a valutare l'esistenza in
concreto di codesto prerequisito, che (con la guerra) rappresenta la
condizione alla quale l'articolo 15 comma 1 ammette la facoltà di
prendere misure derogatorie della Convenzione, "nella stretta
misura in cui la situazione lo richieda ed a condizione che tali
misure non siano in contraddizione con gli altri obblighi derivanti
dal diritto internazionale".
E' questo il vero legame con il sistema dello ius gentium al quale la
Corte dovrebbe tendere: visto che tra l'altro il rinvio al diritto
umanitario di guerra rappresenta tutt'altro che una guarentigia
accordata unilateralmente per aumentare la possibilità che nemici
irriducibili e feroci la facciano franca. Proprio il comma 2
dell'articolo 15 della Convenzione fa salve le deroghe all'articolo 2
(diritto alla vita) che coprano decessi causati da "legittimi atti di
guerra": il timore che induce d'Oltreoceano a guardare con estremo
sospetto al Tribunale penale internazionale è, almeno per quanto
riguarda il sistema europeo di salvaguardia dei diritti umani, già
fugato da questa previsione. Gli è che le diplomazie degli Stati
paiono tornate ad un Ottocento unilateralista che le induce a
rifiutare di assoggettarsi allo scrutinio di un organo giurisdizionale
internazionale per dimostrare la legittimità di un atto di guerra: è
più facile apporre una riserva all'operatività della Convenzione
europea, o frapporre ostacoli all'entrata in funzione del Tribunale
penale internazionale, che rendere conto del motivo per il quale s'è
scelto di non passare per il Consiglio di sicurezza per adottare
misure coercitive che si sarebbero agevolmente potute autorizzare ai
sensi del capo VII della Carta delle Nazioni Unite.
SOCIJALISTIÈKA PARTIJA SRBIJE
VAS POZIVA NA VELIKI NARODNI PROTEST PROTIV
TZV. HA©KOG TRIBUNALA.
BEOGRAD 09. FEBRUAR 2002. GODINE
12 ÈASOVA
TRG REPUBLIKE
===*===
> http://www.sps.org.yu/aktuelno/2002/01/30-01.html
Predsednik Slobodan Milo¹eviæ u Hagu,
30. januara 2002. godine (stenogram)
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
Sabiranjem tri lazi ne dobija se istina
nego se samo uvecava laz.
Sve ove tri optuznice, zaista imaju jednu crvenu nit,
da upotrebim izraz koji sam ovde cuo, a ta crvena nit
je dugotrajni zlocin protiv Jugoslavije i protiv mog
naroda. Ovo je ovde, ocigledno, jedna velika
zloupotreba moci da bi se proizvela istorijska prevara
u kojoj ce, oni koji su se zalagali za ocuvanje
Jugoslavije, biti optuzeni za njeno razbijanje, oni
koji su branili zemlju biti optuzeni za zlocine, da bi
oni koji su se zalagali i izvrsili secesiju, koji su
se zalagali za separatizam do terorizma, bili
amnestirani, jer su iza njih stajale sile kojima je
bio cilj da uspostave kontrolu nad Balkanom, kako bi
sa te geostrateske tacke dalje uspostavljali kontrolu
u drugim pravcima.
Vi ovde govorite o tri povezane stvari, o tome smo
ovde culi, a setili su se autori tog tzv. plana o kome
govore sa takvom samouverenoscu da posle 10 godina
podnose tuzbe za Bosnu i Hrvatsku, koje su apsurdne,
koje su besmislene, pre svega, zato sto se citava
srpska politika, Srbija i ja licno, i u Hrvatskoj i u
Bosni bavila mirom, a ne ratom i sav svoj uticaj
upotrebila da sto pre dodje do mira.
Na samom pocetku sukoba u Hrvatskoj mi smo se zalagali
za politicko resenje, i na bazi tog zalaganja odmah su
uspostavljene zasticene zone Ujedinjenih nacija i
odmah smirena cela ta situacija. 24. marta 1992.
godine, pokojni hrvatski sef Tudjman uputio je poruku
naciji sa Trga Bana Jelacica u kojoj je rekao
doslovce: "Rata ne bi bilo da ga Hrvatska nije zelela,
ali mi smo procenili da samo tako mozemo ostvariti
samostalnost". Svakako da ne bi bilo rata da ga
Hrvatska nije zelela, a u tom ratu Srbija nije
ucestvovala kao zaracena strana, vec je to bio
unutrasnji sukob.
A zasto je Hrvatska zelela rat? Ne zato da bi hrvatski
narod koristio svoje pravo na samoopredeljenje i
otcepljenje, svakako ne zato (na primer, Makedonija je
koristila to pravo i izdvojila se iz Jugoslavije),
nego zato da bi postigla cilj da istera blizu pola
miliona Srba iz Hrvatske, pola miliona Srba iz Srpske
Krajine, u kojoj su vekovima ziveli svoj na svome, a
ne nikako kao uzurpatori.
Do dolaska te hrvatske vlasti koja je zelela taj rat i
koja je i objavila da ga je zelela, Hrvatska je imala
Ustav u kome je pisalo da je Hrvatska drzava hrvatskog
naroda, drzava srpskog naroda i drzava ostalih naroda
koji zive u Hrvatskoj. Taj je Ustav promenjen. Srbi su
izgubili pravo i status konstitutivnog naroda u
Hrvatskoj i pobunili se. U to vreme u Srbiji nije ni
postojala svest o tome da u nekom delu Hrvatske zive
Srbi.
Vi govorite o planu u kome je, uz podrsku Nemacke, vec
krajem 1991. godine doslo do prevremenog priznanja
Hrvatske, ne cekajuci politicka resenja, i izazivanja
sukoba u kojima je, ponavljam, Srbija imala samo
doprinos da se sto pre postigne mir. Pa nas nikada ni
hrvatsko rukovodstvo nije prozivalo za te sukobe, a
danas cujem ovde da je za to postojao nekakav plan. U
stvari, postojao je jasan plan protiv drzave koja je
bila, rekao bih, u ono vreme, model buduceg evropskog
federalizma. To je bila Jugoslavija u kojoj je vise
nacionalnosti bilo u jednom federalnom sistemu,
ostvarilo mogucnosti da zivi ravnopravno, da zivi
uspesno, da se razvija i da bude, rekao bih, citavom
svetu primer kako se moze zajedno ziveti.
Sve vreme smo se borili za Jugoslaviju, za ocuvanje
Jugoslavije. Na kraju krajeva, svaka cinjenica, u
stvari, samo dokazuje da je istina ovo sto ja govorim.
Jedino je Savezna Republika Jugoslavija, koja sada
postoji, zadrzala svoju nacionalnu strukturu. Tu nije
bilo nikakavih progona. Od pocetka do kraja
jugoslovenske krize. Sve druge republike su je
promenile. Iz Hrvatske je isterano pola miliona Srba,
poznato je sta se dogodilo u Bosni, da ne govorim i o
drugim krajevima Jugoslavije.
Prema tome, to je jedna, rekao bih, zlonamerna,
krajnje, neprijateljska aktivnost usmerena upravo da
opravda zlocin nad mojom zemljom i da ovaj sud
upotrebi kao sredstvo rata protiv moje zemlje i mog
naroda.
Pogledajte Bosnu i Hercegovinu, tamo smo od samog
pocetka nastojali da se obezbedi mir. sta se dogodilo
sa Kutiljerovim planom koji su svi podrzali? Na
inicijativu ambasadora Amerike, odbijen je od strane
Muslimana, a onda su zapoceti sukobi. Kako je to
Srbija mogla da bude optuzena za bilo sta u Bosni kada
se zna da smo sve mirovne sporazume, nastojeci da sav
uticaj iskoristimo upravo za mir, ne samo podrzali
nego nastojali da oni budu sprovedeni. 1993. godine
odrzan je u Atini susret na kome je potpisan
Vens-Ovenov plan. Potpisali su ga svi. Ja sam isao na
Pale zajedno sa Micotakisom i nekadasnjim predsednikom
Jugoslavije Dobricom ]osicem, gde smo se zalagali da
se taj plan prihvati. Nazalost, odbijen je 3. maja ili
5. maja, vise se ne secam, 1993. godine. Mi smo tada
cak uveli blokadu Republike Srpske da bismo naterali
tadasnje rukovodstvo da prihvati taj mirovni plan. To
je bila uloga Srbije - da nastoji da se prihvati mir.
I stalno smo isticali, jedina formula postizanja mira
u Bosni je formula koja ce podjednako zastiti interese
sva tri naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini, Srba, Muslimana
i Hrvata. Dejton je uspeo, zato sto je ta formula
prihvacena. Zato sto se nastojalo da se podjednako
zastite interesi sva tri naroda.
Sada ovde cujem da je Dejton trebalo da raspravlja o
Kosovu. To su besmislice. Dejtonski pregovori su
sazvani zbog mira u Bosni i Hercegovini, i nikome nije
padalo na pamet tada da otvara pitanje Kosova, koje je
unutrasnje pitanje Republike Srbije, i za koje niko
nije mogao da sanja da neko moze nastojati da
internacionalizuje. I ne mozete ni na kakav nacin, ni
Srbiju ni srpsku politiku da povezete ni sa kakvim
zlocinima, pogotovo ne da tuzite i sudite posle 10
godina za ono o cemu nikada niko nije prema nama
zauzimao bilo kakav drugi odnos, osim odnos respekta i
uvazavanja za ogromne mirovne napore koje smo u vezi
sa tamosnjim dogadjajima upravo mi ulagali. I Srbija u
celini i srpska politika.
Kada je u pitanju Bosna, da li znate da je 70 hiljada
muslimanskih izbeglica bilo u Srbiji za vreme sukoba u
Bosni? Da li mislite da neko zeli da izbegne iz svoje
kuce i da prebegne na teritoriju sa koje mu preti
opasnost. Koliko smo samo spasli zivota, koliko smo
vasih talaca isli da spasavamo po Bosni, od UN trupa
do pilota, i na koliko mirovnih sporazuma smo
insistirali i tako ih omogucili? I na kraju krajeva,
imali smo najvecu zaslugu za taj mir i postigli,
upravo zato, da se Dejton uspesno zavrsi.
Bio je to potpuni mir, jedna potpuna relaksacija, a
onda... Ja cu vam reci kako je pocelo Kosovo. Upravo
zato sto je postojao plan da se stavi pod kontrolu
teritorija Balkana, teritorija nekadasnje Jugoslavije,
pocelo je sa nastojanjem da se na Kosovu izvrsi
destabilizacija. Upravo onda kada je postalo jasno da
ce se sve zavrsiti na miran nacin.
U novembru 1997. godine odrzan je Samit Jugoistocne
Evrope na Kritu, svi smo bili na tom Samitu, sefovi
drzava i vlada Jugoistocne Evrope. Tada smo, upravo na
nasu inicijativu, veoma mnogo govorili o ukidanju
barijera, o ukidanju carina, o integracijama unutar
Jugoistocne Evrope i o unapredjenju saradnje. Ja sam
imao neposredan dijalog sa albanskim premijerom
Fatosom Nanoom. Govorili smo o normalizaciji odnosa, o
ukidanju viza, o ukidanju carina, o razvoju
saobracaja, trgovine i svega drugog. Fatos Nano i ja
smo izasli pred televizijske kamere i on je tada
rekao, uz sve ovo sto smo govorili o saradnji, o
razvoju odnosa - pitanje Kosova je unutrasnje pitanje
Republike Srbije. Sve je to obecavalo veliko
smirivanje, mirno resenje svih problema.
Upravo to je bio alarm za uzbunu onih sila koje su
nastavile da vrse zlocin nad mojom zemljom, koje su
nastojale da destabilizuju Jugoslaviju i da izvrse
intervenciju koju su izvrsili. Neposredno mesec ili
dva posle toga, stiglo je pismo Kinkela i Vedrina o
njihovoj zabrinutosti na stanje na Kosovu. Deset
godina do tog vremena, od vremena od kada vi tvrdite
da je Srbija preuzela kontrolu nad svojom sopstvenom
teritorijom, nikakvih ubistava, nikakvih progona,
nikakvih pljacki, nikakvih paljevina, nikakvih
hapsenja nije bilo na Kosovu. Mi nismo imali ni jednog
jedinog politickog zatvorenika u Jugoslaviji.
Nijednog. Na Kosovu je izlazilo 20 albanskih listova
na albanskom jeziku koje ste mogli da kupite na svakom
cosku. Nikada nijedan primerak nije bio zabranjen.
Delovale su slobodno albanske partije, ukljucujuci i
separatisticke partije. Neko je ovde rekao bili smo
tolerantni prema njima. Ne, nego smo smatrali da je
sve slobodno osim nasilja.
Onda su grcevito, ove sile koje stoje iza razbijanja
Jugoslavije i njene okupacije, okupile kriminalce po
Zapadnoj Evropi i poslale ih dole da organizuju
teroristicku organizaciju. Poceli su teroristicke
akcije od pocetka 1998. godine. I tada su krahirali.
Vec do jeseni 1998. godine oni su bili potpuno
eliminisani. Vracali su punim traktorima oruzje koje
su bili prokrijumcarili policiji.
A u tih godinu dana uglavnom su ubijali Albance. Ja
nemam precizne podatke da ovde iznesem pred javnost,
jer nisam ni znao da cu imati priliku da govorim
danas. Tek juce sam obavesten da treba danas da dodjem
ovde. Niti sam znao o cemu ce se razgovarati. Nemam
podatke da vam iznesem, ali cu vam reci ono sto znam.
Dva i po puta ...
KLOD ZORDA :
Gospodine Milosevicu, molim Vas dozvolite...
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
... vise su teroristi ubili Albanaca u 1998. godini
nego sto su ubili Srba. Ubijali su Albance koji su
bili policajci, koji su bili postari, koji su bili
sumari, koji su bili penzioneri - samo zato sto idu da
primaju drzavnu penziju. Dakle, nastojali su da zavedu
teror medju Albancima i da ubiju sto vise Srba. Mi smo
zastitili nase gradjane, i Srbe, i Albance, od
terorizma, i ta je akcija pala, njihova je akcija
suzbijena u jesen 1998. godine. A onda je dosao
Holbruk da trazi verifikacionu misiju kako bi se
napravio pretekst za napad na Jugoslaviju. A ja cu vam
reci.....
KLOD ZORDA:
Gospodine Milosevicu, dozvolite mi samo jedan minut.
Molim Vas. Samo jedan minut. Ja Vam necu oduzeti vreme
koje vam stoji na raspolaganju, ja cu Vam ga sigurno
dati. cak i ovaj Medjunarodni sud ciju legalnost vi
sporite, naravno daje Vam priliku da se u potpunosti
izjasnite. Meni se cini najpre da ste Vi spremni da se
sa sudjenjem pocne odmah i to cak danas, cini mi se.
Naravno, to Vam sluzi na cast. Vi ste spremni. No, ja
Vas moram vratiti mozda na to da biste... Molim Vas,
pokusajte da ne zaboravite u potpunosti pitanje o
kojem se razgovara. Mi nismo Vece koje ce voditi Vase
sudjenje. Mi smo dobro razumeli da je zapravo Vasa
ideja vodilja sasvim suprotna - da se radi o
legitimizaciji Vase zemlje, mi smo to culi i razumeli.
Ali bilo bi dobro, gospodine Milosevicu, da se ne
prevarite u pogledu Veca koje vodi sudjenje. Vi ste
iskoristili, Vi imate na raspolaganju isto vremena kao
i tuzilac. Ja kao predsednik ovoga Veca vam garantujem
to vreme. Molim Vas da se dakle ne prevarite u pogledu
teme o kojoj govorimo.
Vi dakle imate svoju tezu koju nastojite da branite i
Vi na to imate pravo i imacete to pravo. No, ja Vas
moram podsetiti da je ovo zalbeno Vece suoceno sa
jednim vaznim proceduralnim pitanjem, mozda ne Vama,
vec je vazno za nas, jer mi zapravo cuvamo norme
pravicnog i ravnopravnog postupka, mi zapravo zelimo
da znamo da li biste Vi zeleli da se sudjenje protiv
Vas vodi kao jedno sudjenje za Kosovo razdvojeno od
sudjenja za Bosnu i Hrvatsku ili bi Vam vise
odgovaralo da se to sve zajedno spoji. Ja naravno
razumem da cete nam Vi mozda zaobilaznim putem dati
odgovor na to pitanje. Ja cu vam naravno dati rec. Vi
ste zapravo optuzeni koji je pri sasvim dobrom
mentalnom zdravlju i pri dobrom stanju svesti. Ja Vas
molim da pokusate da odgovorite na ovo pitanje. Hvala
Vam unapred i sada opet imate rec.
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
Pre svega, ovo je prvi put da ne budem prekidan i da
mogu da nesto kazem, i ja cu svaku priliku koju budem
imao da se obratim javnosti u vezi sa zlocinom koji se
vrsi protiv moje zemlje koristiti da to uradim, i to
ne cinim zbog procedure, jer mene procedura ne zanima,
vec da bih odgovorio na napad koji se vrsi na moju
zemlju i moj narod i zlocin koji jos uvek traje. Ja
zelim da skrenem paznju javnosti, da je nakon agresije
......
KLOD ZORDA:
Sacekajte gospodine Milosevicu, dobro ste razumeli da
imate sve vreme na raspolaganju, ali da cete jos vise
vremena imati kada pocne sudjenje. Naravno to nije
predmet nase danasnje rasprave. Vi imate pravo da
nastavite sada ovo sto govorite. Ali Vi se zapravo
sada obracate ljudima izvan sudnice. Gospodine
Milosevicu, ja Vam moram reci da cete imati pravo da
se obratite javnosti. Medjunarodna zajednica je
stvorila ovo sudjenje i ja naravno zelim da sve sto se
odvija ovde, i da se pravila postupka koja su vazila i
za vas i za optuzbu, kao i za civilizaciju dobro i
pravilno postuju. Ova danasnja rasprave se zapravo
tice necega kako ce se zapravo voditi sudjenje pred
drugim vecem. Ja nemam nameru da Vas prekinem u ovome
sto govorite. Ja cu oduzeti vreme koje sam Vam oduzeo
u prekidima. Sada mozete nastaviti.
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
zelim da naglasim da zlocin koji je zapocet nad mojom
zemljom jos uvek traje. Poslednji Srbin za koga znam
da je ubijen na Kosovu, ubijen je ove godine na Bozic.
350.000 je isterano sa Kosova pod okriljem Ujedinjenih
nacija, pod zastitom teroristickih aktivnosti
albanskih terorista od strane Ujedinjenih nacija. Od
dolaska, navodno, zastitnih snaga Ujedinjenih nacija
koje su po Rezoluciji 1244 bile duzne da svakom
gradjaninu Kosova garantuju licnu i imovinsku
sigurnost i bezbednost. Albanski teroristi su pod
njihovom zastitom 350.000 ljudi isterali, vise
desetina hiljada kuca spalili. Nekada po 50, po 60,
nekada sve srpske kuce u selima, sve to pred ocima
trupa koje su ustvari okupacione trupe i dosle su
tamo, samo pod zastavom Ujedinjenih nacija, da bi se
preko noci pretvorile u okupacione trupe, i saveznike,
i nastavili da budu saveznici tih istih terorista koji
su toliko ljudi poklali, pobili, popalili. I dan
danas. I kazu da nisu imali u vidu da se to dogadja.
Da li neko moze da veruje da se nekoliko desetina
hiljada kuca zapali, a da snage koje su tamo ne vide
sta se dogadja? Da li neko moze da osteti i srusi, za
to vreme, dakle, od kada su tamo trupe Ujedinjenih
nacija, 107 srpskih crkava je sruseno? Da li neko moze
da srusi citavu zrkvu i zapali je, a da ne vide trupe
Ujedinjenih nacija?
Rec je, dakle, o udruzivanju radi zlocina sila koje su
izvrsile zlocin nad Jugoslavijom i terorista i
narkomafije albanskih terorista na Kosovu i Metohiji
da bi se izvrsio zlocin, ne samo nad Srbima, nego i
nad svim drugim nealbanskim stanovnistvom, ukljucujuci
cak i Albance katolike. Ali, ukljucujuci cak i Albance
koji su, na bilo kakav nacin, makar kazem i primanjem
penzije pokazali lojalnost prema Republici Srbiji kao
svojoj drzavi.
Ovim sto se tamo dogadja, prakticno se rehabilituje
politika iz vremena nacizma, Hitlera i Musolinija. Ova
velika galama o "Velikoj Srbiji", takozvanoj ideji
koja nikada nije postojala, galama o "Velikoj Srbiji"
se dize da bi se iza te galame i prasine pravila
"Velika Albanija" ista onakva kakvu su napravili
Hitler i Musolini u vreme Drugog svetskog rata.
Pogledajte tu semu i pogledajte ovo sto se sada radi,
sto zele da uzmu od Srbije, od Crne Gore, od
Makedonije, a sutra i od Severne Grcke - kada ponovo
budu zategli grcko-turske odnose na bazi diktata
zajednickog sefa - i to ce pitanje da resavaju.
Prema tome, ocigledno je da je rec o zlocinu i
ocigledno je da je crvena nit zlocin protiv
Jugoslavije. Ali, ja zelim da skrenem paznju na
cinjenicu da nije lako falsifikovati istorijske fakte.
Nije ih lako falsifikovati ni onda kada za njih zna
vrlo mali broj ljudi, a nemoguce ih je falsifikovati
kada za njih zna citav jedan narod, i narod jedne
zemlje, kada te fakte znaju milioni ljudi. Bez uvrede
bilo koga, sudije u ovom procesu po podeli uloga treba
da budu - ne vi koji imate sudijske mantije - nego oni
koji su odlucivali o ubijanju dece u mojoj zemlji,
koji su lansirali agresiju NATO pakta na moju zemlju,
koji su bacili 25 hiljada tona bombi za 78 dana i
pobili uglavnom starce, decu i zene. Oni to zele da
budu u podeli uloga, ali nece ni oni moci da budu
sudije.
Ovde je sudija narod, i ne samo narod Jugoslavije,
nego narodi svih zemalja kojima je stalo do slobode i
ravnopravnosti. Prema tome, ne kaze se uzalud: narodni
sud - bozji sud. Svi smo pred tim sudom, ne samo ja
koji ovde pokusava da se ucini odgovornim za nesto za
sta treba da dobije sva priznanja, nego i vi, ali i
vasi poslodavci, pogotovo oni koji su izvrsili zlocine
nad mojom zemljom.
I posto smatrate da treba da kazem nesto sto treba da
zahtevam od vas, ja zahtevam da me pustite na slobodu.
Zahtevam da me pustite na slobodu, jer je valjda i
vama i celom svetu jasno, da iz ove bitke koja se vodi
protiv moje zemlje i moga naroda, ja necu da pobegnem,
i da nemam nameru da pobegnem, i da to sto me drzite u
ovim nepristojnim uslovima ovde, zatvorenog, da bi
uskratili svaku mogucu ravnopravnost u iznosenju
argumenata, nece moci da sluzi na cast ovoj
instituciji, cak i kada bi bila legalna, a i sami
znate da nije legalna.
Jer da nemate tu sumnju - ne govorim sada vama licno
nego govorim o instituciji - onda biste prihvatili
zahtev vasih prijatelja suda koji ste sami imenovali,
da trazite savetodavno misljenje Medjunarodnog suda
pravde o legalitetu ovog suda. Medjutim, vi ga nista
trazili, jer ishod svako moze da pretpostavi.
Sve u svemu, smatram da, s obzirom na jedan ovako,
rekao bih, zlocinacki prilaz, u pokusaju da se zrtva
pretvori u krivca, i kada je rec o mome narodu i kada
je rec o mojoj drzavi, i kada je rec o meni licno,
koji dosad nije zabelezen, - smatram da bi bilo i
logicno i pravedno da me pustite na slobodu, a ja
pobeci necu i u svaku od ovih rasprava sam spreman da
udjem jer iz te bitke, svakako, ne bih smeo da
izostanem.
VAS POZIVA NA VELIKI NARODNI PROTEST PROTIV
TZV. HA©KOG TRIBUNALA.
BEOGRAD 09. FEBRUAR 2002. GODINE
12 ÈASOVA
TRG REPUBLIKE
===*===
> http://www.sps.org.yu/aktuelno/2002/01/30-01.html
Predsednik Slobodan Milo¹eviæ u Hagu,
30. januara 2002. godine (stenogram)
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
Sabiranjem tri lazi ne dobija se istina
nego se samo uvecava laz.
Sve ove tri optuznice, zaista imaju jednu crvenu nit,
da upotrebim izraz koji sam ovde cuo, a ta crvena nit
je dugotrajni zlocin protiv Jugoslavije i protiv mog
naroda. Ovo je ovde, ocigledno, jedna velika
zloupotreba moci da bi se proizvela istorijska prevara
u kojoj ce, oni koji su se zalagali za ocuvanje
Jugoslavije, biti optuzeni za njeno razbijanje, oni
koji su branili zemlju biti optuzeni za zlocine, da bi
oni koji su se zalagali i izvrsili secesiju, koji su
se zalagali za separatizam do terorizma, bili
amnestirani, jer su iza njih stajale sile kojima je
bio cilj da uspostave kontrolu nad Balkanom, kako bi
sa te geostrateske tacke dalje uspostavljali kontrolu
u drugim pravcima.
Vi ovde govorite o tri povezane stvari, o tome smo
ovde culi, a setili su se autori tog tzv. plana o kome
govore sa takvom samouverenoscu da posle 10 godina
podnose tuzbe za Bosnu i Hrvatsku, koje su apsurdne,
koje su besmislene, pre svega, zato sto se citava
srpska politika, Srbija i ja licno, i u Hrvatskoj i u
Bosni bavila mirom, a ne ratom i sav svoj uticaj
upotrebila da sto pre dodje do mira.
Na samom pocetku sukoba u Hrvatskoj mi smo se zalagali
za politicko resenje, i na bazi tog zalaganja odmah su
uspostavljene zasticene zone Ujedinjenih nacija i
odmah smirena cela ta situacija. 24. marta 1992.
godine, pokojni hrvatski sef Tudjman uputio je poruku
naciji sa Trga Bana Jelacica u kojoj je rekao
doslovce: "Rata ne bi bilo da ga Hrvatska nije zelela,
ali mi smo procenili da samo tako mozemo ostvariti
samostalnost". Svakako da ne bi bilo rata da ga
Hrvatska nije zelela, a u tom ratu Srbija nije
ucestvovala kao zaracena strana, vec je to bio
unutrasnji sukob.
A zasto je Hrvatska zelela rat? Ne zato da bi hrvatski
narod koristio svoje pravo na samoopredeljenje i
otcepljenje, svakako ne zato (na primer, Makedonija je
koristila to pravo i izdvojila se iz Jugoslavije),
nego zato da bi postigla cilj da istera blizu pola
miliona Srba iz Hrvatske, pola miliona Srba iz Srpske
Krajine, u kojoj su vekovima ziveli svoj na svome, a
ne nikako kao uzurpatori.
Do dolaska te hrvatske vlasti koja je zelela taj rat i
koja je i objavila da ga je zelela, Hrvatska je imala
Ustav u kome je pisalo da je Hrvatska drzava hrvatskog
naroda, drzava srpskog naroda i drzava ostalih naroda
koji zive u Hrvatskoj. Taj je Ustav promenjen. Srbi su
izgubili pravo i status konstitutivnog naroda u
Hrvatskoj i pobunili se. U to vreme u Srbiji nije ni
postojala svest o tome da u nekom delu Hrvatske zive
Srbi.
Vi govorite o planu u kome je, uz podrsku Nemacke, vec
krajem 1991. godine doslo do prevremenog priznanja
Hrvatske, ne cekajuci politicka resenja, i izazivanja
sukoba u kojima je, ponavljam, Srbija imala samo
doprinos da se sto pre postigne mir. Pa nas nikada ni
hrvatsko rukovodstvo nije prozivalo za te sukobe, a
danas cujem ovde da je za to postojao nekakav plan. U
stvari, postojao je jasan plan protiv drzave koja je
bila, rekao bih, u ono vreme, model buduceg evropskog
federalizma. To je bila Jugoslavija u kojoj je vise
nacionalnosti bilo u jednom federalnom sistemu,
ostvarilo mogucnosti da zivi ravnopravno, da zivi
uspesno, da se razvija i da bude, rekao bih, citavom
svetu primer kako se moze zajedno ziveti.
Sve vreme smo se borili za Jugoslaviju, za ocuvanje
Jugoslavije. Na kraju krajeva, svaka cinjenica, u
stvari, samo dokazuje da je istina ovo sto ja govorim.
Jedino je Savezna Republika Jugoslavija, koja sada
postoji, zadrzala svoju nacionalnu strukturu. Tu nije
bilo nikakavih progona. Od pocetka do kraja
jugoslovenske krize. Sve druge republike su je
promenile. Iz Hrvatske je isterano pola miliona Srba,
poznato je sta se dogodilo u Bosni, da ne govorim i o
drugim krajevima Jugoslavije.
Prema tome, to je jedna, rekao bih, zlonamerna,
krajnje, neprijateljska aktivnost usmerena upravo da
opravda zlocin nad mojom zemljom i da ovaj sud
upotrebi kao sredstvo rata protiv moje zemlje i mog
naroda.
Pogledajte Bosnu i Hercegovinu, tamo smo od samog
pocetka nastojali da se obezbedi mir. sta se dogodilo
sa Kutiljerovim planom koji su svi podrzali? Na
inicijativu ambasadora Amerike, odbijen je od strane
Muslimana, a onda su zapoceti sukobi. Kako je to
Srbija mogla da bude optuzena za bilo sta u Bosni kada
se zna da smo sve mirovne sporazume, nastojeci da sav
uticaj iskoristimo upravo za mir, ne samo podrzali
nego nastojali da oni budu sprovedeni. 1993. godine
odrzan je u Atini susret na kome je potpisan
Vens-Ovenov plan. Potpisali su ga svi. Ja sam isao na
Pale zajedno sa Micotakisom i nekadasnjim predsednikom
Jugoslavije Dobricom ]osicem, gde smo se zalagali da
se taj plan prihvati. Nazalost, odbijen je 3. maja ili
5. maja, vise se ne secam, 1993. godine. Mi smo tada
cak uveli blokadu Republike Srpske da bismo naterali
tadasnje rukovodstvo da prihvati taj mirovni plan. To
je bila uloga Srbije - da nastoji da se prihvati mir.
I stalno smo isticali, jedina formula postizanja mira
u Bosni je formula koja ce podjednako zastiti interese
sva tri naroda u Bosni i Hercegovini, Srba, Muslimana
i Hrvata. Dejton je uspeo, zato sto je ta formula
prihvacena. Zato sto se nastojalo da se podjednako
zastite interesi sva tri naroda.
Sada ovde cujem da je Dejton trebalo da raspravlja o
Kosovu. To su besmislice. Dejtonski pregovori su
sazvani zbog mira u Bosni i Hercegovini, i nikome nije
padalo na pamet tada da otvara pitanje Kosova, koje je
unutrasnje pitanje Republike Srbije, i za koje niko
nije mogao da sanja da neko moze nastojati da
internacionalizuje. I ne mozete ni na kakav nacin, ni
Srbiju ni srpsku politiku da povezete ni sa kakvim
zlocinima, pogotovo ne da tuzite i sudite posle 10
godina za ono o cemu nikada niko nije prema nama
zauzimao bilo kakav drugi odnos, osim odnos respekta i
uvazavanja za ogromne mirovne napore koje smo u vezi
sa tamosnjim dogadjajima upravo mi ulagali. I Srbija u
celini i srpska politika.
Kada je u pitanju Bosna, da li znate da je 70 hiljada
muslimanskih izbeglica bilo u Srbiji za vreme sukoba u
Bosni? Da li mislite da neko zeli da izbegne iz svoje
kuce i da prebegne na teritoriju sa koje mu preti
opasnost. Koliko smo samo spasli zivota, koliko smo
vasih talaca isli da spasavamo po Bosni, od UN trupa
do pilota, i na koliko mirovnih sporazuma smo
insistirali i tako ih omogucili? I na kraju krajeva,
imali smo najvecu zaslugu za taj mir i postigli,
upravo zato, da se Dejton uspesno zavrsi.
Bio je to potpuni mir, jedna potpuna relaksacija, a
onda... Ja cu vam reci kako je pocelo Kosovo. Upravo
zato sto je postojao plan da se stavi pod kontrolu
teritorija Balkana, teritorija nekadasnje Jugoslavije,
pocelo je sa nastojanjem da se na Kosovu izvrsi
destabilizacija. Upravo onda kada je postalo jasno da
ce se sve zavrsiti na miran nacin.
U novembru 1997. godine odrzan je Samit Jugoistocne
Evrope na Kritu, svi smo bili na tom Samitu, sefovi
drzava i vlada Jugoistocne Evrope. Tada smo, upravo na
nasu inicijativu, veoma mnogo govorili o ukidanju
barijera, o ukidanju carina, o integracijama unutar
Jugoistocne Evrope i o unapredjenju saradnje. Ja sam
imao neposredan dijalog sa albanskim premijerom
Fatosom Nanoom. Govorili smo o normalizaciji odnosa, o
ukidanju viza, o ukidanju carina, o razvoju
saobracaja, trgovine i svega drugog. Fatos Nano i ja
smo izasli pred televizijske kamere i on je tada
rekao, uz sve ovo sto smo govorili o saradnji, o
razvoju odnosa - pitanje Kosova je unutrasnje pitanje
Republike Srbije. Sve je to obecavalo veliko
smirivanje, mirno resenje svih problema.
Upravo to je bio alarm za uzbunu onih sila koje su
nastavile da vrse zlocin nad mojom zemljom, koje su
nastojale da destabilizuju Jugoslaviju i da izvrse
intervenciju koju su izvrsili. Neposredno mesec ili
dva posle toga, stiglo je pismo Kinkela i Vedrina o
njihovoj zabrinutosti na stanje na Kosovu. Deset
godina do tog vremena, od vremena od kada vi tvrdite
da je Srbija preuzela kontrolu nad svojom sopstvenom
teritorijom, nikakvih ubistava, nikakvih progona,
nikakvih pljacki, nikakvih paljevina, nikakvih
hapsenja nije bilo na Kosovu. Mi nismo imali ni jednog
jedinog politickog zatvorenika u Jugoslaviji.
Nijednog. Na Kosovu je izlazilo 20 albanskih listova
na albanskom jeziku koje ste mogli da kupite na svakom
cosku. Nikada nijedan primerak nije bio zabranjen.
Delovale su slobodno albanske partije, ukljucujuci i
separatisticke partije. Neko je ovde rekao bili smo
tolerantni prema njima. Ne, nego smo smatrali da je
sve slobodno osim nasilja.
Onda su grcevito, ove sile koje stoje iza razbijanja
Jugoslavije i njene okupacije, okupile kriminalce po
Zapadnoj Evropi i poslale ih dole da organizuju
teroristicku organizaciju. Poceli su teroristicke
akcije od pocetka 1998. godine. I tada su krahirali.
Vec do jeseni 1998. godine oni su bili potpuno
eliminisani. Vracali su punim traktorima oruzje koje
su bili prokrijumcarili policiji.
A u tih godinu dana uglavnom su ubijali Albance. Ja
nemam precizne podatke da ovde iznesem pred javnost,
jer nisam ni znao da cu imati priliku da govorim
danas. Tek juce sam obavesten da treba danas da dodjem
ovde. Niti sam znao o cemu ce se razgovarati. Nemam
podatke da vam iznesem, ali cu vam reci ono sto znam.
Dva i po puta ...
KLOD ZORDA :
Gospodine Milosevicu, molim Vas dozvolite...
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
... vise su teroristi ubili Albanaca u 1998. godini
nego sto su ubili Srba. Ubijali su Albance koji su
bili policajci, koji su bili postari, koji su bili
sumari, koji su bili penzioneri - samo zato sto idu da
primaju drzavnu penziju. Dakle, nastojali su da zavedu
teror medju Albancima i da ubiju sto vise Srba. Mi smo
zastitili nase gradjane, i Srbe, i Albance, od
terorizma, i ta je akcija pala, njihova je akcija
suzbijena u jesen 1998. godine. A onda je dosao
Holbruk da trazi verifikacionu misiju kako bi se
napravio pretekst za napad na Jugoslaviju. A ja cu vam
reci.....
KLOD ZORDA:
Gospodine Milosevicu, dozvolite mi samo jedan minut.
Molim Vas. Samo jedan minut. Ja Vam necu oduzeti vreme
koje vam stoji na raspolaganju, ja cu Vam ga sigurno
dati. cak i ovaj Medjunarodni sud ciju legalnost vi
sporite, naravno daje Vam priliku da se u potpunosti
izjasnite. Meni se cini najpre da ste Vi spremni da se
sa sudjenjem pocne odmah i to cak danas, cini mi se.
Naravno, to Vam sluzi na cast. Vi ste spremni. No, ja
Vas moram vratiti mozda na to da biste... Molim Vas,
pokusajte da ne zaboravite u potpunosti pitanje o
kojem se razgovara. Mi nismo Vece koje ce voditi Vase
sudjenje. Mi smo dobro razumeli da je zapravo Vasa
ideja vodilja sasvim suprotna - da se radi o
legitimizaciji Vase zemlje, mi smo to culi i razumeli.
Ali bilo bi dobro, gospodine Milosevicu, da se ne
prevarite u pogledu Veca koje vodi sudjenje. Vi ste
iskoristili, Vi imate na raspolaganju isto vremena kao
i tuzilac. Ja kao predsednik ovoga Veca vam garantujem
to vreme. Molim Vas da se dakle ne prevarite u pogledu
teme o kojoj govorimo.
Vi dakle imate svoju tezu koju nastojite da branite i
Vi na to imate pravo i imacete to pravo. No, ja Vas
moram podsetiti da je ovo zalbeno Vece suoceno sa
jednim vaznim proceduralnim pitanjem, mozda ne Vama,
vec je vazno za nas, jer mi zapravo cuvamo norme
pravicnog i ravnopravnog postupka, mi zapravo zelimo
da znamo da li biste Vi zeleli da se sudjenje protiv
Vas vodi kao jedno sudjenje za Kosovo razdvojeno od
sudjenja za Bosnu i Hrvatsku ili bi Vam vise
odgovaralo da se to sve zajedno spoji. Ja naravno
razumem da cete nam Vi mozda zaobilaznim putem dati
odgovor na to pitanje. Ja cu vam naravno dati rec. Vi
ste zapravo optuzeni koji je pri sasvim dobrom
mentalnom zdravlju i pri dobrom stanju svesti. Ja Vas
molim da pokusate da odgovorite na ovo pitanje. Hvala
Vam unapred i sada opet imate rec.
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
Pre svega, ovo je prvi put da ne budem prekidan i da
mogu da nesto kazem, i ja cu svaku priliku koju budem
imao da se obratim javnosti u vezi sa zlocinom koji se
vrsi protiv moje zemlje koristiti da to uradim, i to
ne cinim zbog procedure, jer mene procedura ne zanima,
vec da bih odgovorio na napad koji se vrsi na moju
zemlju i moj narod i zlocin koji jos uvek traje. Ja
zelim da skrenem paznju javnosti, da je nakon agresije
......
KLOD ZORDA:
Sacekajte gospodine Milosevicu, dobro ste razumeli da
imate sve vreme na raspolaganju, ali da cete jos vise
vremena imati kada pocne sudjenje. Naravno to nije
predmet nase danasnje rasprave. Vi imate pravo da
nastavite sada ovo sto govorite. Ali Vi se zapravo
sada obracate ljudima izvan sudnice. Gospodine
Milosevicu, ja Vam moram reci da cete imati pravo da
se obratite javnosti. Medjunarodna zajednica je
stvorila ovo sudjenje i ja naravno zelim da sve sto se
odvija ovde, i da se pravila postupka koja su vazila i
za vas i za optuzbu, kao i za civilizaciju dobro i
pravilno postuju. Ova danasnja rasprave se zapravo
tice necega kako ce se zapravo voditi sudjenje pred
drugim vecem. Ja nemam nameru da Vas prekinem u ovome
sto govorite. Ja cu oduzeti vreme koje sam Vam oduzeo
u prekidima. Sada mozete nastaviti.
PREDSEDNIK SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC:
zelim da naglasim da zlocin koji je zapocet nad mojom
zemljom jos uvek traje. Poslednji Srbin za koga znam
da je ubijen na Kosovu, ubijen je ove godine na Bozic.
350.000 je isterano sa Kosova pod okriljem Ujedinjenih
nacija, pod zastitom teroristickih aktivnosti
albanskih terorista od strane Ujedinjenih nacija. Od
dolaska, navodno, zastitnih snaga Ujedinjenih nacija
koje su po Rezoluciji 1244 bile duzne da svakom
gradjaninu Kosova garantuju licnu i imovinsku
sigurnost i bezbednost. Albanski teroristi su pod
njihovom zastitom 350.000 ljudi isterali, vise
desetina hiljada kuca spalili. Nekada po 50, po 60,
nekada sve srpske kuce u selima, sve to pred ocima
trupa koje su ustvari okupacione trupe i dosle su
tamo, samo pod zastavom Ujedinjenih nacija, da bi se
preko noci pretvorile u okupacione trupe, i saveznike,
i nastavili da budu saveznici tih istih terorista koji
su toliko ljudi poklali, pobili, popalili. I dan
danas. I kazu da nisu imali u vidu da se to dogadja.
Da li neko moze da veruje da se nekoliko desetina
hiljada kuca zapali, a da snage koje su tamo ne vide
sta se dogadja? Da li neko moze da osteti i srusi, za
to vreme, dakle, od kada su tamo trupe Ujedinjenih
nacija, 107 srpskih crkava je sruseno? Da li neko moze
da srusi citavu zrkvu i zapali je, a da ne vide trupe
Ujedinjenih nacija?
Rec je, dakle, o udruzivanju radi zlocina sila koje su
izvrsile zlocin nad Jugoslavijom i terorista i
narkomafije albanskih terorista na Kosovu i Metohiji
da bi se izvrsio zlocin, ne samo nad Srbima, nego i
nad svim drugim nealbanskim stanovnistvom, ukljucujuci
cak i Albance katolike. Ali, ukljucujuci cak i Albance
koji su, na bilo kakav nacin, makar kazem i primanjem
penzije pokazali lojalnost prema Republici Srbiji kao
svojoj drzavi.
Ovim sto se tamo dogadja, prakticno se rehabilituje
politika iz vremena nacizma, Hitlera i Musolinija. Ova
velika galama o "Velikoj Srbiji", takozvanoj ideji
koja nikada nije postojala, galama o "Velikoj Srbiji"
se dize da bi se iza te galame i prasine pravila
"Velika Albanija" ista onakva kakvu su napravili
Hitler i Musolini u vreme Drugog svetskog rata.
Pogledajte tu semu i pogledajte ovo sto se sada radi,
sto zele da uzmu od Srbije, od Crne Gore, od
Makedonije, a sutra i od Severne Grcke - kada ponovo
budu zategli grcko-turske odnose na bazi diktata
zajednickog sefa - i to ce pitanje da resavaju.
Prema tome, ocigledno je da je rec o zlocinu i
ocigledno je da je crvena nit zlocin protiv
Jugoslavije. Ali, ja zelim da skrenem paznju na
cinjenicu da nije lako falsifikovati istorijske fakte.
Nije ih lako falsifikovati ni onda kada za njih zna
vrlo mali broj ljudi, a nemoguce ih je falsifikovati
kada za njih zna citav jedan narod, i narod jedne
zemlje, kada te fakte znaju milioni ljudi. Bez uvrede
bilo koga, sudije u ovom procesu po podeli uloga treba
da budu - ne vi koji imate sudijske mantije - nego oni
koji su odlucivali o ubijanju dece u mojoj zemlji,
koji su lansirali agresiju NATO pakta na moju zemlju,
koji su bacili 25 hiljada tona bombi za 78 dana i
pobili uglavnom starce, decu i zene. Oni to zele da
budu u podeli uloga, ali nece ni oni moci da budu
sudije.
Ovde je sudija narod, i ne samo narod Jugoslavije,
nego narodi svih zemalja kojima je stalo do slobode i
ravnopravnosti. Prema tome, ne kaze se uzalud: narodni
sud - bozji sud. Svi smo pred tim sudom, ne samo ja
koji ovde pokusava da se ucini odgovornim za nesto za
sta treba da dobije sva priznanja, nego i vi, ali i
vasi poslodavci, pogotovo oni koji su izvrsili zlocine
nad mojom zemljom.
I posto smatrate da treba da kazem nesto sto treba da
zahtevam od vas, ja zahtevam da me pustite na slobodu.
Zahtevam da me pustite na slobodu, jer je valjda i
vama i celom svetu jasno, da iz ove bitke koja se vodi
protiv moje zemlje i moga naroda, ja necu da pobegnem,
i da nemam nameru da pobegnem, i da to sto me drzite u
ovim nepristojnim uslovima ovde, zatvorenog, da bi
uskratili svaku mogucu ravnopravnost u iznosenju
argumenata, nece moci da sluzi na cast ovoj
instituciji, cak i kada bi bila legalna, a i sami
znate da nije legalna.
Jer da nemate tu sumnju - ne govorim sada vama licno
nego govorim o instituciji - onda biste prihvatili
zahtev vasih prijatelja suda koji ste sami imenovali,
da trazite savetodavno misljenje Medjunarodnog suda
pravde o legalitetu ovog suda. Medjutim, vi ga nista
trazili, jer ishod svako moze da pretpostavi.
Sve u svemu, smatram da, s obzirom na jedan ovako,
rekao bih, zlocinacki prilaz, u pokusaju da se zrtva
pretvori u krivca, i kada je rec o mome narodu i kada
je rec o mojoj drzavi, i kada je rec o meni licno,
koji dosad nije zabelezen, - smatram da bi bilo i
logicno i pravedno da me pustite na slobodu, a ja
pobeci necu i u svaku od ovih rasprava sam spreman da
udjem jer iz te bitke, svakako, ne bih smeo da
izostanem.
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/yugoslaviainfo/message/3723
Copyright 2002 Associated Newspapers Ltd.
MAIL ON SUNDAY
February 3, 2002
HEADLINE: ELLIE, 20, WAS RAPED BY 300 MEN IN KOSOVO AFTER BEING
KIDNAPPED. SHE IS ONE OF COUNTLESS VICTIMS, SOME AS YOUNG AS 13, OF A
GROTESQUE 21ST CENTURY TRADE IN SEX SLAVES.
HER TORMENTORS? PEACEKEEPERS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS...
BY: BOB GRAHAM
SHE will never know the names of the hundreds of men who raped her.
As
Ellie Milutinovic lay on her back she closed her eyes and tried to
shut her mind to the savage reality of her ordeal - for her rapists
were the men who had been sent on a humanitarian mission in the name
of Britain, America, Europe and the rest of the civilised world.
Each time Ellie, a trainee nurse, from Belgrade, was forced to have
sex with another 'client' she saw the uniforms and the emblems of the
United Nations and K-FOR soldiers.
The men - of many nationalities - can have had no doubt that they
were
raping this 20-year-old girl who wanted to be a children's nurse.
To those who could speak English she made it clear: 'I am being held
as a prisoner.' Others, unable to understand or unwilling to hear her
desperate pleas, saw only the tears as they had their way with her.
The men each paid 100 Deutschmarks (about GBP 30) to have sex with
Ellie, although she received none of it. Each time she was forced to
submit to one of the K-FOR soldiers or contract work-ers, or one of
the UN police officers, it was against her wishes.
Ellie - and countless hundreds of other young women, some as young as
13 - are part of the shocking 21st Century white slave trade that has
forced them into prostitution in Kosovo.
The UN humanitarian effort to restore peace and freedom to the area -
after Nato's bombing campaign ended in June 1999 - is being
undermined
by the collective turning of blind eyes to the extent of this vile
human trade.
Ellie, the daughter of a professional footballer, was kidnapped 18
months ago and raped over a period of nine months before escaping
last
March to a British-controlled zone.
Her life was then threatened as she was due to give evidence in court
in the Kosovan capital, Pristina, against the men who had kidnapped
and abused her.
She was provided with round-the-clock security and worked as a UN
interpreter for the British. When the case ended, she was given a new
life in the West as part of an unofficial witness protection
programme.
In Britain she received help in piecing together her shattered life
and now has a new identity. She plans to settle in a small town in
southern Germany and pick up her studies as a nurse.
Ellie, her voice still quivering, remembers every detail of the
humiliation: 'Each day the nightmare of what happened comes into my
head. Even when I'm here, in this safe little community, I close my
eyes and see the faces of the men.
'I know I must be very careful because there are people out there who
are looking for me.
'My suffering will always be with me. Here, I am isolated. I will
always be running away.'
In Kosovo the majority of the sex trade involves women, like Ellie,
who have been kidnapped or duped by the promise of a better job, then
sold into a life of sexual slavery.
The girls are mainly from poverty-ridden former Communist states such
as Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The pimps are
part of a giant web of organised crime gangs.
Although the UN administration enacted new laws to prohibit
trafficking of women in January, the reality is there have been few
prosecutions and those that have taken place have been tainted by
accusations of corruption.
Inside the sleazy bars and nightclubs that have sprung up throughout
Kosovo in the past two years, the scene seldom changes, with the
dimmed red lights, loud music, cheap booze and the girls - often
semi-comatose from being drugged - draped over the men who have
become
known locally as 'The Internationals'.
OFFICIALLY, the UN, K-FOR and international aid agencies have
produced
lists of bars and clubs banned to the international brigade.
Kristine Brubacher, a Canadian police officer who headed the
Trafficking and Prostitution Unit set up by the UN to target the
bars,
admitted: 'The Internationals have created and contributed to the
problem because they bring in so much money to what was previously a
very poor region. Because of the money, thousands of girls are now
forced to work in prostitution.
'By the time they end up in Kosovo they will have been beaten, raped
repeatedly and imprisoned.
'Their pimp has their home address and their travel documents. They
are told that if they try to escape they will be beaten or killed and
their families back home will suffer.'
Much of the trade centres around addresses in Belgrade. There, girls
are paraded in front of potential buyers - Serbs, Albanians,
Macedonians and Montenegrin organised crime groups. Britons have been
among those invited to 'view and test the girls'.
The Trafficking and Prostitution Unit, backed up by armed Military
Police, frequently raid the banned bars. However, on several raids on
which I accompanied them, K-FOR personnel found in them were given a
quiet lecture and told to leave.
In a staggering double standard, the focus of attention is on
prosecuting bar owners and the girls.
Only on rare occasions are the details of The Internationals
revealed.
Last year, a senior British Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew
Buxton, a married 43-year-old father of two, was caught in a grubby
brothel which police intelligence files showed included girls who had
been trafficked.
Buxton, a liaison officer with the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of
Fusiliers, was immediately relieved of his duties in Kosovo and
returned to the UK.
A spokesman for the Army refused to disclose what action had been
taken against Buxton.
In Kosovo, where K-FOR has 39 countries supplying more than 44,000
soldiers - nearly ten per cent of them from Britain - guidelines on
'brothels and prostitution' have been issued to all contributing
countries. Additionally, there are 7,000-plus UN staff as well as
workers with more than 260 western aid agencies.
K-FOR spokesman Squadron Leader Roy Brown said: 'Any involvement of
K-FOR personnel with the victims of trafficking or prostitution that
is brought to our attention, will be thoroughly investigated.'
However, the publicly stated policy is not matched by performance. I
have seen state-ments taken from girls rescued from brothels which
indicate how they have been forcibly taken into K-FOR camps.
The statements point to widespread abuse of trafficked women by K-FOR
soldiers - particularly the 3,000-plus Russian K-FOR troops -
including occasions when girls were imprisoned inside the Russian
camp. Despite the K-FOR edict, Russian camps have not been searched,
nor have Russian soldiers been questioned about the accusations.
The reason for the lack of intervention is because it is 'politically
too sensitive' to do so.
But Ellie Milutinovic's case highlighted the extent of the K-FOR
abuse. After being kidnapped in a street near her Belgrade home,
Ellie
emerged from her drug-induced sleep and was raped before being told
she had been sold to a bar owner for 4,000 Deutschmarks (GBP 1,250)
to
work as a prostitute. If she refused, she was told, she would be
killed.
'We were taken to a place near Devic Skenderaj, to the Russian
military camp there.
'Two Russian soldiers came into a tent and told us to take off our
clothes. They had sex with us, then we were forced to have sex with
lots of soldiers. Twenty had sex with me.
'I could not believe what was happening to me, my mind had stopped
working. I could not eat or drink. I thought of escaping but I knew
they would kill me.
'The men were Internationals - Africans, Asians, a Pakistani who was
a
senior officer, and Russian soldiers including one who had three
stars
on his uniform. These men should be the ones helping me.
'I did not believe I could trust the police because there were police
officers who came in and had sex with us, knowing we were being held
as prisoners.'
Ellie estimates she was forced to have sex with at least 300 men
during the six weeks she was held - almost every one of them an
International. None of them, she says, was British.
When, eventually, she was rescued by a team of British police
officers, she agreed to give evidence in court against the five men
who had trafficked and abused her. It was the first case to be tried
under the new trafficking regulations in Kosovo.
But it was a case tainted by scandal with one of the accused offering
the international prosecutor, Peter Korneck, a 500,000 Deutschmark
(GBP 150,000) bribe to drop the charges. He refused it.
TWO days after the men - three Serbs and two Kosovars and all known
members of a crime gang - were found guilty and jailed for a total of
11 years, a local judge ordered their release 'pending an appeal'.
The likelihood of the five returning to court is small.
Ellie said: 'After the war I thought there would be better times.
Then
I was kidnapped and the nightmare just got worse. But the British
soldiers treated me well and with respect. It helped me build trust
again in people and in men.'
Today, Ellie still longs to return home but realises it is impossible
and is surprisingly pragmatic. 'I know it cannot be,' she says.
'Maybe
it's right I should not think of the past because when I do, it is of
the many men. I must only think of the future and try to forget.'
When, eventually, she was rescued by a team of British police
officers, she agreed to give evidence in court against the five men
who had trafficked and abused her. It was the first case to be tried
under the new trafficking regulations in Kosovo.
Copyright 2002 Associated Newspapers Ltd.
MAIL ON SUNDAY
February 3, 2002
HEADLINE: ELLIE, 20, WAS RAPED BY 300 MEN IN KOSOVO AFTER BEING
KIDNAPPED. SHE IS ONE OF COUNTLESS VICTIMS, SOME AS YOUNG AS 13, OF A
GROTESQUE 21ST CENTURY TRADE IN SEX SLAVES.
HER TORMENTORS? PEACEKEEPERS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS...
BY: BOB GRAHAM
SHE will never know the names of the hundreds of men who raped her.
As
Ellie Milutinovic lay on her back she closed her eyes and tried to
shut her mind to the savage reality of her ordeal - for her rapists
were the men who had been sent on a humanitarian mission in the name
of Britain, America, Europe and the rest of the civilised world.
Each time Ellie, a trainee nurse, from Belgrade, was forced to have
sex with another 'client' she saw the uniforms and the emblems of the
United Nations and K-FOR soldiers.
The men - of many nationalities - can have had no doubt that they
were
raping this 20-year-old girl who wanted to be a children's nurse.
To those who could speak English she made it clear: 'I am being held
as a prisoner.' Others, unable to understand or unwilling to hear her
desperate pleas, saw only the tears as they had their way with her.
The men each paid 100 Deutschmarks (about GBP 30) to have sex with
Ellie, although she received none of it. Each time she was forced to
submit to one of the K-FOR soldiers or contract work-ers, or one of
the UN police officers, it was against her wishes.
Ellie - and countless hundreds of other young women, some as young as
13 - are part of the shocking 21st Century white slave trade that has
forced them into prostitution in Kosovo.
The UN humanitarian effort to restore peace and freedom to the area -
after Nato's bombing campaign ended in June 1999 - is being
undermined
by the collective turning of blind eyes to the extent of this vile
human trade.
Ellie, the daughter of a professional footballer, was kidnapped 18
months ago and raped over a period of nine months before escaping
last
March to a British-controlled zone.
Her life was then threatened as she was due to give evidence in court
in the Kosovan capital, Pristina, against the men who had kidnapped
and abused her.
She was provided with round-the-clock security and worked as a UN
interpreter for the British. When the case ended, she was given a new
life in the West as part of an unofficial witness protection
programme.
In Britain she received help in piecing together her shattered life
and now has a new identity. She plans to settle in a small town in
southern Germany and pick up her studies as a nurse.
Ellie, her voice still quivering, remembers every detail of the
humiliation: 'Each day the nightmare of what happened comes into my
head. Even when I'm here, in this safe little community, I close my
eyes and see the faces of the men.
'I know I must be very careful because there are people out there who
are looking for me.
'My suffering will always be with me. Here, I am isolated. I will
always be running away.'
In Kosovo the majority of the sex trade involves women, like Ellie,
who have been kidnapped or duped by the promise of a better job, then
sold into a life of sexual slavery.
The girls are mainly from poverty-ridden former Communist states such
as Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The pimps are
part of a giant web of organised crime gangs.
Although the UN administration enacted new laws to prohibit
trafficking of women in January, the reality is there have been few
prosecutions and those that have taken place have been tainted by
accusations of corruption.
Inside the sleazy bars and nightclubs that have sprung up throughout
Kosovo in the past two years, the scene seldom changes, with the
dimmed red lights, loud music, cheap booze and the girls - often
semi-comatose from being drugged - draped over the men who have
become
known locally as 'The Internationals'.
OFFICIALLY, the UN, K-FOR and international aid agencies have
produced
lists of bars and clubs banned to the international brigade.
Kristine Brubacher, a Canadian police officer who headed the
Trafficking and Prostitution Unit set up by the UN to target the
bars,
admitted: 'The Internationals have created and contributed to the
problem because they bring in so much money to what was previously a
very poor region. Because of the money, thousands of girls are now
forced to work in prostitution.
'By the time they end up in Kosovo they will have been beaten, raped
repeatedly and imprisoned.
'Their pimp has their home address and their travel documents. They
are told that if they try to escape they will be beaten or killed and
their families back home will suffer.'
Much of the trade centres around addresses in Belgrade. There, girls
are paraded in front of potential buyers - Serbs, Albanians,
Macedonians and Montenegrin organised crime groups. Britons have been
among those invited to 'view and test the girls'.
The Trafficking and Prostitution Unit, backed up by armed Military
Police, frequently raid the banned bars. However, on several raids on
which I accompanied them, K-FOR personnel found in them were given a
quiet lecture and told to leave.
In a staggering double standard, the focus of attention is on
prosecuting bar owners and the girls.
Only on rare occasions are the details of The Internationals
revealed.
Last year, a senior British Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew
Buxton, a married 43-year-old father of two, was caught in a grubby
brothel which police intelligence files showed included girls who had
been trafficked.
Buxton, a liaison officer with the 2nd Battalion Royal Regiment of
Fusiliers, was immediately relieved of his duties in Kosovo and
returned to the UK.
A spokesman for the Army refused to disclose what action had been
taken against Buxton.
In Kosovo, where K-FOR has 39 countries supplying more than 44,000
soldiers - nearly ten per cent of them from Britain - guidelines on
'brothels and prostitution' have been issued to all contributing
countries. Additionally, there are 7,000-plus UN staff as well as
workers with more than 260 western aid agencies.
K-FOR spokesman Squadron Leader Roy Brown said: 'Any involvement of
K-FOR personnel with the victims of trafficking or prostitution that
is brought to our attention, will be thoroughly investigated.'
However, the publicly stated policy is not matched by performance. I
have seen state-ments taken from girls rescued from brothels which
indicate how they have been forcibly taken into K-FOR camps.
The statements point to widespread abuse of trafficked women by K-FOR
soldiers - particularly the 3,000-plus Russian K-FOR troops -
including occasions when girls were imprisoned inside the Russian
camp. Despite the K-FOR edict, Russian camps have not been searched,
nor have Russian soldiers been questioned about the accusations.
The reason for the lack of intervention is because it is 'politically
too sensitive' to do so.
But Ellie Milutinovic's case highlighted the extent of the K-FOR
abuse. After being kidnapped in a street near her Belgrade home,
Ellie
emerged from her drug-induced sleep and was raped before being told
she had been sold to a bar owner for 4,000 Deutschmarks (GBP 1,250)
to
work as a prostitute. If she refused, she was told, she would be
killed.
'We were taken to a place near Devic Skenderaj, to the Russian
military camp there.
'Two Russian soldiers came into a tent and told us to take off our
clothes. They had sex with us, then we were forced to have sex with
lots of soldiers. Twenty had sex with me.
'I could not believe what was happening to me, my mind had stopped
working. I could not eat or drink. I thought of escaping but I knew
they would kill me.
'The men were Internationals - Africans, Asians, a Pakistani who was
a
senior officer, and Russian soldiers including one who had three
stars
on his uniform. These men should be the ones helping me.
'I did not believe I could trust the police because there were police
officers who came in and had sex with us, knowing we were being held
as prisoners.'
Ellie estimates she was forced to have sex with at least 300 men
during the six weeks she was held - almost every one of them an
International. None of them, she says, was British.
When, eventually, she was rescued by a team of British police
officers, she agreed to give evidence in court against the five men
who had trafficked and abused her. It was the first case to be tried
under the new trafficking regulations in Kosovo.
But it was a case tainted by scandal with one of the accused offering
the international prosecutor, Peter Korneck, a 500,000 Deutschmark
(GBP 150,000) bribe to drop the charges. He refused it.
TWO days after the men - three Serbs and two Kosovars and all known
members of a crime gang - were found guilty and jailed for a total of
11 years, a local judge ordered their release 'pending an appeal'.
The likelihood of the five returning to court is small.
Ellie said: 'After the war I thought there would be better times.
Then
I was kidnapped and the nightmare just got worse. But the British
soldiers treated me well and with respect. It helped me build trust
again in people and in men.'
Today, Ellie still longs to return home but realises it is impossible
and is surprisingly pragmatic. 'I know it cannot be,' she says.
'Maybe
it's right I should not think of the past because when I do, it is of
the many men. I must only think of the future and try to forget.'
When, eventually, she was rescued by a team of British police
officers, she agreed to give evidence in court against the five men
who had trafficked and abused her. It was the first case to be tried
under the new trafficking regulations in Kosovo.
URL for this article:
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/menzies.htm
www.tenc.net * [Emperor's Clothes]
=======================================
Brokered by a Top U.S. Official:
TERRORIST TO BE KOSOVO'S 'PREMIER'
From BETA wire service
[Posted 26 January 2002]
=======================================
[EMPEROR'S CLOTHES NOTE: If you think
you've seen everything, check out the
dispatch from the BETA wire service,
posted below.
In the midst of the infinite war
against terrorism, John Menzies, top
U.S. official in Pristina, capital of the
Serbian province of Kosovo, has arranged
a deal appointing a KLA terrorist to be
the so-called Premier of Kosovo.
How can the U.S. foreign policy
Establishment expect to get away with
this open endorsement of terrorism?
Actually it's quite simple. Although
BBC WorldWide Monitoring has posted
transcripts of Albanian secessionist
sources reporting that Menzies was
trying to arrange such a deal, not one
important English-language news source
has at this time (2 AM ET, 26 January)
reported that Menzies pulled it off.
The motto of our brave new Empire might
be: an uninformed people is a placid people.
The dispatch from the BETA wire service
refers to the Democratic [sic!] Party
of Kosovo (DPK). The DPK is one of two
parties formed from factions of the
terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
Keep in mind that these same
terrorists are continuing to attack
southern Serbia and Macedonia, and
assassinate Serbs and others in Kosovo.
(1) & (2)
The DPK is the party of Mr. Hacim
Thaci's faction. The other KLA party is
called the Alliance for the Future of
Kosovo. It is led by Ramush (or Ramus)
Haradinaj, who participated in Mr.
Menzies' meeting in Pristina, discussed
in the BETA dispatch.
Haradinaj is infamous for the bombing
of the Panda Cafe in Pec in December
1999. Haradinaj's KLA opened fire on
the Cafe, machine gunning six Serbian
teenagers. (3)
If you are distressed that this deal,
giving Thaci's party the post of
Premier of Kosovo, was arranged by the
top U.S. official in Kosovo - you
should be. Alas this is nothing new.
The U.S. has been using Kosovo
secessionists, including the KLA, to
destabilize the Balkans for years. (4)
& (5)
-- Jared Israel ]
BETA DAILY NEWS
January 24
ALBANIAN LEADERS IN KOSOVO REACH
AGREEMENT ON DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES.
[EC Note: The following is the full
text of the BETA dispatch concerning
the agreement.]
An agreement was reached in the U.S.
office in Pristina on the distribution
of top political duties in the
province, BETA learned from unofficial
sources.
According to the sources, leaders of
the three strongest Kosovo parties had
talks with the head of the U.S. office
in Pristina John Menzies on Jan. 22
and 23, about ending the political
crisis in Kosovo.
Besides Menzies, the meeting was
attended by the president of the Democratic
Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) Ibrahim
Rugova, Fatmir Limaj and Hajredin Kuci
of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK),
and by the president of the Alliance
for the Future of Kosovo Ramus Haradinaj.
Sources close to the participants of
the meeting said that the DSK gave up
on the duty of Kosovo premier and agreed
that this position belongs to the DPK,
which won 26 seats in the Kosovo
assembly.
According to BETA's sources, the DSK
still requested that the premier be
proposed by assembly speaker Nexhat
Daci and not directly by the DPK.
So far the DSK had offered five
ministerial positions to its partners,
two deputy premierships and one deputy
assembly speaker post, which the DPK and
the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
rejected.
According to the new agreement, the DSK
will take the office of Kosovo
president and assembly speaker. If the
DPK is to supply the premier, the
party will then have only one minister
in the future Kosovo government.
Out of nine portfolios in the future
cabinet, seven will be controlled by
Albanian parties. Meanwhile, Kosovo
Albanian leaders are under great pressure
by representatives of the international
community in Pristina to appoint top
officials of the interim administration.
(c) BETA 2002 - Posted for Fair Use Only
For full dispatch from which the
section concerning this meeting was
taken, see
http://www.google.com/search?q=
cache:544iejN9TsQC:www.beta.co.yu/vestieng.asp+
beta+thaci+menzies&hl=en
***
Emperor's Clothes Urgently Needs
Your Help!
[See Below]
Please feel free to
re-post our material, but please quote
our words rather than paraphrasing.
Please credit the author(s) if you use
our work. And please give the
article's Web address so people can
check the documentation.
FOOTNOTES:
* 'Afghan Operation Leaves Russia
'Encircled' by US-NATO'
by Sergey Ptichkin and Aleksey
Chichkin. Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/encircle.htm
1) 'How NATO and the UN Sponsor
Terrorists in Kosovo'
by Jared Israel and Rick Rozoff Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/nocrime.htm
2) 'Dragoljub Markovic, Murdered by
NATO Terrorists on Orthodox Christmas'
by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/dragoljub.htm
3) Regarding both the slaughter in the
Panda Cafe and the current
British/U.S. policy of grooming the KLA
terrorists in the disguise of
humanitarian, democratic politicians,
see 'Which Terrorists Are Worse?
Al Qaeda? Or the KLA?' by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/kla-aq.htm
4) In 'The Cat is Out of the Bag,' we
quote Western media sources to confirm
that the U.S. Establishment used the
so-called Kosovo Verification Mission
in the fall of 1998 to reorganize the
Kosovo Liberation Army, attempting to
create a more effective terrorist force.
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/ciaaided.htm
This is U.S. strategy is brilliantly
explained by Kosovo Archivist Cedomir
Prlincevic in the interview, 'Why
Albanians Fled During the NATO Bombing,' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/keys.htm
This is must reading for
anyone who would understand a) the
Balkans and b) the skill with which
U.S. covert operations manipulate ethnic
groups for geopolitical ends.
(5) 'Articles Documenting the U.S./NATO
Assault on Macedonia,' can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/mac/list-m.htm
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This Website is mirrored at
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http://emperors-clothes.com/news/menzies.htm
www.tenc.net * [Emperor's Clothes]
=======================================
Brokered by a Top U.S. Official:
TERRORIST TO BE KOSOVO'S 'PREMIER'
From BETA wire service
[Posted 26 January 2002]
=======================================
[EMPEROR'S CLOTHES NOTE: If you think
you've seen everything, check out the
dispatch from the BETA wire service,
posted below.
In the midst of the infinite war
against terrorism, John Menzies, top
U.S. official in Pristina, capital of the
Serbian province of Kosovo, has arranged
a deal appointing a KLA terrorist to be
the so-called Premier of Kosovo.
How can the U.S. foreign policy
Establishment expect to get away with
this open endorsement of terrorism?
Actually it's quite simple. Although
BBC WorldWide Monitoring has posted
transcripts of Albanian secessionist
sources reporting that Menzies was
trying to arrange such a deal, not one
important English-language news source
has at this time (2 AM ET, 26 January)
reported that Menzies pulled it off.
The motto of our brave new Empire might
be: an uninformed people is a placid people.
The dispatch from the BETA wire service
refers to the Democratic [sic!] Party
of Kosovo (DPK). The DPK is one of two
parties formed from factions of the
terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
Keep in mind that these same
terrorists are continuing to attack
southern Serbia and Macedonia, and
assassinate Serbs and others in Kosovo.
(1) & (2)
The DPK is the party of Mr. Hacim
Thaci's faction. The other KLA party is
called the Alliance for the Future of
Kosovo. It is led by Ramush (or Ramus)
Haradinaj, who participated in Mr.
Menzies' meeting in Pristina, discussed
in the BETA dispatch.
Haradinaj is infamous for the bombing
of the Panda Cafe in Pec in December
1999. Haradinaj's KLA opened fire on
the Cafe, machine gunning six Serbian
teenagers. (3)
If you are distressed that this deal,
giving Thaci's party the post of
Premier of Kosovo, was arranged by the
top U.S. official in Kosovo - you
should be. Alas this is nothing new.
The U.S. has been using Kosovo
secessionists, including the KLA, to
destabilize the Balkans for years. (4)
& (5)
-- Jared Israel ]
BETA DAILY NEWS
January 24
ALBANIAN LEADERS IN KOSOVO REACH
AGREEMENT ON DISTRIBUTION OF DUTIES.
[EC Note: The following is the full
text of the BETA dispatch concerning
the agreement.]
An agreement was reached in the U.S.
office in Pristina on the distribution
of top political duties in the
province, BETA learned from unofficial
sources.
According to the sources, leaders of
the three strongest Kosovo parties had
talks with the head of the U.S. office
in Pristina John Menzies on Jan. 22
and 23, about ending the political
crisis in Kosovo.
Besides Menzies, the meeting was
attended by the president of the Democratic
Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) Ibrahim
Rugova, Fatmir Limaj and Hajredin Kuci
of the Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK),
and by the president of the Alliance
for the Future of Kosovo Ramus Haradinaj.
Sources close to the participants of
the meeting said that the DSK gave up
on the duty of Kosovo premier and agreed
that this position belongs to the DPK,
which won 26 seats in the Kosovo
assembly.
According to BETA's sources, the DSK
still requested that the premier be
proposed by assembly speaker Nexhat
Daci and not directly by the DPK.
So far the DSK had offered five
ministerial positions to its partners,
two deputy premierships and one deputy
assembly speaker post, which the DPK and
the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
rejected.
According to the new agreement, the DSK
will take the office of Kosovo
president and assembly speaker. If the
DPK is to supply the premier, the
party will then have only one minister
in the future Kosovo government.
Out of nine portfolios in the future
cabinet, seven will be controlled by
Albanian parties. Meanwhile, Kosovo
Albanian leaders are under great pressure
by representatives of the international
community in Pristina to appoint top
officials of the interim administration.
(c) BETA 2002 - Posted for Fair Use Only
For full dispatch from which the
section concerning this meeting was
taken, see
http://www.google.com/search?q=
cache:544iejN9TsQC:www.beta.co.yu/vestieng.asp+
beta+thaci+menzies&hl=en
***
Emperor's Clothes Urgently Needs
Your Help!
[See Below]
Please feel free to
re-post our material, but please quote
our words rather than paraphrasing.
Please credit the author(s) if you use
our work. And please give the
article's Web address so people can
check the documentation.
FOOTNOTES:
* 'Afghan Operation Leaves Russia
'Encircled' by US-NATO'
by Sergey Ptichkin and Aleksey
Chichkin. Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/encircle.htm
1) 'How NATO and the UN Sponsor
Terrorists in Kosovo'
by Jared Israel and Rick Rozoff Can be read at
http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/nocrime.htm
2) 'Dragoljub Markovic, Murdered by
NATO Terrorists on Orthodox Christmas'
by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/dragoljub.htm
3) Regarding both the slaughter in the
Panda Cafe and the current
British/U.S. policy of grooming the KLA
terrorists in the disguise of
humanitarian, democratic politicians,
see 'Which Terrorists Are Worse?
Al Qaeda? Or the KLA?' by Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/kla-aq.htm
4) In 'The Cat is Out of the Bag,' we
quote Western media sources to confirm
that the U.S. Establishment used the
so-called Kosovo Verification Mission
in the fall of 1998 to reorganize the
Kosovo Liberation Army, attempting to
create a more effective terrorist force.
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/ciaaided.htm
This is U.S. strategy is brilliantly
explained by Kosovo Archivist Cedomir
Prlincevic in the interview, 'Why
Albanians Fled During the NATO Bombing,' at
http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/keys.htm
This is must reading for
anyone who would understand a) the
Balkans and b) the skill with which
U.S. covert operations manipulate ethnic
groups for geopolitical ends.
(5) 'Articles Documenting the U.S./NATO
Assault on Macedonia,' can be read at
http://www.emperors-clothes.com/mac/list-m.htm
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Data: 05/02/2002 21:57
Da: Vladimir Krsljanin
Oggetto: Borislav Milosevic: Intervju o "intervjuu"
Sovjetska Rusija, 5. februar 2002.
Pre nekoliko dana se u listu "Izvestija" pojavio "ekskluzivni
intervju" Slobodana Milosevica koji je on navodno tajno dao dopisniku
ITAR-TASS u Italiji Olegu Osipovu. Duboku sumnju izazivaju kako sadrzaj
"intervjua" tako i okolnosti njegovog pojavljivanja. Zato je "Sovjetska
Rusija" odlucila da se obrati coveku koji, po svoj prilici, moze
najkompetentnije suditi o njegovoj verodostojnosti. To je Borislav
Milosevic - brat bivseg predsednika Savezne Republike Jugoslavije.
P. Borislave Svetozarevicu, citali ste "intervju" Slobodana
Milosevica u "Izvestijama". Koliko Vam se cini verodostojnim?
O. To je vrlo cudna prica. "Intervju" je navodno dobijen preko
"pres-sluzbe umerenog lidera kosovskih Albanaca I. Rugove". Kakva
kojestarija. Izmedju S. Milosevica i I. Rugove nikad nije bilo tako
prijateljskih odnosa da bi se sad odjednom Rugova pozabavio
organizacijom "tajnog intervjua".
Dalje sledi jos zakukuljenije. "Intervju" je navodno bio moguc
samo uz koriscenje sredstava "iz arsenala agenta 007" uz primenu
nekih tamo "sicusnih mikrocipova" koje koriste zapadne
specijalne sluzbe. To je jos veca kojestarija. Slobodan je pod
tako strogom kontrolom da je nemoguce koristiti bilo
kakve "mikrocipove". Svi njegovi telefonski razgovori se
zvanicno snimaju. On je pod neprestanom prismotrom pomocu videokamera
i infracrvenih kamera. Pokusaj sugerisanja citaocima da je u takvim
uslovima moguc nekakav tajni intervju - to je racunanje na sasvim
naivne ljude.
P. A koliko se moze smatrati verodostojnim sadrzaj tog teksta?
O. Ocigledno ga je napisao covek koji se nikad nije sreo sa
Slobodanom, pa cak nije citao ni njegove clanke i nastupe. "Ja sam
simbol istocnoevropskog sveta", "vodim dnevnik da bih potomcima preneo
lucu istorije zapaljenu svescu Srba". Tako kitnjast stil apsolutno nije
svojstven Slobodanu Milosevicu. Dovoljno je procitati njegove nastupe u
natovskom "tribunalu", objavljene u "Sovjetskoj Rusiji", da bi se
shvatilo da je "intervju" napisan stilom koji mu je apsolutno stran.
Jos jednom ponavljam: oni koji su pripremali taj falsifikat cak nisu
nasli za shodno ni da se upoznaju s radovima S. Milosevica. "Intervju"
sadrzi mnogo svakojakih gluposti koje, medjutim, uopste nisu bezazlene.
P. Zasto je, po Vasem misljenju, sve to pokrenuto?
O. Pocnimo od toga da list "Izvestija" u predgovoru tog
"intervjua" izliva bujicu blacenja i laznih optuzbi na S. Milosevica.
Vec iz toga se moze steci slika o zamisli te provokacije. Ima nekoliko
mogucih razloga. Glavni je u tome sto se natovski "tribunal" suocava sa
znatnim problemima. On ne raspolaze dokazima krivice S. Milosevica za
zlocine koji mu se pripisuju. A kroz nedelju dana, 12. februara,
pocinje glavno sudjenje.
Zato se izvodi svojevrsna "propagandna artiljerijska priprema". Sve to
je uobicajeni postupak zapadnih "zastitnika ljudskih prava": javna
glasila iznose najnezamislivije optuzbe i blate coveka. Teze da
ga "satanizuju" (kako to sami nazivaju) da bi javnost prihvatila
najmonstruozniju osudu.
Takvim falsifikatima pokuzavaju da uguse njegove prave izjave u haskom
"tribunalu", koje se izmedju ostalog objavljuju i u "Sovjetskoj Rusiji".
Drugo. U svetu jacaju sumnje u zakonitost samog "Medjunarodnog
tribunala". Sve vise ljudi, pa i poznatih strucnjaka za medjunarodno
pravo, smatra da je nelegalno stvoren. "Tribunal" je nastao po odluci
Saveta bezbednosti OUN. Medjutim, po Povelji OUN Savet bezbednosti nema
pravo da formira sudske organe. Poznati francuski advokat Zak Verzes je
bukvalno prekjuce u jednosatnom radio-intervjuu taj "tribunal"
pretvorio u prah i pepeo, dokazavsi njegovu nelegalnost. Veliko je
pitanje i oko izvora finansiranja "tribunala", od kojih znatan deo
stize iz "privatnih izvora".
Mnogi pravnici osudjuju i "samouspostavljanje" proceduralnih normi
"tribunala" koje mu dozvoljavaju koriscenje, na primer, anonimnih
svedoka.
Pa to je najgrublje krsenje opsteprihvacenih pravnih normi. Cak ni u
nacistickim sudovima nije bilo anonimnih svedoka.
Uzged, imam podatke da se i rukovodstvo Rusije prema delatnosti
"tribunala" odnosi bez preteranog entuzijazma. Ministarstvo inostranih
poslova Rusije postavlja svojim zapadnim partnerima pitanje skorog
zavrsetka delatnosti "tribunala".
P. Moguce da su na Zapadu nervozni zbog propalog pokusaja da se
svetskom javnom mnjenju nametne predstava o bivsem predsedniku
Jugoslavije kao o "zlocincu"?
O. Potpuno tacno. Medjunarodna kampanja podrske Slobodanu
Milosevicu poprima zaista svetski karakter. Ona se vrlo aktivno vodi u
Zapadnoj Evropi i u SAD. Medjunarodni komitet za odbranu Slobodana
Milosevica podneo je tuzbu Evropskom sudu za ljudska prava zbog
kriminalne otmice S. Milosevica iz Beograda po porudzbini "tribunala".
U mnogim zemljama se odrzavaju mitinzi i protestne demonstracije. U
Hagu ce 12. februara poceti sudski proces protiv "tribunala" na
inicijativu holandskog pravnika koji optuzuje "tribunal" za
organizaciju otmice S. Milosevica.
Nedavno je grupa deputata Drzavne Dume - clanova Parlamentarne
skupstine Saveta Evrope zvanicno pred PSSE postavila pitanje o
mnogobrojnim krsenjima zakona u "slucaju Slobodana Milosevica". Takvo
pismo je, sa potpisima G. A. Zjuganova, I. I. Meljnjikova i deputata
parlamenta jos sest evropskih zemalja, upuceno Komitetu PSSE za pravna
pitanja i ljudska prava.
Medjutim, sve cesce se pojavljuju dokazi o povezanosti albanskih
naoruzanih separatista i terorista na Kosovu sa medjunarodnom
teroristickom mrezom Osame bin Ladena. Zapravo, i sam Slobodan
Milosevic je jos pre nekoliko godina o tome govorio zvanicnim
predstavnicima SAD. Sada, u jeku "antiteroristicke kampanje" Zapad bi
morao da prizna da se S. Milosevic u stvari borio sa medjunarodnim
terorizmom. A to se SAD i njihovim saveznicima uopste ne isplati. Jer,
ispostavlja se da su, podrzavajuci kosovske ekstremiste, podrzavali
terorizam. Zato se takve skrabotine i javljaju da bi se paznja svetske
javnosti odvratila od umesanosti Zapada u teror.
P. Zar ne iskljucujete mogucnost da se iza tog "intervjua" kriju
jos zloslutniji motivi od onih koje ste naveli?
O. Ne, ne iskljucujem. Vrlo je moguce da taj "intervju" treba da
pripremi teren za optuzbu Slobodana Milosevica za grubo krsenje
zatvorskih pravila i za ostro ogranicavanje njegovih prava, izmedju
ostalog i na kontakte s porodicom i pravnicima.
Istovremeno bih zeleo da obratim paznju na onaj deo tog
"intervjua" u kome S. Milosevic navodno karakterise svoje stanje
kao "visece uz bojazljivu nadu". Slobodan je po prirodi borac. I to je
svima dobro poznato. Medjutim, zapadna stampa i politicari vec odavno
svima sugerisu misao da je Slobodan navodno sklon samoubistvu. Svako ko
ga poznaje ili ga je prosto video na TV ekranu u akciji, tokom haske
sudanije, zna da je spreman za borbu u najtezim uslovima. Medjutim,
stalno nam podmecu ideju o "samoubistvu" da bi opravdali moguci fizicki
obracun s njim u slucaju kraha sudanije.
P. Vratimo se ipak izvorima: ITAR-TASS-u i listu "Izvestija".
Zasto se taj "ekskluzivni intervju" pojavio bas u Rusiji?
O. S velikim postovanjem se odnosim prema ITAR-TASS. To je jedna
od pet vodecih svetskih agencija. Pa i "Izvestija" su novine vrlo
ugledne proslosti. Zato me narocito cudi sto dozvoljavaju da ih koriste
za tudju i prilicno primitivnu provokaciju. Jer, taj "intervju" je
odmah preneo citav niz jugoslovenskih listova. Ocigledno se racunalo na
to da ce u Jugoslaviji vise verovati informacijama koje poticu iz
Rusije. Za zaljenje je sto je list "Izvestija" odlucio da publikuje
takvu jeftinu laz i to jos sa predgovorom urednistva koji protivureci
opstepoznatim cinjenicama. Jer, cak i Zapadna glasila cesto
objektivnije i odmerenije ocenjuju situaciju oko haskog procesa.
Uzgred, pre jedno tri nedelje se pojavila vest da su u
Jugoslaviji uhapseni bivsi lideri bosanskih Srba R. Karadzic i R.
Mladic, za kojima takodje traga natovski "tribunal". To saopstenje,
koje je izazvalo burno negodovanje u Jugoslaviji, pripisano je
predsedniku Kostunici. Bio je prinudjen da to specijalno demantuje.
Informacija je poticala iz ITAR-TASS i takodje je (navodno!) bila
dobijena od pres-sluzbe I. Rugove. To vec nikako nije slucajno.
P. Da li je, po Vasem misljenju, taj "interjvu" jednokratna
akcija ili deo sire kampanje?
O. To je deo siroke klevetnicke kampanje protiv S. Milosevica i
njegove porodice koja se vec preko 10 godina vodi. Licno sam 1993.
godine u Parizu video ulicne plakate sa likom S. Milosevica pored ....
Hitlera.
Kampanja lazi protiv njega bukne svaki put uoci nekih vaznih dogadjaja.
Tako je bilo 1995. godine kada je S. Milosevic vodio razgovore o
uspostavljanju mira u Bosni. Tada su ga u zapadnim glasilima u tolikoj
meri blatili da je svojim americkim partnerima izjavio da ce napustiti
razgovore ukoliko moralna ucena ne prestane. Ali, Slobodan sada ima
manje mogucnosti za odbranu od klevetnickih optuzbi. Inicijatori
provokacije to i koriste. Sada je u Jugoslaviji pocelo objavljivanje
izvesnih "stenograma telefonskih razgovora" koje je navodno hrvatska
obavestajna sluzba prisluskivala i snimila 1996-1998. godine. Jos jedan
falsifikat.
P. Svakako da bi bilo krajnje interesantno i vazno cuti
misljenje samog Slobodana Milosevica o ovome.
O. Bukvalno juce sam razgovarao telefonom sa njim. Taj
"intervju" je kod njega izazvao ironican osmeh.
Razgovarao V. Tetjokin
To join or help this struggle, visit:
http://www.sps.org.yu/ (official SPS website)
http://www.belgrade-forum.org/ (forum for the world of equals)
http://www.icdsm.org/ (the international committee to defend Slobodan
Milosevic)
http://www.jutarnje.co.yu/ ('morning news' the only Serbian newspaper
advocating liberation)
Da: Vladimir Krsljanin
Oggetto: Borislav Milosevic: Intervju o "intervjuu"
Sovjetska Rusija, 5. februar 2002.
Pre nekoliko dana se u listu "Izvestija" pojavio "ekskluzivni
intervju" Slobodana Milosevica koji je on navodno tajno dao dopisniku
ITAR-TASS u Italiji Olegu Osipovu. Duboku sumnju izazivaju kako sadrzaj
"intervjua" tako i okolnosti njegovog pojavljivanja. Zato je "Sovjetska
Rusija" odlucila da se obrati coveku koji, po svoj prilici, moze
najkompetentnije suditi o njegovoj verodostojnosti. To je Borislav
Milosevic - brat bivseg predsednika Savezne Republike Jugoslavije.
P. Borislave Svetozarevicu, citali ste "intervju" Slobodana
Milosevica u "Izvestijama". Koliko Vam se cini verodostojnim?
O. To je vrlo cudna prica. "Intervju" je navodno dobijen preko
"pres-sluzbe umerenog lidera kosovskih Albanaca I. Rugove". Kakva
kojestarija. Izmedju S. Milosevica i I. Rugove nikad nije bilo tako
prijateljskih odnosa da bi se sad odjednom Rugova pozabavio
organizacijom "tajnog intervjua".
Dalje sledi jos zakukuljenije. "Intervju" je navodno bio moguc
samo uz koriscenje sredstava "iz arsenala agenta 007" uz primenu
nekih tamo "sicusnih mikrocipova" koje koriste zapadne
specijalne sluzbe. To je jos veca kojestarija. Slobodan je pod
tako strogom kontrolom da je nemoguce koristiti bilo
kakve "mikrocipove". Svi njegovi telefonski razgovori se
zvanicno snimaju. On je pod neprestanom prismotrom pomocu videokamera
i infracrvenih kamera. Pokusaj sugerisanja citaocima da je u takvim
uslovima moguc nekakav tajni intervju - to je racunanje na sasvim
naivne ljude.
P. A koliko se moze smatrati verodostojnim sadrzaj tog teksta?
O. Ocigledno ga je napisao covek koji se nikad nije sreo sa
Slobodanom, pa cak nije citao ni njegove clanke i nastupe. "Ja sam
simbol istocnoevropskog sveta", "vodim dnevnik da bih potomcima preneo
lucu istorije zapaljenu svescu Srba". Tako kitnjast stil apsolutno nije
svojstven Slobodanu Milosevicu. Dovoljno je procitati njegove nastupe u
natovskom "tribunalu", objavljene u "Sovjetskoj Rusiji", da bi se
shvatilo da je "intervju" napisan stilom koji mu je apsolutno stran.
Jos jednom ponavljam: oni koji su pripremali taj falsifikat cak nisu
nasli za shodno ni da se upoznaju s radovima S. Milosevica. "Intervju"
sadrzi mnogo svakojakih gluposti koje, medjutim, uopste nisu bezazlene.
P. Zasto je, po Vasem misljenju, sve to pokrenuto?
O. Pocnimo od toga da list "Izvestija" u predgovoru tog
"intervjua" izliva bujicu blacenja i laznih optuzbi na S. Milosevica.
Vec iz toga se moze steci slika o zamisli te provokacije. Ima nekoliko
mogucih razloga. Glavni je u tome sto se natovski "tribunal" suocava sa
znatnim problemima. On ne raspolaze dokazima krivice S. Milosevica za
zlocine koji mu se pripisuju. A kroz nedelju dana, 12. februara,
pocinje glavno sudjenje.
Zato se izvodi svojevrsna "propagandna artiljerijska priprema". Sve to
je uobicajeni postupak zapadnih "zastitnika ljudskih prava": javna
glasila iznose najnezamislivije optuzbe i blate coveka. Teze da
ga "satanizuju" (kako to sami nazivaju) da bi javnost prihvatila
najmonstruozniju osudu.
Takvim falsifikatima pokuzavaju da uguse njegove prave izjave u haskom
"tribunalu", koje se izmedju ostalog objavljuju i u "Sovjetskoj Rusiji".
Drugo. U svetu jacaju sumnje u zakonitost samog "Medjunarodnog
tribunala". Sve vise ljudi, pa i poznatih strucnjaka za medjunarodno
pravo, smatra da je nelegalno stvoren. "Tribunal" je nastao po odluci
Saveta bezbednosti OUN. Medjutim, po Povelji OUN Savet bezbednosti nema
pravo da formira sudske organe. Poznati francuski advokat Zak Verzes je
bukvalno prekjuce u jednosatnom radio-intervjuu taj "tribunal"
pretvorio u prah i pepeo, dokazavsi njegovu nelegalnost. Veliko je
pitanje i oko izvora finansiranja "tribunala", od kojih znatan deo
stize iz "privatnih izvora".
Mnogi pravnici osudjuju i "samouspostavljanje" proceduralnih normi
"tribunala" koje mu dozvoljavaju koriscenje, na primer, anonimnih
svedoka.
Pa to je najgrublje krsenje opsteprihvacenih pravnih normi. Cak ni u
nacistickim sudovima nije bilo anonimnih svedoka.
Uzged, imam podatke da se i rukovodstvo Rusije prema delatnosti
"tribunala" odnosi bez preteranog entuzijazma. Ministarstvo inostranih
poslova Rusije postavlja svojim zapadnim partnerima pitanje skorog
zavrsetka delatnosti "tribunala".
P. Moguce da su na Zapadu nervozni zbog propalog pokusaja da se
svetskom javnom mnjenju nametne predstava o bivsem predsedniku
Jugoslavije kao o "zlocincu"?
O. Potpuno tacno. Medjunarodna kampanja podrske Slobodanu
Milosevicu poprima zaista svetski karakter. Ona se vrlo aktivno vodi u
Zapadnoj Evropi i u SAD. Medjunarodni komitet za odbranu Slobodana
Milosevica podneo je tuzbu Evropskom sudu za ljudska prava zbog
kriminalne otmice S. Milosevica iz Beograda po porudzbini "tribunala".
U mnogim zemljama se odrzavaju mitinzi i protestne demonstracije. U
Hagu ce 12. februara poceti sudski proces protiv "tribunala" na
inicijativu holandskog pravnika koji optuzuje "tribunal" za
organizaciju otmice S. Milosevica.
Nedavno je grupa deputata Drzavne Dume - clanova Parlamentarne
skupstine Saveta Evrope zvanicno pred PSSE postavila pitanje o
mnogobrojnim krsenjima zakona u "slucaju Slobodana Milosevica". Takvo
pismo je, sa potpisima G. A. Zjuganova, I. I. Meljnjikova i deputata
parlamenta jos sest evropskih zemalja, upuceno Komitetu PSSE za pravna
pitanja i ljudska prava.
Medjutim, sve cesce se pojavljuju dokazi o povezanosti albanskih
naoruzanih separatista i terorista na Kosovu sa medjunarodnom
teroristickom mrezom Osame bin Ladena. Zapravo, i sam Slobodan
Milosevic je jos pre nekoliko godina o tome govorio zvanicnim
predstavnicima SAD. Sada, u jeku "antiteroristicke kampanje" Zapad bi
morao da prizna da se S. Milosevic u stvari borio sa medjunarodnim
terorizmom. A to se SAD i njihovim saveznicima uopste ne isplati. Jer,
ispostavlja se da su, podrzavajuci kosovske ekstremiste, podrzavali
terorizam. Zato se takve skrabotine i javljaju da bi se paznja svetske
javnosti odvratila od umesanosti Zapada u teror.
P. Zar ne iskljucujete mogucnost da se iza tog "intervjua" kriju
jos zloslutniji motivi od onih koje ste naveli?
O. Ne, ne iskljucujem. Vrlo je moguce da taj "intervju" treba da
pripremi teren za optuzbu Slobodana Milosevica za grubo krsenje
zatvorskih pravila i za ostro ogranicavanje njegovih prava, izmedju
ostalog i na kontakte s porodicom i pravnicima.
Istovremeno bih zeleo da obratim paznju na onaj deo tog
"intervjua" u kome S. Milosevic navodno karakterise svoje stanje
kao "visece uz bojazljivu nadu". Slobodan je po prirodi borac. I to je
svima dobro poznato. Medjutim, zapadna stampa i politicari vec odavno
svima sugerisu misao da je Slobodan navodno sklon samoubistvu. Svako ko
ga poznaje ili ga je prosto video na TV ekranu u akciji, tokom haske
sudanije, zna da je spreman za borbu u najtezim uslovima. Medjutim,
stalno nam podmecu ideju o "samoubistvu" da bi opravdali moguci fizicki
obracun s njim u slucaju kraha sudanije.
P. Vratimo se ipak izvorima: ITAR-TASS-u i listu "Izvestija".
Zasto se taj "ekskluzivni intervju" pojavio bas u Rusiji?
O. S velikim postovanjem se odnosim prema ITAR-TASS. To je jedna
od pet vodecih svetskih agencija. Pa i "Izvestija" su novine vrlo
ugledne proslosti. Zato me narocito cudi sto dozvoljavaju da ih koriste
za tudju i prilicno primitivnu provokaciju. Jer, taj "intervju" je
odmah preneo citav niz jugoslovenskih listova. Ocigledno se racunalo na
to da ce u Jugoslaviji vise verovati informacijama koje poticu iz
Rusije. Za zaljenje je sto je list "Izvestija" odlucio da publikuje
takvu jeftinu laz i to jos sa predgovorom urednistva koji protivureci
opstepoznatim cinjenicama. Jer, cak i Zapadna glasila cesto
objektivnije i odmerenije ocenjuju situaciju oko haskog procesa.
Uzgred, pre jedno tri nedelje se pojavila vest da su u
Jugoslaviji uhapseni bivsi lideri bosanskih Srba R. Karadzic i R.
Mladic, za kojima takodje traga natovski "tribunal". To saopstenje,
koje je izazvalo burno negodovanje u Jugoslaviji, pripisano je
predsedniku Kostunici. Bio je prinudjen da to specijalno demantuje.
Informacija je poticala iz ITAR-TASS i takodje je (navodno!) bila
dobijena od pres-sluzbe I. Rugove. To vec nikako nije slucajno.
P. Da li je, po Vasem misljenju, taj "interjvu" jednokratna
akcija ili deo sire kampanje?
O. To je deo siroke klevetnicke kampanje protiv S. Milosevica i
njegove porodice koja se vec preko 10 godina vodi. Licno sam 1993.
godine u Parizu video ulicne plakate sa likom S. Milosevica pored ....
Hitlera.
Kampanja lazi protiv njega bukne svaki put uoci nekih vaznih dogadjaja.
Tako je bilo 1995. godine kada je S. Milosevic vodio razgovore o
uspostavljanju mira u Bosni. Tada su ga u zapadnim glasilima u tolikoj
meri blatili da je svojim americkim partnerima izjavio da ce napustiti
razgovore ukoliko moralna ucena ne prestane. Ali, Slobodan sada ima
manje mogucnosti za odbranu od klevetnickih optuzbi. Inicijatori
provokacije to i koriste. Sada je u Jugoslaviji pocelo objavljivanje
izvesnih "stenograma telefonskih razgovora" koje je navodno hrvatska
obavestajna sluzba prisluskivala i snimila 1996-1998. godine. Jos jedan
falsifikat.
P. Svakako da bi bilo krajnje interesantno i vazno cuti
misljenje samog Slobodana Milosevica o ovome.
O. Bukvalno juce sam razgovarao telefonom sa njim. Taj
"intervju" je kod njega izazvao ironican osmeh.
Razgovarao V. Tetjokin
To join or help this struggle, visit:
http://www.sps.org.yu/ (official SPS website)
http://www.belgrade-forum.org/ (forum for the world of equals)
http://www.icdsm.org/ (the international committee to defend Slobodan
Milosevic)
http://www.jutarnje.co.yu/ ('morning news' the only Serbian newspaper
advocating liberation)
DECISION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Here is the second part of the text.
The first has been already distributed - see
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1554
The third - and last - follows in a subsequent posting.
===*===
After it was made on November 6, the Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the the Federal
Government's Decree on cooperation with the so-called tribunal in the
Hague has finally been published. Here is an unofficial English
translation of it.
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRY, No.70/01, December 28, 2001
(...) [for the first part see:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1554%5d
III
1. The Federal Government regulated in
the contested Decree the procedure
for cooperation of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia with the International
Criminal Tribunal in criminal prosecution
of individuals responsible for
grave crimes against the international
humanitarian law perpetrated in the
territory of ex-Yugoslavia since
1991(hereinafter: the International
Criminal Tribunal) and performance of
obligations of FRY stemming from the
Security Council Resolution 827(1993) and
the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal.
The Decree covered, inter alia: transfer
of criminal proceedings held in the
national courts to the International
Criminal Tribunal if so requested;
proceedings and jurisdiction of courts
and other authorities for decision
making in such matters (Article 12 ad
13): the proceedings in national
courts after the transfer of the
proceedings to the International Criminal
Tribunal (Article 14): the possibility of
extradition of all the accused
(foreigners and Yugoslav citizens) to the
jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Tribunal and its investigation
bodies to undertake activities in
the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia(Articles 9 and 10); legal
assistance to
the International Criminal Tribunal,
including granting of transit of the
Yugoslav citizens through the territory
if the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia( Articles 18 and 19) and
others. The Decree contains references
to the application of the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal and
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to
be applied by judicial and other
authorities in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Articles l, 2, 6, 12 and 17).
2. The provisions of Constitution of FRY
provided for the following: power
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
organized along the principle of
division of legislative, executive and
judicial power (Article 12); the
executive and judicial power are bound by
the laws, which are in compliance
with the Constitution (Article 9, pars 2
and 3); the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia honors in good faith, the
obligations under the international
treaties to which is a party, and the
international treaties ratified and
published in keeping with the
Constitution and generally accepted rules
of the international law that are an
integral part of the national legal system
(Article 16); a constituent republic is
sovereign in those matters not
covered by the Constitution of FRY as
competences of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and that a constituent
republic may independently regulate its
governance under its own Constitution
(Article 6, pars 2 and 3); that no
Yugoslav citizen may be deprived of its
citizenship, expelled from his
country, or extradited to another
state(Article 17, par 3); that everyone
is entitle to personal freedom and no one
may be apprehended except in the
cases processed under the federal law and
that illegal apprehension is
punishable (Article 23, pars 1,2, and 6);
that everyone is entitled to equal
protection of his/her rights in legally
determined procedure (Article 26,
par 1); that no one may be punished for
any offense before it had been
perpetrated, was not set out in the law
or regulation based on the law as a
punishable offence, nor may be sentenced
to the term which was not legally
stipulated for such an offense (Article
27, par 1); that no one may be
repeatedly sentenced or punished for an
offense in the case finally
suspended or the indictment finally
dismissed or if he/she finally
acquitted or sentenced (Article 28); that
a foreigner may be extradited to
another state only in the cases
stipulated in the international treaties
which are binding on the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and that the right
to asylum is guaranteed to a foreign
national and a person without
citizenship persecuted due to democratic
views and on the grounds of his/her
participation in the movements for social
and national liberations, for
freedom and rights of a human being, or
for freedom of scientific or
artistic creative work (Article 66, pars
2 and 3); that only law may
stipulate the ways of realization of
individual freedoms and rights of man
and citizens when so stipulated under the
Constitution of FRY or necessary
for their realization and that freedoms
and rights recognized and guaranteed
by the Constitution of FRY enjoy judicial
protection (Article 67, pars. 2
and 4); as well as that the Federal
Government may enact the decrees,
decisions and other instruments for
implementation of the federal laws and
other regulations and general enactments
of the Federal Parliament (Article
99, par 1, item 4) .
The provisions of Chapters XXX and XXXI
of the Law on Criminal Proceedings
(Official Gazette of FRY Nos.4/77,
14/85,54/87,57/89,3/90 and Official
Gazette of FRY Nos. 27/92 and 24/94)
stipulated the procedure for
international legal assistance and
performance under the international
treaties in criminal matters as well as
the procedure for the extradition of
the accused and sentenced individuals.
Those provisions, inter alia,
stipulated territorial and actual
jurisdiction of national courts and other
state authorities in the procedure on the
request of the foreign authority
and even in case when the request
concerns criminal offence which under the
national regulations no extradition is
allows; that one of the conditions
for extradition of the accused or
sentenced individuals is that such an
individual is no Yugoslav citizen as well
as that the requested extradition
of any individual shall have been ruled
by the competent court.
3. The Federal Constitutional Court,
starting from the above stated
provisions of the Constitution of FRY and
the Law on Criminal Proceedings
finds that the contested Decree does not
comply with the Constitution and
the Law on Criminal Proceedings.
To begin with, the contested Decree is
not in compliance with the
Constitution of FRY because it regulated
the procedure (means) of
realization of individual freedoms and
rights of a man and citizen
determined under the Constitution of FRY
by the competent authority. Namely,
further to the provisions of Article 67,
par 2, of the Constitution of FRY
the manner (procedure) of implementation
of individual freedoms and human
and civil rights may be stipulated by the
law only, provided however, that
this possibility is anticipated in the
Constitution of FRY or when it is
necessary for their implementation. The
provisions of Article 26, par 1 of
the Constitution of FRY it was further
laid down that everyone is entitled
to equal protection of its rights in the
legally prescribed procedure. By
the contested Decree the Federal
Government as the executive authority,
having regulated the possibility and the
procedure for transfer of criminal
proceedings underway in the national
court to the International Criminal
Tribunal at its request, having regulated
the application of the provisions
of the Chapter XXXI of the Law on
Criminal Proceedings which covers also
apprehension of the individual requested
to be extradited to the
International Criminal Tribunal, having
regulated the power of the
International Criminal Tribunal to
undertake investigation activities
against the individuals in the territory
of FRY, actually regulated the
manner (procedure) of realization,
limitation and protection of individual
freedoms and human and civil by a by-law.
The law only, as was already
mentioned, may regulate such a procedure,
enacted by legislative power,
which was done in the matters of criminal
legal protection under the law on
Criminal Proceedings.
The contested Decree of the Federal
Government regulated apart from the
procedure also the jurisdiction and
composition of courts and jurisdiction
of governments in constituent republics
to decide on the requests of the
International Criminal Tribunal despite
the fact that further to Article 6
of the Constitution of FRY a constituent
republic may autonomously regulate
governance and competences of its own
authorities.
Having stipulated the application of the
Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence by the Courts and
other authorities in FRY the Federal
Government overstepped its
constitutional powers of the executive
branch because confirmation of the
International legal acts and their
integration into the internal legal
system falls within the exclusive purview
of the Federal Parliament, under
Article 78 of the Constitution of FRY, as
legislative and representative
body of the citizens of Yugoslavia and
her constituent republics.
Apart from the stated non-constitutionality
the disputed Decree is further
in conflict with the Constitution of FRY
because it regulates the
possibility of extradition of the
Yugoslav citizens even outside the area
of territorial jurisdiction and Yugoslav
judicial and other state authorities
although the Constitution of FRY in its
Article 17, par.3 explicitly bans
such a possibility in the case of
Yugoslav citizens. A foreign citizen may
be extradited only in the cases and under
the procedure stipulated in the
Constitution of FRY, the Law on Criminal
Proceeding and international
treaties. The Federal Constitutional
Court finds that the Constitution of
FRY, namely the mentioned Article 17 par
3, no extradition of the Yugoslav
citizens outside the sovereign territory
of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia irrespective whether the
request for extradition was submitted by
the court established by one state or
several states under an international
treaty or under the instrument of an
international organization, because the
provisions of the Constitution of FRY as
the basic law in FR Yugoslavia in
the hierarchy of legal regulations are
the norms of the highest legal
priority and therefore any other general
norms, including published
international treaties must comply with
its provisions.
The legal instruments of the federal and
republic governments, federal and
republic laws containing legal solutions
in conflict with the constitutional
provisions cannot stand in harmony with
the Constitution of FRY. Neither the
federal laws confirming the International
treaties can be in compliance if
such treaties contain provisions contrary
to the Constitution of FRY. Only
an act of legal strength equal to
constitution may change the
constitutional
provisions, specifically those relating
to human and civil rights such as
the provision of Article 17, par 3
prohibiting deprivation of citizenship,
expulsion from the country or extradition
of a Yugoslav citizen to others.
Since this provision is located within
the basic provisions of the
Constitution of FRY, the Federal
Constitutional Court submits that it
acknowledges and guarantees human and
civil rights and freedoms and citizens
in FR of Yugoslavia in keeping with the
Universal declaration on human
rights. The same goes for the possibility
provided for by the Decree if the
permission for transit of the Yugoslav
nationals through the territory of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the
request of the International
Criminal Tribunal. The Federal
Constitutional Court is competent to rule
whether any of the general norms are in
compliance with the Constitution of
FRY or not, and its rulings are generally
binding and final, with the legal
consequences set out in the Constitution
of FRY and the Law on the Federal
Constitutional Court.
The Federal Constitutional Court,
starting from the nature of the legal
instrument, its substance and
promulgator, has not gone deeper into
structuring the final legal views on the
manner of the implementation of the
Decree, legal nature or the manner of
honoring the obligations created by
the establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunal under the Security
Council Resolution. Consequently, the
Federal Constitutional Court in this
Decision provided no complete replies to
the question: did the Security
Council, as one of the main bodies of the
United Nations, laid down in the
Charter, and primarily responsible for
maintenance of international peace
and security, and which in performing
that mandate must act in conformity
with the goals and principles of United
Nations (Article 24 of the Charter),
in establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal acted in keeping with
the United Nations Charter or overstepped
its powers, namely acted ultra
virus; whether the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal, as
an ad hoc measure which should though
criminal prosecution of the
individuals responsible for grave
violations of the international
humanitarian law, enable reestablishment
of peace in the territory of former
SFRY and its maintenance, in keeping with
the measures that the Security
Council may take as conducive to the
maintenance of the international peace
and security, in conformity with the
Charter and its own Rules of Procedure;
whether and in what way is FR of
Yugoslavia bound, as member of United
Nations, to cooperate with the
International Criminal Tribunal, which is not
a court authority envisaged by the United
Nations Charter, unlike the
International Court of Justice,
anticipated in Chapter XIV of the Charter,
but "a measure" of the Security Council;
whether the acts and measures of
the Security Council taken with reference
to the Charter of the United
Nations have the same force as the
Charter itself (whether they are its
integral part?); how to proceed under the
Statute and other by-laws of that
Tribunal, without harmonization of the
internal law with their substance;
whether the Statute and the Rules of the
Tribunal are based on generally
accepted principles and rules of
international law and particularly on the
rules on the function of the prosecutor
in the proceedings, ban of renewed
trial in the same case, detention,
duration of which is not limited, the so
called covert indictments, anonymous
witnesses, duration of the imprisonment
term, extradition of nationals etc.;
whether priority of legal instruments
exists in the hierarchy of international
law and whether the acts of the
United Nations bodies must be in
conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations, and which body and in which
procedure determines that concord; that
the members of the United Nations are
obliged to enforce the instruments of
UN only if they were adopted in
conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations, which member states accepted or
the obligation of the members
exists by the very act of acceptance of
the Charter, as a multinational
international treaty; whether some states
members of the United Nations,
which through their competent body,
adopted respective instruments on
cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal violated the Charter of
UN because they banned under these
instruments the extradition of their
nationals to that Court, because such
cooperation is prohibited by their
constitutions and why they had to adopt
such instruments if the Resolution
of the Security Council on the
establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal 827 and the Statute of that
Court are integral parts of the
internal law of those states; why certain
member states of UN had to change
their constitutions which prohibited the
extradition of their nationals to
other states, to be able to pass the
instrument governing the cooperation
with the International Criminal Tribunal
which includes also the
extradition of their nationals to the
mentioned court, if the instruments of
the Security Council of the United
Nations, in the legal hierarchy have
priority over the constitutions of UN
member states, or have the same
strength, on the other hand; whether the
stated practice of these UN member
states clearly shows that the
constitution of UN member states are the
legal instruments with the highest legal
strength in every UN member state,
and that, consequently the instruments of
the competent state authorities
enabling the implementation of the
mentioned Resolution of the Security
Council and the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal, must be
approved in compliance with the
constitution of a member state, in formal
and material terms, and that the
instruments of the Security Council
therefore represent no legal merit for
direct implementation by the very
fact of their instruments, since every
UN member state has to make own
decision about their integration into the
legal system of every UN member
state, to determine, under its
constitution the competent authority and in
the prescribed manner; whether the act of
implementation/integration into
the national legal system passed by the
competent authority of UN member
state can set out the manner of
implementation of individual human rights
and freedom under the rules unpublished
and therefore inaccessible to a
citizen and man applicable to, despite
the fact that the constitution of
that state stipulated the publication of
all general norms as obligatory if
they constitute part of its legal order,
as is the case of the Constitution
of FR Yugoslavia; whether the
promulgation of an instrument for enforcement
of the mentioned Resolution and Statute
of the International Criminal
Tribunal would be in harmony with the
international treaties acceded to by
the UN member states and with the
generally accepted rule of international
law, and many other questions. This is
because the Federal Constitutional
Court submits that replies to all these
questions are irrelevant to the
Court ruling on constitutionality and
legality of the contested Decree.
Namely, the Federal Constitutional Court
in its proceedings determines, as a
preceding question, formal
constitutionality and legality of the contested
general legal instrument, e.g. whether it
was enacted by the competent
authority stipulated in the Constitution
of FRY, confirmed and published
international treaty and federal law.
(2/3 - continues)
Here is the second part of the text.
The first has been already distributed - see
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1554
The third - and last - follows in a subsequent posting.
===*===
After it was made on November 6, the Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the the Federal
Government's Decree on cooperation with the so-called tribunal in the
Hague has finally been published. Here is an unofficial English
translation of it.
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRY, No.70/01, December 28, 2001
(...) [for the first part see:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/1554%5d
III
1. The Federal Government regulated in
the contested Decree the procedure
for cooperation of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia with the International
Criminal Tribunal in criminal prosecution
of individuals responsible for
grave crimes against the international
humanitarian law perpetrated in the
territory of ex-Yugoslavia since
1991(hereinafter: the International
Criminal Tribunal) and performance of
obligations of FRY stemming from the
Security Council Resolution 827(1993) and
the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal.
The Decree covered, inter alia: transfer
of criminal proceedings held in the
national courts to the International
Criminal Tribunal if so requested;
proceedings and jurisdiction of courts
and other authorities for decision
making in such matters (Article 12 ad
13): the proceedings in national
courts after the transfer of the
proceedings to the International Criminal
Tribunal (Article 14): the possibility of
extradition of all the accused
(foreigners and Yugoslav citizens) to the
jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Tribunal and its investigation
bodies to undertake activities in
the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia(Articles 9 and 10); legal
assistance to
the International Criminal Tribunal,
including granting of transit of the
Yugoslav citizens through the territory
if the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia( Articles 18 and 19) and
others. The Decree contains references
to the application of the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal and
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, to
be applied by judicial and other
authorities in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Articles l, 2, 6, 12 and 17).
2. The provisions of Constitution of FRY
provided for the following: power
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
organized along the principle of
division of legislative, executive and
judicial power (Article 12); the
executive and judicial power are bound by
the laws, which are in compliance
with the Constitution (Article 9, pars 2
and 3); the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia honors in good faith, the
obligations under the international
treaties to which is a party, and the
international treaties ratified and
published in keeping with the
Constitution and generally accepted rules
of the international law that are an
integral part of the national legal system
(Article 16); a constituent republic is
sovereign in those matters not
covered by the Constitution of FRY as
competences of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and that a constituent
republic may independently regulate its
governance under its own Constitution
(Article 6, pars 2 and 3); that no
Yugoslav citizen may be deprived of its
citizenship, expelled from his
country, or extradited to another
state(Article 17, par 3); that everyone
is entitle to personal freedom and no one
may be apprehended except in the
cases processed under the federal law and
that illegal apprehension is
punishable (Article 23, pars 1,2, and 6);
that everyone is entitled to equal
protection of his/her rights in legally
determined procedure (Article 26,
par 1); that no one may be punished for
any offense before it had been
perpetrated, was not set out in the law
or regulation based on the law as a
punishable offence, nor may be sentenced
to the term which was not legally
stipulated for such an offense (Article
27, par 1); that no one may be
repeatedly sentenced or punished for an
offense in the case finally
suspended or the indictment finally
dismissed or if he/she finally
acquitted or sentenced (Article 28); that
a foreigner may be extradited to
another state only in the cases
stipulated in the international treaties
which are binding on the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and that the right
to asylum is guaranteed to a foreign
national and a person without
citizenship persecuted due to democratic
views and on the grounds of his/her
participation in the movements for social
and national liberations, for
freedom and rights of a human being, or
for freedom of scientific or
artistic creative work (Article 66, pars
2 and 3); that only law may
stipulate the ways of realization of
individual freedoms and rights of man
and citizens when so stipulated under the
Constitution of FRY or necessary
for their realization and that freedoms
and rights recognized and guaranteed
by the Constitution of FRY enjoy judicial
protection (Article 67, pars. 2
and 4); as well as that the Federal
Government may enact the decrees,
decisions and other instruments for
implementation of the federal laws and
other regulations and general enactments
of the Federal Parliament (Article
99, par 1, item 4) .
The provisions of Chapters XXX and XXXI
of the Law on Criminal Proceedings
(Official Gazette of FRY Nos.4/77,
14/85,54/87,57/89,3/90 and Official
Gazette of FRY Nos. 27/92 and 24/94)
stipulated the procedure for
international legal assistance and
performance under the international
treaties in criminal matters as well as
the procedure for the extradition of
the accused and sentenced individuals.
Those provisions, inter alia,
stipulated territorial and actual
jurisdiction of national courts and other
state authorities in the procedure on the
request of the foreign authority
and even in case when the request
concerns criminal offence which under the
national regulations no extradition is
allows; that one of the conditions
for extradition of the accused or
sentenced individuals is that such an
individual is no Yugoslav citizen as well
as that the requested extradition
of any individual shall have been ruled
by the competent court.
3. The Federal Constitutional Court,
starting from the above stated
provisions of the Constitution of FRY and
the Law on Criminal Proceedings
finds that the contested Decree does not
comply with the Constitution and
the Law on Criminal Proceedings.
To begin with, the contested Decree is
not in compliance with the
Constitution of FRY because it regulated
the procedure (means) of
realization of individual freedoms and
rights of a man and citizen
determined under the Constitution of FRY
by the competent authority. Namely,
further to the provisions of Article 67,
par 2, of the Constitution of FRY
the manner (procedure) of implementation
of individual freedoms and human
and civil rights may be stipulated by the
law only, provided however, that
this possibility is anticipated in the
Constitution of FRY or when it is
necessary for their implementation. The
provisions of Article 26, par 1 of
the Constitution of FRY it was further
laid down that everyone is entitled
to equal protection of its rights in the
legally prescribed procedure. By
the contested Decree the Federal
Government as the executive authority,
having regulated the possibility and the
procedure for transfer of criminal
proceedings underway in the national
court to the International Criminal
Tribunal at its request, having regulated
the application of the provisions
of the Chapter XXXI of the Law on
Criminal Proceedings which covers also
apprehension of the individual requested
to be extradited to the
International Criminal Tribunal, having
regulated the power of the
International Criminal Tribunal to
undertake investigation activities
against the individuals in the territory
of FRY, actually regulated the
manner (procedure) of realization,
limitation and protection of individual
freedoms and human and civil by a by-law.
The law only, as was already
mentioned, may regulate such a procedure,
enacted by legislative power,
which was done in the matters of criminal
legal protection under the law on
Criminal Proceedings.
The contested Decree of the Federal
Government regulated apart from the
procedure also the jurisdiction and
composition of courts and jurisdiction
of governments in constituent republics
to decide on the requests of the
International Criminal Tribunal despite
the fact that further to Article 6
of the Constitution of FRY a constituent
republic may autonomously regulate
governance and competences of its own
authorities.
Having stipulated the application of the
Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence by the Courts and
other authorities in FRY the Federal
Government overstepped its
constitutional powers of the executive
branch because confirmation of the
International legal acts and their
integration into the internal legal
system falls within the exclusive purview
of the Federal Parliament, under
Article 78 of the Constitution of FRY, as
legislative and representative
body of the citizens of Yugoslavia and
her constituent republics.
Apart from the stated non-constitutionality
the disputed Decree is further
in conflict with the Constitution of FRY
because it regulates the
possibility of extradition of the
Yugoslav citizens even outside the area
of territorial jurisdiction and Yugoslav
judicial and other state authorities
although the Constitution of FRY in its
Article 17, par.3 explicitly bans
such a possibility in the case of
Yugoslav citizens. A foreign citizen may
be extradited only in the cases and under
the procedure stipulated in the
Constitution of FRY, the Law on Criminal
Proceeding and international
treaties. The Federal Constitutional
Court finds that the Constitution of
FRY, namely the mentioned Article 17 par
3, no extradition of the Yugoslav
citizens outside the sovereign territory
of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia irrespective whether the
request for extradition was submitted by
the court established by one state or
several states under an international
treaty or under the instrument of an
international organization, because the
provisions of the Constitution of FRY as
the basic law in FR Yugoslavia in
the hierarchy of legal regulations are
the norms of the highest legal
priority and therefore any other general
norms, including published
international treaties must comply with
its provisions.
The legal instruments of the federal and
republic governments, federal and
republic laws containing legal solutions
in conflict with the constitutional
provisions cannot stand in harmony with
the Constitution of FRY. Neither the
federal laws confirming the International
treaties can be in compliance if
such treaties contain provisions contrary
to the Constitution of FRY. Only
an act of legal strength equal to
constitution may change the
constitutional
provisions, specifically those relating
to human and civil rights such as
the provision of Article 17, par 3
prohibiting deprivation of citizenship,
expulsion from the country or extradition
of a Yugoslav citizen to others.
Since this provision is located within
the basic provisions of the
Constitution of FRY, the Federal
Constitutional Court submits that it
acknowledges and guarantees human and
civil rights and freedoms and citizens
in FR of Yugoslavia in keeping with the
Universal declaration on human
rights. The same goes for the possibility
provided for by the Decree if the
permission for transit of the Yugoslav
nationals through the territory of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the
request of the International
Criminal Tribunal. The Federal
Constitutional Court is competent to rule
whether any of the general norms are in
compliance with the Constitution of
FRY or not, and its rulings are generally
binding and final, with the legal
consequences set out in the Constitution
of FRY and the Law on the Federal
Constitutional Court.
The Federal Constitutional Court,
starting from the nature of the legal
instrument, its substance and
promulgator, has not gone deeper into
structuring the final legal views on the
manner of the implementation of the
Decree, legal nature or the manner of
honoring the obligations created by
the establishment of the International
Criminal Tribunal under the Security
Council Resolution. Consequently, the
Federal Constitutional Court in this
Decision provided no complete replies to
the question: did the Security
Council, as one of the main bodies of the
United Nations, laid down in the
Charter, and primarily responsible for
maintenance of international peace
and security, and which in performing
that mandate must act in conformity
with the goals and principles of United
Nations (Article 24 of the Charter),
in establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal acted in keeping with
the United Nations Charter or overstepped
its powers, namely acted ultra
virus; whether the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal, as
an ad hoc measure which should though
criminal prosecution of the
individuals responsible for grave
violations of the international
humanitarian law, enable reestablishment
of peace in the territory of former
SFRY and its maintenance, in keeping with
the measures that the Security
Council may take as conducive to the
maintenance of the international peace
and security, in conformity with the
Charter and its own Rules of Procedure;
whether and in what way is FR of
Yugoslavia bound, as member of United
Nations, to cooperate with the
International Criminal Tribunal, which is not
a court authority envisaged by the United
Nations Charter, unlike the
International Court of Justice,
anticipated in Chapter XIV of the Charter,
but "a measure" of the Security Council;
whether the acts and measures of
the Security Council taken with reference
to the Charter of the United
Nations have the same force as the
Charter itself (whether they are its
integral part?); how to proceed under the
Statute and other by-laws of that
Tribunal, without harmonization of the
internal law with their substance;
whether the Statute and the Rules of the
Tribunal are based on generally
accepted principles and rules of
international law and particularly on the
rules on the function of the prosecutor
in the proceedings, ban of renewed
trial in the same case, detention,
duration of which is not limited, the so
called covert indictments, anonymous
witnesses, duration of the imprisonment
term, extradition of nationals etc.;
whether priority of legal instruments
exists in the hierarchy of international
law and whether the acts of the
United Nations bodies must be in
conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations, and which body and in which
procedure determines that concord; that
the members of the United Nations are
obliged to enforce the instruments of
UN only if they were adopted in
conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations, which member states accepted or
the obligation of the members
exists by the very act of acceptance of
the Charter, as a multinational
international treaty; whether some states
members of the United Nations,
which through their competent body,
adopted respective instruments on
cooperation with the International
Criminal Tribunal violated the Charter of
UN because they banned under these
instruments the extradition of their
nationals to that Court, because such
cooperation is prohibited by their
constitutions and why they had to adopt
such instruments if the Resolution
of the Security Council on the
establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal 827 and the Statute of that
Court are integral parts of the
internal law of those states; why certain
member states of UN had to change
their constitutions which prohibited the
extradition of their nationals to
other states, to be able to pass the
instrument governing the cooperation
with the International Criminal Tribunal
which includes also the
extradition of their nationals to the
mentioned court, if the instruments of
the Security Council of the United
Nations, in the legal hierarchy have
priority over the constitutions of UN
member states, or have the same
strength, on the other hand; whether the
stated practice of these UN member
states clearly shows that the
constitution of UN member states are the
legal instruments with the highest legal
strength in every UN member state,
and that, consequently the instruments of
the competent state authorities
enabling the implementation of the
mentioned Resolution of the Security
Council and the Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal, must be
approved in compliance with the
constitution of a member state, in formal
and material terms, and that the
instruments of the Security Council
therefore represent no legal merit for
direct implementation by the very
fact of their instruments, since every
UN member state has to make own
decision about their integration into the
legal system of every UN member
state, to determine, under its
constitution the competent authority and in
the prescribed manner; whether the act of
implementation/integration into
the national legal system passed by the
competent authority of UN member
state can set out the manner of
implementation of individual human rights
and freedom under the rules unpublished
and therefore inaccessible to a
citizen and man applicable to, despite
the fact that the constitution of
that state stipulated the publication of
all general norms as obligatory if
they constitute part of its legal order,
as is the case of the Constitution
of FR Yugoslavia; whether the
promulgation of an instrument for enforcement
of the mentioned Resolution and Statute
of the International Criminal
Tribunal would be in harmony with the
international treaties acceded to by
the UN member states and with the
generally accepted rule of international
law, and many other questions. This is
because the Federal Constitutional
Court submits that replies to all these
questions are irrelevant to the
Court ruling on constitutionality and
legality of the contested Decree.
Namely, the Federal Constitutional Court
in its proceedings determines, as a
preceding question, formal
constitutionality and legality of the contested
general legal instrument, e.g. whether it
was enacted by the competent
authority stipulated in the Constitution
of FRY, confirmed and published
international treaty and federal law.
(2/3 - continues)
After it was made on November 6, the Decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the the Federal
Government's Decree on cooperation with the so-called tribunal in the
Hague has finally been published. Here is an unofficial English
translation of it.
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRY, No.70/01, December 28, 2001
===*===
Third - and final - piece of the text:
===
By virtue of Article 16 of the
Constitution of FRY the international
treaties confirmed and published in
keeping with the Constitution and
generally accepted rules of international
law are integral parts of the
national legal order. Hence, the
international treaties and generally
accepted rules of international law,
according to their legal strength are
above the federal law.
According to the position of the
Federal Constitutional Court
distinction must be made between the
obligations of the stated under the
international community on the whole and
obligations towards a given state
or group of states. The confirmed and
published international treaties
constitute the international legal
obligation of FRY law beyond any doubt
towards all the states signatories
thereof, while the generally accepted
rules of the international law concern
all the states within the
international legal system and all the
personalities under the international
law have the obligation and shared
interest in their protection (the rules
ius cogeus). Besides, in the case of
non-observance of those internal legal
norms, sanctions shall be imposed,
primarily legal in nature, unlike the
political agreements where sanctions are
of not legal but political and/or
other nature.
The generally accepted rules of
international law represent legal
principles of the norms derived from
custom rules common to all the states
or known in the majority of legal systems
of the world. Those rules have
general, absolute and objective
character, but also their dynamic
development. At the same time the scope
and character of their changes
provoke different views. There is more
agreement about their identification,
particularly in process law, as the
principles of "reasonable time-limit","
fair trial",
"degrading treatment", "arbitrary
apprehension "presumption of innocence",
timely pronunciation of sentence", "right
to appeal" and other general
rules.
The Federal Constitutional Court
judges that the Resolution of the
Security Council 827 establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal does
not fall within the international law
which constitutes the part of the
internal legal order under Article 16 of
the Constitution of FRY. This is
because an ad hoc measure approved by the
Security Council under the
Resolution - the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for
Criminal prosecution of individuals
responsible for grave violations of the
international humanitarian law-contains
no international legal norms
producing "validity" namely has no
"obligatory strength". Without such
properties that Resolution constitutes
but a political instrument which
entails political obligations, but the
legal validity shall be achieved only
upon its enforcement by the legitimate
and legal authority in individual
legal systems of each state.
Namely, UN member states, having
accepted the UN Charter. Accepted
legal validity of all its norms, and also
the legal instrument passed by UN
bodies in compliance with and in the
manner set out in the Charter. However,
the UN member states had never vested
judicial power to UN bodies. Except
those, naturally expressly specified in
the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, envisaged in the
Chapter XIV of the UN Charter. This is
not the case. That is why the Resolution
of the Security Council 827 in its
item 4 specified a political obligation
of all the states to "fully
cooperate with the International Criminal
Tribunal....and that all the
states undertake measures in keeping with
the national legislation conducive
to giving effect to the provisions" of
that Resolution. Hence, only if and
when that obligation under the mentioned
Resolution of the Security Council
is "translated into a legal norm" in
harmony with the national legislation,
the Statute and the Rules of the
International Criminal Tribunal, shall
obtain the normative character with legal
validity. Without it, those are
specific political obligations; the
non-performance may, of course, produce
very grave consequences for individual
states.
As was said, under Article 24 of the
United Nations Charter, concerning the
international peace and security, the
Security Council in implementing its
mandate, acts on behalf of the United
Nations.
Further to Article 25 of the
Charter - UN members have agreed to
accept and implement the decisions of the
Security Council in line with the
Charter.
In case that Security Council
should find that there exists threat
to peace or violation of peace, it shall
decide what measures are to be
taken to reestablish peace, the supreme
value of the whole international
system.
In conformity with the assessed
status of relations, causes and
consequences, Security Council decided to
establish a court under its
resolution 827 (1993) under the name "The
International Tribunal for
Prosecution of Individuals responsible
for grave violations of the
International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of former Yugoslavia between
1991". Starting from the substance of
Articles 24, 25 and Article 29 of the
United Nations Charter, that Decision may
be viewed as one of the measures
for protection of peace in the territory
of former SFRY, taken by the United
Nations.
Oppositely, as was already
revealed, this Court was of the view that
the substance of the Charter of the
United Nations does not imply that the
Security Council has an exclusive power
to create and establish judicial
bodies as a protection measure, to deal
with the responsibility of the
citizens in the countries that violated
peace and security in the world. It
follows from the substance of the quoted
provisions of the Charter that such
a measure may be considered as an
international accomplished fact binding
on
any member state of United Nations. In
such a case an obligation is created
to legally regulate the issues concerning
constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms and rights of the citizens,
position of the state authorities and
provision of that protection, as well as
the conduct of local authorities in
giving legal assistance to protect the
international peace. One of the
rights of member states in this case, are
well-supported approaches to the
United Nation bodies to check the
correctness of the procedure.
The above quoted constitutional
and legal provisions imply no
obligation or possibility for the
national legal system, under the
extraordinary procedure and extraordinary
legal instrument, harmonize with
the international coercive measure.
Hence, these relations should be
established in constitutionally oriented
procedure, which shall observe and
be secured by international law, but also
the internal order of FR of
Yugoslavia, in observance of the Charter
of the united Nations,
International Declaration on Human
Rights, the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, Constitution
of FRY and other legal instruments
of the national and international law.
III
4. The Federal Constitutional
Court, by virtue of Article 124, par
1, items 2 and 4 of the Constitution of
FRY and Articles 30, 58 and 68 par
1, items 2 and 4 of the Law on the
Federal Constitutional Court (Official
Gazette of FRY no.36/92), at its session
of 06.11.2001, passed the following
DECISION
It is ruled that the Decree on
the process of cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal (Official
Gazette of FRY no.30/01) is in no
conformity with Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Law on Criminal Proceedings (Official
Gazette of SFRY Nos.4/77, 14/85,
74/87, 57/89, 3/90 and Official Gazette
of FRY No/ 27/92 and 24/94).
The Federal Constitutional Court
has passed the present Decision in
the following sitting: Acting Chairman of
the Federal Constitutional Court
Judge Milan Vesovic, and Judges Milorad
Gogic, Dr. Momcilo Grubac, Mr.
Milomir Jakovljevic, Veseling Lekic and
Aleksandar Simic.
The Federal Constitutional Court
Acting Chairman
of
the Federal Constitutional Court
Judge Milan Vesovic
To join or help this struggle, visit:
http://www.sps.org.yu/ (official SPS
website)
http://www.belgrade-forum.org/ (forum for
the world of equals)
http://www.icdsm.org/ (the international
committee to defend Slobodan
Milosevic)
http://www.jutarnje.co.yu/ ('morning
news' the only Serbian newspaper
advocating liberation)
Constitutional Court on unconstitutionality of the the Federal
Government's Decree on cooperation with the so-called tribunal in the
Hague has finally been published. Here is an unofficial English
translation of it.
OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRY, No.70/01, December 28, 2001
===*===
Third - and final - piece of the text:
===
By virtue of Article 16 of the
Constitution of FRY the international
treaties confirmed and published in
keeping with the Constitution and
generally accepted rules of international
law are integral parts of the
national legal order. Hence, the
international treaties and generally
accepted rules of international law,
according to their legal strength are
above the federal law.
According to the position of the
Federal Constitutional Court
distinction must be made between the
obligations of the stated under the
international community on the whole and
obligations towards a given state
or group of states. The confirmed and
published international treaties
constitute the international legal
obligation of FRY law beyond any doubt
towards all the states signatories
thereof, while the generally accepted
rules of the international law concern
all the states within the
international legal system and all the
personalities under the international
law have the obligation and shared
interest in their protection (the rules
ius cogeus). Besides, in the case of
non-observance of those internal legal
norms, sanctions shall be imposed,
primarily legal in nature, unlike the
political agreements where sanctions are
of not legal but political and/or
other nature.
The generally accepted rules of
international law represent legal
principles of the norms derived from
custom rules common to all the states
or known in the majority of legal systems
of the world. Those rules have
general, absolute and objective
character, but also their dynamic
development. At the same time the scope
and character of their changes
provoke different views. There is more
agreement about their identification,
particularly in process law, as the
principles of "reasonable time-limit","
fair trial",
"degrading treatment", "arbitrary
apprehension "presumption of innocence",
timely pronunciation of sentence", "right
to appeal" and other general
rules.
The Federal Constitutional Court
judges that the Resolution of the
Security Council 827 establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal does
not fall within the international law
which constitutes the part of the
internal legal order under Article 16 of
the Constitution of FRY. This is
because an ad hoc measure approved by the
Security Council under the
Resolution - the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for
Criminal prosecution of individuals
responsible for grave violations of the
international humanitarian law-contains
no international legal norms
producing "validity" namely has no
"obligatory strength". Without such
properties that Resolution constitutes
but a political instrument which
entails political obligations, but the
legal validity shall be achieved only
upon its enforcement by the legitimate
and legal authority in individual
legal systems of each state.
Namely, UN member states, having
accepted the UN Charter. Accepted
legal validity of all its norms, and also
the legal instrument passed by UN
bodies in compliance with and in the
manner set out in the Charter. However,
the UN member states had never vested
judicial power to UN bodies. Except
those, naturally expressly specified in
the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, envisaged in the
Chapter XIV of the UN Charter. This is
not the case. That is why the Resolution
of the Security Council 827 in its
item 4 specified a political obligation
of all the states to "fully
cooperate with the International Criminal
Tribunal....and that all the
states undertake measures in keeping with
the national legislation conducive
to giving effect to the provisions" of
that Resolution. Hence, only if and
when that obligation under the mentioned
Resolution of the Security Council
is "translated into a legal norm" in
harmony with the national legislation,
the Statute and the Rules of the
International Criminal Tribunal, shall
obtain the normative character with legal
validity. Without it, those are
specific political obligations; the
non-performance may, of course, produce
very grave consequences for individual
states.
As was said, under Article 24 of the
United Nations Charter, concerning the
international peace and security, the
Security Council in implementing its
mandate, acts on behalf of the United
Nations.
Further to Article 25 of the
Charter - UN members have agreed to
accept and implement the decisions of the
Security Council in line with the
Charter.
In case that Security Council
should find that there exists threat
to peace or violation of peace, it shall
decide what measures are to be
taken to reestablish peace, the supreme
value of the whole international
system.
In conformity with the assessed
status of relations, causes and
consequences, Security Council decided to
establish a court under its
resolution 827 (1993) under the name "The
International Tribunal for
Prosecution of Individuals responsible
for grave violations of the
International Humanitarian Law in the
Territory of former Yugoslavia between
1991". Starting from the substance of
Articles 24, 25 and Article 29 of the
United Nations Charter, that Decision may
be viewed as one of the measures
for protection of peace in the territory
of former SFRY, taken by the United
Nations.
Oppositely, as was already
revealed, this Court was of the view that
the substance of the Charter of the
United Nations does not imply that the
Security Council has an exclusive power
to create and establish judicial
bodies as a protection measure, to deal
with the responsibility of the
citizens in the countries that violated
peace and security in the world. It
follows from the substance of the quoted
provisions of the Charter that such
a measure may be considered as an
international accomplished fact binding
on
any member state of United Nations. In
such a case an obligation is created
to legally regulate the issues concerning
constitutionally guaranteed
freedoms and rights of the citizens,
position of the state authorities and
provision of that protection, as well as
the conduct of local authorities in
giving legal assistance to protect the
international peace. One of the
rights of member states in this case, are
well-supported approaches to the
United Nation bodies to check the
correctness of the procedure.
The above quoted constitutional
and legal provisions imply no
obligation or possibility for the
national legal system, under the
extraordinary procedure and extraordinary
legal instrument, harmonize with
the international coercive measure.
Hence, these relations should be
established in constitutionally oriented
procedure, which shall observe and
be secured by international law, but also
the internal order of FR of
Yugoslavia, in observance of the Charter
of the united Nations,
International Declaration on Human
Rights, the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, Constitution
of FRY and other legal instruments
of the national and international law.
III
4. The Federal Constitutional
Court, by virtue of Article 124, par
1, items 2 and 4 of the Constitution of
FRY and Articles 30, 58 and 68 par
1, items 2 and 4 of the Law on the
Federal Constitutional Court (Official
Gazette of FRY no.36/92), at its session
of 06.11.2001, passed the following
DECISION
It is ruled that the Decree on
the process of cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal (Official
Gazette of FRY no.30/01) is in no
conformity with Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Law on Criminal Proceedings (Official
Gazette of SFRY Nos.4/77, 14/85,
74/87, 57/89, 3/90 and Official Gazette
of FRY No/ 27/92 and 24/94).
The Federal Constitutional Court
has passed the present Decision in
the following sitting: Acting Chairman of
the Federal Constitutional Court
Judge Milan Vesovic, and Judges Milorad
Gogic, Dr. Momcilo Grubac, Mr.
Milomir Jakovljevic, Veseling Lekic and
Aleksandar Simic.
The Federal Constitutional Court
Acting Chairman
of
the Federal Constitutional Court
Judge Milan Vesovic
To join or help this struggle, visit:
http://www.sps.org.yu/ (official SPS
website)
http://www.belgrade-forum.org/ (forum for
the world of equals)
http://www.icdsm.org/ (the international
committee to defend Slobodan
Milosevic)
http://www.jutarnje.co.yu/ ('morning
news' the only Serbian newspaper
advocating liberation)
"DEMOCRATICI" MEDIA JUGOSLAVI INVENTANO
DI SANA PIANTA INTERVISTA A MILOSEVIC
Alcuni media jugoslavi, citandosi a vicenda, e sulla base
di una fonte assolutamente ignota, hanno pubblicato estratti
di una "intervista" che il presidente Milosevic avrebbe
rilasciato al "corrispondente da Roma della agenzia russa
ITAR-TASS" e ad alcuni "altri giornalisti italiani".
Questa vile montatura, pregna di astio e spirito acido,
mira chiaramente a creare confusione in Jugoslavia,
dove la gente e' sempre piu' determinata ad appoggiare
il presidente Milosevic. Inoltre, l'intento e' di nascondere
il vero messaggio politico del presidente Milosevic, dando
molto risalto a simili montature.
(From: "Vladimir Krsljanin" - SPS)
UPOZORENJE: Tzv. intervju Milosevica ITAR-TASS-u je lazan!
Beogradski mediji, pozivajuci se jedan na drugog u krug,
non-stop citiraju ovu jeftinu izmisljotinu, lansiranu sa
ciljem da se stvori konfuzija u casu kada podrska
predsedniku Milosevicu raste, kao i da bi se
sakrile njegove prave poruke.
(From: "Vladimir Krsljanin" - SPS)
SO-CALLED MILOSEVIC'S INTERVIEW TO ITAR-TASS IS FALSE!
Some Yugoslav media, quoting each other, with completelly
unknown source, published excerpts from an "interview" of
President Milosevic given to the "Rome correspondent of
Russian agency ITAR-TASS" and to some "other Italian
journalists". This cheap fabrication, full of spirit of
bitterness and dissapointment has an obvious aim to create
confusion in Yugoslavia, where determination of the people in
support of President Milosevic increases. Also, intention is
to hide the true political messages of President Milosevic by
giving big publicity to fabricated sensations.
(From: "Vladimir Krsljanin" - SPS)
DI SANA PIANTA INTERVISTA A MILOSEVIC
Alcuni media jugoslavi, citandosi a vicenda, e sulla base
di una fonte assolutamente ignota, hanno pubblicato estratti
di una "intervista" che il presidente Milosevic avrebbe
rilasciato al "corrispondente da Roma della agenzia russa
ITAR-TASS" e ad alcuni "altri giornalisti italiani".
Questa vile montatura, pregna di astio e spirito acido,
mira chiaramente a creare confusione in Jugoslavia,
dove la gente e' sempre piu' determinata ad appoggiare
il presidente Milosevic. Inoltre, l'intento e' di nascondere
il vero messaggio politico del presidente Milosevic, dando
molto risalto a simili montature.
(From: "Vladimir Krsljanin" - SPS)
UPOZORENJE: Tzv. intervju Milosevica ITAR-TASS-u je lazan!
Beogradski mediji, pozivajuci se jedan na drugog u krug,
non-stop citiraju ovu jeftinu izmisljotinu, lansiranu sa
ciljem da se stvori konfuzija u casu kada podrska
predsedniku Milosevicu raste, kao i da bi se
sakrile njegove prave poruke.
(From: "Vladimir Krsljanin" - SPS)
SO-CALLED MILOSEVIC'S INTERVIEW TO ITAR-TASS IS FALSE!
Some Yugoslav media, quoting each other, with completelly
unknown source, published excerpts from an "interview" of
President Milosevic given to the "Rome correspondent of
Russian agency ITAR-TASS" and to some "other Italian
journalists". This cheap fabrication, full of spirit of
bitterness and dissapointment has an obvious aim to create
confusion in Yugoslavia, where determination of the people in
support of President Milosevic increases. Also, intention is
to hide the true political messages of President Milosevic by
giving big publicity to fabricated sensations.
(From: "Vladimir Krsljanin" - SPS)
http://news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=
FT3UFAV05XC&live=true&tagid=IXLVJTFUICC&subheading=emergingmarkets
Enron's curious Croatian client
By Robert Wright in Budapest
Financial Times
January 31 2002 23:36
"In one meeting, Mr Tudjman asked Joseph Sutton, head
of Enron's international operations, how much
influence his company had with the US state department
and whether it could arrange WTO entry.
"Mr Sutton said he could not promise WTO membership,
but guaranteed that Enron and the US would lobby for
Croatia's entry into the WTO, Partnership for Peace
and Nato."
The Enron collapse may have finally ended a
long-running scandal over relations between the US
energy company and the semi-authoritarian government
of the late Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman.
Mr Tudjman, who led Croatia through independence,
negotiated a controversial memorandum of understanding
with Enron before his death in December 1999. It would
have given Enron rights to build a power station in
Croatia and run it for 20 years, selling electricity
to HEP, the state electricity company, at above-market
rates.
Questions about the deal intensified after Mr
Tudjman's death and the election, in January 2000, of
a democratic government. Tapes of conversations show
that Mr Tudjman hoped giving Enron the contract would
secure political favours, including a state visit to
Washington.
After renegotiation, Enron is thought to have retained
the right to build a power station and sell
electricity to HEP at above-market rates, though lower
than previously. That contract expires this summer,
though details are unclear due to confidentiality
agreements.
Enron's power deliveries to Croatia ended on November
30, when other European deliveries ceased. The power
station has not been built.
The deal's legacy, however, may be the light it sheds
on Mr Tudjman in his later years - and on Enron's
readiness to and play along with his fantasies.
In the weekly magazine Globus, President Tudjman said
that, on top of a visit to Washington, he expected
Croatia to join the World Trade Organisation, Nato's
Partnership for Peace programme and Nato itself if he
signed the deal. He even linked the deal to avoiding
his arrest and that of other senior figures by the
Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal.
Croatia had been isolated politically - particularly
by the European Union - over treatment of Serbs during
the offensive that ended its war of independence.
When challenged on the cost of electricity under the
deal - an estimated $120m-$200m above market prices
over 20 years - he justified it using the political
benefits.
FT3UFAV05XC&live=true&tagid=IXLVJTFUICC&subheading=emergingmarkets
Enron's curious Croatian client
By Robert Wright in Budapest
Financial Times
January 31 2002 23:36
"In one meeting, Mr Tudjman asked Joseph Sutton, head
of Enron's international operations, how much
influence his company had with the US state department
and whether it could arrange WTO entry.
"Mr Sutton said he could not promise WTO membership,
but guaranteed that Enron and the US would lobby for
Croatia's entry into the WTO, Partnership for Peace
and Nato."
The Enron collapse may have finally ended a
long-running scandal over relations between the US
energy company and the semi-authoritarian government
of the late Croatian president, Franjo Tudjman.
Mr Tudjman, who led Croatia through independence,
negotiated a controversial memorandum of understanding
with Enron before his death in December 1999. It would
have given Enron rights to build a power station in
Croatia and run it for 20 years, selling electricity
to HEP, the state electricity company, at above-market
rates.
Questions about the deal intensified after Mr
Tudjman's death and the election, in January 2000, of
a democratic government. Tapes of conversations show
that Mr Tudjman hoped giving Enron the contract would
secure political favours, including a state visit to
Washington.
After renegotiation, Enron is thought to have retained
the right to build a power station and sell
electricity to HEP at above-market rates, though lower
than previously. That contract expires this summer,
though details are unclear due to confidentiality
agreements.
Enron's power deliveries to Croatia ended on November
30, when other European deliveries ceased. The power
station has not been built.
The deal's legacy, however, may be the light it sheds
on Mr Tudjman in his later years - and on Enron's
readiness to and play along with his fantasies.
In the weekly magazine Globus, President Tudjman said
that, on top of a visit to Washington, he expected
Croatia to join the World Trade Organisation, Nato's
Partnership for Peace programme and Nato itself if he
signed the deal. He even linked the deal to avoiding
his arrest and that of other senior figures by the
Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal.
Croatia had been isolated politically - particularly
by the European Union - over treatment of Serbs during
the offensive that ended its war of independence.
When challenged on the cost of electricity under the
deal - an estimated $120m-$200m above market prices
over 20 years - he justified it using the political
benefits.
Subject: Part 1 - PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC IN
THE HAGUE JAN. 30, 2002 - OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2002 22:57:13 EST
From: JaredI@...
To: JaredI@...
International Committee to Defend Slobodan
Milosevic www.icdsm.org
The URL for this article is:
http://www.icdsm.org/milosevic/30jan.htm
Subscribe to the ICDSM email list at
http://www.icdsm.org/maillist.htm
Receive no more than one article per day.
=============================================
Part 1 - PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC IN THE HAGUE
JAN. 30, 2002 - OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
BY ADDING THREE LIES, ONE DOES NOT GET THE
TRUTH - ONLY A BIGGER LIE
[Posted 1 February 2002]
=============================================
Pres. Milosevic:
By adding three lies, one does not get the
truth - only a bigger lie.
All three indictments really have a thread
running through them - to use an
expression I've heard used here - which is
the ongoing crime against
Yugoslavia and against my people.
This here is obviously a colossal abuse of
power to fabricate an historical
forgery in which those who advocated the
preservation of Yugoslavia would be
charged with its destruction; those who
defended the country would be accused
of crimes; and those who advocated and
committed secession, advocating
separatism and terrorism, would be given
amnesty - because they were backed
by forces that wanted to establish control
over the Balkans, so as to be able
to use this strategic position to establish
their control elsewhere.
As we've heard, you spoke of three connected
events. How come the authors of
this so-called plan, of which they speak so
self-assuredly, only got around
to making allegations about Bosnia and
Croatia after ten years? Furthermore,
these claims are absurd and nonsensical,
primarily because the entire policy
of the Serbs, Serbia and me personally was in
regard to Croatia and Bosnia
focused on peace, not war. We used all our
influence to achieve peace as soon
as possible.
At the very beginning of the conflict in
Croatia, we advocated a political
solution. Based on that proposal, the UN
Protected Areas were established and
the situation calmed down immediately. On
March 24, 1992, the late Croatian
leader Tudjman spoke to his nation from the
Ban Jelacic Square [in Zagreb],
saying literally: "There would not have been
a war had Croatia not wanted it,
but we judged this was the only way to
achieve independence."
There would have certainly been no war had
Croatia not wished for it. Serbia
never participated in that war anyway. It was
an internal conflict.
But why did Croatia want war? Most certainly
not in order for the Croatian
people to use their right to
self-determination and secession (Macedonia,
for example, claimed that right and separated
from Yugoslavia), but to achieve
its goal of expelling half a million Serbs
from Croatia - Serbian Krajina -
who for centuries lived there on their own
land, and not as occupiers.
Until the arrival of that Croatian regime
that wanted war and so admitted
publicly, Croatia had a Constitution
describing it as a state of Croats,
Serbs and other peoples residing therein.
That Constitution was changed.
Serbs lost their rights and their constituent
status in Croatia, and they
rose in rebellion. At the time, few in Serbia
even knew that Serbs lived in
some part of Croatia.
You speak of the plan according to which,
with German support, Croatia was
prematurely recognized at the end of 1991,
without waiting for a political
solution, which sparked a confrontation in
which Serbia - I repeat - only
contributed in finding a peaceful solution as
soon as possible. Even the
Croatian government never accused us of
responsibility for that conflict, and
now I hear, here, today, that we had some
sort of a plan for that?
There was, in fact, a plan - a clear plan
aimed against a state that was, I
would say, at the time a model of future
European federalism. That state was
Yugoslavia, in which multiple nations lived
in a federation, on equal
footing, successfully, with the ability to
prosper, develop, and show the
entire world that coexistence was possible.
All the time we fought for Yugoslavia, for
the preservation of Yugoslavia.
After all, all the facts prove that what I am
saying is true. Only the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which now
exists, retained its ethnic makeup.
There were no expulsions, from the beginning
to the end of the Yugoslav
crisis. All other republics changed their
ethnic makeup. Half a million Serbs
were expelled from Croatia and we all know
what happened in Bosnia, not to
mention other parts of Yugoslavia.
Therefore, I would say this is a malicious,
utterly hostile process aimed at
justifying the crime against my country,
using this 'court' as a weapon
against my country and my people.
Look at Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over there, we
tried from the very beginning to
secure peace. What happened to the Cutillero
Plan, which everyone had backed?
The Islamist Bosnian government rejected it
at the urging of the U.S.
Ambassador and the conflict began. How can
Serbia be accused of anything in
Bosnia, when it is well known that,
attempting to use our influence for
peace, we not only backed all the peace
proposals but also tried to help
implement them?
In 1993, in Athens, there was a meeting at
which the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
was signed. Everybody signed it. I went to
Pale with [Greek Prime Minister]
Mitsotakis and former Yugoslav president
Dobrica Cosic, and we advocated the
acceptance of this plan. Unfortunately, it
was rejected - on May 3 or May 5,
1993, I don't remember exactly. Even then we
initiated a blockade of the Serb
Republic, in order to force its leadership to
accept the peace plan. This was
Serbia's role - to attempt to achieve
peace.
We had constantly emphasized that the only
formula for achieving peace in
Bosnia was to equally protect the interests
of all three peoples in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serbs, Muslims and
Croats. The Dayton Agreement succeeded
because that formula was accepted - because
the national interests of all
three peoples were protected equally.
Now I hear that Dayton was supposed to
discuss Kosovo. That is nonsense. The
Dayton talks were convened to establish peace
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and no
one even thought of addressing the issue of
Kosovo. It has been an internal
issue of Serbia, and no one could have even
dreamed that someone would
attempt to internationalize it.
You cannot, in any way, link Serbia or the
Serbian policy with any kind of
crimes. You especially cannot legally claim,
ten years later, something that
no one ever alleged about us, even then. We
were accorded only respect and
appreciation for the gigantic efforts Serbia
and the Serbian policy made to
achieve peace.
Speaking of Bosnia, do you know that 70,000
Muslim refugees sought sanctuary
in Serbia during the Bosnian conflict? Do you
think someone would flee their
home and take refuge in the very territory
from which they were endangered?
How many lives did we save, how many of your
hostages did we rescue from
Bosnia - from UN peacekeepers to pilots -
and how many peace treaties did we
insist on and make possible? Eventually, we
were the most responsible for the
success of the Dayton talks and the peace
that ensued.
It was a total peace, a complete relaxation
of tensions, and then... I will
tell you how it all began in Kosovo. Because
of the plan to establish control
of the Balkans, the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, efforts were made to
destabilize Kosovo at precisely the time when
it seemed everything would be
resolved peacefully.
(CONTINUED PART 2)
www.icdsm.org
THE HAGUE JAN. 30, 2002 - OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2002 22:57:13 EST
From: JaredI@...
To: JaredI@...
International Committee to Defend Slobodan
Milosevic www.icdsm.org
The URL for this article is:
http://www.icdsm.org/milosevic/30jan.htm
Subscribe to the ICDSM email list at
http://www.icdsm.org/maillist.htm
Receive no more than one article per day.
=============================================
Part 1 - PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC IN THE HAGUE
JAN. 30, 2002 - OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
BY ADDING THREE LIES, ONE DOES NOT GET THE
TRUTH - ONLY A BIGGER LIE
[Posted 1 February 2002]
=============================================
Pres. Milosevic:
By adding three lies, one does not get the
truth - only a bigger lie.
All three indictments really have a thread
running through them - to use an
expression I've heard used here - which is
the ongoing crime against
Yugoslavia and against my people.
This here is obviously a colossal abuse of
power to fabricate an historical
forgery in which those who advocated the
preservation of Yugoslavia would be
charged with its destruction; those who
defended the country would be accused
of crimes; and those who advocated and
committed secession, advocating
separatism and terrorism, would be given
amnesty - because they were backed
by forces that wanted to establish control
over the Balkans, so as to be able
to use this strategic position to establish
their control elsewhere.
As we've heard, you spoke of three connected
events. How come the authors of
this so-called plan, of which they speak so
self-assuredly, only got around
to making allegations about Bosnia and
Croatia after ten years? Furthermore,
these claims are absurd and nonsensical,
primarily because the entire policy
of the Serbs, Serbia and me personally was in
regard to Croatia and Bosnia
focused on peace, not war. We used all our
influence to achieve peace as soon
as possible.
At the very beginning of the conflict in
Croatia, we advocated a political
solution. Based on that proposal, the UN
Protected Areas were established and
the situation calmed down immediately. On
March 24, 1992, the late Croatian
leader Tudjman spoke to his nation from the
Ban Jelacic Square [in Zagreb],
saying literally: "There would not have been
a war had Croatia not wanted it,
but we judged this was the only way to
achieve independence."
There would have certainly been no war had
Croatia not wished for it. Serbia
never participated in that war anyway. It was
an internal conflict.
But why did Croatia want war? Most certainly
not in order for the Croatian
people to use their right to
self-determination and secession (Macedonia,
for example, claimed that right and separated
from Yugoslavia), but to achieve
its goal of expelling half a million Serbs
from Croatia - Serbian Krajina -
who for centuries lived there on their own
land, and not as occupiers.
Until the arrival of that Croatian regime
that wanted war and so admitted
publicly, Croatia had a Constitution
describing it as a state of Croats,
Serbs and other peoples residing therein.
That Constitution was changed.
Serbs lost their rights and their constituent
status in Croatia, and they
rose in rebellion. At the time, few in Serbia
even knew that Serbs lived in
some part of Croatia.
You speak of the plan according to which,
with German support, Croatia was
prematurely recognized at the end of 1991,
without waiting for a political
solution, which sparked a confrontation in
which Serbia - I repeat - only
contributed in finding a peaceful solution as
soon as possible. Even the
Croatian government never accused us of
responsibility for that conflict, and
now I hear, here, today, that we had some
sort of a plan for that?
There was, in fact, a plan - a clear plan
aimed against a state that was, I
would say, at the time a model of future
European federalism. That state was
Yugoslavia, in which multiple nations lived
in a federation, on equal
footing, successfully, with the ability to
prosper, develop, and show the
entire world that coexistence was possible.
All the time we fought for Yugoslavia, for
the preservation of Yugoslavia.
After all, all the facts prove that what I am
saying is true. Only the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which now
exists, retained its ethnic makeup.
There were no expulsions, from the beginning
to the end of the Yugoslav
crisis. All other republics changed their
ethnic makeup. Half a million Serbs
were expelled from Croatia and we all know
what happened in Bosnia, not to
mention other parts of Yugoslavia.
Therefore, I would say this is a malicious,
utterly hostile process aimed at
justifying the crime against my country,
using this 'court' as a weapon
against my country and my people.
Look at Bosnia-Herzegovina. Over there, we
tried from the very beginning to
secure peace. What happened to the Cutillero
Plan, which everyone had backed?
The Islamist Bosnian government rejected it
at the urging of the U.S.
Ambassador and the conflict began. How can
Serbia be accused of anything in
Bosnia, when it is well known that,
attempting to use our influence for
peace, we not only backed all the peace
proposals but also tried to help
implement them?
In 1993, in Athens, there was a meeting at
which the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
was signed. Everybody signed it. I went to
Pale with [Greek Prime Minister]
Mitsotakis and former Yugoslav president
Dobrica Cosic, and we advocated the
acceptance of this plan. Unfortunately, it
was rejected - on May 3 or May 5,
1993, I don't remember exactly. Even then we
initiated a blockade of the Serb
Republic, in order to force its leadership to
accept the peace plan. This was
Serbia's role - to attempt to achieve
peace.
We had constantly emphasized that the only
formula for achieving peace in
Bosnia was to equally protect the interests
of all three peoples in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Serbs, Muslims and
Croats. The Dayton Agreement succeeded
because that formula was accepted - because
the national interests of all
three peoples were protected equally.
Now I hear that Dayton was supposed to
discuss Kosovo. That is nonsense. The
Dayton talks were convened to establish peace
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and no
one even thought of addressing the issue of
Kosovo. It has been an internal
issue of Serbia, and no one could have even
dreamed that someone would
attempt to internationalize it.
You cannot, in any way, link Serbia or the
Serbian policy with any kind of
crimes. You especially cannot legally claim,
ten years later, something that
no one ever alleged about us, even then. We
were accorded only respect and
appreciation for the gigantic efforts Serbia
and the Serbian policy made to
achieve peace.
Speaking of Bosnia, do you know that 70,000
Muslim refugees sought sanctuary
in Serbia during the Bosnian conflict? Do you
think someone would flee their
home and take refuge in the very territory
from which they were endangered?
How many lives did we save, how many of your
hostages did we rescue from
Bosnia - from UN peacekeepers to pilots -
and how many peace treaties did we
insist on and make possible? Eventually, we
were the most responsible for the
success of the Dayton talks and the peace
that ensued.
It was a total peace, a complete relaxation
of tensions, and then... I will
tell you how it all began in Kosovo. Because
of the plan to establish control
of the Balkans, the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, efforts were made to
destabilize Kosovo at precisely the time when
it seemed everything would be
resolved peacefully.
(CONTINUED PART 2)
www.icdsm.org
Subject: Part 2 of 2 - PRESIDENT
MILOSEVIC IN THE HAGUE JAN. 30, 2002 - TRANSCRIPT
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2002 22:58:39 EST
From: JaredI@...
To: JaredI@...
Part 2 of 2 - PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC IN
THE HAGUE JAN. 30, 2002 - TRANSCRIPT
In November 1997, there was a summit
meeting in Crete of all heads of state
and governments of Southeastern Europe.
Back then, we discussed - at our
initiative - the elimination of
barriers, tariffs, integration within
Southeastern Europe and improving our
mutual cooperation. I had a direct
dialog with the Albanian Prime Minister
Fatos Nano. We spoke of normalizing
our relations, eliminating visas and
tariffs, developing transport and trade
links, et cetera. Fatos Nano and I went
before the TV cameras and he then
said, after talking about cooperation
and improving our mutual relations,
that Kosovo was an internal Serbian
matter. This was a promise of peace, of
peaceful solutions to all these problems.
But this was an alarm for all the
powers that continued to act criminally
against my country, trying to
destabilize Yugoslavia and intervene
the way they did. A month or two afterwards,
we received a letter from [German
Foreign Minister] Kinkel and [French
Foreign Minister] Vedrine saying they
were worried about the situation in
Kosovo. For ten years since the time you
claim Serbia "seized" control of its
own territory, there were no murders,
no expulsions, no plunder, no arson, no
arrests in Kosovo. We did not have a
single political prisoner in Yugoslavia
- not one. Kosovo had 20 newspapers
and other publications in Albanian,
which one could buy at every street
corner. Not a single issue, not a
single copy, was ever banned. Albanian
political parties, even separatist
ones, worked freely. Someone here said
we tolerated them. No, our view was that
everything should be permitted - except
violence.
Then the powers behind Yugoslavia's
destruction and occupation rounded up
criminals throughout Western Europe and
sent them to Kosovo to establish a
terrorist organization. They began
terrorist attacks in the spring of 1998.
Then they were crushed. By the fall of
1998, they were completely eliminated,
surrendering by the truckload the
weapons they had smuggled in.
Within that year, they mostly killed
Albanians. I do not have specific
figures with me, since I did not know I
would be given a chance to speak
today. I was notified of my appearance
here only yesterday, and I did not
know what would be discussed. So I do
not have all the specific information,
but I will tell you what I do have. Two
and a half times...
Claude Jorda:
Mr. Milosevic, please allow...
Pres. Milosevic:
... more Albanians than Serbs were
killed by the terrorists in 1998. They
killed Albanian police officers, postal
carriers, forest rangers, even
retirees - only because they received
their retirement checks from the state.
They were attempting to strike terror
in the hearts of Albanians as well as
kill Serbs. We protected our citizens
- both Serbs and Albanians - from
terrorism, and this operation was
completed by the fall of 1998. Then [US
envoy] Holbrooke came to demand a
Verification Mission in order to create
a pretext for attacking Yugoslavia. Let
me tell you....
Claude Jorda:
Mr. Milosevic, allow me just a minute.
Please. Just one minute. I will not
take away your time, I will certainly
give it to you. Even this International
Tribunal whose legality you dispute is
giving you the opportunity to fully
state your case. It seems to me, first
of all, that you are ready to start
with the trial - even today, as it
seems. This goes to your credit. You are
ready. But I have to take you back to
the... Please, try not to completely
lose sight of the issue we are discussing
today. We are not the chamber that
will conduct your trial. We understand
well that your central idea is quite
contrary - that this is a victimization
of your country. It has been heard
and understood.
It would be good for you, Mr.
Milosevic, not to deceive yourself about the
chamber that will try you. You have the
same amount of time as the prosecutor
here. As the chairman of this chamber I
guarantee that. Please, do not lose
sight of the topic we are discussing, then.
You have a thesis you are attempting to
defend, and you have that right - and
will have that right. However, I have
to remind you that this Appeals chamber
is facing an important procedural
question. It may not be important to you,
but it is to us, since we are trying to
safeguard the norms of just and
equitable procedure. What we would like
to know is if you would like your
trial for Kosovo to be separate from
the trial for Bosnia and Croatia, or if
you would prefer them to be combined. I
understand that you might answer this
in a roundabout way. I will, of course,
permit you to speak. You are a
defendant who has good mental health
and clarity of thought. Therefore I ask
you to try and answer this question.
Thank you in advance. You have the floor
again.
Pres. Milosevic:
First of all, this is the only time I
have not been interrupted, the first
time I can say something, and I will
use every opportunity to address the
public regarding the crime that is
being perpetrated against my country. I
do this not because of procedure, since
procedure does not interest me, but in
order to answer the attacks against my
country and my people, and the ongoing
crimes against them. I want the public
to know that after the aggression...
Claude Jorda:
Please wait, Mr. Milosevic. You
understand that you have much time at
your disposal, but you will have more when
the trial starts. This is, of course,
not the subject of today's debate.
You have the right to continue. But you
are now addressing the people outside
this courtroom. Mr. Milosevic, I have
to tell you that you will have the
right to address the public. The
international community created this
trial and I certainly wish that all the
rules that apply to the prosecution, to
you and to the civilization are
respected. Today's debate is about
how the trial would take place in
another chamber. I have no intention of
interrupting you and will subtract the
time I used up by my interruptions. You may
proceed now.
Pres. Milosevic:
I want to emphasize that the crime
against my country has continued. The
most recent Serb murdered in Kosovo that
I've heard of was killed on Christmas
this year. Some 350,000 were expelled
from Kosovo under UN auspices, while
Albanian terrorist activities were
protected by the UN. Since the arrival of
the so-called UN peacekeepers that were
obligated by [UN Security Council]
Resolution 1244 to guarantee the
security of person and property to
every inhabitant of Kosovo, Albanian
terrorists have expelled 350,000 people
and torched tens of thousands of homes.
Sometimes they would burn 50, 60, all
the Serbian houses in a village, in plain
sight of the [UN] troops. These are in
fact occupation troops, who came [to
Kosovo] under the UN banner only to
transform themselves overnight into
occupiers and allies of the terrorists
who killed, who mutilated and butchered
so many, and burned so much, and
continue to do so even today. And they
say they were unaware this was happening.
Can anyone believe that the troops over
there could be unaware that tens of
thousands of homes were being torched?
Can someone damage and destroy...since
the UN troops came, 107 Serbian
churches have been destroyed. Can someone
destroy an entire church and burn it
without the UN troops knowing?
This is a "joint criminal enterprise"
- of the forces who committed crimes
against Yugoslavia with the drug-Mafia
and Albanian terrorists in Kosovo, for
the purpose of crimes not only against
the Serbs but all other non-Albanians,
even Catholic Albanians. Even Albanians
who, in any way - such as cashing
their retirement checks - showed any
loyalty to the Republic of Serbia as
their state.
What is happening over there is
practically the rehabilitation of a policy
led by Hitler and Mussolini. This talk
about "Greater Serbia", this alleged
idea that never really existed, is only
raised to mask the creation of
"Greater Albania" - the very same one
that was made by Hitler and Mussolini
in World War Two. Look at it then, and
look at what is being done now, what
they want to seize from Serbia,
Montenegro, Macedonia - tomorrow maybe from
northern Greece, when Greek-Turkish
relations are strained under orders of
the common master.
This is obviously a crime, and the
thread running through it is obviously
a crime against Yugoslavia. I want to
point out that falsifying historical
facts is not easy, though. It is not
easy even when these facts are only
known to a select group of people, and
downright impossible when millions,
entire nations, know the facts. With
all due respect, the real judges in this
trial - not you who wear the robes
- are those who decided to murder
children in my country, who launched
NATO's aggression and dropped 25
thousand tons of bombs in 78 days,
murdering mostly elderly people,
children and women.
They want to play that role. But they
will not be the judges.
The real judge here is the people -
not just the people of Yugoslavia, but
the peoples of all the countries who
care about liberty and equality. Not for
nothing do we have a saying that the
judgment of the people is the judgment
of God. We all face that judgment, not
just me - who is facing an attempt
here to be made responsible instead of
being given recognition - but also
you, and your employers, especially
those who committed crimes against my
country.
Since you want me to request something
of you, let me demand this: set me
free. I demand to be set free because
you and the entire world should know by
now that I will not run from a fight
for my people and my country. I have no
intention of running. It does not serve
the honor of this institution to keep
me imprisoned here, in disgraceful
conditions, in order to deprive me of
equality in stating my arguments -
even if this institution were legal,
and you know very well that it isn't.
For if you didn't know - and I
don't refer to you in particular, but
to the institution - then you would have
accepted the motion from the amici curiae
to seek advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice on the
legality of this tribunal. You did not
seek it, because the outcome would be
entirely predictable.
Altogether, I think that such a
criminal approach, an attempt to cast
the victim as the culprit, both in regard
to my country, my people and myself,
has not yet been recorded in history.
With that in mind, I consider it both
logical and just to release me
immediately. I will not flee, and I am
ready to enter any of these debates, since
this is one battle which I certainly
have an obligation to fight.
***
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MILOSEVIC IN THE HAGUE JAN. 30, 2002 - TRANSCRIPT
Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2002 22:58:39 EST
From: JaredI@...
To: JaredI@...
Part 2 of 2 - PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC IN
THE HAGUE JAN. 30, 2002 - TRANSCRIPT
In November 1997, there was a summit
meeting in Crete of all heads of state
and governments of Southeastern Europe.
Back then, we discussed - at our
initiative - the elimination of
barriers, tariffs, integration within
Southeastern Europe and improving our
mutual cooperation. I had a direct
dialog with the Albanian Prime Minister
Fatos Nano. We spoke of normalizing
our relations, eliminating visas and
tariffs, developing transport and trade
links, et cetera. Fatos Nano and I went
before the TV cameras and he then
said, after talking about cooperation
and improving our mutual relations,
that Kosovo was an internal Serbian
matter. This was a promise of peace, of
peaceful solutions to all these problems.
But this was an alarm for all the
powers that continued to act criminally
against my country, trying to
destabilize Yugoslavia and intervene
the way they did. A month or two afterwards,
we received a letter from [German
Foreign Minister] Kinkel and [French
Foreign Minister] Vedrine saying they
were worried about the situation in
Kosovo. For ten years since the time you
claim Serbia "seized" control of its
own territory, there were no murders,
no expulsions, no plunder, no arson, no
arrests in Kosovo. We did not have a
single political prisoner in Yugoslavia
- not one. Kosovo had 20 newspapers
and other publications in Albanian,
which one could buy at every street
corner. Not a single issue, not a
single copy, was ever banned. Albanian
political parties, even separatist
ones, worked freely. Someone here said
we tolerated them. No, our view was that
everything should be permitted - except
violence.
Then the powers behind Yugoslavia's
destruction and occupation rounded up
criminals throughout Western Europe and
sent them to Kosovo to establish a
terrorist organization. They began
terrorist attacks in the spring of 1998.
Then they were crushed. By the fall of
1998, they were completely eliminated,
surrendering by the truckload the
weapons they had smuggled in.
Within that year, they mostly killed
Albanians. I do not have specific
figures with me, since I did not know I
would be given a chance to speak
today. I was notified of my appearance
here only yesterday, and I did not
know what would be discussed. So I do
not have all the specific information,
but I will tell you what I do have. Two
and a half times...
Claude Jorda:
Mr. Milosevic, please allow...
Pres. Milosevic:
... more Albanians than Serbs were
killed by the terrorists in 1998. They
killed Albanian police officers, postal
carriers, forest rangers, even
retirees - only because they received
their retirement checks from the state.
They were attempting to strike terror
in the hearts of Albanians as well as
kill Serbs. We protected our citizens
- both Serbs and Albanians - from
terrorism, and this operation was
completed by the fall of 1998. Then [US
envoy] Holbrooke came to demand a
Verification Mission in order to create
a pretext for attacking Yugoslavia. Let
me tell you....
Claude Jorda:
Mr. Milosevic, allow me just a minute.
Please. Just one minute. I will not
take away your time, I will certainly
give it to you. Even this International
Tribunal whose legality you dispute is
giving you the opportunity to fully
state your case. It seems to me, first
of all, that you are ready to start
with the trial - even today, as it
seems. This goes to your credit. You are
ready. But I have to take you back to
the... Please, try not to completely
lose sight of the issue we are discussing
today. We are not the chamber that
will conduct your trial. We understand
well that your central idea is quite
contrary - that this is a victimization
of your country. It has been heard
and understood.
It would be good for you, Mr.
Milosevic, not to deceive yourself about the
chamber that will try you. You have the
same amount of time as the prosecutor
here. As the chairman of this chamber I
guarantee that. Please, do not lose
sight of the topic we are discussing, then.
You have a thesis you are attempting to
defend, and you have that right - and
will have that right. However, I have
to remind you that this Appeals chamber
is facing an important procedural
question. It may not be important to you,
but it is to us, since we are trying to
safeguard the norms of just and
equitable procedure. What we would like
to know is if you would like your
trial for Kosovo to be separate from
the trial for Bosnia and Croatia, or if
you would prefer them to be combined. I
understand that you might answer this
in a roundabout way. I will, of course,
permit you to speak. You are a
defendant who has good mental health
and clarity of thought. Therefore I ask
you to try and answer this question.
Thank you in advance. You have the floor
again.
Pres. Milosevic:
First of all, this is the only time I
have not been interrupted, the first
time I can say something, and I will
use every opportunity to address the
public regarding the crime that is
being perpetrated against my country. I
do this not because of procedure, since
procedure does not interest me, but in
order to answer the attacks against my
country and my people, and the ongoing
crimes against them. I want the public
to know that after the aggression...
Claude Jorda:
Please wait, Mr. Milosevic. You
understand that you have much time at
your disposal, but you will have more when
the trial starts. This is, of course,
not the subject of today's debate.
You have the right to continue. But you
are now addressing the people outside
this courtroom. Mr. Milosevic, I have
to tell you that you will have the
right to address the public. The
international community created this
trial and I certainly wish that all the
rules that apply to the prosecution, to
you and to the civilization are
respected. Today's debate is about
how the trial would take place in
another chamber. I have no intention of
interrupting you and will subtract the
time I used up by my interruptions. You may
proceed now.
Pres. Milosevic:
I want to emphasize that the crime
against my country has continued. The
most recent Serb murdered in Kosovo that
I've heard of was killed on Christmas
this year. Some 350,000 were expelled
from Kosovo under UN auspices, while
Albanian terrorist activities were
protected by the UN. Since the arrival of
the so-called UN peacekeepers that were
obligated by [UN Security Council]
Resolution 1244 to guarantee the
security of person and property to
every inhabitant of Kosovo, Albanian
terrorists have expelled 350,000 people
and torched tens of thousands of homes.
Sometimes they would burn 50, 60, all
the Serbian houses in a village, in plain
sight of the [UN] troops. These are in
fact occupation troops, who came [to
Kosovo] under the UN banner only to
transform themselves overnight into
occupiers and allies of the terrorists
who killed, who mutilated and butchered
so many, and burned so much, and
continue to do so even today. And they
say they were unaware this was happening.
Can anyone believe that the troops over
there could be unaware that tens of
thousands of homes were being torched?
Can someone damage and destroy...since
the UN troops came, 107 Serbian
churches have been destroyed. Can someone
destroy an entire church and burn it
without the UN troops knowing?
This is a "joint criminal enterprise"
- of the forces who committed crimes
against Yugoslavia with the drug-Mafia
and Albanian terrorists in Kosovo, for
the purpose of crimes not only against
the Serbs but all other non-Albanians,
even Catholic Albanians. Even Albanians
who, in any way - such as cashing
their retirement checks - showed any
loyalty to the Republic of Serbia as
their state.
What is happening over there is
practically the rehabilitation of a policy
led by Hitler and Mussolini. This talk
about "Greater Serbia", this alleged
idea that never really existed, is only
raised to mask the creation of
"Greater Albania" - the very same one
that was made by Hitler and Mussolini
in World War Two. Look at it then, and
look at what is being done now, what
they want to seize from Serbia,
Montenegro, Macedonia - tomorrow maybe from
northern Greece, when Greek-Turkish
relations are strained under orders of
the common master.
This is obviously a crime, and the
thread running through it is obviously
a crime against Yugoslavia. I want to
point out that falsifying historical
facts is not easy, though. It is not
easy even when these facts are only
known to a select group of people, and
downright impossible when millions,
entire nations, know the facts. With
all due respect, the real judges in this
trial - not you who wear the robes
- are those who decided to murder
children in my country, who launched
NATO's aggression and dropped 25
thousand tons of bombs in 78 days,
murdering mostly elderly people,
children and women.
They want to play that role. But they
will not be the judges.
The real judge here is the people -
not just the people of Yugoslavia, but
the peoples of all the countries who
care about liberty and equality. Not for
nothing do we have a saying that the
judgment of the people is the judgment
of God. We all face that judgment, not
just me - who is facing an attempt
here to be made responsible instead of
being given recognition - but also
you, and your employers, especially
those who committed crimes against my
country.
Since you want me to request something
of you, let me demand this: set me
free. I demand to be set free because
you and the entire world should know by
now that I will not run from a fight
for my people and my country. I have no
intention of running. It does not serve
the honor of this institution to keep
me imprisoned here, in disgraceful
conditions, in order to deprive me of
equality in stating my arguments -
even if this institution were legal,
and you know very well that it isn't.
For if you didn't know - and I
don't refer to you in particular, but
to the institution - then you would have
accepted the motion from the amici curiae
to seek advisory opinion from the
International Court of Justice on the
legality of this tribunal. You did not
seek it, because the outcome would be
entirely predictable.
Altogether, I think that such a
criminal approach, an attempt to cast
the victim as the culprit, both in regard
to my country, my people and myself,
has not yet been recorded in history.
With that in mind, I consider it both
logical and just to release me
immediately. I will not flee, and I am
ready to enter any of these debates, since
this is one battle which I certainly
have an obligation to fight.
***
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AMSELFELD NEWSLETTER 31.1.2002
________________________
AMSELFELD NEWSLETTER
31.1.2002
http://www.amselfeld.com
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+++ Ab Freitag wieder Konvois von und nach Strpce +++
STRPCE, 31.Januar 2002. Ab dem morgigen Freitag werden wieder
Konvois in den Ort Strpce in der serbischen Provinz Kosovo und Metochien
gelangen können. Dies erklärte heute der Ortsvorsitzende der
demokratischen Partei Slavisa Staletovic. Die KFOR besteht nun nicht
mehr darauf, daß die serbische Bevölkerung den von der UNMIK
zwangseingesetzten albanischen Bürgermeister in den Ort lassen, weswegen
der Ort und seine Bevölkerung sowohl von der KFOR abgeriegelt, als auch
von Albanern blockiert worden war.
STIMME KOSOVOS
+++ Albanischer Schütze von Plemetina gefaßt +++
PLEMETINA, 31.Januar 2002. Der Albaner, der gestern in der
Ortschaft Plemetina auf eine Gruppe serbischer Kinder geschossen hat,
konnte heute festgenommen werden. Glücklicherweise wurde bei dem
hinterhältigen Angriff, den der Albaner aus seinem Auto heraus
ausgeführt hatte, keines der Kinder verletzt.
STIMME KOSOVOS
+++ Neue Kommunalwahlen in Kosovo und Metochien? +++
PRISTINA, 31.Januar 2002. Nach den Worten der UNMIK-Sprecherin
Suzan Manuel wird es im September dieses Jahres neue Kommunalwahlen in
der serbischen Provinz Kosovo und Metochien geben. Die Wahlen werden
erneut von den UN und der OSZE organisiert werden.
B92
Redaktion Amselfeld
leserbriefe@...
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Um von dieser Mailingliste entfernt zu werden,
klicken Sie den unteren Link an:
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________________________
AMSELFELD NEWSLETTER
31.1.2002
http://www.amselfeld.com
________________________
+++ Ab Freitag wieder Konvois von und nach Strpce +++
STRPCE, 31.Januar 2002. Ab dem morgigen Freitag werden wieder
Konvois in den Ort Strpce in der serbischen Provinz Kosovo und Metochien
gelangen können. Dies erklärte heute der Ortsvorsitzende der
demokratischen Partei Slavisa Staletovic. Die KFOR besteht nun nicht
mehr darauf, daß die serbische Bevölkerung den von der UNMIK
zwangseingesetzten albanischen Bürgermeister in den Ort lassen, weswegen
der Ort und seine Bevölkerung sowohl von der KFOR abgeriegelt, als auch
von Albanern blockiert worden war.
STIMME KOSOVOS
+++ Albanischer Schütze von Plemetina gefaßt +++
PLEMETINA, 31.Januar 2002. Der Albaner, der gestern in der
Ortschaft Plemetina auf eine Gruppe serbischer Kinder geschossen hat,
konnte heute festgenommen werden. Glücklicherweise wurde bei dem
hinterhältigen Angriff, den der Albaner aus seinem Auto heraus
ausgeführt hatte, keines der Kinder verletzt.
STIMME KOSOVOS
+++ Neue Kommunalwahlen in Kosovo und Metochien? +++
PRISTINA, 31.Januar 2002. Nach den Worten der UNMIK-Sprecherin
Suzan Manuel wird es im September dieses Jahres neue Kommunalwahlen in
der serbischen Provinz Kosovo und Metochien geben. Die Wahlen werden
erneut von den UN und der OSZE organisiert werden.
B92
Redaktion Amselfeld
leserbriefe@...
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Um von dieser Mailingliste entfernt zu werden,
klicken Sie den unteren Link an:
http://amselfeld.com/cgi-bin/mail.cgi?jugocoord@...
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