POLITICAMENTE SCORRETTI


Osservatorio Etico Ambientale wrote:
>
> VI CONTESTO QUESTA CILEGINA perché Alessandro Curzi,
> HA DETTO LA VERITÀ !!!
>
> Siete attenti a criticare gli altri, e nello stesso momento siete carenti del
> senso di auto critica !!
>
> Siete politicamente scorretti !
>
> In poche parole, voi tutti siete per una Dittatura che si chiama: Dittatura
> del Proletariato !?
> Io sono di origine jugoslava e in ex-Yugoslavia non c'è stata mai la Dittatura
> del Proletariato ! C'è stata la Dittatura, però, la Dittatura
> del CKMP Yugoslavije [Comitato Centrale del Partito Comunista]!!! Il resto è
> stata solo una illusione: i operai non hanno avuto mai la voce in capitolo: la
> famosa autogestione " fabbriche agli operai", era solo sulla carta e nei mass
> media ! Gli operai non avevano diritto di contestare assolutamente niente,
> altrimenti chi lo faceva subiva delle persecuzioni di vario tipo ! Il
> Sindacato era di fatto una struttura virtuale ! Non hanno mai curato gli
> interessi degli operai, mentre la "borghesia rossa" del Comitato Centrale del
> Partito Comunista Yugoslavo faceva bello e cattivo tempo !!! Si sanno queste
> cose molto bene, è inutile nascondersi dietro un dito !
>
> Chi non era iscritto nel Partito Comunista non poteva fare nessun passo nella
> vita, malgrado la capacità e qualità che avevano le persone ! Quasi tutto
> funzionava sulla raccomandazione e familiarissimo ... chi non condivideva tale
> politica fu perseguitato con l'accusa di essere dissidente, o traditore o
> fascista o mercenario delle "forze nefaste occidentali" ...
>
> PIACE O NO, questa è la verità !
>
> Chi dice diversamente semplicemente è: o un ignorante o è un essere in mala
> fede che difende interessi chissà quali !!!
>
> Da parte nostra possiamo solo salutare le parole del
> Compagno Direttore Alessandro Curzi !!
>
> BRAVO CURZI, BEN'DETTO !!!
>
> Voi in Italia avete tanti di quelli problemi e "pani sporchi", [per esempio:
> avete ancora le leggi fascista in vigore], che di certo non potete criticare
> il popolo yugolsavo e le loro legittime scelte !!!
>
> Il voto del popolo yugoslavo è una svolta millenaria e di certo non
> permetteranno a nessuno di confiscare la Vittoria storica ! Noi non abbiamo
> dimenticato cosa è successo nel famoso 1948. quando regime di Staglin ci
> voleva sotto il suo ombrello. Sono stati per primi proprio i comunisti
> italiani di allora ad appoggiare Staglin ... !!
>
> Se vi piace così tanto la Dittatura di qualsiasi tipo perché non mettete Slobo
> Milosevic, Mira Markovic, Vojislav Seselj, Zjugunov e Zirinowschi
> nel vostro Montecitorio ?!
>
> Ma per favore, fate un aggiornamento della vostra geografia mentale ?!
>
> Un altra cosa, dovete moderare il vostro linguaggio:"...con le pezze al culo
> ..." è una espressione di peggior giornalismo, compreso pure quel giornalismo
> italiano noto come giornalismo inquisitorio pieno di bugie, menzogne e
> disinformazione lanciate a insabbiare ogni progresso delle
> forze veramente sane !!!!
>
> Mi state deludeno, mi dispiace !!!!
>
> Ciao a tutti,
>
> Danica Razlag
> http://stop-u238.i.am
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> Date: Sat, 30 Sep 00 12:47PM MET DST
> From: Coordinamento Romano per la Jugoslavia <crj@...>
> To: crj <crj@...>
> Subject: Ciliegina numero 206 BIS
>
> DEMOCRAZIA O DITTATURA?
>
> Subject: Re: Ciliegina numero 206
> Date: Sat, 30 Sep 2000 12:12:35 +0200
> From: "sorgiorgio"
> To: <alessandro.curzi@...>, "crj"
>
> Caro Compagno Direttore Alessandro Curzi,
> hai torto! In Jugoslavia, purtroppo, c'è la democrazia. Quando c'era la
> Dittatura, la Dittatura del Proletariato,
> le cose andavano molto meglio.
> Vedi la Russia adesso c'è la democrazia e sono con le pezze al culo.
> Cordiali saluti
>

Gentile signora Danica,

kao prvo, mi od CRJ nismo samo italijani, ima i jugoslavena, i to znaci
OD CIJELE SFRJ-e.

La RFS di Jugoslavia poteva certo essere meglio di quello che e' stata,
fatto sta che - proprio in base ai discutibili criteri di democrazia da
lei richiamati - era assai piu' "democratica" del resto dei paesi a
"socialismo reale". La conseguenza di questa "democraticita'", tanto
apprezzata allora anche dalla nostra "sinistra" che oggi vi bombarda, e'
stato lo sfascio del paese, caduto in mano alle forze "democratiche"
filooccidentali, nazionaliste borghesi e secessioniste.

Lei scrive: "chi non condivideva tale politica fu perseguitato con
l'accusa di essere dissidente, o traditore o fascista o mercenario delle
'forze nefaste occidentali'". Magari avesse ragione! Dissidenti,
traditori, fascisti e mercenari al soldo dell'occidente erano veramente
un pericolo che purtroppo fu preso sottogamba, come e' dimostrato dal
fatto che quando queste canaglie hanno preso il potere - da Jansa a
Tudjman a Izetbegovic a Djukanovic a Thaci - la RFSJ e' precipitata in
un bagno di sangue.

Per quanto riguarda il libero voto del popolo jugoslavo, siete voi che
non lo state rispettando: infatti - come blocco DOS - avete partecipato
alle elezioni, eravate presenti come scrutatori in tutti i seggi, avete
lavorato nella commissione elettorale centrale insieme ai rappresentanti
di tutti i candidati. ED AVETE VINTO: quasi la maggioranza assoluta!
Allora, perche' non volete andare al ballottaggio? Con l'appoggio di
Seselj, di Djukanovic e di chissa' chi altro otterreste una maggioranza
schiacciante!

Perche' non volete andare al ballottaggio?
Perche' ve lo dicono gli USA, dai quali ricevete miliardi di dollari,
che vogliono gettare discredito sul sistema politico della RF di
Jugoslavia per condurre ad uno sfascio ulteriore, incominciando dalla
secessione del Montenegro, che e' gia' un feudo della mafia albanese.

S jugoslavenkim pozdravima

CRJ


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------

106th CONGRESS
2d Session

H. R. 1064
AN ACT
To authorize a coordinated program to promote the development of
democracy in Serbia and Montenegro.

HR 1064 EH
106th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 1064

AN ACT
To authorize a coordinated program to promote the development of
democracy in Serbia and Montenegro.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE- This Act may be cited as the `Serbia Democratization
Act of
2000'.
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES
Sec. 101. Findings and policy.
Sec. 102. Assistance to promote democracy and civil society in
Yugoslavia.
Sec. 103. Authority for radio and television broadcasting.
Sec. 104. Development of political contacts relating to the Republic of
Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.
TITLE II--ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS OF OPPRESSION
Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Sense of the Congress.
Sec. 203. Assistance.
TITLE III--`OUTER WALL' SANCTIONS
Sec. 301. `Outer Wall' sanctions.
Sec. 302. International financial institutions not in compliance with
`Outer
Wall' sanctions.
TITLE IV--OTHER MEASURES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA
Sec. 401. Blocking assets in the United States.
Sec. 402. Suspension of entry into the United States.
Sec. 403. Prohibition on strategic exports to Yugoslavia.
Sec. 404. Prohibition on loans and investment.
Sec. 405. Prohibition of military-to-military cooperation.
Sec. 406. Multilateral sanctions.
Sec. 407. Exemptions.
Sec. 408. Waiver; termination of measures against Yugoslavia.
Sec. 409. Statutory construction.
TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Sec. 501. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Sec. 502. Sense of the Congress with respect to ethnic Hungarians of
Vojvodina.
Sec. 503. Ownership and use of diplomatic and consular properties.
Sec. 504. Transition assistance.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:
(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES- The term `appropriate
congressional committees' means the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the
Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives.
(2) COMMERCIAL EXPORT- The term `commercial export' means the sale of an
agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical equipment by a United
States
seller to a foreign buyer in exchange for cash payment on market terms
without benefit of concessionary financing, export subsidies, government
or
government-backed credits or other nonmarket financing arrangements.
(3) INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA OR
TRIBUNAL-
The term `International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia' or
the
`Tribunal' means the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, as
established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 of May 25,
1993.
(4) YUGOSLAVIA- The term `Yugoslavia' means the so-called Federal
Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and the term `Government of
Yugoslavia' means the central government of Yugoslavia.

TITLE I--SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES

SEC. 101. FINDINGS AND POLICY.

(a) FINDINGS- Congress finds the following:
(1) The President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, has consistently
engaged in undemocratic methods of governing.
(2) Yugoslavia has passed and implemented a law strictly limiting
freedom of
the press and has acted to intimidate and prevent independent media from
operating inside Yugoslavia.
(3) Although the Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions provide for the
right of
citizens to change their government, citizens of Serbia in practice are
prevented from exercising that right by the Milosevic regime's
domination of
the mass media and manipulation of the electoral process.
(4) The Yugoslav and Serbian governments have orchestrated attacks on
academics at institutes and universities throughout the country in an
effort
to prevent the dissemination of opinions that differ from official state
propaganda.
(5) The Yugoslav and Serbian governments hinder the formation of
nonviolent,
democratic opposition through restrictions on freedom of assembly and
association.
(6) The Yugoslav and Serbian governments use control and intimidation to
control the judiciary and manipulate the country's legal framework to
suit
the regime's immediate political interests.
(7) The Government of Serbia and the Government of Yugoslavia, under the
direction of President Milosevic, have obstructed the efforts of the
Government of Montenegro to pursue democratic and free-market policies.
(8) At great risk, the Government of Montenegro has withstood efforts by
President Milosevic to interfere with its government.
(9) The people of Serbia who do not endorse the undemocratic actions of
the
Milosevic government should not be the target of criticism that is
rightly
directed at the Milosevic regime.
(b) POLICY; SENSE OF THE CONGRESS-
(1) POLICY- It is the policy of the United States to encourage the
development of a government in Yugoslavia based on democratic principles
and
the rule of law and that respects internationally recognized human
rights.
(2) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that--
(A) the United States should actively support the democratic forces in
Yugoslavia, including political parties and independent trade unions, to
develop a legitimate and viable alternative to the Milosevic regime;
(B) all United States Government officials, including individuals from
the
private sector acting on behalf of the United States Government, should
meet
regularly with representatives of democratic forces in Yugoslavia and
minimize to the extent practicable any direct contacts with officials of
the
Yugoslav or Serbian governments, and not meet with any individual
indicted
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
particularly President Slobodan Milosevic; and
(C) the United States should emphasize to all political leaders in
Yugoslavia the importance of respecting internationally recognized human
rights for all individuals residing in Yugoslavia.

SEC. 102. ASSISTANCE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN
YUGOSLAVIA.

(a) ASSISTANCE FOR THE SERBIAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES-
(1) PURPOSE OF ASSISTANCE- The purpose of assistance under this
subsection
is to promote and strengthen institutions of democratic government and
the
growth of an independent civil society in Serbia, including ethnic
tolerance
and respect for internationally recognized human rights.
(2) AUTHORIZATION FOR ASSISTANCE- To carry out the purpose of paragraph
(1),
the President is authorized to furnish assistance and other support for
the
activities described in paragraph (3).
(3) ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED- Activities that may be supported by assistance
under paragraph (2) include the following:
(A) Democracy building.
(B) The development of nongovernmental organizations.
(C) The development of independent Serbian media.
(D) The development of the rule of law, to include a strong, independent
judiciary, the impartial administration of justice, and transparency in
political practices.
(E) International exchanges and advanced professional training programs
in
skill areas central to the development of civil society and a market
economy.
(F) The development of all elements of the democratic process, including
political parties and the ability to administer free and fair elections.
(G) The development of local governance.
(H) The development of a free-market economy.
(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS-
(A) IN GENERAL- There is authorized to be appropriated to the President
$50,000,000 for the period beginning October 1, 2000, and ending
September
30, 2001, to be made available for activities in support of the
democratization of the Republic of Serbia (excluding Kosovo) pursuant to
this subsection.
(B) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS- Amounts appropriated pursuant to subparagraph
(A)
are authorized to remain available until expended.
(b) PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA OR OF SERBIA-
In
carrying out subsection (a), the President should take all necessary
steps
to ensure that no funds or other assistance is provided to the
Government of
Yugoslavia or to the Government of Serbia, except for purposes permitted
under this title.
(c) ASSISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT OF MONTENEGRO-
(1) IN GENERAL- The President may provide assistance to the Government
of
Montenegro, unless the President determines, and so reports to the
appropriate congressional committees, that the leadership of the
Government
of Montenegro is not committed to, or is not taking steps to promote,
democratic principles, the rule of law, or respect for internationally
recognized human rights.
(2) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- Unless the President makes the
determination, and so reports to the appropriate congressional
committees,
under paragraph (1), there is authorized to be appropriated to the
President
$55,000,000 for the period beginning October 1, 2000, and ending
September
30, 2001, to be made available for activities for or in the Republic of
Montenegro for purposes described in subsection (a), as well as to
support
ongoing political and economic reforms, and economic stabilization in
support of democratization.

SEC. 103. AUTHORITY FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING.

(a) IN GENERAL- The Broadcasting Board of Governors shall further the
open
communication of information and ideas through the increased use of
radio
and television broadcasting to Yugoslavia in both the Serbo-Croatian and
Albanian languages.
(b) IMPLEMENTATION- Radio and television broadcasting under subsection
(a)
shall be carried out by the Voice of America and, in addition, radio
broadcasting under that subsection shall be carried out by RFE/RL,
Incorporated. Subsection (a) shall be carried out in accordance with all
the
respective Voice of America and RFE/RL, Incorporated, standards to
ensure
that radio and television broadcasting to Yugoslavia serves as a
consistently reliable and authoritative source of accurate, objective,
and
comprehensive news.
(c) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- The implementation of subsection (a) may not
be
construed as a replacement for the strengthening of indigenous
independent
media called for in section 102(a)(3)(C). To the maximum extent
practicable,
the two efforts (strengthening independent media and increasing
broadcasts
into Serbia) shall be carried out in such a way that they mutually
support
each other.

SEC. 104. DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL CONTACTS RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC OF
SERBIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO.

(a) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that
political
contacts between United States officials and those individuals who, in
an
official or unofficial capacity, represent a genuine desire for
democratic
governance in the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro
should
be developed through regular and well publicized meetings.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- There is authorized to be
appropriated
to the Secretary of State $350,000 for fiscal year 2001 for a voluntary
contribution to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly--
(1) to facilitate contacts by those who, in an official or unofficial
capacity, represent a genuine desire for democratic governance in the
Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, with their
counterparts
in other countries; and
(2) to encourage the development of a multilateral effort to promote
democracy in the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro.

TITLE II--ASSISTANCE TO THE VICTIMS OF OPPRESSION

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:
(1) Beginning in February 1998 and ending in June 1999, the armed forces
of
Yugoslavia and the Serbian Interior Ministry police force engaged in a
brutal crackdown against the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo.
(2) As a result of the attack by Yugoslav and Serbian forces against the
Albanian population of Kosovo, more than 10,000 individuals were killed
and
1,500,000 individuals were displaced from their homes.
(3) The majority of the individuals displaced by the conflict in Kosovo
was
left homeless or was forced to find temporary shelter in Kosovo or
outside
the country.
(4) The activities of the Yugoslav armed forces and the police force of
the
Serbian Interior Ministry resulted in the widespread destruction of
agricultural crops, livestock, and property, as well as the poisoning of
wells and water supplies, and the looting of humanitarian goods provided
by
the international community.

SEC. 202. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the Government of Yugoslavia and the Government of Serbia bear
responsibility to the victims of the conflict in Kosovo, including
refugees
and internally displaced persons, and for property damage in Kosovo;
(2) under the direction of President Milosevic, neither the Government
of
Yugoslavia nor the Government of Serbia provided the resources to assist
innocent, civilian victims of oppression in Kosovo; and
(3) because neither the Government of Yugoslavia nor the Government of
Serbia fulfilled the responsibilities of a sovereign government toward
the
people in Kosovo, the international community offers the only recourse
for
humanitarian assistance to victims of oppression in Kosovo.

SEC. 203. ASSISTANCE.

(a) AUTHORITY- The President is authorized to furnish assistance under
section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2292) and
the
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (22 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.),
as
appropriate, for--
(1) relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Kosovo; and
(2) refugees and persons displaced by the conflict in Kosovo.
(b) PROHIBITION- No assistance may be provided under this section to any
organization that has been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization
under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1189).
(c) USE OF ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS- Any funds that have been allocated
under
chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
2346
et seq.) for assistance described in subsection (a) may be used in
accordance with the authority of that subsection.

TITLE III--`OUTER WALL' SANCTIONS

SEC. 301. `OUTER WALL' SANCTIONS.

(a) APPLICATION OF MEASURES- The sanctions described in subsections (c)
through (g) shall apply with respect to Yugoslavia until the President
determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
that
the Government of Yugoslavia has made significant progress in meeting
the
conditions described in subsection (b).
(b) CONDITIONS- The conditions referred to in subsection (a) are the
following:
(1) Agreement on a lasting settlement in Kosovo.
(2) Compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia
and
Herzegovina.
(3) Implementation of internal democratic reform.
(4) Settlement of all succession issues with the other republics that
emerged from the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
(5) Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, including the transfer to The Hague of all individuals in
Yugoslavia indicted by the Tribunal.
(c) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS- The Secretary of the Treasury
shall instruct the United States executive directors of the
international
financial institutions to oppose, and vote against, any extension by
those
institutions of any financial assistance (including any technical
assistance
or grant) of any kind to the Government of Yugoslavia.
(d) ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE- The Secretary
of
State should instruct the United States Ambassador to the Organization
for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to oppose and block any
consensus
to allow the participation of Yugoslavia in the OSCE or any organization
affiliated with the OSCE.
(e) UNITED NATIONS- The Secretary of State should instruct the United
States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations--
(1) to oppose and vote against any resolution in the United Nations
Security
Council to admit Yugoslavia to the United Nations or any organization
affiliated with the United Nations; and
(2) to actively oppose and, if necessary, veto any proposal to allow
Yugoslavia to assume the membership of the former Socialist Federal
Republic
of Yugoslavia in the United Nations General Assembly or any other
organization affiliated with the United Nations.
(f) NATO- The Secretary of State should instruct the United States
Permanent
Representative to the North Atlantic Council to oppose and vote against
the
extension to Yugoslavia of membership or participation in the
Partnership
for Peace program or any other organization affiliated with NATO.
(g) SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN COOPERATION INITIATIVE- The Secretary of State
should
instruct the United States Representatives to the Southeast European
Cooperation Initiative (SECI) to actively oppose the participation of
Yugoslavia in SECI.

(h) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the President should not restore full diplomatic relations with
Yugoslavia until the President has determined and so reported to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Yugoslavia
has
met the conditions described in subsection (b); and
(2) the President should encourage all other European countries to
diminish
their level of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia.
(i) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION DEFINED- In this section, the
term
`international financial institution' includes the International
Monetary
Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
International Development Association, the International Finance
Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guaranty Agency, and the
European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

SEC. 302. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH
`OUTER WALL' SANCTIONS.

It is the sense of the Congress that, if any international financial
institution (as defined in section 301(i)) approves a loan or other
financial assistance to the Government of Yugoslavia over the opposition
of
the United States, then the Secretary of the Treasury should withhold
from
payment of the United States share of any increase in the paid-in
capital of
such institution an amount equal to the amount of the loan or other
assistance.

TITLE IV--OTHER MEASURES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA

SEC. 401. BLOCKING ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES.

(a) BLOCKING OF ASSETS- All property and interests in property,
including
all commercial, industrial, or public utility undertakings or entities,
of
or in the name of the Government of Serbia or the Government of
Yugoslavia
that are in the United States, that come within the United States, or
that
are or come within the possession or control of United States persons,
including their overseas branches, are blocked.
(b) PROHIBITED TRANSFERS- Payments or transfers of any property or any
transactions involving the transfer of anything of economic value by any
United States person to the Government of Serbia, the Government of
Yugoslavia, or any person or entity acting for or on behalf of, or owned
or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by any of those governments,
persons, or
entities, are prohibited.
(c) EXERCISE OF AUTHORITIES- The Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall take such actions, including the
promulgation of regulations, orders, directives, rulings, instructions,
and
licenses, and employ all powers granted to the President by the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, as may be necessary to
carry
out the purposes of this section, including, but not limited to, taking
such
steps as may be necessary to continue in effect the measures contained
in
Executive Order No. 13088 of June 9, 1998, and Executive Order No. 13121
of
April 30, 1999, and any rule, regulation, license, or order issued
thereunder.
(d) PAYMENT OF EXPENSES- All expenses incident to the blocking and
maintenance of property blocked under subsection (a) shall be charged to
the
owners or operators of such property, and expenses shall not be paid for
from blocked funds.
(e) PROHIBITIONS- The following are prohibited:
(1) Any transaction within the United States or by a United States
person
relating to any vessel in which a majority or controlling interest is
held
by a person or entity in, or operating from, Serbia, regardless of the
flag
under which the vessel sails.
(2)(A) The exportation to Serbia or to any entity operated from Serbia
or
owned and controlled by the Government of Serbia or the Government of
Yugoslavia, directly or indirectly, of any goods, software technology,
or
services, either--
(i) from the United States;
(ii) requiring the issuance of a license by a Federal agency; or
(iii) involving the use of United States registered vessels or aircraft.
(B) Any activity that promotes or is intended to promote exportation
described in subparagraph (A).
(3)(A) Any dealing by a United States person in--
(i) property exported from Serbia; or
(ii) property intended for exportation from Serbia to any country or
exportation to Serbia from any country.
(B) Any activity of any kind that promotes or is intended to promote any
dealing described in subparagraph (A).
(4) The performance by any United States person of any contract,
including a
financing contract, in support of an industrial, commercial, public
utility,
or governmental project in Serbia.
(f) EXCEPTIONS- Nothing in this section shall apply to--
(1) assistance provided under section 102 or section 203 of this Act; or
(2) information or informational materials described in section
203(b)(3) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.
(g) DEFINITION- In this section, the term `United States person' means
any
United States citizen, any alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence
within the United States, any entity organized under the laws of the
United
States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.

SEC. 402. SUSPENSION OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES.

(a) PROHIBITION- The President shall use his authority under section
212(f)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) to suspend the
entry into the United States of any alien who--
(1) holds a position in the senior leadership of the Government of
Yugoslavia or the Government of Serbia; or
(2) is a spouse, minor child, or agent of a person inadmissible under
paragraph (1).
(b) SENIOR LEADERSHIP DEFINED- In subsection (a)(1), the term `senior
leadership'--
(1) includes--
(A) the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, and
government
ministers of Yugoslavia;
(B) the Governor of the National Bank of Yugoslavia; and
(C) the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, and
government
ministers of the Republic of Serbia; and
(2) does not include the President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime
Ministers,
and government ministers of the Republic of Montenegro.

SEC. 403. PROHIBITION ON STRATEGIC EXPORTS TO YUGOSLAVIA.

(a) PROHIBITION- No computers, computer software, or goods or technology
intended to manufacture or service computers may be exported to or for
use
by the Government of Yugoslavia or by the Government of Serbia, or by
any of
the following entities of either government:
(1) The military.
(2) The police.
(3) The prison system.
(4) The national security agencies.
(b) STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- Nothing in this section shall prevent the
issuance of licenses to ensure the safety of civil aviation and safe
operation of United States-origin commercial passenger aircraft and to
ensure the safety of ocean-going maritime traffic in international
waters.

SEC. 404. PROHIBITION ON LOANS AND INVESTMENT.

(a) UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FINANCING- No loan, credit guarantee,
insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance may be
extended
by any agency of the United States Government (including the
Export-Import
Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to the Government
of
Yugoslavia or the Government of Serbia.
(b) TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY- No funds made available by law may be
available for activities of the Trade and Development Agency in or for
Serbia.
(c) THIRD COUNTRY ACTION- The Secretary of State is urged to encourage
all
other countries, particularly European countries, to suspend any of
their
own programs providing support similar to that described in subsection
(a)
or (b) to the Government of Yugoslavia or the Government of Serbia,
including by rescheduling repayment of the indebtedness of either
government
under more favorable conditions.
(d) PROHIBITION ON PRIVATE CREDITS-
(1) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in paragraph (2), no national of the
United States may make or approve any loan or other extension of credit,
directly or indirectly, to the Government of Yugoslavia or to the
Government
of Serbia or to any corporation, partnership, or other organization that
is
owned or controlled by either the Government of Yugoslavia or the
Government
of Serbia.
(2) EXCEPTION- Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a loan or extension of
credit for any housing, education, or humanitarian benefit to assist the
victims of oppression in Kosovo.

SEC. 405. PROHIBITION OF MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION.

The United States Government (including any agency or entity of the
United
States) shall not provide assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 or the Arms Export Control Act (including the provision of Foreign
Military Financing under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act or
international military education and training under chapter 5 of part II
of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) or provide any defense articles or
defense services under those Acts, to the armed forces of the Government
of
Yugoslavia or of the Government of Serbia.

SEC. 406. MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS.

It is the sense of the Congress that the President should continue to
seek
to coordinate with other countries, particularly European countries, a
comprehensive, multilateral strategy to further the purposes of this
title,
including, as appropriate, encouraging other countries to take measures
similar to those described in this title.

SEC. 407. EXEMPTIONS.

(a) EXEMPTION FOR KOSOVO- None of the restrictions imposed by this Act
shall
apply with respect to Kosovo, including with respect to governmental
entities or administering authorities or the people of Kosovo.
(b) EXEMPTION FOR MONTENEGRO- None of the restrictions imposed by this
Act
shall apply with respect to Montenegro, including with respect to
governmental entities of Montenegro, unless the President determines and
so
certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the
leadership of
the Government of Montenegro is not committed to, or is not taking steps
to
promote, democratic principles, the rule of law, or respect for
internationally recognized human rights.

SEC. 408. WAIVER; TERMINATION OF MEASURES AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA.

(a) GENERAL WAIVER AUTHORITY- Except as provided in subsection (b), the
requirement to impose any measure under this Act may be waived for
successive periods not to exceed 12 months each, and the President may
provide assistance in furtherance of this Act notwithstanding any other
provision of law, if the President determines and so certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees in writing 15 days in advance of
the
implementation of any such waiver that--
(1) it is important to the national interest of the United States; or
(2) significant progress has been made in Yugoslavia in establishing a
government based on democratic principles and the rule of law, and that
respects internationally recognized human rights.
(b) EXCEPTION- The President may implement the waiver under subsection
(a)
for successive periods not to exceed 3 months each without the 15 day
advance notification under that subsection--
(1) if the President determines that exceptional circumstances require
the
implementation of such waiver; and
(2) the President immediately notifies the appropriate congressional
committees of his determination.
(c) TERMINATION OF RESTRICTIONS- The restrictions imposed by this title
shall be terminated if the President determines and so certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Yugoslavia
is a
government that is committed to democratic principles and the rule of
law,
and that respects internationally recognized human rights.
SEC. 409. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
(a) IN GENERAL- None of the restrictions or prohibitions contained in
this
Act shall be construed to limit humanitarian assistance (including the
provision of food and medicine), or the commercial export of
agricultural
commodities or medicine and medical equipment, to Yugoslavia.
(b) SPECIAL RULE- Nothing in subsection (a) shall be construed to permit
the
export of an agricultural commodity or medicine that could contribute to
the
development of a chemical or biological weapon.

TITLE V--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SEC. 501. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

(a) FINDINGS- Congress finds the following:
(1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, which was adopted
May
25, 1993, established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since January 1, 1991.
(2) United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 requires full
cooperation
by all countries with the Tribunal, including the obligation of
countries to
comply with requests of the Tribunal for assistance or orders.
(3) The Government of Yugoslavia has disregarded its international
obligations with regard to the Tribunal, including its obligation to
transfer or facilitate the transfer to the Tribunal of any person on the
territory of Yugoslavia who has been indicted for war crimes or other
crimes
against humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
(4) The Government of Yugoslavia publicly rejected the Tribunal's
jurisdiction over events in Kosovo and has impeded the investigation of
representatives from the Tribunal, including denying those
representatives
visas for entry into Yugoslavia, in their efforts to gather information
about alleged crimes against humanity in Kosovo under the jurisdiction
of
the Tribunal.
(5) The Tribunal has indicted President Slobodan Milosevic for--
(A) crimes against humanity, specifically murder, deportations, and
persecutions; and
(B) violations of the laws and customs of war.
(b) POLICY- It shall be the policy of the United States to support fully
and
completely the investigation of President Slobodan Milosevic by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention.
(c) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS- Subject to subsection (b), it is the sense of
the
Congress that the United States Government should gather all information
that the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) collects or has collected to
support an investigation of President Slobodan Milosevic for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and grave breaches of the Geneva
Convention by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and that the Department of State should provide all appropriate
information to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY under procedures
established by the Director of Central Intelligence that are necessary
to
ensure adequate protection of intelligence sources and methods.
(d) REPORT TO CONGRESS- Not less than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter for the succeeding
5-year period, the President shall submit a report, in classified form
if
necessary, to the appropriate congressional committees that describes
the
information that was provided by the Department of State to the Office
of
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia for the purposes of subsection (c).

SEC. 502. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO ETHNIC HUNGARIANS OF
VOJVODINA.

(a) FINDINGS- Congress finds that--
(1) approximately 350,000 ethnic Hungarians, as well as several other
minority populations, reside in the province of Vojvodina, part of
Serbia,
in traditional settlements in existence for centuries;
(2) this community has taken no side in any of the Balkan conflicts
since
1990, but has maintained a consistent position of nonviolence, while
seeking
to protect its existence through the meager opportunities afforded under
the
existing political system;
(3) the Serbian leadership deprived Vojvodina of its autonomous status
at
the same time as it did the same to the province of Kosovo;
(4) this population is subject to continuous harassment, intimidation,
and
threatening suggestions that they leave the land of their ancestors; and
(5) during the past 10 years this form of ethnic cleansing has already
driven 50,000 ethnic Hungarians and members of other minority
communities
out of the province of Vojvodina.
(b) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that the
President should--
(1) condemn harassment, threats, and intimidation against any ethnic
group
in Yugoslavia as the usual precursor of violent ethnic cleansing;
(2) express deep concern over the reports on recent threats,
intimidation,
and even violent incidents against the ethnic Hungarian inhabitants of
the
province of Vojvodina;
(3) call on the Secretary of State to regularly monitor the situation of
the
Hungarian ethnic group in Vojvodina; and
(4) call on the NATO allies of the United States, during any negotiation
on
the future status of Kosovo, also to pay substantial attention to
establishing satisfactory guarantees for the rights of the people of
Vojvodina, and, in particular, of the ethnic minorities in the province.

SEC. 503. OWNERSHIP AND USE OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PROPERTIES.

(a) FINDINGS- Congress finds the following:
(1) The international judicial system, as currently structured, lacks
fully
effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for
unjust
enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property by
governments
and private entities at the expense of the rightful owners of the
property.
(2) Since the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia
until March and June 1999, when the United States Government took
custody,
the Government of Yugoslavia exclusively used, and benefited from the
use
of, properties located in the United States that were owned by the
Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
(3) Until the United States Government took custody, the Governments of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia,
and Slovenia were blocked by the Government of Yugoslavia from using, or
benefiting from the use of, any property located in the United States
that
was previously owned by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
(4) The occupation and use by officials of Yugoslavia of that property
without prompt, adequate, and effective compensation under the
applicable
principles of international law to the Governments of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and
Slovenia is unjust and unreasonable.
(b) POLICY ON NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING PROPERTIES- It is the policy of the
United States to insist that the Government of Yugoslavia has a
responsibility to, and should, actively and cooperatively engage in good
faith negotiations with the Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia,
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Slovenia for resolution
of
the outstanding property issues resulting from the dissolution of the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including the disposition of
the
following properties located in the United States:
(1) 2222 Decatur Street, NW, Washington, DC.
(2) 2410 California Street, NW, Washington, DC.
(3) 1907 Quincy Street, NW, Washington, DC.
(4) 3600 Edmonds Street, NW, Washington, DC.
(5) 2221 R Street, NW, Washington, DC.
(6) 854 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY.
(7) 730 Park Avenue, New York, NY.
(c) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON RETURN OF PROPERTIES- It is the sense of
the
Congress that, if the Government of Yugoslavia refuses to engage in good
faith negotiations on the status of the properties listed in subsection
(b),
the President should take steps to ensure that the interests of the
Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic
of Macedonia, and Slovenia are protected in accordance with
international
law.

SEC. 504. TRANSITION ASSISTANCE.

(a) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS- It is the sense of the Congress that once the
regime of President Slobodan Milosevic has been replaced by a government
that is committed to democratic principles and the rule of law, and that
respects internationally recognized human rights, the President of the
United States should support the transition to democracy in Yugoslavia
by
providing immediate and substantial assistance, including facilitating
its
integration into international organizations.
(b) AUTHORIZATION OF ASSISTANCE- The President is authorized to furnish
assistance to Yugoslavia if he determines, and so certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Yugoslavia
is
committed to democratic principles and the rule of law and respects
internationally recognized human rights.
(c) REPORT TO CONGRESS-
(1) DEVELOPMENT OF PLAN- The President shall develop a plan for
providing
assistance to Yugoslavia in accordance with this section. Such
assistance
would be provided at such time as the President determines that the
Government of Yugoslavia is committed to democratic principles and the
rule
of law and respects internationally recognized human rights.
(2) STRATEGY- The plan developed under paragraph (1) shall include a
strategy for distributing assistance to Yugoslavia under the plan.
(3) DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS- The President shall take the necessary steps--
(A) to seek to obtain the agreement of other countries and international
financial institutions and other multilateral organizations to provide
assistance to Yugoslavia after the President determines that the
Government
of Yugoslavia is committed to democratic principles, the rule of law,
and
that respects internationally recognized human rights; and
(B) to work with such countries, institutions, and organizations to
coordinate all such assistance programs.
(4) COMMUNICATION OF PLAN- The President shall take the necessary steps
to
communicate to the people of Yugoslavia the plan for assistance
developed
under this section.
(5) REPORT- Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this
Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report describing in detail the plan required to be
developed
by paragraph (1).

Passed the House of Representatives September 25, 2000.
Attest:
Clerk.
END

URL for this article is http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/1.htm

The International Monetary Fund And The Yugoslav Elections

by Michel Chossudovsky and Jared Israel (9-28-2000)

www.tenc.net
[Emperor's Clothes]


>"We want to be open colony and open society." G-17 coordinator VESELIN
>VUKOTIC interviewed on "The News Hour with Jim Lehrer", US Public
Television,
>July 14, 1999.
>
>How the International Monetary Fund and World Bank operate: "First, they
>force governments to do away with any social protections - subsidized food
or
>rent, free transportation, free medical care. Second, they force
businesses -
>public and private - into bankruptcy. Then these businesses are taken over
by
>a small clique of leveraged buyout speculators and other powerful foreign
>economic interests. They purchase the businesses at rock bottom prices.
This
>is called "Privatization through Liquidation" which is standard practice in
>the Balkans and Eastern Europe." (From the text below)
>
>Recently there's been a lot of interest in the economists in the Yugoslav
>group G-17. They wrote the Program adopted by the so-called "democratic"
>opposition and its Presidential candidate, Vojislav Kostunica. (For a
>discussion of that Program, see "US Arrogance & Yugoslav Elections" at
>www.emperors-clothes.com/engl.htm )
>
>The G-17 likes to give the impression it is independent and
>Yugoslav-oriented. In fact it is funded mainly through the Washington-based
>Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). CIPE describes itself
as
>"an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce." But in fact it is "a core
>institute" of the National Endowment for Democracy which has nothing to do,
>as far as we can tell, with Democracy. Rather, the Endowment was created in
>1983 to solve a problem of Empire. People knew that the CIA bribed
>intellectuals and leaders and set up front groups to carry out US policy:
>
>"When these covert activities surfaced (as they inevitably did), the
fallout
>was devastating." ('Washington Post', Sept. 22, 1991).
>
>This is why Congress created the National Endowment for Democracy.
>
>Allen Weinstein, who planned the Endowment, said:
>
>"A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA."
>('Washington Post', Sept. 21, 1991)
>
>The National Endowment for Democracy (a sort of CIA spin-off) controls and
>pays for the Center for International Private Enterprise which in turn
funds
>the G-17.
>
>Three of the leading members of G-17 are Washington-based staff members of
>the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. They are, Dusan Vujovic,
>Zeliko Bogetic and Branko Milanovic. In addition, G-17 coordinator
Professor
>Veselin Vukotic has worked closely with the World Bank. He was in charge of
>the World Bank "bankruptcy program" in Yugoslavia during 1989-1990, which
led
>to the devastation of the Yugoslav economy and set the stage for the
breakup
>of Yugoslavia. While on IMF/WB payrolls, they are heavily involved in
>politics in Serbia and Montenegro. Other members of the G-17 consult for
the
>World Bank and attend World Bank-organized meetings.
>
>The "democratic" opposition works with the G-17. It has endorsed the G-17
>Economic program. If it got into power, the G-17 economists would be in
>charge of remaking Yugoslavia. This is not a guess. The opposition Program
>calls for working closely with the International Monetary Fund. The Fund
>always insists that its men run the show. That is not open for negotiation.
>And the IMF's men can conveniently be found among the leading members of
G-17.
>
>On their Website, the G-17 states that their aim is to establish: "...a
>network of experts in all Serbian towns able to create and practically
>implement necessary changes in all fields of social life."
>
>This is not simply a group of economists. It is a network. The
International
>Monetary Fund and World Bank are using this network to impose their
policies
>on Yugoslavia. Meanwhile they tell everyone the fiction that G-17 is a
>home-grown alternative.
>
>G-17 Coordinator Mladjan Dinkic is right now on his way to Bulgaria to draw
>up a "Letter Of Intent" with his colleagues at the International Monetary
>Fund. This will be the first step toward enforcing IMF "economic medicine."
>"We hope they will accept it," Dinkic said to a Pacifica Radio reporter.
>
>Economic Medicine Worse than Russia and Ukraine
>
>What happens when the IMF takes over a country?
>
>One of writers, Prof. Chossudovsky, studies the International Monetary Fund
>and World Bank and what their policies do to countries. . The G-17 Economic
>Program contains the same measures they forced on Russia, the Ukraine,
>Bulgaria and Peru, and many others. The results: social and economic
>devastation.
>
>But Yugoslavia has resisted NATO's attack on its national sovereignty. So
the
>IMF will hit Yugoslavia with even harder economic medicine.
>
>Forced Bankruptcies and Mass Misery
>
>G-17 economists like to talk about "free markets" and "privatization." But
in
>fact their International Monetary Fund wrecks countries.
>
>First, they force governments to do away with any social protections -
>subsidized food or rent, free transportation, free medical care. Out the
>window.
>
>Second, they use economic manipulation and new laws to force businesses -
>public and private - into bankruptcy. Then these businesses are taken over
by
>a small clique of leveraged buyout speculators and other powerful foreign
>economic interests. They purchase the businesses at rock bottom prices.
This
>is called "Privatization through Liquidation" and it is standard practice
in
>the Balkans and Eastern Europe.
>
>A case in point: Yugoslavia, 1989
>
>The elder statesman of the G-17 is Professor Veselin Vukotic. Presently he
is
>one of the economic brains behind Montenegrin secessionism.
>
>But what was he doing before the breakup of Yugoslavia?
>
>In 1989 he was appointed Minister of Privatization under Yugoslav Premier
>Ante Markovic.
>
>Yugoslavs have bitter memories of 1989-1991. But do they "put a human face"
>on the nightmare? Perhaps people think the economic disaster resulted from
>"market mechanisms" or "incompetent government." In fact it resulted from a
>World Bank plan.
>
>People in Ante Markovic's government pulled the strings. In 1989-90,
>Professor Vukotic worked with his Cabinet colleagues and an army of Western
>lawyers and consultants. They imposed the Financial Operations Act. It was
a
>World Bank plan.
>
>Under this law, companies were carefully selected for bankruptcy or
>liquidation. They were forced to meet impossible conditions. In this way,
the
>World Bank, through the Ministry of Privatization headed by Professor
Vukotic
>orchestrated the breakup of fifty percent of Yugoslav industry. World Bank
>data confirms that under his direction more than 1100 industrial firms were
>wiped out from January 1989 to September 1990
>
>And that was only the beginning.
>
>Over 614,000 industrial workers were laid off out of 2.7 million. The areas
>hardest hit were: Serbia, including Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and
>Macedonia. Real wages did a nose-dive. Social programs collapsed.
>Unemployment shot up.
>
>And now this same Professor Vukotic, a key man in the G-17, wants to return
>to power. When the IMF gets its jaws on a country it forces the government
to
>work under people who have already served the IMF and World Bank before.,
>People like Professor Vukotic. Vukotic could finish the job he started in
>1989 under the World Bank, a job ironically discontinued when economic
>sanctions were imposed in 1992. (Bulgaria would probably be better off
today
>if it had been hit with sanctions instead of with the International
Monetary
>Fund!)
>
>Giving Montenegrin Property to Foreign Speculators
>
>While Prof. Vukotic hopes to regain cabinet status in a "democratic"
>opposition government in Yugoslavia he has also been working closely with
the
>secessionist government of Montenegro. Montenegrin President Milo
Djukanovic,
>his former student, had put him in charge of the privatization program
which
>is auctioning off state property in Montenegro.
>
>Recently we found a US Commerce Department advertisement on the internet.
The
>title is: " Montenegro: Seeks Privatization Fund Managers."
>
>The advertisement explains that these Managers are needed in Montenegro,
>where US officials are "providing technical support" for so-called
>privatization. The managers would control "funds" that would take over
>ownership of what is now public property. The Managers could "restructure"
>these privatized companies - lay off the workers and sell the most valuable
>components. The Commerce department promises that this "should be quite
>profitable." Note how brazenly the U.S. Commerce Department celebrates
>turning Montenegrin property into foreign profit.
>
>Kosovo
>
>Professor Vukotic has also been vocal on the political and economic status
of
>Kosovo. Last June NATO marched into Kosovo, and the UCK (or Kosovo
Liberation
>Army) along with them. Wherever they went, they drove loyal Yugoslav
citizens
>from their homes, stole or destroyed their property and threatened them
with
>death. By June 26, the expulsions were at a peak.
>
>While Kosovo was devastated, Professor Vukotic said: "Kosovo should also
have
>its own currency." That's virtually the same as saying Kosovo should be a
>separate country. ('Associated Press,' June 26, 1999)
>
>The Deutschmark was adopted as legal tender and almost the entire banking
>system in Kosovo was handed over to Germanys Commerzbank A.G. And the G-17
>economists applaud
>
>The G-17 on the IMF-World Bank Payroll
>
>One of the most prominent members of the G-17 is Dr. Dusan Vujovic, a
senior
>economist at the World Bank. He acts as a link between the G-17 and
>Washington. He has been very active overseeing "reforms" in so-called
>"transition countries". In August 2000, Vujovic was put in charge of
>negotiating one of the World Bank's most deadly economic packages. It was
>imposed on the Ukraine, already devastated by earlier IMF-World Bank
reforms.
>
>What happened to the Ukraine? The Ukraine disaster started in the fall of
>1994. Prime Minister Vitali Masol signed an agreement with the
International
>Monetary Fund. In exchange for accepting "economic shock treatment" Ukraine
>got a 360 million dollar loan. That's a very small amount for a country..
>"Reforms" began in mid-October, 1994. The IMF ordered the Ukrainian
>authorities to end State controls over the currency exchange rate. This led
>to the collapse of the currency. The price of bread shot up overnight -
300%.
>Electricity- up 600%. Public transportation - up 900%.
>
>The population was forced to buy necessities based on "dollarized" prices.
>Meanwhile people were earning less than ten dollars a month. Credit was
>frozen. With electricity prices sky high and no credit, public and private
>industries were destroyed. The international speculators moved in like
sharks
>in a frenzy.
>
>Then in November 1994, World Bank negotiators were sent in to further
>"advise" the government. This time they overhauled Ukraine's agriculture.
The
>grain market was deregulated. This allowed the US to dump grain surpluses
on
>the Ukraine market. Ukraine went from being a grain exporter to begging for
>Food Aid from the European Union and the U.S. Thanks to the International
>Monetary Fund, Ukraine is now a starving political protectorate of the US
and
>Germany. And remember, Ukraine never did anything to offend the U.S.. It
>didn't rebel for 10 years, like Yugoslavia.
>
>The Case of Bulgaria
>
>Another key member of the G-17 is Dr. Zeliko Bogetic who holds a senior
>position at the International Monetary Fund. The International Monetary
Fund
>has been the doctor in many economic cures. The patient always dies. In
>1994-96, Bogetic participated on behalf of the IMF in forcing a structural
>adjustment program (SAP) on Bulgaria. All social defenses - price controls,
>subsidized food, housing and medical care - were stripped away.
>
>The program led to mass poverty and terrible suffering. By 1997, old age
>pensions (according to World Bank sources) had collapsed to two dollars a
>month. The World Bank admits that 90 percent of Bulgarians now live below
the
>poverty line but, they announce, much economic progress is being made.
>Perhaps when all the Bulgarians are dead they will announce the achievement
>of perfection.
>
>In early 2000, Bogetic was dispatched by the International Monetary Fund to
>Podgorica, Montenegro to advise the pro-secessionist government of
President
>Milo Djukanovic. Bogetic was to help set up a currency board modeled on
that
>of Bosnia under the Dayton Accord. Bogetic's advice was to stop using the
>Dinar, the Yugoslav currency. He said that under no circumstances should
>Montenegro establish a Central Bank. Now remember, the Djukanovic
government
>in Montenegro says it wants "independence" from Yugoslavia. But a Central
>Bank is the requirement for real independence. No, said Bogetic, that is
the
>"worst possible solution". So this "independence" really means "colony"!
>
>
>Bogetic would be the likely candidate for Yugoslav Central Bank Governor if
>the "democratic" opposition were to win. He'd do the same thing he's doing
in
>Montenegro. He'd establish a colonial style currency board linked to the
>Deutschmark. Then monetary policy would be controlled by the country's
>creditors. This would be a excellent for the creditors but very bad for the
>common people including local businessmen and farmers. It would make it
>impossible to finance economic reconstruction through the mobilization of
>Yugoslavia's own domestic resources. The country would be in a
straightjacket.
>
>If the "democratic opposition" came to power they have said they will
>introduce International Monetary Fund medicine. That's what they say in
their
>Program. But would this be the same medicine that the IMF have prescribed
for
>Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine?
>
>Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine cooperated fully with Washington. As nations,
>they never resisted being turned into colonies. Was the West merciful?
>Consider Russia. During the first year that the reforms were applied, which
>was 1992, wages collapsed by 86 percent. And in many of the countries of
the
>Balkans and Eastern Europe, economic activity has been cut in half. And
these
>are cooperative countries. As everyone knows, the U.S. is very annoyed with
>Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has not been a good slave. It has not kissed the
hand
>of the bombers.
>
>History shows that if the International Monetary Fund gets hold of a
country
>that has been rebellious the treatment is vicious. And we are not talking
>about major rebels, like Yugoslavia. We are talking about very moderate
>rebels, like Peru.
>
>In Peru, the government of President Alan Garcia (1985-1990) refused to do
>some of what the International Monetary Fund ordered. In 1985, it decided
to
>pay international debts at a reduced rate. It instituted an economic
program
>that would help (instead of destroying) the economy.
>
>The International Monetary Fund Responds
>
>The country was immediately put on a black list by the . This disrupted
>Peru's foreign trade. It damaged the economy. It produced discontent.
>
>Enter Professor Alberto Fujimori. It was the 1990 elections. With help from
>Washington, Peru was having economic problems. Many people wanted change.
>Professor Fujimori was unknown. People felt he was "honest" and
"promising".
>He led a tiny party that had never held power. He was the winner in the
1990
>elections.
>
>Once in office, Fujimori caved in to the International Monetary Fund's
>demands. What followed was the most deadly economic "reform" in Latin
>American history. From one day to the next, the price of fuel increased by
31
>times (2,968 per cent). The price of bread increased more than twelve times
>(1,150 per cent).
>
>People could no longer afford to boil water. A cholera epidemic broke out.
>The social consequences were devastating. An agricultural worker in August
>1990 was paid $7.50 a month (US). That was enough to buy two hamburgers and
a
>drink at McDonalds. Consumer prices in Lima were higher than New York. Real
>earnings dropped by 60 per cent. By mid-1991 the standard of living had
>declined by 85 per cent compared to the levels in the 1970s.And this was
the
>just beginning of ten years of deadly reforms under Fujimori.
>
>And remember, Peru didn't really do anything. Just resisted a few
>International Monetary Fund Measures. But Yugoslavia? Yugoslavia resisted
>colonial domination by Germany during World War II and now by the U.S.A.
>
>Washington and Berlin would like nothing more than to make Yugoslavia an
>example of what happens when you resist. That is, they would like to make
it
>a "model" protectorate.
>
>Haven't the U.S. and Germany made this perfectly clear in Kosovo? A
>gangster-fascist regime with links to the drug trade has been installed.
And
>Western leaders are fully aware of the horror they have wrought in Kosovo.
UN
>Secretary General Kofi Annan received a special report about this. The
report
>was discussed by the British newspaper, The Observer':
>
>"Murder, torture and extortion: these are the extraordinary charges made
>against the UN's own Kosovo Protection Corps in a confidential United
Nations
>report written for Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
>
>"The KPC stands accused in the document, drawn up on 29 February, of
>'criminal activities - killings, ill-treatment/torture, illegal policing,
>abuse of authority, intimidation, breaches of political neutrality and
>hate-speech'. " (quoted in "How Will You Plead at your Trial, Mr. Annan?"
at
>http://emperors-clothes.com/news/howwill.htm )
>
>What would Washington do if it's G-17 employees got hold of Yugoslavia?
They
>would institute the most extreme economic "reforms". Prices would go sky
>high. Farmers would lose their land. Businesses would be bought up and
closed
>down.
>
>This kind of suffering produces ethnic tension. Washington would whip this
up
>by sending in their UCK (KLA) terrorists. Why does Washington keep the UCK
in
>power in Kosovo? Because they want to use them again. For what? They are
>incapable of fighting a real army. What are they good for?
>
>They are good for driving 350,000 unarmed civilians from their homes,
>kidnapping hundreds of people, killing hundreds or perhaps thousands. They
>can be used again in Serbia north of Kosovo - if the US gives them the nod.
>
>A Washington-controlled government would bring in NATO troops to "help keep
>order." The troops would never leave. The hunt for imaginary war criminals
>would go on, a thousand times worse than it is in the Bosnian Serb
Republic.
>Croatians, Bosnian Muslims and ethnic Albanians who fled to Serbia to
escape
>fascist persecution would be put on the list of phony war criminals. All
>loyal Yugoslavs would have to pay for their (imaginary) crimes so that
>"healing can begin."
>
>Every effort would be made to humiliate the people, to break their spirit,
>and to eliminate potential leaders of resistance.
>
>The example of post-war relations between the US and Vietnam is
informative.
>When the Vietnam War ended, the US government ordered an embargo which
>seriously hurt Vietnam, socially and economically. A few years ago,
>Washington agreed to lift the embargo following a secret agreement under
the
>Paris Club of official creditors. Vietnam agreed to pay the debts of the
>former South Vietnamese government. This was a puppet regime set up by
>Washington. It had gone into debt borrowing money from the US, money which
>was mainly used to buy weapons from the US to kill Vietnamese. And now
>Vietnam must repay Washington this odious debt.
>
>While Kostunica presents himself as a nationalist critical of NATO, he also
>wants to "normalise" Yugoslavia's relationship to the IMF and the OSCE. But
>these are "sister institutions", they work together in one big family. NATO
>is the "military arm" of Western financial interests. It does not operate
>independently but works in close consultation with Wall Street and the IMF.
>In Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO military repression is coordinated with actions
of
>the IMF and the World Bank.
>
>Under the IMF, the country would be transformed into a protectorate.
>"Economic warfare" would devastate the society. The Yugoslav people have
done
>remarkable work rebuilding what was destroyed by the NATO bombing last
year.
>But the IMF working through G-17 economists would work to liquidate
national
>industry . (We have seen a sample of this in Kosovo with the Trepca mining
>complex. It was handed over on a silver platter to the powerful "Washington
>Group", a US based construction, mining and defence contractor. The local
>employees have been discharged,)
>
>This economic assault would tend to increase ethnic tensions, providing
>opportunities for provocateurs. NATO could use the excuse of "age old
ethnic
>hatreds" to bring troops into the country. Meanwhile, as indicated in the
>G-17 Program, the IMF would order cuts in military spending. With a
weakened
>army it would be much more difficult to deal with the influx of Kosovo
>Liberation Army terrorists.
>
>Of course, the Yugoslav people could and undoubtedly would organize to
oppose
>these measures. But people should be aware that this can be the result of
>letting the International Monetary Fund get a grip on Yugoslavia.
>
>***
>
>Michel Chossudovsky is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa.
He
>is author of "The Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank
>Reforms," TWN, Penang and Zed Books, London, 1997. His special expertise is
>studying the consequences of the intervention by Western dominated economic
>institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in Third World and former
>Socialist countries.
>
>Jared Israel, the editor of Emperor's Clothes, was a leader of the student
>antiwar movement in the 1960s. The Yugoslav resistance to U.S. government
>bullying inspired him to return to antiwar activity. He has written about
the
>struggle in the Balkans in newspapers around the world.
>
>To read articles by Chossudovsky or Israel go to
>http://emperors-clothes.com/artbyauth.html and click on "c" or "i"
>
>***
>
>If you find emperors-clothes useful, we can use your help...
>
>(The Soros Foundation doesn't fund us...)
>
>We rely on volunteer labor and donations. Our expenses include: Internet
>fees, Lexis, our Internet research tool, equipment and phone bills. We use
>the phone for interviews and editorial changes.
>
>Every month hundreds of thousands of people read articles from Emperor's
>Clothes. By making a contribution you will be helping to spread the word.
>
>To use our secure server to make a donation please go to
>http://www.emperors-clothes.com/howyour.htm . Or you can mail a check to
>Emperor's Clothes, P.O. Box 610-321, Newton, MA 02461-0321. (USA) Or call
in
>a contribution at 617 916-1705
>
>Thanks for reading and thanks for helping.
>
>www.tenc.net
>[Emperor's Clothes]
>


--------- COORDINAMENTO ROMANO PER LA JUGOSLAVIA -----------
RIMSKI SAVEZ ZA JUGOSLAVIJU
e-mail: crj@... - URL: http://marx2001.org/crj
http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
------------------------------------------------------------

* Yugoslav 'Opposition' Negotiates Sale of Yugoslavia!
by Michel Chossudovsky and Jared Israel

* Joseph Biden (US congressman): "We, the Congress, are saying to the
people of Serbia that they are our friends, not our enemies. It is their
Government, it is Slobodan Milosevic that is the problem, not the
Serbian people... Should our West European allies choose to embrace a
post-Milosevic, democratically elected, but ultra-nationalistic Serbia,
then I would say to them `good luck'..."

* Washington Votes to Finance Yugoslav Runoff Election
by Michel Chossudovsky

* Blatant U.S. intervention in Yugoslav elections protested; Group calls
for investigation (IAC)

* Are Washingtonians Helping Milosevic Survive?
by Srdja Trifkovic


---


URL for this article is http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/11.htm

Yugoslav 'Opposition' Negotiates Sale of Yugoslavia!
by Michel Chossudovsky and Jared Israel

www.tenc.net
[Emperor's Clothes]

>People may not be aware that two prominent members of the Democratic
>Opposition of Serbia (DOS) just made a very important trip to Bulgaria.
They
>met with representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
World
>Bank and the NATO governments at a so-called "donor conference." The
purpose
>was to set the stage for NATO governments to takeover Yugoslavia.
>
>The trip was announced the day after the Yugoslav elections. Mladjan
Dinkic,
>the most likely Finance Minister in an opposition government, "said that
>representatives of his G-17 Plus will travel to Bulgaria this week for a
>donor conference on Yugoslavia with representatives of the International
>Monetary Fund." (United Press International, 27 September 2000)
>
>Dinkic was accompanied by Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic, an economist in Zoran
>Djindjic's 'Alliance for Change'. These so-called "democratic opposition"
>groups have been paid huge sums by US government agencies.
>
>Dinkic told United Press International that "Dragoslav Avramovic had
drafted
>a letter of intent with a request to the IMF and World Bank. Dinkic said he
>expected that this would be followed by negotiations with creditor
countries,
>the so-called Paris Club..." These are the NATO countries.
>
>A "Letter of Intent" includes a "Memorandum on Economic and Financial
>Policies". This establishes the conditions under which all of Yugoslavia
>would be put under the control of Western donors and creditors. Only a
>Yugoslav Finance Minister, selected by Parliament, has a legal right to
draft
>a "Letter of Intent." But Dinkic and Avramovic represent only the so-called
>"democratic" opposition. In what country is it legal for opposition
elements
>to "negotiate" with enemy countries who finance their movement? This is an
>extreme act of interference by the NATO countries.
>
>What measures do the NATO countries want to impose?
>
>* End of all government price controls;
>
>* Introduction of "free markets" without any protection for farmers or
>businesses from dumping of foreign goods;
>
>* End to all social protection. No government help with medical care,
>transportation , food or heating;
>
>* A freeze on credit to businesses
>
>* Massive layoffs of workers and drastic pay cuts for workers and farmers;
>
>* Forced liquidation of important businesses and industries, public and
>private
>
>* Any future reconstruction work to correct bombing damage be entrusted to
>companies from the NATO countries. They would be paid with money Yugoslavia
>would be forced to borrow from international lenders.
>
>The result of these policies would be: food prices would go fly high;
>enterprises would be driven into bankruptcy and liquidation; foreign
capital
>would seize the entire economy.
>
>The "Letter of Intent" would require the acceptance of Washington's
political
>demands. These were just laid out in the so-called "Serbian Democratization
>Act," # HR1064. It was passed by the US House of Representatives on
September
>25, the day Dinkic announced his trip to Bulgaria. Good timing. This law
>states that for Yugoslavia to be free of sanctions, and for it to be
>"allowed" into the IMF it would have to:
>
>1) Negotiate independence (meaning secession) for Kosovo and probably
>Vojvodina
>
>2) Completely "democratize" the country. "Democratize" is a code word for
>carrying out all US government orders;
>
>3) Settle "all succession issues with the other republics". This would
>include the 50 billion (US) that the Croatian government and the
Izetbegovic
>government in Bosnia are demanding as war reparations. The money would go
>right to these countries' creditors, which are NATO governments and Western
>Banks;
>
>4) Fully cooperate "with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
>Yugoslavia, including the transfer to The Hague of all individuals in
>Yugoslavia indicted by the Tribunal." This means the Yugoslav Army would
have
>to hunt down any person the Hague tribunal said was a war criminal. Any
>leader of resistance could be put on the Hague's secret list of phony war
>criminals..
>
>All this makes perfectly clear that Mr. Kostunica's promise to work with
the
>International Monetary Fund but at the same time "safeguard Yugoslavia" is
>hollow words: they sound good but mean nothing. In agreeing to draft a
Letter
>of Intent, Kostunica's coalition has already deserted national sovereignty.
>They have sold Yugoslavia, its economy, its institutions and its people.
>
>Meanwhile, the US law, HR 1064, authorizes the US government to immediately
>transfer another $105 million to the so-called "democratic" opposition and
>the secessionist government in Montenegro. American money -- together with
>funds transferred from other sources -- will not only pay for campaign
>expenses, it will finance payoffs.
>
>Washington and NATO are openly paying key individuals in the opposition
>parties to do what they are told to do. They are on the NATO bombers'
>payroll.
>
>Further reading:
>
>'The International Monetary Fund And The Yugoslav Elections' by Michel
>Chossudovsky and Jared Israel. Summarizes devestating effects of World
>Bank/IMF intervention in several countries. Discusses link between Western
>financial takeover and social-political destruction.
>http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/1.htm
>
>'How the U.S. has Created a Corrupt Opposition in Serbia'
>By Jared Israel, Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, Karen Talbot, Nico Varkevisser
>and Prof. Petar Maher.
>http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/scam.htm
>
>''NY Times' Confirms Charge: U.S. Gov't Meddles in Yugoslavia' with
comments
>by Jared Israel. "Suitcases full of cash" says the 'Times.'
>http://emperors-clothes.com/news/erlang.htm
>
>'Emperor's Clothes Interviews Radio B292'
>Revealing interviews by Jared Israel with two staff members at the U.S.
>"independent" radio station in Belgrade.
>http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/emperor.htm
>
>'Criticism of Emperor's Clothes on the Yugoslav Elections, with Reply'
>Prof. Robert Hayden & Jared Israel
>http://emperors-clothes.com/letters/yugoltr.htm
>
>'Will the US Get Their Money's Worth in Yugo Elections?' by George Szamuely
>at http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/szamuely/willthe.htm
>
>'U.S. Law Passed by House of Represntatives on Funding Yugo Opposition and
>Harsh Terms for Lifting Sanctions'
>http://emperors-clothes.com/news/1064.htm (If this link gives you a server
>error please try a bit later; it is being set up.)
>
>www.tenc.net
>[Emperor's Clothes]


--


AP Worldstream
September 27, 2000; Wednesday 1:59 PM Eastern Time

Croatia's president said Wednesday that the West should maintain
sanctions
against Yugoslavia until Belgrade starts cooperating with the U.N.
tribunal
in The Hague and extradites suspected war criminals.

Following are comments by Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) on the Senate floor
on
9/26/00 re the elections in Serbia. They fully illustrate why action on
HR
1064, a bill purportedly aimed at supporting democracy in Serbia, would
be
counterproductive. Once again, this bill would help save the Clinton
policy (and possibly save Milosevic too), not help get Milosevic out of
power.

Senator Biden says that "We, the Congress, are saying to the people of
Serbia that they are our friends, not our enemies. It is their
Government,
it is Slobodan Milosevic that is the problem, not the Serbian people."
But
a simple reading of the balance of his comments show that that is
clearly
not the case: under HR 1064 sanctions punishing Serbia -- not Milosevic
and
his black-market gang -- will be codified and kept in place (with some
unspecified "flexibility" generously promised by Sec. Albright) until
Kostunica complies with every demand from Washington, including sending
all
indicted war criminals to The Hague. Kostunica has stated that he will
not
do so, and as a patriot is he is no less
willing to send any of his countrymen to The Hague than any real
American
would be to send any U.S. citizen, however criminal he might be, to be
tried by a United Nations court.

The fact that this bill is a weapon aimed not at Milosevic but at
Kostunica
or any other democratic successor -- and that Kostunica has been
condemned
in advance as an "ultra-nationalist" if he does not agree to become
exactly
the quisling Milosevic accuses him of being -- is betrayed by the
following
comments near the end:

" To be blunt: respect for Dayton and cooperation with The Hague
Tribunal
must be litmus tests for any democratic government in Serbia. I
fervently
hope that Mr. Kostunica emerges victorious in the Yugoslav elections. If
he
does, the United States should immediately extend to him a sincere hand
of
friendship, with the assistance outlined in the pending legislation. .
. .
If, on the other hand, Mr. Kostunica comes to power and thinks that his
undeniable and praiseworthy democratic credentials will enable him to
pursue an aggressive Serbian nationalist policy with a kinder face, then
we
must disabuse him of this notion. Should our West European allies
choose
to embrace a post-Milosevic , democratically elected, but
ultra-nationalistic Serbia, then I would say to them `good luck; we'll
concentrate our policy in the former Yugoslavia on preparing democratic
and
prosperous Slovenia for the next round of NATO enlargement, on
continuing
to help reconstruct Bosnia and Kosovo, and on supporting the democratic
governments in Macedonia, Croatia, and Montenegro."


SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN SERBIA (Senate - September 26, 2000)

[Page: S9251] GPO's PDF

Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, on another matter which relates to another
form
of human rights, I wish to speak to the legislation we are going to
bring
up tomorrow, the Serbian Democratization Act of 2000. I am an original
cosponsor of this legislation. I am told that tomorrow we are going to
get
a chance to deal with this issue.

As everyone knows, Slobodan Milosevic is on the ropes. Despite
Milosevic's
massive systematic effort to steal Sunday's Yugoslav Presidential
election,
his state election commission had to admit that the opposition candidate
Vojislav Kostunica won at least the plurality of the votes already
counted;
48.22 percent to be exact.

According to opposition poll watchers, Kostunica in all probability
actually won about 55 percent of the vote, which would have obviated the
need for a two-candidate second-round runoff with Milosevic , which now
seems likely.

It is still unclear whether the democratic opposition will go along with
this semi-rigged, desperation plan of Milosevic's to hang on by rigging
the
runoff. Even if Milosevic loses the runoff and is forced to recognize
the
results of the election, he may still attempt to hold on to the levers
of
power through his control of the federal parliament and of the Socialist
Party with its network of political cronies
and corrupt businessmen.

He may use the classic tactic of provoking a foreign crisis by trying to
unseat the democratically elected, pro-Western government in Montenegro,
a
move I warned against on this floor several months ago.

We will have to wait and see for a few days before knowing exactly how
the
situation in Yugoslavia is going to develop, but there is no doubt
whatsoever as to who the primary villain in this drama is. It was, it
is,
and it continues to be Slobodan Milosevic , one of the most despicable
men
I have personally met, and, as everyone in this Chamber knows, a man who
has been indicted by The Hague Tribunal for war crimes and is the chief
obstacle to peace and stability in the Balkans.

Therefore, it should be--and has been--a primary goal of U.S. foreign
policy to isolate Milosevic and his cronies, and to assist the Serbian
democratic opposition in toppling him.

Earlier this year, with this goal in mind, the Serbian Democratization
Act
of 2000 was drafted in a bipartisan effort. It is particularly timely
that
the Senate consider this legislation tomorrow, precisely at the moment
when the Serbian people have courageously voted against Milosevic's
tyranny
that has so thoroughly ruined their country during the last decade.

I would like to review the main provisions of the legislation we will be
voting on tomorrow and then propose alternative strategies for our
relations with Serbia, depending upon the outcome of the elections.

The act supports the democratic opposition by authorizing $50 million
for
fiscal year 2001 to promote democracy and civil society in Serbia and
$55
million to assist the Government of Montenegro in its ongoing political
and economic reform efforts. It also authorizes increasing Voice of
America and Radio Free Europe broadcasting to Yugoslavia in both the
Serbo-Croatian and Albanian languages.

Second, the act prescribes assistance to the victims of Serbian
oppression
by authorizing the President of the United States to use authorities in
the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide humanitarian assistance to
individuals living in Kosovo for relief, rehabilitation, and
reconstruction, and to refugees and persons displaced by the conflict.

Third, the act we will vote on tomorrow codifies the so-called `outer
wall'
of sanctions by multilateral organizations, including the international
financial institutions.

I talked about this with Senator Voinovich of Ohio, and we agreed that
we
have to give the President more flexibility in this area.

Fourth, it authorizes other measures against Yugoslavia, including
blocking
Yugoslavia's assets in the United States; prohibits the issuance of
visas
and admission into the United States of any alien who holds a position
in
the senior leadership of the Government of Yugoslavia of Slobodan
Milosevic
or the
Government of Serbia and to members of their families; and prohibits
strategic exports to Yugoslavia, on private loans and investments and on
military-to-military cooperation.

The act also grants exceptions on export restrictions for humanitarian
assistance to Kosovo and on visa prohibitions to senior officials of the
Government of Montenegro, unless that Government changes its current
policy
of respect forinternational norms.

The act contains a national interest waiver for the President. The
President may also waive the act's provision if he certifies that
`significant progress has been made in Yugoslavia in establishing a
government based upon democratic principles and the rule of law, and
that
respects internationally recognized human rights.'

Clearly, if the democratic opposition triumphs in the current elections,
the chances will increase dramatically that the President will exercise
this waiver option.

We, the Congress, are saying to the people of Serbia that they are our
friends, not our enemies. It is their Government, it is Slobodan
Milosevic
that is the problem, not the Serbian people.

Today in the Committee on Foreign Relations, we discussed at length with
Madeleine Albright what we should be doing about Serbia. I have
discussed
it as well with Senator Voinovich.

I see the Senator from Iowa is on the floor. He may be here for other
reasons, but I know his keen interest in Serbia, the Serbian people, and
the need for us to render assistance if they, in fact, move in the
direction of democracy.

The act calls for Serbia to cooperate with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

It also contains two important Sense of the Congress provisions. The
first
is that the President should condemn the harassment, threats, and
intimidation against any ethnic group in Yugoslavia, but in particular
against such persecution of the ethnic Hungarian minority in the Serbian
province of Vojvodina.

The second voices support for a fair and equitable disposition of the
ownership and use of the former Yugoslavia's diplomatic and consular
properties in the United States.

Finally, in a move to facilitate the transition to democracy in the
Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Congress authorizes the President to furnish
assistance to Yugoslavia if he determines and certifies to the
appropriate
congressional committees that a post-Milosevic Government of Yugoslavia
is
`committed to democratic principles and the rule of law, and that
respects
internationally recognized human rights.'

Mr. President, the Serbia Democratization Act offers the President ample
flexibility in dealing with Serbia. If Milosevic should succeed in
frustrating the will of the Serbian people by stealing this election,
the
act will give the President of the United States a complete kit of
peaceful
tools to continue to try to undermine his oppressive regime.

If, on the other hand, the democratic opposition led by Mr. Kostunica
manages to make its electoral victory stick, then the final provision of
the act becomes the operative one in which we open up the spigot of
increased assistance to a democratic Serbia. Obviously, this would be
the
preferred option.

Unfortunately, however, foreign policy is rarely so black and white. The
apparent winner of the election, Mr. Kostunica, is vastly preferable to
Milosevic, but this may be a case of damning by faint praise. As many of
my
colleagues have heard me say on other occasions, I met Milosevic in
Belgrade during the Bosnian war and called him a war criminal to his
face.
Not only is he a war criminal, but he is thoroughly corrupt and
anti-democratic.

Mr. Kostunica, by all accounts, is honest and democratic, a dissident in
Communist times and a man with a reputation for probity. He seems,
however,
to represent a democratic, honest variant of a rather extreme Serbian
nationalism.

His language describing NATO's Operation Allied Force has been strident.
Like Milosevic --and most other Serbian politicians--he calls for the
return of Kosovo to Belgrade's rule. But I am prepared to have an open
mind
on what he said. I can understand why, in running for President, being
labeled by Mr. Milosevic as the `dupe of the West' and `a puppet of the
United States,' he would feel the need to openly condemn the United
States.

I also do not have a problem with the fact that he may have used tough
language with regard to Kosovo. There is a difference between words and
his
actions. So I will have great problems with him if, in fact, he tries to
again suppress the Kosovars, who, if he comes to power will probably
increase their agitation for independence.

Moreover, Kostunica has repeatedly said that if he is elected he would
refuse to hand over The Hague those Serbs indicted by the International
War
Crimes Tribunal.

To a large extent Kostunica's criticism of Milosevic's policies toward
non-Serbs in the old Yugoslavia--Slovenes, Croats, Bosniaks, and
Kosovars--is that those policies resulted in four failed wars. There is
no
indication, for example, that Kostunica would cut off Belgrade's support
for the radical Bosnian Serbs who on a daily basis are trying to
undermine
the Dayton Agreement.

Of course, as I have indicated earlier, Kostunica's policies must be
seen
in the context of an electoral campaign. Nonetheless, they do reflect
what
the traffic will bear. In other words, they reflect his view of
contemporary Serbian society.

During the Bosnian war and after it, I often stated publicly that in my
opinion Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was cut from the same cloth as
Milosevic --an aggressive, anti-democratic leader. The only reason I
advocated helping to rebuild his army was because, unlike Serbia,
Croatia
did not represent a major threat to the region. In fact, in the summer
of
1995 the reorganized Croatian Army provided the
Bosnian Army and the Bosnian Croat militia the support necessary to rout
the Bosnian Serbs and bring all parties to the negotiating table.

Since Tudjman's death, Croatia has proven that beneath the surface of
Tudjman's authoritarianism a genuine, Western-style democratic body
politic
survived. The newly elected government of President Stipe Mesic and
Prime
Minister Ivica Racan has utilized this mandate not only to enact
domestic
democratic reforms, but also to cut off support for the radical
Herzegovina
Croats who have done everything in their power to undo Dayton. The
government has also taken the much less popular step of handing over to
The
Hague Tribunal several high-ranking Croats who were indicted for alleged
war crimes.

The United States has a great deal invested in a democratic, multiethnic
Bosnia, and if Serbia and the rest of the world is lucky enough to be
rid
of Slobodan Milosevic , we should not give him an ex post facto victory
by
applying a looser standard of behavior on his successor than we have to
Tudjman's successors in Croatia. To be blunt: respect for Dayton and
cooperation with The Hague Tribunal must
be litmus tests for any democratic government in Serbia.

I fervently hope that Mr. Kostunica emerges victorious in the Yugoslav
elections. If he does, the United States should immediately extend to
him a
sincere hand of friendship, with the assistance outlined in the pending
legislation.

We should make clear to him that if he chooses to cooperate with us, a
`win-win' situation would result, with tangible benefits for the
long-suffering and isolated Serbian people who, we should never forget,
were this country's allies in two world wars during the twentieth
century.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Kostunica comes to power and thinks that his
undeniable and praiseworthy democratic credentials will enable him to
pursue an aggressive Serbian nationalist policy with a kinder face, then
we
must disabuse him of this notion.

Should our West European allies choose to embrace a post-Milosevic ,
democratically elected, but ultra-nationalistic Serbia, then I would say
to
them `good luck; we'll concentrate our policy in the former Yugoslavia
on
preparing democratic and prosperous Slovenia for the next round of NATO
enlargement, on continuing to help reconstruct Bosnia and Kosovo, and on
supporting the democratic
governments in Macedonia, Croatia, and Montenegro.'

Mr. President, the long-frozen, icy situation in Serbia appears finally
to
be breaking up. I genuinely hope that Serbia is on the verge of
democracy.
I urge my colleagues to support the Serbia Democratization Act of 2000
in
order to enable ourgovernment peacefully to deal with any eventuality in
that country.


---


Washington Votes to Finance Yugoslav Runoff Election
by Professor Michel Chossudovsky (9-27-2000)

Washington is preparing for the run-off election in Yugoslavia. More
money is scheduled to be wired to opposition groups to their bank
accounts
in Budapest with fresh and "clean" dollar bills to be transported in
suitcases across the border. And this time it's big bucks: 500 million
US
dollars...

Perfect timing. On the day after the Presidential election, the US
House
of Representatives approved a bill:

"authorizing financial aid for opposition groups in Serbia. The
bill
authorizes $500
million to help finance democratic forces in Serbia and
Montenegro,
including $ 50 million
to fund the activities of pro-democracy and dissident groups.".
('Los Angeles Times,' September 26, 2000).

In an ironic twist, while the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS)
receives big bucks from the
bombers, it has committed itself in its electoral platform to adopting
"new laws" on the financing of
political parties. These laws are to be:

"in accordance with the generally accepted standards of democratic
societies.
Republican parliaments will be advised to adjust their legislation
according
to these principles."
(Election manifesto of "Democratic Opposition of Serbia", 5
September
2000).

With opposition political parties on the enemy's payroll, the Western
media has casually accused the
Yugoslav authorities of electoral fraud. In any other country,
receiving
cash from a foreign government would lead to the immediate indictment of
the political parties concerned. Their bank
accounts would be frozen. This has not happened yet in Yugoslavia.
Yet the media accuses the Yugoslav government of mistreating the
"democratic" opposition. In the
US, taking money from an unfriendly foreign power, especially a hostile
one, to finance campaign
expenses would quite understandably be considered "un-American". But in
Belgrade opposition forces say that they are patriotic. For them it is
not
"un-Yugoslav" to accept 500 million dollars from the bombers of their
country...

Michel Chossudovsky

---

International Action Center
39 West 14th Street, #206
New York, NY 10011
212-633-6646
212-633-2889 fax
iacenter@...
www.iacenter.org

International Action Center statement--
September 28, 2000; For immediate release:

Blatant U.S. intervention in Yugoslav elections protested; Group calls
for
investigation

In response to the emergency situation in Yugoslavia caused by the open
and extensive intervention in that nation’s election process by the U.S.
and
West European governments, the International Action Center is calling
for
the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate U.S.
manipulation of elections and other interference in the internal affairs
of
sovereign countries.

This intervention has taken the form of military pressure, with NATO
naval
maneuvers in the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas and threats of resumed
bombings, economic pressure that a 9-year-long embargo would be relieved
only if the vote went against President Slobodan Milosevic, and direct
financing of organizations and parties that oppose the Milosevic-lead
coalition.

The IAC, founded in 1992 by former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark
and
other anti-war activists, has played a leading role in the anti-war
struggle in
the United States and in the fight to end sanctions against Iraq,
Yugoslavia,
Cuba and other countries.

In calling for the creation of the Commission of Inquiry Ramsey Clark
drew
attention to past U.S. manipulations of elections, giving the examples
of
Nicaragua, where the popular Sandinista government was voted out in 1990
and where Washington injected $54 million into that poor country. He
also
spoke of countries where the U.S. overrode the electoral process and
organized violent coups to put in their own person, as with Mobutu in
Zaire
(now Congo), or in Chile, Haiti and Iran.

“In all cases where the U.S. put ‘its man’ in office,” said Clark, “the
people
wound up worse off than before. Think of what Mobutu did to the Congo,
what Pinochet did to Chile, and that under the U.S.-backed governments
after
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua that country was reduced to one of the
poorest
on the earth. After the election in each country, U.S. money stopped
coming
in.”

The U.S. never kept its promises of aid to develop Nicaragua. Currently
Taiwanese bankers and industrialists are the major exploiters of
low-paid
Nicaraguan labor in the “free-trade zones,” where conditions of work in
the
sweatshops are about the worst in the world. The money Washington put
into the country was not a promise of things to come but an investment
expected to earn a quick return.

“We need,” said Clark, “to expose the way the U.S. government takes
advantage of elections to put in a regime of their choice, and how this
has
always been harmful to the people of that country.”

The U.S. government has boasted that it injected $77 million into
Yugoslavia
to build up the opposition to President Slobodan Milosevic and his
governing coalition. Another $105 million has been authorized on
September
26th by the U.S. House of Representatives for similar use.

“To put this amount in perspective,” said IAC co-director Sara
Flounders,
“The U.S. has voted more money to subvert an election in little
Yugoslavia
than the total funds both major U.S. Presidential candidates have
raised. This
year Al Gore has reported $47 million in contributions and George W.
Bush
$87 million. And that’s for a rich country with almost 300 million
people.

“This money goes a long way in Yugoslavia—a much poorer country with
only 11 million people. It’s as if some foreign country recently a U.S.
enemy
put tens of billions of dollars behind a candidate in the U.S. And this
is only
hard money. What about the millions of dollars in soft money from the
Soros
Foundation and the NGOs?”

“You can only imagine,” continued Flounders, “the hysteria it would
arouse
if that happened here. Those taking the money would be labeled as
traitors,
refused the right to run and probably charged with crimes.”

Flounders said the Commission of Inquiry was calling on others who have
the detailed information to show just what methods were used to
influence
the Yugoslav elections as well as other elections in the past. Others
may
want to illustrate how the U.S. government tried to buy elections in
their
countries. She also suggested that organizations in the other NATO
countries might want to investigate what the governments there have done
to manipulate the Yugoslav elections.

“The Yugoslav people heroically faced NATO bombing for 78 days last
year,” she said. “Now they are facing an equally heavy barrage of
high-tech
propaganda beamed in from the most powerful lie machine the human race
ever saw. We plan to reveal the insides of that machine and expose its
dangers to the world.”

For more information, call 212-633-6646 or look at the IAC web site at
www.iacenter.org.


---


http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/NewsST092800.htm

CHRONICLES ONLINE, Thursday, September 28, 2000

Are Washingtonians Helping Milosevic Survive?

by Srdja Trifkovic

Facts never speak for themselves, but people do.Those who still
doubt that there are powerful forces in Washington that are scared stiff
of Milosevics defeat are well advised to read some comments made by
Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) on the Senate floor on Tuesday, September 26,
regarding the elections in Serbia.

Senator Biden was speaking in support of HR 1064.This bill is
ostensibly aimed at supporting democracy in Serbia, but in terms of its
assumptions and practical consequences it could be called Saving
Slobos Skin. Biden opened by saying that Slobodan Milosevic is the
problem, not the Serbian people, but then he explained that under HR
1064 the array of sanctions punishing Serbia -- not Milosevic and his
cronies --will be re-codified and kept in place until Vojislav
Kostunica (or any other successor to Milosevic) complies with every
demand from Washington, including the delivery of all indicted war
criminals to The Hague tribunal. Dr. Kostunica has repeatedly stated
that this he will not do.Even if this tribunal wasnt a purely
political construct devoid of legal basis -- which it is -- Kostunica
would be right to loath sending any of his countrymen to The Hague, just
as any real American should shudder at the thought of sending any U.S.
citizen, however culpable, to be tried by a United Nations court.

Throwing the challenge of HR 1064 at Kostunica and doing so at the
very moment when he is locked in a life-and-death struggle with
Milosevic is either utterly insane, or deeply devious.Bad, or mad,
or both, Biden is very much in charge of Senate foreign relations, and
the context of his remarks makes it evident that this bill enjoys full
Administration support. It is not promoting democracy in Serbia but
preventing it.To Milosevics infinite delight Biden has condemned
Kostunica in advance as an ultra-nationalist if he does not agree to
become exactly the kind of NATO-friendly quisling the Belgrade regime
accuses him of being.The spirit and true intent of the bill is fully
betrayed by the following comments at the end of Bidens address:

To be blunt: respect for Dayton and cooperation with The Hague
Tribunal must be litmus tests for any democratic government in Serbia.I
fervently hope that Mr. Kostunica emerges victorious in the Yugoslav
elections.If he does, the United States should immediately extend to him
a
sincere hand of friendship, with the assistance outlined in the pending
legislation.If, on the other hand, Mr. Kostunica comes to power and
thinks
that his undeniable and praiseworthy democratic credentials will enable
him to
pursue an aggressive Serbian nationalist policy with a kinder face, then
we
must disabuse him of this notion.

In summary, to lay prostrate merits a friendly hand.The refusal to
submit is aggressive nationalism. Plus ca change: in June 1992 I
attended a meeting in Washington with then-assistant to the National
Security Advisor for European affairs, Jenone Walker.Referring to the
sanctions against Serbia -- in the context of Milosevics offer to
resign if they were lifted -- she stated that (quite apart from
Milosevic) they would stay in force until all current and potential
sources of conflict in the former Yugoslavia were removed, agreements
signed and sealed, and respected by the Serbs to the satisfaction of the
U.S. government.Eight years later HR 1064 proves that, on some issues
at least, there IS remarkable continuity and consistency in Washington.

But back to Biden. His concluding remarks had a threatening air: Should
our West European allies choose to embrace a post-Milosevic,
democratically elected, but ultra-nationalistic Serbia, then I would say
to them good luck; well concentrate our policy in the former Yugoslavia
on preparing democratic and prosperous Slovenia for the next round of
NATO enlargement, on continuing to help reconstruct Bosnia and Kosovo,
and on supporting the democratic governments in Macedonia, Croatia, and
Montenegro.

This is the kind of challenge Americas European partners may well
accept this time.Some are keen to lift all sanctions against Serbia
regardless of who prevails in Belgrade.Theyve had enough of this kind
of neoimperial arrogance French planes are landing in Baghdad these
days - and they could easily turn the policy towards Belgrade after
Milosevic into a litmus test of their ability to say no to
Washington.The writing has been on the wall ever since the EU foreign
ministers had announced that all sanctions against Serbia would be
unconditionally lifted if Milosevic were to fall, and the country itself
welcomed with open arms into Europe, and helped financially.

This prospect is anathema to Joseph Biden and his like-minded friends
and colleagues in Washington.They dont want a democratic Serbia
reintegrated into the community of European nations, but a
Gauleiter-ruled colony in which any attempt to assert ones dignity, let
alone pride in ones identity, would be equated with aggressive
ultra-nationalism.That much has become clear in their attempt to
sabotage Milosevics opponents while he is struggling for survival.As
a UPI report noted last Monday, from Washingtons point of view a
Kostunica victory would derail U.S. hopes of negotiating a broad
settlement to Yugoslav issues on Washingtons terms.Those terms
entail acceptance of the loss of sovereignty (The Hague) and loss of
territory (Kosovo), plus whatever else is ordered from Washington.Last
Monday night Kostunica replied when he said that Yugoslavia must not
become anybodys protectorate.In the eyes of Biden & Co. this merely
confirms that he is an ultra-nationalist, which proves that we need HR
1064 enacted before Milosevic falls.

As Serbias true democrats struggle against that misshapen despot whose
strongest trump card is to accuse them of being pro-NATO traitors, a
concerted attempt is under way in Washington to impose humiliating
conditions on them that no democratically elected leaders of any nation
could ever accept.The participants in that endeavor know not what is
shame.The rest of us do, living as we do in the eighth year of the
Clinton-Gore presidency.

P.S.: From our We Told You So department:

It hardly needs stating that Americas support to the democratic
opposition in Belgrade has nothing to do with the alleged democratic
credentials of the specific parties, and everything to do with the
degree of its leaders professed readiness to act in accordance with the
diktat from Washington.[They need to be] submissive to the West,
a-national to the point of self-hatred, brazenly materialistic,
antitraditionalist and secular.With such an opposition, it is
unsurprising that the popular discontent with Milosevic could not have
been channeled into a victory for his enemies.Even thoroughly moderate
patriots with impeccable democratic credentials such as Dr. Kostunica
were simply not kosher enough for the U.S. State Department.

(Slobodan Milosevic, Our S.O.B. Chronicles, June 1997)


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