Informazione
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jan2003/hagu-j16_prn.shtml
World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org
WSWS : News & Analysis : Europe : The Balkans
The Milosevic trial
Pro-western Bosnian Serb leader
given exceptional treatment
By Paul Mitchell
16 January 2003
Back to screen version | Send this link by email | Email the author
The favourable treatment given an indicted Bosnian
Serb war criminal underscores the hypocrisy of
western claims to be upholding standards of
international justice at The Hague.
In 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted former vice
president of the Republika Srpska (RS) Biljana Plavsic
for her role during the 1991-92 civil war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The charges included "genocide
and complicity in genocide; crimes against humanity
(five counts: extermination; murder; persecution on
political, racial and religious grounds; deportation and
inhumane acts); a grave breach of the Geneva
Convention (wilful killing) and violation of the laws or
customs of war (murder)."
In December 2002 Plavsic pled guilty to the charge of
political, racial and religious persecution and the
remaining charges were dropped. Tribunal judges will
issue a sentence this month. Defence lawyers are
arguing for eight years imprisonment rather than the
usual life sentence.
Several international politicians appeared in court as
character witnesses for Plavsic, including Carl Bildt,
former Swedish prime minister, co-chair of the
Dayton Agreement (that ended the Bosnian civil war
in 1995) and High Representative in Bosnia and the
current pro-western RS Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik.
More extraordinary was the appearance of Madeleine
Albright, former US secretary of state, as a common
witness (for the defence and prosecution) and US
diplomat Robert Frowick, former head of the Bosnia
mission of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as a defence witness.
Albright told the hearing that Plavsic was "someone
who changed tremendously for the good during the
difficult history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She
clearly was a member of the Bosnian Serb leadership
in the early days of the conflict. Over the months she
not only broke with the others, but she also became
instrumental in the implementation of the Dayton
Agreement. It can be said unequivocally that without
her support we would not have accomplished all that
we did."
The current US administration has refused to ratify
the International Criminal Court and previously
prevented US citizens from testifying at the ICTY (in
the event a precedent is set for its own officials being
charged with war crimes). It endorsed Albright's
appearance in this instance, however, because it is
keen to bring the ICTY proceedings to a speedy end
and prevent a full exposure of America's role in the
Balkans conflagration.
Although Plavsic's guilty plea has effectively blocked
full details of her dealings with US officials from
coming to light during the trial, there is no doubt she
was a key asset.
In the 1970s Plavsic spent two years in the US on a
Fulbright scholarship, mixing in Serb nationalist and
Christian Orthodox émigré circles. On her return to
Bosnia, she became dean of the Sarajevo University
Faculty of Sciences and Mathematics-an usual post
for someone who had refused to join the Yugoslav
Communist Party.
Indeed Plavsic spoke openly of her anticommunist
and pro-monarchist sentiments, praising Second
World War Chetnik fascist leader Dragoljub
Mihailovic for his efforts to "cleanse the future united
Serb lands of all enemies of Serbdom and Orthodoxy,
as well as of anti-national elements" (Srbija,
September 1992).
Plavsic was a co-founder of the Serbian Democratic
Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDS) in 1990 and
for the next two years-the period covered by the
indictment-she was a member of the collective
Presidency and served as president of the Council for
Protection of the Constitutional Order overseeing the
intelligence services.
During the disintegration of Yugoslavia along ethnic
lines, the SDS campaigned for the creation of a
separate Serb territory in Bosnia. In 1991 the SDS
proclaimed a Serb Autonomous Region and four Serb
Autonomous Districts-the "Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina"-and set up a separate
Bosnian Serb Assembly.
In May 1992 the Assembly formed an army
commanded by Ratko Mladic, indicted for genocide
by The Hague, and Plavsic regularly toured the
frontlines during the Bosnian conflict hailing Mladic
as a national hero. She has also described the former
paramilitary leader Arkan, who committed some of
the worst atrocities of the Bosnian civil war, as "a Serb
hero. He's a real Serb-that's the kind of men we
need" ( On, November 1996).
Plavsic openly boasted of her extreme nationalism,
deriding Muslims as "genetically deformed material
that embraced Islam" ( Svet, September 1993), and
denouncing the then Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic as a traitor to the Serbs who had
"surrendered Kosovo [to the Kosovar Albanians]."
She also condemned Milosevic for trying to get her to
sign the first Bosnian (Vance-Owen) peace plan and
then because he signed the Dayton Agreement.
At the time, Plavsic was the trusted ally of Radovan
Karadzic-also wanted by The Hague-serving as the
war-time Bosnian Serb leader's vice president until
1996 and then nominated by him as Republika Srpska
president when he stood down.
Contrary to Albright's testimony, Plavsic never
changed her aim of a Greater Serbia. Rather she
became convinced that this was only possible by
cooperating with the US-brokered Dayton Accord
that had partitioned the former Yugoslav republic into
two ethnically based entities-that of the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Moslem-Croat alliance),
and the RS.
One of Albright's first acts as Clinton's newly
appointed secretary of state was to meet Plavsic in
June 1997, where she warned her that future
economic aid and political backing to the RS
depended upon full implementation of the accord.
What they agreed has never been made public, but the
events that followed have all the characteristics of a
coup d'état encouraged by the high-level US
representatives-including US Senator Joseph Biden
and Special Envoys Richard Holbrooke and Robert
Gelbard-who flocked to Bosnia in the following
weeks to back Plavsic.
Within a month, Plavsic had launched an offensive
against her former associates Karadzic and Momcilo
Krajisnik, who opposed the Dayton Accord, using the
pretext of a campaign against corruption. Plavsic
suspended the Assembly and called for new elections.
Acting on secret indictments from the ICTY, British
special forces arrested Plavsic's opponents. The new
High Representative Carlos Westendorp ordered
NATO troops to replace police chiefs loyal to Karadzic
and hand over pro-Karadzic TV stations to Plavsic's
supporters. Rallies by Karadzic's supporters were
banned and only OSCE-approved candidates were
eligible to stand for election. Millions of dollars were
given to municipalities loyal to Plavsic. The
Western-backed Milorad Dodik was voted prime
minister after opposition members had left, following
the assembly's adjournment. NATO troops
surrounded the assembly to ensure a "peaceful
transition". Planned presidential elections were
delayed.
David Binder in the Washington Times (August 29,
1997) was moved to point out, "Mrs. Plavsic could not
possibly win Republika Srpska elections unless they
were rigged by the United States; she has virtually no
constituency and no party organisation."
In December 1997, Clinton also met with Plavsic.
Clinton reported later that they had held "a very open
discussion about the situation which she faces in
Republic of Srpska and the importance that we place
on her support and implementation of the Dayton
process and the work that she is doing."
Soon thereafter media reports suggested that the
ICTY had cancelled a warrant for Plavsic's arrest.
The ICTY Prosecution issued "the clearest possible
statement that Biljana Plavsic has never been indicted
by this Tribunal nor has any warrant of arrest ever
been issued by this Tribunal for her arrest" and
rejected the suggestion that the Tribunal and its
prosecutor were "influenced for political reasons to
withdraw a warrant of arrest in respect of Biljana
Plavsic."
Albright visited Bosnia again in August 1998 to give
her support to Plavsic's presidential election
campaign. Again, candidates were disqualified by
OSCE supervisors and bribes offered. Albright toured
an electrical power station with Plavsic and Dodik
reminding Bosnia's voters that they relied on
electricity supplied by US aid and promised $100
million more in aid if they voted the right way.
However, Plavsic suffered a resounding defeat in the
elections by the Serbian Radical Party candidate
Nikola Poplasen, and further defeats in local elections
in April 2000 forced her resignation.
In January 2001, ICTY officials announced that
Plavsic had voluntarily surrendered after receiving a
"signal ... from United States and British diplomatic
circles in Bosnia" that the tribunal had issued a secret
warrant for her arrest the previous year. At her first
appearance in The Hague Plavsic pled "not guilty on
all counts".
Prosecutors stressed there had been "no negotiations,
except over the technical and logistical details of
surrender" and any deal such as plea-bargaining was
not "an option open to them".. However, Plavsic left
the United Nations detention unit in September 2001
after several closed court sessions and returned to
Serbia on bail.
Plavsic's favourable treatment stands in sharp
contrast to that handed out to Milosevic, despite their
similar nationalist backgrounds. Although Plavsic had
previously said she would not testify against Milosevic
her statement in court in December implicated the
former president in the central charge the prosecution
have been trying to prove against him-that he
masterminded the campaign of ethnic cleansing in the
Balkans. Plavsic told the court that the "ethnic
separation of the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina
was planned and executed in cooperation with the
authorities of Serbia by permanent and forced removal
of non-Serbs, including numerous crimes, from the
territories the Serbs considered their own."
Whilst blaming others for ordering such crimes,
Plavsic admitted to the tribunal that she had known of
the ethnic cleansing directed against non-Serbs, but
"at the time I convinced myself that this [was] a
matter of survival and self-defence".
Albright also told the tribunal that "obviously, she
[Plavsic] was involved in horrendous things" during
the Balkans conflict but praised her role in upholding
the accord.
The Hague supported such reasoning. Announcing
that it would drop the more serious charges against
her, Judge Richard May remarked, "Very well. The
position is this: Mrs. Plavsic, we're going to take a
wholly exceptional course in your case because these
are wholly exceptional circumstances."
When it comes to human rights abuses, exceptions
are indeed made for those who have shown their
willingness to act as loyal appendages of NATO
foreign policy.
Copyright 1998-2003
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved
World Socialist Web Site www.wsws.org
WSWS : News & Analysis : Europe : The Balkans
The Milosevic trial
Pro-western Bosnian Serb leader
given exceptional treatment
By Paul Mitchell
16 January 2003
Back to screen version | Send this link by email | Email the author
The favourable treatment given an indicted Bosnian
Serb war criminal underscores the hypocrisy of
western claims to be upholding standards of
international justice at The Hague.
In 2000, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted former vice
president of the Republika Srpska (RS) Biljana Plavsic
for her role during the 1991-92 civil war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The charges included "genocide
and complicity in genocide; crimes against humanity
(five counts: extermination; murder; persecution on
political, racial and religious grounds; deportation and
inhumane acts); a grave breach of the Geneva
Convention (wilful killing) and violation of the laws or
customs of war (murder)."
In December 2002 Plavsic pled guilty to the charge of
political, racial and religious persecution and the
remaining charges were dropped. Tribunal judges will
issue a sentence this month. Defence lawyers are
arguing for eight years imprisonment rather than the
usual life sentence.
Several international politicians appeared in court as
character witnesses for Plavsic, including Carl Bildt,
former Swedish prime minister, co-chair of the
Dayton Agreement (that ended the Bosnian civil war
in 1995) and High Representative in Bosnia and the
current pro-western RS Prime Minister Milorad
Dodik.
More extraordinary was the appearance of Madeleine
Albright, former US secretary of state, as a common
witness (for the defence and prosecution) and US
diplomat Robert Frowick, former head of the Bosnia
mission of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as a defence witness.
Albright told the hearing that Plavsic was "someone
who changed tremendously for the good during the
difficult history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. She
clearly was a member of the Bosnian Serb leadership
in the early days of the conflict. Over the months she
not only broke with the others, but she also became
instrumental in the implementation of the Dayton
Agreement. It can be said unequivocally that without
her support we would not have accomplished all that
we did."
The current US administration has refused to ratify
the International Criminal Court and previously
prevented US citizens from testifying at the ICTY (in
the event a precedent is set for its own officials being
charged with war crimes). It endorsed Albright's
appearance in this instance, however, because it is
keen to bring the ICTY proceedings to a speedy end
and prevent a full exposure of America's role in the
Balkans conflagration.
Although Plavsic's guilty plea has effectively blocked
full details of her dealings with US officials from
coming to light during the trial, there is no doubt she
was a key asset.
In the 1970s Plavsic spent two years in the US on a
Fulbright scholarship, mixing in Serb nationalist and
Christian Orthodox émigré circles. On her return to
Bosnia, she became dean of the Sarajevo University
Faculty of Sciences and Mathematics-an usual post
for someone who had refused to join the Yugoslav
Communist Party.
Indeed Plavsic spoke openly of her anticommunist
and pro-monarchist sentiments, praising Second
World War Chetnik fascist leader Dragoljub
Mihailovic for his efforts to "cleanse the future united
Serb lands of all enemies of Serbdom and Orthodoxy,
as well as of anti-national elements" (Srbija,
September 1992).
Plavsic was a co-founder of the Serbian Democratic
Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDS) in 1990 and
for the next two years-the period covered by the
indictment-she was a member of the collective
Presidency and served as president of the Council for
Protection of the Constitutional Order overseeing the
intelligence services.
During the disintegration of Yugoslavia along ethnic
lines, the SDS campaigned for the creation of a
separate Serb territory in Bosnia. In 1991 the SDS
proclaimed a Serb Autonomous Region and four Serb
Autonomous Districts-the "Serbian Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina"-and set up a separate
Bosnian Serb Assembly.
In May 1992 the Assembly formed an army
commanded by Ratko Mladic, indicted for genocide
by The Hague, and Plavsic regularly toured the
frontlines during the Bosnian conflict hailing Mladic
as a national hero. She has also described the former
paramilitary leader Arkan, who committed some of
the worst atrocities of the Bosnian civil war, as "a Serb
hero. He's a real Serb-that's the kind of men we
need" ( On, November 1996).
Plavsic openly boasted of her extreme nationalism,
deriding Muslims as "genetically deformed material
that embraced Islam" ( Svet, September 1993), and
denouncing the then Yugoslav president Slobodan
Milosevic as a traitor to the Serbs who had
"surrendered Kosovo [to the Kosovar Albanians]."
She also condemned Milosevic for trying to get her to
sign the first Bosnian (Vance-Owen) peace plan and
then because he signed the Dayton Agreement.
At the time, Plavsic was the trusted ally of Radovan
Karadzic-also wanted by The Hague-serving as the
war-time Bosnian Serb leader's vice president until
1996 and then nominated by him as Republika Srpska
president when he stood down.
Contrary to Albright's testimony, Plavsic never
changed her aim of a Greater Serbia. Rather she
became convinced that this was only possible by
cooperating with the US-brokered Dayton Accord
that had partitioned the former Yugoslav republic into
two ethnically based entities-that of the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Moslem-Croat alliance),
and the RS.
One of Albright's first acts as Clinton's newly
appointed secretary of state was to meet Plavsic in
June 1997, where she warned her that future
economic aid and political backing to the RS
depended upon full implementation of the accord.
What they agreed has never been made public, but the
events that followed have all the characteristics of a
coup d'état encouraged by the high-level US
representatives-including US Senator Joseph Biden
and Special Envoys Richard Holbrooke and Robert
Gelbard-who flocked to Bosnia in the following
weeks to back Plavsic.
Within a month, Plavsic had launched an offensive
against her former associates Karadzic and Momcilo
Krajisnik, who opposed the Dayton Accord, using the
pretext of a campaign against corruption. Plavsic
suspended the Assembly and called for new elections.
Acting on secret indictments from the ICTY, British
special forces arrested Plavsic's opponents. The new
High Representative Carlos Westendorp ordered
NATO troops to replace police chiefs loyal to Karadzic
and hand over pro-Karadzic TV stations to Plavsic's
supporters. Rallies by Karadzic's supporters were
banned and only OSCE-approved candidates were
eligible to stand for election. Millions of dollars were
given to municipalities loyal to Plavsic. The
Western-backed Milorad Dodik was voted prime
minister after opposition members had left, following
the assembly's adjournment. NATO troops
surrounded the assembly to ensure a "peaceful
transition". Planned presidential elections were
delayed.
David Binder in the Washington Times (August 29,
1997) was moved to point out, "Mrs. Plavsic could not
possibly win Republika Srpska elections unless they
were rigged by the United States; she has virtually no
constituency and no party organisation."
In December 1997, Clinton also met with Plavsic.
Clinton reported later that they had held "a very open
discussion about the situation which she faces in
Republic of Srpska and the importance that we place
on her support and implementation of the Dayton
process and the work that she is doing."
Soon thereafter media reports suggested that the
ICTY had cancelled a warrant for Plavsic's arrest.
The ICTY Prosecution issued "the clearest possible
statement that Biljana Plavsic has never been indicted
by this Tribunal nor has any warrant of arrest ever
been issued by this Tribunal for her arrest" and
rejected the suggestion that the Tribunal and its
prosecutor were "influenced for political reasons to
withdraw a warrant of arrest in respect of Biljana
Plavsic."
Albright visited Bosnia again in August 1998 to give
her support to Plavsic's presidential election
campaign. Again, candidates were disqualified by
OSCE supervisors and bribes offered. Albright toured
an electrical power station with Plavsic and Dodik
reminding Bosnia's voters that they relied on
electricity supplied by US aid and promised $100
million more in aid if they voted the right way.
However, Plavsic suffered a resounding defeat in the
elections by the Serbian Radical Party candidate
Nikola Poplasen, and further defeats in local elections
in April 2000 forced her resignation.
In January 2001, ICTY officials announced that
Plavsic had voluntarily surrendered after receiving a
"signal ... from United States and British diplomatic
circles in Bosnia" that the tribunal had issued a secret
warrant for her arrest the previous year. At her first
appearance in The Hague Plavsic pled "not guilty on
all counts".
Prosecutors stressed there had been "no negotiations,
except over the technical and logistical details of
surrender" and any deal such as plea-bargaining was
not "an option open to them".. However, Plavsic left
the United Nations detention unit in September 2001
after several closed court sessions and returned to
Serbia on bail.
Plavsic's favourable treatment stands in sharp
contrast to that handed out to Milosevic, despite their
similar nationalist backgrounds. Although Plavsic had
previously said she would not testify against Milosevic
her statement in court in December implicated the
former president in the central charge the prosecution
have been trying to prove against him-that he
masterminded the campaign of ethnic cleansing in the
Balkans. Plavsic told the court that the "ethnic
separation of the peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina
was planned and executed in cooperation with the
authorities of Serbia by permanent and forced removal
of non-Serbs, including numerous crimes, from the
territories the Serbs considered their own."
Whilst blaming others for ordering such crimes,
Plavsic admitted to the tribunal that she had known of
the ethnic cleansing directed against non-Serbs, but
"at the time I convinced myself that this [was] a
matter of survival and self-defence".
Albright also told the tribunal that "obviously, she
[Plavsic] was involved in horrendous things" during
the Balkans conflict but praised her role in upholding
the accord.
The Hague supported such reasoning. Announcing
that it would drop the more serious charges against
her, Judge Richard May remarked, "Very well. The
position is this: Mrs. Plavsic, we're going to take a
wholly exceptional course in your case because these
are wholly exceptional circumstances."
When it comes to human rights abuses, exceptions
are indeed made for those who have shown their
willingness to act as loyal appendages of NATO
foreign policy.
Copyright 1998-2003
World Socialist Web Site
All rights reserved
L'età della Geoinformazione (C. Jean)
In questa relazione il generale C. Jean analizza il rapporto
media-militari dal lato dei militari, per la conduzione di quella
che chiama "softwar". Si tratta di un'interessante punto di
vista per capire a grandi linee quali strategie mediatiche
vengono utilizzate, e in linea di massima preferite, dagli
apparati militari. Pat
fonte:
http://www.starfarm.it/casd/home/html/pubblicazioni.html
---
"i media offrono anche interessanti oppportunità a livello sia
politico che militare. Per esempio, possono essere utilizzati
per inviare messaggi all'avversario, al pubblico generico, alle
proprie truppe e alla popolazione civile dei Paesi in cui vi
siano attività di supporto alla pace."
L'impatto della tecnologia dei media sulla pianificazione
e sulle operazioni militari
Gen. Carlo Jean - Roma (5 Novembre, 1996)
---
L'età della Geoinformazione
La geoinformazione, non la geoeconomia, ha rimpiazzato la
geostrategia come strumento geopolitico più importante. La
presente analisi non si occupa dell'impatto diretto della
rivoluzione dell'informazione sulla strategia e sulle
operazioni, cioè la Guerra Basata sull'Informazione
(Information-Based Warfare nell'originale, ndr) o la
Rivoluzione negli Affari Militari (Revolution in Military
Affairs nell'originale, ndr) (RMA). Essa si focalizza sulle
relazioni militare-media e sulle comunicazioni di "softwar"
che devono essere condotte contestualmente alla "cyberwar"
e alla "netwar" sul campo di battaglia.
Lo sviluppo delle tecnologie dei media ha portato quasi una
rivoluzione nella diffusione di notizie che ha un impatto
significativo sulla sicurezza e sull'uso della forza militare, in
cui al primo posto vi è ciò che a volte viene detta Rivoluzione
negli Affari della Sicurezza (RSA). La RSA è pensata per
essere ancora più cruciale della RMA. Costringe politici e
militari a spostare la loro attenzione dagli aspetti "hard" agli
aspetti "soft" della sicurezza. In occidente, l'importanza della
softwar trae origine anche dalla sparizione della minaccia
diretta agli interessi vitali occidentali, come dalla difficoltà di
mantenere il consenso interno della popolazione e l'unità
dell'Alleanza quando vi siano interessi divergenti degli stati
membri coinvolti. Il cosiddetto "fattore CNN" è spesso
responsabile di insidiare la razionalità delle scelte di politica e
strategia. Nonostante il suo nome, tuttavia, questo fenomeno
non fu inventato dalla CNN. Si tratta di un inevitabile
sottoprodotto dei media odierni, e non può essere vinto
introducendo regolamenti appositi o, ancor meno, con la
semplice condanna. Politiche e strategie non sono più una
prerogativa d'elite. Esse sono divenute attività di massa. I
leader politici e militari non possono più nascondersi dietro il
segreto di gabinetto o del consiglio di guerra, perchè i media
sono pervasivi e non sono soggetti a barriere o frontiere.
Quindi, l'atteggiamento passivo, protettivo utilizzato nel
passato deve essere rimpiazzato da un approccio più attivo e
dinamico.
Comunicazione, Politica e Strategia
L'influenza della comunicazione su politica, strategia e tattica
non è una storia nuova. Basta pensare alle trombe di Jericho e
ai principi di Sun Tzu. Negli ultimi due secoli, ci sono state
molte spinte tecnologiche nella diffusione di notizie. Mentre
nel passato l'informazione era una prerogativa esclusiva di
governi e generali, ora i media e le agenzie di stampa sono in
grado di diffonderla in tutto il mondo anche prima che
raggiunga i decisori poltici e militari. L'informazione è potere
e la sua tempestività è decisiva. Nell'era dell'informazione, il
tempo ha rimpiazzato lo spazio come dimensione strategica
più importante. Sebbene questo fenomeno sia già esistito,
oggi è quantitativamente diverso dal passato. Nei paesi
democratici, i media non solo influenzano le elite politiche e il
pubblico consenso, ma hanno anche una influenza cruciale
sulle scelte operative. Possono restringere la libertà d'azione,
ostacolare la sorpresa e la sicurezza e possono essere usati
come strumento d'intelligence o di manipolazione,
disinformazione e propaganda. L'azione dei media impone
rapidità di reazione politica e strategica e la pressione
temporale risultante può influire sulla razionalità delle
decisioni. D'altro canto, i media offrono anche interessanti
opportunità a livello sia politico che militare. Per esempio,
possono essere usati per mandare messaggi all'avversario, al
pubblico generico, ai propri soldati e alla popolazione civile
dei paesi in cui vi siano in atto operazioni di supporto alla
pace.
---
"la guerra (...) è condotta per forzare
l'avversario a prendere decisioni politiche
che siano favorevoli ai propri interessi."
"E' l'informazione che crea la realtà."
"Identificare una "giusta causa" per ogni intervento è
divenuta una necessità, sicchè gli obiettivi di "realpolitik"
devono essere mascherati da "idealpolitik"."
da:
The Impact of Media Technology on Military Planning
and Operations
Gen. Carlo Jean - Roma (5 Novembre, 1996)
---
I due aspetti di ogni conflitto: Confronto delle Volontà e
Prova di Forza
In ogni conflitto, ci sono due differenti aspetti: il confronto di
opposte volontà politiche e la prova di forza militare. La guerra
non viene condotta per ragioni sue proprie. E' condotta per
forzare l'avversario a prendere decisioni politiche che siano
favorevoli ai propri interessi. Il confronto di volontà può essere
condotto sia attraverso una strategia diretta, attaccando e
distruggendo le forze nemiche e occupando i suoi territori allo
scopo di influenzare le sue decisioni politiche, o attraverso
una strategia indiretta che prenda di mira i centri decisionali
del nemico ("strategia a carciofo", guerra di lunga durata,
guerra psicologica, "softwar", ecc.). In quest'ultimo caso, la
focalizzazione sull'attività strategica non è nè militare nè
territoriale ma giace nel meta-sistema politico e sociale di cui
le forze militari sono un'espressione. Gli aspetti psicologici
sono stati spesso cruciali nelle operazioni militari. Tutte le
guerre sono anche "psico-guerre". Usualmente, la guerra è
limitata. Quindi, ogni proiettile è anche un invito a negoziare
e, da un punto di vista politico, è fondamentalmente un
messaggio. Ciò è molto chiaramente visibile nella brillante
combinazione di diplomazia e forza fatta da Richard
Holbrooke in Bosnia nell'estate del 1995. Minore è l'uso della
forza e più lunga la durata dell'intervento, più grande è
l'importanza della dimensione psicologica dei media. Poche
operazioni possono essere specificamente dirette a supporto di
quest'ultima.
Nuove tecnologie mediatiche e loro effetti politici e
militari
La tecnologia attualmente utilizzata dai media permette loro
di essere più pervasivi e globalizzati quanto mai prima, e di
fornire copertura in tempo reale. E' l'informazione che crea la
realtà. La diffusione in diretta di immagini crea un legame
diretto tra i livelli tattico e politico-strategico. Le azioni
tattiche sono immediatamente amplificate dai media e
acquisiscono un impatto politico. La tradizionale separazione
tra il livello strategico, il livello operativo e quello tattico
nella conduzione delle operazioni è stato sostituito da una grande
sovraimposizione. Anche i comandanti dei livelli inferiori
devono essere ben consapevoli dell'impatto "mediatico" - e
quindi politico - delle loro dichiarazioni ed azioni. Nei corsi
Ufficiali, gli studi sui media non possono più essere
considerati attività secondaria.
Nelle operazioni di supporto alla pace - OOTW - non v'è
linea del fronte e nessun controllo completo può essere
raggiunto sui territori amici. Quindi, i reporters si possono
muovere liberamente. I loro telefoni satellitari e le loro
telecamere possono diffondere istantaneamente e in tutto il
mondo le notizie. Le democrazie non possono facilmente
imporre misure censorie, tenere segreti o restringere i
movimenti dei reporters. I politici hanno bisogno
dell'approvazione dei media e i militari devono cooperare per
ottenerla. I comandanti militari stessi desiderano
l'approvazione dei media, se non altro perchè migliora il
morale delle loro truppe. Atteggiamenti come tentare di
nascondere notizie spiacevoli ai media o esigere il segreto
militare crea sospetti e induce i reporters a violare le regole
allo scopo di assicurare notizie esclusive.
Per ragioni teniche, la televisione non può fornire un contesto
alle immagini che diffonde. La sua logica di mercato la induce
a favorire la spettacolarità e il romanzo piuttosto che la verità.
Come regola, il media tende a criticare piuttosto che capire le
difficoltà incontrate dai militari o la complessità delle
situazioni che essi coprono. Inoltre, sono inclini ad
evidenziare gli aspetti più turpi della guerra, i problemi e i
fallimenti di chi vi è coinvolto. Questa tendenza crea
inevitabili tensioni tra media e militari (Sindrome Vietnam).
A causa della dominanza nei media del tempo reale e della
diretta, come la televisione, e della importanza cruciale del
consenso, la pubblica opinione è divenuta un attore
strategico. Comunque, l'approvazione dei media è spesso
scambiata per consenso pubblico, sebbene le due cose non
sempre coincidano. Il consenso pubblico è determinato pù
dalla forma in cui il messaggio viene convogliato che dal suo
contenuto Questa istanza richiede ulteriori studi. Il consenso
non è lineare e non funziona attraverso i
meccanismi "stimolo-risposta". Esso viene rinforzato dalle
informazioni che riguardano i valori dominanti del pubblico.
L'identificazione di una "giusta causa" per ogni intervento è
divenuta una necessità, così gli obiettivi di "realpolitik"
devono essere mascherati da "idealpolitik".
Naturalmente, queste considerazioni non devono essere fatte
saltuariamente. Alla fine della giornata, è compito della
leadership politica costruire il consenso sulle decisioni
politiche e strategiche più adeguate, piuttosto che decidere
sula base del consenso esistente o sui volatili umori del
pubblico ("videopolitica"). I decisori politici e militari devono
assicurarsi la loro libertà d'azione contro la pressione dei
media. Essi non devono perdere le loro responsabilità allo
scopo di cercare il consenso a tutti i costi. Comunque, il
risultato può essere ottenuto solo se i decisori sono credibili e
se hanno capacità leaderistiche. Altrimenti prevarranno gli
aspetti emotivi e irrazionali.
---
La "softwar" o la guerra mediatica è condotta
con una logica strategica e un meccanismo
simile a quello che governa le armate
combattenti. Quindi, occorre avere sia la
dimensione attiva che passiva, sia quella
difensiva che quella offensiva."
"Oggi, due guerre parallele devono essere condotte: una sul
campo di battaglia e una sui media. (...) La scelta di parole e
segnali è tanto importante quanto la scelta delle armi (..). Le
semiotiche creano una realtà virtuale che è tanto importante
quanto la "reale" realtà del campo di battaglia e che
influenza sia il consenso che le decisioni."
"La pianificazione delle priorità e delle scelte operative
dovrebbe tener conto delle condizioni imposte dai media
(riduzione delle perdite attraverso l'utilizzo di unità corazzate
anzichè di fanteria, rapidità di reazione e breve durata degli
interventi, scelta degli obiettivi; "telegenicità" dei sistemi
d'arma da utilizzare)."
da:
The Impact of Media Technology on Military Planning
and Operations
Gen. Carlo Jean - Roma (5 Novembre, 1996)
---
I media e il concetto di guerra di Clausewitz
L'importanza che i media e la pubblica opinione hanno
acquisito, è una delle ragioni che indusse Martin van Creveld
e John Keegan a stabilire che il concetto di guerra di
Clausewitz non è più valido. Secondo loro, nelle società
dell'era dell'informazione non vi è distinzione tra governo,
popolo ed esercito, e la forza militare non può essere usata
razionalmente come uno strumento di politica.
Personalmente, io non condivido questa visione. Il pensiero di
Clausewitz sulla guerra è basato su ciò che il generale
prussiano chiamava "la simpatica trinità" di forze razionali,
arazionali e irrazionali, cioè intelligence strategica, fortuna e
violenza e passione (Aristotele le chiamò "logos", "ethos" e
"pathos"). Tali forze sono, nelle parole di Clausewitz, i tre
magneti nel mezzo dei quali ogni guerra reale è sospesa.
Questa struttura di base non è cambiata, sebbene il
fattore-CNN abbia aumentato l'importanza di passioni ed
emozioni. Per attenersi ai suoi obiettivi politici, la strategia
deve utilizzare il fattore emotivo, o almeno tenerne conto. La
"softwar" o la guerra mediatica è condotta con una logica
strategica e un meccanismo simile a quello che governa le
armate combattenti. Quindi, occorre avere sia la dimensione
attiva che passiva, sia quella difensiva che quella offensiva. La
difesa da sola non basta, anche perchè i media non rispettano
alcuna frontiera. I soldati non devono confinare se stessi alla
reazione: devono prevedere e prevenire. Essi devono, in breve,
avere un'atteggiamento "pro-attivo".
Oggi, due guerre parallele devono essere condotte: una sul
campo di battaglia e una sui media. Le possibilità sorgono dal
combattere guerre "virtuali" basate su strategie "soft"
piuttosto che "hard". La scelta di parole e segnali è tanto
importante quanto la scelta delle armi ("la penna è più potente
della spada"). Le semiotiche creano una realtà virtuale che è
tanto importante quanto la "reale" realtà del campo di
battaglia e che influenza sia il consenso che le decisioni.
Aggiustamento del militare al "fattore-CNN"
I militari dovrebbero imparare a capire i meccanismi e la
logica dei media, i modi in cui questi influenzano le politiche
e le strategie. I militari dovrebbero tener conto, più che nel
passato, delle ripercussioni politiche delle loro decisioni
tecniche e delle loro dichiarazioni ai media. Le relazioni
pubbliche sono divenute una funzione da comando speciale. I
media creano vincoli all'uso della forza. In particolare,
determinano una tendenza a preferire opzioni con bassi rischi,
bassi costi (in termini di perdite) e breve durata. Questo
implica considerare le difficoltà nell'uso della forza militare, in
quanto, in termini strategici, i costi e i rischi impegnati nel
raggiungimento di un obiettivo sono inversamente
proporzionali. Tradizionalmente, una scelta strategica deve
essere fatta tra opzioni di basso costo e alto rischio e alto
costo e basso rischio. L'azione dei media, d'altra parte,
impone una riduzione sia dei costi che dei rischi. Come
risultato, gli obiettivi da perseguire devono essere limitati e la
forza deve essere usata con la massima cautela, resistendo
alla domanda pubblica di intervento o "mission creep".
Rispetto a questo, la cosiddetta "curva-CNN" deve essere
tenuta a mente: la pressione mediatica in favore
dell'intervento militare o l'espansione degli obiettivi di un
intervento rapidamente sfociano in critiche all'intervento
stesso o in domande di ritirata in caso di fallimento, anche
parziale, o se le perdte sono sostenute. Quindi, interventi
navali e aerei tendono ad essere privilegiati rispetto alle azioni
sul terreno, indipendentemente dalla loro utilità. Quanto più
lontano è concepito l'intervento, tanto più tendono ad essere
utilizzati voli cruise e armi riservate per evitare rischi di
perdite e specialmente la cattura di interi equipaggi. La
robotica sui campi da battaglia diverrà molto popolare.
Siccome la logica militare differisce da quella dei media, le
relazioni tra i militari e i media tendono ad essere difficoltose.
I militari sono costretti al segreto, per ragioni di sopresa e
sicurezza. La loro disciplina e gerarchia verticale li rende
particolarmente sensibili alle critiche. Per natura, il militare
tende a censurare o manipolare i media allo scopo di
disinformare e confondere il nemico per prenderlo di sorpresa.
Inoltre, la competizione può sorgere tra militari e media su chi
informerà per primo i politici (Bush dichiarò che le sue
decisioni erano basate più sulle informazioni della CNN che
sul quelle della CIA). I miitari possono anche essere tentati ad
usare presunte "falle" di informazione per influenzare le
decisioni delle leadership politiche o militari.
I media possono anche influenzare la coesione di alleanze
multinazionali (oggi, le crisi disgregano le alleanze, piuttosto
che unificarle, al contrario di quanto accadeva nel periodo
della guerra fredda). I comandi multinazionali sono
generalmente incapaci di imporre una comune politica
comunicativa. Anche l'ONU evita di farlo, per mantenere la
sua immagine neutrale. Il contingente nazionale tenterà,
comunque, di mantenere buone relazioni con altri media
nazionali. Quindi, se un contingente nazionale impone
restrizioni più strette degli altri, le possibilità che si creino
tensioni e divisioni tra le varie nazioni, e tra ogni esercito
nazionale e i media, aumentano. Il rischio innesca
un'escalation di domanda dei media.
L'incolumità dei reporters è un'istanza particolarmente
critica. I reporters tendono a muoversi autonomamente e a
violare le regole decise dai comandi militari al fine di ottenere
notizie o immagini esclusive. Il sistema del "circo mediatico",
cioè, l'accordo fra reporters, è solo limitatamente effettivo in
questo contesto.
I militari devono tener presente i bisogni legittimi dei media. I
loro sistemi di comunicazione dovrebbero evolvere al di là
degli ottusi bollettini ufficiali: devono essere introdotti grafici,
animazioni, chiare e semplici spiegazioni degli obiettivi e degli
scopi delle operazioni. Dovrebbe verificarsi la tendenza a
"saturare" i media, anche al fine di riuscire a preservare il
segreto delle informazioni confidenziali senza sollevare
sospetti, speculazioni e critiche. La strategia comunicativa
dovrebbe essere elaborata ed esplicitata da staff specializzati
(comunque, mentre è abbastanza facile persuadere un
generale a non sottomettersi ad un'operazione di appendicite,
è a volte abbastanza difficile convincerlo a tacere e che le
relazioni con i media richiedono una professionalità
specifica!)
Teoricamente, le informazioni dovrebbero essere tenute
abbastanza separate dalla guerra psicologica, la
disinformazione e la propaganda. In pratica, ad ogni modo,
tale distinzione è molto difficile e i tentativi di attuarla
possono tramutarsi in disastri, compromettendo la credibilità
dei militari agli occhi dei reporters. Gli unici vantaggi che i
militari detengono sono la vastità del teatro delle operazioni,
l'esclusività sulle informazioni e sugli "eint" satellitari, e la
disponibilità di armi a lunga gittata che agiscono al di fuori
della raggiungibilità mediatica.
La logica dei media
I media, e specialmente la televisione, seguono una logica di
mercato: velocità, esclusiva sulle notizie, spettacolarità e
drammatizzazione dominano sul contesto, sulle analisi e sulle
interpretazioni dei fatti, sulle verifiche e sulla veridicità
dell'informazione. La critica alle azioni delle leadership
politiche e militari "vende" molto di più di una approvazione o
di una informazione neutra. E' noto che l'operatore mediatico
esperto è forgiato dallo sviluppo della tecnologia che utilizza. I
corrispondenti di guerra come quelli operanti nella seconda
guerra mondiale, che potevano interpretare i fatti e porli nel
loro contesto appropriato, non esistono più. Questo può
essere spiegato in parte dal fatto che l'interesse per la politica
estera e le strategie si è diffusa tra la gente e che la stampa ha
perso importanza rispetto alla diffusione delle immagini.
Spesso, la decisione deve essere presa sotto gli occhi attenti di
telecamere che sono pronte ad evidenziare ogni problema e
incongruenza. Il militare non può uscire da gioco anche
perchè i decisori politici chiedono la sua cooperazione per la
costruzione del consenso.
Comunque, non sono solo i militari che devono adeguarsi alla
nuova realtà. Anche i media dovrebbero trovare risposte
adeguate alla legittima domanda: come possono i
media lottare contro la manipolazione? Come possono evitare
la manipolazione nascosta, facendo una chiara distinzione tra
fatti e commenti nei programmi tv? Come possono fornire un
background generale alle immagini trasmesse? Come
possono tener conto della loro naturale tendenza ad
influenzare il pubblico con effetti originati dalla combinazione
di immagini drammatiche e commenti?
Cooperazione tra militari e media
Considerare i media come avversari sleali che devono esere
evitati o combattuti, è l'errore più serio che i militari possono
commettere. Nelle società democratiche, i reporters non
possono rinunciare al loro diritto di informazione e critica.
Sebbene seguano la logica di mercato, i reporter devono avere
il loro codice etico, che è meno ragionevole di quanto
comunemente si pensi. Molti esempi provano questo. Per
esempio, il reporter che vide la 24ma divisione meccanizzata
nel Golfo muoversi con il suo equipaggiamento "bridge", capì
perfettamente cosa ciò significasse, ma mantenne il silenzio.
Le esperienze provano che il dialogo e la cooperazione tra i
militari e i media sono possibili. Sono simili a quelle
relazioni stabilite tra membri di una coalizione. Il militare
dovrebbe capire a fondo la logica e i bisogni dei media e
dovrebbe "selezionare le sue parole" valutandone la
consistenza con l'effetto che quelle frasi avranno sulla
pubblica opinione e sui reporters stessi. Di quando in quando,
regole chiare e ragionevoli devono essere definite quanto più
si tratta di informazioni cruciali. Le relazioni media-militari,
quindi, non sono un gioco a somma zero e nemmeno a
somma negativa. Se correttamente organizzate, possono
sfociare in un gioco a somma positiva. L'informazione è un
diritto/dovere, su cui giacciono le basi per il corretto
funzionamento di ogni sistema democratico, e la
manipolazione o la disinformazione danno origine ad istanze
di legittimità costituzionale e non solo di legalità. In più, la
critica dei media contribuisce a migliorare le decisioni
politiche e strategiche. I media possono essere usati per
informare il pubblico sugli scopi e gli obiettivi perseguiti, per
mandare messaggi al nemico, per fare operazioni di guerra
trasparente (OOTW), per ottenere cooperazione dalle
popolazioni locali (basta pensare al successo della Radio IBIS,
del contingente italiano in Somalia) o per depistare il nemico
(come nella guerra del Golfo, dove l'enfasi si pose sulle
esercitazioni di terra dei marines).
D'altra parte, poche operazioni possono essere specialmente
evidenziate per ottenere gli scopi preferiti dai media (armi non
letali; coordinazione delle operazioni e delle azioni mediatiche
effettuate dagli sloveni nel'estate del 1991, ecc..). La
pianificazione delle priorità e delle scelte operative dovrebbe
tener conto delle condizioni imposte dai media (riduzione
delle perdite attraverso l'utilizzo di unità corazzate anzichè di
fanteria, rapidità di reazione e breve durata degli interventi,
scelta degli obiettivi; "telegenicità" dei sistemi d'arma da
utilizzare).
Commenti finali
In conclusione, i militari dovrebbero imparare a capire la
logica e i meccanismi di funzionamento dei media e adeguare
la loro gestione alle richieste della "geoinformazione". Nello
stesso tempo, i reporters dovrebbero migliorare le loro
conoscenze delle necessità e dei condizionamenti operativi, e
il pubblico generico e le elites politiche dovrebbero imparare a
capire meglio la realtà e gli imperativi militari. In breve, l'era
della geoinformazione richiede più elevati livelli di cultura
militare nella società. Solo così sarà possibile operare scelte
razionali e mantenere il consenso e il "fattore CNN" potrà
essere prevenuto dall'eccessiva influenza sulle scelte politiche
e strategiche.
- fine -
fonte:
http://www.starfarm.it/casd/home/html/pubblicazioni.html
In questa relazione il generale C. Jean analizza il rapporto
media-militari dal lato dei militari, per la conduzione di quella
che chiama "softwar". Si tratta di un'interessante punto di
vista per capire a grandi linee quali strategie mediatiche
vengono utilizzate, e in linea di massima preferite, dagli
apparati militari. Pat
fonte:
http://www.starfarm.it/casd/home/html/pubblicazioni.html
---
"i media offrono anche interessanti oppportunità a livello sia
politico che militare. Per esempio, possono essere utilizzati
per inviare messaggi all'avversario, al pubblico generico, alle
proprie truppe e alla popolazione civile dei Paesi in cui vi
siano attività di supporto alla pace."
L'impatto della tecnologia dei media sulla pianificazione
e sulle operazioni militari
Gen. Carlo Jean - Roma (5 Novembre, 1996)
---
L'età della Geoinformazione
La geoinformazione, non la geoeconomia, ha rimpiazzato la
geostrategia come strumento geopolitico più importante. La
presente analisi non si occupa dell'impatto diretto della
rivoluzione dell'informazione sulla strategia e sulle
operazioni, cioè la Guerra Basata sull'Informazione
(Information-Based Warfare nell'originale, ndr) o la
Rivoluzione negli Affari Militari (Revolution in Military
Affairs nell'originale, ndr) (RMA). Essa si focalizza sulle
relazioni militare-media e sulle comunicazioni di "softwar"
che devono essere condotte contestualmente alla "cyberwar"
e alla "netwar" sul campo di battaglia.
Lo sviluppo delle tecnologie dei media ha portato quasi una
rivoluzione nella diffusione di notizie che ha un impatto
significativo sulla sicurezza e sull'uso della forza militare, in
cui al primo posto vi è ciò che a volte viene detta Rivoluzione
negli Affari della Sicurezza (RSA). La RSA è pensata per
essere ancora più cruciale della RMA. Costringe politici e
militari a spostare la loro attenzione dagli aspetti "hard" agli
aspetti "soft" della sicurezza. In occidente, l'importanza della
softwar trae origine anche dalla sparizione della minaccia
diretta agli interessi vitali occidentali, come dalla difficoltà di
mantenere il consenso interno della popolazione e l'unità
dell'Alleanza quando vi siano interessi divergenti degli stati
membri coinvolti. Il cosiddetto "fattore CNN" è spesso
responsabile di insidiare la razionalità delle scelte di politica e
strategia. Nonostante il suo nome, tuttavia, questo fenomeno
non fu inventato dalla CNN. Si tratta di un inevitabile
sottoprodotto dei media odierni, e non può essere vinto
introducendo regolamenti appositi o, ancor meno, con la
semplice condanna. Politiche e strategie non sono più una
prerogativa d'elite. Esse sono divenute attività di massa. I
leader politici e militari non possono più nascondersi dietro il
segreto di gabinetto o del consiglio di guerra, perchè i media
sono pervasivi e non sono soggetti a barriere o frontiere.
Quindi, l'atteggiamento passivo, protettivo utilizzato nel
passato deve essere rimpiazzato da un approccio più attivo e
dinamico.
Comunicazione, Politica e Strategia
L'influenza della comunicazione su politica, strategia e tattica
non è una storia nuova. Basta pensare alle trombe di Jericho e
ai principi di Sun Tzu. Negli ultimi due secoli, ci sono state
molte spinte tecnologiche nella diffusione di notizie. Mentre
nel passato l'informazione era una prerogativa esclusiva di
governi e generali, ora i media e le agenzie di stampa sono in
grado di diffonderla in tutto il mondo anche prima che
raggiunga i decisori poltici e militari. L'informazione è potere
e la sua tempestività è decisiva. Nell'era dell'informazione, il
tempo ha rimpiazzato lo spazio come dimensione strategica
più importante. Sebbene questo fenomeno sia già esistito,
oggi è quantitativamente diverso dal passato. Nei paesi
democratici, i media non solo influenzano le elite politiche e il
pubblico consenso, ma hanno anche una influenza cruciale
sulle scelte operative. Possono restringere la libertà d'azione,
ostacolare la sorpresa e la sicurezza e possono essere usati
come strumento d'intelligence o di manipolazione,
disinformazione e propaganda. L'azione dei media impone
rapidità di reazione politica e strategica e la pressione
temporale risultante può influire sulla razionalità delle
decisioni. D'altro canto, i media offrono anche interessanti
opportunità a livello sia politico che militare. Per esempio,
possono essere usati per mandare messaggi all'avversario, al
pubblico generico, ai propri soldati e alla popolazione civile
dei paesi in cui vi siano in atto operazioni di supporto alla
pace.
---
"la guerra (...) è condotta per forzare
l'avversario a prendere decisioni politiche
che siano favorevoli ai propri interessi."
"E' l'informazione che crea la realtà."
"Identificare una "giusta causa" per ogni intervento è
divenuta una necessità, sicchè gli obiettivi di "realpolitik"
devono essere mascherati da "idealpolitik"."
da:
The Impact of Media Technology on Military Planning
and Operations
Gen. Carlo Jean - Roma (5 Novembre, 1996)
---
I due aspetti di ogni conflitto: Confronto delle Volontà e
Prova di Forza
In ogni conflitto, ci sono due differenti aspetti: il confronto di
opposte volontà politiche e la prova di forza militare. La guerra
non viene condotta per ragioni sue proprie. E' condotta per
forzare l'avversario a prendere decisioni politiche che siano
favorevoli ai propri interessi. Il confronto di volontà può essere
condotto sia attraverso una strategia diretta, attaccando e
distruggendo le forze nemiche e occupando i suoi territori allo
scopo di influenzare le sue decisioni politiche, o attraverso
una strategia indiretta che prenda di mira i centri decisionali
del nemico ("strategia a carciofo", guerra di lunga durata,
guerra psicologica, "softwar", ecc.). In quest'ultimo caso, la
focalizzazione sull'attività strategica non è nè militare nè
territoriale ma giace nel meta-sistema politico e sociale di cui
le forze militari sono un'espressione. Gli aspetti psicologici
sono stati spesso cruciali nelle operazioni militari. Tutte le
guerre sono anche "psico-guerre". Usualmente, la guerra è
limitata. Quindi, ogni proiettile è anche un invito a negoziare
e, da un punto di vista politico, è fondamentalmente un
messaggio. Ciò è molto chiaramente visibile nella brillante
combinazione di diplomazia e forza fatta da Richard
Holbrooke in Bosnia nell'estate del 1995. Minore è l'uso della
forza e più lunga la durata dell'intervento, più grande è
l'importanza della dimensione psicologica dei media. Poche
operazioni possono essere specificamente dirette a supporto di
quest'ultima.
Nuove tecnologie mediatiche e loro effetti politici e
militari
La tecnologia attualmente utilizzata dai media permette loro
di essere più pervasivi e globalizzati quanto mai prima, e di
fornire copertura in tempo reale. E' l'informazione che crea la
realtà. La diffusione in diretta di immagini crea un legame
diretto tra i livelli tattico e politico-strategico. Le azioni
tattiche sono immediatamente amplificate dai media e
acquisiscono un impatto politico. La tradizionale separazione
tra il livello strategico, il livello operativo e quello tattico
nella conduzione delle operazioni è stato sostituito da una grande
sovraimposizione. Anche i comandanti dei livelli inferiori
devono essere ben consapevoli dell'impatto "mediatico" - e
quindi politico - delle loro dichiarazioni ed azioni. Nei corsi
Ufficiali, gli studi sui media non possono più essere
considerati attività secondaria.
Nelle operazioni di supporto alla pace - OOTW - non v'è
linea del fronte e nessun controllo completo può essere
raggiunto sui territori amici. Quindi, i reporters si possono
muovere liberamente. I loro telefoni satellitari e le loro
telecamere possono diffondere istantaneamente e in tutto il
mondo le notizie. Le democrazie non possono facilmente
imporre misure censorie, tenere segreti o restringere i
movimenti dei reporters. I politici hanno bisogno
dell'approvazione dei media e i militari devono cooperare per
ottenerla. I comandanti militari stessi desiderano
l'approvazione dei media, se non altro perchè migliora il
morale delle loro truppe. Atteggiamenti come tentare di
nascondere notizie spiacevoli ai media o esigere il segreto
militare crea sospetti e induce i reporters a violare le regole
allo scopo di assicurare notizie esclusive.
Per ragioni teniche, la televisione non può fornire un contesto
alle immagini che diffonde. La sua logica di mercato la induce
a favorire la spettacolarità e il romanzo piuttosto che la verità.
Come regola, il media tende a criticare piuttosto che capire le
difficoltà incontrate dai militari o la complessità delle
situazioni che essi coprono. Inoltre, sono inclini ad
evidenziare gli aspetti più turpi della guerra, i problemi e i
fallimenti di chi vi è coinvolto. Questa tendenza crea
inevitabili tensioni tra media e militari (Sindrome Vietnam).
A causa della dominanza nei media del tempo reale e della
diretta, come la televisione, e della importanza cruciale del
consenso, la pubblica opinione è divenuta un attore
strategico. Comunque, l'approvazione dei media è spesso
scambiata per consenso pubblico, sebbene le due cose non
sempre coincidano. Il consenso pubblico è determinato pù
dalla forma in cui il messaggio viene convogliato che dal suo
contenuto Questa istanza richiede ulteriori studi. Il consenso
non è lineare e non funziona attraverso i
meccanismi "stimolo-risposta". Esso viene rinforzato dalle
informazioni che riguardano i valori dominanti del pubblico.
L'identificazione di una "giusta causa" per ogni intervento è
divenuta una necessità, così gli obiettivi di "realpolitik"
devono essere mascherati da "idealpolitik".
Naturalmente, queste considerazioni non devono essere fatte
saltuariamente. Alla fine della giornata, è compito della
leadership politica costruire il consenso sulle decisioni
politiche e strategiche più adeguate, piuttosto che decidere
sula base del consenso esistente o sui volatili umori del
pubblico ("videopolitica"). I decisori politici e militari devono
assicurarsi la loro libertà d'azione contro la pressione dei
media. Essi non devono perdere le loro responsabilità allo
scopo di cercare il consenso a tutti i costi. Comunque, il
risultato può essere ottenuto solo se i decisori sono credibili e
se hanno capacità leaderistiche. Altrimenti prevarranno gli
aspetti emotivi e irrazionali.
---
La "softwar" o la guerra mediatica è condotta
con una logica strategica e un meccanismo
simile a quello che governa le armate
combattenti. Quindi, occorre avere sia la
dimensione attiva che passiva, sia quella
difensiva che quella offensiva."
"Oggi, due guerre parallele devono essere condotte: una sul
campo di battaglia e una sui media. (...) La scelta di parole e
segnali è tanto importante quanto la scelta delle armi (..). Le
semiotiche creano una realtà virtuale che è tanto importante
quanto la "reale" realtà del campo di battaglia e che
influenza sia il consenso che le decisioni."
"La pianificazione delle priorità e delle scelte operative
dovrebbe tener conto delle condizioni imposte dai media
(riduzione delle perdite attraverso l'utilizzo di unità corazzate
anzichè di fanteria, rapidità di reazione e breve durata degli
interventi, scelta degli obiettivi; "telegenicità" dei sistemi
d'arma da utilizzare)."
da:
The Impact of Media Technology on Military Planning
and Operations
Gen. Carlo Jean - Roma (5 Novembre, 1996)
---
I media e il concetto di guerra di Clausewitz
L'importanza che i media e la pubblica opinione hanno
acquisito, è una delle ragioni che indusse Martin van Creveld
e John Keegan a stabilire che il concetto di guerra di
Clausewitz non è più valido. Secondo loro, nelle società
dell'era dell'informazione non vi è distinzione tra governo,
popolo ed esercito, e la forza militare non può essere usata
razionalmente come uno strumento di politica.
Personalmente, io non condivido questa visione. Il pensiero di
Clausewitz sulla guerra è basato su ciò che il generale
prussiano chiamava "la simpatica trinità" di forze razionali,
arazionali e irrazionali, cioè intelligence strategica, fortuna e
violenza e passione (Aristotele le chiamò "logos", "ethos" e
"pathos"). Tali forze sono, nelle parole di Clausewitz, i tre
magneti nel mezzo dei quali ogni guerra reale è sospesa.
Questa struttura di base non è cambiata, sebbene il
fattore-CNN abbia aumentato l'importanza di passioni ed
emozioni. Per attenersi ai suoi obiettivi politici, la strategia
deve utilizzare il fattore emotivo, o almeno tenerne conto. La
"softwar" o la guerra mediatica è condotta con una logica
strategica e un meccanismo simile a quello che governa le
armate combattenti. Quindi, occorre avere sia la dimensione
attiva che passiva, sia quella difensiva che quella offensiva. La
difesa da sola non basta, anche perchè i media non rispettano
alcuna frontiera. I soldati non devono confinare se stessi alla
reazione: devono prevedere e prevenire. Essi devono, in breve,
avere un'atteggiamento "pro-attivo".
Oggi, due guerre parallele devono essere condotte: una sul
campo di battaglia e una sui media. Le possibilità sorgono dal
combattere guerre "virtuali" basate su strategie "soft"
piuttosto che "hard". La scelta di parole e segnali è tanto
importante quanto la scelta delle armi ("la penna è più potente
della spada"). Le semiotiche creano una realtà virtuale che è
tanto importante quanto la "reale" realtà del campo di
battaglia e che influenza sia il consenso che le decisioni.
Aggiustamento del militare al "fattore-CNN"
I militari dovrebbero imparare a capire i meccanismi e la
logica dei media, i modi in cui questi influenzano le politiche
e le strategie. I militari dovrebbero tener conto, più che nel
passato, delle ripercussioni politiche delle loro decisioni
tecniche e delle loro dichiarazioni ai media. Le relazioni
pubbliche sono divenute una funzione da comando speciale. I
media creano vincoli all'uso della forza. In particolare,
determinano una tendenza a preferire opzioni con bassi rischi,
bassi costi (in termini di perdite) e breve durata. Questo
implica considerare le difficoltà nell'uso della forza militare, in
quanto, in termini strategici, i costi e i rischi impegnati nel
raggiungimento di un obiettivo sono inversamente
proporzionali. Tradizionalmente, una scelta strategica deve
essere fatta tra opzioni di basso costo e alto rischio e alto
costo e basso rischio. L'azione dei media, d'altra parte,
impone una riduzione sia dei costi che dei rischi. Come
risultato, gli obiettivi da perseguire devono essere limitati e la
forza deve essere usata con la massima cautela, resistendo
alla domanda pubblica di intervento o "mission creep".
Rispetto a questo, la cosiddetta "curva-CNN" deve essere
tenuta a mente: la pressione mediatica in favore
dell'intervento militare o l'espansione degli obiettivi di un
intervento rapidamente sfociano in critiche all'intervento
stesso o in domande di ritirata in caso di fallimento, anche
parziale, o se le perdte sono sostenute. Quindi, interventi
navali e aerei tendono ad essere privilegiati rispetto alle azioni
sul terreno, indipendentemente dalla loro utilità. Quanto più
lontano è concepito l'intervento, tanto più tendono ad essere
utilizzati voli cruise e armi riservate per evitare rischi di
perdite e specialmente la cattura di interi equipaggi. La
robotica sui campi da battaglia diverrà molto popolare.
Siccome la logica militare differisce da quella dei media, le
relazioni tra i militari e i media tendono ad essere difficoltose.
I militari sono costretti al segreto, per ragioni di sopresa e
sicurezza. La loro disciplina e gerarchia verticale li rende
particolarmente sensibili alle critiche. Per natura, il militare
tende a censurare o manipolare i media allo scopo di
disinformare e confondere il nemico per prenderlo di sorpresa.
Inoltre, la competizione può sorgere tra militari e media su chi
informerà per primo i politici (Bush dichiarò che le sue
decisioni erano basate più sulle informazioni della CNN che
sul quelle della CIA). I miitari possono anche essere tentati ad
usare presunte "falle" di informazione per influenzare le
decisioni delle leadership politiche o militari.
I media possono anche influenzare la coesione di alleanze
multinazionali (oggi, le crisi disgregano le alleanze, piuttosto
che unificarle, al contrario di quanto accadeva nel periodo
della guerra fredda). I comandi multinazionali sono
generalmente incapaci di imporre una comune politica
comunicativa. Anche l'ONU evita di farlo, per mantenere la
sua immagine neutrale. Il contingente nazionale tenterà,
comunque, di mantenere buone relazioni con altri media
nazionali. Quindi, se un contingente nazionale impone
restrizioni più strette degli altri, le possibilità che si creino
tensioni e divisioni tra le varie nazioni, e tra ogni esercito
nazionale e i media, aumentano. Il rischio innesca
un'escalation di domanda dei media.
L'incolumità dei reporters è un'istanza particolarmente
critica. I reporters tendono a muoversi autonomamente e a
violare le regole decise dai comandi militari al fine di ottenere
notizie o immagini esclusive. Il sistema del "circo mediatico",
cioè, l'accordo fra reporters, è solo limitatamente effettivo in
questo contesto.
I militari devono tener presente i bisogni legittimi dei media. I
loro sistemi di comunicazione dovrebbero evolvere al di là
degli ottusi bollettini ufficiali: devono essere introdotti grafici,
animazioni, chiare e semplici spiegazioni degli obiettivi e degli
scopi delle operazioni. Dovrebbe verificarsi la tendenza a
"saturare" i media, anche al fine di riuscire a preservare il
segreto delle informazioni confidenziali senza sollevare
sospetti, speculazioni e critiche. La strategia comunicativa
dovrebbe essere elaborata ed esplicitata da staff specializzati
(comunque, mentre è abbastanza facile persuadere un
generale a non sottomettersi ad un'operazione di appendicite,
è a volte abbastanza difficile convincerlo a tacere e che le
relazioni con i media richiedono una professionalità
specifica!)
Teoricamente, le informazioni dovrebbero essere tenute
abbastanza separate dalla guerra psicologica, la
disinformazione e la propaganda. In pratica, ad ogni modo,
tale distinzione è molto difficile e i tentativi di attuarla
possono tramutarsi in disastri, compromettendo la credibilità
dei militari agli occhi dei reporters. Gli unici vantaggi che i
militari detengono sono la vastità del teatro delle operazioni,
l'esclusività sulle informazioni e sugli "eint" satellitari, e la
disponibilità di armi a lunga gittata che agiscono al di fuori
della raggiungibilità mediatica.
La logica dei media
I media, e specialmente la televisione, seguono una logica di
mercato: velocità, esclusiva sulle notizie, spettacolarità e
drammatizzazione dominano sul contesto, sulle analisi e sulle
interpretazioni dei fatti, sulle verifiche e sulla veridicità
dell'informazione. La critica alle azioni delle leadership
politiche e militari "vende" molto di più di una approvazione o
di una informazione neutra. E' noto che l'operatore mediatico
esperto è forgiato dallo sviluppo della tecnologia che utilizza. I
corrispondenti di guerra come quelli operanti nella seconda
guerra mondiale, che potevano interpretare i fatti e porli nel
loro contesto appropriato, non esistono più. Questo può
essere spiegato in parte dal fatto che l'interesse per la politica
estera e le strategie si è diffusa tra la gente e che la stampa ha
perso importanza rispetto alla diffusione delle immagini.
Spesso, la decisione deve essere presa sotto gli occhi attenti di
telecamere che sono pronte ad evidenziare ogni problema e
incongruenza. Il militare non può uscire da gioco anche
perchè i decisori politici chiedono la sua cooperazione per la
costruzione del consenso.
Comunque, non sono solo i militari che devono adeguarsi alla
nuova realtà. Anche i media dovrebbero trovare risposte
adeguate alla legittima domanda: come possono i
media lottare contro la manipolazione? Come possono evitare
la manipolazione nascosta, facendo una chiara distinzione tra
fatti e commenti nei programmi tv? Come possono fornire un
background generale alle immagini trasmesse? Come
possono tener conto della loro naturale tendenza ad
influenzare il pubblico con effetti originati dalla combinazione
di immagini drammatiche e commenti?
Cooperazione tra militari e media
Considerare i media come avversari sleali che devono esere
evitati o combattuti, è l'errore più serio che i militari possono
commettere. Nelle società democratiche, i reporters non
possono rinunciare al loro diritto di informazione e critica.
Sebbene seguano la logica di mercato, i reporter devono avere
il loro codice etico, che è meno ragionevole di quanto
comunemente si pensi. Molti esempi provano questo. Per
esempio, il reporter che vide la 24ma divisione meccanizzata
nel Golfo muoversi con il suo equipaggiamento "bridge", capì
perfettamente cosa ciò significasse, ma mantenne il silenzio.
Le esperienze provano che il dialogo e la cooperazione tra i
militari e i media sono possibili. Sono simili a quelle
relazioni stabilite tra membri di una coalizione. Il militare
dovrebbe capire a fondo la logica e i bisogni dei media e
dovrebbe "selezionare le sue parole" valutandone la
consistenza con l'effetto che quelle frasi avranno sulla
pubblica opinione e sui reporters stessi. Di quando in quando,
regole chiare e ragionevoli devono essere definite quanto più
si tratta di informazioni cruciali. Le relazioni media-militari,
quindi, non sono un gioco a somma zero e nemmeno a
somma negativa. Se correttamente organizzate, possono
sfociare in un gioco a somma positiva. L'informazione è un
diritto/dovere, su cui giacciono le basi per il corretto
funzionamento di ogni sistema democratico, e la
manipolazione o la disinformazione danno origine ad istanze
di legittimità costituzionale e non solo di legalità. In più, la
critica dei media contribuisce a migliorare le decisioni
politiche e strategiche. I media possono essere usati per
informare il pubblico sugli scopi e gli obiettivi perseguiti, per
mandare messaggi al nemico, per fare operazioni di guerra
trasparente (OOTW), per ottenere cooperazione dalle
popolazioni locali (basta pensare al successo della Radio IBIS,
del contingente italiano in Somalia) o per depistare il nemico
(come nella guerra del Golfo, dove l'enfasi si pose sulle
esercitazioni di terra dei marines).
D'altra parte, poche operazioni possono essere specialmente
evidenziate per ottenere gli scopi preferiti dai media (armi non
letali; coordinazione delle operazioni e delle azioni mediatiche
effettuate dagli sloveni nel'estate del 1991, ecc..). La
pianificazione delle priorità e delle scelte operative dovrebbe
tener conto delle condizioni imposte dai media (riduzione
delle perdite attraverso l'utilizzo di unità corazzate anzichè di
fanteria, rapidità di reazione e breve durata degli interventi,
scelta degli obiettivi; "telegenicità" dei sistemi d'arma da
utilizzare).
Commenti finali
In conclusione, i militari dovrebbero imparare a capire la
logica e i meccanismi di funzionamento dei media e adeguare
la loro gestione alle richieste della "geoinformazione". Nello
stesso tempo, i reporters dovrebbero migliorare le loro
conoscenze delle necessità e dei condizionamenti operativi, e
il pubblico generico e le elites politiche dovrebbero imparare a
capire meglio la realtà e gli imperativi militari. In breve, l'era
della geoinformazione richiede più elevati livelli di cultura
militare nella società. Solo così sarà possibile operare scelte
razionali e mantenere il consenso e il "fattore CNN" potrà
essere prevenuto dall'eccessiva influenza sulle scelte politiche
e strategiche.
- fine -
fonte:
http://www.starfarm.it/casd/home/html/pubblicazioni.html
YUGOSLAVIA "HAS BEEN SUICIDED"
The decision of the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
taken on Febrary 4th 2003, is a simbolic fulfillment of the
revanscist and bloody project, against the Balkans' country
and against all its citizens, at work since 1990.
Such project, which has been realized on behalf of the Western power
centrals by dishonourable local political representatives (the ones
who are now ruling in all the formerly federated Republics) has
been worked out during the time which can be simbolically defined by
two dates: November 5th, 1990 - when the US Congress passed the Law
101/513, advocating for dissolution of Yugoslavia through direct
financing of all the new "democratic" (i.e. nationalistic and
secessionistic) political parties - and February 4th, 2003 - with the
birth of this formal "Union of Serbia and Montenegro" and the
cancellation of the name itself of "Yugoslavia" from the geographic
maps of Europe.
Although we understand and share the "nostalgy" expressed by the
serbomontenegrian Ambassador in Italy, Lekic, we cannot agree with his
opinion - that the new "Union" will be "more efficient and less
strong". On the contrary, open statements, made by the ruling
politicians of Montenegro as well as by political representatives of
the provinces of Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina, make it perfectly
clear that the new status is considered as a provisory one, and that
it is aimed only to allow the further disgregation of the country,
thus the creation of new borders to divide apart the inhabitants of
those territories.
The vote of the federal Parliament has been welcomed with joy by the
mastermind of this latest "enterprise", Xavier Solana: the same person
who is so well-known to the local peoples for having directed the
military aggression of 1999. All this satisfaction - no matter whether
openly proclaimed or not - by the international and local political
representatives does actually reveal the hidden inspiration hiding
behind the many criminal decisions which were made, all over the past
few years, starting with the diplomatic recognition of the
secessionist Republics. All these decisions caused inexpressible
human tragedies: re-drawing the Balkans' political geography following
the lines of colonial protectorates, just like during the nazi-fascist
occupation epoch; transforming those territories in Western military
bases and basins for well-exploitable resources and workers;
destroying the conditions of normal coexistance and common culture of
those peoples.
For us, Italian Coordination for Yugoslavia, what is going on in
Yugoslavia is an enormous, long-lasting crime against the humanity,
whose end is unfortunately yet to be seen, and whose responsibles must
be yet recognized and punished. For us, however, Yugoslavia hasn't
died on February 4th, 2003.
Long live Yugoslavia,
long live unity and brotherhood among the peoples.
Italian Coordination for Yugoslavia,
February 2003
---
NARUCENO SAMOUBISTVO JUGOSLAVIJE
Glasanje u Saveznoj skupstini Jugoslavije, 4. februara 2003.,
predstavlja simbolicni cin revansistickog zlocinackog plana protiv ove
zemlje i njenih gradjana, pocev od 1990. Taj plan, koji su po nalogu
zapadnjacke klike sprovodila bedna politicka rukovodstva (a u svim
bivsim federalnim republikama i danas su na vlasti) sprovodjen je
postepeno, simbolicno receno pocev od 5. novembra 1990. - kada je u
Kongresu SAD-a izglasan zakon 101/513 i utemeljen raspad Jugoslavije,
direktnom finansijskom podrskom svim novim "demokratskim"
tvorevinama (nacionalistickim i secesionistickim) sve do 4.
februara 2003. kada nastaje formalna "Zajednica Srbije i Crne Gore",
brisanjem "Jugoslavije" iz evropskih geografskih karti.
Iako bismo mogli da prihvatimo "nostalgicni" ton srpskocrnogorskog
ambasadora u Rimu, gospodina Lekica, ne mozemo nikako da delimo
njegovo misljenje prema kome ce nova "Zajednica biti efikasnija i
manje jaka". Naprotiv, rukovodioci Crne Gore i odgovorni politicari
pokrajina Kosovo-Metohije i Vojvodine otvoreno izjavljuju da
novi status smatraju prelaznim, te da mu je funkcija dalje
rasparcavanje zemlje, dakle, stvaranje novih granica koje ce usloviti
nove deobe stanovnistva.
Ksavijer Solana, oprobani idejni tvorac slicnih poduhvata poznat
po tome sto je izdao nalog za agresiju 1992. prihvatio je nepravilno
izglasanu odluku Savezne skupstine. Svo to ocigledno i
neprikriveno zadovoljstvo odgovornih medjunarodnih i lokalnih
politicara, odaje skrivene ciljeve zlocinackih poteza iz proteklih
godina, pocev od diplomatsog priznavanja secesionistickih republika.
Bila su to politicka opredeljenja koja su izazvala uzasne ljudske
tragedije, menjane su granice i na Balkanu stvarani kolonijalni
protektorati kao u vreme nacifasisticke okupacije, na ogromnim
prostranstvima podignute su vojne baze zapadnih sila koje
eksploatisu prirodna bogatstva zemlje i njenu radnu
snagu, posejana je mrznju medju stanovnistvom i unisteni temelji
sazivota i zajednistva kulturnih bastina tih naroda.
Za nas iz "Italijanskog saveza za Jugoslaviju" sve to predstavlja
zlocin protiv covecnosti nesagledivih posledica. Smatramo da treba da
sednu na optuzenicku klupu svi oni koji su odgovorni za taj zlocin.
Jugoslavija za nas nije prestala da postoji 4. februara 2003. godine
i zato klicemo:
Zivela Jugoslavija!
Zivelo bratstvo i jedinstvo medju narodima!
Italijanska Koordinacija za Jugoslaviju (CNJ)
Februar 2003
---
HANNO "SUICIDATO" LA JUGOSLAVIA
Il voto del Parlamento Federale Jugoslavo del 4 febbraio scorso
rappresenta un compimento simbolico del progetto revanscista
sanguinario messo in atto ai danni del paese balcanico e dei suoi
cittadini a partire dal 1990.
Tale progetto, realizzato su procura delle consorterie occidentali da
indegni rappresentanti politici (quelli oggi al potere in tutte le
Repubbliche ex-federate), si e' articolato in un arco di tempo
simbolicamente collocabile tra il 5 novembre 1990 - quando il
Congresso degli USA approvo' la legge 101/513, che sanciva la
dissoluzione della Jugoslavia attraverso il finanziamento
diretto di tutte le nuove formazioni "democratiche" (nazionaliste e
secessioniste) - al 4 febbraio 2003 - con la nascita di questa
formale "Unione di Serbia e Montenegro" e la cancellazione dello
stesso nome della "Jugoslavia" dalle cartine geografiche dell'Europa.
Pur comprendendo e condividendo la "nostalgia" di cui parla
l'ambasciatore serbomontenegrino in Italia, Lekic, non condividiamo
per nulla la sua opinione secondo cui la nuova "Unione" sara' "piu'
efficiente e meno forte". Viceversa, le dichiarazioni esplicite degli
uomini di governo del Montenegro e dei responsabili politici delle
provincie di Kosovo-Metohija e Vojvodina chiariscono che il nuovo
status e' considerato transitorio ed e' funzionale solo all'ulteriore
disgregazione del paese, dunque alla creazione di nuove frontiere a
dividere gli abitanti di quelle terre.
Il voto del Parlamento Federale viene accolto con grande giubilo
dall'ideatore di questa ennesima "impresa", Xavier Solana, gia' ben
noto alle popolazioni locali per avere comandato la aggressione
militare del 1999. Tutta questa soddisfazione, palese o malcelata, da
parte dei responsabili politici internazionali e locali tradisce
l'ispirazione profonda delle scelte criminali compiute in tutti questi
anni, a partire dal riconoscimento diplomatico delle Repubbliche
secessioniste. Scelte che hanno causato indicibili tragedie umane,
ridisegnando i Balcani secondo protettorati coloniali come ai tempi
dell'occupazione nazifascista, trasformandone i territori in servitu'
militari occidentali e bacini di sfruttamento delle risorse e della
forza-lavoro, devastando le basi della convivenza civile e della
cultura comune di quelle genti.
Per noi del Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia quello che
continua a svolgersi in Jugoslavia e' un immenso e protratto crimine
contro l'umanita', del quale ancora purtroppo non si vede la fine, e
del quale dovranno rispondere quelli che ne portano la
responsabilita'. Per noi, la Jugoslavia non muore il 4 febbraio 2003.
Che viva la Jugoslavia,
che vivano l'unita' e la fratellanza tra i popoli.
Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia
Febbraio 2003
The decision of the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
taken on Febrary 4th 2003, is a simbolic fulfillment of the
revanscist and bloody project, against the Balkans' country
and against all its citizens, at work since 1990.
Such project, which has been realized on behalf of the Western power
centrals by dishonourable local political representatives (the ones
who are now ruling in all the formerly federated Republics) has
been worked out during the time which can be simbolically defined by
two dates: November 5th, 1990 - when the US Congress passed the Law
101/513, advocating for dissolution of Yugoslavia through direct
financing of all the new "democratic" (i.e. nationalistic and
secessionistic) political parties - and February 4th, 2003 - with the
birth of this formal "Union of Serbia and Montenegro" and the
cancellation of the name itself of "Yugoslavia" from the geographic
maps of Europe.
Although we understand and share the "nostalgy" expressed by the
serbomontenegrian Ambassador in Italy, Lekic, we cannot agree with his
opinion - that the new "Union" will be "more efficient and less
strong". On the contrary, open statements, made by the ruling
politicians of Montenegro as well as by political representatives of
the provinces of Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina, make it perfectly
clear that the new status is considered as a provisory one, and that
it is aimed only to allow the further disgregation of the country,
thus the creation of new borders to divide apart the inhabitants of
those territories.
The vote of the federal Parliament has been welcomed with joy by the
mastermind of this latest "enterprise", Xavier Solana: the same person
who is so well-known to the local peoples for having directed the
military aggression of 1999. All this satisfaction - no matter whether
openly proclaimed or not - by the international and local political
representatives does actually reveal the hidden inspiration hiding
behind the many criminal decisions which were made, all over the past
few years, starting with the diplomatic recognition of the
secessionist Republics. All these decisions caused inexpressible
human tragedies: re-drawing the Balkans' political geography following
the lines of colonial protectorates, just like during the nazi-fascist
occupation epoch; transforming those territories in Western military
bases and basins for well-exploitable resources and workers;
destroying the conditions of normal coexistance and common culture of
those peoples.
For us, Italian Coordination for Yugoslavia, what is going on in
Yugoslavia is an enormous, long-lasting crime against the humanity,
whose end is unfortunately yet to be seen, and whose responsibles must
be yet recognized and punished. For us, however, Yugoslavia hasn't
died on February 4th, 2003.
Long live Yugoslavia,
long live unity and brotherhood among the peoples.
Italian Coordination for Yugoslavia,
February 2003
---
NARUCENO SAMOUBISTVO JUGOSLAVIJE
Glasanje u Saveznoj skupstini Jugoslavije, 4. februara 2003.,
predstavlja simbolicni cin revansistickog zlocinackog plana protiv ove
zemlje i njenih gradjana, pocev od 1990. Taj plan, koji su po nalogu
zapadnjacke klike sprovodila bedna politicka rukovodstva (a u svim
bivsim federalnim republikama i danas su na vlasti) sprovodjen je
postepeno, simbolicno receno pocev od 5. novembra 1990. - kada je u
Kongresu SAD-a izglasan zakon 101/513 i utemeljen raspad Jugoslavije,
direktnom finansijskom podrskom svim novim "demokratskim"
tvorevinama (nacionalistickim i secesionistickim) sve do 4.
februara 2003. kada nastaje formalna "Zajednica Srbije i Crne Gore",
brisanjem "Jugoslavije" iz evropskih geografskih karti.
Iako bismo mogli da prihvatimo "nostalgicni" ton srpskocrnogorskog
ambasadora u Rimu, gospodina Lekica, ne mozemo nikako da delimo
njegovo misljenje prema kome ce nova "Zajednica biti efikasnija i
manje jaka". Naprotiv, rukovodioci Crne Gore i odgovorni politicari
pokrajina Kosovo-Metohije i Vojvodine otvoreno izjavljuju da
novi status smatraju prelaznim, te da mu je funkcija dalje
rasparcavanje zemlje, dakle, stvaranje novih granica koje ce usloviti
nove deobe stanovnistva.
Ksavijer Solana, oprobani idejni tvorac slicnih poduhvata poznat
po tome sto je izdao nalog za agresiju 1992. prihvatio je nepravilno
izglasanu odluku Savezne skupstine. Svo to ocigledno i
neprikriveno zadovoljstvo odgovornih medjunarodnih i lokalnih
politicara, odaje skrivene ciljeve zlocinackih poteza iz proteklih
godina, pocev od diplomatsog priznavanja secesionistickih republika.
Bila su to politicka opredeljenja koja su izazvala uzasne ljudske
tragedije, menjane su granice i na Balkanu stvarani kolonijalni
protektorati kao u vreme nacifasisticke okupacije, na ogromnim
prostranstvima podignute su vojne baze zapadnih sila koje
eksploatisu prirodna bogatstva zemlje i njenu radnu
snagu, posejana je mrznju medju stanovnistvom i unisteni temelji
sazivota i zajednistva kulturnih bastina tih naroda.
Za nas iz "Italijanskog saveza za Jugoslaviju" sve to predstavlja
zlocin protiv covecnosti nesagledivih posledica. Smatramo da treba da
sednu na optuzenicku klupu svi oni koji su odgovorni za taj zlocin.
Jugoslavija za nas nije prestala da postoji 4. februara 2003. godine
i zato klicemo:
Zivela Jugoslavija!
Zivelo bratstvo i jedinstvo medju narodima!
Italijanska Koordinacija za Jugoslaviju (CNJ)
Februar 2003
---
HANNO "SUICIDATO" LA JUGOSLAVIA
Il voto del Parlamento Federale Jugoslavo del 4 febbraio scorso
rappresenta un compimento simbolico del progetto revanscista
sanguinario messo in atto ai danni del paese balcanico e dei suoi
cittadini a partire dal 1990.
Tale progetto, realizzato su procura delle consorterie occidentali da
indegni rappresentanti politici (quelli oggi al potere in tutte le
Repubbliche ex-federate), si e' articolato in un arco di tempo
simbolicamente collocabile tra il 5 novembre 1990 - quando il
Congresso degli USA approvo' la legge 101/513, che sanciva la
dissoluzione della Jugoslavia attraverso il finanziamento
diretto di tutte le nuove formazioni "democratiche" (nazionaliste e
secessioniste) - al 4 febbraio 2003 - con la nascita di questa
formale "Unione di Serbia e Montenegro" e la cancellazione dello
stesso nome della "Jugoslavia" dalle cartine geografiche dell'Europa.
Pur comprendendo e condividendo la "nostalgia" di cui parla
l'ambasciatore serbomontenegrino in Italia, Lekic, non condividiamo
per nulla la sua opinione secondo cui la nuova "Unione" sara' "piu'
efficiente e meno forte". Viceversa, le dichiarazioni esplicite degli
uomini di governo del Montenegro e dei responsabili politici delle
provincie di Kosovo-Metohija e Vojvodina chiariscono che il nuovo
status e' considerato transitorio ed e' funzionale solo all'ulteriore
disgregazione del paese, dunque alla creazione di nuove frontiere a
dividere gli abitanti di quelle terre.
Il voto del Parlamento Federale viene accolto con grande giubilo
dall'ideatore di questa ennesima "impresa", Xavier Solana, gia' ben
noto alle popolazioni locali per avere comandato la aggressione
militare del 1999. Tutta questa soddisfazione, palese o malcelata, da
parte dei responsabili politici internazionali e locali tradisce
l'ispirazione profonda delle scelte criminali compiute in tutti questi
anni, a partire dal riconoscimento diplomatico delle Repubbliche
secessioniste. Scelte che hanno causato indicibili tragedie umane,
ridisegnando i Balcani secondo protettorati coloniali come ai tempi
dell'occupazione nazifascista, trasformandone i territori in servitu'
militari occidentali e bacini di sfruttamento delle risorse e della
forza-lavoro, devastando le basi della convivenza civile e della
cultura comune di quelle genti.
Per noi del Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia quello che
continua a svolgersi in Jugoslavia e' un immenso e protratto crimine
contro l'umanita', del quale ancora purtroppo non si vede la fine, e
del quale dovranno rispondere quelli che ne portano la
responsabilita'. Per noi, la Jugoslavia non muore il 4 febbraio 2003.
Che viva la Jugoslavia,
che vivano l'unita' e la fratellanza tra i popoli.
Coordinamento Nazionale per la Jugoslavia
Febbraio 2003
http://www.b-i-infos.com/index.html
"Balkans Infos"
B. I. Balkans-Infos est un mensuel de politique internationale
totalement indépendant de tout gouvernement, institution ou parti, qui
paraît depuis près de sept ans. Il n'est diffusé que sur abonnements.
Fondé à l'origine pour réagir aux mensonges des grands médias
concernant la Yougoslavie et les Balkans, il est devenu un organe de
référence dans une dénonciation d'ensemble de l'impérialisme
économique, du fanatisme religieux et de la désinformation.
B.I. Balkans - Infos N° 75 mars 2003
EDITORIAL N 75
SOMMAIRE DU N° 75
Le pouvoir mondial du "nouveau messie" : le "révérend" Moon. Une
remarquable étude de Michel Blanzat sur l'influence secrète d'un des
hommes les plus puissants de la planète, à la fois sur Washington et
sur Pyong Yang.
Un nouveau document de Pierre Hillard : la carte de l'Europe en
miettes qui préfigure la mosaïque continentale préparée par les
partisans de la globalisation.
Le compte rendu d'une visite de huit jours en Irak, par le
contre-amiral Claude Gaucherand, qui prouve que "ce pays ne menace
personne".
Le bilan de deux ans et demi de régime "démocratique" pro-occidental à
Belgrade. Un constat saisissant de chaos organisé, de misère et de
néo-colonialisme de la communauté internationale.
L'analyse de la constitution ubuesque qui doit régir le nouveau
monstre inventé par la diplomatie occidentale : la Serbie-Monténégro.
Une étude de Kosta Christitch.
Komnen Becirovic corrige les erreurs historiques d'Edgar Morin à
propos de la "civilisation" turque dans les Balkans.
Les réactions aux menaces de guerre à l'Irak, de diverses
personnalités : Rony Brauman, Tzvetan Todorov, Bernard-Henri Lévy,
Christiane Taubira, Harold Pinter et Stella Jatras.
Le Dr Rajko Dolecek dit la vérité sur l'idole des salons de "gauche",
Vaclav Havel - une vérité qui contraste avec l'hagiographie officielle
- et le Dr Martin Janecek traite des rapports entre occident,
orthodoxie et islam.
Les " nouvelles de l'empire " font le point sur les derniers progrès
de la colonisation américaine dans le monde.
La rubrique "entre guillemets" décrit l'embarras des pauvres intellos
de Saint-Germain des Prés, qui ne sont pas pacifistes mais ne veulent
pas la guerre et qui sont pro-américains tout en s'inquiétant des
délires de Washnington.
Le quatrième roman d'Ivanka Mikic, "Komarac", remporte un succès
mérité à Belgrade. Le livre en serbe est disponible en France pour le
prix de 15 euros (envoi compris). Le commander au journal.
---
Abonnements
http://www.b-i-infos.com/sab.html
S'abonne pour 20 numéros
45 euros pour la France
65 euros hors France (par voie rapide)
S'abonne pour 10 numéros
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40 euros hors France (par voie rapide)
---
B I
Rédaction / Administration
CAP 8
BP 391
75869 PARIS cedex 18
lodalmas@...
Tel : 01 42 54 25 01
Fax : 01 42 23 07 30
"Balkans Infos"
B. I. Balkans-Infos est un mensuel de politique internationale
totalement indépendant de tout gouvernement, institution ou parti, qui
paraît depuis près de sept ans. Il n'est diffusé que sur abonnements.
Fondé à l'origine pour réagir aux mensonges des grands médias
concernant la Yougoslavie et les Balkans, il est devenu un organe de
référence dans une dénonciation d'ensemble de l'impérialisme
économique, du fanatisme religieux et de la désinformation.
B.I. Balkans - Infos N° 75 mars 2003
EDITORIAL N 75
SOMMAIRE DU N° 75
Le pouvoir mondial du "nouveau messie" : le "révérend" Moon. Une
remarquable étude de Michel Blanzat sur l'influence secrète d'un des
hommes les plus puissants de la planète, à la fois sur Washington et
sur Pyong Yang.
Un nouveau document de Pierre Hillard : la carte de l'Europe en
miettes qui préfigure la mosaïque continentale préparée par les
partisans de la globalisation.
Le compte rendu d'une visite de huit jours en Irak, par le
contre-amiral Claude Gaucherand, qui prouve que "ce pays ne menace
personne".
Le bilan de deux ans et demi de régime "démocratique" pro-occidental à
Belgrade. Un constat saisissant de chaos organisé, de misère et de
néo-colonialisme de la communauté internationale.
L'analyse de la constitution ubuesque qui doit régir le nouveau
monstre inventé par la diplomatie occidentale : la Serbie-Monténégro.
Une étude de Kosta Christitch.
Komnen Becirovic corrige les erreurs historiques d'Edgar Morin à
propos de la "civilisation" turque dans les Balkans.
Les réactions aux menaces de guerre à l'Irak, de diverses
personnalités : Rony Brauman, Tzvetan Todorov, Bernard-Henri Lévy,
Christiane Taubira, Harold Pinter et Stella Jatras.
Le Dr Rajko Dolecek dit la vérité sur l'idole des salons de "gauche",
Vaclav Havel - une vérité qui contraste avec l'hagiographie officielle
- et le Dr Martin Janecek traite des rapports entre occident,
orthodoxie et islam.
Les " nouvelles de l'empire " font le point sur les derniers progrès
de la colonisation américaine dans le monde.
La rubrique "entre guillemets" décrit l'embarras des pauvres intellos
de Saint-Germain des Prés, qui ne sont pas pacifistes mais ne veulent
pas la guerre et qui sont pro-américains tout en s'inquiétant des
délires de Washnington.
Le quatrième roman d'Ivanka Mikic, "Komarac", remporte un succès
mérité à Belgrade. Le livre en serbe est disponible en France pour le
prix de 15 euros (envoi compris). Le commander au journal.
---
Abonnements
http://www.b-i-infos.com/sab.html
S'abonne pour 20 numéros
45 euros pour la France
65 euros hors France (par voie rapide)
S'abonne pour 10 numéros
30 euros pour la France
40 euros hors France (par voie rapide)
---
B I
Rédaction / Administration
CAP 8
BP 391
75869 PARIS cedex 18
lodalmas@...
Tel : 01 42 54 25 01
Fax : 01 42 23 07 30
(na engleskom i srpskohrvatskom)
=== ENGLISH ===
ARTEL GEOPOLITIKA by www.artel.co.yu
office@...
Date:21 February 2003
The Book of Borka Vucic: BANKING - CHOICE OR DESTINY
The book "BANKING - CHOICE OR DESTINY?" is
the first monograph published by Udruzenje gradjana CER.
This association is also editing the
monthly journal "Geopolitika"
already for two years.
The book is written in latin letters,
the format is B-5 (17x24 cm), the
volume is 328 pages, with more
than 200 illustrations;
black&white and colour
photographs, facsimiles, tables,
extracts, "tumbstones" of loans,
bonds and other placements.
The book can be ordered at the address:
E-mail: bvcycha@...
Fax: +381 11 367 17 99
Price: $12 or 12?
Zepter Bank, Bulevar Mihajla Pupina 117, 11070 Novi
Beograd, Serbia & Montenegro
540100-17250647 Udruzenje gradjana Cer
Extracts from the foreword, preface, reviews, synopsis
etc.
... It is uncommon that a Banker writes a book about
banking, most of the time it is done by governors of
Central Banks. This is probably due to business
confidentiality. The testimony of Borka Vucic of the period
of four decades, as seen in the book "Banking, a choice or
destiny", is therefore of interest to readers, especially for
those with good intentions and to those who are
uninformed of the happenings in our imperiled country.
... Indeed, the author defends and presents Yugoslav
banking during the development period of transformation
from the plan economy to market economy, with facts,
rarely seen documents and photographs. This especially
relays in respect to efforts and achieved results on the
international segment.
... Of interest are also parts of the book which talk about
connecting commercial banks, especially the Beogradska
Banka, with international institutions, with intentions to
apply investment programs as well as the rapid adjustment
to modern models of capital markets. This explains the fact
that Beogradska Banka, as well as some other Yugoslav
banks, were among the top 1000, 500 and 100 listed banks
on the World, European and East-European markets.
[photo] President of the Republic of Cyprus George Vassilliou opens
a new building of Beogradska banka, Nicosia,in May 1991
[photo] With Tassos Papadopoulos, Nicosia, 1991
[photo] Kikis Lazarides, Chairmain of the Cyprus Popular Bank (in
the middle), Andreas Philipou of the Central Bank and the
Governog (right)
[photo] With the Serbian Patriarch Mr. Pavle and the Cypriot
Archbishop Mr. Chrisostomos
... The period of UN-sanctions and the financial blockade
are illustrated with the Bank's efforts to survive. An
impression of constant straggle appears and determination
to use allowed models in order to comply with sanctions
and at the same time to comply with Yugoslav legal
procedures and those of countries and markets where it
was possible and legal.
... While reading the book, the reader receives a strong
impression about a woman banker - a professional, who
cuts through this men's world of extraordinary and
influential experts, sometimes in very hard circumstances.
... The author still carries the spirit of optimism after
leaving the position of the President of the Yugoslav
largest bank. She writes a book, maintains contacts with a
large circle of friends, experts of banks, companies and
from various institutions of the country and abroad.
[photo] A visit of David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase
Manhattan Bank, New York, 1979 (B. Zoric, B. Vucic, D.
Rockefeller, B. Kostic)
[photo] With the Director of Barclay`s Bank, Mr. Michael London
and his deputy, Mr. G. Miller
[photo] With Edward Palmer, the Executive President of Citybank,
New York
[photo] Signing the contract with EXIM Bank, Washington for the
purchase of the plane DC - 10
... Although an aged person, she learned to use the PC and
the internet. She likes to help and maintain contact with
Yugoslavs abroad-Diaspora, which she appreciates it very
much.
... Involvements in the activities of The Fund for
Supplemental Education of Young Farmers are of most
interest to the author as well as a fast integration of 120
farmers into the program for specializing in 2002/03 in
Austria, Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Canada, Australia
and the Republic of South Africa.
... Since her early youth, carried by curiosity of spirit,
persistency and consistency, she walked along the path of
her choice and her destiny and along the hard and
complicated paths of banking, constantly learning and
simultaneously teaching others, always advancing and
enabling others to advance.
... Life destiny was often cruel to her, but despite of all, she
remained always strong, surprising even those who know
her very well, how she is able to absorb her energy and
strength.
... The book is distincted by plenty of information,
important and interesting data and a string of didactical
and ingenious events, all presented in a direct, simple and
clean language style. The book is entirely a reflection of
her personality, her life approach and believes and
therefore it presents a precious testimony.
... This book, written by Borka Vucic, is therefore not only
a book about a woman banker and the banking profession
but also a wonderful story about our people.
Serbia needs tolerance and reconciliation of the Left and
the Right block, of the Karadjordjevic and the Obrenovic
dynasties, Communists and Non-communists, Chetnics
and Partisans, Believers and Non-believers, the North and
the South, Ideologists and the Practical, the Capital and
the Province.
Our homeland needs harmony and unity, respect of
history, traditions and continuity
in accordance with the course of a modern and humane
civilization.
CONTENT
FOREWORD 9
THE REASON WHY I AM WRITING A BOOK 13
CHILDHOOD, EDUCATION AND FAMILY
o My Grandfathers Dragic and Simeun 23 o Encounter at
the Drinking Fountain 25 o Entrance Examination in
Obrenovac 27 o Challenge of the City Life 29 o German
Occupation and Joining Partisans 31 o Story about the
Faculty and Professional Orientation 35
II BANKING WAYS AND CROSSWAYS
o Overture for the Banker 41 o Krajger's Favourable Evaluation 41
o High Level Practice 44 o Misunderstandings with the Chief 45
o Establishment of the Economic Bank of the Republic of
Serbia in 1961 46 o Orientation to the Market, and
International Operations 47 o Field Work 48
III CHALLENGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKET
o Opening to International Market 53 o A Visit to a London Broker 55
o Good Intentions of "Great Banker" 56 o An Englishman
and the Plum Brandy 58 o Airline Business with the EXIM Bank 61
o European Continental Partners - HERMES and COFACE 63
IV THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
AND THE WORLD BANK
o Integration in International Organizations 67 o Activities
of the IMF and World Bank's Delegates and of Other Important Guests 68
o The World Bank Projects 69 o Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) 70
o World Experience of a Man from Jagodina 71 o Visits of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to Belgrade 71
o The Anglo-Yugoslav Bank 72 o In the Summer House
of the Obrenovic Dynasty Near Smederevo 77 o Visit to
Mr. David Rockefeller 78 o What Meant the Beogradska
Banka Guarantee for the "Sava" Centre and the
"Intercontinental" Hotel 79 o The "Sava" Centre 80 o
Clinton's Speech - Malum omen 82
V TRACKING WORLD TRENDS
o Tendencies of Bank Integration Processes 87 o Merger of
Banks 88 o Facing Reality 90 o Belgrade Bank Group 90 o
Consolidation of Banks within the Beogradska Banka
System 92 o The First Borrowing Worth $ 50 Million and
Repayment Ahead of Schedule 97
o International Payment Transactions 98 o Financial
Market in the Country 99 o Restored Confidence 99 o The
War Bank 102 o E-75 Motorway /Novi Sad-Belgrade Section/ 104 o
Public Loan for Economic Development of the Republic of
Serbia 105 o "Old" Foreign Currency Savings 107
o The Donor Bank 109
VI OPENING STATEMENTS
AT THE MEETINGS OF BEOGRADSKA BANKA a.d.
o Shareholders Regularly Furnished with Information 173
o Opening Statement at the Seventh Meeting of
Beogradska Banka a.d. held on 12 June 1998 173 o
Opening Statement at the Tenth Meeting Session of
Beogradska Banka a.d. held on 14 December 1999 124
VII FOREIGN LOANS AND DEVELOPMENT
o Syndicated Loans, Public and Private Placements 137 o
New President of the Bank - Slobodan Milosevic 145 o
Long-term Loan Worth $ 700 Million 148 o Our
Economic and Financial Cooperation with Kuwait 148 o
The Falcon on the Emir's Shoulder 150 o Our Delegation
in Kuwait at the Conference of Potential Investors 752 o
The Joke and the Truth about Slobodan Milosevic's
Knowledge of English 153 o Significant Syndicated Loans
155 o Linking Theory and Practice 158 o A Junior
Colleague from Austria 159 o Recommendation for the
International Banking Summer School 160
o Experiences with the General Manager 160
VIII BEOGRADSKA BANKA - CYPRUS,
OFF-SHORE BANKING UNIT (BB COBU)
o Orientation to Financial Cooperation with the Middle East 165
o Ideal Location 165 o Cyprus - Divine Gift for Businesses 166
o Off-shore Companies 167 o Cooperation with Law Office Tassos
Papadopoulos and Renown Audit Company Price Waterhouse 169
o Cooperation with Banks in Mixed Ownership 170
-Successful Business Performance 177 o The President of
Cyprus Attending the Opening of the New Premises 173 o
Sky Promotion of BB COBU 176
o The Chance Which Should Not Be Missed 177
IX SANCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
o Operations Getting Worse 157 o Unjustifiably Frozen Assets 157
o Accusations with no Grounds but with Evil Intention 152
o Continuity of Success 152 o Control without Remarks 153
o Facing Temptation with Two Ladies 155 o Futile Effort 155
o A Bank for Some Other Times 155 o English Impoliteness 159
o American Welcome 190 o The Truth about Frozen Assets in America 190
X YUGOSLAV PEOPLE IN CYPRUS
o Activities of Businessmen and Bankers 195 o
Motherland in the Heart 196 o A Loyal and Compact
Team 201 o A Non-Banking Success 202 o Gratitude to
the Cypriot People 202 o The Ambassador's Statement 204
XITHE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM
o Meeting in Salzburg in 1998 211
XII HELP FROM THE DIASPORA
o Assembly and Councils of the Diaspora 217 o Great
Success of the First Assembly 220 o A Visit to a Farmer's
Holding 223 o Thin Layers of Dough from Valjevo in Paris 223 o
Customs Duties, Citizenship and Additional Training 225
o The Serbian Home - Decision of the Assembly 225 o
The Serbian Memorial -Srboslov 225 o Small- and
Medium-Size Projects - A Farmer Seeking the Rain 226
XIII HOLDING POSITION OF FEDERAL MINISTER
o Federal Minister for Coordination with International
Financial Institutions 231 o Main Tasks that Occupied Me
234 o Banking and Financial Market in Yugoslavia-
Constraints and Possibilities in Post-Sanctions and
Post-NATO Aggression Period 238
XIV FUND FOR SUPPLEMENTAL EDUCATION
OF YOUNG FARMERS
o Support to Young Rural Population 249 o Requirements
for Loan Disbursement 251 o Education Centres 251 o
Financial Operation of the Fund 253
XV REFLECTION IN THE PUBLIC MIRROR
o Others about Me, and I about Myself 257
XVI MY "LEAVING" THE POSITION
OF PRESIDENT OF BEOGRADSKA BANKA
o Destiny of the Biggest Development Bank 295 o Raid by
Unknown Persons 296 o Difficulties in Providing the
Meeting Hall 298 o Attempt of Raid and Take-Over of the
Bank 299
EPILOGUE 311
EPILOGUE
Immediately after the first edition of this book was
published in late August 2002, it was presented to the
public in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Krupanj (my native
town). The second and third editions followed soon.
The book presentations were very well attended and in the audience
were sitting mostly young people, holders of high academic titles,
bankers, diplomats, journalists as well as many other friends of
mine. The book was presented by Prof. Dr. Oskar Kovac,
Prof. Dr. Zora Zakic, Radovan Pesikan, M.Sc., Merima
Rankovic, Editor-in-Chief of the Jugoslovenska Knjiga,
Dragutin Matanovic, a businessman, and Dr. Slavko
Mrdovic, a surgeon, from our Diaspora in Switzerland.
They all underlined the message the book conveys and the
topicality of its testimony about the development of the
Yugoslav banking and economy over a rather long
historical period of time.
[photo] Presentation on Kolarac university, August 2002
Serbian media also covered this event by a number of
interesting and positive reviews of the book published in
several dailies, weeklies and periodicals {Politika, Glas
Javnosti, Vecernje novosti, Nacional, Svedok, llustrovana
poli-tika, Nin, Selo, Telegraf, EU market) as well as in TV
programmes.
The English edition is intended for my business partners,
bankers and numerous friends all over the world. I believe
that many of my countless colleagues and friends abroad
will recognize themselves in this book.
It is precisely at this point in time that I wish my book to
be a part of a broader programme of intellectual
self-defense and protection against malicious
manipulations coming from a number of both local and
foreign circles.
Presently, the current regime in my country is
thunderously announcing that the "reforms' and the
transition process it is implementing represent a final shift
from the Soviet-type centrally and administratively
planned economy to the one market oriented. I, therefore,
feel it necessary to emphasize that the centrally planned
economy was abandoned in the former Yugoslavia far
back during the 1950s. The beginning of my banking
career precisely coincided with the processes of transition
and orientation to the market economy and with the
linking with foreign money and capital markets. I very
well remember that in the course of the 1960s a
comparative study of market functioning was made in
Oxford in which Yugoslavia held a place between
Germany and Japan. Accordingly, Yugoslavia commenced
its market transition process immediately after the
economic enterprises were entrusted to workers to manage
them, in the period of the so-called workers'
self-management. As early as at the beginning of the
1950s the state domination started to decline gradually,
and the economic results Yugoslavia had achieved from
that moment on were so striking that the countries
currently undergoing transition can only dream of.
Yugoslavia was for years recording the fastest economic
growth in Europe and I remember very well (in 1962 our
country had a higher living standard than Italy) that in
terms of the rate of growth Yugoslavia was just after
Japan.
It is interesting that the transition process in the former
Yugoslavia is currently hardly ever mentioned, let alone
the results it had achieved, even by international
institutions involved in that process. For example, the
World Bank published a specific analysis of the transition
processes in all countries of the world; however,
Yugoslavia's efficient and effective transition carried out
back in the 1950s and later has not been mentioned at all.
Many eminent economic experts, whose views I fully
share, think that this is just the matter of a solely
ideological approach on the side of international
institutions whose only interest is to expand their activities
and to facilitate the companies from the west, in the first
place, to conquer new profitable markets.
By carefully analyzing the transition processes in the
countries which became independent by seceding from
Yugoslavia, one can note that no transition process is in
place there. Instead, one can speak of the process of
restoration of capitalism from the time of monarchial
Yugoslavia combined with the concept of cheap and hasty
privatization of good and market-oriented enterprises.
Similarly, in one of his interviews, Dr. Branko Horvat,*
Professor at the Faculty of Economics of Zagreb,
emphasized that "if the present-day situation in any of the
former republics is compared with the situation that
prevailed in Yugoslavia in the past, one can note that
everything has devalued and that the former Yugoslavia,
which was once on the top internationally, now has the
successors who are in the so-called Western Balkans. All
the countries that cannot join the European Union are
placed there". He thus concludes that all countries that
were part of Yugoslavia have over the last 10 years been
experiencing an economic crisis deeper than the one
recorded worldwide in the course of the 1930s.
Also interesting was the lecture delivered by Dr. Ivan
Ribnikar,* Professor at the Faculty of Economics of
Ljubljana, at the Milocer Seminar in September 2002. His
point was that the most important issue in transition is not
to allow any enterprise to fail if its problems can be settled.
Presenting Slovenia's experience, Dr. Ivan Ribnikar
pointed to the erroneousness of the idea of having
everything first "cleaned" in a country and then start again
from the very beginning. Slovenia saved everything it
could by implementing a persistent rehabilitation of the
bank and enterprise sector. Slovenian Government has not
liqudat-ed its own banks; instead it has consolidated them.
Therefore, the results Slovenia has achieved show that in
terms of business effectiveness Slovenia is holding the first
place, while in terms of invested foreign capital it is at the
very bottom. Western theoreticians, including international
financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank did not
agree with this model; however, Slovenia has so far
managed to protect itself against such influences of theirs.
Since the new regime came to power in Serbia on 5
October 2000, the process of major socio-economic
changes has entirely neglected the continuity in all
segments of economy and finance. Everything is being
commenced from the very start. Such practice is neither
good for the processes in the country nor for cooperation
with foreign commodity and financial markets. For
example, the hasty decision on bankruptcy of four national
banks (Jugobanka AD, Beogradska Banka AD,
Investiciona Banka AD and Beobanka AD) is a major
failure on which history and future generations will surely
pass their judgement. What is already clear now - imposed
liquidation of these commercial banks caused immediate
suffocation of production and development. A standstill
and apathy are characterizing the development of one of
the most significant factors in the fight against
unemployment and for economic progress. On the other
hand, major decisions are made in the area of privatization
even before the appropriate legislation come into force,
which speaks a lot about the (irregularity of the
privatization process.
Support to agriculture is only declarative in nature and I
wish to ascertain that even during the hardest time of
economic and financial sanctions and international
isolation, the agricultural sector enjoyed more incentives
and support than it is the case nowadays. It is the major
and significant economic area which helped us survive in
all serious crises, wars and ten-year long sanctions
imposed by the international community and the USA,
including the NATO bombing.
Also, the role of domestic banks in development is
restricted, while foreign banks whose number is significant
and which are privileged in relation to local banks do not
engage in investment, which prevents realization of
positive transition trends.
Monographs of commercial bankers are rare, they are
more often written by central bank governors. This book is
my testimony of the events, facts, rarely published
documents and pictures covering the period of four
decades.
I have written the Banking - Choice or Destiny not only
to let the reader get the impression about me as a lady
professional banker fighting her way through the male
world of extraordinary and influential experts in,
sometimes, impossible circumstances. But at the same time
I defend in this book the Yugoslav commercial banking,
Beogradska Banka and their roles in development projects
in the country, particularly in cooperation with
international financial institutions and commercial banks
in implementing investment projects in infrastructure,
industry, agriculture, tourism, etc. Our commercial banks
were always able to quickly adapt to current capital
market models by establishing direct interest-based
relations with foreign commercial banks, funds and state
owned financial and insurance institutions (the EXIM
banks, ECGD, COFAS, HERMES, EDC, etc.) without
assistance by mediators. Our bankers acquired
specialisation and training in accordance with the
requirements of western banking, particularly in showing
the business performance of either banks or companies, as
well as in showing their audited balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts. Finally, we wanted to boast as
aggregate Yugoslav commercial banking at that time of
our regularity in repaying contracted international loans
and of a sustainable debt servicing ratio of the country.
I am proud that I can say that at that time which was
characterized by a severe bank competition internationally
my Beogradska Banka was on the list of 100 major world
banks and among the first 20 in Europe.
It is for this reason that today, when my thoughts flash
through numerous reminiscences about my engagement in
banking and finance during the past years, I am filled with
pleasure. It is true that the banking business has its strict,
precisely defined and exact rules and standards; however, it
is just these rules and standards that require
open-mindedness, listening with care and concentration to
every business partner, no matter whether a new or an old
one - and also making maximum efforts to help him. In
today's world of global and technological civilization there
are a great number of high quality and profitable projects
the implementation of which is waiting to be supported,
especially in small countries and those undergoing
transition. It is, therefore, important to have in such
countries sound and strong domestic banks as well as
highly professionally trained domestic bankers. It is
necessary for the development of Serbia, as it is also for
the creation of the conditions for as many job opportunities
as possible.
I belong, perhaps, to a different school of thought. I do
hope, however, that one of the priority tasks of another
and better government in Serbia will be to acknowledge
the continuity in the country's development and to show
more respect for its own human resources and positive
experiences.
The Author
=== SRPSKOHRVATSKI ===
ARTEL GEOPOLITIKA by www.artel.co.yu
office@...
Datum: 19. februar 2003. g.
Knjiga Borke Vucic: BANKARSTVO - IZBOR ILI SUDBINA
UVOD
Prva monografija u okviru Izdavackog plana Udru?enja gradana CER.
Ubraja se u memoarsku literaturu.
Pored uvoda, predgovora i autorovog objasnjenja o tome zasto pise
knjigu, sadr?aj ukljucuje 16 poglavlja i indeks imena.
Knjiga je stampana latincnim pismom, formata B-5 /17x24 cm/, obima 312
stranica, sa preko 200 ilustracija; crno-bele i kolor fotografije,
faksimili, tabele, izvodi, tumbstones /spomen ploce/ kredita,
obveznica i drugih plasmana.
Prvo izdanje, brosirano, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Drugo izdanje, tvrdi povez, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Knjiga se mo?e kupiti u mnogim knji?arama sirom
zemlje i naruciti na bvcycha@..., fax: +381 11 367 17 99.
Izvodi iz uvoda, predgovora, recenzija, sinopsisa i dr.
... Retko poslovni bankar pise knjigu o bankarstvu, to cesce
cine guverneri centralnih banaka. Verovatno zbog
poslovne tajne. Svedocanstvo Borke Vucic u periodu od
cetiri decenije u knjizi Bankarstvo, izbor ili sudbina zbog
toga je interesantno za citaoce, posebno dobronamerne i
nedovoljno upucene u dosadasnja zbivanja nase, po svemu
ugro?ene zemlje.
... Zaista, autor cinjenicama, retko videnim dokumentima i
slikama u svojoj knjizi prezentira i brani poslovno
bankarstvo Jugoslavije i Srbije u periodu razvoja od
planske ka tr?isnoj ekonomiji. To se narocito odnosi na
njihove napore i rezultate na medunarodnom segmentu.
... Zanimljiva je obrada povezivanja poslovnih banaka i
Beogradske banke sa medunarodnim finansijskim
institucijama na realizaciji investicionih projekata i
sposobnosti brzog prilagodavanja savremenim modelima
tr?ista kapitala. Zato je razumljivo da su se Beogradska
banka i jos neke jugoslovenske banke godinama nalazile na
listi medu hiljadu, petstotina i sto najvecih svetskih,
evropskih i istocno-evropskih banaka.
... Period sankcija OUN-a i finansijske blokade u knjizi se
ilustruju kroz velike napore Beogradske banke za
pre?ivljavanje. Posebno se stice utisak stalne borbe i
upornosti za koriscenje dozvoljenih modela u cilju
pridr?avanja sankcija i u skladu sa zakonskom procedurom
Jugoslavije i zemalja onih tr?ista gde je to bilo moguce i
legalno.
... Citajuci knjigu, citalac dobija sna?an utisak o ?eni
bankaru - profesionalcu, koja se probija u tom muskom
svetu izuzetnih i uticajnih strucnjaka u ponekad
nemogucim uslovima.
... Duh optimizma autor nosi u sebi i posle odlaska sa
mesta predsednika najvece banke Jugoslavije. Pise knjigu,
odr?ava kontakte sa velikim krugom prijatelja, strucnjaka
iz banaka, kompanija i raznih institucija u zemlji i svetu.
... Iako u poznim godinama naucila je da koristi kompjuter
i internet. Rado obavlja poslove i kontakt sa dijasporom
koju veoma uva?ava.
... Ipak najradije se ukljucuje u razgovor o aktiviranju
fonda za doskolovanje mladih seljaka i njihovo sto br?e
ukljucivanje u realizaciju programa za odlazak 120
kandidata na specijalizaciju u 2002./03. godini u Austriju,
Nemacku, Dansku, Ukrajinu, Kanadu, Australiju i Ju?nu
Afriku.
... Od rane mladosti, vodena radoznaloscu duha, upornoscu
i doslednoscu, isla je putem svoga izbora i svoje sudbine,
teskim i komplikovanim stazama bankarstva, stalno uceci i
istovremeno uceci druge, stalno napredujuci i istovremeno
omogucavajuci napredak drugima.
... ?ivotna sudbina je bila prema njoj cesto okrutna, ali je,
bez obzira, na sve ostala jaka, nepokolebljiva i sna?na
duhom, ostavljajuci one koji je poznaju u nedoumici odakle
crpi energiju i snagu.
... Njenu knjigu odlikuje obilje informacija, va?nih i
interesantnih podataka i niz poucnih i duhovitih
dogadanja, sve iskazano neposrednim, jednostavnim i
cistim jezickim stilom. Knjiga je u potpunosti odraz njene
licnosti, shvatanja i verovanja i otuda predstavlja
dragoceno svedocanstvo.
... Njena knjiga o ?eni bankaru otuda i nije samo knjiga
njoj i njenom pozivu vec je istovremeno i jedna divna prica
o nasem velikom narodu...
SADR?AJ
UMESTO PREDGOVORA 11
ZASTO PISEM KNJIGU 15
I
DETINJSTVO, SKOLOVANJE I PORODICA
* Deda Dragic i deda Simeun 25 * Susret na cesmi 27 *
Prijemni ispit u Obrenovcu 29 * Izazov gradskog ?ivota 30
* Nemacka okupacija i odlazak u partizane 32 * Prica o
fakultetu i profesionalno opredeljenje 36
II
BANKARSKI PUTEVI I RASKRSCA
* Uvertira za bankara 41 * Povoljna Krajgerova ocena 41
* Praksa na visokom nivou 44 * Nesporazumi sa sefom 45
* Osnivanje Privredne banke Republike Srbije 1961. godine
46 * Orijentacija na tr?iste i poslove sa inostranstvom 47 *
Terenski rad 48
III
IZAZOV ME?UNARODNOG TR?ISTA KAPITALA
* Otvaranje prema inostranom tr?istu 51 * U poseti
londonskom brokeru 53 * Dobronamernost "velikog
bankara" 54 * Englez i sljivovica 56 * Avio biznis sa
EXIM bankom 59 * Evropski kontinentalni partneri -
HERMES I COFACE 60
IV
ME?UNARODNI MONETARNI FOND I SVETSKA BANKA
* Ukljucivanje u medunarodne organizacije 63 * Aktivnost
delegata MMF-a i Svetske banke kao i drugih znacajnih
gostiju 64 * Projekti Svetske banke 65 * SAL kredit 66 *
Mondijalisticko iskustvo jednog Jagodinca 67 * Gostovanje
MMF-a i Svetske banke u Beogradu 67 * Anglo Yugoslav
Bank 68 * U starom letnjikovcu dinastije Obrenovic kod
Smedereva 73 * Elitne zvanice pod satorom 74 * Poseta
Davidu Rokfeleru 74 * Sta je znacila garancija Beogradske
banke za Centar "Sava" i "Interkontinental" 76 * Centar
"Sava" 77 * Klintonov govor - Malum omen (los
predznak) 78
V
NA TRAGU SVETSKIH TRENDOVA
* Tendencije integracije banaka 83 * Ukrupnjavanje
banaka 84 * Suocavanje sa realnoscu 86 * Beogradska
bankarska grupa 87 * Konsolidacija banaka u sistemu
Beogradske banke 90 * Prvo zadu?enje vredno 50 miliona
dolara i otplata pre roka 94 * Platni promet sa
inostranstvom 95 * Finansijsko tr?iste u zemlji 96 *
Vraceno poverenje 96 * Ratna banka 99 * Autoput E-75
/deonica Novi Sad-Beograd/ 101 * Zajam za privredni
razvoj Republike Srbije 102 * Stara devizna stednja 103 *
Banka - donator 105
VI
UVODNA IZLAGANJA SA SEDNICA SKUPSTINA
BEOGRADSKE BANKE a.d.
* Redovno informisanje akcionara 109 * Uvodno izlaganje
na VII sednici Skupstine Beogradske banke a.d., odr?anoj
12. juna 1998. godine 109 * Uvodno izlaganje na X sednici
Skupstine Beogradske banke a.d., odr?ane 14. decembra
1999. godine 119
VII
INOSTRANI KREDITI I RAZVOJ
* Konzorcijalni krediti, javni i privatni plasmani 131 *
Novi predsednik banke - Slobodan Milosevic 139 *
Dugorocni kredit vredan 700 miliona dolara 142 * Nasa
privredna i finansijska saradnja sa Kuvajtom 142 * Soko
na ramenu emira 144 * Boravak nase delegacije u Kuvajtu
na konferenciji potencijalnih investitora 146 * Sala i zbilja
o ucenju engleskog jezika Slobodana Milosevica 147 *
Znacajniji konzorcijalni krediti 149 * Spoj teorije i prakse
152 * Mladi kolega iz Austrije 153 * Preporuka za
Medunarodnu bankarsku skolu 154 * Iskustva sa
generalnim direktorom 154
VIII
"BEOGRADSKA BANKA - CYPRUS, OFFSHORE
BANKING UNIT" (BB COBU)
* Orijentacija finansijske saradnje sa bliskim istokom 159 *
Idealna destinacija 159 * Kipar - bo?ji dar za biznis 160 *
"Offshore" kompanije 161 * Saradnja sa advokatskom
kucom "Tassos Papadopoulos" i poznatim revizorom
"Price Waterhouse" 163 * Saradnja sa mesovitim bankama
164 * IICY International Investment Corporation for
Yugoslavia 165 * Uspesno poslovanje 166 * Predsednik
Kipra na otvaranju nove zgrade 167 * Nebeska promocija
"BB COBU" 169 * Sansa koja se ne propusta 170
IX
SANKCIJE OUN
* Pogorsanje poslovanja 173 * Bezrazlo?no zamrznute
devize 173 * Optu?be bez osnova ali i sa namerom 174 *
Besprekorni cash flow 174 * Kontinuitet uspeha 175 *
Kontrola bez primedbi 176 * U iskusenju sa damama 177 *
Napor bez uspeha 179 * Banka za neka druga vremena 180
* Engleska neuctivost 181 * Americka dobrodoslica 181 *
Istina o zamrnutim sredstvima u Americi 182
X
JUGOSLOVENI NA KIPRU
* Aktivnosti privrednika i bankara 187 * Domovina u srcu
188 * Odana i kompaktna ekipa 193 * Vanbankarski uspeh
193 * Hvala kiparskom narodu 194 * Ambasadorova izjava
196
XI
SVETSKI EKONOMSKI FORUM
* Sastanak u Salcburgu 1998. godine 201
XII
POMOC DIJASPORE
* Sabor i Saveti dijaspore 207 * Veliki uspeh na prvom
saboru 210 * Poseta seljackom gazdinstvu 213 * Valjevske
kore za pitu u Parizu 213 * Carine, dr?avljanstvo,
dopunska nastava 215 * Srpski dom - odluka Sabora 215 *
Srpski memorijal, Srboslov 215 * Mali i srednji projekti -
seljak tra?i kisu 216
XIII
NA MESTU SAVEZNOG MINISTRA
* Savezni ministar za koordinaciju sa medunarodnim
finansijskim institucijama 221 * Glavni poslovi koji su me
okupirali 223 * Bankarstvo i finansijsko tr?iste u
Jugoslaviji - ogranicenja i mogucnosti posle sankcija i
agresije NATO 227
XIV
FOND ZA DOSKOLOVANJE MLADIH POLJOPRIVREDNIKA
* Podrska mladoj seoskoj populaciji 237 * Uslovi koriscenja
kredita 239 * Obrazovni centri 239 * Finansijsko
poslovanje Fonda 241
XV
PEROM O MENI
* Dugi o meni i ja o sebi 245
XVI
MOJ "ODLAZAK" SA MESTA
PREDSEDNIKA BEOGRADSKE BANKE
* Sudbina najvece razvojne banke 289 * Upadanje
nepoznatih lica 290 * Teskoce sa obezbedenjem sale 295 *
Pokusaj upada i preuzimanje Banke 295
INDEKS IMENA 303
ZASTO PISEM KNJIGU
Verovatno ce se c
=== ENGLISH ===
ARTEL GEOPOLITIKA by www.artel.co.yu
office@...
Date:21 February 2003
The Book of Borka Vucic: BANKING - CHOICE OR DESTINY
The book "BANKING - CHOICE OR DESTINY?" is
the first monograph published by Udruzenje gradjana CER.
This association is also editing the
monthly journal "Geopolitika"
already for two years.
The book is written in latin letters,
the format is B-5 (17x24 cm), the
volume is 328 pages, with more
than 200 illustrations;
black&white and colour
photographs, facsimiles, tables,
extracts, "tumbstones" of loans,
bonds and other placements.
The book can be ordered at the address:
E-mail: bvcycha@...
Fax: +381 11 367 17 99
Price: $12 or 12?
Zepter Bank, Bulevar Mihajla Pupina 117, 11070 Novi
Beograd, Serbia & Montenegro
540100-17250647 Udruzenje gradjana Cer
Extracts from the foreword, preface, reviews, synopsis
etc.
... It is uncommon that a Banker writes a book about
banking, most of the time it is done by governors of
Central Banks. This is probably due to business
confidentiality. The testimony of Borka Vucic of the period
of four decades, as seen in the book "Banking, a choice or
destiny", is therefore of interest to readers, especially for
those with good intentions and to those who are
uninformed of the happenings in our imperiled country.
... Indeed, the author defends and presents Yugoslav
banking during the development period of transformation
from the plan economy to market economy, with facts,
rarely seen documents and photographs. This especially
relays in respect to efforts and achieved results on the
international segment.
... Of interest are also parts of the book which talk about
connecting commercial banks, especially the Beogradska
Banka, with international institutions, with intentions to
apply investment programs as well as the rapid adjustment
to modern models of capital markets. This explains the fact
that Beogradska Banka, as well as some other Yugoslav
banks, were among the top 1000, 500 and 100 listed banks
on the World, European and East-European markets.
[photo] President of the Republic of Cyprus George Vassilliou opens
a new building of Beogradska banka, Nicosia,in May 1991
[photo] With Tassos Papadopoulos, Nicosia, 1991
[photo] Kikis Lazarides, Chairmain of the Cyprus Popular Bank (in
the middle), Andreas Philipou of the Central Bank and the
Governog (right)
[photo] With the Serbian Patriarch Mr. Pavle and the Cypriot
Archbishop Mr. Chrisostomos
... The period of UN-sanctions and the financial blockade
are illustrated with the Bank's efforts to survive. An
impression of constant straggle appears and determination
to use allowed models in order to comply with sanctions
and at the same time to comply with Yugoslav legal
procedures and those of countries and markets where it
was possible and legal.
... While reading the book, the reader receives a strong
impression about a woman banker - a professional, who
cuts through this men's world of extraordinary and
influential experts, sometimes in very hard circumstances.
... The author still carries the spirit of optimism after
leaving the position of the President of the Yugoslav
largest bank. She writes a book, maintains contacts with a
large circle of friends, experts of banks, companies and
from various institutions of the country and abroad.
[photo] A visit of David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Chase
Manhattan Bank, New York, 1979 (B. Zoric, B. Vucic, D.
Rockefeller, B. Kostic)
[photo] With the Director of Barclay`s Bank, Mr. Michael London
and his deputy, Mr. G. Miller
[photo] With Edward Palmer, the Executive President of Citybank,
New York
[photo] Signing the contract with EXIM Bank, Washington for the
purchase of the plane DC - 10
... Although an aged person, she learned to use the PC and
the internet. She likes to help and maintain contact with
Yugoslavs abroad-Diaspora, which she appreciates it very
much.
... Involvements in the activities of The Fund for
Supplemental Education of Young Farmers are of most
interest to the author as well as a fast integration of 120
farmers into the program for specializing in 2002/03 in
Austria, Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Canada, Australia
and the Republic of South Africa.
... Since her early youth, carried by curiosity of spirit,
persistency and consistency, she walked along the path of
her choice and her destiny and along the hard and
complicated paths of banking, constantly learning and
simultaneously teaching others, always advancing and
enabling others to advance.
... Life destiny was often cruel to her, but despite of all, she
remained always strong, surprising even those who know
her very well, how she is able to absorb her energy and
strength.
... The book is distincted by plenty of information,
important and interesting data and a string of didactical
and ingenious events, all presented in a direct, simple and
clean language style. The book is entirely a reflection of
her personality, her life approach and believes and
therefore it presents a precious testimony.
... This book, written by Borka Vucic, is therefore not only
a book about a woman banker and the banking profession
but also a wonderful story about our people.
Serbia needs tolerance and reconciliation of the Left and
the Right block, of the Karadjordjevic and the Obrenovic
dynasties, Communists and Non-communists, Chetnics
and Partisans, Believers and Non-believers, the North and
the South, Ideologists and the Practical, the Capital and
the Province.
Our homeland needs harmony and unity, respect of
history, traditions and continuity
in accordance with the course of a modern and humane
civilization.
CONTENT
FOREWORD 9
THE REASON WHY I AM WRITING A BOOK 13
CHILDHOOD, EDUCATION AND FAMILY
o My Grandfathers Dragic and Simeun 23 o Encounter at
the Drinking Fountain 25 o Entrance Examination in
Obrenovac 27 o Challenge of the City Life 29 o German
Occupation and Joining Partisans 31 o Story about the
Faculty and Professional Orientation 35
II BANKING WAYS AND CROSSWAYS
o Overture for the Banker 41 o Krajger's Favourable Evaluation 41
o High Level Practice 44 o Misunderstandings with the Chief 45
o Establishment of the Economic Bank of the Republic of
Serbia in 1961 46 o Orientation to the Market, and
International Operations 47 o Field Work 48
III CHALLENGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKET
o Opening to International Market 53 o A Visit to a London Broker 55
o Good Intentions of "Great Banker" 56 o An Englishman
and the Plum Brandy 58 o Airline Business with the EXIM Bank 61
o European Continental Partners - HERMES and COFACE 63
IV THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
AND THE WORLD BANK
o Integration in International Organizations 67 o Activities
of the IMF and World Bank's Delegates and of Other Important Guests 68
o The World Bank Projects 69 o Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) 70
o World Experience of a Man from Jagodina 71 o Visits of
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to Belgrade 71
o The Anglo-Yugoslav Bank 72 o In the Summer House
of the Obrenovic Dynasty Near Smederevo 77 o Visit to
Mr. David Rockefeller 78 o What Meant the Beogradska
Banka Guarantee for the "Sava" Centre and the
"Intercontinental" Hotel 79 o The "Sava" Centre 80 o
Clinton's Speech - Malum omen 82
V TRACKING WORLD TRENDS
o Tendencies of Bank Integration Processes 87 o Merger of
Banks 88 o Facing Reality 90 o Belgrade Bank Group 90 o
Consolidation of Banks within the Beogradska Banka
System 92 o The First Borrowing Worth $ 50 Million and
Repayment Ahead of Schedule 97
o International Payment Transactions 98 o Financial
Market in the Country 99 o Restored Confidence 99 o The
War Bank 102 o E-75 Motorway /Novi Sad-Belgrade Section/ 104 o
Public Loan for Economic Development of the Republic of
Serbia 105 o "Old" Foreign Currency Savings 107
o The Donor Bank 109
VI OPENING STATEMENTS
AT THE MEETINGS OF BEOGRADSKA BANKA a.d.
o Shareholders Regularly Furnished with Information 173
o Opening Statement at the Seventh Meeting of
Beogradska Banka a.d. held on 12 June 1998 173 o
Opening Statement at the Tenth Meeting Session of
Beogradska Banka a.d. held on 14 December 1999 124
VII FOREIGN LOANS AND DEVELOPMENT
o Syndicated Loans, Public and Private Placements 137 o
New President of the Bank - Slobodan Milosevic 145 o
Long-term Loan Worth $ 700 Million 148 o Our
Economic and Financial Cooperation with Kuwait 148 o
The Falcon on the Emir's Shoulder 150 o Our Delegation
in Kuwait at the Conference of Potential Investors 752 o
The Joke and the Truth about Slobodan Milosevic's
Knowledge of English 153 o Significant Syndicated Loans
155 o Linking Theory and Practice 158 o A Junior
Colleague from Austria 159 o Recommendation for the
International Banking Summer School 160
o Experiences with the General Manager 160
VIII BEOGRADSKA BANKA - CYPRUS,
OFF-SHORE BANKING UNIT (BB COBU)
o Orientation to Financial Cooperation with the Middle East 165
o Ideal Location 165 o Cyprus - Divine Gift for Businesses 166
o Off-shore Companies 167 o Cooperation with Law Office Tassos
Papadopoulos and Renown Audit Company Price Waterhouse 169
o Cooperation with Banks in Mixed Ownership 170
-Successful Business Performance 177 o The President of
Cyprus Attending the Opening of the New Premises 173 o
Sky Promotion of BB COBU 176
o The Chance Which Should Not Be Missed 177
IX SANCTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
o Operations Getting Worse 157 o Unjustifiably Frozen Assets 157
o Accusations with no Grounds but with Evil Intention 152
o Continuity of Success 152 o Control without Remarks 153
o Facing Temptation with Two Ladies 155 o Futile Effort 155
o A Bank for Some Other Times 155 o English Impoliteness 159
o American Welcome 190 o The Truth about Frozen Assets in America 190
X YUGOSLAV PEOPLE IN CYPRUS
o Activities of Businessmen and Bankers 195 o
Motherland in the Heart 196 o A Loyal and Compact
Team 201 o A Non-Banking Success 202 o Gratitude to
the Cypriot People 202 o The Ambassador's Statement 204
XITHE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM
o Meeting in Salzburg in 1998 211
XII HELP FROM THE DIASPORA
o Assembly and Councils of the Diaspora 217 o Great
Success of the First Assembly 220 o A Visit to a Farmer's
Holding 223 o Thin Layers of Dough from Valjevo in Paris 223 o
Customs Duties, Citizenship and Additional Training 225
o The Serbian Home - Decision of the Assembly 225 o
The Serbian Memorial -Srboslov 225 o Small- and
Medium-Size Projects - A Farmer Seeking the Rain 226
XIII HOLDING POSITION OF FEDERAL MINISTER
o Federal Minister for Coordination with International
Financial Institutions 231 o Main Tasks that Occupied Me
234 o Banking and Financial Market in Yugoslavia-
Constraints and Possibilities in Post-Sanctions and
Post-NATO Aggression Period 238
XIV FUND FOR SUPPLEMENTAL EDUCATION
OF YOUNG FARMERS
o Support to Young Rural Population 249 o Requirements
for Loan Disbursement 251 o Education Centres 251 o
Financial Operation of the Fund 253
XV REFLECTION IN THE PUBLIC MIRROR
o Others about Me, and I about Myself 257
XVI MY "LEAVING" THE POSITION
OF PRESIDENT OF BEOGRADSKA BANKA
o Destiny of the Biggest Development Bank 295 o Raid by
Unknown Persons 296 o Difficulties in Providing the
Meeting Hall 298 o Attempt of Raid and Take-Over of the
Bank 299
EPILOGUE 311
EPILOGUE
Immediately after the first edition of this book was
published in late August 2002, it was presented to the
public in Belgrade, Novi Sad and Krupanj (my native
town). The second and third editions followed soon.
The book presentations were very well attended and in the audience
were sitting mostly young people, holders of high academic titles,
bankers, diplomats, journalists as well as many other friends of
mine. The book was presented by Prof. Dr. Oskar Kovac,
Prof. Dr. Zora Zakic, Radovan Pesikan, M.Sc., Merima
Rankovic, Editor-in-Chief of the Jugoslovenska Knjiga,
Dragutin Matanovic, a businessman, and Dr. Slavko
Mrdovic, a surgeon, from our Diaspora in Switzerland.
They all underlined the message the book conveys and the
topicality of its testimony about the development of the
Yugoslav banking and economy over a rather long
historical period of time.
[photo] Presentation on Kolarac university, August 2002
Serbian media also covered this event by a number of
interesting and positive reviews of the book published in
several dailies, weeklies and periodicals {Politika, Glas
Javnosti, Vecernje novosti, Nacional, Svedok, llustrovana
poli-tika, Nin, Selo, Telegraf, EU market) as well as in TV
programmes.
The English edition is intended for my business partners,
bankers and numerous friends all over the world. I believe
that many of my countless colleagues and friends abroad
will recognize themselves in this book.
It is precisely at this point in time that I wish my book to
be a part of a broader programme of intellectual
self-defense and protection against malicious
manipulations coming from a number of both local and
foreign circles.
Presently, the current regime in my country is
thunderously announcing that the "reforms' and the
transition process it is implementing represent a final shift
from the Soviet-type centrally and administratively
planned economy to the one market oriented. I, therefore,
feel it necessary to emphasize that the centrally planned
economy was abandoned in the former Yugoslavia far
back during the 1950s. The beginning of my banking
career precisely coincided with the processes of transition
and orientation to the market economy and with the
linking with foreign money and capital markets. I very
well remember that in the course of the 1960s a
comparative study of market functioning was made in
Oxford in which Yugoslavia held a place between
Germany and Japan. Accordingly, Yugoslavia commenced
its market transition process immediately after the
economic enterprises were entrusted to workers to manage
them, in the period of the so-called workers'
self-management. As early as at the beginning of the
1950s the state domination started to decline gradually,
and the economic results Yugoslavia had achieved from
that moment on were so striking that the countries
currently undergoing transition can only dream of.
Yugoslavia was for years recording the fastest economic
growth in Europe and I remember very well (in 1962 our
country had a higher living standard than Italy) that in
terms of the rate of growth Yugoslavia was just after
Japan.
It is interesting that the transition process in the former
Yugoslavia is currently hardly ever mentioned, let alone
the results it had achieved, even by international
institutions involved in that process. For example, the
World Bank published a specific analysis of the transition
processes in all countries of the world; however,
Yugoslavia's efficient and effective transition carried out
back in the 1950s and later has not been mentioned at all.
Many eminent economic experts, whose views I fully
share, think that this is just the matter of a solely
ideological approach on the side of international
institutions whose only interest is to expand their activities
and to facilitate the companies from the west, in the first
place, to conquer new profitable markets.
By carefully analyzing the transition processes in the
countries which became independent by seceding from
Yugoslavia, one can note that no transition process is in
place there. Instead, one can speak of the process of
restoration of capitalism from the time of monarchial
Yugoslavia combined with the concept of cheap and hasty
privatization of good and market-oriented enterprises.
Similarly, in one of his interviews, Dr. Branko Horvat,*
Professor at the Faculty of Economics of Zagreb,
emphasized that "if the present-day situation in any of the
former republics is compared with the situation that
prevailed in Yugoslavia in the past, one can note that
everything has devalued and that the former Yugoslavia,
which was once on the top internationally, now has the
successors who are in the so-called Western Balkans. All
the countries that cannot join the European Union are
placed there". He thus concludes that all countries that
were part of Yugoslavia have over the last 10 years been
experiencing an economic crisis deeper than the one
recorded worldwide in the course of the 1930s.
Also interesting was the lecture delivered by Dr. Ivan
Ribnikar,* Professor at the Faculty of Economics of
Ljubljana, at the Milocer Seminar in September 2002. His
point was that the most important issue in transition is not
to allow any enterprise to fail if its problems can be settled.
Presenting Slovenia's experience, Dr. Ivan Ribnikar
pointed to the erroneousness of the idea of having
everything first "cleaned" in a country and then start again
from the very beginning. Slovenia saved everything it
could by implementing a persistent rehabilitation of the
bank and enterprise sector. Slovenian Government has not
liqudat-ed its own banks; instead it has consolidated them.
Therefore, the results Slovenia has achieved show that in
terms of business effectiveness Slovenia is holding the first
place, while in terms of invested foreign capital it is at the
very bottom. Western theoreticians, including international
financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank did not
agree with this model; however, Slovenia has so far
managed to protect itself against such influences of theirs.
Since the new regime came to power in Serbia on 5
October 2000, the process of major socio-economic
changes has entirely neglected the continuity in all
segments of economy and finance. Everything is being
commenced from the very start. Such practice is neither
good for the processes in the country nor for cooperation
with foreign commodity and financial markets. For
example, the hasty decision on bankruptcy of four national
banks (Jugobanka AD, Beogradska Banka AD,
Investiciona Banka AD and Beobanka AD) is a major
failure on which history and future generations will surely
pass their judgement. What is already clear now - imposed
liquidation of these commercial banks caused immediate
suffocation of production and development. A standstill
and apathy are characterizing the development of one of
the most significant factors in the fight against
unemployment and for economic progress. On the other
hand, major decisions are made in the area of privatization
even before the appropriate legislation come into force,
which speaks a lot about the (irregularity of the
privatization process.
Support to agriculture is only declarative in nature and I
wish to ascertain that even during the hardest time of
economic and financial sanctions and international
isolation, the agricultural sector enjoyed more incentives
and support than it is the case nowadays. It is the major
and significant economic area which helped us survive in
all serious crises, wars and ten-year long sanctions
imposed by the international community and the USA,
including the NATO bombing.
Also, the role of domestic banks in development is
restricted, while foreign banks whose number is significant
and which are privileged in relation to local banks do not
engage in investment, which prevents realization of
positive transition trends.
Monographs of commercial bankers are rare, they are
more often written by central bank governors. This book is
my testimony of the events, facts, rarely published
documents and pictures covering the period of four
decades.
I have written the Banking - Choice or Destiny not only
to let the reader get the impression about me as a lady
professional banker fighting her way through the male
world of extraordinary and influential experts in,
sometimes, impossible circumstances. But at the same time
I defend in this book the Yugoslav commercial banking,
Beogradska Banka and their roles in development projects
in the country, particularly in cooperation with
international financial institutions and commercial banks
in implementing investment projects in infrastructure,
industry, agriculture, tourism, etc. Our commercial banks
were always able to quickly adapt to current capital
market models by establishing direct interest-based
relations with foreign commercial banks, funds and state
owned financial and insurance institutions (the EXIM
banks, ECGD, COFAS, HERMES, EDC, etc.) without
assistance by mediators. Our bankers acquired
specialisation and training in accordance with the
requirements of western banking, particularly in showing
the business performance of either banks or companies, as
well as in showing their audited balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts. Finally, we wanted to boast as
aggregate Yugoslav commercial banking at that time of
our regularity in repaying contracted international loans
and of a sustainable debt servicing ratio of the country.
I am proud that I can say that at that time which was
characterized by a severe bank competition internationally
my Beogradska Banka was on the list of 100 major world
banks and among the first 20 in Europe.
It is for this reason that today, when my thoughts flash
through numerous reminiscences about my engagement in
banking and finance during the past years, I am filled with
pleasure. It is true that the banking business has its strict,
precisely defined and exact rules and standards; however, it
is just these rules and standards that require
open-mindedness, listening with care and concentration to
every business partner, no matter whether a new or an old
one - and also making maximum efforts to help him. In
today's world of global and technological civilization there
are a great number of high quality and profitable projects
the implementation of which is waiting to be supported,
especially in small countries and those undergoing
transition. It is, therefore, important to have in such
countries sound and strong domestic banks as well as
highly professionally trained domestic bankers. It is
necessary for the development of Serbia, as it is also for
the creation of the conditions for as many job opportunities
as possible.
I belong, perhaps, to a different school of thought. I do
hope, however, that one of the priority tasks of another
and better government in Serbia will be to acknowledge
the continuity in the country's development and to show
more respect for its own human resources and positive
experiences.
The Author
=== SRPSKOHRVATSKI ===
ARTEL GEOPOLITIKA by www.artel.co.yu
office@...
Datum: 19. februar 2003. g.
Knjiga Borke Vucic: BANKARSTVO - IZBOR ILI SUDBINA
UVOD
Prva monografija u okviru Izdavackog plana Udru?enja gradana CER.
Ubraja se u memoarsku literaturu.
Pored uvoda, predgovora i autorovog objasnjenja o tome zasto pise
knjigu, sadr?aj ukljucuje 16 poglavlja i indeks imena.
Knjiga je stampana latincnim pismom, formata B-5 /17x24 cm/, obima 312
stranica, sa preko 200 ilustracija; crno-bele i kolor fotografije,
faksimili, tabele, izvodi, tumbstones /spomen ploce/ kredita,
obveznica i drugih plasmana.
Prvo izdanje, brosirano, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Drugo izdanje, tvrdi povez, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Knjiga se mo?e kupiti u mnogim knji?arama sirom
zemlje i naruciti na bvcycha@..., fax: +381 11 367 17 99.
Izvodi iz uvoda, predgovora, recenzija, sinopsisa i dr.
... Retko poslovni bankar pise knjigu o bankarstvu, to cesce
cine guverneri centralnih banaka. Verovatno zbog
poslovne tajne. Svedocanstvo Borke Vucic u periodu od
cetiri decenije u knjizi Bankarstvo, izbor ili sudbina zbog
toga je interesantno za citaoce, posebno dobronamerne i
nedovoljno upucene u dosadasnja zbivanja nase, po svemu
ugro?ene zemlje.
... Zaista, autor cinjenicama, retko videnim dokumentima i
slikama u svojoj knjizi prezentira i brani poslovno
bankarstvo Jugoslavije i Srbije u periodu razvoja od
planske ka tr?isnoj ekonomiji. To se narocito odnosi na
njihove napore i rezultate na medunarodnom segmentu.
... Zanimljiva je obrada povezivanja poslovnih banaka i
Beogradske banke sa medunarodnim finansijskim
institucijama na realizaciji investicionih projekata i
sposobnosti brzog prilagodavanja savremenim modelima
tr?ista kapitala. Zato je razumljivo da su se Beogradska
banka i jos neke jugoslovenske banke godinama nalazile na
listi medu hiljadu, petstotina i sto najvecih svetskih,
evropskih i istocno-evropskih banaka.
... Period sankcija OUN-a i finansijske blokade u knjizi se
ilustruju kroz velike napore Beogradske banke za
pre?ivljavanje. Posebno se stice utisak stalne borbe i
upornosti za koriscenje dozvoljenih modela u cilju
pridr?avanja sankcija i u skladu sa zakonskom procedurom
Jugoslavije i zemalja onih tr?ista gde je to bilo moguce i
legalno.
... Citajuci knjigu, citalac dobija sna?an utisak o ?eni
bankaru - profesionalcu, koja se probija u tom muskom
svetu izuzetnih i uticajnih strucnjaka u ponekad
nemogucim uslovima.
... Duh optimizma autor nosi u sebi i posle odlaska sa
mesta predsednika najvece banke Jugoslavije. Pise knjigu,
odr?ava kontakte sa velikim krugom prijatelja, strucnjaka
iz banaka, kompanija i raznih institucija u zemlji i svetu.
... Iako u poznim godinama naucila je da koristi kompjuter
i internet. Rado obavlja poslove i kontakt sa dijasporom
koju veoma uva?ava.
... Ipak najradije se ukljucuje u razgovor o aktiviranju
fonda za doskolovanje mladih seljaka i njihovo sto br?e
ukljucivanje u realizaciju programa za odlazak 120
kandidata na specijalizaciju u 2002./03. godini u Austriju,
Nemacku, Dansku, Ukrajinu, Kanadu, Australiju i Ju?nu
Afriku.
... Od rane mladosti, vodena radoznaloscu duha, upornoscu
i doslednoscu, isla je putem svoga izbora i svoje sudbine,
teskim i komplikovanim stazama bankarstva, stalno uceci i
istovremeno uceci druge, stalno napredujuci i istovremeno
omogucavajuci napredak drugima.
... ?ivotna sudbina je bila prema njoj cesto okrutna, ali je,
bez obzira, na sve ostala jaka, nepokolebljiva i sna?na
duhom, ostavljajuci one koji je poznaju u nedoumici odakle
crpi energiju i snagu.
... Njenu knjigu odlikuje obilje informacija, va?nih i
interesantnih podataka i niz poucnih i duhovitih
dogadanja, sve iskazano neposrednim, jednostavnim i
cistim jezickim stilom. Knjiga je u potpunosti odraz njene
licnosti, shvatanja i verovanja i otuda predstavlja
dragoceno svedocanstvo.
... Njena knjiga o ?eni bankaru otuda i nije samo knjiga
njoj i njenom pozivu vec je istovremeno i jedna divna prica
o nasem velikom narodu...
SADR?AJ
UMESTO PREDGOVORA 11
ZASTO PISEM KNJIGU 15
I
DETINJSTVO, SKOLOVANJE I PORODICA
* Deda Dragic i deda Simeun 25 * Susret na cesmi 27 *
Prijemni ispit u Obrenovcu 29 * Izazov gradskog ?ivota 30
* Nemacka okupacija i odlazak u partizane 32 * Prica o
fakultetu i profesionalno opredeljenje 36
II
BANKARSKI PUTEVI I RASKRSCA
* Uvertira za bankara 41 * Povoljna Krajgerova ocena 41
* Praksa na visokom nivou 44 * Nesporazumi sa sefom 45
* Osnivanje Privredne banke Republike Srbije 1961. godine
46 * Orijentacija na tr?iste i poslove sa inostranstvom 47 *
Terenski rad 48
III
IZAZOV ME?UNARODNOG TR?ISTA KAPITALA
* Otvaranje prema inostranom tr?istu 51 * U poseti
londonskom brokeru 53 * Dobronamernost "velikog
bankara" 54 * Englez i sljivovica 56 * Avio biznis sa
EXIM bankom 59 * Evropski kontinentalni partneri -
HERMES I COFACE 60
IV
ME?UNARODNI MONETARNI FOND I SVETSKA BANKA
* Ukljucivanje u medunarodne organizacije 63 * Aktivnost
delegata MMF-a i Svetske banke kao i drugih znacajnih
gostiju 64 * Projekti Svetske banke 65 * SAL kredit 66 *
Mondijalisticko iskustvo jednog Jagodinca 67 * Gostovanje
MMF-a i Svetske banke u Beogradu 67 * Anglo Yugoslav
Bank 68 * U starom letnjikovcu dinastije Obrenovic kod
Smedereva 73 * Elitne zvanice pod satorom 74 * Poseta
Davidu Rokfeleru 74 * Sta je znacila garancija Beogradske
banke za Centar "Sava" i "Interkontinental" 76 * Centar
"Sava" 77 * Klintonov govor - Malum omen (los
predznak) 78
V
NA TRAGU SVETSKIH TRENDOVA
* Tendencije integracije banaka 83 * Ukrupnjavanje
banaka 84 * Suocavanje sa realnoscu 86 * Beogradska
bankarska grupa 87 * Konsolidacija banaka u sistemu
Beogradske banke 90 * Prvo zadu?enje vredno 50 miliona
dolara i otplata pre roka 94 * Platni promet sa
inostranstvom 95 * Finansijsko tr?iste u zemlji 96 *
Vraceno poverenje 96 * Ratna banka 99 * Autoput E-75
/deonica Novi Sad-Beograd/ 101 * Zajam za privredni
razvoj Republike Srbije 102 * Stara devizna stednja 103 *
Banka - donator 105
VI
UVODNA IZLAGANJA SA SEDNICA SKUPSTINA
BEOGRADSKE BANKE a.d.
* Redovno informisanje akcionara 109 * Uvodno izlaganje
na VII sednici Skupstine Beogradske banke a.d., odr?anoj
12. juna 1998. godine 109 * Uvodno izlaganje na X sednici
Skupstine Beogradske banke a.d., odr?ane 14. decembra
1999. godine 119
VII
INOSTRANI KREDITI I RAZVOJ
* Konzorcijalni krediti, javni i privatni plasmani 131 *
Novi predsednik banke - Slobodan Milosevic 139 *
Dugorocni kredit vredan 700 miliona dolara 142 * Nasa
privredna i finansijska saradnja sa Kuvajtom 142 * Soko
na ramenu emira 144 * Boravak nase delegacije u Kuvajtu
na konferenciji potencijalnih investitora 146 * Sala i zbilja
o ucenju engleskog jezika Slobodana Milosevica 147 *
Znacajniji konzorcijalni krediti 149 * Spoj teorije i prakse
152 * Mladi kolega iz Austrije 153 * Preporuka za
Medunarodnu bankarsku skolu 154 * Iskustva sa
generalnim direktorom 154
VIII
"BEOGRADSKA BANKA - CYPRUS, OFFSHORE
BANKING UNIT" (BB COBU)
* Orijentacija finansijske saradnje sa bliskim istokom 159 *
Idealna destinacija 159 * Kipar - bo?ji dar za biznis 160 *
"Offshore" kompanije 161 * Saradnja sa advokatskom
kucom "Tassos Papadopoulos" i poznatim revizorom
"Price Waterhouse" 163 * Saradnja sa mesovitim bankama
164 * IICY International Investment Corporation for
Yugoslavia 165 * Uspesno poslovanje 166 * Predsednik
Kipra na otvaranju nove zgrade 167 * Nebeska promocija
"BB COBU" 169 * Sansa koja se ne propusta 170
IX
SANKCIJE OUN
* Pogorsanje poslovanja 173 * Bezrazlo?no zamrznute
devize 173 * Optu?be bez osnova ali i sa namerom 174 *
Besprekorni cash flow 174 * Kontinuitet uspeha 175 *
Kontrola bez primedbi 176 * U iskusenju sa damama 177 *
Napor bez uspeha 179 * Banka za neka druga vremena 180
* Engleska neuctivost 181 * Americka dobrodoslica 181 *
Istina o zamrnutim sredstvima u Americi 182
X
JUGOSLOVENI NA KIPRU
* Aktivnosti privrednika i bankara 187 * Domovina u srcu
188 * Odana i kompaktna ekipa 193 * Vanbankarski uspeh
193 * Hvala kiparskom narodu 194 * Ambasadorova izjava
196
XI
SVETSKI EKONOMSKI FORUM
* Sastanak u Salcburgu 1998. godine 201
XII
POMOC DIJASPORE
* Sabor i Saveti dijaspore 207 * Veliki uspeh na prvom
saboru 210 * Poseta seljackom gazdinstvu 213 * Valjevske
kore za pitu u Parizu 213 * Carine, dr?avljanstvo,
dopunska nastava 215 * Srpski dom - odluka Sabora 215 *
Srpski memorijal, Srboslov 215 * Mali i srednji projekti -
seljak tra?i kisu 216
XIII
NA MESTU SAVEZNOG MINISTRA
* Savezni ministar za koordinaciju sa medunarodnim
finansijskim institucijama 221 * Glavni poslovi koji su me
okupirali 223 * Bankarstvo i finansijsko tr?iste u
Jugoslaviji - ogranicenja i mogucnosti posle sankcija i
agresije NATO 227
XIV
FOND ZA DOSKOLOVANJE MLADIH POLJOPRIVREDNIKA
* Podrska mladoj seoskoj populaciji 237 * Uslovi koriscenja
kredita 239 * Obrazovni centri 239 * Finansijsko
poslovanje Fonda 241
XV
PEROM O MENI
* Dugi o meni i ja o sebi 245
XVI
MOJ "ODLAZAK" SA MESTA
PREDSEDNIKA BEOGRADSKE BANKE
* Sudbina najvece razvojne banke 289 * Upadanje
nepoznatih lica 290 * Teskoce sa obezbedenjem sale 295 *
Pokusaj upada i preuzimanje Banke 295
INDEKS IMENA 303
ZASTO PISEM KNJIGU
Verovatno ce se c
THE PRESIDENTIAL PRAYER TEAM
La "squadra preghiere" del Presidente Bush invita tutti i patrioti a
spremere le meningi - da soli od in gruppo, quando vi gira oppure in
maniera organizzata - invocando Dio affinche' protegga il Presidente,
l'America, i suoi valori ed i suoi fast food da Saddam Hussein, dai
terroristi, dai comunisti, dai cinesi e da tutte le terribili minacce
sempre in agguato dietro l'angolo. La "squadra", che attraverso il suo
sito internet (http://www.presidentialprayerteam.org/index.htm)
propone ogni giorno nuove preghiere, si avvale di una organizzazione
eccezionale, nomi famosi e tantissimi gadgets che si possono vincere
se si e' pregato bene. Questa settimana in regalo: una splendida
tazza.
(da una segnalazione di Patti)
La "squadra preghiere" del Presidente Bush invita tutti i patrioti a
spremere le meningi - da soli od in gruppo, quando vi gira oppure in
maniera organizzata - invocando Dio affinche' protegga il Presidente,
l'America, i suoi valori ed i suoi fast food da Saddam Hussein, dai
terroristi, dai comunisti, dai cinesi e da tutte le terribili minacce
sempre in agguato dietro l'angolo. La "squadra", che attraverso il suo
sito internet (http://www.presidentialprayerteam.org/index.htm)
propone ogni giorno nuove preghiere, si avvale di una organizzazione
eccezionale, nomi famosi e tantissimi gadgets che si possono vincere
se si e' pregato bene. Questa settimana in regalo: una splendida
tazza.
(da una segnalazione di Patti)
Knjiga Borke Vucic: BANKARSTVO - IZBOR ILI SUDBINA
Knjiga je stampana latincnim pismom, formata B-5 /17x24 cm/, obima 312
stranica, sa preko 200 ilustracija; crno-bele i kolor fotografije,
faksimili, tabele, izvodi, tumbstones /spomen ploce/ kredita,
obveznica i drugih plasmana.
Prvo izdanje, brosirano, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Drugo izdanje, tvrdi povez, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Knjiga se mo?e kupiti u mnogim knji?arama sirom zemlje i naruciti na
bvcycha@..., fax: +381 11 367 17 99.
(...)
ZASTO PISEM KNJIGU
Verovatno ce se citalac zapitati sta se krije iza korica ove knjige,
sta ja to citam?
Knjigu tajni o pojedinim ljudima i dogadajima?
Moguce.
Roman o jednoj ?eni bankaru?
Mo?e se reci.
Memoare eks ministra?
Pa i to.
Autobiografske beleske iz bankarstva u cijem se okru?enju
nalazio i buduci predsednik dr?ave?
Sve to i jos stogod.
U svem ovom zamesateljstvu ja nemam nikakve dileme.
Ovo je ispovest bankarke koja je sticajem raznoraznih
okolnosti, znanih i neznanih, sudbinskih i onih koji to nisu,
ceo radni vek provela u bankarstvu zemlje koja je menjala
svoje nazive, uredenja, ideologije, garniture, sisteme,
istoriju i teritoriju i uz to postojano izgradivala svoje
bankarstvo. Kao i sve ostalo i bankarstvo je pre?ivljavalo
svoje mene, imalo svoje puteve i raskrsca.
Ova knjiga je moje svedocanstvo o jednom vremenu
iskazano jezikom cinjenica, brojki, dokumenata, fotografija
i dogadaja onako kako sam ih videla, do?ivela i kakvi su
ostali u mom secanju. Citaoci ce se vec sami uveriti da
dogadaji i ljudi nisu ni poetizovani, ni dramatizovani.
Dati su u celini ili u epizodi ali onakvi kakvi su bili. Licni
pecat je neminovnost.
Trudila sam se da ne osudujem niti presudujem ni o cemu i
ni o kome. Neka to rade drugi.
U nasoj zemlji, koju mnogi sa strane nazivaju zemljom
cudesa, nije uobicajeno da jedan bankar napise knjigu o
svom cetrdesetogodisnjem radu u bankarstvu.
Za mene je bankarstvo bilo i ostalo vise od bankarstva.
Citalac ce, nadam se, moci da uoci moju predanost i strast
prema poslu koji sam godinama obavljala u zemlji i sirom
sveta, poslu kome sam posvetila sve svoje intelektualne i
ljudske moci ali i poslu, priznajem, ciji sam zavisnik bila i
ostala.
Namera mi je da ostavim svoj beleg o radu u bankarstvu.
Bankar je zahtevna profesija. To su pregovori i cenjkanja,
putovanja radnim i neradnim danima, rizici, garancije,
poznavanje tradicije, podneblja i obicaja, procenti, umece
da se pronikne u motive pregovaraca sa druge strane stola,
umece ubedivanja da ste za suprotnu stranu povoljniji i
prihvatljiviji od drugih, to su izgubljeni sati cekanja na
neprofesionalne partnere iz nekih zemalja ili deo njihovog
pregovarackog rituala, i stosta drugo.
?elim da se obratim i mladim generacijama bankara.
Njihov doprinos, narocito u periodu blokade i ekonomskih
sankcija, bio je veliki i pozitivna pokretacka snaga.
Prednjacili su ne samo u sferi ovladavanja tekucim
operativnim poslovima vec i na polju kreacije i primene
elektronike, odnosno, u svim segmentima operativnih
transakcija. Sa specijalizacija na raznim kursevima i
seminarima u zemlji i inostranstvu mladi su uvek donosili
odlicne uspehe. Svojom bogatom arhivom Beogradska
banka svedoci o pohvalama upucenih strucnosti,
sposobnosti i talentu njenih kandidata, a datih od banaka i
medunarodnih finansjiskih institucija kao sto su: Deutsche
bank, Commerzbank, Société Générale, Banco di Roma,
Barclays Bank, National Westminster Bank, Lloyds Bank,
Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank, First Chicago
Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto Dominion Bank,
Bank of Nova Scotia i dr.
Mislim da je obaveza savremenika, pa i nas iz struke da
generacijama koje dolaze, na osnovu dostupne grade,
predocimo istorijsku sliku geneze i razvoja pomenute
institucije ostavljajuci mogucnost da je dopune i koriguju u
buducnosti.
Tu bih svrstala i "novogodisnju cestitku" od 3. januara
2002. godine kada su ugasene cetiri najvece nacionalne
banke u nasoj zemlji.
One su na evropskim listama godinama zauzimale visoka
mesta. Ishitreno i bez dublje analize, kao i bez ucesca
revizora, Narodna banka Jugoslavije i Savezna agencija za
osiguranje depozita, sanaciju, stecaj i likvidaciju banaka
ugasile su Beogradsku banku a.d. Beograd, Invest banku
a.d. Beograd, Jugobanku a.d. Beograd i Beobanku a.d.
Beograd.
Bez obzira na podnete tu?be u postupku i za razliku od
svetskih iskustava, kao i zbivanja u vecini zemalja u
procesu tranzicije koje su u ovom periodu sanaciju banaka
vrsile prema modelima konsolidacije i integracije, taj proces
je kod nas zapoceo odlukom o stecaju uz veoma
karakteristicno ucesce kako domacih tako i stranih faktora.
Pomenute banke u stecaju su za odobrene kredite uzimale
obezbedenje zajmotra?ilaca u vidu hipoteke, rucne zaloge,
zlata ili deviza.
U bilo kom trenutku mogli su se aktivirati instrumenti
obezbedenja cime bi se u stecaj bacio veci deo privrede. To
nije ucinjeno jer su tako nalagala pravila ponasanja u
vreme sankcija i ekonomske blokade zemlje.
Uverena sam da ce vreme, jedini nepristrasni i objektivni
sudija, potvrditi moju ocenu da je stecaj cetiri najvece
srpske banke bio nepromisljen i pogresan potez. Moja
uverenost proizilazi iz poznavanja potencijala, mogucnosti i
kadrova, ali i realne problematike pomenutih banaka. U
saznanju sam da je svakoj dobroj nacionalnoj ekonomiji
potrebno i jako nacionalno bankarstvo, naravno u sprezi i
kvalitetnoj konkurenciji sa jakim medunarodnim bankama.
Na kraju ?elim da priznam svoju pristrasnost prema
bankarstvu. Da li je ova knjiga u neku ruku oda
bankarstvu? Bez dvoumljenja - da. Ja sam covek te
profesije.
Ipak, ne gubite iz vida da je u pitanju ?ena. ?ena bankar. To
je i danas retkost u svetu, a pogotovu u vreme kada sam
zapocinjala svoju karijeru. Na Balkanu, narocito.
U nesto vise od pet decenija dugoj istoriji Beogradske
banke na njenom celu bilo je 12 predsednika, odnosno
generalnih direktora. Uz promenu imena banke menjali su
se i prvi ljudi te nase najvece finansijske institucije. Mada
razliciti po prirodi, karakteru, profesiji i sposobnosti, dali su
svoj nesebicni doprinos kontinuitetu u jacanju razvojne
Banke naseg sistema, nacionalnih banaka i drugih
finansijskih asocijacija, kao i privrednog razvoja zemlje.
Sledbenik sam rukovodstva banke koje je bilo poznato i
priznato u svetu bankarstva i uva?avano od saradnika i
slu?benika u samoj banci. Svima njima pripada mesto u
ovoj knjizi.
Moj izbor i moja sudbina
Vreme je nesto sto brzo prolazi,
a ono sto sporo prolazi je tocak sudbine.
(Li Ju)
Celog ?ivota tragala sam za necim neuhvatljivim, necim
sto nazivamo srecom. Pronasla sam je u porodici i u mom
poslu. Jedno od vecnih pitanja je sta je starije - nas izbor ili
nasa sudbina. Odgovor na ovu dilemu nije nimalo
jednostavan i mislim da se razlikuje od coveka do coveka.
Ako je u pitanju covek koji se bori, radi se vise o licnom
izboru, a covek koji ceka je covek pod uticajem sudbine.
Mada je neophodno da se za neke stvari u ?ivotu slo?e
kockice, uverena sam da u mom slucaju preovladuje svesni
izbor. Slaganje mog bankarskog mozaika je verovatno
zapocelo jos u detinjstvu kod dede Dragica cije je iskustvo
bilo vrlo inspirativno i uverljivo. Mislim da iz tog perioda
se?u i moja danasnja interesovanja za obrazovanje Fonda
za doskolovanje mladih poljoprivrednika.
Nikada mi nisu nedostajali ambicija, entuzijazam i
upornost. Na tim pretpostavkama je stvoren i moderan
svet. Ekonomija i profit su dve strane iste pojave. I u
nekadasnjoj socijalistickoj, samoupravnoj Jugoslaviji mi iz
bankarstva smo imali "privilegiju" da radimo i saradujemo
sa svetom u kome tr?iste igra dominatnu ulogu. Mada smo
od njih ucili, po visprenosti smo stajali uz njih a cesto ih i
prevazilazili.
Spoznali smo da je mogucnost ostvarenja naseg uspeha
ipak u nasim rukama. Pogubno je sedeti i cekati prilike.
Karijera se planira i gradi, a uslov za to je da budete
preduzimljivi, informisani, kompetentni, brzi. Samo takvi
mo?ete uspeti u tr?isnoj areni.
Videla sam na delu mnoge lidere i konkurente u oblasti
finansija i bankarstva. Prema njima procenjujete koliko
vredite. Bila sam u kontaktu sa eminentnim finansijskim
liderima i magnatima i zapazila njihov sjaj i bedu, britkost
profesionalnosti ali i sitne ljudske slabosti.
Gotovo da nema posla koji se ne mo?e, u normalnim
uslovima zavrsiti. Makar i uz polovicno zadovoljstvo,
d?entlmenski sporazum ili kompromis gde obe strane
dobijaju po nesto. Moje iskustvo govori, da uspeti znaci
najcesce ici do kraja. Volter ka?e da je uspeh dete smelosti .
Vera u sebe je prvi uslov da uspete. Ali i vera u druge, u
poslovne partnere, u saradnike. Doduse, proveravaju oni
vas ali i vi njih. Takva su pravila igre.
Greske su moguce. One su deo ljudske prirode. Deo posla.
Ali i deo napretka. Ljudski je gresiti - ka?u. Va?no je ne
praviti iste greske jer kineska izreka opominje: ko nacini a
ne ispravi, cini dvostruku gresku. Greske u bankarstvu su
preskupe. Zato kod poslovnog partnera morate prepoznati i
skrivene namere.
Uverila sam se, takode, da je ugled dobrog bankara vredniji
od novca kojim raspola?e. U svetu finansija i bankarstva
reputacija je znak poverenja. Ko proigra principe, pravila,
ugovor, rokove, sam je sebe otpisao. Nigde tako ne va?i, kao
u bankarstvu ona nasa: dobar glas se daleko cuje a los jos
dalje.
Donosenje odluka i preuzimanje odgovornosti za njihov
kvalitet i isplativost jeste izazov ali i suocavanje sa
direktorima i sefovima. Iznad svega to je preispitivanje
samog sebe. Sustina je da koristite vreme na prave stvari, a
ne da ga gubite baveci se neva?nim.
Odluke se ne mogu predugo odlagati jer ce se u
meduvremenu promeniti okolnosti a onda ce odluka koju
donesete biti pogresna. Umece je naci pravu meru izmedu
brzopleto donete odluke i zakasnele odluke jer i jedna i
druga vode u pogresku.
Kad vam je argumentacija ravnopravna izmedu za i protiv,
kada je neresena i ne mo?ete da se u nju pouzdate, ne
odbacujte intuiciju, za koju vam treba vise od teorije, vise
od vida i uvida. Ponekad kad nemate izbora, jednostavno
morate biti hrabri. I to se meni desavalo.
Necu reci nista novo ako zapisem da ugled jedne profesije
zavisi od mnogo cega, ali najvise od nje same. Okolnosti su
promenljive a kadrovi konstantni. U bankarstvu i
finansijama, vise nego u drugim oblastima va?i pravilo da
si dobar onoliko koliko kvalitetnih saradnika okupis oko
sebe.
Radeci toliko godina u bankarstvu i finansijama dr?ala sam
se nekih principa i ?ivotnih pouka koje mogu koristiti
buducim bankarima. Bez namere da ikoga poducavam i bez
?elje da se sa mnom slo?ite prenosim vam ?ivotni kredo
?ene ciji je radni vek protekao u bankarstvu:
imajte u vidu da bankari daju novac a ne savet. Zna se da
je novac dobar sluga ali zao gospodar;
savete primajte pre nego sto se dogovorite sa partnerom,
prijateljem, depozitarom;
pregovaranje je surova igra, ali nikada ne dozvolite da bude
i prljava. U takvoj igri svi gube. Kad-tad;
kada se jednom dogovorite ne vracajte se nazad osim ako to
ne ucini vas partner u poslu;
ne gubite iz vida da je vasa pru?ena ruka po zakljucenju
posla vasa obaveza i vasa odgovornost sve dok taj posao
traje; prijateljstvo koje zasnujete na poslu bolje je nego posao
zasnovan na prijateljstvu. U ovoj poruci sam prenela samo
svoju saglasnost sa D?onom Rokfelerom koji je mnogo pre
mene ovo shvatio;
potrebno je 20 godina za uspeh "preko noci" rekao je Edi
Kantor, pisac (1892).
Sto se tice moje sudbine ona nije bila milostiva. Vise puta
me je neumoljivo i tragicno pogadala. U tim trenucima,
kada ?ivot gubi svaki smisao imala sam neponovljivu
podrsku svoje rodbine, prijatelja, poznanika, kolega,
saradnika, poznatih i nepoznatih ljudi. Oni su mi pomogli
da savladam bol i slabost i shvatim da sudbina ima i drugu
stranu - onu surovu. Da uzima vise nego sto daje.
Bila sam u prilici da radim sa najrazlicitijim ljudima u
zemlji i inostranstvu. Od mnogih sam ucila, takode, i oni od
mene. Vecina je bila na visokom profesionalnom nivou.
Mlade smo negovali a starije postovali. Trudili smo se da
svako ima svoje mesto, onako kakvo zaslu?uju njegove
sposobnosti.
Bicu zadovoljna ako ovaj moj zapis shvatite i prihvatite
kao napor da vam koliko-toliko pribli?im jedno vreme i
profesiju.
Profesija bankara na jugoslovenskim finansijskim
prostorima ispripovedana je i kroz ovu ?ivotnu pricu.
Imala sam prilike da decenijama ucestvujem u postavljanju
stubova na kojima je pocivala zgrada domaceg bankarstva,
a sada u ovo "vreme promena" do?ivljavam njeno rusenje,
krah ili transformacju. Ali, ja sam iz drugog vremena.
Onog u kojoj je nase bankarstvo bele?ilo svetlije dane.
UMESTO PREDGOVORA
Secanja gospode Borke Vucic izneta u ovoj knjizi prakticno
predstavljaju hronologiju razvoja naseg bankarstva u
poslednjih 50 godina. Ova knjiga nije samo znacajna sto
govori o jednoj uspesnoj karijeri vec i vrlo korisna
literatura za sve one koji se bave istorijom i razvojem naseg
bankarstva. U svojstvu predsednika Upravnog odbora
Beogradske banke a.d. sa gospodom Vucic neposredno sam
saradivao najvecim delom u vreme njenog obavljanja
du?nosti Generalnog direktora banke. To je bilo vreme
ekonomskih sankcija i politickih pritisaka koje su pocetkom
1999. godine kulminirale brutalnom agresijom NATO
snaga na nasu zemlju. Znajuci ulogu bankarskog sistema u
nasoj privredi banka je sve svoje aktivnosti usmerila na
preduzimanje mera i akcija primerenih tom vremenu u
kome smo ?iveli i radili.
Gospoda Vucic je izabrana za Generalnog direktora
Beogradske banke pocetkom 1997. godine. Imajuci u vidu
poodmakle godine gospode Vucic, predlog za njeno
imenovanje za Generalnog direktora primio sam sa
odredenom rezervom. U svakom slucaju ocekivao sam
znatno mladu osobu. Medutim, posle prvih dana njenog
rada u Banci uverio sam se da godine nisu uvek merilo
uspesnog rada. Za vrlo kratko vreme Beogradska banka je
presla iz jedne pasivne pozicije u nosioca razvoja svih
znacajnih bankarskih aktivnosti u zemlji. Ceo kadrovski
potencijal banke je aktiviran preko noci, a radno vreme
stavljeno u zavisnost od izvrsenja programa i rokova.
Savesnost, profesionalnost i odgovornost gospode Vucic
kao generalnog direktora veoma brzo su se odrazila na
poslovanju banke.
Osecam potrebu da navedem samo neke od postignutih
rezultata koji su u knjizi detaljnije napisani.
Nelikvidnost banaka je u to vreme bila vrlo izra?ena sto je
sa svoje strane privredi stvaralo dodatne teskoce ne samo u
procesu odr?avanja reprodukcije vec je indirektno
prouzrokovalo i mnoge socijalne probleme. Na zadovoljstvo
svih akcionara ovaj problem je brzo i trajno resen.
Obezbedena je sigurnost svih komitenata da po svojoj volji
mogu koristiti sredstva na svojim racunima. Prestalo je
ula?enje u minusna stanja a prosecno dnevno stanje na ?iro
racunima je visestruko povecano.
Formiranje Beogradske bankarske grupe je doprinelo
daljem povecanju dinarske likvidnosti i znatnim deviznim
ustedama. Stvorena je, za nase prilike, jedna znacajna
bankarska institucija koja je mogla i trebala da preuzme
kreditne i devizne aran?mane sa inostranstvom. Sklopljeni
su, i prvi krediti koji su za nasu privredu bili veoma
znacajni.
Povecanjem depozita i reprogramiranjem dugova vrlo brzo
je sanirano sedam banaka clanica sistema Beogradske
bankarske grupe. Koliki je bio znacaj ovog sistema govori i
cinjenica da je Banka imala preko pet hiljada akcionara
koji su sacinjavali vise od 50% privrede Srbije.
Agencija za sanaciju, konsolidaciju i dokapitalizaciju u
okviru Beogradske bankarske grupe imala je zadatak da u
saradnji sa poveriocima, komitentima, Narodnom bankom i
drugim institucijama u zemlji preuzme poslove sanacije
velikih du?nika za koje se znalo da nisu u mogucnosti da
otplacuju svoje dugove. U tom smislu vodeni su i
preliminarni razgovori sa Pariskim i Londonskim klubom.
Banka je bila svesna da je za povracaj stare devizne stednje
preduslov obnavljanje poverenje gradana za ulaganje svojih
ustedevina na stednju kod banaka. U tom cilju Banka je u
zajednici sa dr?avnim institucijama bila inicijator brojnih
projekata kroz ponudu stanova, banja, poslovnog prostora, i
sl. koji bi se placali sredstvima stare devizne stednje. Naveo
sam samo ovih nekoliko aktivnosti banke koji govore da se
Banka nije bavila samo tekucim pitanjima vec je paralelno
stvarana osnova i politika Banke za neko postsankciono
vreme.
Dolazak gospode Borke Vucic na mesto predsednika
Beogradske banke doprineo je jednoj intenzivnijoj saradnji
izmedu Upravnog odbora i menad?menta banke. Postojalo
je uzajamno razumevanje i radna atmosfera koju bi svaki
upravni odbor mogao po?eleti. Posebno treba istaci da je
gospoda Vucic imala izra?en "sluh" za privredu bez obzira
sto je gotovo celokupno radno iskustvo imala u bankarstvu.
Svi potezi i predlozi Banke bili su pa?ljivo odmeravani sa
gledista posledica i efekata koje ce imati na privredu.
Uveren sam da je merama i aktivnoscu Banke u ovom
veoma teskom periodu privreda imala manje teskoca i
problema blagovremenog iznala?enja odgovora na teskoce
vremena u kome smo ?iveli.
Gospoda Vucic je poznato ime i u medunarodnom
bankarstvu. Nisam uveren da danas bilo koji bankar u
zemlji mo?e neposredno da ostvari kontakte sa vrhunskim
bankarima u svetu kao sto to mo?e gospoda Vucic. To je
izuzetno vredan "kapital" koji mi na?alost ne znamo da
cenimo.
Mr Radovan Pesikan
UVODNA REC
Bankarstvo, monetarna ekonomija i medunarodne finansije
su i zanat i nauka; i vestina i umetnost. Strucno znanje za
tu delatnost je potreban ali ne i dovoljan uslov. Svi koji su
u toj oblasti stvorili nesto imali su predispoziciju, talenat i
specificnu etiku. Novac je krvotok privrede; ko ucestvuje u
upravljanju njime, utice na ?ivot hiljada preduzeca i
miliona ljudi.
Mnogi guverneri centralnih banaka napisali su strucne,
naucne ili memoarske knjige. Znatno rede to cine poslovni
bankari. Njihovi klijenti su u stalnoj konkurentskoj borbi,
njihovi planovi i projekti su poslovna tajna. Bankar mora
da ih zna, ali i da ih cuva. I njihovi zapisi su vredna
svedocanstva. Bez obzira na zvanicno resenje, ona
pokazuju sta se u stvarnom ?ivotu desavalo, na sceni ili iza
nje.
Borka Vucic ovom svojom knjigom dokazuje i jedno i
drugo, i svoju predispoziciju i talenat za bankarstvo, ali i
cinjenicu da je u Jugoslaviji jos od 60-ih godina itekako
postojalo poslovno bankarstvo bez kojeg privredni uspon i
izlazak na svetsku scenu ne bi bili ostvareni.
Sve karakterne osobine, odnos prema ?ivotu, licna etika
formiraju se jos u ranom ?ivotnom dobu a Borka Vucic je
jos kao dete u naju?oj porodici, na primeru svog dede
Dragica, imala prilike da shvati smisao poslovnog
bankarstva. Deda Dragic ne samo da je uredno, papirima,
regulisao odnose sa ljudima kojima je davao usluge ili
novac na zajam vec je jos pre 100 godina filozofskom
mirnocom vrsio "reprogramiranje duga" kada su to
okolnosti nametnule, a danas jos ima bankara koji ne
shvataju da im od toga nema spasa.
Da ni bankar ni trgovac ne mogu da oplode svoj ni tudi
kapital ako on nije ukljucen u stvaranje nove vrednosti,
znao je i njen drugi deda Simeun, trgovac. Cvrsta pravila
poslovanja koja je on primenjivao slu?ila su za sticanje i
odr?avanje poverenja, kredibiliteta, bez kojeg bi svaki
poslovni bankar promasio profesiju.
Tok njene profesionalne karijere takode je Borku Vucic
osposobljavao za uspesnog bankara. Radila je u dr?avnim
institucijama visokog strucnog nivoa u vreme kada je u
Jugoslaviji postojala razvojna i tekuca ekonomska politika
koja se uspesno primenjivala. Mnogi dobri investicioni
projekti, nova, uspesna preduzeca stvarana su uz
nezamenljivu ulogu poslovnog bankarstva, domaceg i
inostranog kapitala.
Danas se o tom periodu proturaju la?i: da nije bilo tr?isne
privrede niti poslovnog bankarstva. O suprotnom svedoci
ozbiljna i velika studija Svetske banke Yugoslavia -
Development with Decentralization.* Ona pokazuje da je u
Jugoslaviji jos od 1955. razdvojeno cenralno od poslovnog
bankarstva i da je pored specijalizovanih banaka (za
spoljnu trgovinu, poljoprivredu, investicije, kao i postanske
stedionice) postojalo 220 komunalnih banaka za
kratkorocno komercijalno kreditiranje (str. 216). Vec od
1965. godine svako je mogao biti osnivac poslovne banke
ako je obezbedio osnivacki ulog, a ucesce pojedinacnog
osnivaca bilo je ograniceno na 10% glasova u Skupstini
(str. 49).
Svedocenje Borke Vucic podupire navedenu istinu.
Poslovno bankarstvo Jugoslavije se brzo razvijalo i
osposobljavalo za poslovanje sa inostranstvom. Svi krediti
medunarodnih finansijskih institucija, inostranih vlada i
onih sa slobodnog tr?ista kapitala, realizovali su se
posredstvom poslovnih banaka. Ona navodi brojne primere
koji pokazuju da je nakon pocetnog kolebanja, poslovno
bankarstvo Jugoslavije prihvaceno u svetu kao poslovno
samostalno i na tr?istima zasnovano.
Takvi su bili i kriterijumi za izbor investicionih projekata
koje je poslovno bankarstvo primenjivalo. Sa pravom je na
prvom mestu bio princip pozitivnog neto deviznog efekta.
Prioritet su imali projekti i preduzeca koja su svojim
izvozom mogla da otplacuju inostrani zajam i pokriju svoje
uvozne potrebe.
Uvodenjem sankcija prema narodu Jugoslavije 1991/1992.
godine poslovne banke su postepeno onemogucavane u
poslovanju sa inostranstvom, njihovi racuni i racuni
njihovih klijenata u inostranstvu su blokirani. U tim
uslovima su mnoga preduzeca osnovala sopstvena
preduzeca u inostranstvu, pa i na Kipru jer su ta preduzeca,
sem ogranicenja poslovanja sa Jugoslavijom, mogla
normalno da posluju. Druga takva preduzeca i banke su u
uslovima sankcija izuzetno pomogla poslovanju preduzeca
u Jugoslaviji. Borka Vucic sa bankom na Kipru, koja je
poslovala pod strogim nadzorom Centralne banke i vlasti
Kipra, u tom pogledu je dala izuzetan doprinos. Zajedno sa
celom tamosnjom jugoslovenskom zajednicom
organizovala je humanitarnu i medicinsku pomoc i
odr?avala veliko prijateljstvo kiparskog naroda prema
gradanima Jugoslavije pod sankcijama.
Sa svojom strucnom ekipom na Kipru, uz odredene
konsultacije drugih eksperata, pripremila je i koncept
ozdravljenja poslovnog bankarstva Jugoslavije, koji je susta
suprotnost sadasnjoj politici njegovog likvidiranja.
Na jednom mestu u knjizi Borke Vucic uporeduju se Kipar
i Jugoslavija. Kipar nema narocitih prirodnih uslova za
razvoj. Jugoslavija ima. Kipar ipak ima 10 puta veci
nacionani dohodak po stanovniku nego Jugoslavija. Jedino
sto im je zajednicko je to sto je vise od jedne trecine zemlje
pod okupacijom. Odakle, medutim, ostala razlika? Ona je
naravno u ljudskom faktoru.
Najvise revolta izaziva poglavlje u knjizi koje opisuje nacin
nasilnog preuzimanja Beogradske banke. Rec je o
naoru?anim nasilnicima "kriznog staba" i falsifikatima.
Kao u vreme prohibicije ili Makartizma u danasnjoj jedinoj
svetskoj supersili.
Danas je banka kojoj je na celu bila Borka Vucic u stecaju,
zajedno sa jos tri jugoslovenske banke. Jednog dana ce
nepristrasan sud pokazati da je to bio neopravdan potez,
odluka suprotna interesima dr?ave i naroda. To se vec i
pokazalo. Nedavno je Zakonom obezbedeno da se uslovi
otpisa i reprograma spoljnog duga ugovoreni izmedu
inostranih poverilaca i dr?ave SRJ kao garanta u svemu
"preslikaju" na doticne banke i preduzeca. Takvim
smanjenjem duga preduzeca postaju sposobna da u novim
uslovima otplacuju preostali dug, a banke time umesto
nenaplativih sticu kvalitetna potra?ivanja i popravljaju svoj
bilans. Na?alost, ovaj zakon se ne odnosi na cetiri banke
koje su 3. januara 2002. godine oterane u stecaj. Nekome je
ocito stalo da ih unisti. Treba pogledati ko je predlo?io
terminski plan za uvodenje stecaja.
Ovde nije moguce istaci sva vredna svedocenja Borke
Vucic o razvoju jugoslovenskog bankarstva, privrede i
dr?ave. Neka od njih su ipak nezaobilazna: o varvarskim
sankcijama, poslovanju banaka na Kipru i sadasnjem
sumraku u odnosu vlasti prema poslovnom bankarstvu.
Prof. dr Oskar Kovac
* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London, 1975.
Knjiga je stampana latincnim pismom, formata B-5 /17x24 cm/, obima 312
stranica, sa preko 200 ilustracija; crno-bele i kolor fotografije,
faksimili, tabele, izvodi, tumbstones /spomen ploce/ kredita,
obveznica i drugih plasmana.
Prvo izdanje, brosirano, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Drugo izdanje, tvrdi povez, stampano je u 500 primeraka.
Knjiga se mo?e kupiti u mnogim knji?arama sirom zemlje i naruciti na
bvcycha@..., fax: +381 11 367 17 99.
(...)
ZASTO PISEM KNJIGU
Verovatno ce se citalac zapitati sta se krije iza korica ove knjige,
sta ja to citam?
Knjigu tajni o pojedinim ljudima i dogadajima?
Moguce.
Roman o jednoj ?eni bankaru?
Mo?e se reci.
Memoare eks ministra?
Pa i to.
Autobiografske beleske iz bankarstva u cijem se okru?enju
nalazio i buduci predsednik dr?ave?
Sve to i jos stogod.
U svem ovom zamesateljstvu ja nemam nikakve dileme.
Ovo je ispovest bankarke koja je sticajem raznoraznih
okolnosti, znanih i neznanih, sudbinskih i onih koji to nisu,
ceo radni vek provela u bankarstvu zemlje koja je menjala
svoje nazive, uredenja, ideologije, garniture, sisteme,
istoriju i teritoriju i uz to postojano izgradivala svoje
bankarstvo. Kao i sve ostalo i bankarstvo je pre?ivljavalo
svoje mene, imalo svoje puteve i raskrsca.
Ova knjiga je moje svedocanstvo o jednom vremenu
iskazano jezikom cinjenica, brojki, dokumenata, fotografija
i dogadaja onako kako sam ih videla, do?ivela i kakvi su
ostali u mom secanju. Citaoci ce se vec sami uveriti da
dogadaji i ljudi nisu ni poetizovani, ni dramatizovani.
Dati su u celini ili u epizodi ali onakvi kakvi su bili. Licni
pecat je neminovnost.
Trudila sam se da ne osudujem niti presudujem ni o cemu i
ni o kome. Neka to rade drugi.
U nasoj zemlji, koju mnogi sa strane nazivaju zemljom
cudesa, nije uobicajeno da jedan bankar napise knjigu o
svom cetrdesetogodisnjem radu u bankarstvu.
Za mene je bankarstvo bilo i ostalo vise od bankarstva.
Citalac ce, nadam se, moci da uoci moju predanost i strast
prema poslu koji sam godinama obavljala u zemlji i sirom
sveta, poslu kome sam posvetila sve svoje intelektualne i
ljudske moci ali i poslu, priznajem, ciji sam zavisnik bila i
ostala.
Namera mi je da ostavim svoj beleg o radu u bankarstvu.
Bankar je zahtevna profesija. To su pregovori i cenjkanja,
putovanja radnim i neradnim danima, rizici, garancije,
poznavanje tradicije, podneblja i obicaja, procenti, umece
da se pronikne u motive pregovaraca sa druge strane stola,
umece ubedivanja da ste za suprotnu stranu povoljniji i
prihvatljiviji od drugih, to su izgubljeni sati cekanja na
neprofesionalne partnere iz nekih zemalja ili deo njihovog
pregovarackog rituala, i stosta drugo.
?elim da se obratim i mladim generacijama bankara.
Njihov doprinos, narocito u periodu blokade i ekonomskih
sankcija, bio je veliki i pozitivna pokretacka snaga.
Prednjacili su ne samo u sferi ovladavanja tekucim
operativnim poslovima vec i na polju kreacije i primene
elektronike, odnosno, u svim segmentima operativnih
transakcija. Sa specijalizacija na raznim kursevima i
seminarima u zemlji i inostranstvu mladi su uvek donosili
odlicne uspehe. Svojom bogatom arhivom Beogradska
banka svedoci o pohvalama upucenih strucnosti,
sposobnosti i talentu njenih kandidata, a datih od banaka i
medunarodnih finansjiskih institucija kao sto su: Deutsche
bank, Commerzbank, Société Générale, Banco di Roma,
Barclays Bank, National Westminster Bank, Lloyds Bank,
Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Bank, First Chicago
Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto Dominion Bank,
Bank of Nova Scotia i dr.
Mislim da je obaveza savremenika, pa i nas iz struke da
generacijama koje dolaze, na osnovu dostupne grade,
predocimo istorijsku sliku geneze i razvoja pomenute
institucije ostavljajuci mogucnost da je dopune i koriguju u
buducnosti.
Tu bih svrstala i "novogodisnju cestitku" od 3. januara
2002. godine kada su ugasene cetiri najvece nacionalne
banke u nasoj zemlji.
One su na evropskim listama godinama zauzimale visoka
mesta. Ishitreno i bez dublje analize, kao i bez ucesca
revizora, Narodna banka Jugoslavije i Savezna agencija za
osiguranje depozita, sanaciju, stecaj i likvidaciju banaka
ugasile su Beogradsku banku a.d. Beograd, Invest banku
a.d. Beograd, Jugobanku a.d. Beograd i Beobanku a.d.
Beograd.
Bez obzira na podnete tu?be u postupku i za razliku od
svetskih iskustava, kao i zbivanja u vecini zemalja u
procesu tranzicije koje su u ovom periodu sanaciju banaka
vrsile prema modelima konsolidacije i integracije, taj proces
je kod nas zapoceo odlukom o stecaju uz veoma
karakteristicno ucesce kako domacih tako i stranih faktora.
Pomenute banke u stecaju su za odobrene kredite uzimale
obezbedenje zajmotra?ilaca u vidu hipoteke, rucne zaloge,
zlata ili deviza.
U bilo kom trenutku mogli su se aktivirati instrumenti
obezbedenja cime bi se u stecaj bacio veci deo privrede. To
nije ucinjeno jer su tako nalagala pravila ponasanja u
vreme sankcija i ekonomske blokade zemlje.
Uverena sam da ce vreme, jedini nepristrasni i objektivni
sudija, potvrditi moju ocenu da je stecaj cetiri najvece
srpske banke bio nepromisljen i pogresan potez. Moja
uverenost proizilazi iz poznavanja potencijala, mogucnosti i
kadrova, ali i realne problematike pomenutih banaka. U
saznanju sam da je svakoj dobroj nacionalnoj ekonomiji
potrebno i jako nacionalno bankarstvo, naravno u sprezi i
kvalitetnoj konkurenciji sa jakim medunarodnim bankama.
Na kraju ?elim da priznam svoju pristrasnost prema
bankarstvu. Da li je ova knjiga u neku ruku oda
bankarstvu? Bez dvoumljenja - da. Ja sam covek te
profesije.
Ipak, ne gubite iz vida da je u pitanju ?ena. ?ena bankar. To
je i danas retkost u svetu, a pogotovu u vreme kada sam
zapocinjala svoju karijeru. Na Balkanu, narocito.
U nesto vise od pet decenija dugoj istoriji Beogradske
banke na njenom celu bilo je 12 predsednika, odnosno
generalnih direktora. Uz promenu imena banke menjali su
se i prvi ljudi te nase najvece finansijske institucije. Mada
razliciti po prirodi, karakteru, profesiji i sposobnosti, dali su
svoj nesebicni doprinos kontinuitetu u jacanju razvojne
Banke naseg sistema, nacionalnih banaka i drugih
finansijskih asocijacija, kao i privrednog razvoja zemlje.
Sledbenik sam rukovodstva banke koje je bilo poznato i
priznato u svetu bankarstva i uva?avano od saradnika i
slu?benika u samoj banci. Svima njima pripada mesto u
ovoj knjizi.
Moj izbor i moja sudbina
Vreme je nesto sto brzo prolazi,
a ono sto sporo prolazi je tocak sudbine.
(Li Ju)
Celog ?ivota tragala sam za necim neuhvatljivim, necim
sto nazivamo srecom. Pronasla sam je u porodici i u mom
poslu. Jedno od vecnih pitanja je sta je starije - nas izbor ili
nasa sudbina. Odgovor na ovu dilemu nije nimalo
jednostavan i mislim da se razlikuje od coveka do coveka.
Ako je u pitanju covek koji se bori, radi se vise o licnom
izboru, a covek koji ceka je covek pod uticajem sudbine.
Mada je neophodno da se za neke stvari u ?ivotu slo?e
kockice, uverena sam da u mom slucaju preovladuje svesni
izbor. Slaganje mog bankarskog mozaika je verovatno
zapocelo jos u detinjstvu kod dede Dragica cije je iskustvo
bilo vrlo inspirativno i uverljivo. Mislim da iz tog perioda
se?u i moja danasnja interesovanja za obrazovanje Fonda
za doskolovanje mladih poljoprivrednika.
Nikada mi nisu nedostajali ambicija, entuzijazam i
upornost. Na tim pretpostavkama je stvoren i moderan
svet. Ekonomija i profit su dve strane iste pojave. I u
nekadasnjoj socijalistickoj, samoupravnoj Jugoslaviji mi iz
bankarstva smo imali "privilegiju" da radimo i saradujemo
sa svetom u kome tr?iste igra dominatnu ulogu. Mada smo
od njih ucili, po visprenosti smo stajali uz njih a cesto ih i
prevazilazili.
Spoznali smo da je mogucnost ostvarenja naseg uspeha
ipak u nasim rukama. Pogubno je sedeti i cekati prilike.
Karijera se planira i gradi, a uslov za to je da budete
preduzimljivi, informisani, kompetentni, brzi. Samo takvi
mo?ete uspeti u tr?isnoj areni.
Videla sam na delu mnoge lidere i konkurente u oblasti
finansija i bankarstva. Prema njima procenjujete koliko
vredite. Bila sam u kontaktu sa eminentnim finansijskim
liderima i magnatima i zapazila njihov sjaj i bedu, britkost
profesionalnosti ali i sitne ljudske slabosti.
Gotovo da nema posla koji se ne mo?e, u normalnim
uslovima zavrsiti. Makar i uz polovicno zadovoljstvo,
d?entlmenski sporazum ili kompromis gde obe strane
dobijaju po nesto. Moje iskustvo govori, da uspeti znaci
najcesce ici do kraja. Volter ka?e da je uspeh dete smelosti .
Vera u sebe je prvi uslov da uspete. Ali i vera u druge, u
poslovne partnere, u saradnike. Doduse, proveravaju oni
vas ali i vi njih. Takva su pravila igre.
Greske su moguce. One su deo ljudske prirode. Deo posla.
Ali i deo napretka. Ljudski je gresiti - ka?u. Va?no je ne
praviti iste greske jer kineska izreka opominje: ko nacini a
ne ispravi, cini dvostruku gresku. Greske u bankarstvu su
preskupe. Zato kod poslovnog partnera morate prepoznati i
skrivene namere.
Uverila sam se, takode, da je ugled dobrog bankara vredniji
od novca kojim raspola?e. U svetu finansija i bankarstva
reputacija je znak poverenja. Ko proigra principe, pravila,
ugovor, rokove, sam je sebe otpisao. Nigde tako ne va?i, kao
u bankarstvu ona nasa: dobar glas se daleko cuje a los jos
dalje.
Donosenje odluka i preuzimanje odgovornosti za njihov
kvalitet i isplativost jeste izazov ali i suocavanje sa
direktorima i sefovima. Iznad svega to je preispitivanje
samog sebe. Sustina je da koristite vreme na prave stvari, a
ne da ga gubite baveci se neva?nim.
Odluke se ne mogu predugo odlagati jer ce se u
meduvremenu promeniti okolnosti a onda ce odluka koju
donesete biti pogresna. Umece je naci pravu meru izmedu
brzopleto donete odluke i zakasnele odluke jer i jedna i
druga vode u pogresku.
Kad vam je argumentacija ravnopravna izmedu za i protiv,
kada je neresena i ne mo?ete da se u nju pouzdate, ne
odbacujte intuiciju, za koju vam treba vise od teorije, vise
od vida i uvida. Ponekad kad nemate izbora, jednostavno
morate biti hrabri. I to se meni desavalo.
Necu reci nista novo ako zapisem da ugled jedne profesije
zavisi od mnogo cega, ali najvise od nje same. Okolnosti su
promenljive a kadrovi konstantni. U bankarstvu i
finansijama, vise nego u drugim oblastima va?i pravilo da
si dobar onoliko koliko kvalitetnih saradnika okupis oko
sebe.
Radeci toliko godina u bankarstvu i finansijama dr?ala sam
se nekih principa i ?ivotnih pouka koje mogu koristiti
buducim bankarima. Bez namere da ikoga poducavam i bez
?elje da se sa mnom slo?ite prenosim vam ?ivotni kredo
?ene ciji je radni vek protekao u bankarstvu:
imajte u vidu da bankari daju novac a ne savet. Zna se da
je novac dobar sluga ali zao gospodar;
savete primajte pre nego sto se dogovorite sa partnerom,
prijateljem, depozitarom;
pregovaranje je surova igra, ali nikada ne dozvolite da bude
i prljava. U takvoj igri svi gube. Kad-tad;
kada se jednom dogovorite ne vracajte se nazad osim ako to
ne ucini vas partner u poslu;
ne gubite iz vida da je vasa pru?ena ruka po zakljucenju
posla vasa obaveza i vasa odgovornost sve dok taj posao
traje; prijateljstvo koje zasnujete na poslu bolje je nego posao
zasnovan na prijateljstvu. U ovoj poruci sam prenela samo
svoju saglasnost sa D?onom Rokfelerom koji je mnogo pre
mene ovo shvatio;
potrebno je 20 godina za uspeh "preko noci" rekao je Edi
Kantor, pisac (1892).
Sto se tice moje sudbine ona nije bila milostiva. Vise puta
me je neumoljivo i tragicno pogadala. U tim trenucima,
kada ?ivot gubi svaki smisao imala sam neponovljivu
podrsku svoje rodbine, prijatelja, poznanika, kolega,
saradnika, poznatih i nepoznatih ljudi. Oni su mi pomogli
da savladam bol i slabost i shvatim da sudbina ima i drugu
stranu - onu surovu. Da uzima vise nego sto daje.
Bila sam u prilici da radim sa najrazlicitijim ljudima u
zemlji i inostranstvu. Od mnogih sam ucila, takode, i oni od
mene. Vecina je bila na visokom profesionalnom nivou.
Mlade smo negovali a starije postovali. Trudili smo se da
svako ima svoje mesto, onako kakvo zaslu?uju njegove
sposobnosti.
Bicu zadovoljna ako ovaj moj zapis shvatite i prihvatite
kao napor da vam koliko-toliko pribli?im jedno vreme i
profesiju.
Profesija bankara na jugoslovenskim finansijskim
prostorima ispripovedana je i kroz ovu ?ivotnu pricu.
Imala sam prilike da decenijama ucestvujem u postavljanju
stubova na kojima je pocivala zgrada domaceg bankarstva,
a sada u ovo "vreme promena" do?ivljavam njeno rusenje,
krah ili transformacju. Ali, ja sam iz drugog vremena.
Onog u kojoj je nase bankarstvo bele?ilo svetlije dane.
UMESTO PREDGOVORA
Secanja gospode Borke Vucic izneta u ovoj knjizi prakticno
predstavljaju hronologiju razvoja naseg bankarstva u
poslednjih 50 godina. Ova knjiga nije samo znacajna sto
govori o jednoj uspesnoj karijeri vec i vrlo korisna
literatura za sve one koji se bave istorijom i razvojem naseg
bankarstva. U svojstvu predsednika Upravnog odbora
Beogradske banke a.d. sa gospodom Vucic neposredno sam
saradivao najvecim delom u vreme njenog obavljanja
du?nosti Generalnog direktora banke. To je bilo vreme
ekonomskih sankcija i politickih pritisaka koje su pocetkom
1999. godine kulminirale brutalnom agresijom NATO
snaga na nasu zemlju. Znajuci ulogu bankarskog sistema u
nasoj privredi banka je sve svoje aktivnosti usmerila na
preduzimanje mera i akcija primerenih tom vremenu u
kome smo ?iveli i radili.
Gospoda Vucic je izabrana za Generalnog direktora
Beogradske banke pocetkom 1997. godine. Imajuci u vidu
poodmakle godine gospode Vucic, predlog za njeno
imenovanje za Generalnog direktora primio sam sa
odredenom rezervom. U svakom slucaju ocekivao sam
znatno mladu osobu. Medutim, posle prvih dana njenog
rada u Banci uverio sam se da godine nisu uvek merilo
uspesnog rada. Za vrlo kratko vreme Beogradska banka je
presla iz jedne pasivne pozicije u nosioca razvoja svih
znacajnih bankarskih aktivnosti u zemlji. Ceo kadrovski
potencijal banke je aktiviran preko noci, a radno vreme
stavljeno u zavisnost od izvrsenja programa i rokova.
Savesnost, profesionalnost i odgovornost gospode Vucic
kao generalnog direktora veoma brzo su se odrazila na
poslovanju banke.
Osecam potrebu da navedem samo neke od postignutih
rezultata koji su u knjizi detaljnije napisani.
Nelikvidnost banaka je u to vreme bila vrlo izra?ena sto je
sa svoje strane privredi stvaralo dodatne teskoce ne samo u
procesu odr?avanja reprodukcije vec je indirektno
prouzrokovalo i mnoge socijalne probleme. Na zadovoljstvo
svih akcionara ovaj problem je brzo i trajno resen.
Obezbedena je sigurnost svih komitenata da po svojoj volji
mogu koristiti sredstva na svojim racunima. Prestalo je
ula?enje u minusna stanja a prosecno dnevno stanje na ?iro
racunima je visestruko povecano.
Formiranje Beogradske bankarske grupe je doprinelo
daljem povecanju dinarske likvidnosti i znatnim deviznim
ustedama. Stvorena je, za nase prilike, jedna znacajna
bankarska institucija koja je mogla i trebala da preuzme
kreditne i devizne aran?mane sa inostranstvom. Sklopljeni
su, i prvi krediti koji su za nasu privredu bili veoma
znacajni.
Povecanjem depozita i reprogramiranjem dugova vrlo brzo
je sanirano sedam banaka clanica sistema Beogradske
bankarske grupe. Koliki je bio znacaj ovog sistema govori i
cinjenica da je Banka imala preko pet hiljada akcionara
koji su sacinjavali vise od 50% privrede Srbije.
Agencija za sanaciju, konsolidaciju i dokapitalizaciju u
okviru Beogradske bankarske grupe imala je zadatak da u
saradnji sa poveriocima, komitentima, Narodnom bankom i
drugim institucijama u zemlji preuzme poslove sanacije
velikih du?nika za koje se znalo da nisu u mogucnosti da
otplacuju svoje dugove. U tom smislu vodeni su i
preliminarni razgovori sa Pariskim i Londonskim klubom.
Banka je bila svesna da je za povracaj stare devizne stednje
preduslov obnavljanje poverenje gradana za ulaganje svojih
ustedevina na stednju kod banaka. U tom cilju Banka je u
zajednici sa dr?avnim institucijama bila inicijator brojnih
projekata kroz ponudu stanova, banja, poslovnog prostora, i
sl. koji bi se placali sredstvima stare devizne stednje. Naveo
sam samo ovih nekoliko aktivnosti banke koji govore da se
Banka nije bavila samo tekucim pitanjima vec je paralelno
stvarana osnova i politika Banke za neko postsankciono
vreme.
Dolazak gospode Borke Vucic na mesto predsednika
Beogradske banke doprineo je jednoj intenzivnijoj saradnji
izmedu Upravnog odbora i menad?menta banke. Postojalo
je uzajamno razumevanje i radna atmosfera koju bi svaki
upravni odbor mogao po?eleti. Posebno treba istaci da je
gospoda Vucic imala izra?en "sluh" za privredu bez obzira
sto je gotovo celokupno radno iskustvo imala u bankarstvu.
Svi potezi i predlozi Banke bili su pa?ljivo odmeravani sa
gledista posledica i efekata koje ce imati na privredu.
Uveren sam da je merama i aktivnoscu Banke u ovom
veoma teskom periodu privreda imala manje teskoca i
problema blagovremenog iznala?enja odgovora na teskoce
vremena u kome smo ?iveli.
Gospoda Vucic je poznato ime i u medunarodnom
bankarstvu. Nisam uveren da danas bilo koji bankar u
zemlji mo?e neposredno da ostvari kontakte sa vrhunskim
bankarima u svetu kao sto to mo?e gospoda Vucic. To je
izuzetno vredan "kapital" koji mi na?alost ne znamo da
cenimo.
Mr Radovan Pesikan
UVODNA REC
Bankarstvo, monetarna ekonomija i medunarodne finansije
su i zanat i nauka; i vestina i umetnost. Strucno znanje za
tu delatnost je potreban ali ne i dovoljan uslov. Svi koji su
u toj oblasti stvorili nesto imali su predispoziciju, talenat i
specificnu etiku. Novac je krvotok privrede; ko ucestvuje u
upravljanju njime, utice na ?ivot hiljada preduzeca i
miliona ljudi.
Mnogi guverneri centralnih banaka napisali su strucne,
naucne ili memoarske knjige. Znatno rede to cine poslovni
bankari. Njihovi klijenti su u stalnoj konkurentskoj borbi,
njihovi planovi i projekti su poslovna tajna. Bankar mora
da ih zna, ali i da ih cuva. I njihovi zapisi su vredna
svedocanstva. Bez obzira na zvanicno resenje, ona
pokazuju sta se u stvarnom ?ivotu desavalo, na sceni ili iza
nje.
Borka Vucic ovom svojom knjigom dokazuje i jedno i
drugo, i svoju predispoziciju i talenat za bankarstvo, ali i
cinjenicu da je u Jugoslaviji jos od 60-ih godina itekako
postojalo poslovno bankarstvo bez kojeg privredni uspon i
izlazak na svetsku scenu ne bi bili ostvareni.
Sve karakterne osobine, odnos prema ?ivotu, licna etika
formiraju se jos u ranom ?ivotnom dobu a Borka Vucic je
jos kao dete u naju?oj porodici, na primeru svog dede
Dragica, imala prilike da shvati smisao poslovnog
bankarstva. Deda Dragic ne samo da je uredno, papirima,
regulisao odnose sa ljudima kojima je davao usluge ili
novac na zajam vec je jos pre 100 godina filozofskom
mirnocom vrsio "reprogramiranje duga" kada su to
okolnosti nametnule, a danas jos ima bankara koji ne
shvataju da im od toga nema spasa.
Da ni bankar ni trgovac ne mogu da oplode svoj ni tudi
kapital ako on nije ukljucen u stvaranje nove vrednosti,
znao je i njen drugi deda Simeun, trgovac. Cvrsta pravila
poslovanja koja je on primenjivao slu?ila su za sticanje i
odr?avanje poverenja, kredibiliteta, bez kojeg bi svaki
poslovni bankar promasio profesiju.
Tok njene profesionalne karijere takode je Borku Vucic
osposobljavao za uspesnog bankara. Radila je u dr?avnim
institucijama visokog strucnog nivoa u vreme kada je u
Jugoslaviji postojala razvojna i tekuca ekonomska politika
koja se uspesno primenjivala. Mnogi dobri investicioni
projekti, nova, uspesna preduzeca stvarana su uz
nezamenljivu ulogu poslovnog bankarstva, domaceg i
inostranog kapitala.
Danas se o tom periodu proturaju la?i: da nije bilo tr?isne
privrede niti poslovnog bankarstva. O suprotnom svedoci
ozbiljna i velika studija Svetske banke Yugoslavia -
Development with Decentralization.* Ona pokazuje da je u
Jugoslaviji jos od 1955. razdvojeno cenralno od poslovnog
bankarstva i da je pored specijalizovanih banaka (za
spoljnu trgovinu, poljoprivredu, investicije, kao i postanske
stedionice) postojalo 220 komunalnih banaka za
kratkorocno komercijalno kreditiranje (str. 216). Vec od
1965. godine svako je mogao biti osnivac poslovne banke
ako je obezbedio osnivacki ulog, a ucesce pojedinacnog
osnivaca bilo je ograniceno na 10% glasova u Skupstini
(str. 49).
Svedocenje Borke Vucic podupire navedenu istinu.
Poslovno bankarstvo Jugoslavije se brzo razvijalo i
osposobljavalo za poslovanje sa inostranstvom. Svi krediti
medunarodnih finansijskih institucija, inostranih vlada i
onih sa slobodnog tr?ista kapitala, realizovali su se
posredstvom poslovnih banaka. Ona navodi brojne primere
koji pokazuju da je nakon pocetnog kolebanja, poslovno
bankarstvo Jugoslavije prihvaceno u svetu kao poslovno
samostalno i na tr?istima zasnovano.
Takvi su bili i kriterijumi za izbor investicionih projekata
koje je poslovno bankarstvo primenjivalo. Sa pravom je na
prvom mestu bio princip pozitivnog neto deviznog efekta.
Prioritet su imali projekti i preduzeca koja su svojim
izvozom mogla da otplacuju inostrani zajam i pokriju svoje
uvozne potrebe.
Uvodenjem sankcija prema narodu Jugoslavije 1991/1992.
godine poslovne banke su postepeno onemogucavane u
poslovanju sa inostranstvom, njihovi racuni i racuni
njihovih klijenata u inostranstvu su blokirani. U tim
uslovima su mnoga preduzeca osnovala sopstvena
preduzeca u inostranstvu, pa i na Kipru jer su ta preduzeca,
sem ogranicenja poslovanja sa Jugoslavijom, mogla
normalno da posluju. Druga takva preduzeca i banke su u
uslovima sankcija izuzetno pomogla poslovanju preduzeca
u Jugoslaviji. Borka Vucic sa bankom na Kipru, koja je
poslovala pod strogim nadzorom Centralne banke i vlasti
Kipra, u tom pogledu je dala izuzetan doprinos. Zajedno sa
celom tamosnjom jugoslovenskom zajednicom
organizovala je humanitarnu i medicinsku pomoc i
odr?avala veliko prijateljstvo kiparskog naroda prema
gradanima Jugoslavije pod sankcijama.
Sa svojom strucnom ekipom na Kipru, uz odredene
konsultacije drugih eksperata, pripremila je i koncept
ozdravljenja poslovnog bankarstva Jugoslavije, koji je susta
suprotnost sadasnjoj politici njegovog likvidiranja.
Na jednom mestu u knjizi Borke Vucic uporeduju se Kipar
i Jugoslavija. Kipar nema narocitih prirodnih uslova za
razvoj. Jugoslavija ima. Kipar ipak ima 10 puta veci
nacionani dohodak po stanovniku nego Jugoslavija. Jedino
sto im je zajednicko je to sto je vise od jedne trecine zemlje
pod okupacijom. Odakle, medutim, ostala razlika? Ona je
naravno u ljudskom faktoru.
Najvise revolta izaziva poglavlje u knjizi koje opisuje nacin
nasilnog preuzimanja Beogradske banke. Rec je o
naoru?anim nasilnicima "kriznog staba" i falsifikatima.
Kao u vreme prohibicije ili Makartizma u danasnjoj jedinoj
svetskoj supersili.
Danas je banka kojoj je na celu bila Borka Vucic u stecaju,
zajedno sa jos tri jugoslovenske banke. Jednog dana ce
nepristrasan sud pokazati da je to bio neopravdan potez,
odluka suprotna interesima dr?ave i naroda. To se vec i
pokazalo. Nedavno je Zakonom obezbedeno da se uslovi
otpisa i reprograma spoljnog duga ugovoreni izmedu
inostranih poverilaca i dr?ave SRJ kao garanta u svemu
"preslikaju" na doticne banke i preduzeca. Takvim
smanjenjem duga preduzeca postaju sposobna da u novim
uslovima otplacuju preostali dug, a banke time umesto
nenaplativih sticu kvalitetna potra?ivanja i popravljaju svoj
bilans. Na?alost, ovaj zakon se ne odnosi na cetiri banke
koje su 3. januara 2002. godine oterane u stecaj. Nekome je
ocito stalo da ih unisti. Treba pogledati ko je predlo?io
terminski plan za uvodenje stecaja.
Ovde nije moguce istaci sva vredna svedocenja Borke
Vucic o razvoju jugoslovenskog bankarstva, privrede i
dr?ave. Neka od njih su ipak nezaobilazna: o varvarskim
sankcijama, poslovanju banaka na Kipru i sadasnjem
sumraku u odnosu vlasti prema poslovnom bankarstvu.
Prof. dr Oskar Kovac
* The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London, 1975.
(za verziju na srpskohrvatskom: Artel website ili
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2274)
BELGRADE FORUM: NO WAR ON IRAQ
BELGRADE FORUM FOR THE WORLD OF EQUALS
No.: 10/2003
Belgrade, 23. 01. 2003
The Belgrade Forum For the World of Equals is profoundly disturbed by
the United States of America and Great Britain's preparations for the
War on Iraq. Their massive build-up of military forces and armaments
on the borders of Iraq and in the region of Middle East is unfolding
in the face of international public violating the UN Charter, which
forbids threatening and use of force and demands peaceful solution of
all international problems.
It is clear that the US Administration is not interested in truth but
in imposing its control over the world's richest oil and natural gas
reserves. If any country in the world possesses armaments of massive
destruction then the United States of America is on the top of the
list. It's objective is to use the war on Iraq to experiment the new
armaments for massive destruction.
While the great majority of the countries in the world, including all
Arab states insist on peaceful solution of all issues with Iraq in the
spirit of UN Charter, the US Administration insists on the war option,
even without approval of the UN Security Council.
Iraqi people already suffering tragic consequences of prolonged
sanctions and almost daily US and British bombardment, is faced now
with fear of total war.
The Belgrade Forum joins and supports the world - wide protests
against the war on Iraq. The Forum calls upon all organizations,
institutions of the civil society, the national public and
peace-loving individuals cherishing the international law, to join the
international protests in Europe and the World against the aggression
on Iraq and to demand peaceful solution of all issues in accordance
with the UN Charter.
The Yugoslav public is entitled and morally obliged to take a clear
stand against the war on Iraq having in mind that Yugoslavia has been
the victim of the direct aggression of NATO and has experienced the
tragic consequences of the policy of force and violation of the UN
Charter.
The Belgrade Forum calls upon the Yugoslav authorities not to let use
of the Yugoslav territory, sea - ports, nor the air space for
preparations or undertaking of any military action against Iraq, as
this would involve the country in the war against the friendly Iraqi
people and its country.
---
BELGRADE FORUM FOR THE WORLD OF EQUALS
11000 Belgrade, Misarska 6/2, Yugoslavia
T/F: (++ 381-11) 3245 601
www.belgrade-forum.org
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2274)
BELGRADE FORUM: NO WAR ON IRAQ
BELGRADE FORUM FOR THE WORLD OF EQUALS
No.: 10/2003
Belgrade, 23. 01. 2003
The Belgrade Forum For the World of Equals is profoundly disturbed by
the United States of America and Great Britain's preparations for the
War on Iraq. Their massive build-up of military forces and armaments
on the borders of Iraq and in the region of Middle East is unfolding
in the face of international public violating the UN Charter, which
forbids threatening and use of force and demands peaceful solution of
all international problems.
It is clear that the US Administration is not interested in truth but
in imposing its control over the world's richest oil and natural gas
reserves. If any country in the world possesses armaments of massive
destruction then the United States of America is on the top of the
list. It's objective is to use the war on Iraq to experiment the new
armaments for massive destruction.
While the great majority of the countries in the world, including all
Arab states insist on peaceful solution of all issues with Iraq in the
spirit of UN Charter, the US Administration insists on the war option,
even without approval of the UN Security Council.
Iraqi people already suffering tragic consequences of prolonged
sanctions and almost daily US and British bombardment, is faced now
with fear of total war.
The Belgrade Forum joins and supports the world - wide protests
against the war on Iraq. The Forum calls upon all organizations,
institutions of the civil society, the national public and
peace-loving individuals cherishing the international law, to join the
international protests in Europe and the World against the aggression
on Iraq and to demand peaceful solution of all issues in accordance
with the UN Charter.
The Yugoslav public is entitled and morally obliged to take a clear
stand against the war on Iraq having in mind that Yugoslavia has been
the victim of the direct aggression of NATO and has experienced the
tragic consequences of the policy of force and violation of the UN
Charter.
The Belgrade Forum calls upon the Yugoslav authorities not to let use
of the Yugoslav territory, sea - ports, nor the air space for
preparations or undertaking of any military action against Iraq, as
this would involve the country in the war against the friendly Iraqi
people and its country.
---
BELGRADE FORUM FOR THE WORLD OF EQUALS
11000 Belgrade, Misarska 6/2, Yugoslavia
T/F: (++ 381-11) 3245 601
www.belgrade-forum.org
SUBITO CHIARITO IL MOTIVO DELL'ARRESTO DEI TERRORISTI UCK
Il "Tribunale" dell'Aia ha chiarito, attraverso il suo servizio
ufficioso di propaganda ("Tribunal Update", bollettino a cura della
agenzia IWPR, finanziata da generose strutture NATO), le vere ragioni
dell'arresto dei criminali dell'UCK, avvenuto alcuni giorni fa.
L'arresto ha sorpreso tutti gli osservatori poiche' e' il primo caso
(e rimarra' l'unico) di cattura di criminali di guerra dell'UCK -
benche' si tratti comunque di figure di secondo piano (i "pesci
grossi" sono tra i migliori alleati della NATO nella regione e
resteranno intoccabili).
Come recita testualmente "Tribunal Update", "l'arresto [dei membri]
UCK potrebbe aiutare L'Aia a sconfiggere i serbi", in quanto "il
procedimento contro gli ex guerriglieri albanesi potrebbe in qualche
maniera persuadere i serbi che L'Aia e' imparziale".
ANALYSIS:
KLA Arrests May Help Hague Win Over Serbs
Indictment of former Albanian guerrillas could go some way to
persuading Serbs that The Hague is even-handed.
By Chris Stephen in The Hague.
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri_301_2_eng.txt
Il "Tribunale" dell'Aia ha chiarito, attraverso il suo servizio
ufficioso di propaganda ("Tribunal Update", bollettino a cura della
agenzia IWPR, finanziata da generose strutture NATO), le vere ragioni
dell'arresto dei criminali dell'UCK, avvenuto alcuni giorni fa.
L'arresto ha sorpreso tutti gli osservatori poiche' e' il primo caso
(e rimarra' l'unico) di cattura di criminali di guerra dell'UCK -
benche' si tratti comunque di figure di secondo piano (i "pesci
grossi" sono tra i migliori alleati della NATO nella regione e
resteranno intoccabili).
Come recita testualmente "Tribunal Update", "l'arresto [dei membri]
UCK potrebbe aiutare L'Aia a sconfiggere i serbi", in quanto "il
procedimento contro gli ex guerriglieri albanesi potrebbe in qualche
maniera persuadere i serbi che L'Aia e' imparziale".
ANALYSIS:
KLA Arrests May Help Hague Win Over Serbs
Indictment of former Albanian guerrillas could go some way to
persuading Serbs that The Hague is even-handed.
By Chris Stephen in The Hague.
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri_301_2_eng.txt
Le 26 février à la Sorbonne
Les Amis du MONDE-diplomatique
ont proposé un débat autour du livre de
D. Johnstone, 'La Croisade des fous'
avec la partecipatione de Subhi Toma
et Jean Bricmont.
Diana Johnstone
GUERRES SANS FIN
La SORBONNE 26 février 2003
Droit international contre droit du plus fort
Devant le Conseil de Sécurité le 14 février, le ministre français,
Dominique de Villepin, a fait un discours admirable de raison et de
clarté qui a été très apprécié -- sauf, vous le savez bien, par les
dirigeants et la presse anglophone.
Les Etats-Unis sont dirigés actuellement par un petit groupe de
mégalomanes dont les idées et les projets étaient parfaitement
inconnus de l'électorat américain qui, selon la Cour Suprème choisi
par son père, avait élu George Bush... par une large minorité de
votes. Plus fondamentalement, l'électorat américain depuis longtemps
n'a pas de vrai choix, car le processus "démocratique" au niveau
national a été complètement accaparé par le complex
militaro-industriel. Une poignée d'illuminés a imposé une
politique qui n'a jamais été soumis à un débat démocratique aux
Etats-Unis, et il ne veulent pas que le débat venu d'ailleurs arrivent
aux oreilles des citoyens Américains. C'est pour cela que leurs
propagandistes dans les médias ont répondu par un torrent d'invectives
imbéciles versé sur la France -- dont la faute originelle n'était que
de vouloir habiller la guerre à venir de quelques oripeaux de légalité
internationale. Car la position de la France, jusque là, revenait à
tenter de rester dans les formes du droit international, rien de
plus. Mais l'équipe au pouvoir à Washington n'apprécie guère cet
effort. Son but est d'impressionner le monde et de lui dicter sa loi
par la force. Le droit international doit céder au droit du plus fort,
c'est la base du "nouvel ordre mondial" style Bush et compagnie.
Les dirigeants américains ont l'habitude de dire de celui qu'ils
veulent attaquer, qu'il "ne peut comprendre que la force". Plus
exactement, ils voudraient que les autres ne comprennent que la force,
car c'est le langage qu'eux, il maîtrisent. Ils veulent que la
démonstration soit faite que la force aura le dernier mot.
La crise irakienne fait ressortir une opposition dramatique entre
le droit international et le droit du plus fort. Le droit
international, dans la mesure où il serait universel, applicable à
tous de la même manière, est maintenant un obstacle que Washington
préfère écraser par la loi du plus fort -- sa loi à elle.
L'Illusion de la "Communauté internationale"
Pour la vieille Europe, et surtout pour la France, cette crise autour
de l'Irak devrait mettre fin à certaines illusions. La grande
illusion des années quatre-vingt dix était d'imaginer que l'immense
puissance militaire des Etats-Unis pouvait se laisser transformer en
instrument charitable pour accomplir les interventions "humanitaires"
souhaitées par les champions des droits l'homme devenus la conscience
d'une vague "communauté internationale". La référence constante à
cette "communauté internationale" avait deux fonctions idéologiques:
de masquer la destruction de l'autorité des Nations-Unies, et de
donner l'impression d'un certain multilatéralisme. Ce concept vague
s'applique surtout aux nations occidentales, supposées représenter la
conscience supérieure de l'humanité. En même temps, cette "communauté
internationale" correspondait, en réalité, à un "condominium impérial"
des puissances occidentales capitalistes qui, unies sur l'hégémonie
américaine, pourrait dominer le monde ensemble sans se détruire
mutuellement dans les guerres mondiales pour diviser les continents du
Sud. Cette "C.I.", communauté internationale ou condominium impérial,
imposerait un ordre "moral" au monde, basé sur les "valeurs",
notamment les "droits de l'homme".
La Continuité
En comparaison avec l'équipe Bush, ouvertement de plus en plus
criminelle, le monde risque d'éprouver une énorme nostalgie pour
l'administration Clinton, et de souhaiter le retour des Démocrates
comme les chrétiens de l'antiquité souhaitaient le retour du Christ.
Le multilatéralisme traditionnel des Démocrates sauvaient au moins les
apparences aux yeux des alliés européens, qui pouvaient jouer les
seconds rôles et payer la nôte avec un minimum de dignité.
Mais attention, s'il est vrai que d'abord l'électorat démocrate,
puis à un bien moindre degré les politiciens démocrates, sont comme on
dit là-bas plus "libéraux", c'est-à-dire plus sociaux, en ce qui
concerne la politique intérieure, il y a deux réserves à signaler:
pour la politique intérieure, tout se situe aujourd'hui largement à la
droite par rapport à la France... et deuxièmement, en ce qui concerne
la politique extérieure, c'est surtout l'emballage qui change. Dans
le fond, il y a une grande continuité, due à la logique d'un complexe
militaro-industriel surgonflé, et assurée par la petite élite de
spécialistes qui créent les projets de politique internationale dans
le conforts des fondations privées, abrités des regards de la
population en général mais très proches des grands médias.
Je voudrais signaler quelques indices de cette continuité. Vous
avez vu le Président Bush exhorter ses troupes en proclamant que "nous
avons la plus grande armée de la terre" comme si c'était une qualité
morale. Mais l'ambassadrice de Clinton, Madeleine Albright, avait
exclamé, "à quoi ça sert d'avoir la plus grande force militaire du
monde si l'on ne l'utilise pas!" La personnalité qui, choqué par ces
mots belliqueux, les avait racontés dans ses mémoires n'était autre
que le Général Colin Powell, qui depuis en a vu d'autres...
Oui, et c'était déjà Madeleine Albright qui voulait à tout pris
déclencher la guerre contre la Yougoslavie sans mandat du Conseil de
Sécurité. Aujourd'hui, quand le Président Chirac et son ministre des
affaires étrangères insistent sur la nécessité de passer par le
Conseil de Sécurité des Nations-Unies, on est presque gêné de
rappeller que la France n'avait pas le même scrupule il y a quatre
ans...
Mais il faut le dire.
Le Kosovo
Ici je dois aborder un sujet que beaucoup préfèrent éviter, le Kosovo,
car l'illusion n'est pas encore totalement dissipée en ce qui concerne
le Kosovo, dont beaucoup gardent encore une impression erronnée
des causes comme des effets. Il faut y revenir parce que la
"réussite" de la guerre du Kosovo est citée régulièrement aujourd'hui
comme précédent heureux, comme argument irréfutable en faveur de la
"guerre préventive"contre les "dictateurs" qui ne penseraieent qu'à
commettre des "génocides". Si on ne brise pas cette illusion, on
continuera à brandir "le Kosovo" comme la carte blanche à la guerre
"juste" en permanence
Tout cela était prévisible. Justifier la guerre préventive sans
mandat du Conseil de Sécurité devait créer un précédent dangereux,
comme Hubert Védrine lui-même a bien reconnu peu après, dans les pages
du Monde diplomatique. Je ne peux pas juger à quel point les
dirigeants européens disposant de services de renseignement étaient
dupes de la rhétorique du moment, mais tous ont répété la même
propagande à l'époque: les mensonges les plus énormes venant de
l'équipe britannique autour de Blair, qui récidive, et du ministre de
la défense allemand Rudolf Scharping, qui a été démissioné depuis au
milieu d'une pléthore de scandales.
En France, il existait le "lobby Sarajevo" qui réclamait cette
intervention militaire comme le seul moyen de traiter les conflits
yougoslaves. Beaucoup d'intellectuels français, surtout qui ont
transformé la fonction de la "philosophie" de quête de savoir en
étalage d'indignation contre les mécréants lointains, ont stigmatisé
tout effort de comprendre et de chercher la conciliation comme une
sorte de complicité avec le nouvel "Hitler". En rejettant tout
réalisme en politique comme l'oeuvre du diable, ils sont préféré
tourner vers les missiles cruises pour régler les affaires complexes.
Il fallait une naïveté volontaire pour croire que les Etats-Unis --
vu leur histoire d'ingérences ouvertes ou clandestines
(parmi d'autres) au Guatemala, en Iran, au Vietnam, au Chili, en
Angola, et de façon presque constante depuis un siècle dans toute
l'Amérique centrale -- allaient, une fois libérés de la contrainte
représentée par une superpuissance rivale, se transformer en branche
armée des soeurs de la charité.
En réalité, les Etats-Unis ne se sont pas laissé entraînés dans la
guerre au Kosovo à cause des arguments de BHL ou des larmes de
Glucksmann.
Comme pour la guerre en Iraq, ils voulaient y aller et cherchaient des
prétextes, quand ils ne les créaient pas.
Les vrais causes sont visibles à partir des effets réels. Les
résultats éloquents de la guerre du Kosovo sont les suivants:
* légitimer la guerre comme moyen privilégié pour résoudre les
problèmes politiques, ce qui revient à délégitimer la négociation, la
diplomatie, la médiation, tous les moyens pacifiques qui, on voit
aujourd'hui, sont rejetés comme des formes de làcheté.
* créer un précédent pour faire la guerre sans mandat du Conseil de
Sécurité sous prétexte d'un cas d'urgence extrême, urgence évaluée par
les Etats-Unis et (peut-être) leurs alliés.
* sauver l'Otan en lui dotant d'une nouvelle "mission humanitaire"
hors de la zone de défense des pays de l'alliance, et en la
transformant en "boite à outils" dans laquelles les Etats-Unis
pourront puiser pour leurs opération plus à l'Est et au Sud. Ici se
trouve la cause et l'effet les plus importants de cette aventure, ce
qui explique la grande hâte avec laquelle il fallait procéder aux
bombardements au moment choisi, à la veille du cinquantième
anniversaire de l'Otan, ce qui permettait à Washington de présenter la
nouvelle stratégie de l'Otan en forme de fait accompli, sans vrai
debat.
* renforcer de façon décisive l'influence des Etats-Unis sur l'Europe
par le biais de l'Otan. Cette opération a été cruciale en offrant aux
pays de l'Europe ex-communiste une adhésion occidentale alternative à
l'Union Européenne.
* faire du Kosovo une base militaire américaine, le "Camp Bondsteel",
construit immédiatement après l'occupation du Kosovo sans demander la
permission à personne.
Et le Kosovo lui-même? Le problème des "deux peuples pour une
terre "durait depuis longtemps, et aurait pu être traité avec patience
comme d'autres problèmes du même genre. Ce qui a précipité la crise
était d'abord la crise financière en Albanie en 1997, qui d'une part
ouvrait une porte à la négociation (en décourageant pour l'instant les
séparatistes) et d'autre inondait le Kosovo d'armes volées dans les
arsenaux albanais. Un carrefour entre paix et guerre où les
Etats-Unis surtout ont choisi le chemin de la guerre, tout en disant
le contraire. L'UÇK, soutenu vigoureusement par un lobby à Washington
comprenant un ancient candidat républicain à la présidence, Robert
Dole, a pu jouer contre Milosevic le rôle des "Contras" lancés par la
CIA contre le Nicaragua sandiniste, pour réduire toute la Yougoslavie
à un statut comparable à celui des pays de l'Amérique centrale. Le
Kosovo occupé et gouverné formellement par les Nations-Unies, en
réalité par les pays de l'Otan avec quelques auxiliaires
subordonnés, est devenu la plaque tournante de trafics de femmes, de
drogue et d'armes. Libérés de la police serbe, les milices
albanophones font la guerre les unes aux autres. Je ne dirai pas que
c'est cela l'objectif américain, mais c'est le type de situation dont
ils s'accommodent fort bien un peu partout là où ils cherchent
n'importe quel allié contre un régime récalcitrant.
La volonté d'ingérence militaire
Dès l'ouverture de la crise yougoslave au début des années
quatre-vingt-dix, l'ingérence des puissances occidentales -- sans le
dire ouvertement, et dans une certaine mesure peut-être sans le penser
-- avait tout fait pour entraîner leur propre intervention militaire.
1 - D'abord, il est notoire que le gouvernement allemand a insisté
sur la reconnaissance de l'indépendence de la Slovénie et de la
Croatie, contre tout usage diplomatique et contre l'avis de leurs
propres diplomates sur place. C'est un sujet intéressant, que je
traite dans mon livre, mais par déférence envers l'attitude actuelle
du gouvernement allemand, je ne veux pas insister trop sur ce sujet
ici. Mais il faut noter pourtant que ceux qui prônaient une
reconnaissance rapide insistaient qu'elle empêcherait la
guerre civile en tranchant la question de la Yougoslavie une fois pour
toutes. Mais le véritable résultat de la reconnaissance rapide ne fut
pas de mettre fin au conflit, mais plutôt de transformer une guerre
civile en conflit international, ouvrant la voie à l'intervention
internationale. En prenant parti pour les sécessionnistes, les états
européens réduisaient leur possibilités de médiation neutre et
contribuaient à la polarisation.
2 - Puis, la désintégration violente de la Yougoslavie fut
déterminée aussi par les Etats-Unis qui, tout en se proclamant en
faveur de la préservation de la Yougoslavie, par voie diplomatique
interdit à l'Armée populaire yougoslave de garder l'unité du pays par
la force. Ce geste de "pacifiste bêlant" revenait à donner carte
blanche aux forces nationalistes et séparatistes qui s'étaient armées
clandestinement et qui se sont mises à réaliser la sécession par fait
accompli. Toutes ces sécessions -- celle de la Slovénie, de la
Croatie, mais aussi des Serbes de Krajina qui faisaient
sécession de la Croatie -- auraient pu être empêchées par l'armée
yougoslave, le temps de prendre des mesures pour sauver la Fédération
multinationale, ce qui était sans doute ce que souhaitait encore la
majorité de la population de la Yougoslavie, qu'on n'a jamais
consultée sur dans son ensemble et qui n'imaginait pas les désastres à
venir.
L'ironie, c'est qu'à la fin les Etats-Unis, qui avait interdit
l'utilisation de la force pour préserver le pays "multi-ethnique" ont
fini par utiliser eux-mêmes une force bien plus dévastatrice,
soi-disant pour préserver la multi-ethnicité de certains fragments de
la fédération éclatée. Ce qu'ils n'ont même pas réussi à faire par
leur force militaire, vu l'état des relations inter-ethniques
extrêmement tendues dans les protectorats de Bosnie et du Kosovo.
Derrière la façade du multilatéralisme, dans les conflits yougoslaves,
les Etats-Unis ont saboté les efforts européens de favoriser une
solution négociée.
-- En Bosnie, ils ont encouragé Izetbegovic, dont le parti avait de
bonnes relations aux Etats-Unis, surtout par Mohamed Sacirbey et son
père.
Il faut surtout lire les mémoires de David Owen pour voir comment
Washington a saboté tout accord de paix. En assimilant la guerre à un
match sportif, on adoptait l'absurde slogan qu'il fallait doter la
Bosnie d'un "terrain de jeu équitable" en armant la partie la plus
faible... une logique déjà appliquée en fait dans la guerre Iran-Iraq,
que l'Occident avait attisée pendant huit ans... mais qu'on n'applique
évidemment pas à Israël et Palestine. En réalité, avec l'Iran et
d'autres pays musulmans, les Etats-Unis ont renforcé le parti
d'Izetbegovic, avec pour résultat, une guerre prolongée, plus de
souffrances et de morts, des intégristes islamistes venus d'ailleurs
installés autour de Zenica et en fin de compte une Bosnie encore plus
divisée qu'aurait été la Bosnie décidée à Lisbonne.
Loin d'être exceptionnelle, cette alliance avec le parti islamiste
était en parfaite continuité avec la politique américaine au Moyen
Orient, qui a constamment favorisé les Islamistes contre les régimes
laïcs dans les pays musulmans. C'est ainsi que les réseaux d'anciens
combattants d'Afghanistan, parfois liés à bin Laden, étaient les
bien-venus. Et il est très significatif que la délégation
d'Izetbegovic à Dayton fut conseillé par Richard Perle, le sinistre
conseiller au Pentagone de l'administration Bush, champion de
l'extrême droite en Israel, Netanyahou....
-- Au Kosovo, au lieu de rechercher la conciliation, Washington l'a
rendu impossible en encourageant l'intransigence des Albanais. A
travers la National Endowment for Democracy {"la fondation nationale
pour la démocratie"), établie sous l'administration Reagan pour
financer l'ingérence dans la vie politique d'autres pays, les
Etats-Unis ont pu influencer la façon dont le problème du Kosovo était
vu par le monde extérieur, et même par les Albanais du Kosovo
eux-mêmes. Cette fondation est un exemple important du phénomène de
"l'organisation non-gouvernementale" ...gouvernementale, phénomène qui
joue un rôle capital dans la formation de la "politique des droits de
l'homme" qui sert à justifier les interventions dites "humanitaires".
Cette aide américaine était particulièrement importante dans le
domaine décisif de l'information sur les droits de l'homme. La source
principale de tous les rapports diffusés dans le monde entier sur la
question du traitement de la population albanaise au Kosovo était le
"Conseil pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés",
fondé en 1989 par des militants séparatistes albanais. Cet organisme
ne s'intéressait pas aux droits de tous les habitants du Kosovo, mais
uniquement des Kosovars albanais, car le Conseil était l'instrument de
propagande clé pour la cause, et l'exagération des faits devenait une
habitude. Un don de la fondation a permis au Conseil d'embaucher un
directeur à plein temps et d'établir un réseau de 27 sous-conseils,
présent dans tous les villes de la province. En 1998, une publication
de cette "fondation nationale pour la démocratie" se vantait de cette
aide, qui a fourni aux quelques 2,000 volontaires des machines de fax
et des ordinateurs. Le Conseil, selon son bienfaiteur, était "la
source d'information la plus importante sur les droits de l'homme au
Kosovo. Une large gamme d'organisation internationales de droits de
l'homme et des agences de presse utilisent ses informations, telles
que la Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, la Commission
des Nations-Unies pour les Droits de l'Homme, et l'agence Associated
Press."
Ainsi, une petite province censée crouler sous une oppression digne
des Nazis était couverte d'un réseau de bureaux payés par l'étranger
où les opposants de l'état travaillaient sans cesse pour discréditer
cet état auprès des organisations et des publics du monde entier.
Etant donné la difficulté de pénétrer la société albanaise
traditionnelle, et la rareté de personnes maîtrisant la langue
albanaise, il n'était pas facile pour les ONG ou les agences de presse
étranger de vérifier ces informations.
Pourtant, en général elles les acceptaient et les diffusaient sans
poser trop de questions. C'était "les victimes" a priori...
Cette crédulité foncionnait comme une invitation aux deux
mille Albanais du réseau à rapporter tout ce qu'ils pensaient
susceptibles de servir leur cause, sans trop se soucier de ce concept
abstrait "la vérité", un idéal pas nécessairement considéré comme plus
honorable que la fidélité aux siens, au clan, au sang. Pendant les
bombardements de l'Otan, ce même Conseil continuait à fournir à
l'Occident les histoires d'atrocités dont il était plus avide que
jamais... pour justifier ses bombardements.
Après, quand beaucoup de ses histoires se sont révélées fictives, on
pensait déjà à autre chose.
-- En liaison étroite avec l'UCK, les Etats-Unis ont saboté la
mission de l'OSCE (ainsi qu'en témoigne l'ambassadeur français Gabriel
Keller). Ils ont transformé l'incident de l'attaque de la police serbe
contre la base d'UCK à Racak en "massacre" génocidaire et en casus
belli.
Ici il faut noter un autre élément de continuité dans le personnel:
l'ambassadeur envoyé par l'administration Clinton pour diriger la
mission de l'OSCE au Kosovo, William Walker, était un ancien de
l'ingérence la plus sanglante en Amérique centrale. Ses activités
liées aux "Contras" l'ont bien préparés... et sous la présidence de
Reagan, Walker était un proche collaborateur d'Elliott Abrams, dont
les activités criminelles liées aux ventes illégales d'armes à l'Iran
pour financer les terroristes "Contra" ont été établies... et
pardonnées par le premier président Bush.
Aujourd'hui ce même Elliott Abrams -- très lié à l'extrême droite
sioniste -- après avoir été chargé des "droits de l'homme", est chargé
des affaires du Moyen Orient par le Conseil National de Sécurité de
Bush.
-- Pour revenir à l'administration Clinton, les Américains ont
bloqué au lieu d'encourager les négociations entre Albanais du Kosovo
et Belgrade. Enfin, ils ont empêché que les "négociations" de
Rambouillet trouvent une solution pacifique. Non seulement par leur
"annexe B", qui aurait transformé toute la Yougoslavie en pays
d'occupation militaire, -- mais en ignorant complètement les
propositions serbes et en insistant avant tout sur la présence au
Kosovo, non pas d'une force de paix internationale, disons des Nations
Unies, qui aurait pu être acceptable par Belgrade, mais de l'Otan.
L'essentiel pour Washington c'était l'occupation par l'Otan. Et
une fois sur place, ils ont construit (sans demander la permission à
personne) la base de Bondsteel, d'où ils encouragent l'UCK à
poursuivre son projet en Macédoine...
Le mythe manichéen de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale
L'acceptation de la guerre comme seul moyen de traiter le problème
du Kosovo revenait à confirmer et à renforcer le mythe manichéen de la
Deuxième Guerre Mondiale comme grille de perception du monde. Ce
mythe est un élément essentiel de la propagande des Etats-Unis dans sa
phase actuelle de justicier universel. C'est l'antidote au supposé
"syndrome du Viet-Nam", leçon d'échec. Ce mythe est un conte de fée
basé sur une version simpliste des années 1933-45 transformées en
unique modèle pour saisir l'identité profonde des nations et de leur
relations. Ainsi, tout est réduit à quelques personnages: d'abord,
Hitler, le monstre, ses victimes passives, et l'Oncle Sam qui sauve
ceux-ci de celui-là. Les motivations politiques sont également
réduites à quelques unes: du côté du monstre, une volonté diabolique
de commettre un génocide. Du côté de l'Oncle Sam, la générosité
et le courage. Le rôle de l'Armée Rouge dans la défaite de la
Wehrmacht? A la trappe! Demandez aux Américains qui a libéré Auschwitz
ils diront les GIs, ils ont vu le film. Mais il y a quelques
figurants, dont les Français, qui viennent de découvrir leur propre
place dans cette distribution: les lâches... j'arrête là, on n'a que
consulter la presse dite de caniveau britannique. Mais cette vision
simpliste trouve ses adeptes en Europe, et même en France, où l'on
ajoute un raffinement: le populisme nationaliste de la populace qui
risque toujours d'être exploité par le Hitler du jour ...
Ce mythe a ses utilisations. La plus évidente est de justifier,
dans les cas bien choisis, l'utilisation de la force américaine contre
toute négociation, la "capitulation inconditionnelle" de l'adversaire
restant la seule issue de toute guerre entamée par les Etats-Unis.
Contre l'ancienne sagesse qui cherche à laisser une porte de sortie à
l'autre, le Yankee n'accepte que l'humiliation totale de l'autre. Dès
que les Etats-Unis veulent s'y ingérer, tout dirigeant mal-aimé
devient "Hitler" et chaque répression d'une rébellion locale devient
"génocide". Si ce sont nos amis, ils s'agit plutôt de lutte légitime
contre le terrorisme.
Mais il y a une autre utilisation de ce mythe, plus subtile: il
sert d'instrument d'intimidation morale envers l'Europe, surtout
l'Allemagne et -- plus encore -- la France. Car par une étrange
déformation, qui n'est pas le sujet de cette conférence, la France est
la cible privilégiée de l'accusation d' "anti-sémitisme"... vaste
sujet que je laisse de côté.
Affronter la réalité du vingt-et-unième siècle
Le Pentagone a trouvé que le "multilatéralisme" était une gêne dans
la guerre du Kosovo. Les Européens ont pu apprendre qu'ils étaient là
pour partager les frais et faire le ménage après... cette leçon s'est
répétée en Afghanistan. La leçon n'a pas encore été totalement
assimilée, mais l'élève fait des progrès sous la férule du maître
Rumsfeld. L'illusion de l'unité européenne et atlantique a été brisée
par le mépris manifeste des dirigeants anglo-américains et de leurs
médias envers leurs chers alliés une fois que ceux-ci osent prendre
une position indépendante.
Il faut démystifier les fameuses "valeurs communes". On peut
penser que les Américains dans leur grande majorité chérissent
toujours la liberté et la démocratie. Tout comme les Européens, et
tout comme, peut-être, la plupart des gens de par le monde d'une
manière ou d'une autre. Pourtant, le capitalisme néo-libéral
déchainé, un complexe militaro-industriel dominant, un lavage de
cerveau quotidien de la part des médias possédés par ces
puissances-là, un système électoral soumis à l'argent, ont fini par
éliminer la démocratie des sphères dominantes de la société
américaine.
Il serait sans doute souhaitable d'apporter la démocratie en
Bosnie-Herzégovine, au Kosovo, en Iraq ou au Tibet. Il est beaucoup
plus essentiel pour l'avenir du monde de la restaurer aux Etats-Unis.
Vous ne serez peut-être pas d'accord, mais ces puissances néfastes
qui dominent la vie politique américaine n'ont pas encore étouffé la
démocratie de la "vieille Europe". On essaie: la "nouvelle Europe"
proclamée par le Secrétaire à la défense Donald Rumsfield est celle où
les chefs de gouvernements suivent les ordres de Washington sans
respecter ni le droit, ni la morale, ni leur opinion publique. C'est
un échantillon significatif de la "démocratie" que Washington veut
imposer en guise de "nouvel ordre mondial".
La France a sombré, comme le reste de l'Occident, dans la
dépolitisation du néo-libéralisme, mais il y reste des "valeurs" qui
ne sont pas celles de l'Amérique de Bush. La liberté, pour les
Bushites, c'est le "marché libre", qui n'est même pas libre, mais
ordonné selon les intérêts des plus forts, qui interdisent aux faibles
de protéger leurs propres productions, populations et environnement...
L'égalité est totalement balayée... Je suis d'accord avec Emmanuel
Todd que les Etats-Unis impériaux ne peuvent plus prétendre à
l'universalisme, tant leur système aggrave de façon dramatique toutes
les inégalités.
Quant à la fraternité, une société dans laquelle les hommes se
sentent obligés de s'armer jusqu'aux dents pour se protéger de leur
voisin, elle bat de l'aile...
Donc parler d'une "communauté de valeurs" entre la France et les
Etats-Unis de Bush n'a plus -- je l'espère -- aucun sens. Les
"valeurs" que Washington veut imposer par la force sonneraient le glas
des valeurs de gauche issues de la révolution française.
Certains en France rêvent d'une "Europe" superpuissance pour
contrer la superpuissance américaine. Mais la crise actuelle a déjà
montré qu'il est trop tard pour cela ... Dans le domaine de la
technologie militaire, les choses sont tellement imbriquées que
"l'Europe" comme entité politique indépendante ne peut pas rattraper
les Etats-Unis, par ailleurs cette puissance militaire n'est conçue
que pour les "guerres" unilatérales contre les adversaires faibles. Si
l'Europe abandonnait, comme les Etats-Unis, ses avancées sociales pour
financer une gigantesque machine militaire, elle finirait par faire
une politique semblable ou identique.
L'alternative n'est pas de retourner aux rivalités entre grandes
puissances impérialistes occidentales qui ont produit les deux grandes
guerres du vingtième siècle.
Il est vain de riposter à l'arrogance américaine par l'imitation.
Il faut une voie opposée, dont on a vu un premier espoir avec le
discours de Dominique de Villepin devant le Conseil de Sécurité. Ce
discours a reçu une ovation qui montre la voie. Evidemment M. de
Villepin n'apporte pas la révolution, ni l'altermondialisation qu'on
peut estimer nécessaire pour sauver la planète. Mais au point où nous
sommes, la première nécessité est de résister à la guerre de conquête,
de faire respecter un minimum de droit international, et enfin de
désarmer la seule grande puissance prête à lâcher ses armes de
destruction massive sur les terres et les peuples du monde entier.
En l'absence d'une politique possible d'égalité économique, les
peuples tournent vers l'affirmation des identités, car la politique
identitaire -- nationale ou religieuse -- promets au moins certains
avantages dans une communauté qui exclut les autres. C'est une
tendance très répandue, tout à fait compréhensible, mais qu'il ne faut
pas encourager. C'est un pas vers la guerre de tous contre tous, qui
sera maitrisée par le plus fort.
L'auto-détermination digne de soutien n'est pas l'affirmation d'une
identité, mais la volonté de développement visant l'égalité de droits
politiques dans un ordre économique qui conserve l'environnement
naturel et social: l'école, la santé, et d'autres services publics.
La France et la "vieille Europe" doivent chercher une nouvelle
solidarité avec le monde entier, et surtout avec les peuples du Sud...
non pas en tant que "victimes" à sauver mais en tant qu'acteurs
capables de régler leurs propres affaires... mal, peut-être, mais
mieux que si on le fait à leur place. C'est cela les "valeurs
communes" de liberté, d'égalité et de fraternité.
La crise actuelle a révélé la seule voie pour l'Europe, indiquée
presque par hasard (élections allemandes, jeu français à l'Onu): de se
joindre au reste du monde -- y compris la Chine et la Russie -- en
exigeant un vrai multilatéralisme mondial, qui oblige les Etats-Unis
de devenir un grand pays comme un autre, et non pas le centre d'un
Empire féroce.
-----
D. Johnstone
auteure de "Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, Nato and Western Delusions"
Pluto Press 2002
Les Amis du MONDE-diplomatique
ont proposé un débat autour du livre de
D. Johnstone, 'La Croisade des fous'
avec la partecipatione de Subhi Toma
et Jean Bricmont.
Diana Johnstone
GUERRES SANS FIN
La SORBONNE 26 février 2003
Droit international contre droit du plus fort
Devant le Conseil de Sécurité le 14 février, le ministre français,
Dominique de Villepin, a fait un discours admirable de raison et de
clarté qui a été très apprécié -- sauf, vous le savez bien, par les
dirigeants et la presse anglophone.
Les Etats-Unis sont dirigés actuellement par un petit groupe de
mégalomanes dont les idées et les projets étaient parfaitement
inconnus de l'électorat américain qui, selon la Cour Suprème choisi
par son père, avait élu George Bush... par une large minorité de
votes. Plus fondamentalement, l'électorat américain depuis longtemps
n'a pas de vrai choix, car le processus "démocratique" au niveau
national a été complètement accaparé par le complex
militaro-industriel. Une poignée d'illuminés a imposé une
politique qui n'a jamais été soumis à un débat démocratique aux
Etats-Unis, et il ne veulent pas que le débat venu d'ailleurs arrivent
aux oreilles des citoyens Américains. C'est pour cela que leurs
propagandistes dans les médias ont répondu par un torrent d'invectives
imbéciles versé sur la France -- dont la faute originelle n'était que
de vouloir habiller la guerre à venir de quelques oripeaux de légalité
internationale. Car la position de la France, jusque là, revenait à
tenter de rester dans les formes du droit international, rien de
plus. Mais l'équipe au pouvoir à Washington n'apprécie guère cet
effort. Son but est d'impressionner le monde et de lui dicter sa loi
par la force. Le droit international doit céder au droit du plus fort,
c'est la base du "nouvel ordre mondial" style Bush et compagnie.
Les dirigeants américains ont l'habitude de dire de celui qu'ils
veulent attaquer, qu'il "ne peut comprendre que la force". Plus
exactement, ils voudraient que les autres ne comprennent que la force,
car c'est le langage qu'eux, il maîtrisent. Ils veulent que la
démonstration soit faite que la force aura le dernier mot.
La crise irakienne fait ressortir une opposition dramatique entre
le droit international et le droit du plus fort. Le droit
international, dans la mesure où il serait universel, applicable à
tous de la même manière, est maintenant un obstacle que Washington
préfère écraser par la loi du plus fort -- sa loi à elle.
L'Illusion de la "Communauté internationale"
Pour la vieille Europe, et surtout pour la France, cette crise autour
de l'Irak devrait mettre fin à certaines illusions. La grande
illusion des années quatre-vingt dix était d'imaginer que l'immense
puissance militaire des Etats-Unis pouvait se laisser transformer en
instrument charitable pour accomplir les interventions "humanitaires"
souhaitées par les champions des droits l'homme devenus la conscience
d'une vague "communauté internationale". La référence constante à
cette "communauté internationale" avait deux fonctions idéologiques:
de masquer la destruction de l'autorité des Nations-Unies, et de
donner l'impression d'un certain multilatéralisme. Ce concept vague
s'applique surtout aux nations occidentales, supposées représenter la
conscience supérieure de l'humanité. En même temps, cette "communauté
internationale" correspondait, en réalité, à un "condominium impérial"
des puissances occidentales capitalistes qui, unies sur l'hégémonie
américaine, pourrait dominer le monde ensemble sans se détruire
mutuellement dans les guerres mondiales pour diviser les continents du
Sud. Cette "C.I.", communauté internationale ou condominium impérial,
imposerait un ordre "moral" au monde, basé sur les "valeurs",
notamment les "droits de l'homme".
La Continuité
En comparaison avec l'équipe Bush, ouvertement de plus en plus
criminelle, le monde risque d'éprouver une énorme nostalgie pour
l'administration Clinton, et de souhaiter le retour des Démocrates
comme les chrétiens de l'antiquité souhaitaient le retour du Christ.
Le multilatéralisme traditionnel des Démocrates sauvaient au moins les
apparences aux yeux des alliés européens, qui pouvaient jouer les
seconds rôles et payer la nôte avec un minimum de dignité.
Mais attention, s'il est vrai que d'abord l'électorat démocrate,
puis à un bien moindre degré les politiciens démocrates, sont comme on
dit là-bas plus "libéraux", c'est-à-dire plus sociaux, en ce qui
concerne la politique intérieure, il y a deux réserves à signaler:
pour la politique intérieure, tout se situe aujourd'hui largement à la
droite par rapport à la France... et deuxièmement, en ce qui concerne
la politique extérieure, c'est surtout l'emballage qui change. Dans
le fond, il y a une grande continuité, due à la logique d'un complexe
militaro-industriel surgonflé, et assurée par la petite élite de
spécialistes qui créent les projets de politique internationale dans
le conforts des fondations privées, abrités des regards de la
population en général mais très proches des grands médias.
Je voudrais signaler quelques indices de cette continuité. Vous
avez vu le Président Bush exhorter ses troupes en proclamant que "nous
avons la plus grande armée de la terre" comme si c'était une qualité
morale. Mais l'ambassadrice de Clinton, Madeleine Albright, avait
exclamé, "à quoi ça sert d'avoir la plus grande force militaire du
monde si l'on ne l'utilise pas!" La personnalité qui, choqué par ces
mots belliqueux, les avait racontés dans ses mémoires n'était autre
que le Général Colin Powell, qui depuis en a vu d'autres...
Oui, et c'était déjà Madeleine Albright qui voulait à tout pris
déclencher la guerre contre la Yougoslavie sans mandat du Conseil de
Sécurité. Aujourd'hui, quand le Président Chirac et son ministre des
affaires étrangères insistent sur la nécessité de passer par le
Conseil de Sécurité des Nations-Unies, on est presque gêné de
rappeller que la France n'avait pas le même scrupule il y a quatre
ans...
Mais il faut le dire.
Le Kosovo
Ici je dois aborder un sujet que beaucoup préfèrent éviter, le Kosovo,
car l'illusion n'est pas encore totalement dissipée en ce qui concerne
le Kosovo, dont beaucoup gardent encore une impression erronnée
des causes comme des effets. Il faut y revenir parce que la
"réussite" de la guerre du Kosovo est citée régulièrement aujourd'hui
comme précédent heureux, comme argument irréfutable en faveur de la
"guerre préventive"contre les "dictateurs" qui ne penseraieent qu'à
commettre des "génocides". Si on ne brise pas cette illusion, on
continuera à brandir "le Kosovo" comme la carte blanche à la guerre
"juste" en permanence
Tout cela était prévisible. Justifier la guerre préventive sans
mandat du Conseil de Sécurité devait créer un précédent dangereux,
comme Hubert Védrine lui-même a bien reconnu peu après, dans les pages
du Monde diplomatique. Je ne peux pas juger à quel point les
dirigeants européens disposant de services de renseignement étaient
dupes de la rhétorique du moment, mais tous ont répété la même
propagande à l'époque: les mensonges les plus énormes venant de
l'équipe britannique autour de Blair, qui récidive, et du ministre de
la défense allemand Rudolf Scharping, qui a été démissioné depuis au
milieu d'une pléthore de scandales.
En France, il existait le "lobby Sarajevo" qui réclamait cette
intervention militaire comme le seul moyen de traiter les conflits
yougoslaves. Beaucoup d'intellectuels français, surtout qui ont
transformé la fonction de la "philosophie" de quête de savoir en
étalage d'indignation contre les mécréants lointains, ont stigmatisé
tout effort de comprendre et de chercher la conciliation comme une
sorte de complicité avec le nouvel "Hitler". En rejettant tout
réalisme en politique comme l'oeuvre du diable, ils sont préféré
tourner vers les missiles cruises pour régler les affaires complexes.
Il fallait une naïveté volontaire pour croire que les Etats-Unis --
vu leur histoire d'ingérences ouvertes ou clandestines
(parmi d'autres) au Guatemala, en Iran, au Vietnam, au Chili, en
Angola, et de façon presque constante depuis un siècle dans toute
l'Amérique centrale -- allaient, une fois libérés de la contrainte
représentée par une superpuissance rivale, se transformer en branche
armée des soeurs de la charité.
En réalité, les Etats-Unis ne se sont pas laissé entraînés dans la
guerre au Kosovo à cause des arguments de BHL ou des larmes de
Glucksmann.
Comme pour la guerre en Iraq, ils voulaient y aller et cherchaient des
prétextes, quand ils ne les créaient pas.
Les vrais causes sont visibles à partir des effets réels. Les
résultats éloquents de la guerre du Kosovo sont les suivants:
* légitimer la guerre comme moyen privilégié pour résoudre les
problèmes politiques, ce qui revient à délégitimer la négociation, la
diplomatie, la médiation, tous les moyens pacifiques qui, on voit
aujourd'hui, sont rejetés comme des formes de làcheté.
* créer un précédent pour faire la guerre sans mandat du Conseil de
Sécurité sous prétexte d'un cas d'urgence extrême, urgence évaluée par
les Etats-Unis et (peut-être) leurs alliés.
* sauver l'Otan en lui dotant d'une nouvelle "mission humanitaire"
hors de la zone de défense des pays de l'alliance, et en la
transformant en "boite à outils" dans laquelles les Etats-Unis
pourront puiser pour leurs opération plus à l'Est et au Sud. Ici se
trouve la cause et l'effet les plus importants de cette aventure, ce
qui explique la grande hâte avec laquelle il fallait procéder aux
bombardements au moment choisi, à la veille du cinquantième
anniversaire de l'Otan, ce qui permettait à Washington de présenter la
nouvelle stratégie de l'Otan en forme de fait accompli, sans vrai
debat.
* renforcer de façon décisive l'influence des Etats-Unis sur l'Europe
par le biais de l'Otan. Cette opération a été cruciale en offrant aux
pays de l'Europe ex-communiste une adhésion occidentale alternative à
l'Union Européenne.
* faire du Kosovo une base militaire américaine, le "Camp Bondsteel",
construit immédiatement après l'occupation du Kosovo sans demander la
permission à personne.
Et le Kosovo lui-même? Le problème des "deux peuples pour une
terre "durait depuis longtemps, et aurait pu être traité avec patience
comme d'autres problèmes du même genre. Ce qui a précipité la crise
était d'abord la crise financière en Albanie en 1997, qui d'une part
ouvrait une porte à la négociation (en décourageant pour l'instant les
séparatistes) et d'autre inondait le Kosovo d'armes volées dans les
arsenaux albanais. Un carrefour entre paix et guerre où les
Etats-Unis surtout ont choisi le chemin de la guerre, tout en disant
le contraire. L'UÇK, soutenu vigoureusement par un lobby à Washington
comprenant un ancient candidat républicain à la présidence, Robert
Dole, a pu jouer contre Milosevic le rôle des "Contras" lancés par la
CIA contre le Nicaragua sandiniste, pour réduire toute la Yougoslavie
à un statut comparable à celui des pays de l'Amérique centrale. Le
Kosovo occupé et gouverné formellement par les Nations-Unies, en
réalité par les pays de l'Otan avec quelques auxiliaires
subordonnés, est devenu la plaque tournante de trafics de femmes, de
drogue et d'armes. Libérés de la police serbe, les milices
albanophones font la guerre les unes aux autres. Je ne dirai pas que
c'est cela l'objectif américain, mais c'est le type de situation dont
ils s'accommodent fort bien un peu partout là où ils cherchent
n'importe quel allié contre un régime récalcitrant.
La volonté d'ingérence militaire
Dès l'ouverture de la crise yougoslave au début des années
quatre-vingt-dix, l'ingérence des puissances occidentales -- sans le
dire ouvertement, et dans une certaine mesure peut-être sans le penser
-- avait tout fait pour entraîner leur propre intervention militaire.
1 - D'abord, il est notoire que le gouvernement allemand a insisté
sur la reconnaissance de l'indépendence de la Slovénie et de la
Croatie, contre tout usage diplomatique et contre l'avis de leurs
propres diplomates sur place. C'est un sujet intéressant, que je
traite dans mon livre, mais par déférence envers l'attitude actuelle
du gouvernement allemand, je ne veux pas insister trop sur ce sujet
ici. Mais il faut noter pourtant que ceux qui prônaient une
reconnaissance rapide insistaient qu'elle empêcherait la
guerre civile en tranchant la question de la Yougoslavie une fois pour
toutes. Mais le véritable résultat de la reconnaissance rapide ne fut
pas de mettre fin au conflit, mais plutôt de transformer une guerre
civile en conflit international, ouvrant la voie à l'intervention
internationale. En prenant parti pour les sécessionnistes, les états
européens réduisaient leur possibilités de médiation neutre et
contribuaient à la polarisation.
2 - Puis, la désintégration violente de la Yougoslavie fut
déterminée aussi par les Etats-Unis qui, tout en se proclamant en
faveur de la préservation de la Yougoslavie, par voie diplomatique
interdit à l'Armée populaire yougoslave de garder l'unité du pays par
la force. Ce geste de "pacifiste bêlant" revenait à donner carte
blanche aux forces nationalistes et séparatistes qui s'étaient armées
clandestinement et qui se sont mises à réaliser la sécession par fait
accompli. Toutes ces sécessions -- celle de la Slovénie, de la
Croatie, mais aussi des Serbes de Krajina qui faisaient
sécession de la Croatie -- auraient pu être empêchées par l'armée
yougoslave, le temps de prendre des mesures pour sauver la Fédération
multinationale, ce qui était sans doute ce que souhaitait encore la
majorité de la population de la Yougoslavie, qu'on n'a jamais
consultée sur dans son ensemble et qui n'imaginait pas les désastres à
venir.
L'ironie, c'est qu'à la fin les Etats-Unis, qui avait interdit
l'utilisation de la force pour préserver le pays "multi-ethnique" ont
fini par utiliser eux-mêmes une force bien plus dévastatrice,
soi-disant pour préserver la multi-ethnicité de certains fragments de
la fédération éclatée. Ce qu'ils n'ont même pas réussi à faire par
leur force militaire, vu l'état des relations inter-ethniques
extrêmement tendues dans les protectorats de Bosnie et du Kosovo.
Derrière la façade du multilatéralisme, dans les conflits yougoslaves,
les Etats-Unis ont saboté les efforts européens de favoriser une
solution négociée.
-- En Bosnie, ils ont encouragé Izetbegovic, dont le parti avait de
bonnes relations aux Etats-Unis, surtout par Mohamed Sacirbey et son
père.
Il faut surtout lire les mémoires de David Owen pour voir comment
Washington a saboté tout accord de paix. En assimilant la guerre à un
match sportif, on adoptait l'absurde slogan qu'il fallait doter la
Bosnie d'un "terrain de jeu équitable" en armant la partie la plus
faible... une logique déjà appliquée en fait dans la guerre Iran-Iraq,
que l'Occident avait attisée pendant huit ans... mais qu'on n'applique
évidemment pas à Israël et Palestine. En réalité, avec l'Iran et
d'autres pays musulmans, les Etats-Unis ont renforcé le parti
d'Izetbegovic, avec pour résultat, une guerre prolongée, plus de
souffrances et de morts, des intégristes islamistes venus d'ailleurs
installés autour de Zenica et en fin de compte une Bosnie encore plus
divisée qu'aurait été la Bosnie décidée à Lisbonne.
Loin d'être exceptionnelle, cette alliance avec le parti islamiste
était en parfaite continuité avec la politique américaine au Moyen
Orient, qui a constamment favorisé les Islamistes contre les régimes
laïcs dans les pays musulmans. C'est ainsi que les réseaux d'anciens
combattants d'Afghanistan, parfois liés à bin Laden, étaient les
bien-venus. Et il est très significatif que la délégation
d'Izetbegovic à Dayton fut conseillé par Richard Perle, le sinistre
conseiller au Pentagone de l'administration Bush, champion de
l'extrême droite en Israel, Netanyahou....
-- Au Kosovo, au lieu de rechercher la conciliation, Washington l'a
rendu impossible en encourageant l'intransigence des Albanais. A
travers la National Endowment for Democracy {"la fondation nationale
pour la démocratie"), établie sous l'administration Reagan pour
financer l'ingérence dans la vie politique d'autres pays, les
Etats-Unis ont pu influencer la façon dont le problème du Kosovo était
vu par le monde extérieur, et même par les Albanais du Kosovo
eux-mêmes. Cette fondation est un exemple important du phénomène de
"l'organisation non-gouvernementale" ...gouvernementale, phénomène qui
joue un rôle capital dans la formation de la "politique des droits de
l'homme" qui sert à justifier les interventions dites "humanitaires".
Cette aide américaine était particulièrement importante dans le
domaine décisif de l'information sur les droits de l'homme. La source
principale de tous les rapports diffusés dans le monde entier sur la
question du traitement de la population albanaise au Kosovo était le
"Conseil pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés",
fondé en 1989 par des militants séparatistes albanais. Cet organisme
ne s'intéressait pas aux droits de tous les habitants du Kosovo, mais
uniquement des Kosovars albanais, car le Conseil était l'instrument de
propagande clé pour la cause, et l'exagération des faits devenait une
habitude. Un don de la fondation a permis au Conseil d'embaucher un
directeur à plein temps et d'établir un réseau de 27 sous-conseils,
présent dans tous les villes de la province. En 1998, une publication
de cette "fondation nationale pour la démocratie" se vantait de cette
aide, qui a fourni aux quelques 2,000 volontaires des machines de fax
et des ordinateurs. Le Conseil, selon son bienfaiteur, était "la
source d'information la plus importante sur les droits de l'homme au
Kosovo. Une large gamme d'organisation internationales de droits de
l'homme et des agences de presse utilisent ses informations, telles
que la Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, la Commission
des Nations-Unies pour les Droits de l'Homme, et l'agence Associated
Press."
Ainsi, une petite province censée crouler sous une oppression digne
des Nazis était couverte d'un réseau de bureaux payés par l'étranger
où les opposants de l'état travaillaient sans cesse pour discréditer
cet état auprès des organisations et des publics du monde entier.
Etant donné la difficulté de pénétrer la société albanaise
traditionnelle, et la rareté de personnes maîtrisant la langue
albanaise, il n'était pas facile pour les ONG ou les agences de presse
étranger de vérifier ces informations.
Pourtant, en général elles les acceptaient et les diffusaient sans
poser trop de questions. C'était "les victimes" a priori...
Cette crédulité foncionnait comme une invitation aux deux
mille Albanais du réseau à rapporter tout ce qu'ils pensaient
susceptibles de servir leur cause, sans trop se soucier de ce concept
abstrait "la vérité", un idéal pas nécessairement considéré comme plus
honorable que la fidélité aux siens, au clan, au sang. Pendant les
bombardements de l'Otan, ce même Conseil continuait à fournir à
l'Occident les histoires d'atrocités dont il était plus avide que
jamais... pour justifier ses bombardements.
Après, quand beaucoup de ses histoires se sont révélées fictives, on
pensait déjà à autre chose.
-- En liaison étroite avec l'UCK, les Etats-Unis ont saboté la
mission de l'OSCE (ainsi qu'en témoigne l'ambassadeur français Gabriel
Keller). Ils ont transformé l'incident de l'attaque de la police serbe
contre la base d'UCK à Racak en "massacre" génocidaire et en casus
belli.
Ici il faut noter un autre élément de continuité dans le personnel:
l'ambassadeur envoyé par l'administration Clinton pour diriger la
mission de l'OSCE au Kosovo, William Walker, était un ancien de
l'ingérence la plus sanglante en Amérique centrale. Ses activités
liées aux "Contras" l'ont bien préparés... et sous la présidence de
Reagan, Walker était un proche collaborateur d'Elliott Abrams, dont
les activités criminelles liées aux ventes illégales d'armes à l'Iran
pour financer les terroristes "Contra" ont été établies... et
pardonnées par le premier président Bush.
Aujourd'hui ce même Elliott Abrams -- très lié à l'extrême droite
sioniste -- après avoir été chargé des "droits de l'homme", est chargé
des affaires du Moyen Orient par le Conseil National de Sécurité de
Bush.
-- Pour revenir à l'administration Clinton, les Américains ont
bloqué au lieu d'encourager les négociations entre Albanais du Kosovo
et Belgrade. Enfin, ils ont empêché que les "négociations" de
Rambouillet trouvent une solution pacifique. Non seulement par leur
"annexe B", qui aurait transformé toute la Yougoslavie en pays
d'occupation militaire, -- mais en ignorant complètement les
propositions serbes et en insistant avant tout sur la présence au
Kosovo, non pas d'une force de paix internationale, disons des Nations
Unies, qui aurait pu être acceptable par Belgrade, mais de l'Otan.
L'essentiel pour Washington c'était l'occupation par l'Otan. Et
une fois sur place, ils ont construit (sans demander la permission à
personne) la base de Bondsteel, d'où ils encouragent l'UCK à
poursuivre son projet en Macédoine...
Le mythe manichéen de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale
L'acceptation de la guerre comme seul moyen de traiter le problème
du Kosovo revenait à confirmer et à renforcer le mythe manichéen de la
Deuxième Guerre Mondiale comme grille de perception du monde. Ce
mythe est un élément essentiel de la propagande des Etats-Unis dans sa
phase actuelle de justicier universel. C'est l'antidote au supposé
"syndrome du Viet-Nam", leçon d'échec. Ce mythe est un conte de fée
basé sur une version simpliste des années 1933-45 transformées en
unique modèle pour saisir l'identité profonde des nations et de leur
relations. Ainsi, tout est réduit à quelques personnages: d'abord,
Hitler, le monstre, ses victimes passives, et l'Oncle Sam qui sauve
ceux-ci de celui-là. Les motivations politiques sont également
réduites à quelques unes: du côté du monstre, une volonté diabolique
de commettre un génocide. Du côté de l'Oncle Sam, la générosité
et le courage. Le rôle de l'Armée Rouge dans la défaite de la
Wehrmacht? A la trappe! Demandez aux Américains qui a libéré Auschwitz
ils diront les GIs, ils ont vu le film. Mais il y a quelques
figurants, dont les Français, qui viennent de découvrir leur propre
place dans cette distribution: les lâches... j'arrête là, on n'a que
consulter la presse dite de caniveau britannique. Mais cette vision
simpliste trouve ses adeptes en Europe, et même en France, où l'on
ajoute un raffinement: le populisme nationaliste de la populace qui
risque toujours d'être exploité par le Hitler du jour ...
Ce mythe a ses utilisations. La plus évidente est de justifier,
dans les cas bien choisis, l'utilisation de la force américaine contre
toute négociation, la "capitulation inconditionnelle" de l'adversaire
restant la seule issue de toute guerre entamée par les Etats-Unis.
Contre l'ancienne sagesse qui cherche à laisser une porte de sortie à
l'autre, le Yankee n'accepte que l'humiliation totale de l'autre. Dès
que les Etats-Unis veulent s'y ingérer, tout dirigeant mal-aimé
devient "Hitler" et chaque répression d'une rébellion locale devient
"génocide". Si ce sont nos amis, ils s'agit plutôt de lutte légitime
contre le terrorisme.
Mais il y a une autre utilisation de ce mythe, plus subtile: il
sert d'instrument d'intimidation morale envers l'Europe, surtout
l'Allemagne et -- plus encore -- la France. Car par une étrange
déformation, qui n'est pas le sujet de cette conférence, la France est
la cible privilégiée de l'accusation d' "anti-sémitisme"... vaste
sujet que je laisse de côté.
Affronter la réalité du vingt-et-unième siècle
Le Pentagone a trouvé que le "multilatéralisme" était une gêne dans
la guerre du Kosovo. Les Européens ont pu apprendre qu'ils étaient là
pour partager les frais et faire le ménage après... cette leçon s'est
répétée en Afghanistan. La leçon n'a pas encore été totalement
assimilée, mais l'élève fait des progrès sous la férule du maître
Rumsfeld. L'illusion de l'unité européenne et atlantique a été brisée
par le mépris manifeste des dirigeants anglo-américains et de leurs
médias envers leurs chers alliés une fois que ceux-ci osent prendre
une position indépendante.
Il faut démystifier les fameuses "valeurs communes". On peut
penser que les Américains dans leur grande majorité chérissent
toujours la liberté et la démocratie. Tout comme les Européens, et
tout comme, peut-être, la plupart des gens de par le monde d'une
manière ou d'une autre. Pourtant, le capitalisme néo-libéral
déchainé, un complexe militaro-industriel dominant, un lavage de
cerveau quotidien de la part des médias possédés par ces
puissances-là, un système électoral soumis à l'argent, ont fini par
éliminer la démocratie des sphères dominantes de la société
américaine.
Il serait sans doute souhaitable d'apporter la démocratie en
Bosnie-Herzégovine, au Kosovo, en Iraq ou au Tibet. Il est beaucoup
plus essentiel pour l'avenir du monde de la restaurer aux Etats-Unis.
Vous ne serez peut-être pas d'accord, mais ces puissances néfastes
qui dominent la vie politique américaine n'ont pas encore étouffé la
démocratie de la "vieille Europe". On essaie: la "nouvelle Europe"
proclamée par le Secrétaire à la défense Donald Rumsfield est celle où
les chefs de gouvernements suivent les ordres de Washington sans
respecter ni le droit, ni la morale, ni leur opinion publique. C'est
un échantillon significatif de la "démocratie" que Washington veut
imposer en guise de "nouvel ordre mondial".
La France a sombré, comme le reste de l'Occident, dans la
dépolitisation du néo-libéralisme, mais il y reste des "valeurs" qui
ne sont pas celles de l'Amérique de Bush. La liberté, pour les
Bushites, c'est le "marché libre", qui n'est même pas libre, mais
ordonné selon les intérêts des plus forts, qui interdisent aux faibles
de protéger leurs propres productions, populations et environnement...
L'égalité est totalement balayée... Je suis d'accord avec Emmanuel
Todd que les Etats-Unis impériaux ne peuvent plus prétendre à
l'universalisme, tant leur système aggrave de façon dramatique toutes
les inégalités.
Quant à la fraternité, une société dans laquelle les hommes se
sentent obligés de s'armer jusqu'aux dents pour se protéger de leur
voisin, elle bat de l'aile...
Donc parler d'une "communauté de valeurs" entre la France et les
Etats-Unis de Bush n'a plus -- je l'espère -- aucun sens. Les
"valeurs" que Washington veut imposer par la force sonneraient le glas
des valeurs de gauche issues de la révolution française.
Certains en France rêvent d'une "Europe" superpuissance pour
contrer la superpuissance américaine. Mais la crise actuelle a déjà
montré qu'il est trop tard pour cela ... Dans le domaine de la
technologie militaire, les choses sont tellement imbriquées que
"l'Europe" comme entité politique indépendante ne peut pas rattraper
les Etats-Unis, par ailleurs cette puissance militaire n'est conçue
que pour les "guerres" unilatérales contre les adversaires faibles. Si
l'Europe abandonnait, comme les Etats-Unis, ses avancées sociales pour
financer une gigantesque machine militaire, elle finirait par faire
une politique semblable ou identique.
L'alternative n'est pas de retourner aux rivalités entre grandes
puissances impérialistes occidentales qui ont produit les deux grandes
guerres du vingtième siècle.
Il est vain de riposter à l'arrogance américaine par l'imitation.
Il faut une voie opposée, dont on a vu un premier espoir avec le
discours de Dominique de Villepin devant le Conseil de Sécurité. Ce
discours a reçu une ovation qui montre la voie. Evidemment M. de
Villepin n'apporte pas la révolution, ni l'altermondialisation qu'on
peut estimer nécessaire pour sauver la planète. Mais au point où nous
sommes, la première nécessité est de résister à la guerre de conquête,
de faire respecter un minimum de droit international, et enfin de
désarmer la seule grande puissance prête à lâcher ses armes de
destruction massive sur les terres et les peuples du monde entier.
En l'absence d'une politique possible d'égalité économique, les
peuples tournent vers l'affirmation des identités, car la politique
identitaire -- nationale ou religieuse -- promets au moins certains
avantages dans une communauté qui exclut les autres. C'est une
tendance très répandue, tout à fait compréhensible, mais qu'il ne faut
pas encourager. C'est un pas vers la guerre de tous contre tous, qui
sera maitrisée par le plus fort.
L'auto-détermination digne de soutien n'est pas l'affirmation d'une
identité, mais la volonté de développement visant l'égalité de droits
politiques dans un ordre économique qui conserve l'environnement
naturel et social: l'école, la santé, et d'autres services publics.
La France et la "vieille Europe" doivent chercher une nouvelle
solidarité avec le monde entier, et surtout avec les peuples du Sud...
non pas en tant que "victimes" à sauver mais en tant qu'acteurs
capables de régler leurs propres affaires... mal, peut-être, mais
mieux que si on le fait à leur place. C'est cela les "valeurs
communes" de liberté, d'égalité et de fraternité.
La crise actuelle a révélé la seule voie pour l'Europe, indiquée
presque par hasard (élections allemandes, jeu français à l'Onu): de se
joindre au reste du monde -- y compris la Chine et la Russie -- en
exigeant un vrai multilatéralisme mondial, qui oblige les Etats-Unis
de devenir un grand pays comme un autre, et non pas le centre d'un
Empire féroce.
-----
D. Johnstone
auteure de "Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, Nato and Western Delusions"
Pluto Press 2002
1. Captain Dragan testimony at UN Tribunal: Prosecution witness
supports Milosevic (Vera Martinovic)
2. SLOBODA Appeal, 20/1/2003
=== 1 ===
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/850566/posts
Captain Dragan testimony at UN Tribunal
Prosecution witness supports Milosevic
Jurist.com | Feb 22, 2003 | Vera Martinovic
Posted on 02/24/2003 8:18 AM PST by vooch
The story of Dragan Vasiljkovic, alias Captain Dragan, is a very
simple one: he went twice to Krajina, first time in April
1991 when he was under the command of the Krajina Police; in August he
was expelled by Babic.
The second time he went there after the Croats attacked UNPA zones
(Miljevac Plateau), in a car with two other men
and they put themselves at the disposal of the Krajina Army, because
he 'couldn't calmly walk about the Belgrade
streets while all that was happening'. His mission both times was to
help train volunteers and to participate in combat
missions with his unit, deeply behind the enemy lines but few times
also in direct battles (e.g. taking over of Glina). His
motives: a Serb patriot living in Australia and with a considerable
military expertise, not on strategic but on tactical
level, wanting to help.
He denied the slander of the Army Intelligence General Vasiljevic
against his State Intelligence (SB) rivals, that he was
brought by the SB: 'he either lies, or he's absolutely incompetent'
and 'there was such a fantastic, open animosity
between the Army and the State Service' that he noticed. Nobody
invited nor sent him there, only one Sasa Medakovic
helped his arrival, a local guy who lived, worked and got killed in
Krajina.
His training camp in Golubic near Knin was his sole responsibility,
nobody but him was in charge. He was appointed
there by Milan Martic, with the consent of Babic. He gave a short
evaluation of both men: Babic 'never woke up before
2-3 p.m., his word meant nothing; his nickname was Titic=Little Tito;
he opposed both peace plans. Martic was 'an
honourable man, a man as good as his word'. He explained that
'personal vanity with the Serbs could be an important
issue, capable of exceeding national interests'.
He put things in proportion, both numerically (his unit numbered 21
men, called kninja, the name a fusion of 'Knin'
and 'Ninja'; the volunteers from Serbia 'could have been counted with
the fingers of one hand') and historically (local
Serbs were genuinely afraid of the resurrection of the Fascism in CRO:
'50 years is not ancient history, some people
were still alive and could tell').
His unit avoided local Croat civilians: 'I had extremely sparse
contacts with the Croat civilians, being aware they would
not be overjoyed to meet an armed Serb'; 'extraordinary protective
measures were being taken toward local Croatian
families, the investigators must have these data from the UNPROFOR'.
He personally arrested some Serb suspects for
alleged crimes: 'there were some incidents', 'the general attitude was
- arrest and put to trial, which I did within my
zone of responsibility'; 'they were members of the local TO, I was
reported of a crime, I never saw no corpses, I
disarmed these men, locked them away and gave the key to Martic, no
follow-up because I left for Belgrade soon'. He
wanted to 'help the Tribunal who was never in Krajina' and speaking
from his own 12-year experience of working with
victims, he clarified 'it was almost impossible to send an order to
commit crimes, because in the chain of command
there would always be a normal person who would stop it'. More
probable was the opposite direction and in order to
investigate 'it is more important to start from the victim than from
the top.' He denied any knowledge of any crimes
ordered by the Krajina authorities.
He gave an eye-witness account for the benefit of the judges: 'Since
I've lived in the West, in Serbia and in Krajina, I
can understand how difficult it is for this other side to understand
the reappearance of that Ustasa vampire, for those
villagers living sometimes on the upper floor of their houses with
their sheep below, waking up one morning not as a
constituent people anymore, but as a helpless minority again
threatened with slaughter and expulsion'.
He did not change his testimony during the cross-examination, he
merely clarified gross misinterpretations made by
the Prosecution and the media.
He was a political opponent to Milosevic, he avoided meeting him in
public, 'we met by chance once entering the
Military Academy Hospital when we exchanged courtesy salutations and
the second time when we met here, at this theatre show. He denied any
knowledge of orders coming from Milosevic to perpetrate any crimes,
'if I had such knowledge, as your political opponent I would have done
everything to expose you and to remove you from office'.
During that infamous celebration that was videoed he left earlier to
avoid staying at lunch with Milosevic. He even
became a member of Draskovic's SPO and his 'frame of mind was always
that of the opposition'; the same sentiment
that he nurtures 'for those pawns that are currently in power.'
He was and is a personal friend of Frenki Simatovic, who went to
Krajina few times hiding it from his superiors, trying
to help, and organizing much later the Captain's Fund to receive 20
computers (that was all the 'Security Service of
Serbia involvement'). Contrary to allegations, Frenki was never a
Milosevic man, 'truly, it was impossible to connect
the two of you in any way; he was a professional, an anti-terrorist
agent'. The Captain was never a member nor a
hireling to the Service, except one fee of 2,200 dinars that he
received for supervision of an exercise and they
subsequently talked about the possibility of hiring him, which didn't
come true. He never received any orders from
them. When he was forced by Babic to leave, he left his unit saying
'you should listen to what Frenki has to say',
meaning listen to his explanation of the sudden departure, and not to
his command. Few of his people went to Serbia
with him, some were subsequently admitted to the JSO ('I personally
asked Frenki to admit them, to keep them from
the street, and they had valuable skills; but there were no more than
15 people; I believe the Tribunal is under
impression this is an army that's being discussed').
There were no units from Serbia in Krajina. There were 4 people from
the Security Service of Serbia in all who ever
visited Krajina, each of them no more than once or twice, the task
being 'intelligence data gathering', anything more
was practically impossible 'having Babic as the opponent.'
The relationship between his unit and all Krajina forces on one side
and the JNA on the other was 'almost
hostile'. "We had provided no info to them. They were between the two
sides [Croats and Serbs] and we didn't
know what their reaction would be. They kept the two sides apart even
more scrupulously than the UNPROFOR." When asked about the Croatian
attacks against the JNA, the Captain said: "They only fought back; if
I were in their place, I would have done it much more ferociously; I
believe the JNA didn't fought back enough."
When he arrived in Krajina, the clashes were going on for almost a
year and there were more than enough weapons to
go around: 'Territorial Defence depots, stealing from the JNA, what
the UNPROFOR left for the Croats, and we
captured in battles more than we needed.' There were more weapons
coming from Krajina to Belgrade than the other way around.
The only thing coming were some hunting rifles through private
channels. Re heavy weaponry, the Captain recalled
'one trophy 50 mm cannon from WW2 that a local Serb has been keeping
through all these years in battle condition;
perhaps somebody should ask why.' There was financial help from
Serbia, of course, but no weapons, he only received
'one piece as a gift, a pistol CZ-99 [a great Magnum-type handgun,
popular also in the US, made by Zastava].
Captain Dragan's sole purpose in the courtroom was to tell his angle
of the story and to berate and spit on 'this
institution' along the way: when he was asked about one wounded
Arkan's man who stopped receiving help from his
Fund because he started to receive support from the Belgrade
municipality (oh, the crime!), the Captain sneered that
'the Law on basic rights of all the war invalids was adopted, it was
in all the newspapers, I don't see any significant
discovery here'.
He taught the judges that 'a Secret Service operates secretly, if it
were a public service it would be called a
Public Service'. He informed them 'my unit was public, we had a
headquarters, a flag, I don't see a point in
these questions'. He ridiculed the Greater Serbia notion as
'propaganda, a sheer stupidity or else a jest or a
comedy', which could be considered as true 'only by a malicious man'
and he pointed out that during that infamous celebration of the
'secret' video, with the Serbian Security and the Serbian President,
'a Yugoslav anthem was being played'.
He wondered at the sheer waste of time and effort here: 'I can't
believe that so many educated and serious people seriously consider
the presence of 4 Security people in Krajina as being significant,
there were thousands of European observers there' .
He explained his disdain and loss of patience with the proceedings in
The Hague: 'I've been here for 2 weeks already,
perhaps I'm a bit on the edge of my nerves already, but this is all so
over-exaggerated, that it seems there's no further
purpose for my taking part in it'.
Why was he summoned as the witness to the Prosecution in the first
place is baffling. Maybe they just wanted to
introduce as 'evidence' those ample records of his 'Captain Dragan
Fund', existing for more than 12 years and with
over 300,000 donors (private persons as well as State bodies): 11 CDs
with some 67,000 files of those helped financially,
families of wounded and killed. Yes, that must be it, they want to
further 'prove' where all these men fought using the
certificates signed by their commanders and to prosecute them,
perhaps.
---
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/850585/posts
Part 2 Captain Dragan vs. Milosevic - UN Tribunal
Jurist.com | Feb 23, 2003 | Vera Martinovic
Posted on 02/24/2003 8:39 AM PST by vooch
Part 2 of 2
Milosevic revealed to the Captain that he was listed by the
Prosecution 'as the protected witness B-073', which he never
required himself and which triggered a lengthy discussion among the
judges and amici as a practice of making a rule out of
the exception and actually forcing the protected witness status onto
the witnesses.
Dragan also refused to sign a statement to the effect that what was
said during the investigation or testimony can not be used
against him. He confirmed to have received some EUR 4,000 towards his
travelling expenses and the hotel accommodation,
but 'you do not seriously think I could be bought for that kind of
money?'.
The examination-in-chief by Dermot Groome consisted almost entirely of
making the Captain read some reports not even
connected with Krajina, where volunteers were being vaguely mentioned,
and asking him to comment, to which he would
answer that 'I wouldn't even know to point out where Ozren is on the
map, I don't know these people that you mention, I
have never even been in Bosnia...'
Seeing a futility of this, the Prosecution pulled out 'a secret
video', which the Captain ridiculed in the end.
Let's get one thing clear: that JSO unit of which the 'important'
video had been shown is not a paramilitary unit, it is a regular
police unit for special operations. When the word 'paramilitary' is
applied for civil wars in ex-YU, this simply means
unofficial volunteer units, who put themselves under the unified
command of the local Serb forces.
Therefore, when BBC News of 19 Feb. deftly put together such a yarn
that 'Milosevic... paying tribute to Serb paramilitaries
accused of ethnic cleansing', 'footage shot in a paramilitary camp',
and then continue immediately with 'Captain Dragan told
the judges Serb paramilitary did not act independently, but were part
of the security services, the army or the police', there are
three things amiss here: JSO was being pronounced a paramilitary unit
accused of something, in the next sentence they
switched to 'Serb paramilitary' meaning something entirely different
(volunteer units), but deliberately equating it, and the
words 'of Krajina' were omitted when speaking of who controls them, as
pointed out in Part I of this report. This is not
reporting, this is ice-skating laced with double meaning and gross
hinting. Of course volunteer units could not act
independently, but why jumping to conclusions about Serbia controlling
them, when that was not what the witness said nor meant?
So, BBC spewed this propaganda and even put it in a highlighted inbox,
not bothering to retract it the next day, when
Captain Dragan explained how his meaning was distorted.
Contrary to the belief of some off-hand session-watchers, Captain
Dragan was not a member of that JSO unit from the
video, never has been and was not at the time of this celebration (it
was 1997); he was an invited guest (as somebody who
originally helped train some of its members while they were not the
JSO members). Just like Milosevic was a guest, and both
were given a token dagger as a gift to remember the celebration by,
along with many veterans from other units who were also
present. And the tradition of protecting the Serbs, as evoked by
Franko Simatovic aka Frenki in his speech, applied to the
individual members of the unit, who were previously fighting in
various battlefields individually, before they joined the JSO.
The speech also considered many other units of the Serbs from CRO and
B&H, their training camps and their exploits, and in
his PR effort to create the image for the unit, Frenki tried to
establish the link to that tradition. The famous red berets, which
originally were being given to kninjas after they finished their
training course became a popular symbol, first throughout CRO
and B&H and then even in Serbia with the 23rd parachute brigade of the
Army and the JSO of the Police.
The Captain completely dismissed the importance of the video by
explaining this was merely 'a nice show for the
President and other high officials' to present the unit bigger and
stronger than it ever was (it never surpassed the size
of one company), the helicopter squadron mentioned were precisely 'two
small Gazelles and one ancient Bell from
the Viet Nam war; my friend from the US has a private fleet larger
than that'. Captain Dragan gave his fatherly
opinion to the judges: "I believe this video was being discussed much
too seriously here."
The amicus curiae Kay took only few minutes, questioning the Captain
mainly about the weapons that his unit had, as
opposed to Croatian units that he directly fought at Glina, Skabrnja
and Ljubovo: the Croats were the size of a brigade each
time, much better equipped and with armoured vehicles. The only
advantage the Captain had was the night-vision and
communication equipment, used for behind-the-lines incursions.
Then, it was time for the Prosecution to save something by re-direct
examination and, contrary to what the ICTY apologists
write, it was nowhere near brilliant: Groome's face got all red, he
was constantly being interrupted and corrected by judges
and admonished by Kay and the witness was beyond his reach.
When he desperately tried to prove his own witness was lying/being
hostile/not speaking good Serbian/was talking to Frenki
about his testimony, he amply proved something else: the Prosecution's
own technique of producing evidence by distortion.
In short: Captain Dragan stated he was told by Jovica Stanisic to
leave Krajina, and his first thought was that this came from
Milosevic. Upon reflection, he realized that he was being caught in
feuds between Babic and Martic, Babic wanting to seize
complete control, resenting the Captain as being 'a Martic man' and
forced him to leave, by slandering him in media with 'he
received money, finished the job and went away'. Stanisic just advised
him to better remove himself from these political
clashes, trying to protect him.
The Captain understood Babic had more authority than Milosevic and
that it was the former who forced him away. Poor
Groome tried to prove his witness crazy for stating such a stupidity
and a lengthy discussion developed, including even judges.
Milosevic spoke up, almost laughingly offering help to clear the mess:
the words missing were again 'in Krajina'.
Yes, Babic was more powerful and influential in Krajina than
Milosevic, so he was in a position to expel the Captain.
How desperate the Prosecution is, clutching to such a sliver.
This testimony revealed the sinister practice happening when
statements are being taken from the witnesses by the
Prosecution's investigators.
Captain Dragan gave his statement on 26-27-28 August 2001. But, when
Milosevic read out one paragraph from it,
the witness said he doesn't recall 'ever saying this'. The same
happened during the re-direct examination by
Groome. The problem is the following: there are no questions in these
statements, only the answers, packed together
continuously like a story and worded and interpreted by the
investigators, and not quoted verbatim.
This leaves them opened to misinterpretations, distortions, wild
editing and taking out of context.
Here's one example. Milosevic quoted the statement: "In my opinion,
the war effort was financed by the Serbian government,
but I have no proof of that." The Captain denied ever using the term
'war effort', he thought that 'the question probably was
whether any help was being sent, which of course was, and which was
insufficient in my opinion, but this is absolutely distorted.'
Milosevic took the opportunity to slap May, saying that such practice
is nothing new, that the value of statements concocted
on the basis of answers to God knows which questions is highly
dubious. May admitted that the audio recording doesn't exist
and that we have to be 'satisfied with the statements such as they
are'.
And when Groome pulled the same statement-reading in his re-direct,
the Captain vehemently denied the formulation again
and recognized the plot: that was the 'working version' of the
statement, for which the investigators told him they would
never use it, and there's another, revised version, signed recently.
"This is not correct. These are your formulations,
taken out from our conversation. We agreed this would never be used. I
don't accept this statement, but the revised
one, were the corrections have been made with Mr Sexton. I gave
another statement, because of too many mistakes.
This is a trick. I accept only the statement signed last week!" said
the Captain, waving this piece of paper.
The solution to the problem by May? Both statements were introduced as
evidence.
Captain Dragan and Milosevic chatted away the cross-examination almost
like friends, certainly in a way of two people
deeply aware what kind of false show they got themselves mixed up in.
Speaking of his encounter in Belgrade with Jovica
Stanisic, when he got an advice to get away from Babic-Martic
political games, the Captain admitted his first reaction was to
get angry with Milosevic for sending him such an advice ('I thought I
would get your support'), but instead of that he had to
leave. "And here they are accusing you of exactly the opposite; either
way, it's a no-win situation for you and I wouldn't want
to be in your shoes." Both men laughed.
Yet another Dubrovnik witness, this time an ITN journalist, one Paul
Davis, started to testify on Friday. This is becoming ridiculous.
On Monday there will be no session.
=== 2 ===
From: Vladimir Krsljanin
Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 4:45 PM
SLOBODA/Freedom Association, Belgrade
Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, dear compatriots,
In the Hague, it is the Serbian history and future generations that
are put to trial, rather than any individual and Slobodan Milosevic
in particuilar. As you and the entire mankind know, that great son of
our people does not recognize the "court" that is tending to the
world's rulers and their brute force, and which undoubtedly is a
freak in the international legal system, whose sole purpose is to
ultimately demonize the Serbian people. The courage and resoluteness
of Slobodan Milosevic present a plea to all Serbian patriots to join
the struggle for preservation of the honor and dignity of the Serbian
people.
The struggle of Slobodan Milosevic for the truth, which reveals daily
that the allegations against him and the Serbian people are made up
of lies, is hindered by various obstructions whose goal is to twart
the trooth and conceal the crimes of others. By not recognizing the
court that runs this ignominious process, Slobodan Milosevic and his
defence are deprived, among other things, also of the financial
rights. That is yet another way to to prevent his moral struggle.
Such barriers exist not only among the mighty ones abroad, but also
among their obedient servants and vassals in our fatherland. Those
problems have become so serious that bringing the defence witnesses,
and the entire defence, have been jeopardized, even more so because
the Yugoslav state, or any official structure of the regime, shows no
interest in the successful and upright struggle for the truth about
Serbian nation.
This letter is a bid to you to close the ranks in the battle for
truth. It is for that reason that we appeal to you, and to all honest
people and their organizations, to support financially the defence of
Slobodan Milosevic and make possible this historical struggle for the
integrity, honor, pride and truth about our nation.
In this way, the National Committee for the Liberation of Slobodan
Milosevic, SLOBODA/Freedom Association, together with you, wishes to
help the great son of our people in this struggle.
Belgrade, January 20th, 2003
For SLOBODA/Freedom Association,
Bogoljub Bjelica, president
======================================
SLOBODA/Freedom Association,
National Committee for the Liberation of Slobodan Milosevic
Address: Rajiceva 16, 11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Phones: +381-11-630-206, +381-11-639-152
Fax: +381-11-630-549
Bank giro account
Intermediary:
ABS AG, Zurich, Switzerland
Swift code: UBSWCHZH
Account with:
Komercijalna banka AD,
Svetog Save 14, 11000 Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia
Swift code: KOBBYUBG
Beneficiary:
Acc. # 5428-1246-16154-6
Name: Sloboda za svet slobodnih i ravnopravnih
Address: Rajiceva 16, 11000 Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia
(codes for different currencies: 978 - EUR, 840 - USD, 756 - CHF)
_________________________________________________________________
supports Milosevic (Vera Martinovic)
2. SLOBODA Appeal, 20/1/2003
=== 1 ===
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/850566/posts
Captain Dragan testimony at UN Tribunal
Prosecution witness supports Milosevic
Jurist.com | Feb 22, 2003 | Vera Martinovic
Posted on 02/24/2003 8:18 AM PST by vooch
The story of Dragan Vasiljkovic, alias Captain Dragan, is a very
simple one: he went twice to Krajina, first time in April
1991 when he was under the command of the Krajina Police; in August he
was expelled by Babic.
The second time he went there after the Croats attacked UNPA zones
(Miljevac Plateau), in a car with two other men
and they put themselves at the disposal of the Krajina Army, because
he 'couldn't calmly walk about the Belgrade
streets while all that was happening'. His mission both times was to
help train volunteers and to participate in combat
missions with his unit, deeply behind the enemy lines but few times
also in direct battles (e.g. taking over of Glina). His
motives: a Serb patriot living in Australia and with a considerable
military expertise, not on strategic but on tactical
level, wanting to help.
He denied the slander of the Army Intelligence General Vasiljevic
against his State Intelligence (SB) rivals, that he was
brought by the SB: 'he either lies, or he's absolutely incompetent'
and 'there was such a fantastic, open animosity
between the Army and the State Service' that he noticed. Nobody
invited nor sent him there, only one Sasa Medakovic
helped his arrival, a local guy who lived, worked and got killed in
Krajina.
His training camp in Golubic near Knin was his sole responsibility,
nobody but him was in charge. He was appointed
there by Milan Martic, with the consent of Babic. He gave a short
evaluation of both men: Babic 'never woke up before
2-3 p.m., his word meant nothing; his nickname was Titic=Little Tito;
he opposed both peace plans. Martic was 'an
honourable man, a man as good as his word'. He explained that
'personal vanity with the Serbs could be an important
issue, capable of exceeding national interests'.
He put things in proportion, both numerically (his unit numbered 21
men, called kninja, the name a fusion of 'Knin'
and 'Ninja'; the volunteers from Serbia 'could have been counted with
the fingers of one hand') and historically (local
Serbs were genuinely afraid of the resurrection of the Fascism in CRO:
'50 years is not ancient history, some people
were still alive and could tell').
His unit avoided local Croat civilians: 'I had extremely sparse
contacts with the Croat civilians, being aware they would
not be overjoyed to meet an armed Serb'; 'extraordinary protective
measures were being taken toward local Croatian
families, the investigators must have these data from the UNPROFOR'.
He personally arrested some Serb suspects for
alleged crimes: 'there were some incidents', 'the general attitude was
- arrest and put to trial, which I did within my
zone of responsibility'; 'they were members of the local TO, I was
reported of a crime, I never saw no corpses, I
disarmed these men, locked them away and gave the key to Martic, no
follow-up because I left for Belgrade soon'. He
wanted to 'help the Tribunal who was never in Krajina' and speaking
from his own 12-year experience of working with
victims, he clarified 'it was almost impossible to send an order to
commit crimes, because in the chain of command
there would always be a normal person who would stop it'. More
probable was the opposite direction and in order to
investigate 'it is more important to start from the victim than from
the top.' He denied any knowledge of any crimes
ordered by the Krajina authorities.
He gave an eye-witness account for the benefit of the judges: 'Since
I've lived in the West, in Serbia and in Krajina, I
can understand how difficult it is for this other side to understand
the reappearance of that Ustasa vampire, for those
villagers living sometimes on the upper floor of their houses with
their sheep below, waking up one morning not as a
constituent people anymore, but as a helpless minority again
threatened with slaughter and expulsion'.
He did not change his testimony during the cross-examination, he
merely clarified gross misinterpretations made by
the Prosecution and the media.
He was a political opponent to Milosevic, he avoided meeting him in
public, 'we met by chance once entering the
Military Academy Hospital when we exchanged courtesy salutations and
the second time when we met here, at this theatre show. He denied any
knowledge of orders coming from Milosevic to perpetrate any crimes,
'if I had such knowledge, as your political opponent I would have done
everything to expose you and to remove you from office'.
During that infamous celebration that was videoed he left earlier to
avoid staying at lunch with Milosevic. He even
became a member of Draskovic's SPO and his 'frame of mind was always
that of the opposition'; the same sentiment
that he nurtures 'for those pawns that are currently in power.'
He was and is a personal friend of Frenki Simatovic, who went to
Krajina few times hiding it from his superiors, trying
to help, and organizing much later the Captain's Fund to receive 20
computers (that was all the 'Security Service of
Serbia involvement'). Contrary to allegations, Frenki was never a
Milosevic man, 'truly, it was impossible to connect
the two of you in any way; he was a professional, an anti-terrorist
agent'. The Captain was never a member nor a
hireling to the Service, except one fee of 2,200 dinars that he
received for supervision of an exercise and they
subsequently talked about the possibility of hiring him, which didn't
come true. He never received any orders from
them. When he was forced by Babic to leave, he left his unit saying
'you should listen to what Frenki has to say',
meaning listen to his explanation of the sudden departure, and not to
his command. Few of his people went to Serbia
with him, some were subsequently admitted to the JSO ('I personally
asked Frenki to admit them, to keep them from
the street, and they had valuable skills; but there were no more than
15 people; I believe the Tribunal is under
impression this is an army that's being discussed').
There were no units from Serbia in Krajina. There were 4 people from
the Security Service of Serbia in all who ever
visited Krajina, each of them no more than once or twice, the task
being 'intelligence data gathering', anything more
was practically impossible 'having Babic as the opponent.'
The relationship between his unit and all Krajina forces on one side
and the JNA on the other was 'almost
hostile'. "We had provided no info to them. They were between the two
sides [Croats and Serbs] and we didn't
know what their reaction would be. They kept the two sides apart even
more scrupulously than the UNPROFOR." When asked about the Croatian
attacks against the JNA, the Captain said: "They only fought back; if
I were in their place, I would have done it much more ferociously; I
believe the JNA didn't fought back enough."
When he arrived in Krajina, the clashes were going on for almost a
year and there were more than enough weapons to
go around: 'Territorial Defence depots, stealing from the JNA, what
the UNPROFOR left for the Croats, and we
captured in battles more than we needed.' There were more weapons
coming from Krajina to Belgrade than the other way around.
The only thing coming were some hunting rifles through private
channels. Re heavy weaponry, the Captain recalled
'one trophy 50 mm cannon from WW2 that a local Serb has been keeping
through all these years in battle condition;
perhaps somebody should ask why.' There was financial help from
Serbia, of course, but no weapons, he only received
'one piece as a gift, a pistol CZ-99 [a great Magnum-type handgun,
popular also in the US, made by Zastava].
Captain Dragan's sole purpose in the courtroom was to tell his angle
of the story and to berate and spit on 'this
institution' along the way: when he was asked about one wounded
Arkan's man who stopped receiving help from his
Fund because he started to receive support from the Belgrade
municipality (oh, the crime!), the Captain sneered that
'the Law on basic rights of all the war invalids was adopted, it was
in all the newspapers, I don't see any significant
discovery here'.
He taught the judges that 'a Secret Service operates secretly, if it
were a public service it would be called a
Public Service'. He informed them 'my unit was public, we had a
headquarters, a flag, I don't see a point in
these questions'. He ridiculed the Greater Serbia notion as
'propaganda, a sheer stupidity or else a jest or a
comedy', which could be considered as true 'only by a malicious man'
and he pointed out that during that infamous celebration of the
'secret' video, with the Serbian Security and the Serbian President,
'a Yugoslav anthem was being played'.
He wondered at the sheer waste of time and effort here: 'I can't
believe that so many educated and serious people seriously consider
the presence of 4 Security people in Krajina as being significant,
there were thousands of European observers there' .
He explained his disdain and loss of patience with the proceedings in
The Hague: 'I've been here for 2 weeks already,
perhaps I'm a bit on the edge of my nerves already, but this is all so
over-exaggerated, that it seems there's no further
purpose for my taking part in it'.
Why was he summoned as the witness to the Prosecution in the first
place is baffling. Maybe they just wanted to
introduce as 'evidence' those ample records of his 'Captain Dragan
Fund', existing for more than 12 years and with
over 300,000 donors (private persons as well as State bodies): 11 CDs
with some 67,000 files of those helped financially,
families of wounded and killed. Yes, that must be it, they want to
further 'prove' where all these men fought using the
certificates signed by their commanders and to prosecute them,
perhaps.
---
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/850585/posts
Part 2 Captain Dragan vs. Milosevic - UN Tribunal
Jurist.com | Feb 23, 2003 | Vera Martinovic
Posted on 02/24/2003 8:39 AM PST by vooch
Part 2 of 2
Milosevic revealed to the Captain that he was listed by the
Prosecution 'as the protected witness B-073', which he never
required himself and which triggered a lengthy discussion among the
judges and amici as a practice of making a rule out of
the exception and actually forcing the protected witness status onto
the witnesses.
Dragan also refused to sign a statement to the effect that what was
said during the investigation or testimony can not be used
against him. He confirmed to have received some EUR 4,000 towards his
travelling expenses and the hotel accommodation,
but 'you do not seriously think I could be bought for that kind of
money?'.
The examination-in-chief by Dermot Groome consisted almost entirely of
making the Captain read some reports not even
connected with Krajina, where volunteers were being vaguely mentioned,
and asking him to comment, to which he would
answer that 'I wouldn't even know to point out where Ozren is on the
map, I don't know these people that you mention, I
have never even been in Bosnia...'
Seeing a futility of this, the Prosecution pulled out 'a secret
video', which the Captain ridiculed in the end.
Let's get one thing clear: that JSO unit of which the 'important'
video had been shown is not a paramilitary unit, it is a regular
police unit for special operations. When the word 'paramilitary' is
applied for civil wars in ex-YU, this simply means
unofficial volunteer units, who put themselves under the unified
command of the local Serb forces.
Therefore, when BBC News of 19 Feb. deftly put together such a yarn
that 'Milosevic... paying tribute to Serb paramilitaries
accused of ethnic cleansing', 'footage shot in a paramilitary camp',
and then continue immediately with 'Captain Dragan told
the judges Serb paramilitary did not act independently, but were part
of the security services, the army or the police', there are
three things amiss here: JSO was being pronounced a paramilitary unit
accused of something, in the next sentence they
switched to 'Serb paramilitary' meaning something entirely different
(volunteer units), but deliberately equating it, and the
words 'of Krajina' were omitted when speaking of who controls them, as
pointed out in Part I of this report. This is not
reporting, this is ice-skating laced with double meaning and gross
hinting. Of course volunteer units could not act
independently, but why jumping to conclusions about Serbia controlling
them, when that was not what the witness said nor meant?
So, BBC spewed this propaganda and even put it in a highlighted inbox,
not bothering to retract it the next day, when
Captain Dragan explained how his meaning was distorted.
Contrary to the belief of some off-hand session-watchers, Captain
Dragan was not a member of that JSO unit from the
video, never has been and was not at the time of this celebration (it
was 1997); he was an invited guest (as somebody who
originally helped train some of its members while they were not the
JSO members). Just like Milosevic was a guest, and both
were given a token dagger as a gift to remember the celebration by,
along with many veterans from other units who were also
present. And the tradition of protecting the Serbs, as evoked by
Franko Simatovic aka Frenki in his speech, applied to the
individual members of the unit, who were previously fighting in
various battlefields individually, before they joined the JSO.
The speech also considered many other units of the Serbs from CRO and
B&H, their training camps and their exploits, and in
his PR effort to create the image for the unit, Frenki tried to
establish the link to that tradition. The famous red berets, which
originally were being given to kninjas after they finished their
training course became a popular symbol, first throughout CRO
and B&H and then even in Serbia with the 23rd parachute brigade of the
Army and the JSO of the Police.
The Captain completely dismissed the importance of the video by
explaining this was merely 'a nice show for the
President and other high officials' to present the unit bigger and
stronger than it ever was (it never surpassed the size
of one company), the helicopter squadron mentioned were precisely 'two
small Gazelles and one ancient Bell from
the Viet Nam war; my friend from the US has a private fleet larger
than that'. Captain Dragan gave his fatherly
opinion to the judges: "I believe this video was being discussed much
too seriously here."
The amicus curiae Kay took only few minutes, questioning the Captain
mainly about the weapons that his unit had, as
opposed to Croatian units that he directly fought at Glina, Skabrnja
and Ljubovo: the Croats were the size of a brigade each
time, much better equipped and with armoured vehicles. The only
advantage the Captain had was the night-vision and
communication equipment, used for behind-the-lines incursions.
Then, it was time for the Prosecution to save something by re-direct
examination and, contrary to what the ICTY apologists
write, it was nowhere near brilliant: Groome's face got all red, he
was constantly being interrupted and corrected by judges
and admonished by Kay and the witness was beyond his reach.
When he desperately tried to prove his own witness was lying/being
hostile/not speaking good Serbian/was talking to Frenki
about his testimony, he amply proved something else: the Prosecution's
own technique of producing evidence by distortion.
In short: Captain Dragan stated he was told by Jovica Stanisic to
leave Krajina, and his first thought was that this came from
Milosevic. Upon reflection, he realized that he was being caught in
feuds between Babic and Martic, Babic wanting to seize
complete control, resenting the Captain as being 'a Martic man' and
forced him to leave, by slandering him in media with 'he
received money, finished the job and went away'. Stanisic just advised
him to better remove himself from these political
clashes, trying to protect him.
The Captain understood Babic had more authority than Milosevic and
that it was the former who forced him away. Poor
Groome tried to prove his witness crazy for stating such a stupidity
and a lengthy discussion developed, including even judges.
Milosevic spoke up, almost laughingly offering help to clear the mess:
the words missing were again 'in Krajina'.
Yes, Babic was more powerful and influential in Krajina than
Milosevic, so he was in a position to expel the Captain.
How desperate the Prosecution is, clutching to such a sliver.
This testimony revealed the sinister practice happening when
statements are being taken from the witnesses by the
Prosecution's investigators.
Captain Dragan gave his statement on 26-27-28 August 2001. But, when
Milosevic read out one paragraph from it,
the witness said he doesn't recall 'ever saying this'. The same
happened during the re-direct examination by
Groome. The problem is the following: there are no questions in these
statements, only the answers, packed together
continuously like a story and worded and interpreted by the
investigators, and not quoted verbatim.
This leaves them opened to misinterpretations, distortions, wild
editing and taking out of context.
Here's one example. Milosevic quoted the statement: "In my opinion,
the war effort was financed by the Serbian government,
but I have no proof of that." The Captain denied ever using the term
'war effort', he thought that 'the question probably was
whether any help was being sent, which of course was, and which was
insufficient in my opinion, but this is absolutely distorted.'
Milosevic took the opportunity to slap May, saying that such practice
is nothing new, that the value of statements concocted
on the basis of answers to God knows which questions is highly
dubious. May admitted that the audio recording doesn't exist
and that we have to be 'satisfied with the statements such as they
are'.
And when Groome pulled the same statement-reading in his re-direct,
the Captain vehemently denied the formulation again
and recognized the plot: that was the 'working version' of the
statement, for which the investigators told him they would
never use it, and there's another, revised version, signed recently.
"This is not correct. These are your formulations,
taken out from our conversation. We agreed this would never be used. I
don't accept this statement, but the revised
one, were the corrections have been made with Mr Sexton. I gave
another statement, because of too many mistakes.
This is a trick. I accept only the statement signed last week!" said
the Captain, waving this piece of paper.
The solution to the problem by May? Both statements were introduced as
evidence.
Captain Dragan and Milosevic chatted away the cross-examination almost
like friends, certainly in a way of two people
deeply aware what kind of false show they got themselves mixed up in.
Speaking of his encounter in Belgrade with Jovica
Stanisic, when he got an advice to get away from Babic-Martic
political games, the Captain admitted his first reaction was to
get angry with Milosevic for sending him such an advice ('I thought I
would get your support'), but instead of that he had to
leave. "And here they are accusing you of exactly the opposite; either
way, it's a no-win situation for you and I wouldn't want
to be in your shoes." Both men laughed.
Yet another Dubrovnik witness, this time an ITN journalist, one Paul
Davis, started to testify on Friday. This is becoming ridiculous.
On Monday there will be no session.
=== 2 ===
From: Vladimir Krsljanin
Sent: Friday, January 24, 2003 4:45 PM
SLOBODA/Freedom Association, Belgrade
Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, dear compatriots,
In the Hague, it is the Serbian history and future generations that
are put to trial, rather than any individual and Slobodan Milosevic
in particuilar. As you and the entire mankind know, that great son of
our people does not recognize the "court" that is tending to the
world's rulers and their brute force, and which undoubtedly is a
freak in the international legal system, whose sole purpose is to
ultimately demonize the Serbian people. The courage and resoluteness
of Slobodan Milosevic present a plea to all Serbian patriots to join
the struggle for preservation of the honor and dignity of the Serbian
people.
The struggle of Slobodan Milosevic for the truth, which reveals daily
that the allegations against him and the Serbian people are made up
of lies, is hindered by various obstructions whose goal is to twart
the trooth and conceal the crimes of others. By not recognizing the
court that runs this ignominious process, Slobodan Milosevic and his
defence are deprived, among other things, also of the financial
rights. That is yet another way to to prevent his moral struggle.
Such barriers exist not only among the mighty ones abroad, but also
among their obedient servants and vassals in our fatherland. Those
problems have become so serious that bringing the defence witnesses,
and the entire defence, have been jeopardized, even more so because
the Yugoslav state, or any official structure of the regime, shows no
interest in the successful and upright struggle for the truth about
Serbian nation.
This letter is a bid to you to close the ranks in the battle for
truth. It is for that reason that we appeal to you, and to all honest
people and their organizations, to support financially the defence of
Slobodan Milosevic and make possible this historical struggle for the
integrity, honor, pride and truth about our nation.
In this way, the National Committee for the Liberation of Slobodan
Milosevic, SLOBODA/Freedom Association, together with you, wishes to
help the great son of our people in this struggle.
Belgrade, January 20th, 2003
For SLOBODA/Freedom Association,
Bogoljub Bjelica, president
======================================
SLOBODA/Freedom Association,
National Committee for the Liberation of Slobodan Milosevic
Address: Rajiceva 16, 11000 Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Phones: +381-11-630-206, +381-11-639-152
Fax: +381-11-630-549
Bank giro account
Intermediary:
ABS AG, Zurich, Switzerland
Swift code: UBSWCHZH
Account with:
Komercijalna banka AD,
Svetog Save 14, 11000 Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia
Swift code: KOBBYUBG
Beneficiary:
Acc. # 5428-1246-16154-6
Name: Sloboda za svet slobodnih i ravnopravnih
Address: Rajiceva 16, 11000 Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia
(codes for different currencies: 978 - EUR, 840 - USD, 756 - CHF)
_________________________________________________________________
ERA TUTTO PRONTO
L'amica Olga da Parigi ci spiega come gia' prima
del riconoscimento ufficiale delle secessioni, e
molto prima della secessione della Bosnia-Erzegovina,
i paesi della UE avessero gia' deciso un trattamento
differenziato per i cittadini jugoslavi.
<<...Io personalmente posso testimoniare che a
Belgrado nel 1991 l'Ambasciata Francese,
sul cancello del suo ufficio visti, aveva
affisso un avviso che diceva:
"Le persone in possesso di un passaporto
emesso a Sarajevo devono recarsi a Zagabria
per ottenere il visto per la Francia".
In altre parole, l'Europa aveva gia deciso e
messo in cantiere lo smembramento della Jugoslavia.
Io entrai per chiedere se questo si avviso si
riferiva al caso mio, essendo io bosniaca; ma mi
dissero: no, il suo passaporto è stato
timbrato a Belgrado. Dunque anche se iscritta
all'anagrafe a Livno (Bosnia), qualcuno
aveva deciso che io con la Bosnia non dovevo
piu' avere legami.
Lo ricordo bene perche' passavo ogni giorno
davanti allo sportello, perche' lavoravo alla
Tanjug, distante neanche 50 metri.
L'ufficio visti si trovava accanto al Centro
di Cultura francese, tra Obilicev Venac e la
Kneza Mihajla ulica...>>
L'amica Olga da Parigi ci spiega come gia' prima
del riconoscimento ufficiale delle secessioni, e
molto prima della secessione della Bosnia-Erzegovina,
i paesi della UE avessero gia' deciso un trattamento
differenziato per i cittadini jugoslavi.
<<...Io personalmente posso testimoniare che a
Belgrado nel 1991 l'Ambasciata Francese,
sul cancello del suo ufficio visti, aveva
affisso un avviso che diceva:
"Le persone in possesso di un passaporto
emesso a Sarajevo devono recarsi a Zagabria
per ottenere il visto per la Francia".
In altre parole, l'Europa aveva gia deciso e
messo in cantiere lo smembramento della Jugoslavia.
Io entrai per chiedere se questo si avviso si
riferiva al caso mio, essendo io bosniaca; ma mi
dissero: no, il suo passaporto è stato
timbrato a Belgrado. Dunque anche se iscritta
all'anagrafe a Livno (Bosnia), qualcuno
aveva deciso che io con la Bosnia non dovevo
piu' avere legami.
Lo ricordo bene perche' passavo ogni giorno
davanti allo sportello, perche' lavoravo alla
Tanjug, distante neanche 50 metri.
L'ufficio visti si trovava accanto al Centro
di Cultura francese, tra Obilicev Venac e la
Kneza Mihajla ulica...>>
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