Informazione
PRAVNA PRIRODA SUKOBA NA KOSOVU I METOHIJI
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/reakcije_citalaca/2003-11-11.html
Dr Milan Tepavac
5. novembar 2003.
Sukob izmedu jugoslovenskih i srpskih nadležnih organa sa šiptarskim
pobunjenicima i teroristima na Kosovu i Metohiji nije bio rat u pravnom
smislu. - Treba govoriti o tamo pocinjenim zlocinima, a ne o ratim
zlocinima. - Nema ratnih zlocina bez rata. -Karla del Ponte i njena
prethodnica Luiz Arbur su se rukovodile politickim motivima kada su
period od 1.1. do 20.6.1999. na Kosmetu okarakterisale kao "stanje
oružanog sukoba" (rata) u smislu medunarodnog prava. - Domaci sudovi
cine istu grešku kada krivcna dela tamo pocinjena kvalifikuju kao ratne
zlocine.
1. Uvodne napomene
Takozvano tužilaštvo takozvanog Medunarodnog krivicnog tribunala za
prethodnu Jugoslaviju (u daljem tekstu MKTJ) podnelo je optužnicu
protiv protiv Slobodana Miloševica, Milana Milutinovica, Nikole
Šajnovica, Dragoljuba Ojdanica i Vlajka Stojiljkovica 16. oktobra 2001.
(to je izmenjena optužnica u odnosu na prvu koju je tužilaštvo podnelo
usered agresije NATO, 22.maja 1999). Kasnije, 19. jula 2002, to
tužilaštvo je izdvojilo optužbu protiv Milutinovica, Šajnovica i
Ojdanica (u meduvremenu je Vlajko Stojiljkovic izvršio samoubistvo) u
posebnu optužnicu. Upravo dok pišem ovaj tekst (potkraj oktobra 2003)
tužilaštvo je "otpecatilo" i optužicu - koja nosi datum 22.septembra
2003 - za dogadanja na Kosmetu i protiv dvojice general Vojske
Jugoslavije Pavkovica i Lazarevica i dvojice policijskih general
Đordevica i Lukica.
Optužnica protiv Slobodana Miloševica povodom dogadanja na Kosovu i
Metohiji sadrži kjlucnu odredbu na kojoj, ustvari, pociva citava
optužnica. Rec je o tacki 69 koja glasi:
"69. Sve vreme na koje se odnosi ova optužnica, na Kosovu u SRJ
postojalo je stanje oružanog sukoba".
"Vreme na koje se odnosi optužnica" je vreme od 1. januara do 20. juna
1999. godine. Naime, i Miloševic i njegovi imenovani saradnici optuženi
su za navodna nedala koje su tamo pocinili jugoslovenski i srpski
organi u navedenom vremenskom periodu, koji period vremena je
tužilaštvo ocenilo, okarakterisalo kao "stanje oružanog sukoba".
(Optužnica protiv Pavkovica, Lazarevica, Đordevica i Lukica takode se
odnosi na isti period vremena i u njoj ponavlja da je u naznacenom
periodu na Kosmetu bilo "stanje oružanog sukoba"). Posmatrano sa
politicke tacke gledišta, ovakva ocena tužilaštva ucinjena je iz dva
osnovna razloga: (1) da bi se opravdala agresija NATO pakta i (2) da bi
se tužilaštvo odnosno tribunal mogli proglasiti nadležnim u pogledu
sukoba na Kosovu i Metohiji jugoslovenskih organa sa šiptarskim
pobunjenicima, secesionistima i teroristima.
Dakle, kljucno pitanje koje se ovde namece jeste da li je ili nije u
navedenom vremenskom periodu - od 1. januara do 20. juna 1999 - na
Kosovu i Methiji postojalo "stanje oružanog sukoba" u smislu
medunarodnog prava. Jer, u suprotnom - ako se dokaže da je ocena
tužilaštva pogrešna - optužbe tužilaštva protiv svih lica optuženih
povodom Kosova i Metohije padaju u vodu jer gubi nadležnost, a sva lica
u njegovim kazamatima u Ševeningenu morala bi odmah biti puštena na
slobodu, a verovatno i obeštecana za svu štetu koja im je protivpravno
naneta. Zato ce tužilaštvo, po prirodi stvari uciniti sve da je njegova
gornja postavka tacna, da se na Kosovu i Metohiji u naznacenom periodu
zaista radilo o "stanju oružanog sukoba". Svrha ovoga teksta je da
dokaže da je ocena, bolje receno, pretpostavka tužilaštva pogrešna, to
jest nije se radilo o oružanom sukobu u smislu medunarodnog prava, vec
o normalnoj i uobicajenoj intervenciji nadležnih državnih organa kada
na delu njene teritorije dode do pobune jednog dela njenog
stanovništva. Receno cisto pravnickim jezikom, sukob na Kosovu i
Metohiji u relevantnom vremenskom razdoblju izmedu nadležnih
jugoslovenskih i srpskih organa i jednog dela šiptarskog stanovništva
ne spada pod odredba stava 1 clan 1 Dodatnog protokola II uz Ženevske
konvencije, vec pod odredba stava 2 tog clana istog protokola. U daljem
tekstu ovo cemo razjasniti.
2. Šta se dogadalo u "relevantnom periodu",šta mu je prethodilo i -
usledilo
a) Opšti pogled na šiptarski separatizam
U kosovskoj optužnici protiv Slobodana Miloševica se navodi: "U julu
1990. godine, Skupština Srbije donela je odluku o raspuštanju Skupštine
Kosova, ubrzo nakon što je 114 poslanika od 123 predstavnika kosovskih
Albanca u Skupštini usvojilo nezvanicnu rezoluciju kojom Kosovo
proglašavaju ravnopravnim i nezavisnim entitetom u okviru SFRJ. U
septembru 1990. godine, mnogi od tih istih poslanika kosovskih Albanaca
proglasili su ustav "Republike Kosovo". Godinu dana kasnije, u
septembru 1991. godine, kosovski Albanci održali su nezvanicni
referendum na kome su u ogromnoj vecini glasali za nezavisnost. Dana
24. maja 1992. godine, kosovski Albanci održali su nezvanicne izbore za
skupštinu i predsednika "Republike Kosovo"...
Svakom ko ovo cita mora odmah da pada u oci cinjenica da tužilaštvo sve
te radnje koje su preduzete na Kosovu i Metohiji ne karakteriše pravim
imenom, naime da je rec o protivustavnim i protivzakonitim radnjama, iz
cega logicno sledi da sve ono što su preduzele nadležne jugoslovenske i
srpske vlasti kao odgovor na te radnje nije ništa drugo nego ono što se
preduzima u svakoj civilizovanoj i pravnoj državi. Ali, ovo
falsifikovanje istorije nije ništa prema onome što sledi. Dajuci ocenu
šireg istorijskog konteksta u Jugoslaviji u kome se krecu dogadaji na
KiM, tužilaštvo u istoj optužnici kaže:
"Krajem juna 1991. godine, SFRJ je pocela da se raspada u nizu ratova
koji su usledili jedan za drugim, u Republici Sloveniji (dalje u
tekstu: Slovenija), Republici Hrvatskoj (dalje u tekstu: Hrvatska) i
Bosni i Hercegovini. Slovenija je 25. juna 1991. godine proglasila
nezavisnost od SFRJ, što je dovelo do izbijanja rata; mirovni sporazum
postignut je 8. jula 1991. godine. Hrvatska je svoju nezavisnost
proglasila 25. juna 1991. godine, što je dovelo do borbi izmedu
hrvatskih vojnih snaga s jedne strane i JNA, paravojnih jedinica i
"Vojske Republike Srpske Krajine" s druge... Bosna i Hercegovina
proglasila je nezavisnost 6. marta 1992. godine, što je posle 6. aprila
1992. godine dovelo do rata širokih razmera. Dana 27. aprila 1992.
godine SFRJ je rekonstituisana kao SRJ. U to vreme JNA je
reorganizovana u VJ. U ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini, JNA, a kasnije VJ,
borila se zajedno sa "Vojskom Republike Srpske" protiv vojnih snaga
vlade Bosne i Hercegovine i "Hrvatskog vijeca obrane". Aktivna
neprijateljstva prestala su potpisivanjem Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma
u decembru 1995. godine". Ovim tekstom ce tužilaštvo uci u istoriju
ignorantnosti i bescašca ne samo medunarodne krivicne jurisprudencije i
jurisdikcije nego i u istoriju pravne i politticke teorije i istorije u
pokušaju da se falsifikuje istorija. (Otuda, više je nego normalno da
glavna parola predstojecih demonstracija, koje ce se održati u Hagu 8.
novembra o.g, biti "WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE NATO AGGRESSORS TO WRITE OUR
HISTORY"). I ovde, naravno u još vecoj meri, vredi ono što smo rekli u
pogledu KiM: dogadaje u Hrvatskoj, Sloveniji i Bosni i Hercegovini
tužilaštvo tendeciozno i zlonamerno ne naziva pravim imenom: da je rec
o protivustavnoj i protivzakonitoj oružanoj pobuni secesionistickih
snaga u tim jugoslovenskim republikama, podsticanim, planiranim i
finansiranim od svojih saucesnika - vladajucih krugova u SAD, Vatikanu
i EU (EZ) i islamskih fundamentalista. Svaka kap prolivene krvi na tim
prostorima je na rukama tih zlocinaca, a ovakvim stavovima tužilaštvo
se svrstava u njihove saucesnike.
O šiptarskom terorizmu na Kosovu i Metohiji moglo bi se mnogo govoriti
i kjige napisati. Ali, evo, zadržimo se na današnjoj (5.novembar 2003)
Politici u kojoj je informacija da je vlada Republike Srbije (dakle,
sadašnja, a ne "Miloševiceva" vlada) upravo objavila "belu kjigu" pod
naslovom Albanski terorizam i organizovani kriminal na Kosmetu ciji
naslov govori sam za sebe. Tu je i informacija da je šef UNMIK-a Hari
Holkeri obecao da ce istražiti ceo slucaj identiteta lica na
fotografijama koje su ovih dana objavljene u štampi kako trojica
pripadnika tzv. OVK drže u rukama odsecene glave srpskih vojnika. Tu je
takode informacija da je ministar pravde Srbije izjavio da ministarstvo
poseduje dokumentaciju, desetine hiljada stranica, o stravicnim
zlocinima nad Srbima na Kosmetu "najmonstruoznijim posle Drugog
svetskog rata". Taj materijal na nepobitan nacin potvrduje odgovornost
za više od 7.000 teroristickih napada u kojima je ubijeno preko 1.200
ljudi, ranjeno oko 1.350, kidnapovano gotovo 1.000, proterano 340.000
nealbanaca, oteto ili spaljeno 107.000 kuca...
O dogadajima na Kosovu i Metohiji i svojoj ulozi u njima Slobodan
Milošvic je u postupku protiv njega pred tribunalom rekao dosta toga,
narocito u svom uvodnom izlaganju povodom kosovske optužnice 13, 14,
15. i 18. febrara 2002. Iako je govorio više kao politicar nego kao
pravnik, jasno je da je i on uverenja da tribunal ni po njegovom
statutu nema nadležnosti u pogledu KiM. U svom intervjuu americkoj
agenciji Fox News od 24. avgusta 2001.(iz Haga) on je rekao: "There are
individual crimes, but there was a clear order that any crime has to be
punished immediately, and whoever did it, has to be arrested. And the
proof that that order was obeyed quite clearly and exactly the way it
was supposed to be obeyed is the fact that more than 500 different
individuals were arrested by the police or the army who were doing
so.Those were consequences of a chaotic situation created by the
massive bombing of NATO". Drugim recima, za sve zlocine (neumesno je
upotrebljavati izraz "ratni zlocini") pocinjene tamo i pre, i za vreme
NATO agresije i posle nje nadležni su domaci sudovi, a ne MKTJ.
b) Podrška iz inostranstva
Bez najgrubljeg i najbrutalnijeg mešanja u unutrašnje stvari
Jugoslavije i Srbije, protivno Povelji UN i svim principima
medunarodnog prava i osnovnim dokumentima OEBS (KEBS), bez spoljne
politicke, vojne, finansijske i druge podrške iz inostranstva na Kosovu
i Metohiji nikada ne bi došlo do onoga do cega je došlo i do cega još
uvek dolazi. Kada je rec o politickoj podršci, verovatno je
najpresudnija ona koja dolazi iz uticajnih krugova u SAD kao što su
snažni albanski lobi(1) u toj zemlji i uticajna Medunarodna krizna
grupa (ICG) u kojoj dominira antisrpski jevrejski lobi. Sva nastojanja
i svi apeli da se s tim prestane ostali su bezuspešni. Cak i apeli
Saveta bezbednosti UN da se obustavi spoljna podrska albanskim
teroristima na KiM ostali su i ostaju mrtvo slovo na papiru.
U toj i takvoj raboti posebna je uloga Albanije. Albanija je jedina
drzava na svetu koja je priznala ilegalnu "Republiku Kosovo", koju su
albanski separatisti proglasili nakon ilegalnih jednonacionalnih
"izbora" odrzanih jos 1992. godine. Neskrivenu podrsku albanskim
separatistima davali su svi drzavni organi Albanije, koja je postala
narocito snazna sa rasplamsavanjem terorizma na KiM , posebno od 1998.
godine.Tu podrsku je snazno izrazio i Parlament Albanije, koji je 28.
decembra 1998. godine usvojio "Rezoluciju o stanju na Kosovu", u kojoj
se za odbranu drzavne jugoslovenske granice od upada terorista iz
Albanije i sprecavanje brojnih pokusaja unosenja naoruzanja i vojne
opreme, izmedju ostalog, kaze: "Provokativna politika Beograda na
granici sa Republikom Albanijom tezi prosirivanju sukoba na sve
albanske prostore...". U istoj rezoluciji se, uz neskriven poziv
medjunarodnoj zajednici da vojno pomogne ostvarivanje separatiistickih
ciljeva albanskih terorista na KiM istice da parlament Albanije
..."zahteva snaznu podrsku od albanske vlade i drzave kosovskoj braci,
u cilju odolevanja vanrednim situacijama u kojima se oni nalaze i u
njihovim naporima da sami odlucuju o buducnosti Kosova", kao da je
Kosovo albansko i da ne pripada svim gradjanima koji tamo zive i koji
je nesporan deo Srbije i Jugoslavije.
Podrška Albanije teroristima i separatistima na KiM posebno je izražena
u naoružavanju i obuci terorista UCK.Prema zvanicnim i nezvanicnim
izvorima, u Albaniji je za obuku terorista OVK osnovan veliki broj
posebnih kampova, i to u: Tirani, Kuksu, Tropoji, Peskopeji, Hazu,
Krumi, Fierzi i drugim mestima. Pripremanje teroristickih grupa u
Albaniji potvrdio je i ambasador Dan Everts, sef Misije OEBS u
Albaniji, sto je preneo "Reuters" u svom izvestaju od 21. decembra
1998. godine, u kojem se kaze: ''Guerrillas from the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) are actively girding for war and using northern Albania as a
staging ground for their separatist campaign, an OSCE diplomat said.
'The north (of Albania) is a staging ground for the war and the KLA are
very busy '', ambassador Daan Everts, head of the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Albania told
Reuters at the weekend. The main KLA staging area now appears to have
been moved south into remote parts of a region known as the Has
highlands, wher Krume is the largest nearby town Discretion is the new
KLA watchword. It is uncommon to spot a KLA soldier in uniform in Krume
and the guerrillas generally conduct their business out of sight of
pryin eyes '', istice Reuters.
Niko više ne može da porekne postojanje logora za Al Kaide gde se
vršila obuka terorista. (Boško Jakšic u "Politici" od 1. novembra 2003).
U aktivnoj podrsci u obuci i naoruzavanju albanskih terorista
ucestvovale su i mnoge druge zemlje, posebno Nemacka. Tako, npr.,
britanski dnevnim "European" otkriva, pozivajuci se na diplomatske i
obavestajne izvore, da aktivni angazman nemackih obavestajnih sluzbi
(civilne i vojne) na obucavanju i opremanju terorista UCK za vrsenje
zlocinackih aktivnosti na Kosovu i Metohiji, datira od februara 1996.
godine, sa cilje da ..."cementira nemacki uticaj na balkanskom
prostoru...". Agenti BND bili su zaduzeni da formiraju komandnu
strukturu UCK, obezbede obavestajnu podrsku na ulaznim tackama
terorista u Italiju ( Trst i Bari) i osiguraju njihovo prebacivanje u
Albaniju i obuku terorista.
U najnovijim istraživanjima poznati publicista Kristofer Deliso
(Christopher Deliso) (http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso93.html)
konstatuje: "In 1998, when NATO's war on Yugoslavia was first being
organized, secret camps were set up in northern Albania. There, British
and American forces trained the rag-tag fighters of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). The two countries openly armed, supplied and
supported the KLA during the war against Milosevic, using the
paramilitary group as NATO's ground troops".
Prema pisanju ljubljanskog dnevnika "Delo", oficiri i podoficiri
slovenacke vojske albanske narodnosti ukljuceni su, takode, u obuku
terorista OVK, pa cak i u jihove borbene akcije na KiM.
***
U širokom spektru stavova raznih medunarodnih politickih struktura i
jednom delu medunarodne javnosti dominirala je smisljeno lansirana
neistina o tzv. "OVK" kao nekakvom "gerilskom pokretu" albanske
nacionalne zajednice na KiM.
Ipak je svest o teroristickom karakteru OVK bila prisutna kod
objektivnih posmatraca dogadaja na KiM. Tako je Federacija americkih
naucnika (FAS), koja se smatra "trustom mozgova", objavila izveštaj u
kojem je separatisticko - teroristicku OVK svrstala medu 113
najpoznatijih teroristickih organizacija u svetu. FAS je, uz State
Department, jedina organizacija u SAD koja se ozbiljno bavi
proucavanjem i klasifikovanjem teroristickih organizacija u svetu.
Džon Pajk, šef odseka za bezbednoist FAS -a, izjavio je da je njegova
organizacija izradila "kompletnu analizu, detaljno istražujuci nacin
delovanja i strukturu OVK, za razliku od State Departmenta, koji
procene bazira uglavnom na politickoj osnovi". Pajk sumarno navodi
cinjenice zbog kojih je OVK svrstana medju teroristicke organizacije.
Pre svega, taktika OVK sastoji se u napaima na organe bezbednosti, i to
iz zasede. Zatim, clanovi OVK organizovani su u celije od tri do pet
clanova, što je karaketristicno za teroristicke organizacije. Clanovi
grupe su vidno opsednuti svojom idejom odvajanja KiM od Srbije i SRJ i
njenog pripajanja tzv. "Velikoj Albaniji", a naredbe predpostavljenih
izvrsavaju bezpogovorno. U daljoj analizi FAS-a navodi se da u redovima
OVK ima oko 1000 placenika iz Albanije, Saudijske Arabije , Jemena,
Avganistana, BiH i Hrvatske, kao i "vojnih strucnjaka" iz Velike
Britanije i Nemacke, koji rade kao instruktori. Glavni kampovi za obuku
terorista OVK nalaze se u albanskim gradovima Ljabinot, Tropoja, Kukes
i Bajram Curi, gde su koncentrisane pristalice bivseg albanskog
predsednika Saloja Berise. U izvestaju FAS-a istaknuto je, pored
ostalog da su ..."I Rugova i OVK insistirali na nezavisnosti Kosova.
Otvoreni dugorocni cilj OVK jeste da ujedini albansko stanovnistvo
Kosova, Makedonije i Albanije u Veliku Albaniju. Sve do nedavno,
Kosovari su smatrali da je status trece republike u okviru Jugoslavije
za Kosovo samo prelazna faza u postizanju nezavisnosti Kosova..."
3. Pravna karakterizacija dogadanja u "relevantnom periodu"
Na osnovu onoga što je izneto napred pod tackom 1. i 2. mislimo da se
sam po sebi namece zakljucak da je tužilaštvo MKTJ pogrešno, sa pravnog
stanovišta, okarakterisalo sukob na Kosovu i Metohiji. Ono, ustvari,
ako cemo pravo gledati, i nije ni moglo drukcije da proceni pravnu
prirodu toga sukoba. Kao instrument antijugoslovenske i antisrpske
politike, potpuno u službi NATO pakta i najvecih neprijatelja
Jugoslavije i srpskog naroda koji su ga formirali i koji ga bogato
finansiraju ono, dakle, objektivno nije ni moglo drukcije postupiti.
Zbog toga što je ono podiglo optužnicu protiv Slobodana Miloševica,
tada predsednika SR Jugoslavije, usered NATO varvarske agresije, 22.
maja 1999. godine, ono je nesumnjivo, postalo saucesnik zlocinacke
agresije NATO pakta i njegovih satelita koji su mu dali logisticku i
drugu podršku u agresiji (Albanije, Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine,
Madarske, Makedonije), kao i saucesnik šiptarskih terorista na celu sa
takozvanom Oslobodilackom armijom Kosova. Podizanje te optužnice
nesumnjivo je ohrabrilo kako NATO tako i šiptarske teroriste.
Još pre "relevantnog perioda" glavni tužilac Luis Arbur nastojala je na
sve nacine da sukob na Kosmetu podvede pod oderedbe medunarodnog
humanitarnog prava, i da, na taj nacin, taj sukob podvede pod
jurisdikciju njenog tužilaštva odnosno tribunala. Još u martu 1998. ona
je ispoljavala pretenzije da se umeša u dogadaje na Kosmetu. Oktobra
iste godine ona se i zvanicno obratila jugoslovenskim organima da želi
da na Kosmetu vodi istragu. Tadašnji savezni ministar pravde Zoran
Kneževic je odgovorio Arburovoj da Tribunal nije nadležan za dešavanja
na Kosovu i Metohiji. On je objasnio da "na Kosmetu nema rata", vec da
je Srbija suocena "sa teroristickim akcijama bandita": "Na Kosovu i
Metohiji nije bilo rata. Teroristicke grupe sastavljene od kriminalaca
i verskih fabnatika nikada nisu bile organizovane jedinice", piše
Kneževic i istice da je Srbija uspešno završila policijsku akciju
protiv terorista. Na tom i takvom stavu je Savezna vlada istrajavala
sve do petooktobarske promene 2000. godine.
Medutim, tužilaštvo u novembru 1998. obaveštava jugoslovensku vladu da
je tužilaštvo tribunala zakljucilo da postoji dovoljno osnova za
nadležnost MKTJ i za sprovodenje istrage, i na tom stavu je istrajavalo
i za vreme agresije NATO pakta i istrajava do danas. Petooktobarski
režim je, razume se, odmah prihvatio stav Tribunala u pogledu pravnog
karaktera kosovskometohijskog sukoba, usvojio u tom smislu odgovarajuce
propise, i odmah poceo da "isporucuje" sve one koje je tribunal tražio
"zbog kršenja medunarodnog humanitarnog prava". I u zemlji su poceli
procesi zbog "ratnih zlocina" na KiM(2) Pri tome zaprepašcuje kolko je
prisutno pravnicke neukosti i politicke servilnosti prema stranim
stvarnim i umišljenim mocnicima.
U postupku protiv Slobodana Miloševica tom smislu svedocio je pred
tribunalom zamenik glavnog tužioca tribunala Grejem Bluit 30. oktobra
2003. Miloševic je, razume se, ta i takva nastojanja tužilaštva i
tribunala - da imaju nadležnost u pogledu KiM - osporavo, optužujuci ih
za neistinost, tendencioznost i pristrasnost, mada je trebalo da, kao
pravnik po obrazovanju, da pravno elaborira svoje stavove pozivajuci se
na medunarodno pravo, pre svega na Dopunski protokol II Ženevskim
konvencijama koji predstavljaju savremeno medunarodno pravo. U
unakrsnom ispitivanju Bluita on je povišenim tonom rekao svedoku da
tužilaštvo nije želelo da sprovodi istragu o zlocinima šiptarske
strane, o vezi tzv. OVK sa islamskim teroristima, pa i sa samim Bin
Ladenom, niti je želelo da se bavi zlocinima NATO pocinjenih tokom
bombardovanja Srbije. "Vi ste svojim akcijama podstakli terorizam na
Kosmetu!", rekao je Miloševic, "kao što je i povlacenje Posmatracke
misije OEBS-a bio signal da se može otpoceti bombardovanje od strane
NATO pakta". Drugim recima, i Tribunal i OEBS, su bili saucesnici ne
samo šiptarskih bandita i terorista nego i agresije NATO pakta.
Iako je Savet bezbednosti UN - i uopšte organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija
- davno postao marioneta SAD i njene politike u odnosu na Jugoslaviju i
srpski narod, ipak je on u nekoliko svojih rezolucija akcije šiptarskih
ustanika na Kosmetu okarakterisao kao teroristicke akte, a tzv. OVK kao
teroristicku organizaciju.
Analizirajuci rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti UN o Kosovu i Metohiji,
usvojene pre agresije NATO na SR Jugoslaviju, jasno proizilazi
zakljucak da je na KiM došlo do teroristicke pobune i da je UCK
teroristicka organizacija. To se posebno vidi iz rezolucije 1160,
usvojene na sednici SB 31. marta 1998., zatim rezolucije 1199, usvojene
na sednici SB 23. septembra l998. godine i rezolucije 1203, usvojene na
sednici SB 24. oktobra 1998. godine.
Rezolucija 1160
Vec u samoj preambuli ove rezolucije je, pored ostalog, jasno izrecena
osuda " ... svih akata terorizma od strane KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army)
ili bilo koje druge grupe ili pojedinca, i svake spoljne podrske
teroristickoj aktivnosti na Kosovu, ukljucujuci finansiranje,
naoružavanje i obuku".
U operativnom delu rezolucije, u paragrafu 2, upucen je nedvosmislen
poziv rukovodstvu kosovskih Albanaca da "... osude sve teroristicke
akcije", podvlaceci da "...svi elementi albanske zajednice na Kosovu
treba da ostvaruju svoje ciljeve jedino politickim sredstvima". Nikada,
medutim, politicki predstavnici Albanaca na KiM nisu to ucinili, vec su
svim svojim postupcima ohrabrivali i davali direktnu podrsku terorizmu
OVK.
U paragrafu 8 iste rezolucije, uz zavodenje potpunog embarga u prodaji
ili snabdevanju Jugoslavije u naoružanju, Savet bezbednosti se cvrsto
obavezao da ce "...spreciti naoružavanje i obuku u korist teroristickih
aktivnosti na KiM...".
Da je to ostalo samo prazno obecanje pokazuje naknadni razvoj situacije
na KiM kada je sa jacanjem teroristickih aktivnosti UCK došlo do sve
masovnijeg priliva naoružanja i još intenzivnije obuke terorista,
posebno u Albaniji.
Rezolucija 1199
U preambuli ove rezolucije SB ponavlja osudu terorizma kao sredstva za
"...ostvarivanje politickih ciljeva bilo koje grupe ili pojedinca", i
osudjuje..."svaku spoljnu podrsku takvoj aktivnosti na Kosovu,
ukljucujuci snabdevanje oruzjem i obuku za teroriticke aktivnosti na
Kosovu, uz izrazavanje zabrinutosti zbog izvestaja o neprekinutom
krsenju zabrana uvedenih prethodnom Rezolucijom 1169..."
U operativnom delu rezolucije, u paragrafu 6, Savet insistira da
rukovodstvo kosovskih Albanaca "...osudi sve teroristicke akcije i
podvlaci da svi elementi u zajednici kosovski Albanaca treba da
ostvaruju svoje ciljeve jedino miroljubivim sredestvima..."
U paragrafu 11, Savet bezbednosti zahteva od svih država clanica
da..."sprece prikupljanje novcanih sredstava na njihovoj teritoriji
(funds collected on their territory), koja se koriste za kršenje
rezolucije 1160...".
Rezolucija 1203
I u ovoj, kao i u prethodni rezolucijama, Savet bezbednosti u njenoj
preambuli osudjuje..."kako sve akte nasilja svake strane, tako i
terorizam bilo koje grupe ili pojedinca za postizanje politickih
ciljeva, kao i svaku stranu podršku za takve aktivnosti na Kosovu,
ukljucujuci snabdevanje oružjem i obuku za izvodenje teroristickih
aktivnosti na Kosovu i izražava zabrinutost zbog izveštaja o
kontinuiranom kršenju zabrana uvedenih rezolucijom 1160 ...".
U paragrafu 10 ove, rezolucije Savet bezbednosti..."insistira na tome
da rukovodstvo kosovskih Albanaca osudi sve teroristicke akcije,
zahteva neodložan prestanak takvih aktivnosti i naglašava da svi
elementi albanske zajednice na Kosovu treba da ostvaruju svoje ciljeve
samo miroljubivim sredstvima...".
Šta veli Protokol II uz Ženevske konvencije?
Taj Protokol, koji je usvojen 1977. godine, "razvija i dopunjuje"
zajednicki clan 3 Ženevskih konvencija, clan u Ženevskim konvencijama
koji se odnosi na unutrašnje oružane sukobe, za razliku od ostalih
odredaba tih konvensija koje se odnose na medunarodne oružane sukobe,
to jest na sukome izmedu suverenih država. Da ovaj protokol predstavlja
savremeno pozitivno medunarodno pravo uglavnom nema spora, s napomenom
da ima dosta onih - a medu njima je i Medunarodni komitet crvenog krsta
MKCK) i stotine i stotine samozvanih medunaronih nevladinih
organizacija (NGO) koje sebe nazivaju humanitarnim - koje uporno
nastoje da ukinu razliku izmedu medunarodnih oružanih sukoba i
unutrašnjih, tvrdeci da je putem obicaja do tog izjednacavanja vec
došlo. Ta i takva nastojanja našala su svoj izraz i u clanovima 2-5
Statuta MKTJ, a narocito u jurisdikcije tog tribunala, koji je u više
svojih dosadašnjih odluka protiv Srba protiv kojih je vodio postupak
prrihvatao taj i takav koncep savremenog MHP. Medutim, sva ta i takva
nastojanja su pogrešna i neodrživa jer države clanice Ujedinjenih
nacija nisu spremane da u potpunosti napuste razlikovanja izmedu
pravnog položaja medunarodnih i unutrašnjih oružanih sukoba, što
najbolje svedoci upravo Statut Medunarodnog krivicnog suda, o cemu ce
niže biti pobliže reci.
Ali da se vratimo Protokolu II. Nas ovde ne zanima toliko na koji nacin
ovaj protokol štiti ucesnike u unutrašnjim oružanim sukobima, koliko
nas interesuje to kako ovaj protokol postavlja granicu izmedu noga što
jeste unutrašnji oružanih sukob i onoga što nije.
Nakon što u stavu 1 clana 1 definiše unutrašnji oružani sukob, u stavu
2 istog clana definiše što ne spada pod taj pojam - "oružani sukob
nemedunarodnog karaktera". Taj stav 2 clana 1 glasi:
Ovaj Protokol se nece primenjivati na situacije unutrašnjih nemira i
zategnutosti kao što su pobune, izolovani i sporadicni akti nasilja i
ostali akti slicne prirode, jer to nisu oružani sukobi.
Takve situacije, s kojima se manje-više gotovo svaka država povremno
može suociti u svom istorijskom i politickom trajanju, spadaju u
potpunosti pod njenu nadležnost kao njena unutrašnja stvar u smislu
Povelje UN i medunarodnog prava i pod njen pravni poredak.To, naravno,
ne znaci da se u takvim situacijama ne mogu pociniti zlocini; ustvari,
do zlocina gotovo uvek po prirodi stvari dolazi, ali to nisu "ratni"
zlocini. Niko ne može da porekne da su gotovo svakodnevni zlocini na
desetine a možda i na stotine tacaka u svetu. Gotovo svakodnevno citamo
o Ceceniji, Severnoj Irskoj, Šri Lanki, itd. Tako je bilo i na Kosovu i
Metohiji pre "relevantnog perioda", i za vreme tog perioda. Obe strane
su cinile razne zlocine.(Usput receno, za današnje stanje na KiM - koje
je pod okupacijom UNMIK-a i KFOR-a - može da se kaže da ako postoji
pakao na zemlji onda je to stanje na Kosmetu za Srbe i nealbance
tamo...). Teritorijalna država je, naravno, ne samo iskljucivo nadležna
nego i dužna u skladu sa svojim zakonodavstvom i svojim medunarodnim
obavezama o zaštiti ljudskih prava da goni pocinioce krivicnih dela do
kojih dolazi u takvim situacijama.
Šta veli Statut Medunarodnog krivicnog suda (Rimski statut)?
Vec smo napomenuli da postoje dosta snažne tendencije - narocito od
strane Medunarodnog komiteta crvenog krsta i u jursdikciji MKTJ da se
ukine razlika, u pogledu primene medunarodnog humanitarnog prava -
izmedu medunarodnih i unutrašnjih oružanih sukoba, tvrdeci da je u
periodu posle Drugog svetskog rata došlo do "razvoja" medunarodnog
humanitarnog prava u smislu ukidanja te razlike, to jest do razvoja
koji vodi ka primeni medunarodnog humanitarnog prava koje se odnosi na
medunarodne oružane sukobe i na unutrašnje oružane sukobe, jer,
navodno, nema opravdanja da žrtve ovih sukoba ne budu izjednacene u
pogledu zaštite izjednacene.
Smatramo da Statut Medunarodnog krivicnog suda, koji je usvojen na
1998. godine u Rimu, i kojeg su do danas ratifikovale vecina država
(ukljucujuci Jugoslaviju odnosno Srbiju i Crnu Goru) nije u celosti
prihvatio navedena nastojanja, i da je u osnovi zadržao onu razliku
koju pravi Protokol II.
Ipak, povodeci se za navedenim tendencijama ispoljenim pre svega u
MKCK, "humanitarnim" medunarodnim nevladinim orrganizacijama (NGO)
antijugoslovenskom i antisrpskom kampanjom u vezi sa ratovima na
prostoru prethodne Jugoslavije, Statut je napravio znacajna odstupanja
od postojecih normi medunarodnog humanitarnog prava. Prema clanu 7
Statuta, koji se odnosi na krivicna dela protiv covecnosti, za
pocinjenja nekog od ovih krivicnih dela preduslov više nije postojanje
stanja oružanog sukoba, bilo medunarodnog bilo unutrašnjeg. Drugo
znacajno odsstupanje sastoji se u tome što se pojam "ratni zlocin"
proteže i na oružane sukobe unutrašnjeg, nemedunarodnog oružanog sukoba.
No, ono osnovno što je relevantno za našu temu: razlikovanje kada je
jedan unutrašnji predstavlja rat u pravnotehnickom smislu i kada on to
nije zadržano je.
U relevantmo clanu Statuta MKS - clan 8 - se kaže da se njegove odredbe
koje se odnose na unutrašnje, interne oružane sukobe "ne primenjuju na
situacije unutrašnjih nemira i sukoba kao što su pobune, pojedinacni i
sporadicni akti nasilja ili drugi slicni akti." A zatim se veli (stav
3):
Nijedna od odredbi iz stava 2(c) i (d) (koje se odnose na unutrašnje
oružane sukobe- MT) ne odnosi se na pravo vlade da ordži ponovo
uspostavi red i zakon u državi ili da brani njeno jedinstvo i
teritorijalni integritet svim legitimnim sredstvima koja joj stoje na
raspolaganju.
Cak bi se moglo zakljuciti da su autori Statuta - sevesni onoga što se
dogada u savremenom svetu kao što su unutrašnji i medunarodni
terorizam, naglasili prava teritorrijane države da se obracunava sa
terorizmom i slicnim pojavama.
Statut MKS na snazi je od 1.jula 2002. godine i sve što je napred o
njegovim odredbama receno vredi od tog datuma, a ne za ranije
situacije. Dakle, kada je rec o Kosovu i Metohiji treba govoriti o
pravu koje je bilo na snazi u vreme dogadaja tamo.
Napomena:
(1) U tekstu objavljenom u "Glasu javnosti" od 15.8.2002. prof.dr
Predrag Simic daje gotovo kompletnu sliku albanskog lobija u SAD pa ga
zaista vredi procitati. Tekst je naslovljen "Albanski lobi šiptarska
majka" i podnaslovom "Ko i u cije ime ponovo otima Kosovo i Metohiju" i
"Pare su najjaci motiv americkih kongresmena da se bore za otcepljenje
srpske pokrajine od matice". V. www.glas-javnosti.co.yu od navedenog
datuma.
(2) Povodom tih procesa u zemlji protiv trojice pripadnika VJ, a koje
je Vrhovni vojni sud nedavno osudio na dugogodišnje kazne zatvora, v.
tekst ovog autora "RATNI ZLOCINI" BEZ RATA na adresi
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/reakcije_citalaca/2003-10-21_1.html
Danas (6.11. 2003) citamo u štampi da je, prema saopštenju Ministarstva
pravde Srbije, specijalni tužilac preuzeo vodenje krivicnog postupka
protiv bivših komandanata tzv. OVK Hašima Tacija, Agima Cekua i Ramuša
Haradinaja. Iz saopštrenja nije jasno za koja krivicna dela ce
osumnjiceni biti optuženi, ali izgleda da se srlja u istu grešku - da
ce ih se optužiti za "ratne zlocine", umesto da im se sudi za obicne
zlocine kao što su masovna ubistva, terorizam i drugo, jer, kao što
rekosmo, na Kosovu i Metohiji nije u pravnom smislu bilo rata izmedu
nadležnih jugoslovenskih i srpskih organa i šiptarskih pobunjenika i
terorista.
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/reakcije_citalaca/2003-11-11.html
Dr Milan Tepavac
5. novembar 2003.
Sukob izmedu jugoslovenskih i srpskih nadležnih organa sa šiptarskim
pobunjenicima i teroristima na Kosovu i Metohiji nije bio rat u pravnom
smislu. - Treba govoriti o tamo pocinjenim zlocinima, a ne o ratim
zlocinima. - Nema ratnih zlocina bez rata. -Karla del Ponte i njena
prethodnica Luiz Arbur su se rukovodile politickim motivima kada su
period od 1.1. do 20.6.1999. na Kosmetu okarakterisale kao "stanje
oružanog sukoba" (rata) u smislu medunarodnog prava. - Domaci sudovi
cine istu grešku kada krivcna dela tamo pocinjena kvalifikuju kao ratne
zlocine.
1. Uvodne napomene
Takozvano tužilaštvo takozvanog Medunarodnog krivicnog tribunala za
prethodnu Jugoslaviju (u daljem tekstu MKTJ) podnelo je optužnicu
protiv protiv Slobodana Miloševica, Milana Milutinovica, Nikole
Šajnovica, Dragoljuba Ojdanica i Vlajka Stojiljkovica 16. oktobra 2001.
(to je izmenjena optužnica u odnosu na prvu koju je tužilaštvo podnelo
usered agresije NATO, 22.maja 1999). Kasnije, 19. jula 2002, to
tužilaštvo je izdvojilo optužbu protiv Milutinovica, Šajnovica i
Ojdanica (u meduvremenu je Vlajko Stojiljkovic izvršio samoubistvo) u
posebnu optužnicu. Upravo dok pišem ovaj tekst (potkraj oktobra 2003)
tužilaštvo je "otpecatilo" i optužicu - koja nosi datum 22.septembra
2003 - za dogadanja na Kosmetu i protiv dvojice general Vojske
Jugoslavije Pavkovica i Lazarevica i dvojice policijskih general
Đordevica i Lukica.
Optužnica protiv Slobodana Miloševica povodom dogadanja na Kosovu i
Metohiji sadrži kjlucnu odredbu na kojoj, ustvari, pociva citava
optužnica. Rec je o tacki 69 koja glasi:
"69. Sve vreme na koje se odnosi ova optužnica, na Kosovu u SRJ
postojalo je stanje oružanog sukoba".
"Vreme na koje se odnosi optužnica" je vreme od 1. januara do 20. juna
1999. godine. Naime, i Miloševic i njegovi imenovani saradnici optuženi
su za navodna nedala koje su tamo pocinili jugoslovenski i srpski
organi u navedenom vremenskom periodu, koji period vremena je
tužilaštvo ocenilo, okarakterisalo kao "stanje oružanog sukoba".
(Optužnica protiv Pavkovica, Lazarevica, Đordevica i Lukica takode se
odnosi na isti period vremena i u njoj ponavlja da je u naznacenom
periodu na Kosmetu bilo "stanje oružanog sukoba"). Posmatrano sa
politicke tacke gledišta, ovakva ocena tužilaštva ucinjena je iz dva
osnovna razloga: (1) da bi se opravdala agresija NATO pakta i (2) da bi
se tužilaštvo odnosno tribunal mogli proglasiti nadležnim u pogledu
sukoba na Kosovu i Metohiji jugoslovenskih organa sa šiptarskim
pobunjenicima, secesionistima i teroristima.
Dakle, kljucno pitanje koje se ovde namece jeste da li je ili nije u
navedenom vremenskom periodu - od 1. januara do 20. juna 1999 - na
Kosovu i Methiji postojalo "stanje oružanog sukoba" u smislu
medunarodnog prava. Jer, u suprotnom - ako se dokaže da je ocena
tužilaštva pogrešna - optužbe tužilaštva protiv svih lica optuženih
povodom Kosova i Metohije padaju u vodu jer gubi nadležnost, a sva lica
u njegovim kazamatima u Ševeningenu morala bi odmah biti puštena na
slobodu, a verovatno i obeštecana za svu štetu koja im je protivpravno
naneta. Zato ce tužilaštvo, po prirodi stvari uciniti sve da je njegova
gornja postavka tacna, da se na Kosovu i Metohiji u naznacenom periodu
zaista radilo o "stanju oružanog sukoba". Svrha ovoga teksta je da
dokaže da je ocena, bolje receno, pretpostavka tužilaštva pogrešna, to
jest nije se radilo o oružanom sukobu u smislu medunarodnog prava, vec
o normalnoj i uobicajenoj intervenciji nadležnih državnih organa kada
na delu njene teritorije dode do pobune jednog dela njenog
stanovništva. Receno cisto pravnickim jezikom, sukob na Kosovu i
Metohiji u relevantnom vremenskom razdoblju izmedu nadležnih
jugoslovenskih i srpskih organa i jednog dela šiptarskog stanovništva
ne spada pod odredba stava 1 clan 1 Dodatnog protokola II uz Ženevske
konvencije, vec pod odredba stava 2 tog clana istog protokola. U daljem
tekstu ovo cemo razjasniti.
2. Šta se dogadalo u "relevantnom periodu",šta mu je prethodilo i -
usledilo
a) Opšti pogled na šiptarski separatizam
U kosovskoj optužnici protiv Slobodana Miloševica se navodi: "U julu
1990. godine, Skupština Srbije donela je odluku o raspuštanju Skupštine
Kosova, ubrzo nakon što je 114 poslanika od 123 predstavnika kosovskih
Albanca u Skupštini usvojilo nezvanicnu rezoluciju kojom Kosovo
proglašavaju ravnopravnim i nezavisnim entitetom u okviru SFRJ. U
septembru 1990. godine, mnogi od tih istih poslanika kosovskih Albanaca
proglasili su ustav "Republike Kosovo". Godinu dana kasnije, u
septembru 1991. godine, kosovski Albanci održali su nezvanicni
referendum na kome su u ogromnoj vecini glasali za nezavisnost. Dana
24. maja 1992. godine, kosovski Albanci održali su nezvanicne izbore za
skupštinu i predsednika "Republike Kosovo"...
Svakom ko ovo cita mora odmah da pada u oci cinjenica da tužilaštvo sve
te radnje koje su preduzete na Kosovu i Metohiji ne karakteriše pravim
imenom, naime da je rec o protivustavnim i protivzakonitim radnjama, iz
cega logicno sledi da sve ono što su preduzele nadležne jugoslovenske i
srpske vlasti kao odgovor na te radnje nije ništa drugo nego ono što se
preduzima u svakoj civilizovanoj i pravnoj državi. Ali, ovo
falsifikovanje istorije nije ništa prema onome što sledi. Dajuci ocenu
šireg istorijskog konteksta u Jugoslaviji u kome se krecu dogadaji na
KiM, tužilaštvo u istoj optužnici kaže:
"Krajem juna 1991. godine, SFRJ je pocela da se raspada u nizu ratova
koji su usledili jedan za drugim, u Republici Sloveniji (dalje u
tekstu: Slovenija), Republici Hrvatskoj (dalje u tekstu: Hrvatska) i
Bosni i Hercegovini. Slovenija je 25. juna 1991. godine proglasila
nezavisnost od SFRJ, što je dovelo do izbijanja rata; mirovni sporazum
postignut je 8. jula 1991. godine. Hrvatska je svoju nezavisnost
proglasila 25. juna 1991. godine, što je dovelo do borbi izmedu
hrvatskih vojnih snaga s jedne strane i JNA, paravojnih jedinica i
"Vojske Republike Srpske Krajine" s druge... Bosna i Hercegovina
proglasila je nezavisnost 6. marta 1992. godine, što je posle 6. aprila
1992. godine dovelo do rata širokih razmera. Dana 27. aprila 1992.
godine SFRJ je rekonstituisana kao SRJ. U to vreme JNA je
reorganizovana u VJ. U ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini, JNA, a kasnije VJ,
borila se zajedno sa "Vojskom Republike Srpske" protiv vojnih snaga
vlade Bosne i Hercegovine i "Hrvatskog vijeca obrane". Aktivna
neprijateljstva prestala su potpisivanjem Dejtonskog mirovnog sporazuma
u decembru 1995. godine". Ovim tekstom ce tužilaštvo uci u istoriju
ignorantnosti i bescašca ne samo medunarodne krivicne jurisprudencije i
jurisdikcije nego i u istoriju pravne i politticke teorije i istorije u
pokušaju da se falsifikuje istorija. (Otuda, više je nego normalno da
glavna parola predstojecih demonstracija, koje ce se održati u Hagu 8.
novembra o.g, biti "WE WILL NOT ALLOW THE NATO AGGRESSORS TO WRITE OUR
HISTORY"). I ovde, naravno u još vecoj meri, vredi ono što smo rekli u
pogledu KiM: dogadaje u Hrvatskoj, Sloveniji i Bosni i Hercegovini
tužilaštvo tendeciozno i zlonamerno ne naziva pravim imenom: da je rec
o protivustavnoj i protivzakonitoj oružanoj pobuni secesionistickih
snaga u tim jugoslovenskim republikama, podsticanim, planiranim i
finansiranim od svojih saucesnika - vladajucih krugova u SAD, Vatikanu
i EU (EZ) i islamskih fundamentalista. Svaka kap prolivene krvi na tim
prostorima je na rukama tih zlocinaca, a ovakvim stavovima tužilaštvo
se svrstava u njihove saucesnike.
O šiptarskom terorizmu na Kosovu i Metohiji moglo bi se mnogo govoriti
i kjige napisati. Ali, evo, zadržimo se na današnjoj (5.novembar 2003)
Politici u kojoj je informacija da je vlada Republike Srbije (dakle,
sadašnja, a ne "Miloševiceva" vlada) upravo objavila "belu kjigu" pod
naslovom Albanski terorizam i organizovani kriminal na Kosmetu ciji
naslov govori sam za sebe. Tu je i informacija da je šef UNMIK-a Hari
Holkeri obecao da ce istražiti ceo slucaj identiteta lica na
fotografijama koje su ovih dana objavljene u štampi kako trojica
pripadnika tzv. OVK drže u rukama odsecene glave srpskih vojnika. Tu je
takode informacija da je ministar pravde Srbije izjavio da ministarstvo
poseduje dokumentaciju, desetine hiljada stranica, o stravicnim
zlocinima nad Srbima na Kosmetu "najmonstruoznijim posle Drugog
svetskog rata". Taj materijal na nepobitan nacin potvrduje odgovornost
za više od 7.000 teroristickih napada u kojima je ubijeno preko 1.200
ljudi, ranjeno oko 1.350, kidnapovano gotovo 1.000, proterano 340.000
nealbanaca, oteto ili spaljeno 107.000 kuca...
O dogadajima na Kosovu i Metohiji i svojoj ulozi u njima Slobodan
Milošvic je u postupku protiv njega pred tribunalom rekao dosta toga,
narocito u svom uvodnom izlaganju povodom kosovske optužnice 13, 14,
15. i 18. febrara 2002. Iako je govorio više kao politicar nego kao
pravnik, jasno je da je i on uverenja da tribunal ni po njegovom
statutu nema nadležnosti u pogledu KiM. U svom intervjuu americkoj
agenciji Fox News od 24. avgusta 2001.(iz Haga) on je rekao: "There are
individual crimes, but there was a clear order that any crime has to be
punished immediately, and whoever did it, has to be arrested. And the
proof that that order was obeyed quite clearly and exactly the way it
was supposed to be obeyed is the fact that more than 500 different
individuals were arrested by the police or the army who were doing
so.Those were consequences of a chaotic situation created by the
massive bombing of NATO". Drugim recima, za sve zlocine (neumesno je
upotrebljavati izraz "ratni zlocini") pocinjene tamo i pre, i za vreme
NATO agresije i posle nje nadležni su domaci sudovi, a ne MKTJ.
b) Podrška iz inostranstva
Bez najgrubljeg i najbrutalnijeg mešanja u unutrašnje stvari
Jugoslavije i Srbije, protivno Povelji UN i svim principima
medunarodnog prava i osnovnim dokumentima OEBS (KEBS), bez spoljne
politicke, vojne, finansijske i druge podrške iz inostranstva na Kosovu
i Metohiji nikada ne bi došlo do onoga do cega je došlo i do cega još
uvek dolazi. Kada je rec o politickoj podršci, verovatno je
najpresudnija ona koja dolazi iz uticajnih krugova u SAD kao što su
snažni albanski lobi(1) u toj zemlji i uticajna Medunarodna krizna
grupa (ICG) u kojoj dominira antisrpski jevrejski lobi. Sva nastojanja
i svi apeli da se s tim prestane ostali su bezuspešni. Cak i apeli
Saveta bezbednosti UN da se obustavi spoljna podrska albanskim
teroristima na KiM ostali su i ostaju mrtvo slovo na papiru.
U toj i takvoj raboti posebna je uloga Albanije. Albanija je jedina
drzava na svetu koja je priznala ilegalnu "Republiku Kosovo", koju su
albanski separatisti proglasili nakon ilegalnih jednonacionalnih
"izbora" odrzanih jos 1992. godine. Neskrivenu podrsku albanskim
separatistima davali su svi drzavni organi Albanije, koja je postala
narocito snazna sa rasplamsavanjem terorizma na KiM , posebno od 1998.
godine.Tu podrsku je snazno izrazio i Parlament Albanije, koji je 28.
decembra 1998. godine usvojio "Rezoluciju o stanju na Kosovu", u kojoj
se za odbranu drzavne jugoslovenske granice od upada terorista iz
Albanije i sprecavanje brojnih pokusaja unosenja naoruzanja i vojne
opreme, izmedju ostalog, kaze: "Provokativna politika Beograda na
granici sa Republikom Albanijom tezi prosirivanju sukoba na sve
albanske prostore...". U istoj rezoluciji se, uz neskriven poziv
medjunarodnoj zajednici da vojno pomogne ostvarivanje separatiistickih
ciljeva albanskih terorista na KiM istice da parlament Albanije
..."zahteva snaznu podrsku od albanske vlade i drzave kosovskoj braci,
u cilju odolevanja vanrednim situacijama u kojima se oni nalaze i u
njihovim naporima da sami odlucuju o buducnosti Kosova", kao da je
Kosovo albansko i da ne pripada svim gradjanima koji tamo zive i koji
je nesporan deo Srbije i Jugoslavije.
Podrška Albanije teroristima i separatistima na KiM posebno je izražena
u naoružavanju i obuci terorista UCK.Prema zvanicnim i nezvanicnim
izvorima, u Albaniji je za obuku terorista OVK osnovan veliki broj
posebnih kampova, i to u: Tirani, Kuksu, Tropoji, Peskopeji, Hazu,
Krumi, Fierzi i drugim mestima. Pripremanje teroristickih grupa u
Albaniji potvrdio je i ambasador Dan Everts, sef Misije OEBS u
Albaniji, sto je preneo "Reuters" u svom izvestaju od 21. decembra
1998. godine, u kojem se kaze: ''Guerrillas from the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) are actively girding for war and using northern Albania as a
staging ground for their separatist campaign, an OSCE diplomat said.
'The north (of Albania) is a staging ground for the war and the KLA are
very busy '', ambassador Daan Everts, head of the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission in Albania told
Reuters at the weekend. The main KLA staging area now appears to have
been moved south into remote parts of a region known as the Has
highlands, wher Krume is the largest nearby town Discretion is the new
KLA watchword. It is uncommon to spot a KLA soldier in uniform in Krume
and the guerrillas generally conduct their business out of sight of
pryin eyes '', istice Reuters.
Niko više ne može da porekne postojanje logora za Al Kaide gde se
vršila obuka terorista. (Boško Jakšic u "Politici" od 1. novembra 2003).
U aktivnoj podrsci u obuci i naoruzavanju albanskih terorista
ucestvovale su i mnoge druge zemlje, posebno Nemacka. Tako, npr.,
britanski dnevnim "European" otkriva, pozivajuci se na diplomatske i
obavestajne izvore, da aktivni angazman nemackih obavestajnih sluzbi
(civilne i vojne) na obucavanju i opremanju terorista UCK za vrsenje
zlocinackih aktivnosti na Kosovu i Metohiji, datira od februara 1996.
godine, sa cilje da ..."cementira nemacki uticaj na balkanskom
prostoru...". Agenti BND bili su zaduzeni da formiraju komandnu
strukturu UCK, obezbede obavestajnu podrsku na ulaznim tackama
terorista u Italiju ( Trst i Bari) i osiguraju njihovo prebacivanje u
Albaniju i obuku terorista.
U najnovijim istraživanjima poznati publicista Kristofer Deliso
(Christopher Deliso) (http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso93.html)
konstatuje: "In 1998, when NATO's war on Yugoslavia was first being
organized, secret camps were set up in northern Albania. There, British
and American forces trained the rag-tag fighters of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). The two countries openly armed, supplied and
supported the KLA during the war against Milosevic, using the
paramilitary group as NATO's ground troops".
Prema pisanju ljubljanskog dnevnika "Delo", oficiri i podoficiri
slovenacke vojske albanske narodnosti ukljuceni su, takode, u obuku
terorista OVK, pa cak i u jihove borbene akcije na KiM.
***
U širokom spektru stavova raznih medunarodnih politickih struktura i
jednom delu medunarodne javnosti dominirala je smisljeno lansirana
neistina o tzv. "OVK" kao nekakvom "gerilskom pokretu" albanske
nacionalne zajednice na KiM.
Ipak je svest o teroristickom karakteru OVK bila prisutna kod
objektivnih posmatraca dogadaja na KiM. Tako je Federacija americkih
naucnika (FAS), koja se smatra "trustom mozgova", objavila izveštaj u
kojem je separatisticko - teroristicku OVK svrstala medu 113
najpoznatijih teroristickih organizacija u svetu. FAS je, uz State
Department, jedina organizacija u SAD koja se ozbiljno bavi
proucavanjem i klasifikovanjem teroristickih organizacija u svetu.
Džon Pajk, šef odseka za bezbednoist FAS -a, izjavio je da je njegova
organizacija izradila "kompletnu analizu, detaljno istražujuci nacin
delovanja i strukturu OVK, za razliku od State Departmenta, koji
procene bazira uglavnom na politickoj osnovi". Pajk sumarno navodi
cinjenice zbog kojih je OVK svrstana medju teroristicke organizacije.
Pre svega, taktika OVK sastoji se u napaima na organe bezbednosti, i to
iz zasede. Zatim, clanovi OVK organizovani su u celije od tri do pet
clanova, što je karaketristicno za teroristicke organizacije. Clanovi
grupe su vidno opsednuti svojom idejom odvajanja KiM od Srbije i SRJ i
njenog pripajanja tzv. "Velikoj Albaniji", a naredbe predpostavljenih
izvrsavaju bezpogovorno. U daljoj analizi FAS-a navodi se da u redovima
OVK ima oko 1000 placenika iz Albanije, Saudijske Arabije , Jemena,
Avganistana, BiH i Hrvatske, kao i "vojnih strucnjaka" iz Velike
Britanije i Nemacke, koji rade kao instruktori. Glavni kampovi za obuku
terorista OVK nalaze se u albanskim gradovima Ljabinot, Tropoja, Kukes
i Bajram Curi, gde su koncentrisane pristalice bivseg albanskog
predsednika Saloja Berise. U izvestaju FAS-a istaknuto je, pored
ostalog da su ..."I Rugova i OVK insistirali na nezavisnosti Kosova.
Otvoreni dugorocni cilj OVK jeste da ujedini albansko stanovnistvo
Kosova, Makedonije i Albanije u Veliku Albaniju. Sve do nedavno,
Kosovari su smatrali da je status trece republike u okviru Jugoslavije
za Kosovo samo prelazna faza u postizanju nezavisnosti Kosova..."
3. Pravna karakterizacija dogadanja u "relevantnom periodu"
Na osnovu onoga što je izneto napred pod tackom 1. i 2. mislimo da se
sam po sebi namece zakljucak da je tužilaštvo MKTJ pogrešno, sa pravnog
stanovišta, okarakterisalo sukob na Kosovu i Metohiji. Ono, ustvari,
ako cemo pravo gledati, i nije ni moglo drukcije da proceni pravnu
prirodu toga sukoba. Kao instrument antijugoslovenske i antisrpske
politike, potpuno u službi NATO pakta i najvecih neprijatelja
Jugoslavije i srpskog naroda koji su ga formirali i koji ga bogato
finansiraju ono, dakle, objektivno nije ni moglo drukcije postupiti.
Zbog toga što je ono podiglo optužnicu protiv Slobodana Miloševica,
tada predsednika SR Jugoslavije, usered NATO varvarske agresije, 22.
maja 1999. godine, ono je nesumnjivo, postalo saucesnik zlocinacke
agresije NATO pakta i njegovih satelita koji su mu dali logisticku i
drugu podršku u agresiji (Albanije, Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine,
Madarske, Makedonije), kao i saucesnik šiptarskih terorista na celu sa
takozvanom Oslobodilackom armijom Kosova. Podizanje te optužnice
nesumnjivo je ohrabrilo kako NATO tako i šiptarske teroriste.
Još pre "relevantnog perioda" glavni tužilac Luis Arbur nastojala je na
sve nacine da sukob na Kosmetu podvede pod oderedbe medunarodnog
humanitarnog prava, i da, na taj nacin, taj sukob podvede pod
jurisdikciju njenog tužilaštva odnosno tribunala. Još u martu 1998. ona
je ispoljavala pretenzije da se umeša u dogadaje na Kosmetu. Oktobra
iste godine ona se i zvanicno obratila jugoslovenskim organima da želi
da na Kosmetu vodi istragu. Tadašnji savezni ministar pravde Zoran
Kneževic je odgovorio Arburovoj da Tribunal nije nadležan za dešavanja
na Kosovu i Metohiji. On je objasnio da "na Kosmetu nema rata", vec da
je Srbija suocena "sa teroristickim akcijama bandita": "Na Kosovu i
Metohiji nije bilo rata. Teroristicke grupe sastavljene od kriminalaca
i verskih fabnatika nikada nisu bile organizovane jedinice", piše
Kneževic i istice da je Srbija uspešno završila policijsku akciju
protiv terorista. Na tom i takvom stavu je Savezna vlada istrajavala
sve do petooktobarske promene 2000. godine.
Medutim, tužilaštvo u novembru 1998. obaveštava jugoslovensku vladu da
je tužilaštvo tribunala zakljucilo da postoji dovoljno osnova za
nadležnost MKTJ i za sprovodenje istrage, i na tom stavu je istrajavalo
i za vreme agresije NATO pakta i istrajava do danas. Petooktobarski
režim je, razume se, odmah prihvatio stav Tribunala u pogledu pravnog
karaktera kosovskometohijskog sukoba, usvojio u tom smislu odgovarajuce
propise, i odmah poceo da "isporucuje" sve one koje je tribunal tražio
"zbog kršenja medunarodnog humanitarnog prava". I u zemlji su poceli
procesi zbog "ratnih zlocina" na KiM(2) Pri tome zaprepašcuje kolko je
prisutno pravnicke neukosti i politicke servilnosti prema stranim
stvarnim i umišljenim mocnicima.
U postupku protiv Slobodana Miloševica tom smislu svedocio je pred
tribunalom zamenik glavnog tužioca tribunala Grejem Bluit 30. oktobra
2003. Miloševic je, razume se, ta i takva nastojanja tužilaštva i
tribunala - da imaju nadležnost u pogledu KiM - osporavo, optužujuci ih
za neistinost, tendencioznost i pristrasnost, mada je trebalo da, kao
pravnik po obrazovanju, da pravno elaborira svoje stavove pozivajuci se
na medunarodno pravo, pre svega na Dopunski protokol II Ženevskim
konvencijama koji predstavljaju savremeno medunarodno pravo. U
unakrsnom ispitivanju Bluita on je povišenim tonom rekao svedoku da
tužilaštvo nije želelo da sprovodi istragu o zlocinima šiptarske
strane, o vezi tzv. OVK sa islamskim teroristima, pa i sa samim Bin
Ladenom, niti je želelo da se bavi zlocinima NATO pocinjenih tokom
bombardovanja Srbije. "Vi ste svojim akcijama podstakli terorizam na
Kosmetu!", rekao je Miloševic, "kao što je i povlacenje Posmatracke
misije OEBS-a bio signal da se može otpoceti bombardovanje od strane
NATO pakta". Drugim recima, i Tribunal i OEBS, su bili saucesnici ne
samo šiptarskih bandita i terorista nego i agresije NATO pakta.
Iako je Savet bezbednosti UN - i uopšte organizacija Ujedinjenih nacija
- davno postao marioneta SAD i njene politike u odnosu na Jugoslaviju i
srpski narod, ipak je on u nekoliko svojih rezolucija akcije šiptarskih
ustanika na Kosmetu okarakterisao kao teroristicke akte, a tzv. OVK kao
teroristicku organizaciju.
Analizirajuci rezolucije Saveta bezbednosti UN o Kosovu i Metohiji,
usvojene pre agresije NATO na SR Jugoslaviju, jasno proizilazi
zakljucak da je na KiM došlo do teroristicke pobune i da je UCK
teroristicka organizacija. To se posebno vidi iz rezolucije 1160,
usvojene na sednici SB 31. marta 1998., zatim rezolucije 1199, usvojene
na sednici SB 23. septembra l998. godine i rezolucije 1203, usvojene na
sednici SB 24. oktobra 1998. godine.
Rezolucija 1160
Vec u samoj preambuli ove rezolucije je, pored ostalog, jasno izrecena
osuda " ... svih akata terorizma od strane KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army)
ili bilo koje druge grupe ili pojedinca, i svake spoljne podrske
teroristickoj aktivnosti na Kosovu, ukljucujuci finansiranje,
naoružavanje i obuku".
U operativnom delu rezolucije, u paragrafu 2, upucen je nedvosmislen
poziv rukovodstvu kosovskih Albanaca da "... osude sve teroristicke
akcije", podvlaceci da "...svi elementi albanske zajednice na Kosovu
treba da ostvaruju svoje ciljeve jedino politickim sredstvima". Nikada,
medutim, politicki predstavnici Albanaca na KiM nisu to ucinili, vec su
svim svojim postupcima ohrabrivali i davali direktnu podrsku terorizmu
OVK.
U paragrafu 8 iste rezolucije, uz zavodenje potpunog embarga u prodaji
ili snabdevanju Jugoslavije u naoružanju, Savet bezbednosti se cvrsto
obavezao da ce "...spreciti naoružavanje i obuku u korist teroristickih
aktivnosti na KiM...".
Da je to ostalo samo prazno obecanje pokazuje naknadni razvoj situacije
na KiM kada je sa jacanjem teroristickih aktivnosti UCK došlo do sve
masovnijeg priliva naoružanja i još intenzivnije obuke terorista,
posebno u Albaniji.
Rezolucija 1199
U preambuli ove rezolucije SB ponavlja osudu terorizma kao sredstva za
"...ostvarivanje politickih ciljeva bilo koje grupe ili pojedinca", i
osudjuje..."svaku spoljnu podrsku takvoj aktivnosti na Kosovu,
ukljucujuci snabdevanje oruzjem i obuku za teroriticke aktivnosti na
Kosovu, uz izrazavanje zabrinutosti zbog izvestaja o neprekinutom
krsenju zabrana uvedenih prethodnom Rezolucijom 1169..."
U operativnom delu rezolucije, u paragrafu 6, Savet insistira da
rukovodstvo kosovskih Albanaca "...osudi sve teroristicke akcije i
podvlaci da svi elementi u zajednici kosovski Albanaca treba da
ostvaruju svoje ciljeve jedino miroljubivim sredestvima..."
U paragrafu 11, Savet bezbednosti zahteva od svih država clanica
da..."sprece prikupljanje novcanih sredstava na njihovoj teritoriji
(funds collected on their territory), koja se koriste za kršenje
rezolucije 1160...".
Rezolucija 1203
I u ovoj, kao i u prethodni rezolucijama, Savet bezbednosti u njenoj
preambuli osudjuje..."kako sve akte nasilja svake strane, tako i
terorizam bilo koje grupe ili pojedinca za postizanje politickih
ciljeva, kao i svaku stranu podršku za takve aktivnosti na Kosovu,
ukljucujuci snabdevanje oružjem i obuku za izvodenje teroristickih
aktivnosti na Kosovu i izražava zabrinutost zbog izveštaja o
kontinuiranom kršenju zabrana uvedenih rezolucijom 1160 ...".
U paragrafu 10 ove, rezolucije Savet bezbednosti..."insistira na tome
da rukovodstvo kosovskih Albanaca osudi sve teroristicke akcije,
zahteva neodložan prestanak takvih aktivnosti i naglašava da svi
elementi albanske zajednice na Kosovu treba da ostvaruju svoje ciljeve
samo miroljubivim sredstvima...".
Šta veli Protokol II uz Ženevske konvencije?
Taj Protokol, koji je usvojen 1977. godine, "razvija i dopunjuje"
zajednicki clan 3 Ženevskih konvencija, clan u Ženevskim konvencijama
koji se odnosi na unutrašnje oružane sukobe, za razliku od ostalih
odredaba tih konvensija koje se odnose na medunarodne oružane sukobe,
to jest na sukome izmedu suverenih država. Da ovaj protokol predstavlja
savremeno pozitivno medunarodno pravo uglavnom nema spora, s napomenom
da ima dosta onih - a medu njima je i Medunarodni komitet crvenog krsta
MKCK) i stotine i stotine samozvanih medunaronih nevladinih
organizacija (NGO) koje sebe nazivaju humanitarnim - koje uporno
nastoje da ukinu razliku izmedu medunarodnih oružanih sukoba i
unutrašnjih, tvrdeci da je putem obicaja do tog izjednacavanja vec
došlo. Ta i takva nastojanja našala su svoj izraz i u clanovima 2-5
Statuta MKTJ, a narocito u jurisdikcije tog tribunala, koji je u više
svojih dosadašnjih odluka protiv Srba protiv kojih je vodio postupak
prrihvatao taj i takav koncep savremenog MHP. Medutim, sva ta i takva
nastojanja su pogrešna i neodrživa jer države clanice Ujedinjenih
nacija nisu spremane da u potpunosti napuste razlikovanja izmedu
pravnog položaja medunarodnih i unutrašnjih oružanih sukoba, što
najbolje svedoci upravo Statut Medunarodnog krivicnog suda, o cemu ce
niže biti pobliže reci.
Ali da se vratimo Protokolu II. Nas ovde ne zanima toliko na koji nacin
ovaj protokol štiti ucesnike u unutrašnjim oružanim sukobima, koliko
nas interesuje to kako ovaj protokol postavlja granicu izmedu noga što
jeste unutrašnji oružanih sukob i onoga što nije.
Nakon što u stavu 1 clana 1 definiše unutrašnji oružani sukob, u stavu
2 istog clana definiše što ne spada pod taj pojam - "oružani sukob
nemedunarodnog karaktera". Taj stav 2 clana 1 glasi:
Ovaj Protokol se nece primenjivati na situacije unutrašnjih nemira i
zategnutosti kao što su pobune, izolovani i sporadicni akti nasilja i
ostali akti slicne prirode, jer to nisu oružani sukobi.
Takve situacije, s kojima se manje-više gotovo svaka država povremno
može suociti u svom istorijskom i politickom trajanju, spadaju u
potpunosti pod njenu nadležnost kao njena unutrašnja stvar u smislu
Povelje UN i medunarodnog prava i pod njen pravni poredak.To, naravno,
ne znaci da se u takvim situacijama ne mogu pociniti zlocini; ustvari,
do zlocina gotovo uvek po prirodi stvari dolazi, ali to nisu "ratni"
zlocini. Niko ne može da porekne da su gotovo svakodnevni zlocini na
desetine a možda i na stotine tacaka u svetu. Gotovo svakodnevno citamo
o Ceceniji, Severnoj Irskoj, Šri Lanki, itd. Tako je bilo i na Kosovu i
Metohiji pre "relevantnog perioda", i za vreme tog perioda. Obe strane
su cinile razne zlocine.(Usput receno, za današnje stanje na KiM - koje
je pod okupacijom UNMIK-a i KFOR-a - može da se kaže da ako postoji
pakao na zemlji onda je to stanje na Kosmetu za Srbe i nealbance
tamo...). Teritorijalna država je, naravno, ne samo iskljucivo nadležna
nego i dužna u skladu sa svojim zakonodavstvom i svojim medunarodnim
obavezama o zaštiti ljudskih prava da goni pocinioce krivicnih dela do
kojih dolazi u takvim situacijama.
Šta veli Statut Medunarodnog krivicnog suda (Rimski statut)?
Vec smo napomenuli da postoje dosta snažne tendencije - narocito od
strane Medunarodnog komiteta crvenog krsta i u jursdikciji MKTJ da se
ukine razlika, u pogledu primene medunarodnog humanitarnog prava -
izmedu medunarodnih i unutrašnjih oružanih sukoba, tvrdeci da je u
periodu posle Drugog svetskog rata došlo do "razvoja" medunarodnog
humanitarnog prava u smislu ukidanja te razlike, to jest do razvoja
koji vodi ka primeni medunarodnog humanitarnog prava koje se odnosi na
medunarodne oružane sukobe i na unutrašnje oružane sukobe, jer,
navodno, nema opravdanja da žrtve ovih sukoba ne budu izjednacene u
pogledu zaštite izjednacene.
Smatramo da Statut Medunarodnog krivicnog suda, koji je usvojen na
1998. godine u Rimu, i kojeg su do danas ratifikovale vecina država
(ukljucujuci Jugoslaviju odnosno Srbiju i Crnu Goru) nije u celosti
prihvatio navedena nastojanja, i da je u osnovi zadržao onu razliku
koju pravi Protokol II.
Ipak, povodeci se za navedenim tendencijama ispoljenim pre svega u
MKCK, "humanitarnim" medunarodnim nevladinim orrganizacijama (NGO)
antijugoslovenskom i antisrpskom kampanjom u vezi sa ratovima na
prostoru prethodne Jugoslavije, Statut je napravio znacajna odstupanja
od postojecih normi medunarodnog humanitarnog prava. Prema clanu 7
Statuta, koji se odnosi na krivicna dela protiv covecnosti, za
pocinjenja nekog od ovih krivicnih dela preduslov više nije postojanje
stanja oružanog sukoba, bilo medunarodnog bilo unutrašnjeg. Drugo
znacajno odsstupanje sastoji se u tome što se pojam "ratni zlocin"
proteže i na oružane sukobe unutrašnjeg, nemedunarodnog oružanog sukoba.
No, ono osnovno što je relevantno za našu temu: razlikovanje kada je
jedan unutrašnji predstavlja rat u pravnotehnickom smislu i kada on to
nije zadržano je.
U relevantmo clanu Statuta MKS - clan 8 - se kaže da se njegove odredbe
koje se odnose na unutrašnje, interne oružane sukobe "ne primenjuju na
situacije unutrašnjih nemira i sukoba kao što su pobune, pojedinacni i
sporadicni akti nasilja ili drugi slicni akti." A zatim se veli (stav
3):
Nijedna od odredbi iz stava 2(c) i (d) (koje se odnose na unutrašnje
oružane sukobe- MT) ne odnosi se na pravo vlade da ordži ponovo
uspostavi red i zakon u državi ili da brani njeno jedinstvo i
teritorijalni integritet svim legitimnim sredstvima koja joj stoje na
raspolaganju.
Cak bi se moglo zakljuciti da su autori Statuta - sevesni onoga što se
dogada u savremenom svetu kao što su unutrašnji i medunarodni
terorizam, naglasili prava teritorrijane države da se obracunava sa
terorizmom i slicnim pojavama.
Statut MKS na snazi je od 1.jula 2002. godine i sve što je napred o
njegovim odredbama receno vredi od tog datuma, a ne za ranije
situacije. Dakle, kada je rec o Kosovu i Metohiji treba govoriti o
pravu koje je bilo na snazi u vreme dogadaja tamo.
Napomena:
(1) U tekstu objavljenom u "Glasu javnosti" od 15.8.2002. prof.dr
Predrag Simic daje gotovo kompletnu sliku albanskog lobija u SAD pa ga
zaista vredi procitati. Tekst je naslovljen "Albanski lobi šiptarska
majka" i podnaslovom "Ko i u cije ime ponovo otima Kosovo i Metohiju" i
"Pare su najjaci motiv americkih kongresmena da se bore za otcepljenje
srpske pokrajine od matice". V. www.glas-javnosti.co.yu od navedenog
datuma.
(2) Povodom tih procesa u zemlji protiv trojice pripadnika VJ, a koje
je Vrhovni vojni sud nedavno osudio na dugogodišnje kazne zatvora, v.
tekst ovog autora "RATNI ZLOCINI" BEZ RATA na adresi
http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/reakcije_citalaca/2003-10-21_1.html
Danas (6.11. 2003) citamo u štampi da je, prema saopštenju Ministarstva
pravde Srbije, specijalni tužilac preuzeo vodenje krivicnog postupka
protiv bivših komandanata tzv. OVK Hašima Tacija, Agima Cekua i Ramuša
Haradinaja. Iz saopštrenja nije jasno za koja krivicna dela ce
osumnjiceni biti optuženi, ali izgleda da se srlja u istu grešku - da
ce ih se optužiti za "ratne zlocine", umesto da im se sudi za obicne
zlocine kao što su masovna ubistva, terorizam i drugo, jer, kao što
rekosmo, na Kosovu i Metohiji nije u pravnom smislu bilo rata izmedu
nadležnih jugoslovenskih i srpskih organa i šiptarskih pobunjenika i
terorista.
http://www.resistenze.org/sito/te/po/yu/poyu3m05.htm
---
www.resistenze.org - popoli resistenti - jugoslavia - 05-11-03
Questa breve ma precisa analisi, ci è stata preparata da R.
Milosavljevic, in seguito all’ultimo viaggio ed all’incontro con lei
avuto sulla situazione dei lavoratori. Seguiranno altri lavori a breve.
( E.V.)
Serbia: non si intravede la fine della crisi
Per molti rappresenta probabilmente una sorpresa il fatto che la nostra
economia continua a trovarsi in uno stato di profonda recessione, le
cui conseguenze sopportiamo con sempre maggiore difficoltà, sia perché
la crisi dura da molto tempo, sia perché di essa non si intravede la
fine.
E’ stato un approccio evidentemente sbagliato pensare che la
stabilizzazione e la liberalizzazione a livello macroeconomico, così
come un veloce processo di privatizzazione, avrebbero risolto tutti i
problemi. Purtroppo gli euforici annunci di riforme, così come le
grandi promesse di un miglioramento del livello di vita, non si sono
realizzati. Nemmeno nel terzo anno delle annunciate riforme l’economia
si è messa in moto. I risultati economici sono decisamente negativi e
né i cittadini né gli operatori economici possono più sostenere la
terapia – shock neoliberale. La produzione industriale per i primi
sette mesi ha avuto un crollo del 3,5%, quella agricola una recessione
del 10%, il deficit del commercio estero per gli scorsi 30 mesi ha
raggiunto i 9.215 miliardi di dollari, il nostro debito pubblico alla
fine di agosto ha toccato i 13,5 miliardi di dollari, siamo caduti in
uno stato di schiavitù da indebitamento e l’economia stagnante non sarà
in grado di far fronte a impegni che hanno superato la somma della
produzione nazionale lorda.
Sono disoccupate 968.250 persone, 1.282.049 sono occupate e lavorano
in media 3,5 ore, e 194.779 lavoratori lo scorso mese non hanno
ricevuto lo stipendio.
LO SFRUTTAMENTO DELLE CAPACITA’ PRODUTTIVE
Lo sfruttamento delle capacità produttive è inferiore al 40 per cento,
e l’80 per cento delle attrezzature è antiquato. Il tasso di crescita
economica anche quest’anno difficilmente supererà l’uno per cento, e
secondo il calcolo degli esperti ci saranno necessari 30 anni per
raggiungere il livello del 1989. In particolare 34.208 imprese devono
cadere in fallimento, ed altri 468.000 lavoratori rimanere senza
impiego. Secondo le ricerche degli esperti, il 74 per cento dei
cittadini vive con una quota compresa tra l’uno e i due dollari al
giorno, e di essi il 32% si trova in uno stato di povertà grave. Sulla
Serbia incombe un’esplosione sociale simile a quella avvenuta in
Argentina, lodata dai burocrati internazionali per dieci anni, finché
non è avvenuto il tracollo economico. Al posto di uno sviluppo
economico abbiamo ottenuto una recessione da transizione, una drastica
caduta degli standard di vita, la crescita dei debiti e del deficit ed
un’economia non liquida.
Lo stato dell’economia è drammatico. Le ricerche mostrano che solo il
17,7 per cento dei giovani vuole rimanere in patria, gli altri vogliono
andarsene. Gli esperti continuano ad avvertire che è l’ultimo periodo
utile per poter compiere qualcosa di più serio nel cambiamento di
questo stato. Detto in gergo sportivo, quando i risultati non arrivano
bisogna cambiare la squadra e il gioco; significa che bisogna portare
a termine due elementi chiave, cioè cambiare il concetto di riforma e
cambiare le persone.
Purtroppo in questo momento non c’è né la possibilità né la voglia di
muoversi in questo senso, o perlomeno di raggiungere un consenso
nazionale su una propria strada alle riforme, che costruirebbero un
sistema economico volto ad uno sviluppo in cui con la privatizzazione
si arriverebbe ad una liquidazione delle sostanze. La scena politica
cupa e molto instabile è quotidianamente aggravata da controversie tra
i partiti, da un lavoro esacerbato del parlamento, da scandali
ministeriali, da frequenti scioperi dei lavoratori a causa
dell’illegale attuazione della privatizzazione; è un ambiente che non
permette alla forze politiche progressiste di preparare una svolta più
radicale nella qualità delle riforme e dello sviluppo economico.
E mentre le parti politiche e i sindacati patteggiano reciprocamente
il profitto della propria esistenza, continua lo sfacelo economico, e
di questa crisi non si vede la fine.
Ružica Milosavljević (ex Segretaria Sindacato Samostalni Zastava
Kragujevac)
Trad. a cura di Elisa Marengo
---
www.resistenze.org - popoli resistenti - jugoslavia - 05-11-03
Questa breve ma precisa analisi, ci è stata preparata da R.
Milosavljevic, in seguito all’ultimo viaggio ed all’incontro con lei
avuto sulla situazione dei lavoratori. Seguiranno altri lavori a breve.
( E.V.)
Serbia: non si intravede la fine della crisi
Per molti rappresenta probabilmente una sorpresa il fatto che la nostra
economia continua a trovarsi in uno stato di profonda recessione, le
cui conseguenze sopportiamo con sempre maggiore difficoltà, sia perché
la crisi dura da molto tempo, sia perché di essa non si intravede la
fine.
E’ stato un approccio evidentemente sbagliato pensare che la
stabilizzazione e la liberalizzazione a livello macroeconomico, così
come un veloce processo di privatizzazione, avrebbero risolto tutti i
problemi. Purtroppo gli euforici annunci di riforme, così come le
grandi promesse di un miglioramento del livello di vita, non si sono
realizzati. Nemmeno nel terzo anno delle annunciate riforme l’economia
si è messa in moto. I risultati economici sono decisamente negativi e
né i cittadini né gli operatori economici possono più sostenere la
terapia – shock neoliberale. La produzione industriale per i primi
sette mesi ha avuto un crollo del 3,5%, quella agricola una recessione
del 10%, il deficit del commercio estero per gli scorsi 30 mesi ha
raggiunto i 9.215 miliardi di dollari, il nostro debito pubblico alla
fine di agosto ha toccato i 13,5 miliardi di dollari, siamo caduti in
uno stato di schiavitù da indebitamento e l’economia stagnante non sarà
in grado di far fronte a impegni che hanno superato la somma della
produzione nazionale lorda.
Sono disoccupate 968.250 persone, 1.282.049 sono occupate e lavorano
in media 3,5 ore, e 194.779 lavoratori lo scorso mese non hanno
ricevuto lo stipendio.
LO SFRUTTAMENTO DELLE CAPACITA’ PRODUTTIVE
Lo sfruttamento delle capacità produttive è inferiore al 40 per cento,
e l’80 per cento delle attrezzature è antiquato. Il tasso di crescita
economica anche quest’anno difficilmente supererà l’uno per cento, e
secondo il calcolo degli esperti ci saranno necessari 30 anni per
raggiungere il livello del 1989. In particolare 34.208 imprese devono
cadere in fallimento, ed altri 468.000 lavoratori rimanere senza
impiego. Secondo le ricerche degli esperti, il 74 per cento dei
cittadini vive con una quota compresa tra l’uno e i due dollari al
giorno, e di essi il 32% si trova in uno stato di povertà grave. Sulla
Serbia incombe un’esplosione sociale simile a quella avvenuta in
Argentina, lodata dai burocrati internazionali per dieci anni, finché
non è avvenuto il tracollo economico. Al posto di uno sviluppo
economico abbiamo ottenuto una recessione da transizione, una drastica
caduta degli standard di vita, la crescita dei debiti e del deficit ed
un’economia non liquida.
Lo stato dell’economia è drammatico. Le ricerche mostrano che solo il
17,7 per cento dei giovani vuole rimanere in patria, gli altri vogliono
andarsene. Gli esperti continuano ad avvertire che è l’ultimo periodo
utile per poter compiere qualcosa di più serio nel cambiamento di
questo stato. Detto in gergo sportivo, quando i risultati non arrivano
bisogna cambiare la squadra e il gioco; significa che bisogna portare
a termine due elementi chiave, cioè cambiare il concetto di riforma e
cambiare le persone.
Purtroppo in questo momento non c’è né la possibilità né la voglia di
muoversi in questo senso, o perlomeno di raggiungere un consenso
nazionale su una propria strada alle riforme, che costruirebbero un
sistema economico volto ad uno sviluppo in cui con la privatizzazione
si arriverebbe ad una liquidazione delle sostanze. La scena politica
cupa e molto instabile è quotidianamente aggravata da controversie tra
i partiti, da un lavoro esacerbato del parlamento, da scandali
ministeriali, da frequenti scioperi dei lavoratori a causa
dell’illegale attuazione della privatizzazione; è un ambiente che non
permette alla forze politiche progressiste di preparare una svolta più
radicale nella qualità delle riforme e dello sviluppo economico.
E mentre le parti politiche e i sindacati patteggiano reciprocamente
il profitto della propria esistenza, continua lo sfacelo economico, e
di questa crisi non si vede la fine.
Ružica Milosavljević (ex Segretaria Sindacato Samostalni Zastava
Kragujevac)
Trad. a cura di Elisa Marengo
Terrorists springboards in the Balkans
1. Is Albania Sponsoring 'Freedom Fighters' Next Door?
And What Happened to the Balkan Mujahedin, Anyway?
(by Christopher Deliso)
2. Al Qaeda's European attack route is the Balkans, new
evidence claims (by Christopher Deliso)
3. THE COMING NEW SURGE in European Islamist Terrorism:
The Momentum Has Begun (By Gregory R. Copley, Editor,
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 2003)
RELATED TEXTS:
JIHAD the Holy War - Lashva valley:
http://public.srce.hr/zatocenici/jihad.htm
Video fragments showing Alija Izetbegovic's links with Mujahedin units:
http://public.srce.hr/zatocenici/video_en.htm
The Union of Death - Terrorists and Freedom Fighters in the Balkans (by
Sam Vaknin):
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/vaknin/093.shtml
How we trained al-Qa’eda. The Bosnian war taught Islamic terrorists to
operate abroad:
http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/sep03/hed5999.shtml
or
http://www.spectator.co.uk/
article.php3?table=old§ion=current&issue=2003-09-13&id=3499&searchText=
=== 1 ===
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso93.html
Is Albania Sponsoring 'Freedom Fighters' Next Door?
And What Happened to the Balkan Mujahedin, Anyway?
by Christopher Deliso
October 30, 2003
In 1998, when NATO's war on Yugoslavia was first being
organized, secret camps were set up in northern Albania.
There, British and American forces trained the rag-tag fighters
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The two countries openly
armed, supplied and supported the KLA during the war against
Milosevic, using the paramilitary group as NATO's ground
troops.
A New Question
All of this is fact. Albania's army also directly trained the KLA.
After all, if the West said it was OK, then there was nothing to
be embarrassed about. However, once the fallout from Kosovo
registered and Macedonia was destabilized by the renamed
militants of the NLA (National Liberation Army) in 2001, Tirana
changed its tune. It officially deplored the violence and denied
having anything to do with sponsoring the rebels.
However, at the same time "all contact stopped" between the
intelligence services of the two countries, according to one
informed Macedonian source. Clearly, Albania was not entirely
pleased with beleaguered Macedonia's attempts at self-
defense.
Since then, the Albanian government has gone to great lengths
to boost economic and defense cooperation with Macedonia,
under the rubric of NATO enlargement and participations in
joint ventures along the east-west Corridor 8, such as
prospective railroad lines and oil pipelines . Albania is clearly
looking for a new lease on life and deliverance from the
economic dark ages that afflict most citizens who aren't super-
rich politicos or gangsters.
Nevertheless, despite these increasingly positive
developments, a new question has been raised regarding the
current involvement of the Albanian government – in whole or
in part – in sponsoring paramilitary groups active in
neighboring states. This issue is complex; its contemplation
only invites further questions. With Albania, do we have state-
sponsored attempts at control through disruption (as was the
case with Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban?) Or could it be
instead just the manipulations of sparring political gangs?
Tirana Cracks Down: One Arrested, Another Indicted
In July, the Albanian government arrested one Gafurr Adili,
leader of the Front of Albanian National Unity (FBKSH). This
diaspora-based group claims to be the political wing of the
AKSH (or ANA, Albanian National Army), active since 2001 in
Kosovo and Macedonia. The group's stated goal is to gather all
"Albanian lands" into one majestic 19th century nation-state, by
waging war with the "Slav colonizers," Greeks, and whoever
else gets in their way.
Simultaneously, the Swiss banned Adili from living in their
country. Stated the BBC, "…until now he has enjoyed refugee
status – though it appears that he is not actually barred from
visiting Switzerland where members of his family live." Such
ambivalent restrictions are completely characteristic of the
West's schizophrenic, lax treatment of Albanian militants since
even before 2001.
On 8 October, a second arrest warrant was lodged for the
leader of Albania's right-wing Party of National Unity, Idajet
Beqiri. A high profile FBKSH leader, Beqiri is accused of
"incitement and support for the extremist group."
Since last spring's attack on a bridge near Mitrovica, which
proved that Kosovo Protection Corps staff members were
moonlighting for the AKSH, the group has been deemed a
"terrorist" one by Balkan and Western governments alike.
Reports in the Economist and elsewhere described it as
being run by increasingly desperate criminals and KLA
veterans impatient with UNMIK's rule in Kosovo. This year's
more concerted crackdowns by KFOR on smuggling, as well as
similar revived efforts by Macedonian authorities, have also
angered the militants. Averred the Economist on 12
September:
"…the AKSH represents few ethnic-Albanians. Its core consists
of some 50-70 cigarette smugglers drawn from both sides of
the border with Kosovo. Their latest violence has been largely
prompted by their desire to stop Macedonia's police from
shutting down their smuggling routes and putting them behind
bars. Hisni Shaqiri, an ethnic-Albanian MP in Skopje who is
trying to help keep the peace between Macedonia's Albanians
and Slavs, describes Avdil Jakupi, the AKSH's "divisional
commander" known as Chakala, as a "mental patient and
heroin addict". A British brigadier advising the Macedonian
government on defence calls the AKSH "criminals flying a
political flag of convenience in the hope of finding legitimacy."
Revelations from the Inside
Until now, little has been revealed about the "highly secretive"
AKSH. Who runs it? What are its plans? Does it really exist?
Most importantly, perhaps, what is the leadership and extent of
support enjoyed by its political wing, the FBKSH?
Recent new information from Idajet Beqiri himself casts
considerable light on this issue. In its October 11-17 issue, the
Serbian publication NIN ran a lengthy interview with him.
Apparently, Beqiri also has a pseudonym – Albana Viosu –
and is the secretary of the FBKSH. He founded Albania's Party
of National Unity, was elected its president in 1991, and
embarked on a volatile political career that saw him imprisoned,
empowered and involved with various scandals.
He has a law degree from the University of Tirana, served as a
judge and claims to now work as a lawyer. Since 1997, he has
been stationed in Western Europe, where he has lobbied and
raised money for Albanian militant groups.
NIN claims the interview was arranged "…by tracing the news
of an Albanian lawyer who organizes gatherings for wealthy
Albanians throughout Western Europe." A "smiling" Beqiri then
met the interviewers in Brussels.
Taking All the Credit…
Doubtless, we have to take the inevitable boasting with a grain
of salt. Such figures tend to exaggerate their popularity and
gains. Thus when asked whether the group only exists "on the
internet," Beqiri cited "proof" to the contrary, being "…the 33
attacks for which we have assumed responsibility, as well as
numerous members that join us daily."
Indeed, there have been around 30 minor bombings, murders
and other mishaps since 2001, but it is decidedly unclear as to
whether these were all carried out by one unified group under
a single banner and command. Beqiri himself states that right
now "…seven armed groups that aren't under our control act in
Kosovo and Macedonia," each having around 40 members.
Given the track record for Albanian gang infighting in Kosovo
and Macedonia, it seems more likely that other groups have perpetrated
some of these attacks – for reasons other than the
Greater Albania.
Indeed, an obscure incident took place in Kumanovo a few
weeks ago, when an Albanian from south Serbia opened a
new pizza parlor. Apparently he was trespassing on someone
else's turf, because his first customer was a drive-by shooter,
who fired a hail of bullets into the shop. It is believed that two
people were injured. And there have been numerous other
incidents of such "cross-border cooperation" between Kosovo and
Macedonia.
...Almost
Amazingly enough, Beqiri does not claim responsibility for the
worst attacks – like the land mine deaths of Polish soldiers in
Macedonia last spring, or the murder of Serbian children in the River
Bistrica this summer. In the interview, he doesn't mention
the former (they blamed it on the Macedonian army trying to
discredit the AKSH), and as for the latter, he makes the rather
brazen claim that the Serbs machine-gunned their own
children to turn Western opinion against the Albanians. Beqiri
carefully restricts his group's stated activities to legitimate
military targets (though blowing up railroads and bridges
doesn't seem to exactly fit the bill).
In any case, says Beqiri, "…the Front of Albanian National
Unity (FBKSH) completely controls all diplomatic and armed
ANA forces." This would rather seem to implicate him and his
comrades for the effects of their ordained actions. According to
the now fugitive secretary, the AKSH "…hasn't performed a
single attack without the approval of FBKSH."
An AKSH Chronology
Beqiri's recounting of the group's recent history is particularly
interesting. After the Tetovo turf war of spring 2002 , and the
short-lived Coordinative Council for Albanian unity led by Ali
Ahmeti, many of the latter's "disappointed" NLA fighters went over to
the AKSH. However, adds Beqiri, "…a large part didn't
join anyone and was completely independent. Chaos was
created and the need for establishing was urgent."
Here is where the story takes an interesting twist. Beqiri's
summary of what happened next casts aspersions on Albania's
alleged "neutrality" in Kosovo's ongoing vortex of violence.
States Beqiri:
"…in July 2002 we organized a large gathering in the
Congress Palace in Tirana, where, apart from all commanders
of various fractions from Kosovo and Macedonia, also were
present many high intellectuals, military people, as well as
representatives of all Albanian political parties. It was
established then that all of us share the same desire for
resolving the 'Albanian issue' and it is necessary for the sake of
it to establish a military and political structure with a clear
system of hierarchy. This is how FBKSH was created."
Say What?
If Beqiri can be taken at his word, key players from the whole
Albanian establishment – politicians, intellectuals and most
importantly of all, military men – are behind the AKSH. This
story wildly contradicts every official statement made by Tirana
since the war in Macedonia, i.e., that the country is not helping
paramilitary forces. The most compelling aspect of all this is the
alleged role of the military:
"…the generals played the key role from Albania, who enjoy
enormous authority among the fighters and their commanders.
"…The general personnel are mostly from Albania and from
Kosovo. The main chief of the GS (General Staff) ANA is
General Vigan Gradica. He was honored with three stars and
has enormous experience. The supreme council of ANA, that
brings all military decisions, is made up of a total of eight
generals. The entire general core is educated, mostly in
Croatia and Albania, and even in Germany. All of them are
professional soldiers."
Albania Implicated – and the Diaspora Too
This rather eye-opening statement calls into question Tirana's
publicly stated anti-militant position. Apparently, right up until
Gafurr Adili's arrest the FBKSH operated out of Tirana – "…
where our base has been from the beginning." After losing their
leader, the group went underground – i.e., to Kosovo – where
Beqiri claims they work, "…completely openly as a legal
political party." Given his present indictment by the Albanian
government, and KFOR's uncompromising new attitude, this
assertion will be tested.
According to Beqiri, the FBKSH command structure is made up
11 people and focuses on 5 "interest zones" of conquest: south
Serbia's Presevo Valley, Kosovo, Macedonia, Ulcinj (in
Montenegro) and Greece. Other protagonists in the movement
are stated as being professor Femi Kelmendi, the
aforementioned General Gradica and Bestar Kosova, "who is
in charge of all security affairs."
As with all liberation wars past, funding for weapons comes
mostly from the diaspora. Jane's estimated that during a 6
month period in 2001 the NLA raised $60 million from diaspora
contributions. As was the case then, says Beqiri, "…most of the
aid comes from America, then Canada, Germany, Switzerland,
and Belgium." Card-carrying members (Beqiri rather
bombastically claims to have 20,000) are required to kick down
monthly; locals pay 2 euros per month, diaspora members, 20
euros per month. Finally, he adds, "…we are trying to organize
as many as possible gatherings in the Diaspora at which we
encourage people to help us as much as they can."
It is highly likely that American diaspora funding is being
organized by the same congressional lobby groups that
funded the last two wars, and which retain strong links with
former KLA leaders. The fact that Mr. Beqiri was invited one
month ago to advertise his views in front of the International
Crisis Group in Brussels cannot be reassuring either.
Antagonisms on the Home Front
What kind of support does the AKSH enjoy in Albania itself,
however? It would appear quite a lot. Yet is this a case of
official state support (i.e., the Pakistan model), or a side effect
of instability? Probably the latter. Rather than categorically
blame the Albanian government, we might mention the current
political volatility there – a state of affairs which leaves plenty of
room for third-party mischief.
For months, unrest has been building with the government of
Fatos Nano. Last week his Socialist Party suffered its second
setback in 3 months, winning "…only 65 votes for nominees as
foreign and interior ministers from 131 members of parliament,"
reported Reuters on Thursday .
With longstanding rival Ilir Meta calling for early elections in
Spring, it is quite possible that Nano's days are numbered.
Nano "…accused rivals who voted against him of a 'palace
coup' and making common cause with the opposition
Democratic Party " of Nano's other archenemy, former
president Sali Berisha.
Interestingly enough, from the NIN report we learn that Nano
goes way back with FBKSH Secretary Beqiri – all the way back,
in fact, to their mutual imprisonment under Berisha's regime.
When that regime tanked in 1997, due to the collapse of a
colossal pyramid scheme that impoverished thousands
overnight, Beqiri won his release, and joined a political
coalition with the also-freed Nano. The latter came to power,
but was removed a year later. The enmity between the two
camps continues even now.
The NIN report mentions the Beqiri-Nano friendship and
shared opposition to Berisha. Yet despite their common cause,
the report states, Beqiri and Nano have "divergent" political
views. Is NIN trying to imply that Nano is not a closet supporter
of the AKSH adventure? If this were true, then how was Beqiri
able to operate the FBKSH with such impunity and such high-
level cooperation in Tirana, as he claims?
Indeed, this connection is being made by Beqiri's enemies in
Kosovo, too. Albanian leaders there have recently damned the
AKSH as a dangerous monstrosity run by Hoxha-era
"Communists" under the implicit control of Nano – in other
words, as an unofficial branch of the state.
That said, should we understand current Tirana's crackdown
on Adimi and Beqiri as indicative of Nano's dwindling authority? Or is
he being forced to sacrifice his friend due to
political pressure, either internal or Western?
Hey – What Ever Happened to the Mujahedin?
No article of mine has inspired such a rancorous reaction as
my brief history of Islamic terrorist involvement in Albania.
While admittedly I may have exaggerated the threat, everything
was based on facts and detailed reports. Since 2001, there
haven't been many new developments on this front. However,
another byproduct of today's political volatility in Tirana may be
the subtle penetration of foreign Islamic fighters. The revelation
that bin Laden's forces were training the KLA in 1999, just as
the US and Britain were, was embarrassing enough for the US;
but what if, after so many subsequent anti-terror operations, the
Evil One has returned to the Balkans?
In a report dated 19 September, congressional director of the
Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Yossef
Bodansky claims that Albania is once again being used as a
"springboard" for terrorist activities in Europe:
"…starting in mid-August 2003, there was a discernible
increase in the number of foreigners in the Islamist mosques
throughout Albania. 'They [originally] come from Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. They come from many countries,'
noted an eyewitness in Tirana. 'They arrive [in Tirana] from
Afghanistan,' he added. These expert terrorists are being
prepared in Albania for their specific missions in the West.
"This training program is conducted under the cover of the
Albanian National Army (ANA or AKSh in Albanian) with most
senior trainers and commanders being 'mujahedin who
retreated from Bosnia' and are affiliated with al-Qaida.
"In return for the Albanian support of this endeavor, the
Islamists assist the local terrorists in preparing for launching
spectacular terrorism into the major cities of Serbia and
Montenegro, with Belgrade and Nis believed to be the top
targets. As well, Islamist cadres, mainly veterans of Bosnia, are
providing advance training to thousands of Albanian terrorists
in camps in Kosovo-Metohija, near Prizren, on the slopes of Mt.
Sara, in the Kosovo Morava River valley, in the Albanian towns
of Kukes and Tropoje, and around Tetovo in western
Macedonia."
A Mess of Contradictions
This tantalizing testimony directly contradicts Beqiri's statement
of policy to NIN, namely, that the AKSH desires no help from
the mujahedin and has no interest in attacking Belgrade. Beqiri
claims that all attacks are to be carried out only within the
specified "zones of operation" (i.e., Albanian-populated areas).
However, he also admits that other, apparently unaffiliated
militant groups presently prowl the hills and forests of
Macedonia and Kosovo. Could some of these have struck with
the Islamists? Indeed, a well-informed Western security
official in Kosovo told me earlier this year that the AKSH had
broken up into three groups, precisely because of cooperation
with the mujahedin – unsavory for some, expedient for others.
Yet as Beqiri maintains, the main AKSH body is probably
content to exist solely as a magnificent fighting force of secular-
enough Albanian nationalists. Especially since they seem to
have such a well-oiled and experienced diaspora machine,
this bunch has no interest in winding up on the wrong side of
the war on terror. However, this does not mean that Islamist-
associated fringe groups don't exist in Albania, Kosovo and
Macedonia.
In the end, Bodansky's enigmatic evidence leaves one very
curious as to his sources. Had the Bush Administration not
been so disingenuous with the evidence on Iraq, there would
be no doubting these Balkan revelations. Now we have to be a
bit more critical. One hopes that an American congressional
investigator would be better-informed than a lowly freelance reporter.
However, the mystery may remain unresolved, barring
further violence or other inside revelations.
However, even if we never get an answer on mujahedin in the
Balkans, Albania is not off the hook. Should the authorities
there actually arrest Mr. Beqiri (or other of his cohorts), a
clearer picture will no doubt emerge of the precise connection
between Tirana and the neighborhood's most notorious
paramilitary group.
=== 2 ===
( Source:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/77879
ERP KIM Newsletter 30-10-03b - Special Edition )
Al Qaeda's European attack route is the Balkans, new evidence claims
A provocative report from the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism
and Unconventional Warfare claims that the Balkans is about to heat up
again as an Islamic terrorist base. This surpasses traditional
nationalist rifts, claims author Yossef Bodansky, and is intended to
increase al Qaeda infiltration. Thus the Balkan operations would be
ultimately controlled by the Evil One, OBL.
---
http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=172
BALKANALYSIS
Posted on Thursday, October 30 @ 00:00:00 EST by CDeliso
A provocative report from the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism
and Unconventional Warfare claims that the Balkans is about to heat up
again as an Islamic terrorist base. This surpasses traditional
nationalist rifts, claims author Yossef Bodansky, and is intended to
increase al Qaeda infiltration. Thus the Balkan operations would be
ultimately controlled by the Evil One, OBL.
However, it remains to be seen to what extent this is true. Bodansky
does not cite sources, and his assessment for Bosnia is more likely to
be accurate than his view on Macedonia, for example.
The report, dated 19 September 2003, states that ".starting in
mid-August 2003, radical Islamist leaders elevated the role of the
terrorism infrastructure in the Balkans as a key facilitator of a
proposed escalation of conflict into the heart of Europe, Israel and
the United States."
Apparently, the elevation of one Shahid Emir Mussa Ayzi- a veteran of
Afghanistan with close al Qaeda and Taliban ties- to coordinate and run
special recruitment operations is the ominous development here.
In what can't be a compliment to anyone, Bodansky states the new goal
as making jihadis of the "Slavs" or as jihad leaders call them, "white
devils." He can't be talking about Serbs or Macedonians here. Indeed,
just a little later he describes the "main recruitment pool" as
consisting of Bosnian Muslims, as well as some "Russian converts"
(Chechens?) recruited in the Caucasus.
The report states that in August Ayzi took over this Balkan brigade,
and reported his success with the "Slavs" to Mullah Qudratullah, a
"senior Taliban official." Another key leader is said to be Muhammad
al-Zawahiri, the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Apparently,
".the senior Islamist commanders now consider what they call "the
Albanian land"- Albania, Serbia's Kosovo province and parts of
Macedonia - to be safe for use as a springboard for the insertion of a
new wave of expert terrorists, including the Slavs, into Western Europe
and onward throughout the West."
Bodansky claims that at the same time, ".there was a discernible
increase in the number of foreigners in the Islamist mosques throughout
Albania."
"'.They [originally] come from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and
Iran. They come from many countries,' noted an eyewitness in Tirana.
'They arrive [in Tirana] from Afghanistan,' he added. These expert
terrorists are being prepared in Albania for their specific missions in
the West."
Here is where things get interesting. The Albanian lobbyists in
American are now doubt enflamed by the next charge- that the Albanian
National Army (ANA or AKSH) is now training these dubious imports, with
most of the senior trainers being "mujahedin who retreated from Bosnia."
In return for Albanian support, Bodansky claims, "the Islamists assist
the local terrorists in preparing for launching spectacular terrorism
into the major cities of Serbia and Montenegro, with Belgrade and Nis
believed to be the top targets."
This is certainly a different picture than we get from the AKSH leaders
themselves. Idajet Beqiri, the fugitive political leader with the
group, was recently recorded as saying the AKSH has no contact with
mujahedin- but rather exists only to fight for the Greater Albania. He
vehemently assured that the group does not work with Islamists.
However, we know that in the past, even as recently as 2001 in
Macedonia, this was not the case. Mujahedin from al Qaeda did train the
KLA in 1999 in northern Albania's remote mountains, and documentary,
photographic and verbal evidence exists to indicate a presence among
NLA ranks in Macedonia in 2001. Occasional "sightings"- like the
dark-skinned, bearded man who allegedly loads down an enormous shopping
cart weekly in Skopje's Vero while wearing a bullet-proof vest under
his shirt- are evidence of a continued presence. The enormous,
Saudi-built medresah in the nearby village of Kondovo may be another
site fostering unrest. Israeli sources have also claimed that a certain
number of Albanians were being trained in Hamas camps in Lebanon- but
that the Macedonian government showed no interest in following this up.
Indeed, Bodansky claims that the Islamists are active in Albania,
western Macedonia, and Kosovo (the last is most likely of the three).
Balkanalysis.com has independent information attesting to recent
upsurges in Islamic recruiting activity in the Prizren area (near the
border with all three), as well as cross-border arrests in weapons and
drugs smuggling in recent weeks, that can be linked with terrorist or
at least militant funding.
Still, care should be taken to separate the Islamist movement from the
Albanian one. The latter is predominantly secular. We believe that the
AKSH split earlier this year over just such a divergence in objectives.
If tensions do increase in Kosovo, it will be due to Albanian
impatience with the UNMIK provisional government and a latent fear that
the US is becoming too Serb-friendly. Could lurking Islamists attempt
to ride the coattails of their discontent, in order to make mischief of
their own?
A major aspect of both secular and religious terrorism is symbolism.
The Islamists want their acts to be seen as representative of
something, as do the Albanian separatists. Neither wants the other to
take the credit for their own work, and the latter are especially
fearful that an Islamic attack on the wrong target could be blamed on
them. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the AKSH wishes to perform a
"spectacular" terrorist attack in either Nis or Belgrade (Beqiri
restricted their operations to strictly "Albanian" lands). After all,
there would be no way to bring Serbian tanks back to Kosovo faster than
a firebombing of Belgrade.
When it comes to Bosnia, however, Bodansky might have a more realistic
point to make. He reminds that Islamists have a grudge over Srebrenica
(while, remarkable for an American, admits that the Muslim death count
was bloated for propaganda purposes). According to the London-based
extremist group Al-Muhajiroun, the failure of UN peacekeepers to
protect the Bosnian Muslims made them legitimate targets in Iraq.
On 18 October, Serbian authorities also sounded the alarm. Darko
Trifunovic, a Serbian expert on terrorism, visited Washington then and
announced that:
".a group of ten mujahedin who were trained in Afghanistan have managed
to enter BiH. They are currently in al-Qaeda camps in the vicinity of
Zenica and Tuzla. A plan of this group to blow up a tunnel through
which a row of US vehicles was supposed to pass was prevented at the
last moment."
Once, such warnings would have been cast aside as yet more Serb
propaganda. Now, however, they are being listened to. According to
Trifunovic, a group of 3000 young Kosovo Albanians (who had been
trained in northern Albania), were also sent into Kosovo and Macedonia
along with mujahedin from Middle Eastern and North African countries.
Trifunovic further states that some of them went on to stir up trouble
in Sandzak, while others were arrested in other parts of Serbia. Citing
numerous similar actions in Bosnia, Trifunovic also pointed out that
two banks there (Vakufska Banka and Islamska Banka) continue to work
with impunity despite being suspected of having terrorist ties.
Independent of this, Balkanalysis.com has been informed that a group of
1,000 Iranian students were allowed to attend Serbian universities, a
couple of years ago, on student visas. When a similar request was
lodged in Skopje, the Serbian authorities informed them that of the
original 1,000 students, only "about 30" could be found after one year.
Macedonia wisely ignored the Iranian request.
According to Brendan O'Neill of Spiked! The US adventure in training
foreign mujahedin in Bosnia was "very important" to the rise of a
globalized jihad, in which terrorists ".think nothing of moving from
state to state in the search of outlets for their jihadist mission."
The US should surely know some of the routes through which arms are
smuggled into Bosnia from neighboring states. After all, it created
them in the 1990's arming of the Bosnians. Weapons were taken through
Croatia or airlifted from as far afield as Saudi Arabia, something
about which the US had "very close" knowledge and cooperation. Today,
American diplomats regret this complicity, but doggedly stick to its
necessity for helping the defenseless Muslims of Bosnia:
".Richard Holbrooke, America's former chief Balkans peace negotiator,
has said that the Bosnian Muslims 'wouldn't have survived' without the
help of the mujahedin, though he later admitted that the arrival of the
mujahedin was a 'pact with the devil' from which Bosnia is still
recovering."
Of course, the interventionists then were paid to get a job done, not
think of long-term dangers. This was obfuscated by the continuing
"moral blind spot" that the West has regarding Bosnia, O'Neill
contends. That said, from their enthusiasm with using imported Islamic
fighters in not only Bosnia but Kosovo, one would suspect that the
policy makers had forgotten about the Afghan experience of the 1980's;
lamentably, they would only remember it after September 11th, 2001.
Hopefully they won't suffer more persistent and vivid reminders than
that of this bad decision in the years to come.
=== 3 ===
( Source:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/77879
ERP KIM Newsletter 30-10-03b - Special Edition )
THE COMING NEW SURGE in European Islamist Terrorism: The Momentum Has
Begun
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN THE Balkans and Middle East indicate that the
Iranian and Osama bin Laden terrorist networks, assets and alliances
built up in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Southern
Serbia and elsewhere in the Balkans are preparing for a significant new
slate of operations. Initial operations in this "new slate" have
already begun in Kosovo, and are expected to expand in southern Serbia
in late October and into November 2003.
---
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 2003, pp. 9,12-13
Terrorism
By Gregory R. Copley, Editor
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN THE Balkans and Middle East indicate that the
Iranian and Osama bin Laden terrorist networks, assets and alliances
built up in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Southern
Serbia and elsewhere in the Balkans are preparing for a significant new
slate of operations. Initial operations in this "new slate" have
already begun in Kosovo, and are expected to expand in southern Serbia
in late October and into November 2003.
The intelligence, from a variety of primary sources within the Islamist
movements, points to:
1. Escalation of Islamist terrorist attacks on Serb civilians within
the predominantly Muslim region of Kosovo and Metohija, which is in the
Serbian province of Kosovo;
2. Commencement during October-November 2003 of seemingly-random
bombings of public places, including schools, in Muslim-dominated
cities in the southern Serbian/northern Montenegrin Raska Oblast (this
oblast, or region - not a formal sub-state as in the Russian use of the
word "oblast" - is referred to by Islamists by its Turkish name,
Sandzak) as a prelude to wider violence in this area, and eastern
Montenegro, adjacent to the Albanian border and reaching down to the
Adriatic;
3. Coordination of incidents by the so-called "Albanian National Army"
- a current iteration of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, or UCK:
Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, in Albanian; OVK in Serbo-Croat) - in
Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with activities in
Raska, led by the Bosnian radical Islamist party, SDA (Party of
Democratic Action) of Alija Izetbegovic, and all supported by Albanian
Government-approved/backed training facilities inside Albania, close to
the border with Serbian Kosovo;
4. Escalation of incidents - including threats, political action,
terrorist action - within Bosnia-Herzegovina, designed to further
polarize the Serbian and Croat population away from the Muslim
population;
5. Eventual escalation of "incidents" to create a "no-go" area for
Serbian, Montenegrin, Republica Srpska security forces and
international peacekeepers in a swathe of contiguous territory from the
Adriatic through Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Southern Serbia and
Macedonia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, effectively dissecting the Republica
Srpska state (which is within Bosnia-Herzegovina) at the Gorazde
Corridor and isolating Montenegro;
6. Using the extensive safe-haven areas and "no-go" zones created by
the actions, undertake a range of terrorist actions against targets in
Greece - which is contiguous with Albania and (FYR) Macedonia - during
(and possibly before) the August 2004 Olympic Games. Specific
intelligence points to the fact that the Islamist groups have already
predetermined target opportunities during the Games.
The new intelligence contradicts the public positions of both the
Government of Serbia and the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina
that terrorist threats in their two states were now not evident. The
Serbian Ministry of Interior did, however, acknowledge increased
activities by Wahabbists (such as the bin Ladenists) and intelligence
on planned Islamist bombings in southern Serbia in the coming months.
Significantly, however, Bosnia-Herzegovina High Representative Paddy
Ashdown published, in The Washington Times of October 6, 2003, a letter
to the editor in which he said:
"After September 11 [2001], the Sarajevo authorities took important
steps to ensure that Bosnia-Herzegovina could not in any way be used as
a platform for terrorist attacks of any sort, in Europe or elsewhere.
This country is not a terrorist base, nor will it become one."
Mr Ashdown's statement, in which he actually attempted to predict the
future, is not borne out by the evidence of radical Islamist activities
inside Bosnia.
There were several significant motivations behind the new wave of
coordinated actions, according to our sources and analysis by Defense &
Foreign Affairs.
(i) Iran and al-Qaida Breakout: The Iranian Government, as well as the
Osama bin Laden organization (now being referred to as al-Qaida), have
been working since at least the breakup of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991-92 to build a strong base of Islamism
and terrorist capability in the heart of Europe, and relying on the
entree to the area given by Alija Izetbegovic's SDA party in Bosnia.
Neither Iran nor bin Laden undertook this extensive work for nothing
and, despite the very large Iranian Embassy presence in Sarajevo,
Iran's Shi'a clerics have been happy to provide training, logistics and
intelligence while allowing the Wahhabist/Salafist bin Laden organizers
to work more openly with the Sunni Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian
structures were used to support and actively participate in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States.
Now that both Iran and al-Qaida are under pressure from the US, their
networks in Bosnia - now far stronger than in 2001, and with virtually
all international and Serbian capabilities to stop them suppressed for
fear of political outcries in the event of again attacking the "Muslim
victims" - are preparing to launch their new break-out attacks against
the US and the West, both in order to polarize the Muslim world from
the West at the Olympics [see below] and to build a stridently Islamist
state (or network of states: Bosnia, "Sandzak" [Raska], Kosovo,
Albania, parts of Macedonia, etc.) within Western Europe [see below].
(ii) Olympics: The August 2004 Athens Olympics, with large crowds
present and an estimated four-billion television viewers worldwide, has
been identified as the most obvious symbolic point to force, using
terrorist "spectaculars," the schism between the West and the Muslim
ummah, with the objective of polarizing the Muslim world around a "new
caliphate" of radicalism, forcing the West to further react against the
Muslim world, thereby reinforcing the tendency to drive Muslims toward
the radical leaders. This interpretation is not based on speculation,
but on known plans for the Olympics within terrorist groups related to
al-Qaida and Iran. The Athens Olympics provides the perfect selection
of terrorist targets, especially given the thus-far poor performance of
Greek security services in preparing for the Games, as well as because
of the proximity of Athens to major terrorist operating areas and
support lines (through the Eastern Mediterranean, Albania, etc.).
(iii) Islamist-Controlled Territory in Europe: The prospect of creating
an Islamist territory, comprising Bosnia, Kosovo, and adjacent areas,
reaching from the Adriatic into the heart of Europe, is the most
significant strategic gain foreseen by the Islamists since Muslim
fortunes in Europe waned when the siege of Vienna was raised by the
King of Poland in 1683. Numerous Islamist sources have indicated that
they believe that this "return to Europe" is now within their grasp,
offering enormous political symbolism of the success and power of the
radical Islamists to the Muslim world, particularly if such an
achievement is made as a result of great loss by the West.
Iran, Iranian surrogate forces and al-Qaida are under increasing
pressure to begin the escalation of operations in the Balkans, not just
because of the imminence of the Olympic Games, but also to help deflect
US-led pressure against, and preoccupation with, Iran and
counter-terror operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Revived US
pressures on Syria - a major strategic ally and conduit for Iran - is
seen as escalating the urgency of the "break-out" operations in the
Balkans. The Balkans, however, also remain a strategic goal in their
own right, quite apart from their value in relieving pressure on Iran
and the damaged prestige of the terrorists and Islamists as a result of
the current "war on terror."
During the first half of August 2003, 300 Albanian-trained guerrillas -
including appr. 10 mujahedin (non-Balkan Muslims) - were infiltrated
across the Albanian border into Kosovo, where many have subsequently
been seen in the company (and homes) of members of the so-called Kosovo
Protection Corps which was created out of Kosovo Albanian elements
originally part of the KLA. In fact, the Kosovo Protection Corps seems
almost synonymous with the Albanian National Army (ANA), the new
designation for the KLA. The guerrillas were trained in three camps
inside the Albanian border at the towns of Bajram Curi, Tropoja and
Kuks, where the camps have been in operation since 1997.
The US Government, during the Clinton Administration, supported these
camps, and some sources have said that US and German nationals were
still involved in training guerrillas in the camps. Their existence is
known to the Albanian Government, which reportedly also provides both
protection and support for the facilities. They brought with them from
Albania a variety of light weapons, including mortars and landmines.
Some elements of the 300 in the August 2003 group - believed to be the
mujahedin element - went into action almost immediately, in the
Serbian-occupied Kosovo town of Gorazdevac, near the city of Pec (in
the West, close to Montenegro), on four occasions and on one occasion
killing some children. Significantly, the Albanian doctor who examined
two of the children injured in one of the attacks, Dragana Srbljaka and
Djordje Ugrinovic, was accused by Serbian Government authorities and by
other local medical authorities of having "purposefully making a wrong
diagnosis of fractures, instead of gunshot wounds." He put plaster over
the gunshot wounds and discharged the children, rather than
hospitalizing them.
After these attacks, some of the mujahedin involved moved immediately
Westward, going through Islamist safe-havens in Raska to Bosnia. Many
of the remainder went to areas on the Kosovo border with central Serbia
and/or across into central Serbia. They also engaged in mining in areas
used by Serbia-Montenegro Army vehicles using claymore-style roadside
charges.
It was understood from the Defense & Foreign Affairs sources that US
and NATO intelligence officers operating with UNMIK peacekeeping forces
in Kosovo were aware - or appeared to be aware - of the incursion of
the 300 new Islamist fighters and were also aware, at least to some
extent, of the mingling of the guerrilla fighters with the Kosovo
Protection Corps officials.
Significantly, the transit of weapons and fighters to and from Bosnia
to the Kosovo and Albanian areas has been underway for more than a
decade. In testimony to the State Security service of (then) Yugoslavia
in September 1991, Bosnian Islamist Memic Senad (born 1953)
acknowledged that Sarajevo Muslims, under Izetbegovic's SDA, pushed
arms and ammunition into Raska (Sandzak), and that this was done with
the knowledge of Izetbegovic. The arms had earlier been smuggled into
Bosnia via Croatia, with the help of Croatian police, before going on
to Raska. These shipments consisted of, among other things,
Romanian-made assault rifles and M56 machineguns. The weapons
themselves were acquired in Slovenia, and one shipment noted by Senad
included 1,240 AK-47 assault rifles.
SDA official Hasan Cengic was in charge of buying the weapons,
according to Senad. Hasan Cengic, an Islamist theologian, has been
linked with Iranian-sponsored terrorism since 1983. He is a veteran of
the 13th Waffen SS division of the German Army from World War II, and
later a general in the Bosnian (Islamist) Army as well as former Deputy
Bosnian Defense Minister. He organized much of the influx of foreign
mujahedin fighters into Bosnia during the 1990s and was a member of the
governing board of TWRA (Third World Relief Agency), founded in Vienna
in 1987 and linked with a range of al-Qaida-related and other terrorist
groups. The particular shipment cited in Senad's testimony was escorted
from Bosnia and into Raska by a Libyan consular vehicle, with
diplomatic plates. An Islamist organization, Active Islamic Youth,
actually handled the delivery. Amer Musurati, a Libyan diplomat based
at the Libyan mission in Belgrade, Serbia, paid for the weapons,
despite a long history of cooperation between Qadhafi's Libya and the
old Yugoslavia of Pres. Tito.
At the same time, the Libyan consulate in Sarajevo backed the People's
Democratic Movement of Rasim Kadic. Kadic was also involved in the
distribution of weapons into areas of Bosnia, Raska and Kosovo. Zelic
Cefedin and Kadic were known to have been in Czechoslovakia where they
tried to buy weapons from Australian citizen Hans Herdla.
What assists in diffusing the whole pattern of Islamist activities is
the seeming lack of coordination and formal organization. The links,
however, become evident in the pattern of cooperation, common targets
and accommodations between groups of apparently different ideologies -
such as the Libyans, the Syrian and Iranian-backed HizbAllah Shi'as,
the Wahabbi and Salafi extremist Sunnis, and so on - which is also
evident in terrorist operations around the world. Indeed, cooperation
between Christian (Catholic) Irish Republican Army (IRA) officials with
Libyan and Islamist backers and colleagues, is a case in point. As
well, the issues of a common enemy and, often, a common financing means
(usually narcotics trafficking), brings disparate groups together.
Much of the new round of Islamist activity is centering on the southern
Serbian (Raska) city of Novi Pazar (literally "New Bazaar"). This city
of some 30,000 people is approximately 80 percent Muslim. It has one of
the most radical Islamist bookstores in the world, and the store is
doing brisk business. Here, the principal business of the city is
crime: illegal smuggling of consumer goods, heroin and weapons. And
with its street bazaars and coffee houses, it appears as a Middle
Eastern city within a countryside populated by Orthodox Christian
Serbian farmers. [During Turkish occupation, it was necessary for
inhabitants to adopt Islam in order to gain work in the cities; thus
the farmers remained Orthodox, the city-dwellers became Muslim.]
Novi Pazar is the focus of the Islamist attempt to build a landbridge
from Albania and Kosovo to Bosnia. Further to the East, in southern
Serbia's Raska Oblast, are three other concentrations of Muslims:
Sjenica and Pester area (lightly populated but mostly Muslim),
Prijepolje (some 50 percent Muslim) and - very close to the Bosnia
border where Republica Srpska controls the slender Gorazde corridor -
Priboj (also some 50 percent Muslim). The land between is Serbian
farmland, but the Islamist goal is to link the cities as "evidence"
that the entire region is, or should be, Muslim territory. The same
strategy worked successfully in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbian
farmers were driven off their lands during the civil war.
Just south of the Serbian area of Raska Oblast is the Montenegrin part
of Raska region, where, for example, Bijeljo Polje is some 60 to 80
percent Muslim, and Pijevlja, close to the Bosnian border, is about 40
percent Muslim. These Montenegrin towns, like those of the Western
Serbian Raska region, are the key to the illicit arms and
narcotrafficking across the Gorazde Corridor to Bosnia.
Further southeast in Montenegro, Albanian Muslims now make up some 95
percent of the Adriatic town of Ulcinj, only a few kilometers from
Albania itself.
But it is Novi Pazar which is the focus of the Islamist activity and
ideology. It is, in essence, the equivalent of Pristina in Kosovo, or
Sarajevo, in Bosnia, as far as the Islamists are concerned. A new
Islamist university has opened in Novi Pazar, ostensibly a normal
college, but led by an Islamist mufti of little formal education. And,
as in Pakistan, the divide between "14th Century Islamists" and "21st
Century Islamists" is apparent. This modern institution - whose
officials proclaim it a normal educational institution - reveals its
character in its symbol: the Wahabbi/Salafi dawa symbol, an open Q'uran
surmounted with a rising sun. The university, in a renovated former
textile factory, is a known center of radical Islamist thinking. A book
fair held there in early October 2003 distributed very radical Islamist
literature, specifically advocating conflict with the West.
The dawa sign indicates that the university is predominantly
Saudi-funded, although some Western funding is known to have been
pumped into the institution, reportedly largely to undermine Serb
interests in the region.
It is also significant that the graffiti which dominates Novi Pazar
supports Alija Izetbegovic's SDA party, despite the fact that the SDA
is a Bosnian party and Novi Pazar is in Serbia. But many of the
residents call themselves "Bosniaks," as do the Islamists of Bosnia.
The process by which the Izetbegovic followers are attempting to
"legitimize" their claims to southern Serbia is apparent. [Other
parties, such as Stranka za Sandzak, are evident in Novi Pazar, but
they do not match the SDA's control of the streets.]
And if the escalation of violence erupts on the scale anticipated, the
Serbian Government would be forced to attempt to suppress it. This is
the deliberate intention of the Islamists, to force intervention so
that the Serbs could be, again, blamed for suppressing the "Muslim
victims." [Italic: my emphasis] Effectively, the "no-go" status of
Raska (Sandzak) would create not only a corridor for weapons,
combatant, narcotics and other trafficking, but it would also cut off
Serbia from Montenegro, and deny Serbia its access to the sea. And
although some Montenegrin politicians, supported by some 2.5 percent of
the population of Serbia and Montenegro, have advocated secession from
the Union with Serbia, this de facto separation of the two states by
Islamist militant action would - along with Islamist action in
Montenegro's eastern towns, such as Ulcinj - spell the end of
Montenegro as a self-governing state.
The patterns of recent ANA activities in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia
already shows an upsurge of violence, just as the Kosovo-Serbia talks
began in Vienna in October 2003. The injection of Albanian-trained
guerrillas, linked with ANA and the Kosovo Protection Corps, is also
significant. These indicators, plus other intelligence obtained by
Defense & Foreign Affairs, highlight the broader trend which relates
directly to the need by al-Qaida and Iran's clerics to regain their
initiative and to keep the US strategically at arm's-length.
The Olympics, coupled with the forced deterioration of the security
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina - and the strong likelihood that the
Dayton Accords in Bosnia will be rendered ineffective within, perhaps,
a year - all point to a significant strategic threat emerging to the
West in the Balkans.
Defense & Foreign Affairs analysts believe that the collapse of the
clerical leadership in Iran is the only thing which could remove the
core backing for the al-Qaida groups operating in the Balkans, although
narcotrafficking, supported by criminal elements in Turkey, Albania and
elsewhere and other criminal activities would still sustain some of the
radical activities, as would ongoing funding from some Saudi sources.
But the removal of Iranian support would (and associated Syrian fronts)
significantly reduce the instability in the Balkans.
1. Is Albania Sponsoring 'Freedom Fighters' Next Door?
And What Happened to the Balkan Mujahedin, Anyway?
(by Christopher Deliso)
2. Al Qaeda's European attack route is the Balkans, new
evidence claims (by Christopher Deliso)
3. THE COMING NEW SURGE in European Islamist Terrorism:
The Momentum Has Begun (By Gregory R. Copley, Editor,
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 2003)
RELATED TEXTS:
JIHAD the Holy War - Lashva valley:
http://public.srce.hr/zatocenici/jihad.htm
Video fragments showing Alija Izetbegovic's links with Mujahedin units:
http://public.srce.hr/zatocenici/video_en.htm
The Union of Death - Terrorists and Freedom Fighters in the Balkans (by
Sam Vaknin):
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/vaknin/093.shtml
How we trained al-Qa’eda. The Bosnian war taught Islamic terrorists to
operate abroad:
http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/sep03/hed5999.shtml
or
http://www.spectator.co.uk/
article.php3?table=old§ion=current&issue=2003-09-13&id=3499&searchText=
=== 1 ===
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/deliso93.html
Is Albania Sponsoring 'Freedom Fighters' Next Door?
And What Happened to the Balkan Mujahedin, Anyway?
by Christopher Deliso
October 30, 2003
In 1998, when NATO's war on Yugoslavia was first being
organized, secret camps were set up in northern Albania.
There, British and American forces trained the rag-tag fighters
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The two countries openly
armed, supplied and supported the KLA during the war against
Milosevic, using the paramilitary group as NATO's ground
troops.
A New Question
All of this is fact. Albania's army also directly trained the KLA.
After all, if the West said it was OK, then there was nothing to
be embarrassed about. However, once the fallout from Kosovo
registered and Macedonia was destabilized by the renamed
militants of the NLA (National Liberation Army) in 2001, Tirana
changed its tune. It officially deplored the violence and denied
having anything to do with sponsoring the rebels.
However, at the same time "all contact stopped" between the
intelligence services of the two countries, according to one
informed Macedonian source. Clearly, Albania was not entirely
pleased with beleaguered Macedonia's attempts at self-
defense.
Since then, the Albanian government has gone to great lengths
to boost economic and defense cooperation with Macedonia,
under the rubric of NATO enlargement and participations in
joint ventures along the east-west Corridor 8, such as
prospective railroad lines and oil pipelines . Albania is clearly
looking for a new lease on life and deliverance from the
economic dark ages that afflict most citizens who aren't super-
rich politicos or gangsters.
Nevertheless, despite these increasingly positive
developments, a new question has been raised regarding the
current involvement of the Albanian government – in whole or
in part – in sponsoring paramilitary groups active in
neighboring states. This issue is complex; its contemplation
only invites further questions. With Albania, do we have state-
sponsored attempts at control through disruption (as was the
case with Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban?) Or could it be
instead just the manipulations of sparring political gangs?
Tirana Cracks Down: One Arrested, Another Indicted
In July, the Albanian government arrested one Gafurr Adili,
leader of the Front of Albanian National Unity (FBKSH). This
diaspora-based group claims to be the political wing of the
AKSH (or ANA, Albanian National Army), active since 2001 in
Kosovo and Macedonia. The group's stated goal is to gather all
"Albanian lands" into one majestic 19th century nation-state, by
waging war with the "Slav colonizers," Greeks, and whoever
else gets in their way.
Simultaneously, the Swiss banned Adili from living in their
country. Stated the BBC, "…until now he has enjoyed refugee
status – though it appears that he is not actually barred from
visiting Switzerland where members of his family live." Such
ambivalent restrictions are completely characteristic of the
West's schizophrenic, lax treatment of Albanian militants since
even before 2001.
On 8 October, a second arrest warrant was lodged for the
leader of Albania's right-wing Party of National Unity, Idajet
Beqiri. A high profile FBKSH leader, Beqiri is accused of
"incitement and support for the extremist group."
Since last spring's attack on a bridge near Mitrovica, which
proved that Kosovo Protection Corps staff members were
moonlighting for the AKSH, the group has been deemed a
"terrorist" one by Balkan and Western governments alike.
Reports in the Economist and elsewhere described it as
being run by increasingly desperate criminals and KLA
veterans impatient with UNMIK's rule in Kosovo. This year's
more concerted crackdowns by KFOR on smuggling, as well as
similar revived efforts by Macedonian authorities, have also
angered the militants. Averred the Economist on 12
September:
"…the AKSH represents few ethnic-Albanians. Its core consists
of some 50-70 cigarette smugglers drawn from both sides of
the border with Kosovo. Their latest violence has been largely
prompted by their desire to stop Macedonia's police from
shutting down their smuggling routes and putting them behind
bars. Hisni Shaqiri, an ethnic-Albanian MP in Skopje who is
trying to help keep the peace between Macedonia's Albanians
and Slavs, describes Avdil Jakupi, the AKSH's "divisional
commander" known as Chakala, as a "mental patient and
heroin addict". A British brigadier advising the Macedonian
government on defence calls the AKSH "criminals flying a
political flag of convenience in the hope of finding legitimacy."
Revelations from the Inside
Until now, little has been revealed about the "highly secretive"
AKSH. Who runs it? What are its plans? Does it really exist?
Most importantly, perhaps, what is the leadership and extent of
support enjoyed by its political wing, the FBKSH?
Recent new information from Idajet Beqiri himself casts
considerable light on this issue. In its October 11-17 issue, the
Serbian publication NIN ran a lengthy interview with him.
Apparently, Beqiri also has a pseudonym – Albana Viosu –
and is the secretary of the FBKSH. He founded Albania's Party
of National Unity, was elected its president in 1991, and
embarked on a volatile political career that saw him imprisoned,
empowered and involved with various scandals.
He has a law degree from the University of Tirana, served as a
judge and claims to now work as a lawyer. Since 1997, he has
been stationed in Western Europe, where he has lobbied and
raised money for Albanian militant groups.
NIN claims the interview was arranged "…by tracing the news
of an Albanian lawyer who organizes gatherings for wealthy
Albanians throughout Western Europe." A "smiling" Beqiri then
met the interviewers in Brussels.
Taking All the Credit…
Doubtless, we have to take the inevitable boasting with a grain
of salt. Such figures tend to exaggerate their popularity and
gains. Thus when asked whether the group only exists "on the
internet," Beqiri cited "proof" to the contrary, being "…the 33
attacks for which we have assumed responsibility, as well as
numerous members that join us daily."
Indeed, there have been around 30 minor bombings, murders
and other mishaps since 2001, but it is decidedly unclear as to
whether these were all carried out by one unified group under
a single banner and command. Beqiri himself states that right
now "…seven armed groups that aren't under our control act in
Kosovo and Macedonia," each having around 40 members.
Given the track record for Albanian gang infighting in Kosovo
and Macedonia, it seems more likely that other groups have perpetrated
some of these attacks – for reasons other than the
Greater Albania.
Indeed, an obscure incident took place in Kumanovo a few
weeks ago, when an Albanian from south Serbia opened a
new pizza parlor. Apparently he was trespassing on someone
else's turf, because his first customer was a drive-by shooter,
who fired a hail of bullets into the shop. It is believed that two
people were injured. And there have been numerous other
incidents of such "cross-border cooperation" between Kosovo and
Macedonia.
...Almost
Amazingly enough, Beqiri does not claim responsibility for the
worst attacks – like the land mine deaths of Polish soldiers in
Macedonia last spring, or the murder of Serbian children in the River
Bistrica this summer. In the interview, he doesn't mention
the former (they blamed it on the Macedonian army trying to
discredit the AKSH), and as for the latter, he makes the rather
brazen claim that the Serbs machine-gunned their own
children to turn Western opinion against the Albanians. Beqiri
carefully restricts his group's stated activities to legitimate
military targets (though blowing up railroads and bridges
doesn't seem to exactly fit the bill).
In any case, says Beqiri, "…the Front of Albanian National
Unity (FBKSH) completely controls all diplomatic and armed
ANA forces." This would rather seem to implicate him and his
comrades for the effects of their ordained actions. According to
the now fugitive secretary, the AKSH "…hasn't performed a
single attack without the approval of FBKSH."
An AKSH Chronology
Beqiri's recounting of the group's recent history is particularly
interesting. After the Tetovo turf war of spring 2002 , and the
short-lived Coordinative Council for Albanian unity led by Ali
Ahmeti, many of the latter's "disappointed" NLA fighters went over to
the AKSH. However, adds Beqiri, "…a large part didn't
join anyone and was completely independent. Chaos was
created and the need for establishing was urgent."
Here is where the story takes an interesting twist. Beqiri's
summary of what happened next casts aspersions on Albania's
alleged "neutrality" in Kosovo's ongoing vortex of violence.
States Beqiri:
"…in July 2002 we organized a large gathering in the
Congress Palace in Tirana, where, apart from all commanders
of various fractions from Kosovo and Macedonia, also were
present many high intellectuals, military people, as well as
representatives of all Albanian political parties. It was
established then that all of us share the same desire for
resolving the 'Albanian issue' and it is necessary for the sake of
it to establish a military and political structure with a clear
system of hierarchy. This is how FBKSH was created."
Say What?
If Beqiri can be taken at his word, key players from the whole
Albanian establishment – politicians, intellectuals and most
importantly of all, military men – are behind the AKSH. This
story wildly contradicts every official statement made by Tirana
since the war in Macedonia, i.e., that the country is not helping
paramilitary forces. The most compelling aspect of all this is the
alleged role of the military:
"…the generals played the key role from Albania, who enjoy
enormous authority among the fighters and their commanders.
"…The general personnel are mostly from Albania and from
Kosovo. The main chief of the GS (General Staff) ANA is
General Vigan Gradica. He was honored with three stars and
has enormous experience. The supreme council of ANA, that
brings all military decisions, is made up of a total of eight
generals. The entire general core is educated, mostly in
Croatia and Albania, and even in Germany. All of them are
professional soldiers."
Albania Implicated – and the Diaspora Too
This rather eye-opening statement calls into question Tirana's
publicly stated anti-militant position. Apparently, right up until
Gafurr Adili's arrest the FBKSH operated out of Tirana – "…
where our base has been from the beginning." After losing their
leader, the group went underground – i.e., to Kosovo – where
Beqiri claims they work, "…completely openly as a legal
political party." Given his present indictment by the Albanian
government, and KFOR's uncompromising new attitude, this
assertion will be tested.
According to Beqiri, the FBKSH command structure is made up
11 people and focuses on 5 "interest zones" of conquest: south
Serbia's Presevo Valley, Kosovo, Macedonia, Ulcinj (in
Montenegro) and Greece. Other protagonists in the movement
are stated as being professor Femi Kelmendi, the
aforementioned General Gradica and Bestar Kosova, "who is
in charge of all security affairs."
As with all liberation wars past, funding for weapons comes
mostly from the diaspora. Jane's estimated that during a 6
month period in 2001 the NLA raised $60 million from diaspora
contributions. As was the case then, says Beqiri, "…most of the
aid comes from America, then Canada, Germany, Switzerland,
and Belgium." Card-carrying members (Beqiri rather
bombastically claims to have 20,000) are required to kick down
monthly; locals pay 2 euros per month, diaspora members, 20
euros per month. Finally, he adds, "…we are trying to organize
as many as possible gatherings in the Diaspora at which we
encourage people to help us as much as they can."
It is highly likely that American diaspora funding is being
organized by the same congressional lobby groups that
funded the last two wars, and which retain strong links with
former KLA leaders. The fact that Mr. Beqiri was invited one
month ago to advertise his views in front of the International
Crisis Group in Brussels cannot be reassuring either.
Antagonisms on the Home Front
What kind of support does the AKSH enjoy in Albania itself,
however? It would appear quite a lot. Yet is this a case of
official state support (i.e., the Pakistan model), or a side effect
of instability? Probably the latter. Rather than categorically
blame the Albanian government, we might mention the current
political volatility there – a state of affairs which leaves plenty of
room for third-party mischief.
For months, unrest has been building with the government of
Fatos Nano. Last week his Socialist Party suffered its second
setback in 3 months, winning "…only 65 votes for nominees as
foreign and interior ministers from 131 members of parliament,"
reported Reuters on Thursday .
With longstanding rival Ilir Meta calling for early elections in
Spring, it is quite possible that Nano's days are numbered.
Nano "…accused rivals who voted against him of a 'palace
coup' and making common cause with the opposition
Democratic Party " of Nano's other archenemy, former
president Sali Berisha.
Interestingly enough, from the NIN report we learn that Nano
goes way back with FBKSH Secretary Beqiri – all the way back,
in fact, to their mutual imprisonment under Berisha's regime.
When that regime tanked in 1997, due to the collapse of a
colossal pyramid scheme that impoverished thousands
overnight, Beqiri won his release, and joined a political
coalition with the also-freed Nano. The latter came to power,
but was removed a year later. The enmity between the two
camps continues even now.
The NIN report mentions the Beqiri-Nano friendship and
shared opposition to Berisha. Yet despite their common cause,
the report states, Beqiri and Nano have "divergent" political
views. Is NIN trying to imply that Nano is not a closet supporter
of the AKSH adventure? If this were true, then how was Beqiri
able to operate the FBKSH with such impunity and such high-
level cooperation in Tirana, as he claims?
Indeed, this connection is being made by Beqiri's enemies in
Kosovo, too. Albanian leaders there have recently damned the
AKSH as a dangerous monstrosity run by Hoxha-era
"Communists" under the implicit control of Nano – in other
words, as an unofficial branch of the state.
That said, should we understand current Tirana's crackdown
on Adimi and Beqiri as indicative of Nano's dwindling authority? Or is
he being forced to sacrifice his friend due to
political pressure, either internal or Western?
Hey – What Ever Happened to the Mujahedin?
No article of mine has inspired such a rancorous reaction as
my brief history of Islamic terrorist involvement in Albania.
While admittedly I may have exaggerated the threat, everything
was based on facts and detailed reports. Since 2001, there
haven't been many new developments on this front. However,
another byproduct of today's political volatility in Tirana may be
the subtle penetration of foreign Islamic fighters. The revelation
that bin Laden's forces were training the KLA in 1999, just as
the US and Britain were, was embarrassing enough for the US;
but what if, after so many subsequent anti-terror operations, the
Evil One has returned to the Balkans?
In a report dated 19 September, congressional director of the
Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare Yossef
Bodansky claims that Albania is once again being used as a
"springboard" for terrorist activities in Europe:
"…starting in mid-August 2003, there was a discernible
increase in the number of foreigners in the Islamist mosques
throughout Albania. 'They [originally] come from Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran. They come from many countries,'
noted an eyewitness in Tirana. 'They arrive [in Tirana] from
Afghanistan,' he added. These expert terrorists are being
prepared in Albania for their specific missions in the West.
"This training program is conducted under the cover of the
Albanian National Army (ANA or AKSh in Albanian) with most
senior trainers and commanders being 'mujahedin who
retreated from Bosnia' and are affiliated with al-Qaida.
"In return for the Albanian support of this endeavor, the
Islamists assist the local terrorists in preparing for launching
spectacular terrorism into the major cities of Serbia and
Montenegro, with Belgrade and Nis believed to be the top
targets. As well, Islamist cadres, mainly veterans of Bosnia, are
providing advance training to thousands of Albanian terrorists
in camps in Kosovo-Metohija, near Prizren, on the slopes of Mt.
Sara, in the Kosovo Morava River valley, in the Albanian towns
of Kukes and Tropoje, and around Tetovo in western
Macedonia."
A Mess of Contradictions
This tantalizing testimony directly contradicts Beqiri's statement
of policy to NIN, namely, that the AKSH desires no help from
the mujahedin and has no interest in attacking Belgrade. Beqiri
claims that all attacks are to be carried out only within the
specified "zones of operation" (i.e., Albanian-populated areas).
However, he also admits that other, apparently unaffiliated
militant groups presently prowl the hills and forests of
Macedonia and Kosovo. Could some of these have struck with
the Islamists? Indeed, a well-informed Western security
official in Kosovo told me earlier this year that the AKSH had
broken up into three groups, precisely because of cooperation
with the mujahedin – unsavory for some, expedient for others.
Yet as Beqiri maintains, the main AKSH body is probably
content to exist solely as a magnificent fighting force of secular-
enough Albanian nationalists. Especially since they seem to
have such a well-oiled and experienced diaspora machine,
this bunch has no interest in winding up on the wrong side of
the war on terror. However, this does not mean that Islamist-
associated fringe groups don't exist in Albania, Kosovo and
Macedonia.
In the end, Bodansky's enigmatic evidence leaves one very
curious as to his sources. Had the Bush Administration not
been so disingenuous with the evidence on Iraq, there would
be no doubting these Balkan revelations. Now we have to be a
bit more critical. One hopes that an American congressional
investigator would be better-informed than a lowly freelance reporter.
However, the mystery may remain unresolved, barring
further violence or other inside revelations.
However, even if we never get an answer on mujahedin in the
Balkans, Albania is not off the hook. Should the authorities
there actually arrest Mr. Beqiri (or other of his cohorts), a
clearer picture will no doubt emerge of the precise connection
between Tirana and the neighborhood's most notorious
paramilitary group.
=== 2 ===
( Source:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/77879
ERP KIM Newsletter 30-10-03b - Special Edition )
Al Qaeda's European attack route is the Balkans, new evidence claims
A provocative report from the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism
and Unconventional Warfare claims that the Balkans is about to heat up
again as an Islamic terrorist base. This surpasses traditional
nationalist rifts, claims author Yossef Bodansky, and is intended to
increase al Qaeda infiltration. Thus the Balkan operations would be
ultimately controlled by the Evil One, OBL.
---
http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=172
BALKANALYSIS
Posted on Thursday, October 30 @ 00:00:00 EST by CDeliso
A provocative report from the US Congressional Task Force on Terrorism
and Unconventional Warfare claims that the Balkans is about to heat up
again as an Islamic terrorist base. This surpasses traditional
nationalist rifts, claims author Yossef Bodansky, and is intended to
increase al Qaeda infiltration. Thus the Balkan operations would be
ultimately controlled by the Evil One, OBL.
However, it remains to be seen to what extent this is true. Bodansky
does not cite sources, and his assessment for Bosnia is more likely to
be accurate than his view on Macedonia, for example.
The report, dated 19 September 2003, states that ".starting in
mid-August 2003, radical Islamist leaders elevated the role of the
terrorism infrastructure in the Balkans as a key facilitator of a
proposed escalation of conflict into the heart of Europe, Israel and
the United States."
Apparently, the elevation of one Shahid Emir Mussa Ayzi- a veteran of
Afghanistan with close al Qaeda and Taliban ties- to coordinate and run
special recruitment operations is the ominous development here.
In what can't be a compliment to anyone, Bodansky states the new goal
as making jihadis of the "Slavs" or as jihad leaders call them, "white
devils." He can't be talking about Serbs or Macedonians here. Indeed,
just a little later he describes the "main recruitment pool" as
consisting of Bosnian Muslims, as well as some "Russian converts"
(Chechens?) recruited in the Caucasus.
The report states that in August Ayzi took over this Balkan brigade,
and reported his success with the "Slavs" to Mullah Qudratullah, a
"senior Taliban official." Another key leader is said to be Muhammad
al-Zawahiri, the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri. Apparently,
".the senior Islamist commanders now consider what they call "the
Albanian land"- Albania, Serbia's Kosovo province and parts of
Macedonia - to be safe for use as a springboard for the insertion of a
new wave of expert terrorists, including the Slavs, into Western Europe
and onward throughout the West."
Bodansky claims that at the same time, ".there was a discernible
increase in the number of foreigners in the Islamist mosques throughout
Albania."
"'.They [originally] come from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and
Iran. They come from many countries,' noted an eyewitness in Tirana.
'They arrive [in Tirana] from Afghanistan,' he added. These expert
terrorists are being prepared in Albania for their specific missions in
the West."
Here is where things get interesting. The Albanian lobbyists in
American are now doubt enflamed by the next charge- that the Albanian
National Army (ANA or AKSH) is now training these dubious imports, with
most of the senior trainers being "mujahedin who retreated from Bosnia."
In return for Albanian support, Bodansky claims, "the Islamists assist
the local terrorists in preparing for launching spectacular terrorism
into the major cities of Serbia and Montenegro, with Belgrade and Nis
believed to be the top targets."
This is certainly a different picture than we get from the AKSH leaders
themselves. Idajet Beqiri, the fugitive political leader with the
group, was recently recorded as saying the AKSH has no contact with
mujahedin- but rather exists only to fight for the Greater Albania. He
vehemently assured that the group does not work with Islamists.
However, we know that in the past, even as recently as 2001 in
Macedonia, this was not the case. Mujahedin from al Qaeda did train the
KLA in 1999 in northern Albania's remote mountains, and documentary,
photographic and verbal evidence exists to indicate a presence among
NLA ranks in Macedonia in 2001. Occasional "sightings"- like the
dark-skinned, bearded man who allegedly loads down an enormous shopping
cart weekly in Skopje's Vero while wearing a bullet-proof vest under
his shirt- are evidence of a continued presence. The enormous,
Saudi-built medresah in the nearby village of Kondovo may be another
site fostering unrest. Israeli sources have also claimed that a certain
number of Albanians were being trained in Hamas camps in Lebanon- but
that the Macedonian government showed no interest in following this up.
Indeed, Bodansky claims that the Islamists are active in Albania,
western Macedonia, and Kosovo (the last is most likely of the three).
Balkanalysis.com has independent information attesting to recent
upsurges in Islamic recruiting activity in the Prizren area (near the
border with all three), as well as cross-border arrests in weapons and
drugs smuggling in recent weeks, that can be linked with terrorist or
at least militant funding.
Still, care should be taken to separate the Islamist movement from the
Albanian one. The latter is predominantly secular. We believe that the
AKSH split earlier this year over just such a divergence in objectives.
If tensions do increase in Kosovo, it will be due to Albanian
impatience with the UNMIK provisional government and a latent fear that
the US is becoming too Serb-friendly. Could lurking Islamists attempt
to ride the coattails of their discontent, in order to make mischief of
their own?
A major aspect of both secular and religious terrorism is symbolism.
The Islamists want their acts to be seen as representative of
something, as do the Albanian separatists. Neither wants the other to
take the credit for their own work, and the latter are especially
fearful that an Islamic attack on the wrong target could be blamed on
them. Indeed, it seems unlikely that the AKSH wishes to perform a
"spectacular" terrorist attack in either Nis or Belgrade (Beqiri
restricted their operations to strictly "Albanian" lands). After all,
there would be no way to bring Serbian tanks back to Kosovo faster than
a firebombing of Belgrade.
When it comes to Bosnia, however, Bodansky might have a more realistic
point to make. He reminds that Islamists have a grudge over Srebrenica
(while, remarkable for an American, admits that the Muslim death count
was bloated for propaganda purposes). According to the London-based
extremist group Al-Muhajiroun, the failure of UN peacekeepers to
protect the Bosnian Muslims made them legitimate targets in Iraq.
On 18 October, Serbian authorities also sounded the alarm. Darko
Trifunovic, a Serbian expert on terrorism, visited Washington then and
announced that:
".a group of ten mujahedin who were trained in Afghanistan have managed
to enter BiH. They are currently in al-Qaeda camps in the vicinity of
Zenica and Tuzla. A plan of this group to blow up a tunnel through
which a row of US vehicles was supposed to pass was prevented at the
last moment."
Once, such warnings would have been cast aside as yet more Serb
propaganda. Now, however, they are being listened to. According to
Trifunovic, a group of 3000 young Kosovo Albanians (who had been
trained in northern Albania), were also sent into Kosovo and Macedonia
along with mujahedin from Middle Eastern and North African countries.
Trifunovic further states that some of them went on to stir up trouble
in Sandzak, while others were arrested in other parts of Serbia. Citing
numerous similar actions in Bosnia, Trifunovic also pointed out that
two banks there (Vakufska Banka and Islamska Banka) continue to work
with impunity despite being suspected of having terrorist ties.
Independent of this, Balkanalysis.com has been informed that a group of
1,000 Iranian students were allowed to attend Serbian universities, a
couple of years ago, on student visas. When a similar request was
lodged in Skopje, the Serbian authorities informed them that of the
original 1,000 students, only "about 30" could be found after one year.
Macedonia wisely ignored the Iranian request.
According to Brendan O'Neill of Spiked! The US adventure in training
foreign mujahedin in Bosnia was "very important" to the rise of a
globalized jihad, in which terrorists ".think nothing of moving from
state to state in the search of outlets for their jihadist mission."
The US should surely know some of the routes through which arms are
smuggled into Bosnia from neighboring states. After all, it created
them in the 1990's arming of the Bosnians. Weapons were taken through
Croatia or airlifted from as far afield as Saudi Arabia, something
about which the US had "very close" knowledge and cooperation. Today,
American diplomats regret this complicity, but doggedly stick to its
necessity for helping the defenseless Muslims of Bosnia:
".Richard Holbrooke, America's former chief Balkans peace negotiator,
has said that the Bosnian Muslims 'wouldn't have survived' without the
help of the mujahedin, though he later admitted that the arrival of the
mujahedin was a 'pact with the devil' from which Bosnia is still
recovering."
Of course, the interventionists then were paid to get a job done, not
think of long-term dangers. This was obfuscated by the continuing
"moral blind spot" that the West has regarding Bosnia, O'Neill
contends. That said, from their enthusiasm with using imported Islamic
fighters in not only Bosnia but Kosovo, one would suspect that the
policy makers had forgotten about the Afghan experience of the 1980's;
lamentably, they would only remember it after September 11th, 2001.
Hopefully they won't suffer more persistent and vivid reminders than
that of this bad decision in the years to come.
=== 3 ===
( Source:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/77879
ERP KIM Newsletter 30-10-03b - Special Edition )
THE COMING NEW SURGE in European Islamist Terrorism: The Momentum Has
Begun
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN THE Balkans and Middle East indicate that the
Iranian and Osama bin Laden terrorist networks, assets and alliances
built up in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Southern
Serbia and elsewhere in the Balkans are preparing for a significant new
slate of operations. Initial operations in this "new slate" have
already begun in Kosovo, and are expected to expand in southern Serbia
in late October and into November 2003.
---
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 2003, pp. 9,12-13
Terrorism
By Gregory R. Copley, Editor
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN THE Balkans and Middle East indicate that the
Iranian and Osama bin Laden terrorist networks, assets and alliances
built up in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Southern
Serbia and elsewhere in the Balkans are preparing for a significant new
slate of operations. Initial operations in this "new slate" have
already begun in Kosovo, and are expected to expand in southern Serbia
in late October and into November 2003.
The intelligence, from a variety of primary sources within the Islamist
movements, points to:
1. Escalation of Islamist terrorist attacks on Serb civilians within
the predominantly Muslim region of Kosovo and Metohija, which is in the
Serbian province of Kosovo;
2. Commencement during October-November 2003 of seemingly-random
bombings of public places, including schools, in Muslim-dominated
cities in the southern Serbian/northern Montenegrin Raska Oblast (this
oblast, or region - not a formal sub-state as in the Russian use of the
word "oblast" - is referred to by Islamists by its Turkish name,
Sandzak) as a prelude to wider violence in this area, and eastern
Montenegro, adjacent to the Albanian border and reaching down to the
Adriatic;
3. Coordination of incidents by the so-called "Albanian National Army"
- a current iteration of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, or UCK:
Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, in Albanian; OVK in Serbo-Croat) - in
Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with activities in
Raska, led by the Bosnian radical Islamist party, SDA (Party of
Democratic Action) of Alija Izetbegovic, and all supported by Albanian
Government-approved/backed training facilities inside Albania, close to
the border with Serbian Kosovo;
4. Escalation of incidents - including threats, political action,
terrorist action - within Bosnia-Herzegovina, designed to further
polarize the Serbian and Croat population away from the Muslim
population;
5. Eventual escalation of "incidents" to create a "no-go" area for
Serbian, Montenegrin, Republica Srpska security forces and
international peacekeepers in a swathe of contiguous territory from the
Adriatic through Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Southern Serbia and
Macedonia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, effectively dissecting the Republica
Srpska state (which is within Bosnia-Herzegovina) at the Gorazde
Corridor and isolating Montenegro;
6. Using the extensive safe-haven areas and "no-go" zones created by
the actions, undertake a range of terrorist actions against targets in
Greece - which is contiguous with Albania and (FYR) Macedonia - during
(and possibly before) the August 2004 Olympic Games. Specific
intelligence points to the fact that the Islamist groups have already
predetermined target opportunities during the Games.
The new intelligence contradicts the public positions of both the
Government of Serbia and the High Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina
that terrorist threats in their two states were now not evident. The
Serbian Ministry of Interior did, however, acknowledge increased
activities by Wahabbists (such as the bin Ladenists) and intelligence
on planned Islamist bombings in southern Serbia in the coming months.
Significantly, however, Bosnia-Herzegovina High Representative Paddy
Ashdown published, in The Washington Times of October 6, 2003, a letter
to the editor in which he said:
"After September 11 [2001], the Sarajevo authorities took important
steps to ensure that Bosnia-Herzegovina could not in any way be used as
a platform for terrorist attacks of any sort, in Europe or elsewhere.
This country is not a terrorist base, nor will it become one."
Mr Ashdown's statement, in which he actually attempted to predict the
future, is not borne out by the evidence of radical Islamist activities
inside Bosnia.
There were several significant motivations behind the new wave of
coordinated actions, according to our sources and analysis by Defense &
Foreign Affairs.
(i) Iran and al-Qaida Breakout: The Iranian Government, as well as the
Osama bin Laden organization (now being referred to as al-Qaida), have
been working since at least the breakup of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991-92 to build a strong base of Islamism
and terrorist capability in the heart of Europe, and relying on the
entree to the area given by Alija Izetbegovic's SDA party in Bosnia.
Neither Iran nor bin Laden undertook this extensive work for nothing
and, despite the very large Iranian Embassy presence in Sarajevo,
Iran's Shi'a clerics have been happy to provide training, logistics and
intelligence while allowing the Wahhabist/Salafist bin Laden organizers
to work more openly with the Sunni Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian
structures were used to support and actively participate in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States.
Now that both Iran and al-Qaida are under pressure from the US, their
networks in Bosnia - now far stronger than in 2001, and with virtually
all international and Serbian capabilities to stop them suppressed for
fear of political outcries in the event of again attacking the "Muslim
victims" - are preparing to launch their new break-out attacks against
the US and the West, both in order to polarize the Muslim world from
the West at the Olympics [see below] and to build a stridently Islamist
state (or network of states: Bosnia, "Sandzak" [Raska], Kosovo,
Albania, parts of Macedonia, etc.) within Western Europe [see below].
(ii) Olympics: The August 2004 Athens Olympics, with large crowds
present and an estimated four-billion television viewers worldwide, has
been identified as the most obvious symbolic point to force, using
terrorist "spectaculars," the schism between the West and the Muslim
ummah, with the objective of polarizing the Muslim world around a "new
caliphate" of radicalism, forcing the West to further react against the
Muslim world, thereby reinforcing the tendency to drive Muslims toward
the radical leaders. This interpretation is not based on speculation,
but on known plans for the Olympics within terrorist groups related to
al-Qaida and Iran. The Athens Olympics provides the perfect selection
of terrorist targets, especially given the thus-far poor performance of
Greek security services in preparing for the Games, as well as because
of the proximity of Athens to major terrorist operating areas and
support lines (through the Eastern Mediterranean, Albania, etc.).
(iii) Islamist-Controlled Territory in Europe: The prospect of creating
an Islamist territory, comprising Bosnia, Kosovo, and adjacent areas,
reaching from the Adriatic into the heart of Europe, is the most
significant strategic gain foreseen by the Islamists since Muslim
fortunes in Europe waned when the siege of Vienna was raised by the
King of Poland in 1683. Numerous Islamist sources have indicated that
they believe that this "return to Europe" is now within their grasp,
offering enormous political symbolism of the success and power of the
radical Islamists to the Muslim world, particularly if such an
achievement is made as a result of great loss by the West.
Iran, Iranian surrogate forces and al-Qaida are under increasing
pressure to begin the escalation of operations in the Balkans, not just
because of the imminence of the Olympic Games, but also to help deflect
US-led pressure against, and preoccupation with, Iran and
counter-terror operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Revived US
pressures on Syria - a major strategic ally and conduit for Iran - is
seen as escalating the urgency of the "break-out" operations in the
Balkans. The Balkans, however, also remain a strategic goal in their
own right, quite apart from their value in relieving pressure on Iran
and the damaged prestige of the terrorists and Islamists as a result of
the current "war on terror."
During the first half of August 2003, 300 Albanian-trained guerrillas -
including appr. 10 mujahedin (non-Balkan Muslims) - were infiltrated
across the Albanian border into Kosovo, where many have subsequently
been seen in the company (and homes) of members of the so-called Kosovo
Protection Corps which was created out of Kosovo Albanian elements
originally part of the KLA. In fact, the Kosovo Protection Corps seems
almost synonymous with the Albanian National Army (ANA), the new
designation for the KLA. The guerrillas were trained in three camps
inside the Albanian border at the towns of Bajram Curi, Tropoja and
Kuks, where the camps have been in operation since 1997.
The US Government, during the Clinton Administration, supported these
camps, and some sources have said that US and German nationals were
still involved in training guerrillas in the camps. Their existence is
known to the Albanian Government, which reportedly also provides both
protection and support for the facilities. They brought with them from
Albania a variety of light weapons, including mortars and landmines.
Some elements of the 300 in the August 2003 group - believed to be the
mujahedin element - went into action almost immediately, in the
Serbian-occupied Kosovo town of Gorazdevac, near the city of Pec (in
the West, close to Montenegro), on four occasions and on one occasion
killing some children. Significantly, the Albanian doctor who examined
two of the children injured in one of the attacks, Dragana Srbljaka and
Djordje Ugrinovic, was accused by Serbian Government authorities and by
other local medical authorities of having "purposefully making a wrong
diagnosis of fractures, instead of gunshot wounds." He put plaster over
the gunshot wounds and discharged the children, rather than
hospitalizing them.
After these attacks, some of the mujahedin involved moved immediately
Westward, going through Islamist safe-havens in Raska to Bosnia. Many
of the remainder went to areas on the Kosovo border with central Serbia
and/or across into central Serbia. They also engaged in mining in areas
used by Serbia-Montenegro Army vehicles using claymore-style roadside
charges.
It was understood from the Defense & Foreign Affairs sources that US
and NATO intelligence officers operating with UNMIK peacekeeping forces
in Kosovo were aware - or appeared to be aware - of the incursion of
the 300 new Islamist fighters and were also aware, at least to some
extent, of the mingling of the guerrilla fighters with the Kosovo
Protection Corps officials.
Significantly, the transit of weapons and fighters to and from Bosnia
to the Kosovo and Albanian areas has been underway for more than a
decade. In testimony to the State Security service of (then) Yugoslavia
in September 1991, Bosnian Islamist Memic Senad (born 1953)
acknowledged that Sarajevo Muslims, under Izetbegovic's SDA, pushed
arms and ammunition into Raska (Sandzak), and that this was done with
the knowledge of Izetbegovic. The arms had earlier been smuggled into
Bosnia via Croatia, with the help of Croatian police, before going on
to Raska. These shipments consisted of, among other things,
Romanian-made assault rifles and M56 machineguns. The weapons
themselves were acquired in Slovenia, and one shipment noted by Senad
included 1,240 AK-47 assault rifles.
SDA official Hasan Cengic was in charge of buying the weapons,
according to Senad. Hasan Cengic, an Islamist theologian, has been
linked with Iranian-sponsored terrorism since 1983. He is a veteran of
the 13th Waffen SS division of the German Army from World War II, and
later a general in the Bosnian (Islamist) Army as well as former Deputy
Bosnian Defense Minister. He organized much of the influx of foreign
mujahedin fighters into Bosnia during the 1990s and was a member of the
governing board of TWRA (Third World Relief Agency), founded in Vienna
in 1987 and linked with a range of al-Qaida-related and other terrorist
groups. The particular shipment cited in Senad's testimony was escorted
from Bosnia and into Raska by a Libyan consular vehicle, with
diplomatic plates. An Islamist organization, Active Islamic Youth,
actually handled the delivery. Amer Musurati, a Libyan diplomat based
at the Libyan mission in Belgrade, Serbia, paid for the weapons,
despite a long history of cooperation between Qadhafi's Libya and the
old Yugoslavia of Pres. Tito.
At the same time, the Libyan consulate in Sarajevo backed the People's
Democratic Movement of Rasim Kadic. Kadic was also involved in the
distribution of weapons into areas of Bosnia, Raska and Kosovo. Zelic
Cefedin and Kadic were known to have been in Czechoslovakia where they
tried to buy weapons from Australian citizen Hans Herdla.
What assists in diffusing the whole pattern of Islamist activities is
the seeming lack of coordination and formal organization. The links,
however, become evident in the pattern of cooperation, common targets
and accommodations between groups of apparently different ideologies -
such as the Libyans, the Syrian and Iranian-backed HizbAllah Shi'as,
the Wahabbi and Salafi extremist Sunnis, and so on - which is also
evident in terrorist operations around the world. Indeed, cooperation
between Christian (Catholic) Irish Republican Army (IRA) officials with
Libyan and Islamist backers and colleagues, is a case in point. As
well, the issues of a common enemy and, often, a common financing means
(usually narcotics trafficking), brings disparate groups together.
Much of the new round of Islamist activity is centering on the southern
Serbian (Raska) city of Novi Pazar (literally "New Bazaar"). This city
of some 30,000 people is approximately 80 percent Muslim. It has one of
the most radical Islamist bookstores in the world, and the store is
doing brisk business. Here, the principal business of the city is
crime: illegal smuggling of consumer goods, heroin and weapons. And
with its street bazaars and coffee houses, it appears as a Middle
Eastern city within a countryside populated by Orthodox Christian
Serbian farmers. [During Turkish occupation, it was necessary for
inhabitants to adopt Islam in order to gain work in the cities; thus
the farmers remained Orthodox, the city-dwellers became Muslim.]
Novi Pazar is the focus of the Islamist attempt to build a landbridge
from Albania and Kosovo to Bosnia. Further to the East, in southern
Serbia's Raska Oblast, are three other concentrations of Muslims:
Sjenica and Pester area (lightly populated but mostly Muslim),
Prijepolje (some 50 percent Muslim) and - very close to the Bosnia
border where Republica Srpska controls the slender Gorazde corridor -
Priboj (also some 50 percent Muslim). The land between is Serbian
farmland, but the Islamist goal is to link the cities as "evidence"
that the entire region is, or should be, Muslim territory. The same
strategy worked successfully in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbian
farmers were driven off their lands during the civil war.
Just south of the Serbian area of Raska Oblast is the Montenegrin part
of Raska region, where, for example, Bijeljo Polje is some 60 to 80
percent Muslim, and Pijevlja, close to the Bosnian border, is about 40
percent Muslim. These Montenegrin towns, like those of the Western
Serbian Raska region, are the key to the illicit arms and
narcotrafficking across the Gorazde Corridor to Bosnia.
Further southeast in Montenegro, Albanian Muslims now make up some 95
percent of the Adriatic town of Ulcinj, only a few kilometers from
Albania itself.
But it is Novi Pazar which is the focus of the Islamist activity and
ideology. It is, in essence, the equivalent of Pristina in Kosovo, or
Sarajevo, in Bosnia, as far as the Islamists are concerned. A new
Islamist university has opened in Novi Pazar, ostensibly a normal
college, but led by an Islamist mufti of little formal education. And,
as in Pakistan, the divide between "14th Century Islamists" and "21st
Century Islamists" is apparent. This modern institution - whose
officials proclaim it a normal educational institution - reveals its
character in its symbol: the Wahabbi/Salafi dawa symbol, an open Q'uran
surmounted with a rising sun. The university, in a renovated former
textile factory, is a known center of radical Islamist thinking. A book
fair held there in early October 2003 distributed very radical Islamist
literature, specifically advocating conflict with the West.
The dawa sign indicates that the university is predominantly
Saudi-funded, although some Western funding is known to have been
pumped into the institution, reportedly largely to undermine Serb
interests in the region.
It is also significant that the graffiti which dominates Novi Pazar
supports Alija Izetbegovic's SDA party, despite the fact that the SDA
is a Bosnian party and Novi Pazar is in Serbia. But many of the
residents call themselves "Bosniaks," as do the Islamists of Bosnia.
The process by which the Izetbegovic followers are attempting to
"legitimize" their claims to southern Serbia is apparent. [Other
parties, such as Stranka za Sandzak, are evident in Novi Pazar, but
they do not match the SDA's control of the streets.]
And if the escalation of violence erupts on the scale anticipated, the
Serbian Government would be forced to attempt to suppress it. This is
the deliberate intention of the Islamists, to force intervention so
that the Serbs could be, again, blamed for suppressing the "Muslim
victims." [Italic: my emphasis] Effectively, the "no-go" status of
Raska (Sandzak) would create not only a corridor for weapons,
combatant, narcotics and other trafficking, but it would also cut off
Serbia from Montenegro, and deny Serbia its access to the sea. And
although some Montenegrin politicians, supported by some 2.5 percent of
the population of Serbia and Montenegro, have advocated secession from
the Union with Serbia, this de facto separation of the two states by
Islamist militant action would - along with Islamist action in
Montenegro's eastern towns, such as Ulcinj - spell the end of
Montenegro as a self-governing state.
The patterns of recent ANA activities in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia
already shows an upsurge of violence, just as the Kosovo-Serbia talks
began in Vienna in October 2003. The injection of Albanian-trained
guerrillas, linked with ANA and the Kosovo Protection Corps, is also
significant. These indicators, plus other intelligence obtained by
Defense & Foreign Affairs, highlight the broader trend which relates
directly to the need by al-Qaida and Iran's clerics to regain their
initiative and to keep the US strategically at arm's-length.
The Olympics, coupled with the forced deterioration of the security
situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina - and the strong likelihood that the
Dayton Accords in Bosnia will be rendered ineffective within, perhaps,
a year - all point to a significant strategic threat emerging to the
West in the Balkans.
Defense & Foreign Affairs analysts believe that the collapse of the
clerical leadership in Iran is the only thing which could remove the
core backing for the al-Qaida groups operating in the Balkans, although
narcotrafficking, supported by criminal elements in Turkey, Albania and
elsewhere and other criminal activities would still sustain some of the
radical activities, as would ongoing funding from some Saudi sources.
But the removal of Iranian support would (and associated Syrian fronts)
significantly reduce the instability in the Balkans.
Bosnia (italiano / english / francais / srpskohrvatski)
1. Bosnia: Of Privatization, Bulldozers, Coca-Cola, and Colonial
Occupation. The Principal Deputy High Representative, Donald Hays,
visits the Coca Cola factory in Hadzici (OHR Press Briefing, Oct. 23rd)
2. Bosnia's Viceroy/IMF threaten worker/pensioner's victory in RS:
Ashdown to stop public sector wages, pensions hikes in
Bosnia (Nov. 6th, AFP)
3. Bosnia Ready to Join US-Led Coalition in Iraq
(francais/english - Voice Of America News, Nov. 7th)
4. Zapovjednik NATO-a u Europi general Dzouns za "Oslobodjenje": NATO
odlazi, Amerikanci ostaju?
LA NATO SE NE VA, MA GLI AMERICANI RESTANO?
(Oslobodenje, 21.10.2003)
=== 1 ===
Subj: Bosnia: Of Privatization, Bulldozers, Coca-Cola, and Colonial
Occupation
Date:10/23/03 11:36:39 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From:Kilibarda78
To:Petokraka78
International Press Briefings OHR's Statement at the International
Agency's Joint Press Conference
http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=31049
The Principal Deputy High Representative, Donald Hays, will visit the
Coca Cola factory in Hadzici this afternoon.
Coca Cola, as you know, is a long-standing investor in BiH. It was
active here before the war and has created more than 300 jobs since it
restarted operations here in 1996. The governments are now engaged in a
focused effort to increase investment so as to create jobs, and
Ambassador Hays is interested in learning more about Coca Cola’s
experience as an investor here - specifically the things that make BiH
an attractive investment destination and the things that drive away
international investment.
Through the Privatisation Working Group, the authorities are trying to
remove the roadblocks to a positive privatisation environment, which is
one of the key elements in attracting more investment and creating more
jobs. At the same time, the Bulldozer Committee is working on another
50 reform proposals aimed at getting rid of pointless red tape that
discourages investors from putting their money into BiH. On that issue,
I’ve brought along an article that appeared in a recent issue of The
Economist magazine. It shows the direct correlation between poverty and
excessive bureaucracy. The simpler the regulations, the richer the
country gets. I’ve brought along copies.
Ambassador Hays will make a short statement at the end of his tour of
the Coke factory. You are all welcome to cover the tour and the
statement. If you wish to cover this, please be at the Coke factory by
12.30 today. The event will last about half an hour.
=== 2 ===
From: Petokraka78
Subject: Bosnia's Viceroy/IMF threaten worker/pensioner's victory in RS
["'Don't commit financial suicide. Step back now. If you don't than I
will be forced to intervene to prevent you from destroying this
country's chances of a better future,' Paddy Ashdown told a news
conference, directing his message to the Bosnian Serb government...The
Bosnian Serb government last month announced the 20 percent increase in
payments under strong pressure from labour unions which threatened a
general strike and following pensioners' mass protests. The decision
was made despite an IMF warning that it breached the terms of the
stand-by arrangement."]
Subj: Bosnia: Viceroy Ashdown, IMF Threaten Serb Wage, Pension Increases
Date: 11/6/03 3:13:39 PM Eastern Standard Time
From: r_rozoff
http://www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/dv/Qbosnia-politics.Rysd_DN6.html
Agence France-Presse
November 6, 2003
Ashdown to stop public sector wages, pensions hikes in
Bosnia
SARAJEVO, Nov 6 (AFP) - The top international
representative in Bosnia warned Thursday he would stop
an increase in public spending by Bosnian Serbs to
prevent the country losing the support of the world's
monetary institutions.
"Don't commit financial suicide. Step back now. If you
don't than I will be forced to intervene to prevent
you from destroying this country's chances of a better
future," Paddy Ashdown told a news conference,
directing his message to the Bosnian Serb government.
He was referring to its attempt to buy social peace by
raising public sector wages and pensions by 20 percent
with effect from next week.
It could end Bosnia's stand-by arrangement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and ultimately
jeopardise assistance worth 100 million euros (114
million dollars) from other financial institutions, he
warned.
Ashdown has the authority to cancel government
decisions, impose laws and sack local officials under
sweeping powers bestowed on his office by the peace
accord that ended Bosnia's 1992-95 war.
Since that war Bosnia has been made up of the Serbs'
Republika Srpska (RS) and the Muslim-Croat Federation,
each having its own government, parliament, army and
police forces. The two are linked by weak central
institutions.
The Bosnian Serb government last month announced the
20 percent increase in payments under strong pressure
from labour unions which threatened a general strike
and following pensioners' mass protests.
The decision was made despite an IMF warning that it
breached the terms of the stand-by arrangement.
An average monthly salary in Bosnia amounts to some
200 euros (228 dollars) while an average pension is
roughly half that amount.
The IMF arrangement requires strict fiscal discipline,
provides crucial budgetary support to the entire
country and is seen as a key to other international
monetary institutions' aid.
=== 3 ===
Source: Anti-imperialiste@...
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=96BAD0C9-3653-4C9B-
BA99B9311CF3830C
Bosnia Ready to Join US-Led Coalition in Iraq
Voice Of America News
07 Nov 2003, 20:20 UTC
De hauts responsables bosniaques ont dit que leur pays était prêt à
rejoindre les forces de la coalition dirigées par les USA en Irak.
Dans une déclaration officielle, la présidence collégiale du pays a
annoncé qu'elle était disposée à participer aux efforts de maintien de
la paix. Le document dit aussi que les USA et d'autres troupes de
l'OTAN doivent rester en Bosnie-herzégovine pour consolider la paix et
la stabilité dans la région.
Cette déclaration a été faite durant une visite à Sarajevo du
sous-secrétaire d'état US Marc Grossman.
*****
Top Bosnian leaders say their country is ready to join U.S.-led
coalition forces in Iraq.
In an official statement, the country's collective presidency announced
its readiness to assist in peacekeeping efforts. The document also said
U.S. and other NATO troops must remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina to
reinforce peace and stability in the region.
The statement came during a visit to Sarajevo by U.S. Undersecretary of
State Marc Grossman.
---
http://www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/bd/Qbosnia-us-iraq.R-gf_DN7.html
Agence France-Presse
November 7, 2003
Bosnia offers to send troops to Iraq, host US bases
SARAJEVO, Nov 7 (AFP) - Bosnia is ready to send troops
to Iraq and host US military bases on its territory,
the country's Muslim president said Friday after
meeting US Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Marc Grossman.
Bosnia is ready to "assume its international
obligations by sending its military to Iraq," Sulejman
Tihic, the Muslim member of Bosnia's tripartite
presidency, told a press conference after talks with
Grossman.
He said Bosnian military chiefs would decide exactly
what level of commitment the Balkan country could
offer after a review of its capabilities over the next
10 days.
Bosnia has been weighing whether to deploy soldiers in
Iraq since August, even though it depends for its own
internal security on more than 12,000 NATO-led
international peacekeepers including some 2,000 US
soldiers.
The US troops here are stationed mainly at a base near
the northeastern town of Tuzla.
They are officially part of the so-called SFOR
international stabilisation mission which has kept the
peace since the end of Bosnia's 1992-95 war.
Tihic said it was important for US troops to remain in
Bosnia and he would write to US President George W.
Bush to offer "other forms of military cooperation".
"We plan to offer the stationing of (US) military
bases here. We believe that it would contribute to
overall stability, not only in Bosnia, but in the
region," he said.
Among other countries in southeastern Europe, Albania,
Bulgaria and Macedonia already have troops in Iraq,
while Croatia and Serbia have expressed their
willingness to contribute to the international
coalition there.
Grossman welcomed ongoing defence reforms designed to
streamline Bosnia's post-war armed services and
prepare for the country's eventual membership of
NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.
Post-war Bosnia's two semi-independent entities -- the
Serbs' Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat
Federation -- have their own distict armies.
Under the reforms the two armed forces will have a
central command, the same uniform and a common flag,
but they will remain ethnically distinct.
Grossman is expected to visit Macedonia and Albania at
the end of a trip to southeastern Europe which has
already taken him to Serbia and Macedonia.
=== 4 ===
Zapovjednik NATO-a u Europi general Dzouns za "Oslobodjenje"
NATO odlazi, Amerikanci ostaju?
Prema onome sto je za Oslobodjenje kazao vrhovni zapovjednik
saveznickih snaga u Europi, americki marinski general Dzejms Dzouns
(James L. Jones), americke trupe mogle bi ostati u BiH i nakon
okoncanja misije SFOR-a,
ukoliko americka i bh. vlada o tome postignu poseban bilateralni
dogovor.
"Kao Amerikanci, imamo velik interes osigurati da Bosna nastavi
napredovati. Ako se misija NATO-a u BiH okonca, i kada se okonca, SAD
bi mogle uci u neke bilateralne odnose sa Bosnom. Smatramo da je
geostrateski to vrlo znacajno, jer smo ondje vec investirali u neke
stvari, kao sto su tamosnje baze", kazao nam je ovaj general, koji se
takodjer nalazi i na
celu Europske komande (EUCOM) svih americkih oruzanih snaga u ovome
dijelu svijeta.
Realni potencijal
Kratko smo razgovarali u petak u Brunssumu, Regionalnom zapovjednistvu
Sjevernog krila NATO-a (AFNORTH) u Nizozemskoj. Za Oslobodjenje je
odgovorio na nekoliko pitanja vezanih za situaciju u BiH i cijeloj
regiji. Posebno smo ga zamolili da pojasni svoju nedavnu izjavu da u
BiH postoji
"realni potencijal" za okoncanje vojne misije NATO-a naredne godine te
prepustanje odrzavanja sigurnosti policiji. "Sto god da sam rekao,
trebalo bi se vise interpretirati kao pozitivan razvoj napretka u
Bosni," kazao je general Dzons. "Ne mozemo ne primijetiti sto se ondje
dogadja. A ucinjen je
istinski napredak. I lijepo je sto cemo u jednom trenutku biti u
mogucnosti vidjeti da ce, mozda i naredne 2004. godine, prestati
zahtjevi za vojnom misijom koja bi se mogla promijeniti u nesto drugo,
sto bi bilo potrebno u tom procesu izgradjivanja drzave. Moglo bi doci
do toga da se veci naglasak treba staviti na policijske snage,
naprimjer. A to bi bila i logicna stvar". "No, to ne znaci da bi SAD
izgubile bilo kakav interes na Balkanu.
Drzim da bi bilo pogresno kad bi se ono sto se sada dogadja shvatilo
kao stanje u kojem netko, bilo tko, zeli napustiti Bosnu", veli general.
"Trebali bismo slaviti cinjenicu da se odvija veliki napredak, i da se
mozda priblizavamo trenutku kad bismo trebali razmotriti obavljanje
drukcije misije ondje. Ali iz toga sigurno ne bih izvodio zakljucak da
neka zemlja, ukljucujuci i SAD, zeli napustiti Bosnu na nacin da vise
nikad ne bude prisutna tamo". General Jones je takodjer kazao da je
hapsenje najtrazenijih ratnih zlocinaca, poput Radovana Karadzica i
Ratka Mladica,
vazno za cijelu regiju. "Imamo interesa da se ti ljudi privedu pravdi",
rekao nam je. "To nam je jednako vazno danas, kao sto je uvijek i bilo
vazno. Bilo bi sjajno kad bi nam svatko pomagao u tome, pa da budemo
jos efikasniji u privodjenju tih ljudi. Bio bi to odlican znak za
cijelu regiju, koji bi pokazao da su ondje ljudi ozbiljni uci u
familiju naroda, svejedno radilo se o Europskoj uniji ili Partnerstvu
za mir. Pitanje optuzenih ratnih zlocinaca koji su na slobodi svakako
da je vazan aspekt onoga sto se ondje dogadja, i ne mislimo ubrzo
mijenjati svoj stav o tome".
Bolje od Kosova Zamoljen da nam usporedi sigurnosnu situaciju u BiH i
na Kosovu, zapovjednik snaga NATO-a u Europi kazao nam je da je, s
vojnog aspekta, BiH dalje odmakla u stvaranju okolnosti za okoncanja
NATO-ove
"tradicionalne" vojne zadace. "Jer Kosovo umnogome ovisi od toga kakav
ce biti njegov konacni status. U proteklih nekoliko mjeseci ondje ima i
sporadicnih zaostravanja situacije. Zato mislim da je vojna zadaca na
Kosovu, za razliku od Bosne, vojnicki zbilja potrebna", rekao nam je na
kraju general Dzons.
Antonio PRLENDA
Copyright © 1999-2000 OSLOBODJENJE Sarajevo
----
La NATO se ne va, ma gli Americani restano?
(Oslobodenje, 21.10.2003)
Intervista al comandante supremo della NATO in Europa, generale dei
marines James L. Jones, il quale dichiara
che le truppe americane potrebbero restare in Bosnia anche dopo la fine
della missione SFOR, nel caso i governi statunitense e bosniaco
giungano ad un accordo bilaterale in proposito.
"Come Americani, abbiamo un forte interesse a garantire che la Bosnia
continui a progredire. Se la missione NATO in Bosnia finira' e quando
finira', gli USA potrebbero instaurare rapporti bilaterali con la
Bosnia. Riteniamo che cio' sia molto importante dal punto di vista
geostrategico, poiche' abbiamo gia investito in alcune cose, COME LE
BASI su quel territorio", ha dichiarato a Oslobodenje il genrale Jones,
il quale e' anche a capodel comando in Europa (EUCOM) di tutte le forze
armate statunitensi in questa parte del mondo.
Reale potenziale
La breve intervista, rilasciata nella base olandese di Brunssum presso
il comando dell'ala Nord della NATO (AFNORTH), e' peraltro tutta un
inno alla rassicurazione: Jones infatti aveva recentemente dichiarato
che in Bosnia esiste un "reale potenziale" per la conclusione della
missione militare NATO e il passaggio dei compiti di mantenimento della
sicurezza alla
polizia. "Qualsiasi cosa io abbia detto", ha risposto il generale,
"andrebbe interpretato nel senso di uno sviluppo positivo dei progressi
in Bosnia. Non possiamo non rilevare cio' che accade laggiu'. Ed e'
stato compiuto un reale progresso. E' bello pensare che a un dato
momento, forse gia' nel prossimo 2004, potremo vedere che sara' cessato
il bisogno di una
missione militare, che potrebbe trasformarsi in qualcosa d'altro, che
sia necessario in questo processo di costruzione dello stato. Ad
esempio, potrebbe accadare ce si metta un acento maggiore sulle forze
di polizia. Sarebbe logico"
"Ma questo non significa che gli USA perderebbero ogni interesse nei
Balcani. Secondo me sarebbe un errore se cio che avviene oggi fosse
interpretato come una siuazione in cui qualcuno, chiunque sia, intenda
abbandonare la Bosnia", afforma il generale. "Dovremmo celebrare il
fatto che si assiste a questo progresso, e che forse ci avviciniamo al
momento in
cui dovremmo prendere in considerazione il lancio di un atro tipo di
missione in quel paese. Ma da questo certamente non trarrei la
conclusione che qualche paese, Stati Unit compresi, intenda abbandonare
la Bosnia in modo da non essere piu' presente sul suo territorio". Il
generale Jones ha anche affermato che l'arresto dei piu' ricercati fra
i criminali di guerra,
come Radovan Karadzic e Ratko Mladic, e' importante per tutta la
regione.
"E' nel nostro interesse che questi personaggi siano consegnati alla
giustizia. E' altrettanto importante oggi, quanto lo e' sempre stato.
Sarebbe meraviglioso che tutti ci aiutassero, perche' fossimo piu'
efficienti nella cattura di questi soggetti. Sarebbe un segnale
eccellente per tutta la regione, che dmostrerebbe come la gente di qui
vuole davvero entrare nella famiglia dei popoli, indipendentemente dal
fatto che si tratti dell'Unione Europea o la Partnership for Peace. La
questione dei criminali di guerra ricercati, che ancora si trovano in
liberta', e' sicuramente un aspetto importante di cio' che accade qui,
per cui non pensiamo di cambiare opinione in merito".
Meglio del Kosovo
Richiesto di fare un confronto fra la situazione della sicurezza in
Bosnia e nel Kosovo, il comandante delle forze NATO in Europa ha
dichiarato che, dal punto di vista militare, la Bosnia e' mlto piu'
avanti nel creare le condizioni per la fine della presenza militare
"tradizionali" della NATO.
"Questo perche' il Kosovo in gran parte dipende da quello che sara' il
suo status finale. Negli ultimi mesi qui si e' ache assistit ad uno
sporadico peggioramento della situazione. Per questo penso che la
missione militare in Kosovo, a differenza della Bosnia, e' ancora
davvero necessaria".
Antonio PRLENDA
(Fonte: P. Lucchesi su balcani@peacelink,it, 22/10/2003)
1. Bosnia: Of Privatization, Bulldozers, Coca-Cola, and Colonial
Occupation. The Principal Deputy High Representative, Donald Hays,
visits the Coca Cola factory in Hadzici (OHR Press Briefing, Oct. 23rd)
2. Bosnia's Viceroy/IMF threaten worker/pensioner's victory in RS:
Ashdown to stop public sector wages, pensions hikes in
Bosnia (Nov. 6th, AFP)
3. Bosnia Ready to Join US-Led Coalition in Iraq
(francais/english - Voice Of America News, Nov. 7th)
4. Zapovjednik NATO-a u Europi general Dzouns za "Oslobodjenje": NATO
odlazi, Amerikanci ostaju?
LA NATO SE NE VA, MA GLI AMERICANI RESTANO?
(Oslobodenje, 21.10.2003)
=== 1 ===
Subj: Bosnia: Of Privatization, Bulldozers, Coca-Cola, and Colonial
Occupation
Date:10/23/03 11:36:39 AM Eastern Daylight Time
From:Kilibarda78
To:Petokraka78
International Press Briefings OHR's Statement at the International
Agency's Joint Press Conference
http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=31049
The Principal Deputy High Representative, Donald Hays, will visit the
Coca Cola factory in Hadzici this afternoon.
Coca Cola, as you know, is a long-standing investor in BiH. It was
active here before the war and has created more than 300 jobs since it
restarted operations here in 1996. The governments are now engaged in a
focused effort to increase investment so as to create jobs, and
Ambassador Hays is interested in learning more about Coca Cola’s
experience as an investor here - specifically the things that make BiH
an attractive investment destination and the things that drive away
international investment.
Through the Privatisation Working Group, the authorities are trying to
remove the roadblocks to a positive privatisation environment, which is
one of the key elements in attracting more investment and creating more
jobs. At the same time, the Bulldozer Committee is working on another
50 reform proposals aimed at getting rid of pointless red tape that
discourages investors from putting their money into BiH. On that issue,
I’ve brought along an article that appeared in a recent issue of The
Economist magazine. It shows the direct correlation between poverty and
excessive bureaucracy. The simpler the regulations, the richer the
country gets. I’ve brought along copies.
Ambassador Hays will make a short statement at the end of his tour of
the Coke factory. You are all welcome to cover the tour and the
statement. If you wish to cover this, please be at the Coke factory by
12.30 today. The event will last about half an hour.
=== 2 ===
From: Petokraka78
Subject: Bosnia's Viceroy/IMF threaten worker/pensioner's victory in RS
["'Don't commit financial suicide. Step back now. If you don't than I
will be forced to intervene to prevent you from destroying this
country's chances of a better future,' Paddy Ashdown told a news
conference, directing his message to the Bosnian Serb government...The
Bosnian Serb government last month announced the 20 percent increase in
payments under strong pressure from labour unions which threatened a
general strike and following pensioners' mass protests. The decision
was made despite an IMF warning that it breached the terms of the
stand-by arrangement."]
Subj: Bosnia: Viceroy Ashdown, IMF Threaten Serb Wage, Pension Increases
Date: 11/6/03 3:13:39 PM Eastern Standard Time
From: r_rozoff
http://www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/dv/Qbosnia-politics.Rysd_DN6.html
Agence France-Presse
November 6, 2003
Ashdown to stop public sector wages, pensions hikes in
Bosnia
SARAJEVO, Nov 6 (AFP) - The top international
representative in Bosnia warned Thursday he would stop
an increase in public spending by Bosnian Serbs to
prevent the country losing the support of the world's
monetary institutions.
"Don't commit financial suicide. Step back now. If you
don't than I will be forced to intervene to prevent
you from destroying this country's chances of a better
future," Paddy Ashdown told a news conference,
directing his message to the Bosnian Serb government.
He was referring to its attempt to buy social peace by
raising public sector wages and pensions by 20 percent
with effect from next week.
It could end Bosnia's stand-by arrangement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and ultimately
jeopardise assistance worth 100 million euros (114
million dollars) from other financial institutions, he
warned.
Ashdown has the authority to cancel government
decisions, impose laws and sack local officials under
sweeping powers bestowed on his office by the peace
accord that ended Bosnia's 1992-95 war.
Since that war Bosnia has been made up of the Serbs'
Republika Srpska (RS) and the Muslim-Croat Federation,
each having its own government, parliament, army and
police forces. The two are linked by weak central
institutions.
The Bosnian Serb government last month announced the
20 percent increase in payments under strong pressure
from labour unions which threatened a general strike
and following pensioners' mass protests.
The decision was made despite an IMF warning that it
breached the terms of the stand-by arrangement.
An average monthly salary in Bosnia amounts to some
200 euros (228 dollars) while an average pension is
roughly half that amount.
The IMF arrangement requires strict fiscal discipline,
provides crucial budgetary support to the entire
country and is seen as a key to other international
monetary institutions' aid.
=== 3 ===
Source: Anti-imperialiste@...
http://www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=96BAD0C9-3653-4C9B-
BA99B9311CF3830C
Bosnia Ready to Join US-Led Coalition in Iraq
Voice Of America News
07 Nov 2003, 20:20 UTC
De hauts responsables bosniaques ont dit que leur pays était prêt à
rejoindre les forces de la coalition dirigées par les USA en Irak.
Dans une déclaration officielle, la présidence collégiale du pays a
annoncé qu'elle était disposée à participer aux efforts de maintien de
la paix. Le document dit aussi que les USA et d'autres troupes de
l'OTAN doivent rester en Bosnie-herzégovine pour consolider la paix et
la stabilité dans la région.
Cette déclaration a été faite durant une visite à Sarajevo du
sous-secrétaire d'état US Marc Grossman.
*****
Top Bosnian leaders say their country is ready to join U.S.-led
coalition forces in Iraq.
In an official statement, the country's collective presidency announced
its readiness to assist in peacekeeping efforts. The document also said
U.S. and other NATO troops must remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina to
reinforce peace and stability in the region.
The statement came during a visit to Sarajevo by U.S. Undersecretary of
State Marc Grossman.
---
http://www.ptd.net/webnews/wed/bd/Qbosnia-us-iraq.R-gf_DN7.html
Agence France-Presse
November 7, 2003
Bosnia offers to send troops to Iraq, host US bases
SARAJEVO, Nov 7 (AFP) - Bosnia is ready to send troops
to Iraq and host US military bases on its territory,
the country's Muslim president said Friday after
meeting US Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Marc Grossman.
Bosnia is ready to "assume its international
obligations by sending its military to Iraq," Sulejman
Tihic, the Muslim member of Bosnia's tripartite
presidency, told a press conference after talks with
Grossman.
He said Bosnian military chiefs would decide exactly
what level of commitment the Balkan country could
offer after a review of its capabilities over the next
10 days.
Bosnia has been weighing whether to deploy soldiers in
Iraq since August, even though it depends for its own
internal security on more than 12,000 NATO-led
international peacekeepers including some 2,000 US
soldiers.
The US troops here are stationed mainly at a base near
the northeastern town of Tuzla.
They are officially part of the so-called SFOR
international stabilisation mission which has kept the
peace since the end of Bosnia's 1992-95 war.
Tihic said it was important for US troops to remain in
Bosnia and he would write to US President George W.
Bush to offer "other forms of military cooperation".
"We plan to offer the stationing of (US) military
bases here. We believe that it would contribute to
overall stability, not only in Bosnia, but in the
region," he said.
Among other countries in southeastern Europe, Albania,
Bulgaria and Macedonia already have troops in Iraq,
while Croatia and Serbia have expressed their
willingness to contribute to the international
coalition there.
Grossman welcomed ongoing defence reforms designed to
streamline Bosnia's post-war armed services and
prepare for the country's eventual membership of
NATO's Partnership for Peace programme.
Post-war Bosnia's two semi-independent entities -- the
Serbs' Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat
Federation -- have their own distict armies.
Under the reforms the two armed forces will have a
central command, the same uniform and a common flag,
but they will remain ethnically distinct.
Grossman is expected to visit Macedonia and Albania at
the end of a trip to southeastern Europe which has
already taken him to Serbia and Macedonia.
=== 4 ===
Zapovjednik NATO-a u Europi general Dzouns za "Oslobodjenje"
NATO odlazi, Amerikanci ostaju?
Prema onome sto je za Oslobodjenje kazao vrhovni zapovjednik
saveznickih snaga u Europi, americki marinski general Dzejms Dzouns
(James L. Jones), americke trupe mogle bi ostati u BiH i nakon
okoncanja misije SFOR-a,
ukoliko americka i bh. vlada o tome postignu poseban bilateralni
dogovor.
"Kao Amerikanci, imamo velik interes osigurati da Bosna nastavi
napredovati. Ako se misija NATO-a u BiH okonca, i kada se okonca, SAD
bi mogle uci u neke bilateralne odnose sa Bosnom. Smatramo da je
geostrateski to vrlo znacajno, jer smo ondje vec investirali u neke
stvari, kao sto su tamosnje baze", kazao nam je ovaj general, koji se
takodjer nalazi i na
celu Europske komande (EUCOM) svih americkih oruzanih snaga u ovome
dijelu svijeta.
Realni potencijal
Kratko smo razgovarali u petak u Brunssumu, Regionalnom zapovjednistvu
Sjevernog krila NATO-a (AFNORTH) u Nizozemskoj. Za Oslobodjenje je
odgovorio na nekoliko pitanja vezanih za situaciju u BiH i cijeloj
regiji. Posebno smo ga zamolili da pojasni svoju nedavnu izjavu da u
BiH postoji
"realni potencijal" za okoncanje vojne misije NATO-a naredne godine te
prepustanje odrzavanja sigurnosti policiji. "Sto god da sam rekao,
trebalo bi se vise interpretirati kao pozitivan razvoj napretka u
Bosni," kazao je general Dzons. "Ne mozemo ne primijetiti sto se ondje
dogadja. A ucinjen je
istinski napredak. I lijepo je sto cemo u jednom trenutku biti u
mogucnosti vidjeti da ce, mozda i naredne 2004. godine, prestati
zahtjevi za vojnom misijom koja bi se mogla promijeniti u nesto drugo,
sto bi bilo potrebno u tom procesu izgradjivanja drzave. Moglo bi doci
do toga da se veci naglasak treba staviti na policijske snage,
naprimjer. A to bi bila i logicna stvar". "No, to ne znaci da bi SAD
izgubile bilo kakav interes na Balkanu.
Drzim da bi bilo pogresno kad bi se ono sto se sada dogadja shvatilo
kao stanje u kojem netko, bilo tko, zeli napustiti Bosnu", veli general.
"Trebali bismo slaviti cinjenicu da se odvija veliki napredak, i da se
mozda priblizavamo trenutku kad bismo trebali razmotriti obavljanje
drukcije misije ondje. Ali iz toga sigurno ne bih izvodio zakljucak da
neka zemlja, ukljucujuci i SAD, zeli napustiti Bosnu na nacin da vise
nikad ne bude prisutna tamo". General Jones je takodjer kazao da je
hapsenje najtrazenijih ratnih zlocinaca, poput Radovana Karadzica i
Ratka Mladica,
vazno za cijelu regiju. "Imamo interesa da se ti ljudi privedu pravdi",
rekao nam je. "To nam je jednako vazno danas, kao sto je uvijek i bilo
vazno. Bilo bi sjajno kad bi nam svatko pomagao u tome, pa da budemo
jos efikasniji u privodjenju tih ljudi. Bio bi to odlican znak za
cijelu regiju, koji bi pokazao da su ondje ljudi ozbiljni uci u
familiju naroda, svejedno radilo se o Europskoj uniji ili Partnerstvu
za mir. Pitanje optuzenih ratnih zlocinaca koji su na slobodi svakako
da je vazan aspekt onoga sto se ondje dogadja, i ne mislimo ubrzo
mijenjati svoj stav o tome".
Bolje od Kosova Zamoljen da nam usporedi sigurnosnu situaciju u BiH i
na Kosovu, zapovjednik snaga NATO-a u Europi kazao nam je da je, s
vojnog aspekta, BiH dalje odmakla u stvaranju okolnosti za okoncanja
NATO-ove
"tradicionalne" vojne zadace. "Jer Kosovo umnogome ovisi od toga kakav
ce biti njegov konacni status. U proteklih nekoliko mjeseci ondje ima i
sporadicnih zaostravanja situacije. Zato mislim da je vojna zadaca na
Kosovu, za razliku od Bosne, vojnicki zbilja potrebna", rekao nam je na
kraju general Dzons.
Antonio PRLENDA
Copyright © 1999-2000 OSLOBODJENJE Sarajevo
----
La NATO se ne va, ma gli Americani restano?
(Oslobodenje, 21.10.2003)
Intervista al comandante supremo della NATO in Europa, generale dei
marines James L. Jones, il quale dichiara
che le truppe americane potrebbero restare in Bosnia anche dopo la fine
della missione SFOR, nel caso i governi statunitense e bosniaco
giungano ad un accordo bilaterale in proposito.
"Come Americani, abbiamo un forte interesse a garantire che la Bosnia
continui a progredire. Se la missione NATO in Bosnia finira' e quando
finira', gli USA potrebbero instaurare rapporti bilaterali con la
Bosnia. Riteniamo che cio' sia molto importante dal punto di vista
geostrategico, poiche' abbiamo gia investito in alcune cose, COME LE
BASI su quel territorio", ha dichiarato a Oslobodenje il genrale Jones,
il quale e' anche a capodel comando in Europa (EUCOM) di tutte le forze
armate statunitensi in questa parte del mondo.
Reale potenziale
La breve intervista, rilasciata nella base olandese di Brunssum presso
il comando dell'ala Nord della NATO (AFNORTH), e' peraltro tutta un
inno alla rassicurazione: Jones infatti aveva recentemente dichiarato
che in Bosnia esiste un "reale potenziale" per la conclusione della
missione militare NATO e il passaggio dei compiti di mantenimento della
sicurezza alla
polizia. "Qualsiasi cosa io abbia detto", ha risposto il generale,
"andrebbe interpretato nel senso di uno sviluppo positivo dei progressi
in Bosnia. Non possiamo non rilevare cio' che accade laggiu'. Ed e'
stato compiuto un reale progresso. E' bello pensare che a un dato
momento, forse gia' nel prossimo 2004, potremo vedere che sara' cessato
il bisogno di una
missione militare, che potrebbe trasformarsi in qualcosa d'altro, che
sia necessario in questo processo di costruzione dello stato. Ad
esempio, potrebbe accadare ce si metta un acento maggiore sulle forze
di polizia. Sarebbe logico"
"Ma questo non significa che gli USA perderebbero ogni interesse nei
Balcani. Secondo me sarebbe un errore se cio che avviene oggi fosse
interpretato come una siuazione in cui qualcuno, chiunque sia, intenda
abbandonare la Bosnia", afforma il generale. "Dovremmo celebrare il
fatto che si assiste a questo progresso, e che forse ci avviciniamo al
momento in
cui dovremmo prendere in considerazione il lancio di un atro tipo di
missione in quel paese. Ma da questo certamente non trarrei la
conclusione che qualche paese, Stati Unit compresi, intenda abbandonare
la Bosnia in modo da non essere piu' presente sul suo territorio". Il
generale Jones ha anche affermato che l'arresto dei piu' ricercati fra
i criminali di guerra,
come Radovan Karadzic e Ratko Mladic, e' importante per tutta la
regione.
"E' nel nostro interesse che questi personaggi siano consegnati alla
giustizia. E' altrettanto importante oggi, quanto lo e' sempre stato.
Sarebbe meraviglioso che tutti ci aiutassero, perche' fossimo piu'
efficienti nella cattura di questi soggetti. Sarebbe un segnale
eccellente per tutta la regione, che dmostrerebbe come la gente di qui
vuole davvero entrare nella famiglia dei popoli, indipendentemente dal
fatto che si tratti dell'Unione Europea o la Partnership for Peace. La
questione dei criminali di guerra ricercati, che ancora si trovano in
liberta', e' sicuramente un aspetto importante di cio' che accade qui,
per cui non pensiamo di cambiare opinione in merito".
Meglio del Kosovo
Richiesto di fare un confronto fra la situazione della sicurezza in
Bosnia e nel Kosovo, il comandante delle forze NATO in Europa ha
dichiarato che, dal punto di vista militare, la Bosnia e' mlto piu'
avanti nel creare le condizioni per la fine della presenza militare
"tradizionali" della NATO.
"Questo perche' il Kosovo in gran parte dipende da quello che sara' il
suo status finale. Negli ultimi mesi qui si e' ache assistit ad uno
sporadico peggioramento della situazione. Per questo penso che la
missione militare in Kosovo, a differenza della Bosnia, e' ancora
davvero necessaria".
Antonio PRLENDA
(Fonte: P. Lucchesi su balcani@peacelink,it, 22/10/2003)
