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Datum: 27 novembar 2002


Dusan Milovanovic: Izlaganje na promociji knjige "Terorizam
albanskih ekstremista"

Centralni dom Vojske Jugoslavije
Beograd, 27. novembar 2002. godine
Promocija knjige "Terorizam albanskih ekstremista"
Autori: Milan Mijalkovski i Petar Damjanov
Izdava?: "Novinsko - izdava?ki centar Vojska"

O knjizi su govorili:
- Todor Petkovi?, general - major, recenzent
- Dusan Milovanovi?, glavni i odgovorni urednik nedeljnika
"Revija 92",
- pukovnik Stanoje Jovanovi?, direktor Novinsko - izdava?kog
centra Vojska
- autori

Dusan Milovanovi?:
Imamo pred sobom jednu izuzetnu knjigu. Sveobuhvatnu po
sadr?aju kojim se bavi, analiti?nu po pristupu i veoma metodi?nu
po na?inu izlaganja. Poseban joj je kvalitet jasno?a i jednostavnost
autorskog izraza. Mo?e se re?i da je ova knjiga i svojevrsna
enciklopedija svega onoga sto se mo?e svrstati pod pojam
terorizma, od pojavnih oblika, preko teorije i prakse, do
medjunarodne politike i pravnih normi u toj oblasti.
General Petkovi? je u predgovoru istakao i jednu ?injenicu koja
ukazuje na posebno vredan autorski iskorak u ovoj bransi - medju
pripadnicima vojske i policije veoma redak, kada je u pitanju kritika
prakse i ponasanja vlasti. I, svakako sopstvene prakse. Re? je, kako
on ka?e, "o nedopustivoj nesnala?ljivosti subjekata i snaga sistema
odbrane u celini, naro?ito njegovog podsistema - protiv teroristi?ke
odbrane". I jos jedna konstatacija, da je u odgovoru dr?ave na
albanski terorizam zanemarena njegova ideoloska, propagandna,
finansijska i jata?ka komponenta. Slobodnije re?eno, terorizam je
udaran po prstima, umesto po glavi.
U tom smislu ova knjiga nudi veoma siroku osnovu i bezbroj
?injenica za jos smelije, ?ak i preko potrebno izricanje ocena o
doraslosti institucija dr?ave da se suo?e sa problemom terorizma.
Usudjujem se re?i da i sva pamet sabrana u ovoj knjizi, nudi obilje
saznanja i znanja, koja bi u jednoj druga?ije uspostavljenoj vertikali
odlu?ivanja, komandovanja i rukovodjenja, u borbi protiv
terorizma, dala bolje rezultate od onih sa kakvima se danas ne
mo?emo pomiriti, a sto je jos gore ne mo?emo ih ni bitnije menjati.
Da ne idemo tako daleko, ali podsetio bih da se taj isti terorizam u
nedavnoj drustvenoj, i posebno politi?koj praksi, krstio potpuno
pogresnim terminima - iredentizam, a potom - kontrarevolucija.
^?ak se i jedno vreme tvrdilo da je u pitanju nekakav poseban
siptarski agresivni konzervativizam. Neka civilizacijska razlika u
odnosu sa okru?enje, siptarsko zaostajanje u drustvenom razvoju,
optere?eno i bremenito nacionalnim romantizmom. Frapantan je
raskorak, ravan ?ak i politi?kom slepilu, kad se iz takvog poimanja
suo?imo sa medjunarodnim karakterom terorizma. Koga prozivati,
kome sada ispostaviti ra?une za nespremnost ili nesposobnost u
suo?avanju sa ?injenicom da se u terorizam, sa kakvim smo bili i
jesmo suo?eni, unose elememnti inostranosti. Upli?u se brojne
dr?ave i medjunarodne institucije, pogotovu kad se proglasi da je
ugro?ena neka vrednost i nesto sto stiti medjunarodno pravo. Tesko
da je do ju?e bilo upitanosti sta ?initi pri takvom stanju, mo?e li se
i
mora li se jedino na na?in koji je unarped bio do?ekan na no? i sa
totalnim nerazumevanjem.
Sude?i po veoma respektivnim pokazateljima kojima autori operisu,
neizbe?no se otvara jedan ceo niz pitanja: zasto se tek u poslednjoj
fazi, u direktnom ratu spoznalo i priznalo da imamo posla sa
vrhunskom kategorijom terorista, da su sa njima i medju njima ne
samo belosvetski pla?enici, ve? i ispostave teroristi?ke elite kakva
je
Al kaida, zatim da uplitanjem stranog faktora ne vise posredno
nego sasvim otvoreno i direktno, nije ugro?en samo jug Srbije "ono
dole", ve? i celokupna dr?ava, sve njene institucije i organi, njena
sustinska suverenost, pa i celokupno stanovnistvo, sto ?e do kraja
potvrditi NATO intervencija.
Dok se - sto i autori diskretno ukazuju - na nivou politike govorilo
o "prikrivenim stranim akcijama", u praksi smo imali ogoljenu
podrsku i simpatije za stvar terorista, i to ne od bilo koga, ve? od
vode?ih zemalja sveta: SAD, Nema?ke, Engleske...o neskladu
politi?ke realnosti, sa takvim stanjem sasvim je izlisno govoriti.
Otuda je i pitanje borbe protiv terorizma sa kakvim smo bili
suo?eni, tra?ilo znatno kompleksnije odgovore. Ne toliko
predominantno one u kojima su jedino policija i vojska su?eljene sa
celokupnom lepezom teroristi?kih akcija i ambicija.
Autori su ponudili dovoljno inspirativne gradje i za nesto u sta se
nisu upustali, a to je da li se u nasoj politi?koj praksi, svesno
izbegavalo razlikovanje ogoljenog terorizma od postojanja
sveukupnog problema zvanog albansko, kosovsko, ili siptarsko
pitanje, kako god ho?ete da ga zovemo. Ono postoji skoro jedan
vek, od 1912. od Prvog balkanskog rata, pa preko svih onih
krvarenja i mrcvarenja do 1941. zatim i u prvim godinama posle
oslobodjenja 1945, pa na specifi?an na?in primireno za Titova
vremena, do poslednjeg i po svemu sude?i definitivnog otvaranja sa
sasvim prepoznatljivim i po mnogo ?emu pesimisti?kim
zavrsetkom. Na "neiskorenjivost" ili neprekidnost albanskog
terorizma, kako ga je definisala nasa doju?erasnja politi?ka praksa,
presudno su uticali mnogi nealbanski ?inioci, sto autori sasvim
jasno preciziraju, i naravno, uvek iz svojih interesa. Ovog puta, pri
najnovijoj eskalaciji tog pitanja, kao da je nasa politi?ka
pragmatika u potpunosti potcenila ambicije i resenost inostranog
faktora da upotrebi i ogoljenu silu, direktnim uplitanjem, koje je
zavrseno vojnom intervencijom i pretvaranjem Kosmeta u
medjunarodni protektorat.
Pred zapanjuju?om inostranom podrskom i razumevanjem za
ciljeve terorista, kao da se verovalo da ?e biti delotvorni navodnici,
ono neizbe?no takozvana OVK, samozvana U?K... Navodnici i
odrednice takozvano nisu mogle spre?iti ono sa ?ime se nije htelo
suo?iti - da je ve? uveliko na delu internacionalizacija problema
Kosova i Metohije. Pritom se terorizam, kao nesporno i sasvim
ogoljeno sredstvo, za ostvarenje tih ciljeva, uopste ne dovodi u
pitanje. U tom smislu ova knjiga je i svojevrsna, ako ne kritika, a
ono hronologija te i takve politi?ke, diplomatske, obavestajne i
vojne supremacije nad jednim visestruko ranjivim dr?avnim
improvizarijem, koji se nasao pred tako delikatnim, mo?da i
neresivim problemom koji se zove Kosovo i Metohija. Terorizam je
u tom kompleksnom problemu pokazao sva svoja lica i neshvatljivo
siroku lepezu sveopste upotrebe i zloupotrebe.

International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milosevic

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=================================
Slobodan Milosevic's Cross-Examination of
Croatian President Stjepan Mesic: PART IX
Because the transcript of the cross-examination
is 150 pages long we have broken it into
12 easy to read segments. If you wish to read the whole thing
at once go to: http://emperor.vwh.net/icdsm/more/mesic.htm
=================================



Page 10702

Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the
French and English transcripts.

Page 10703

1 issued a decision on the withdrawal of the reserve forces of the
police

2 from municipalities, mostly in the Krajina, where the Serbs were in
the

3 majority, you remember that, I assume.

4 A. This is yet another lie and another trick. A decision was made to

5 collect weapons in all municipalities of the Republic of Croatia so
that

6 Croatia could defend herself, because the authorities in Belgrade
had

7 previously issued a decision that all weapons should be withdrawn
from

8 Croatia so that Croatia could be brought to her knees.

9 The Territorial Defence, I have to explain, was commanded by a

10 staff in Zagreb, the staff of the Territorial Defence. The army -
that

11 is, the army of the SFRY - was commanded by the General Staff in
Belgrade,

12 but both were components of the armed forces of Yugoslavia. We held
the

13 opinion that it was improper to withdraw weapons from the
Territorial

14 Defence because these weapons were protected in Croatia. However,

15 evidently the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and his subordinates
felt it

16 was in their interest to disarm Croatia and to arm the rebellious
Serbs in

17 order to implement the plan that General Kadijevic also speaks
about, and

18 that is the establishing of the Virovitica-Karlovac-Karlobag
border. I

19 know the accused does not like this, but these are the facts.

20 Q. There's nothing for me to dislike here. These are not facts but

21 your political opinions, Mr. Mesic, because you have failed to put
forward

22 a single fact here.

23 Along with a decision to collect the weapons from the Serb areas

24 in late July, you also made a decision to establish the National
Guard

25 Corps. This was a paramilitary formation. Is this correct or not?

Page 10704

1 A. I have to remind the accused that, on the one hand, there were

2 illegal paramilitary organisations and there were legal paramilitary

3 organisations. The police force is also a paramilitary organisation.

4 They have weapons, they have uniforms, and they have a chain of
command.

5 But they are not an army. Croatia adopted a decision that the
National

6 Guard Corps be established. Its purpose, in fact, was to be
something

7 like the gendarmes in France or the carabinieri in Italy. We wanted
to

8 have a unit which could be activated, in case of need, if the vital

9 interests of the Republic of Croatia were threatened. At that time,
this

10 was not yet the Croatian army.

11 Q. This decision of the Croatian government was to have been

12 implemented, first of all, in the area of Lika, where Serbs made up
93 per

13 cent of the population; is that correct or not?

14 A. Where did you get this 93 per cent? That's not true.

15 Q. Very well, then. The majority.

16 A. Well, 93 per cent and 51 per cent is a big difference. But as we

17 have heard, the accused no longer stands by the usual kind of
arithmetic.

18 Q. When the political and security situation deteriorated, did the

19 political leadership of the Serbs in Krajina decide to hold a
referendum

20 on autonomy? This was in late August 1990.

21 A. I have to respond again, although I have already answered a part

22 of this question: Weapons were collected on the entire territory of
the

23 Republic of Croatia, and the referendum was illegal, and Croatia
failed to

24 recognise it, did not recognise it, because it was an illegal
referendum,

25 and in Croatia law has to be respected.

Page 10705

1 Q. Is it correct that on the 16th and 17th of August, when the
police

2 set out toward Benkovac, where 10.000 Serbs had gathered, do you
think

3 that this move that you made had anything to do with the reactions
of the

4 Serbs and that it was not actually incited by the authorities of
Serbia?

5 You said Belgrade -- I mean, when you say "Belgrade," I assume
you're

6 referring to the federal organs of Yugoslavia, not to the leadership
of

7 the Republic of Serbia.

8 A. I'm referring to the accused and his regime and his links with
the

9 Yugoslav army.

10 Q. All right. We're going to get to that a bit later.

11 Did this have anything to do with the reaction of the Serbs, the

12 fact that the police set out to Benkovac, where 10.000 Serbs had

13 assembled? Is that correct or is that not correct?

14 A. The police did not set out against anyone. They could only

15 provide security at the rally.

16 Q. Oh, so they went there to guarantee their security.

17 A. Yes, by all means.

18 Q. Do you think that such wrong decisions of yours, to send police
to

19 places where people had rallies, in spite of the constitutional
right to

20 freedom of assembly, was a wrongful decision which made the Serbs
place

21 roadblocks; this was not part of a struggle for a greater Serbia?

22 A. During this trial I've answered that question too.

23 Q. All right, Mr. Mesic. After this Croatian government was

24 constituted, the one whose prime minister you were, wasn't it clear
that

25 at that time the activity of the organised arming of HDZ members
started?

Page 10706

1 Is that right or is that not right? Is that being contested too?

2 A. I was prime minister of Croatia for three months before I went to

3 Belgrade, and on the 17th of August, 1990, the log revolution
started.

4 Roads were blocked, roads that were of vital interest to the economy
of

5 Croatia. Croatia had to survive, both politically and economically.
Who

6 was it who was destroying Croatia then? Was it those who wanted to

7 establish free traffic on Croatian roads or those who were carrying
out

8 orders issued by the accused and provoking the Croatian authorities?

9 Q. All right. It just so happens that the accused at that time was

10 vacationing in Dubrovnik and heard about this from the newspapers
there.

11 But are you trying to say that logs are some kind of offensive
weapon, or

12 is it the police that enters settled areas and attacks people? Was

13 anybody ever attacked by a log?

14 A. Yes, logs are a very lethal weapon, because they do not allow

15 free communication in Croatia. They do not allow the economy to

16 function. This is a grave attack on the Croatian economy and the
Croatian

17 state. Before that, I would really like to hear where this
happened,

18 where the police attacked someone so the Croatian roads had to be

19 blocked. I would really like to hear that once and for all.

20 Q. I've given you countless examples - I've presented them here

21 anyway - during 1989 and 1990, many examples. I even quoted your
own

22 newspapers to you, about incursions, about arrests, about people
being

23 taken away and who are still missing. You know about that. Mr.
Mesic, do

24 you think that since at that time you were prime minister, you are
the

25 guiltiest person of all for clashes with the Serbs in Croatia?

Page 10707

1 A. Although this is nonsensical, I am going to dignify it with an

2 answer. They opted to provoke the Croatian authorities in order to

3 establish the boundary that I refer to. Specifically in Pakrac,
there was

4 a conflict between two streams in one police station.

5 Q. All right. You've already explained that.

6 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] He's taking up my time. He spoke

8 about it yesterday.

9 JUDGE MAY: You've put serious allegations to him. He must be

10 able to answer them.

11 Yes. Go on, Mr. Mesic.

12 A. Since part of the police station was disarmed, the Minister of
the

13 Interior sent reinforcements in and disarmed the attackers. That
brought

14 an end to it all. However, the army came into the streets with 20
or 30

15 tanks, and they purportedly separated the conflicting parties.
There were

16 no conflicting parties. There were those who were attacking the
police

17 and there were those who were protecting the police. There were no
two

18 parties that were clashing. There was not an interethnic conflict
there.

19 Nobody was wounded. Nobody was killed. I came to Belgrade. Borislav

20 Jovic, the representative Serbian of the Presidency of Yugoslavia,
said

21 that there was a massacre of Serbs in Pakrac, where 40 persons were

22 massacred. I said, "Well, I was in Pakrac yesterday. Nobody was
wounded.

23 Where did you read that?" And he said, "In the Titograd daily
newspaper

24 of Pobjeda." Now, where is Titograd? Where is Pakrac? They have
nothing

25 to do with each other. But it is obvious that this is a scenario.
The

Page 10708

1 army was supposed to be brought into the picture to ensure the
boundaries

2 that not only General Kadijevic knows of very well but also this
accused,

3 Slobodan Milosevic.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. This accused doesn't, and I do not consider myself to be accused

6 by this false indictment. And since you behaved the way that you
behaved,

7 that you behaved in this broad-minded, democratic manner, how is it

8 then possible and why were you the protagonist of a programme that
Serbs

9 were supposed to be expelled from the constitution of Croatia as a

10 constituent and state-building people?

11 A. Croatia proclaimed its independence. It had its own

12 institutions, it had its own parliament, and it passed laws. I'm
not in a

13 position now to interpret why each and every law was passed and in
which

14 way and how the constitution was adopted. There is a procedure
involved.

15 I don't know in which case I would have to give answers now in
respect of

16 a decision that is reached by the parliament of my country.

17 Q. A parliament that you chaired. So you believe that you preserved

18 the status of the Serbs that they had according to all previous

19 constitutions. I mean, had you retained that status for them, that
they

20 still would have rebelled; is that your opinion?

21 A. Institutionally, no rights of Serbs or of any other ethnic group

22 were violated. I admit that there were some messages that were

23 unacceptable, but they had to be discussed at a table, not by
destroying

24 Dubrovnik, not by destroying Vukovar, Skabrnja, Vucine, not
Cetekovac, not

25 by massacring people. In that way, not a single conflict can be
resolved.

Page 10709

1 Q. Mr. Mesic, as a member of the Presidency, later on you even

2 compounded your responsibility for everything that happened to the
Serbs

3 in 1991 and 1992 and later on your responsibility as Croatia's -- as
the

4 president of Croatia's parliament, at the beginning of 2000, you
stated,

5 on television, that the Croats in 1995, through military actions,
that is

6 to say, through storm and flash, in the war for the homeland, that
they

7 won a glorious victory. Mr. Mesic, no doubt storm and flash are
actions

8 that meant carrying out war crimes and ethnic cleansing, ethnic
cleansing

9 of practically all Serbs from Croatia. Do you --

10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you know that this is not the time to

11 make speeches or try and give evidence, which you're trying to do.
Have

12 you got a question to ask the witness?

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Please, I do have a question. If these were glorious actions,
why

15 are you saying now that Bobetko should be held responsible if he
was doing

16 something glorious, in your words?

17 A. The victories in the homeland war were glorious because they
made

18 it possible for Croatia to reach each and every part of the
Croatian state

19 and to establish the functioning of the institutions of the
Croatian

20 state. In these battles, crimes may occur, as always. I am
advocating

21 the following: That everybody should be held accountable for what
he did.

22 Croatia adopted a constitutional law in cooperation with The Hague

23 Tribunal. I am advocating the following: That everybody should have
the

24 right to defence. All suspects should be held accountable before
The

25 Hague Tribunal. If these are Croatian citizens, then they should
have the

Page 10710

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the
French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 10711

1 right to defence, maximum defence, implying dignity and respect for

2 everything that everyone did by way of a contribution to the
independence

3 of Croatia. But I want each and every citizen to be equal before the
law

4 because it is only then that we can expect to realise our strategic

5 objectives and that is to become part of European and Atlantic
alliances,

6 which is truly our strategic objective.

7 Q. All right. It is my understanding that the expulsion of 250.000

8 Serbs from Krajina and taking tens of thousands of them out of
columns,

9 according to the findings of Commissioner Ema Bonino, and these
persons

10 went missing, simply that you are calling all of this individuals
crimes

11 and individual actions. The expulsion of 250.000 Serbs and the

12 destruction of thousands of persons who were in these columns. You
are

13 calling this individual crimes within this glorious --

14 JUDGE MAY: The witness has dealt with this, and it's not clear

15 what relevance this has to this particular indictment. These are
events

16 in 1995. Yes let's move on to something else.

17 MR. NICE: I'm concerned if there's to be the time limitation that

18 the Chamber has identified that the accused is simply not dealing
with the

19 matters on which evidence has been given, and typically in the last

20 question but two he slid over 1991 and 1992 with an allegation to
which

21 the witness was not allowed to give an answer, that being exactly
the time

22 of the Presidency, the Rump Presidency, and the other matters that
we

23 should be investigating.

24 JUDGE MAY: What was the question that you say he should have been

25 able to answer.

Page 10712

1 MR. NICE: Well, it was where he suggested -- I'll just find it

2 again. He simply suggested that he compounded everything by his
behaviour

3 in 1991 and 1992, without putting any particulars.

4 JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has dealt with that.

5 Mr. Nice, there is a question of time. We understood that the

6 witness could not be available tomorrow. Is that right?

7 MR. NICE: The way I expressed it was he was definitely available

8 yesterday and today and that he might be available for tomorrow. I
know

9 his original plans were to travel back tomorrow. But the Chamber
will of

10 course be in the witness's hands and he'll know better than I, I
not

11 having spoken to him yesterday, what his availability now is.

12 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Mesic, could you help us with this? You've heard

13 about this question of time. Are you available tomorrow at all in
the

14 morning or do you have to get back?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have some engagements tomorrow

16 afternoon, so I could be present in this courtroom for part of the
morning

17 tomorrow.

18 JUDGE MAY: Could you be here for an hour, say from 9.00 to 10.00?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

20 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

21 Well, Mr. Milosevic, you can have until 2.00 today. You can

22 have --

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

24 JUDGE MAY: You can have a few minutes tomorrow in addition to

25 that, but there must be time for the other parties to cross-examine
and

* Continued at: http://emperor.vwh.net/icdsm/more/mesic-10.htm



***** Urgent Message from Sloboda (Freedom) Association and the
International
Committee to Defend Slobodan Milosevic!

The Freedom Association in Belgrade and the ICDSM, based outside
Yugoslavia, are the two
organizations formed at the request of Slobodan Milosevic to aid in
his defense.

Up until now our main work has been threefold. We have publicized the
truth about The
Hague's phony trial. We have organized research to help President
Milosevic expose
NATO's lies. And we have initiated legal action in the Dutch and
European Courts.

Now our job has increased. The defense phase of the "trial" starts in
May 2003. No longer
will Mr. Milosevic be limited to cross-examining Hague witnesses. The
prosecution will be
forced further onto the defensive as victims of NATO's aggression and
experts from
Yugoslavia and the NATO countries tell what really happened and expose
media lies.
Moreover, Mr. Milosevic will call leaders, from East and West, some
friendly and some
hostile to the truth.

The controlled mass media will undoubtedly try to suppress this
testimony as they have tried
to suppress Mr. Milosevic's cross-examinations. Nevertheless this
phase of the "trial" will
be the biggest international forum ever to expose NATO's use of
racism, violence and lies to
attack Yugoslavia.

We urgently need the help of all people who care about what is
happening in The Hague.
Right now, Nico Steijnen , the Dutch lawyer in the ICDSM, is waging
legal battles in the
Dutch courts and before the European Court, about which more news
soon. These efforts
urgently require financial support. We now maintain a small staff of
Yugoslav lawyers in
Holland, assisting and advising Mr. Milosevic full-time. We need to
expand our Dutch
facilities, perhaps bringing in a non-Yugoslav attorney full-time.
Definitely we must
guarantee that we have an office and office manager available at all
times, to compile and
process evidence and for meetings with witnesses and lawyers and as a
base for organizing
press conferences.

All this costs money. And for this, we rely on those who want Mr.
Milosevic to have the best
possible support for attacking NATO's lies.

************
Here's how you can help...
************

* You may contribute by credit card. By the end of September we will
have an ICDSM
secure server so you can contribute directly on the Internet.

For now, you can contribute by credit card in two ways: *

You can Contribute by Credit Card over the Telephone by calling:

ICDSM office, USA: 1 617 916-1705
SLOBODA (Freedom) Association office, Belgrade: 381 63 279 819

You can Contribute using PayPal at:
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You can Contribute by mail to:
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- OR -

You can Contribute by wire transfer to Sloboda Association

Intermediary:
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Swift Code: UBSWCHZH

Account with:
/ 756 - CHF
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SLOBODA
Rajiceva 16, 11000 Belgrade, FR Yugoslavia

Thank you!

http://emperor.vwh.net/icdsm

ZOYA UN ESEMPIO PER TUTTI NOI

IL 29 Novembre 1941 a 70 km da Mosca in una piccola cittadina di nome
Petrisheva in un freddo pomeriggio, tutti gli abitanti notarono il
passaggio di una giovanissima ragazza che a piedi scalzi e con i
vestiti strappati scortata dai soldati tedeschi si avvicinava verso il
patibolo dove fu impiccata.

La ragazza si chiamava Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya ma per i compagni del
servizio di intelligenza della zona di Kuntsevo, in cui si era
arruolata il suo nome era TANYA. Il servizio di intelligenza di
Kuntesvo aveva l'incarico di organizzare i soldati della resistenza
sovietica per attività sovversive dietro le linee nemiche
(Germaniche-Hittleriane).

Tanya insieme a 2 suoi compagni aveva avuto l'incarico di segnalare
con esattezza nel villaggio di Petrisheva la presenza dei tedeschi in
modo che l'artiglieria centrasse per bene i bersagli nemici.I 3
compagni si divisero e purtroppo uno di loro fu arrestato dai tedeschi
e in seguito tradi Tanya e l'altro compagno. Tanya fu catturata e
ripetutamente violentata dai nazisti, alla fine fu legata ad una sedia
e picchiata per due ore con un guanto di gomma per obbligarla a
tradire l'organizzazione. Ma lei in tutti modi cerco' di dimostrare di
essere coraggiosa e mentre la picchiavano si mordeva le labbra
talmente forte da farle sanguinare. Non disse neanche una parola cosi
i nazisti la preso di forza e la trascinarono in mezzo alla neve
scalza, sanguinate e con i vestiti strappati la portarono al patibolo,
le legarono una corda intorno al collo e in quel momento la compagna
Zoya urlò con tutto la sua voce "Dovrete ucciderci tutti , tutti i 200
milioni!!!!! I miei compagni mi vendicheranno!!!! L'Unione Sovietica
Vincerà!!!!". Queste furono le sue ultime parole, che provocarono la
rabbia di un soldato tedesco che quando Tanya fu lasciata cadere, e la
corda intorno al collo le stava togliendo la vita, la infilzò con la
baionetta del suo fucile. Gli ufficiali tedeschi diedero l'ordine
di lasciare il corpo di Tanya appeso al patibolo dove rimase per più
di un mese, finche durante una contro offensiva della gloriosa armata
rossa fu finalmente sepolta. Solo un anno dopo, grazie a un
giornalista della Pravda Pyotr Lidov, si venne a conoscenza della
storia di Tanya, Lidov fece riesumare il cadavere di Tanya per cercare
di dare un volto e per trovare il vero nome di questa giovane ragazza,
ma il riconoscimento naturalmente fu impossibile. Lidov pero' trovo'
una foto e la fece pubblicare sul giornale insieme all'articolo sulla
storia di Tanya, grazie a quella foto il fratello della ragazza
Alexander Kosmodemyansky si presentò in redazione per dire che quella
foto era di sua sorella e che il suo vero nome era Zoya
Kosmodemyanskaya. Grazie a questa segnalazione il nome di
Zoya era diventato simbolo di eroismo per tutta l'Unione Sovietica.

Le ultime parole di Zoya sono diventate slogan ufficiale della
gloriosa Armata Rossa e del popolo sovietico. Il traditore
collaborazionista che tradì Zoya fu catturato e giustiziato
dall'Armata Rossa.

Suo fratello Alexander Kosmodemyansky poco piu' tardi fu dichiarato
Eroe dell'Unione Sovietica perché morì combattendo nella battaglia di
Kaliningrad.

Foto http://www.richard.clark32.btinternet.co.uk/zoya.html

Come Zoya e' bene ricordare che furono oltre 4000 le donne partigiane
uccise dai nazisti, la maggior parte di loro prima di essere impiccate
furono violentate e torturate. Le partigiane più note oltre a Zoya
furono:

Masha Bruskina partigiana di 17 anni uccisa in Bielorussa nel 26
Ottobre del 1941. Foto
http://www.richard.clark32.btinternet.co.uk/masha.html
nella foto porta un cartello al collo con la scritta in tedesco e in
russo con su scritto
"Noi siamo dei Partigiani e abbiamo sparato su un soldato tedesco".

Klava Nazarova partigiana di 24 anni uccisa per impiccagione nel 1942
insieme alla sua compagna di lotta Nura Ivanova.

Maria Kislyak partigiana di 18 anni dopo aver ucciso un ufficiale
tedesco si consegno' ai nazisti per evitare che 100 abitanti del
villaggio venissero fucilati. Foto
http://www.richard.clark32.btinternet.co.uk/kislyak.jpg


[ripreso ed adattato da un messaggio di Yassir, dell'area leninista
del PRC, che ringraziamo per la importante segnalazione]

IL MINI GENERALE HA DECRETATO


http://www.ilmanifesto.it/Quotidiano-archivio/
21-Novembre-2002/art100.html

il manifesto - 21 Novembre 2002

KOSOVO/ARTE

Un Mini-generale da icona

TOMMASO DI FRANCESCO

Lunedì da Pristina è arrivata una nota del comando Kfor-Nato diffusa
proprio nel giorno dell'arrivo di Kofi Annan, segretario Onu. Nella
nota - emessa dopo la distruzione con attentati al tritolo di
due chiese ortodosse che non avevano protezione militare - si
giustificava la disattenzione dei militari atlantici annunciando anzi
che la Kfor-Nato in Kosovo d'ora in poi proteggerà solo «siti
religiosi d'importanza storico-artistica e attivi al culto», perché
«quelle chiese erano da tempo abbandonate e non avevano rilevanza
artistica, una era stata costruita nel 1940 e l'altra nel 1997 e non
contenevano arredi di alcun genere».
Essendo la Kfor-Nato in Kosovo comandata dal generale italiano Fabio
Mini, l'incredibile «nota» non può che essere sua. Ed è vergognoso.
Visto che in Kosovo i contingenti Nato sono 35mila uomini che,
dall'estate del 1999 hanno occupato la regione - ancora serba -
amministrata protempore dall'Onu. Ebbene, da quella data sono stati
uccisi più di mille serbi, rom e albanesi moderati, altrettanti sono
desaparecidos, 200.000 serbi e rom sono fuggiti sotto il terrore della
nuova contropulizia etnica. Ma l'arte che c'entra?
E' che in questi due anni le milizie dell'ex Uck, alleato in guerra
della Nato, hanno distrutto 110 chiese ortodosse, ha ricordato lunedì
il vescovo Artemje. «Non storico-artistiche» per il Mini-generale -
famoso perché durante il governo D'Alema era il capo ufficio
informazione pubblica al ministero della difesa, ma poi
indimenticabile redattore di Limes, con l'articolo che un anno fa
aggrediva così chi era contro la guerra Usa all'Afghanistan:
«Spazzatura propagandistica e di disinformazione che ci viene
propinata sotto le nobili vesti del diritto al dissenso». Perché è
così ignorante? Vorremmo sapere infatti come fa lui a giudicare di
scarsa rilevanza storico-artistica una chiesa (?!) tanto da decidere
se può o meno essere rasa al suolo. Dovrebbe ricordare che: 1) le 110
chiese ortodosse fatte saltare finora erano artisticamente rilevanti,
dice l'Onu, 2) il fatto che quelle di questi giorni siano del 1940 e
del 1997 non vuol dire nulla, visto che erano costruite con pietre di
edifici medioevali distrutti in storici massacri precedenti, 3) dire
che «non contenevano arredi di alcun genere» è uno sfottò, visto che
quegli arredi (con le icone) sono stati trafugati - vuole vedere le
foto? - e vandalizzati sotto gli occhi della Nato, 4) e che è
un'infamia bella e buona raccontare che non sono «attivi al culto»,
visto che i serbi sono stati costretti con la violenza a fuggire e che
l'Onu «promette» di farli rientrare. Faccia il suo mestiere, generale!