Informazione

SECRET WAR: US and EU INTERVENTION IN YUGOSLAVIA

http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/yu_kriza/2003-10-02.html
http://www3.sympatico.ca/sr.gowans/elich1.html

What's Left
November 8, 2002
By Gregory Elich

For one long decade, the West waged a fierce campaign to subjugate
Yugoslavia. Every means was utilized: support for violent
secessionists, the imposition of severe sanctions, a 78-day
bombardment, followed by forcible occupation of the region of Kosovo.
The Yugoslav Federation withstood it all, but it was Western covert
operations that finally brought disaster.

In November 1998, President Clinton launched a plan for the overthrow
of the government of Yugoslavia. The initial emphasis of the plan
centered on supporting secessionist forces in Montenegro and the
right-wing opposition in Serbia. (1) Several months later, while NATO
bombs fell on Yugoslavia, Clinton signed a secret paper instructing the
CIA to topple the Yugoslav government. The plan called for the CIA to
secretly fund opposition groups and the recruitment of moles in the
Yugoslav government and military. (2) The effort to recruit moles in
the police and army eventually yielded fruit nearly two years later,
when renegade policemen aided the mob assault on the Federal Parliament.
There were several components to the plan, and assassination was a key
element in the Western arsenal. On July 8, 1999, U.S. and British
officials revealed that commando teams were training snatch operations
to seize alleged war criminals and Yugoslav President Slobodan
Milosevic. As an encouragement to mercenaries, the U.S. State
Department also announced a $5 million bounty for President Milosevic.
(3) Several Yugoslav government officials and prominent individuals,
including
Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, were gunned down. Most of those
crimes remained unsolved, as the assassins managed to escape. Goran
Zugic, security advisor to secessionist Montenegrin President Milo
Djukanovic, was murdered late on May 31, 2000. The assassin escaped,
allowing Western leaders to place blame on President Milosevic. Coming
just one week before crucial local elections in Montenegro, forces
opposing President Milosevic stood to gain from the murder, as the
effect would tend to sway undecided voters in favor of secessionist
parties. A few days after the assassination, Yugoslav Minister of
Information Goran Matic held a press conference, at which he accused
the CIA of complicity in the murder. Matic played a taped recording of
two telephone
conversations between head of the U.S. mission in Dubrovnik Sean Burns,
U.S. State Department official James Swaggert, Gabriel Escobar of the
U.S. economic group in Montenegro and Paul Davies of the U.S. Agency
for International Development. Excerpts of the conversations, recorded
20
minutes after the assassination and again three hours later, included
comments such as, "It was professional," and "Mission accomplished." (4)
The first publicly known Western plan to assassinate President
Milosevic was drafted in 1992. Richard Tomlinson, a former British MI6
employee, later disclosed the plan. His task as an MI6 agent was to
carry out undercover operations in Eastern Europe while posing as a
businessman or journalist. Tomlinson frequently met with MI6 officer
Nick Fishwick.
During one their meetings, Fishwick showed Tomlinson a document
entitled, "The Need to Assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia."
Three methods were proposed for the assassination of Milosevic. The
first method, Tomlinson recalled, "was to train and equip a Serbian
paramilitary
opposition group," which would have the advantage of deniability but an
unpredictable chance of success. The second method would employ a
specially trained British SAS squad to murder President Milosevic
"either with a bomb or sniper ambush." Fishwick considered this more
reliable, but it lacked deniability. The third method would be to kill
Milosevic
"in a staged car crash." (5) Seven years later, on October 3, 1999, the
third method was employed against the leader of the Serbian Renewal
Movement, Vuk Draskovic, when a truck filled with sand plowed into his
car, killing everyone inside except for Draskovic. The temperamental
Draskovic had been a major factor in the chronic fragmentation of the
right-wing opposition, frustrating Washington's efforts to forge a
unified
opposition. (6)
During NATO's war against Yugoslavia, a missile struck President
Milosevic's home on April 22, 1999. Fortunately, he and his wife were
staying elsewhere that evening. Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon was quick
to announce that "we are not targeting President Milosevic." What else
would a missile striking Milosevic's bedroom at 3:10 AM be? (7)

In November 1999, members of an assassination squad, code-named
"Spider," were arrested in Yugoslavia. According to Minister Goran
Matic, "French intelligence was behind" the Spider group, whose aim was
the assassination of President Milosevic. Planned scenarios included a
sniper attack, planting an explosive device alongside a route they
expected Milosevic to travel, planting an explosive in his car, and
organizing 10 trained commandos to storm the presidential residence.
The leader of the group, Jugoslav Petrusic, had dual Yugoslav and
French citizenship. Matic claimed that Petrusic worked for French
intelligence for ten years. During interrogations, Petrusic said that
he had killed 50 men on orders by French intelligence. Matic announced
that one of the members of Spider was a "specialist for killings with a
truck full of sand" - the same method used against Draskovic the
previous month.
Following the Bosnian war, Petrusic organized the transport of 180
Bosnian Serb mercenaries to fight for Mobutu Sese Seku in Zaire, an
affair that was managed by French intelligence. According to a Bosnian
Serb businessman, Petrusic "did not hide the fact that he was working
for the French intelligence service. I have personally seen a photo of
him next to Mitterrand as his bodyguard." In younger days, Petrusic was
a member of the French Foreign Legion. During NATO's war against
Yugoslavia, the Spider group infiltrated the Yugoslav Army, supplying
information to the French and guiding NATO warplanes to their targets.
Yugoslav secret service sources revealed that the Spider group trained
at NATO bases in Bosnia where "buildings resembling those where
Milosevic
lives were constructed." Money from the French intelligence service for
Spider was brought to the border between Hungary and Yugoslavia by a
man named Serge Lazarevic. (8)
One month later, the members of a second hit team, calling itself the
Serbian Liberation Army, was arrested. Their aim was to assassinate
President Milosevic and restore the monarchy. (9)
At the end of July 2000, a squad of four Dutch commandos was
apprehended while attempting to cross into Serbia from Montenegro.
During the investigation, they admitted that they intended to kill or
kidnap President Milosevic. The four said that they were informed that
$30 million had been offered for "Milosevic's head," and that they
intended to "claim a reward." One of the men said that the group
planned to abduct
Milosevic or former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic and
"surrender them to The Hague." The group planned to put them atop a car
"in a ski box and transport them out of the country." If the abduction
failed, one of the men "had the idea to kill the president, to
decapitate" him, and to put his head "in the box and to send it home"
to the Netherlands.
One of the arrested men, Gotfrides de Ri, belonged to the openly racist
neo-nazi Center Party. During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the
Center Party sent Dutch mercenaries to fight in right-wing Croatian
paramilitary units. At the time of their arrest, the four were found
with several knives, including one with a swastika, and wires with
hooks for strangulation. All four admitted that they had trained under
the British SAS. At a news conference on August 1, 2000, Goran Matic
accused the U.S of being the prime sponsor of assassinations and
attempted assassinations.
"It is obvious that they are recruiting various terrorist groups
because they are frustrated with the fact that their military,
political and economic goals in southeastern Europe have not been
realized. [They are] trying to send them into the country so that they
can change our political and social environment." (10)

Flagrant Western interference distorted the political process in
Yugoslavia. U.S. and Western European funds were channelled to
right-wing opposition parties and media through such organizations as
the National Endowment for Democracy and George Soros' Open Society
Institute. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) is yet another of
the myriad semi-private organizations that have attached themselves
like leeches on Eastern Europe. The NDI opened an office in Belgrade in
1997, hoping to capitalize on opposition attempts to bring down the
government through street demonstrations. By 1999, the NDI had already
trained over 900 right-wing party leaders and activists on "message
development, public outreach and election strategy." NDI also claimed
to have provided "organizational training and coalition-building
expertise" to the opposition. (11)
The New Serbia Forum, funded by the British Foreign Office, brought
Serbian professionals and academics to Hungary on a regular basis for
discussions with British and Central European "experts." The aim of the
meetings was to "design a blueprint for post-Milosevic society." The
Forum developed reports intended to serve as "an action plan" for a
future pro-Western government. Subjects under discussion included
privatization
and economic stabilization. The Forum called for the "reintegration of
Yugoslavia into the European family," a phrase that translated into the
dismantling of the socialist economy and turning it over to Western
corporations. (12)
Western aims were clearly spelled out in the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe of June 10, 1999. This document called for
"creating vibrant market economies" in the Balkans, and "markets open
to greatly expanded foreign trade and private sector investment." One
year later, the White House issued a fact sheet detailing the "major
achievements" of the Pact. Among the achievements listed, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the International
Finance Corporations were said to be "mobilizing private investment,"
and the Pact's Business Advisory Council was "visiting all of the
countries of Southeast Europe" to "offer advice" on investment issues.
Another initiative was Hungarian involvement with opposition-led local
governments and opposition media in Serbia leading up the September 24,
2000 election in Yugoslavia.
On July 26, 2000, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
inaugurated an investment fund to be managed by Soros Private Funds
Management. The Southeast Europe Equity Fund "will invest in companies
in the region in a range of sectors." Its purpose, according to the
U.S. Embassy in Macedonia, is "to provide capital for new business
development, expansion and privatization." In March 2000, Montenegro
signed an agreement permitting the operation of OPIC on its territory.
Billionaire George Soros spelled out what all this means. U.S.
involvement in the region, he said, "creates investment opportunities,"
and "I am happy to put my money where they are putting theirs." Bluntly
put, there is money to be made. George Munoz, President and CEO of
OPIC, was also clear. "The Southeast Europe Equity Fund," he announced,
"is an ideal vehicle to connect American institutional capital with
European entrepreneurs eager to help Americans tap their growing
markets. OPIC is pleased that Soros Private Funds Management has chosen
to send a strong, positive signal that
Southeast Europe is open for business." The final text of the Stability
Pact for Southeast Europe suggested that a Yugoslavia that would
"respect" the Pact's "principles and objectives" would be "welcome" to
become a full member. "In order to draw the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia closer to this goal," the document declared, Montenegro
would be an "early
beneficiary." Western leaders expressed hope that a future pro-Western
Yugoslavia would, as had the rest of Eastern Europe, be "eager to help
Americans" make money. (13)
Western leaders yearned to install a puppet government in Belgrade, and
placed their hopes in the fragmented right-wing opposition parties in
Serbia. In 1999, American officials encouraged these parties to
organize mass demonstrations to overthrow the government, but the
rallies quickly fizzled. When upcoming Yugoslav Federal and local
elections were announced on July 24, 2000, American and Western
European officials met with leaders of Serbian opposition parties,
urging them to unite behind one presidential candidate. The opposition
presidential candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, was essentially hand-picked
by US officials when American-run polls demonstrated that he was the
only candidate capable of
garnering enough support to win the election. (14)

At the beginning of August 2000, the U.S. opened an office in Budapest
specifically tasked to assist opposition parties in Yugoslavia. Among
the staff were at least 30 psychological warfare specialists, some of
whom had earlier been engaged in psychological warfare operations
during NATO's war against Yugoslavia and against Iraq in the Gulf War.
(15) Members of the student opposition group, Otpor, were invited to
attend ten-day courses, beginning August 28, and again on September 11,
2000, at the American embassies in Bulgaria and Romania. The courses,
conducted by CIA personnel and propaganda experts, focused on political
and public-image techniques. (16) In Bulgaria, the Western-financed
Political Academy for Central and Southeastern Europe established a
program for training the Serbian opposition. The academy was tied to
Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, Otpor and various
opposition groups. Another Bulgarian-based and Western-financed
organization, the Balkan Academy of Leading Reporters, gave "financial,
technical and expert assistance" to Yugoslav opposition media prior to
the election. (17)
On August 13 through 15, CIA Director George Tenet visited Bulgaria. In
a series of extraordinary meetings, Tenet met with Bulgarian President
Petur Stoyanov, as well as the Prime Minister, Interior Minister and
Defense Minister. Officially, the purpose of Tenet's visit was to
discuss the problem of organized crime and narcotics. However, Tenet
spent a combined total of only 20 minutes at the headquarters of the
National Security Service and the National Service for Combating
Organized Crime. Unnamed diplomatic sources revealed that the proposed
oil transit pipeline from the Caspian Sea was also a topic of
discussion. The driving motivation for Tenet's visit, though, was to
discuss Yugoslavia. According to an unnamed diplomatic source,
Montenegrin secession from Yugoslavia topped the agenda. Following the
meeting between Tenet and Major General Dimo Gyaurov, Director of the
National Intelligence Service, a public statement was issued which
stressed their "commonality of interests." Reports in the Bulgarian
press revealed that various options were discussed with Bulgaria's
president and prime minister. Leaked information from the meetings
indicated that Tenet's preferred option was the removal of the Yugoslav
government, either as a result of the September 24 election, or by
street demonstrations or an internal coup. Another alternative Tenet
discussed was a NATO military assault that would install a puppet
government. The third option was Montenegrin secession from Yugoslavia.
Were open warfare to break out over Montenegro's secession from
Yugoslavia, then the United States planned to wage a full-scale war.
Sofia's Monitor reported that the "CIA coup machine" was forming. "A
strike against Belgrade is imminent," it warned, and "Bulgaria will
serve as a base." (18) In preparation for possible military action, the
Italian army signed a lease contract to conduct training exercises
beginning in October at the Koren training ground, near Kaskovo in
southeast Bulgaria. The French army signed a similar agreement, in
which French soldiers and tanks would train at the Novo Selo grounds in
central Bulgaria from October 11 to December 12. Plans called for the
U.S. military to lease the Shabla training grounds in northeastern
Bulgaria. All could have served as a launching pad for a NATO strike.
(19) An amphibious training exercise with Croatian and U.S forces was
conducted near Split, Croatia immediately following the Yugoslav
election, and 15 British warships were sent to the
region. (20)
Tenet's third option, the secession of Montenegro from Yugoslavia,
would follow the well-tested model of swallowing Yugoslavia, bite by
bite. The paths of Yugoslavia's two republics had sharply diverged.
Only Serbia stood in the way of the West's grand scheme to integrate
the Balkans into an economic model in which the region's economies
would be subordinated to Western corporate interests. Serbia's economy
included a strong socialist component, and large and medium sized firms
were socially owned. In contrast, Montenegro had embarked on a program
to place its entire economy at the service of the West. November 1999
saw the introduction in Montenegro of the German mark as an official
currency and the passage of legislation eliminating socially owned
property. One month later, several large firms were publicly offered
for sale, including the Electric Power Company, the 13th July
Agricultural Complex, the Hotel-Tourist firm Boka and several others.
(21) The republic's privatization program for 2000 called for
privatization of most state-owned industries, and included measures to
"protect domestic and foreign investors." In early 2000, the U.S.
signed an agreement to provide Montenegro $62 million, including $44
million from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
According to the agency, it would also undertake "assistance programs to
support economic reform and restructuring the economy..to advance
Montenegro toward a free market economy." U.S. policy advisor on the
Balkans James Dobbins indicated that the U.S. viewed the
"market-oriented reforms of the Djukanovic regime as a model and
stimulus for similar reforms throughout the former Yugoslavia." The
U.S. also offered guarantees for private investors in the republic.
Additional aid was provided by the European Union (EU), which approved
$36 million for Montenegro. "From the first day," admitted Djukanovic,
"we have had British and European consultants." (22)
The Center for International Private Enterprise, an affiliate of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, provided support to the Center for
Entrepreneurship (CEP) in Montenegro. According to the center's
executive director, Petar Ivanovic, the organization "focuses on
elementary and high schools," establishing entrepreneurship as a new
subject to be taught in schools. As Ivanovic explained it, "Introducing
young people to the concept of entrepreneurship will make them less
resistant to the private sector." The CEP also intends to "educate
government officials about the potential rewards of the private
sector," and to help them "understand the benefits
of economic reform and privatization." (23) According to Djukanovic,
when he met with President Clinton on June 21, 1999, the U.S. president
gave the privatization process a shove by telling Djukanovic that the
U.S. planned to "stimulate the economy" by "encouraging U.S.
corporations and banks to invest capital in Montenegro." (24)
Djukanovic moved steadily toward secession from Yugoslavia, indicating
that he would push for separation if President Milosevic were reelected
in the September 24 election. In a phone call to Djukanovic in July
2000, Madeleine Albright promised that the U.S would provide him with
an additional $16.5 million. That same week, Djukanovic blurted out
that Montenegro "is no longer part of Yugoslavia." He also made the
astonishing claim that he considered it a "priority" for Montenegro to
join NATO, the organization that had bombed his country only the year
before. The next month, Albright announced that she and Djukanovic "try
and talk to each other and meet on a regular basis," and that the
"United States is supportive of the approach that President Djukanovic
has taken in terms of democratic development and his approach to the
economic reforms also." (25)
Western support for secession extended beyond Albright meeting and
talking with Djukanovic. More than half of the population of Montenegro
opposed secession, and any such move was likely to explode into
violence. In preparation for a rift, Djukanovic built up a private army
of over 20,000 soldiers, the Special Police, including units armed with
anti-tank weapons and mortars. Sources in Montenegro revealed that
Western special forces trained Djukanovic's private army. Prior to the
election, Djukanovic requested that NATO establish an "air shield over
Montenegro." One member of the Special Police, named Velibor, confirmed
that they had received training from the British SAS. "If there is a
situation where weapons will decide the outcome, we are ready," he
said. "We are training for that." At a press conference on August 1,
2000, Minister Goran Matic declared that the "British are carrying out
part of the training of the Montenegrin special units. It is also
true," he added, that the Special Police "are intensively obtaining
various kinds and types of weapons, starting with anti-aircraft and
anti-helicopter weapons and so on, and they are also being assisted by
Croatia, as the weapons go through
Dubrovnik and other places." Furthermore, Matic pointed, "[L]ast year,
before and after the aggression, a group from within the Montenegrin
MUP [Ministry of Interior Affairs] structure left for training within
the U.S. police structure and the U.S. intelligence structures." In
August 2000, two armored vehicles bound for Montenegro were discovered
in the port of Ancona, Italy. One of the vehicles was fitted with a
turret suitable for mounting a machine gun or anti-tank weapon. Italian
customs officials, reported the Italian news service ANSA, were
"convinced" that arms trafficking to Montenegro was "of far greater
magnitude than this single episode might lead one to believe."
Revelling in anticipation of armed conflict, Djukanovic bragged that
"many will tuck their tails between their legs and will soon have to
flee Montenegro." (26)
A violent conflict in Montenegro would have provided NATO with a
pretext for intervention. As early as October 1999, General Wesley
Clark drew up plans for a NATO invasion of Montenegro. The plan
envisioned an amphibious assault by more than 2,000 Marines storming
the port of Bar and securing the port as a beachhead for pushing
inland. Troops ferried by helicopters would seize the airport at
Podgorica, while NATO warplanes would bomb and strafe resisting
Yugoslav forces. According to U.S. officials, other Western countries
had also developed invasion plans. (27) Richard Holbrooke, U.S.
Ambassador to the UN declared, "We are in constant touch with the
leadership of Montenegro," and warned that a conflict in Montenegro
"would be directly affecting NATO's vital interest." (28) NATO General
Secretary George Robertson was more explicit. "I say to Milosevic:
watch out, look what happened the last time you miscalculated." (29)

What the U.S. truly wanted, though, was all of Yugoslavia, not merely
another piece. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expected and
demanded street demonstrations to topple the government if the election
result did not satisfy her. At meetings held in Banja Luka in spring
2000, Albright expressed disappointment with the failure of past
efforts to overthrow the legally elected Yugoslav government. Albright
said that she had hoped sanctions would lead people to "blame Milosevic
for this suffering." An exasperated Albright wondered, "What was
stopping the people from taking to the streets?" Indicating that the
U.S. was casting about for a pretext for intervention, she added,
"Something needs to happen in Serbia that the West can support." (30)
Every contingency was planned for in the multifaceted U.S.
destabilization campaign. In the end, it was George Tenet's preferred
scenario that unfolded. An electoral process distorted by Western
intervention, combined with street action, finally toppled the
government of Yugoslavia.

The U.S. pumped $35 million into the pockets of the right-wing
opposition in the year preceding the September 24, 2000 election. This
haul included transmitters for opposition radio, and computers,
telephones and fax machines for several organizations. Right-wing media
received an additional $6 million from the European Union during this
period. Two organizations under the umbrella of the National Endowment
for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute and the International
Republican Institute, provided $4 million for a door-to-door campaign
and get-out-the-vote programs. (31) American officials assured
opposition media "not to worry about how much they're spending now,"
because much more was on the way. (32) Immediately following the
election, the U.S. House of Representatives passed by voice vote a bill
authorizing an additional $105 million for right-wing parties and media
in Yugoslavia. (33) Organizations such as the International Republican
Institute and the Agency for International Development pumped several
million dollars into the pockets of Otpor, building up the small
student opposition group into a major force. By the time the election
date was announced in Yugoslavia, Otpor had already printed over 60
tons of campaign material. (34)
The week before the election, the European Union issued a "Message to
the Serbian People," in which it announced that a victory for
opposition candidate Vojislav Kostunica would result in lifting of
sanctions. "Even if Milosevic were to be returned by democratic vote,"
stated one EU official, sanctions would remain. This was a powerful
inducement for a population impoverished and devastated by years of
Western sanctions. (35) US State Department official William Montgomery
noted, "Seldom has so much fire, energy, enthusiasm, money - everything
- gone into anything as into Serbia in the months before Milosevic
went." (36) Before the election even took place, Western officials were
accusing the Yugoslav government of electoral fraud, planting the seeds
for disruption.

Throughout election day and the days that followed, the Democratic
Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition proclaimed their candidate's
victory. American officials encouraged the opposition to call for mass
demonstrations, even before official results were announced. Virtually
every day, DOS claimed a different percentage for their candidate. At
one point they claimed 57 percent. Two days after the election, on
September 26, DOS claimed Kostunica won 54.66 percent of the vote,
based on 97.5 percent of the ballots processed, but that 130,000 votes
"and the votes from Kosovo and Montenegro" had yet to be processed by
DOS. The next day, DOS announced that Kostunica led with 52.54 percent
of the vote. The tally, they said, was based on 98.72 percent of the
ballots counted. This time, DOS Electoral Staff spokesman Cedomir
Jovanovic changed his tune, claiming that unprocessed ballots were from
soldiers and mail-in ballots. According to Jovanovic, on September 26,
5,093,038 ballots out of a total of 5,223,629 were processed for a
total of percentage of 97.5. Based on the total given by Jovanovic,
that would have meant less than 64,000 ballots were counted the
following day, when he claimed a count of 98.72 percent. Assuming that
Kostunica lost every single one of those votes, his percentage would
have dropped to 52.75 percent, higher than the announced 52.54 figure.
DOS disposed of this awkwardness by issuing significantly different
totals. On September 26, Jovanovic announced that Kostunica led with
2,783,870 votes, yet on the following day he claimed that when all
votes were counted, "Kostunica will have 2,649,000 votes." Four days
later, Jovanovic claimed 2,424,187 votes for Kostunica, and then on
October 2 opposition spokesman Zoran Sami lowered the total still
further to 2,414,876, for a percentage of 51.34. Later, Sami claimed
the final result showed 2,377,440 votes and a percentage of 50.35 for
Kostunica. Excluded from these counts were the votes from Kosovo and
refugees from Kosovo. Western media treated DOS's claims uncritically,
proclaiming them to be based on precise and meticulous tallying of
ballots, and loud cries of fraud were levelled against the Yugoslav
government. Clearly there was fraud. The figures given out by DOS
itself indicate who was perpetuating the fraud. (37)
Despite claims made to the contrary in the Western media, the official
vote count was publicized widely in Yugoslavia. Vojislav Kostunica won
48.96 percent of the vote, falling just short of the 50 percent
required for outright victory. President Milosevic trailed with 38.62
percent of the vote. A second electoral round for the two top
candidates was called for October 8. (38) Backed by Western officials,
Kostunica and DOS refused to participate in the second round, claiming
that they had already won. DOS filed a complaint with first the Federal
Election Commission, and then the Constitutional Court. They demanded,
among other things, the annulment of votes by refugees from Kosovo, and
from Kosovo itself, where President Milosevic led by a wide margin. The
Constitutional Court upheld the proposal by Milovan Zivkovic, a member
of the Federal Election Commission, for returns from all voting
districts to be reexamined so as to dispel doubts. (39) It was the
threat of a recount that motivated the almost daily reduction in the
number and percentage of votes claimed by DOS for their candidate. The
final percentage DOS announced was close to the official result.
However, DOS refused to include votes cast in Kosovo and by many
refugees from Kosovo, ostensibly because polls in Kosovo closed at 4:00
PM, rather than 8:00 PM. According to DOS, the scheduled early closing
time invalidated all of the ballots cast by these voters. Only by
discounting votes from Kosovo residents and refugees could DOS claim a
50 percent victory for Kostunica.

Over 200 international observers from 54 countries monitored the
election. The observers attended every stage of the election, including
vote counting and correlation of results. One of the observers, Greek
Foreign Minister Carolos Papoulias, concluded, "Those who had announced
widespread fraud, like [EU foreign policy chief] Javier Solana have
been proved wrong," and that the vote had been conducted in "an
impeccable manner."
Atila Volnay, an observer from Hungary, said his delegation had visited
several polling stations and confirmed the presence of opposition
representatives in electoral commissions, and that "there could be no
anomalies." A three-person delegation from Great Britain's Socialist
Labour Party declared that the Federal Electoral Commission "did
everything in its power to ensure that people were able to cast their
votes without intimidation and in an orderly manner," but that
irregularities were observed in Montenegro. "We received many
first-hand reports from people who stated that they had been threatened
[by Djukanovic supporters] with the loss of their jobs if they turned
out to vote." The delegation also noted that "countless refugees from
Kosovo had been deliberately excluded from the electoral lists in
Montenegro," and that the delegation "could only conclude that these
tactics of intimidation and disenfranchisement were designed to benefit
the so-called Democratic Opposition." The head of the Russian
delegation, Konstantin Kosachev, said that they "were satisfied that
virtually no large-scale falsification of the election in Yugoslavia
was possible." A final statement by the observers declared that "the
voting process overall was orderly and smooth" and that, "in the
opinion of many, was equal or superior to the ones in their own
countries." (40)

Given his commanding lead in the first electoral round, a Kostunica
victory in the runoff on October 8 was a near certainty. Why then, did
Kostunica refuse to participate in the runoff? As a result of the
September 24 election, the left coalition won 74 out of 137 seats in
the Chamber of Citizens and 26 out of 40 seats in the Chamber of
Republics.
The left-led coalition already held a majority in the Serbian
Parliament, whose seats were not up for election until the following
year. It would have been impossible for DOS to implement its program,
as the President's duties are rather limited. Only a coup d'etat would
allow DOS to bypass legal constraints, sweep aside the government and
reign unopposed.
Kostunica's campaign manager, Zoran Djindjic, called for a general
strike. "We shall seek to paralyze all institutions, schools, theaters,
cinemas, offices," and "call everyone onto the streets." (41) DOS
supporters throughout the country heeded his call, bringing segments of
the economy
to a standstill, while mass demonstrations sprang up throughout Serbia.
Madeleine Albright's cherished scenario became reality, as
demonstrators demanded the removal of the government. According to
opposition sources, as many as 10,000 armed DOS supporters joined the
final mass demonstration in Belgrade. The assault on the Federal
Parliament and Radio Television Serbia was led by a group of specially
trained squads of former soldiers. Velimir Ilic, opposition mayor of
Cacak, led the assault. "Our action had been planned in advance," he
later explained. "Our aim was very clear; take control of the regime's
key institutions, including the parliament
and the television." Ilic also arranged prior contacts with turncoat
policemen, who assisted Ilic's soldiers. (42) It is probable that the
CIA was involved in the planning of the well-coordinated attacks. After
armed squads forced their way into the Federal Parliament, they were
followed by a drunken mob of DOS supporters, who rampaged through the
building, smashing furniture and computers and setting the Parliament
ablaze. Police were beaten and drunken gangs, many armed with guns,
roamed the streets. Ambulances taking injured police to hospitals were
stopped by DOS activists, who demanded that the injured policemen be
turned over to them. After Radio Television Serbia in Belgrade was
seized, it too was torched. Throughout Serbia, offices of the Socialist
Party of Serbia and Yugoslav United Left were demolished. Socialists
were threatened and beaten, and many received threats over the
telephone. In Kragujevac, ten socialists were tied and abused for
hours. DOS thugs forced their way into the home of Zivojin Stefanovic,
president of the Socialist Party in Leskovac. After looting and
smashing Stefanovic's belongings, they set his house afire. (43)

While roving gangs overturned and burned police vehicles, vandalized
buildings and beat people, Kostunica announced, "Democracy has happened
in Serbia. Communism is falling. It is just a matter of hours." (44)
Establishing their democratic credentials, DOS activists systematically
seized left-oriented
media throughout Yugoslavia. Left-wing newspapers, radio and television
stations were reoriented in support of the right. A formerly rich and
diverse media culture, representing the entire political spectrum, took
on overnight a hue of uniformity, churning out praise for DOS. Gangs of
DOS thugs forcibly removed management at state-run factories and
enterprises, universities, banks and hospitals in towns and cities all
across Serbia. Government ministers were pressured to resign, and DOS
established a crisis committee to perform government functions,
circumventing the Federal Parliament and government ministries. DOS
officials openly threatened to call forth more street violence as a
means of pressuring the Serbian Parliament to agree to new election,
one year ahead of schedule.
Western officials couldn't hide their glee. American and European
corporations were waiting to snatch up state enterprises. The economic
program for DOS was drawn up by an organization named Group 17 Plus.
Their plan, called Project for Serbia, called for a rapid transition to
a full market economy. Immediately following the coup, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development promptly announced plans to
open an office in Belgrade. "It's important that we be there quickly,"
explained the bank's spokesman Jeff Hiday. "We suspect there will be a
lot to do with privatization and restructuring." (45)
Days before the coup, President Milosevic warned that DOS was an
instrument in NATO's campaign to impose neocolonial control over
Yugoslavia. Milosevic pointed out that neighboring countries already
under Western dictate "have speedily become impoverished in a manner
destroying all hope for more just and humane social relations," and
that Eastern Europe had seen a "great division into a poor majority and
a rich minority." Inevitably, he said, "That picture would also include
us." (46)

Alone and isolated, Yugoslavia resisted imperial domination,
withstanding Western-backed secessions, sanctions, war, and covert
operations. Against all odds, they remained independent and committed
to an economy in which socially owned property played a primary role.
The most powerful forces on the planet were arrayed against them, and
yet they held out for a decade. The NATO-backed coup swept all that
away. In one of his first acts as President, Kostunica joined the
Balkan Stability Pact. His privatization minister, Aleksandar Vlahovic,
announced a plan for the privatization of 7,000 firms... "I expect that
four years from now socially-owned capital will be completely
eliminated," Vlahovic explained, and that privatization of the largest
firms would be underway by then. (47) The millions of dollars that the
West stuffed into the pockets of DOS officials will pay handsome
dividends.

NOTES

1) Paul Beaver, "Clinton Tells CIA to Oust Milosevic," The Observer,
November 29, 1998.
Fran Visnar, "Clinton and the CIA Have Created a Scenario to Overthrow
Milosevic," Vijesnik (Zagreb), November 30, 1998.

2) Douglas Waller, "Tearing Down Milosevic," Time Magazine, July 12,
1999.

3) Michael Moran, "A Threat to 'Snatch' Milosevic," MSNBC, July 8, 1999.

4) "Yugoslav Official Accuses CIA of Being Behind Montenegro Murder,"
Agence France-Presse, June 6, 2000.
Aleksandar Vasovic, "Serb Aide Says CIA Behind Slaying," Associated
Press, June 6, 2000.
"Yugoslav Information Minister Accuses CIA of Complicity in Zugic
Murder," Borba (Belgrade), June 6, 2000.

5) Statement by Richard Tomlinson, addressed to John Wadham, September
11, 1998.

6) "Serb Consensus: Draskovic Crash Was No Accident," Seattle Times
News Services, October 13, 1999.

7) "NATO: Milosevic Not Target," BBC News, April 22, 1999.

8) "Serbs Allege Milosevic Assassination Plot," Reuters, November 25,
1999.
"France Plots to Murder Milosevic," Agence France-Presse, November 26,
1999.
"SFOR Units Involved in a Plot to Kill Milosevic," Agence
France-Presse, December 1, 1999.
Gordana Igric, "Alleged 'Assassins' Were No Stranger to France," IWPR
Balkan Crisis Report (London), November 26, 1999.
Milenko Vasovic, "Belgrade's French Connection," IWPR Balkan Crisis
Report (London), November 26, 1999.

9) "Lt. Testifies at Milosevic Trial," Associated Press, April 26, 2000.

10) Aleksandar Vasovic, "4 Accused of Milosevic Death Plot," Associated
Press, July 31, 2000.
"Dutchmen Arrested, Accused of Plotting Against Milosevic," Agence
France-Presse, July 31, 2000.
Email correspondence from Herman de Tollenaere, quoting from
NRC-Business Paper of August 1
"Arrested Dutchmen Admitted Plans to Kill, Kidnap Milosevic," BETA
(Belgrade), August 17, 2000.
"Dutch Espionage Terrorist Gang Arrested in Yugoslavia - Minister,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), July 31, 2000
"Yugoslav Information Minister Says U.S. Behind Dutch 'Mercenaries',"
BBC Monitoring Service, August 1, 2000.

11) "NDI Activities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia-Montenegro)," NDI Worldwide Activities, www.ndi.org

12) "Britain Trains New Elite for Post-Milosevic Era," The Independent
(London), May 3, 2000.
The New Serbia Forum, http://ds.dial.pipex.com/town/way/glj77/Serbia.htm

13) "Final Text of Stability Pact for Southeast Europe," June 10, 1999.
"Southeast Europe Equity Fund Launched July 26," U.S. Embassy, Skopje,
Macedonia, July 27, 2000.
"The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe: One Year Later," White House
Fact Sheet, July 27, 2000.

14) Michael Dobbs, "U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition,"
Washington Post, December 11, 2000.

15) "Federal Foreign Ministry Sends Memorandum to UN Security Council,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), October 4, 2000.
"US Anti-Yugoslav Office Opens in Budapest," Tanjug (Belgrade), August
21, 2000.

16) "CIA Training Resistance Members in Sofia, Bucharest," Tanjug
(Belgrade), August 25, 2000.

17) Elena Staridolska, "Daynov Academy Trains Serbian Opposition,"
Standart News (Sofia), August 29, 2000. Konstantin Chugunov, "We Report
the Details: Our Little Brothers Have Bent in the Face of NATO,"
Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), August 23, 2000.

18) "Bulgaria - Press Review" BTA (Sofia), August 12, 2000
"Bulgaria - Us CIA Director's Visit," BTA (Sofia), August 15, 2000
"CIA Did Not Tell Us the Most Important Thing," Trud (Sofia), August
16, 2000
"Bulgaria - Press Review," BTA (Sofia), August 14, 2000
"Bulgaria - Press Review," BTA (Sofia), August 16, 2000

19) Mila Avramova, "Italians Lease Training Ground for 400,000 Leva,"
Trud (Sofia), August 9, 2000
Michael Evans, "Balkans Watch for 'Invincible'," The Times (London),
August 26, 2000.

20) "U.S. Forces Travel to Croatia for Amphibious Exercise," Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), September 12, 2000.
"U.S. War Game in Adriatic, U.K. Navy in Mediterranean," Reuters,
September 16, 2000.

21) Ljubinka Cagorovic, "Montenegro Assembly Scraps Socially-Owned
Property," Reuters, November 13, 1999.
"Montenegrin Government Prepares to Privatise Economy," Tanjug
(Belgrade), December 25, 1999.

22) Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Center,
"Southeastern Europe Business Brief," February 3, 2000.
Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Center, "Southeastern
Europe Business Brief," April 27, 2000.
Anne Swardson, "West Grows Close to Montenegro," Washington Post, May
24, 2000.

23) Petar Ivanovic, "Montenegro: Laying the Foundation of
Entrepreneurship," Center for International Private Enterprise.

24) Statement by Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, "Important Step
in Opening New Perspectives For Montenegrin State Policy," Pobjeda
(Podgorica), June 22, 1999.

25) "Albright Renews Montenegro Support," Associated Press, July 13,
2000.
"Montenegro Wants to Join NATO and the EU," Agence France-Presse, July
10, 2000.
Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, "Secretary of State
Madeleine K. Albright and Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic," Press
Stakeout at Excelsior Hotel, Rome, Italy, August 1, 2000.

26) "Montenegro Ahead of Elections: Boycott and Threats," BETA
(Belgrade), August 9, 2000.
"Montenegro and Elections - Boycott Becomes Official," BETA (Belgrade),
August 17, 2000.
Phil Reese, "We Have the Heart for Battle, Says Montenegrin Trained by
SAS," The Independent (London), July 30, 2000.
"Yugoslav Information Minister Says U.S. Behind Dutch 'Mercenaries',"
BBC Monitoring Service, August 1, 2000.
"Yugoslavia Says British SAS Trains Montenegrins," Reuters, August 1,
2000.
"Information Minister Sees Montenegrin Arms Purchases, Croatian
Assistance," BETA (Belgrade), July 31, 2000.
"Foreign 'Dogs of War' Training Montenegrin Police to Attack Army,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), August 9, 2000.
"Montenegro: Camouflaged Military Vehicles Seized in Ancona," ANSA
(Rome), August 21, 2000.
"Montenegro: Traffic in Camouflaged Armored Vehicles: Investigation
into Documentation," ANSA (Rome), August 22, 2000.
"SAS Training Montenegrin Police," The Sunday Times (London), October
1, 2000.

27) Richard J. Newman, "Balkan Brinkmanship," US News and World Report,
November 15, 1999.

28) "Clinton Warns Milosevic 'Remains a Threat to Peace," Agence
France-Presse, July 29, 2000.

29) "NATO's Robertson Warns Milosevic on Montenegro," Reuters, July 27,
2000.

30) Borislav Komad, "At Albright's Signal," Vecernje Novosti
(Belgrade), May 18, 2000.

31) George Jahn, "U.S. Funding Yugoslavian Reformers," Associated
Press, September 29, 2000.
Jane Perlez, "U.S. Anti-Milosevic Plan Faces Major Test at Polls," New
York Times, September 23, 2000.
"U.S., EU Generous to Foes of Milosevic," Associated Press, October 1,
2000.

32) Steven Erlanger, "Milosevic, Trailing in Polls, Rails Against
NATO," New York Times, September 20, 2000.

33) "U.S. House Votes to Fund Yugoslavia's Opposition Movement," CNN,
September 25, 2000.

34) Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?" New York Times
Magazine, November 26, 2000.

35) Geoff Meade, "Cook Backs EU Over Oust Milosevic Message," London
Press Association, September 18, 2000.

36) Roger Cohen, "Who Really Brought Down Milosevic?" New York Times
Magazine, November 26, 2000.

37) "DOS Claims Kostunica Leading Milosevic with 54.66 to 35.01 Percent
of Vote," BETA (Belgrade), September 26, 2000.
"DOS Announces Kostunica Clear Winner with 98.72 Percent Data
Processed," BETA (Belgrade), September 27, 2000.
"Federal Electoral Commission - DOS Election Staff Misinformed Public,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), October 3, 2000.
"Who Lies Kostunica?" statement by the Socialist Party of Serbia,
October 11, 2000.

38) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia web site, www.gov.yu "Total Election
Results," and "The Federal Elections Commission Statement." Both
statements were removed following the coup.
"Final Results of FRY Presidential Election," Tanjug (Belgrade),
September 28, 2000.

39) "Yugoslav Constitutional Court Holds Public Debate on DOS Appeal,"
Tanjug (Belgrade), October 4, 2000.
"DOS Requests Annulment of 142,000 Kosovo Votes," BETA (Belgrade),
September 29, 2000.

40) "Contrary to EU Claims, Yugoslav Elections a Success: Greece,"
Agence France-Presse, September 26, 2000.
"210 Observers from 53 States Commend FRY Elections," Tanjug
(Belgrade), September 27, 2000.
"Foreign Observers Say Elections Democratic and Regular," Tanjug
(Belgrade), September 25, 2000.
"Yugoslav Elections - a Lesson in Outside Interference," Socialist
Labour Party statement.
Broadcast, Mayak Radio (Moscow), October 2, 2000.
"'A Fair and Free Election,' International Observers Say," statement by
international observers.

41) Misha Savic, "Milosevic Will Take Part in Runoff," Associated
Press, October 5, 2000.

42) Richard Boudreaux, "A Mayor's Conspiracy Helped Topple Milosevic,"
Los Angeles Times, October 10, 2000.
"Cacak Mayor Says He Led Assault on Yugoslav Parliament," Agence
France-Presse, October 8, 2000. Jonathan Steele, Tim Judah, John
Sweeney, Gillian Sandford, Rory Carroll, Peter Beaumont, "An Outrage
Too Far," The Observer (London), October 8, 2000.
Gillian Sandford, "Army Units Claim Credit for Uprising," The Guardian
(London), October 9, 2000.

43) "Information for the Public," statement by the Socialist Party of
Serbia, October 7, 2000.
"Group of Demonstrators Demolished the House of the District Head,"
BETA (Belgrade), October 6, 2000.

44) "Protesters Storm Yugoslav Parliament," Associated Press, October
5, 2000.
"Good Evening, Liberated Serbia," The Times (London), October 6, 2000.
"Milosevic's Party HQ Ransacked by Protesters," Agence France-Presse,
October 5, 2000.

45) Jelena Radulovic, "Yugoslavia's Kostunica Sets Economic Goals for
New Government," Bloomberg, October 7, 2000.
"Brains Behind Kostunica Have a Plan," Sydney Morning Herald, October
2, 2000.
Stefan Racin, "Yugoslavia's Opposition Outlines Economic Plans," UPI,
September 27, 2000.

46) "Yugoslav President Milosevic Addresses the Nation," Tanjug
(Belgrade), October 3, 2000.

47) Beti Bilandzic, "Serbia Eyes New Privatization Law by April,"
Reuters, January 28, 2001.


Gregory Elich has published dozens of articles on the Balkans and East
Asia in the US, Canada and Europe, in such publications as Covert
Action Quarterly, Politika, Der Junge Welt, Dagbladet Arbejderen,
Science&Society, Swans, and other publications. His research findings
on CIA intervention in Yugoslavia was the subject of articles in
newspapers in Germany, Norway and Italy, including Il Manifesto. He has
been involved in peace activities since the Vietnam War, and was
coordinator of the Committee for Peace in Yugoslavia. He was a member
of a US delegation visiting Yugoslavia after the NATO war, and a member
of the Margarita Papendreou delegation, the first to fly on a Western
national airline to Baghdad in challenge to the sanctions.

Scharping's Lies Won't Last

http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/yu_kriza/2003-10-02_2.html

By Thomas Deichmann
Translated from German by Matthias Gockel.
April 1999


Thomas Deichmann is editor of Novo magazine (www.novo-magazin.de) and a
free lance journalist based in Frankfurt. He is co-editor with Klaus
Bittermann of 'Wie Dr. Joseph Fischer lernte, die Bombe zu lieben'
(Edition Tiamat, Berlin 1999) and editor of 'Noch einmal für
Jugoslawien: Peter Handke' (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 1999).
Deichmann's article 'The picture that fooled the world' about a
misleading TV image from Trnopolje camp was printed in Ramsey Clark et
al: 'NATO in the Balkans. Voices of Opposition', International Action
Centre, New York 1998. Deichmann's study of Roy Gutman's war reporting
appeared under the title 'The Pulitzer Price and Croatian Propaganda'
in 'War Lies & Videotape. How Media Monopoly stifles truth',
International Action Centre, New York 2000.
Deichmann can be contacted at: Thomas.Deichmann@....


For the German political elite, the war against Yugoslavia signaled an
important break with the past, since moral and political renunciation
of militarism had characterized political culture in Germany for more
than half a century since the end of World War II. Accepting a call to
arms still was no routine occurance, especially since the attack was
directed against a country that had suffered immensely from the brutal
onslaught of German fascism 60 years ago. That this military campaign
took place in violation of international law and the German
constitution, both regulative foundations formulated in response to the
crimes of Nazism, complicated matters even further. Moreover, the first
marching orders for German soldiers came from parties commonly
identified with the liberal traditions of the Federal Republic of
Germany. The Social Democrat Rudolf Scharping and Green Party Foreign
Minister Joschka Fischer took on the task of justifying German
participation in this war of aggression. During the Bosnian war,
Fischer, while still in the opposition, had argued against sending
German troops into the Balkans, precisely by reference to the Holocaust.
The German Socialdemocratic Party (SPD) had fewer problems with
pacifist attitudes in its ranks. It faced a different problem. After
the German general elections in fall 1998, when the SPD and the Green
Party (Buendnis'90/Die Gruenen) were setting out with their new
coalition government, they were under harsh criticism. It became clear
soon that the hype of the election campaign in 1998 had concealed a
rather fumbling bunch of Chancelor Gerhard Schroerder's new government
leaders. The war against Yugoslavia offered the government an ideal
opportunity to leave its domestic problems behind and emerge with a new
image. Certainly, the decision to enter the war was not made just with
this goal in mind, but the disastrous condition of Schroeder's team was
an important underlying consideration during the deliberations about
the deployment of the Bundeswehr.
This background led to overreactions that often not merely bordered
fanaticism. The rhetoric of the Holocaust was deployed in Germany more
than any other western country to endow the NATO attack on Serbia and
German participation in it with moral legitimacy. Scharping followed up
with one horror-story with the next and constructed countless analogies
between Serbia and the Third Reich.

LIE MACHINE

A massive public relations campaign prepared and accompanied the German
armed forces' participation in the NATO campaign. German Defense
Minister Scharping became the tireless prime mover of this German war
propaganda. His book 'Wir duerfen nicht wegsehen. Der Kosovo-Krieg und
Europa' ['We can not look away. The Kosovo War and Europe'] (Berlin
1999), which was published a few months after the conflict, quite
openly discloses the scale of the lies and deception Scharping employed
to justify the military campaign against Yugoslavia. For example, we
find the following account in Scharping's 270-page work:

'Shall we overlook all the slaughter that is happening there? Are all
the stories that people tell us no more than invention and propaganda:
that corpses are destroyed with baseball-bats and that their limbs or
heads are cut off? … it seems that human beings in a frenzy can commit
any bestiality, playing soccer with heads that were cut off, tearing
apart corpses, cutting fetuses out of the womb of women who were
killed.' (p.125)

Many reports Scharping presented in this context even during the war
could not stand up to scrutiny. Many allegations were, sooner or later,
unmasked either as misrepresentation or attempts at manipulation - yet
they are included in his book without the slightest amendment or
qualification.

1. Concentration Camps in Pristina

'Allegedly, Albanians are held in the stadium of Pristina. Parts of the
stadium have a basement. There are several small shops below the
spectator stands, which offer space for several thousand people. The
first Albanians were reportedly brought into the stadium on April 1.'
(Entry of April 19, 1999, p.128)

At the outset of the war, Scharping mentions 'serious evidence of
concentration camps in Kosovo'. He adds: 'I say concentration camp on
purpose'. Scharping believes that the soccer-stadium of Pristina was
converted into a Serb-run concentration camp holding 100,000 people.
This claim originated from the KLA (as did the report that influential
Kosovo-Albanian intellectuals were systematically killed by the Serb
military). Scharping nonetheless treated it as though it were
indisputable fact. Yet some days later, several persons who had
allegedly been killed, reappeared. Pictures taken from German
surveillance planes refute the claim that a concentration camp existed
in the stadium of Pristina. Still, there were no retractions, and
concentration camp stories continued to circulate.

2. Operation Horseshoe

'From Joschka [J. Fischer, German Foreign Minister] I receive a paper
that stems from intelligence sources and proves that 'Operation
Horseshoe' was prepared and executed by the Yugoslav Army... An
evaluation of the operation-plan 'Horseshoe' exists. Now we have proof
that a systematic cleansing of Kosovo and the deportation of the
Kosovo-Albanians were already planned in December 1998.' (Entries of
April 5 and 7, 1999, pp.102 & 107)

While other German politicians showed some restraint in using the term
'genocide' in relation to events in Kosovo, Scharping continues to
repeat his thesis that a genocide in Kosovo was 'not only prepared',
but systematically planned, and 'in fact is already happening' (p.84).
To support these claims, he presents dubious documents about an
operation-plan allegedly named 'Horseshoe' in early April, claiming
that operation maps would prove that genocidal plans for the ethnic
cleansing of Kosovo already existed in 1998 and were now awaiting final
execution.
Some months later it was revealed that these documents were false.
According to press reports they came from the German and the Austrian
Secret Services. It is striking that Scharping's propaganda experts
used the Croatian translation of the word 'horseshoe', which is
Potkova, instead of its Serbian translation Potkovica.
Yet in spring 2000 Mr. Scharping still insists on the authenticity of
the documents in question and proudly explains to the press that he
passed all evidence in his possession to the United Nations
International War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague for use by the
prosecution. But the ICTY stated in response to media inquiries that it
would not allow Mr. Scharping's 'Operation Horseshoe' documents as
evidence, because of their unclear sources.

3. Killing Fields and Mountains of Corpses

'The brutality escalates, the refugees literally walk along mountains
of corpses. An old fear comes to my mind: This criminal wants a
cease-fire in the graveyard.' (Entry of April 29, 1999, p.141)

The warring NATO-countries justify the ongoing bombing campaign with
the claim that it would stop 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo. NATO speaker
Jamie Shea compares Kosovo with the 'Killing Fields' of Cambodia, and
Mr. Scharping speaks of 'mountains of corpses'. Estimates of the
numbers of Kosovo-Albanians allegedly killed and buried in mass graves
by Serbian soldiers increases continuously. In early April, the
US-State Department puts out the figure of 500,000. On April 18, David
Scheffer, US-Ambassador for War Crimes, says that possibly up to
100,000 Albanians were killed. On the next day, Jamie Rubin, the
speaker of the State Department, repeats this speculative number:
'Based on past practice, it is chilling to think where those 100,000
men are.' One month later, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen guesses:
'We've now seen about 100.000 military-aged men missing... They may
have been murdered' (Washington Post, May 17, 1999). At the end of the
war, in early June, the number of alleged Kosovo-Albanian victims
killed is drastically reduced to 10,000.
Immediately after NATO occupied Kosovo, approximately 20 teams with
experts from 15 countries enter Kosovo on the orders of the UN Criminal
Tribunal to search for mass graves. The teams numbered 500 experts
altogether, including some FBI officials. Indeed, hundreds of corpses
are exhumed in a few weeks. This seems to affirm the horrific
expectations of genocide on a mass scale. Yet the 'success stories'
come to an end soon. The FBI investigates in the British sector and
finds no more than 200 corpses.
Finally, in the fall of 1999, a first report from the Chief Prosecutor
of the UN-Tribunal, Carla Del Ponte, reveals that the numbers given by
Western governments were gross exaggerations. The accusation that the
Serb military executed genocide now appears to be sheer war propaganda.
Of the 529 locations, where mass graves were suspected (according to
witnesses), 195 were investigated between June and October 1999. The
inspectors were ordered to start in those where the investigations
promised to be most successful. But by October, only 2108 corpses were
exhumed - they were mainly found in individual graves. The
UN-investigators did not offer any information about age, sex,
nationality, or probable time of death of these persons, among whom one
suspects Kosovo-Albanian and Serb fighters as well as civilians from
both sides. How many of these dead may have been killed by the NATO
bombings was also not addressed. Del Ponte maintains, however, that
many presumed gravesites were tampered with, and she speculates that
there may still be as many as 10,000 victims. Further investigations
during the year 2000 are supposed to prove this. But again this remains
pure propaganda.

4. Mass Graves

'Our inquiry teams had learned that up to 200 persons were killed in
the village of Izbica and buried. Soon afterwards, we had pictures that
clearly showed fresh grave sites in Izbica as well as in the
neighboring village of Krasnika.' (Entry of May 25, 1999, p.182f)

Scharping's claim is based on a report of the US State Department,
published on May 10, 1999, with the title 'Erasing History: Ethnic
Cleansing in Kosovo'. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says during
its presentation that it proves 'without any doubt' the existence of 'a
horrible system of war crimes and crimes against humanity', including
'systematic executions' and 'organized rape'. The report says that
approximately 90 percent of Kosovo-Albanians were driven from their
homes, a claim that was later exposed as a blatant lie. Moreover, it is
said that approximately 150 Albanians were killed in Izbica. Satellite
images, which are designed to prove a change in the surface of the
soil, are presented and put onto the Internet. After the war ended, UN
investigators find no corpses at the presumed grave-site near Izbica
(The Spectator, November 20, 1999). However, they find evidence that
allegedly points to the removal of signs of a mass grave by Serb
security forces.
While it remains unclear whether there ever was a mass grave on the
field near Izbica, other investigations at other sites have shown that
similar claims were pure war propaganda. Immediately after the war,
NATO officials referred to Ljubenic near Pec as the site of one of the
largest mass graves. They state that retreating Serb units had buried
350 corpses there in a hurry. UN investigators go to the place and find
exactly seven corpses (Toronto Sun, November 18, 1999). Moreover, the
KLA also reports a huge mass grave in the Trepca mines, claiming that
in one oven up to 100 persons were buried daily and the ashes thrown
into the mine corridors. Approximately 6,000 Kosovo-Albanians allegedly
lost their lives in the process. After the war ended, investigators
expected to find at least the remains of 700 persons in the mine. In
October, Kelly Moore, a speaker of the UN-Tribunal, reports that the
investigators had 'found absolutely nothing' (New York Times, October
13, 1999).
Emilio Perez Pujol, member of a Spanish team of pathologists, already
made the following skeptical comments in September: 'I calculate that
the final figure of dead in Kosovo will be 2,500 at the most. This
includes lots of strange deaths that can't be blamed on anyone in
particular.' The Spanish team was warned that it went into the 'worst
zone of Kosovo', Istok. But at the end of their investigations, the
pathologists had found 187 bodies. They do not find mass graves (El
Pais, September 23, 1999).

5. Systematic Rape

'Satellite images show mass graves; women report to the OSCE about
systematic rape; the UNHCR receives information about young women and
men who are abused as human shields for an ammunition depot in
Prizren.' (Entry of April 27, 1999, p.137).

Scharping and his colleagues repeatedly mention reports of mass rape in
Kosovo. Pictures of refugee convoys and comments by refugees are shown
or presented almost daily, in order to create moral concern among the
population and to drown out discussion about the goals and legitimacy
of the NATO war. Certainly, atrocities occurred during the war, but it
is equally clear that corresponding information and speculation is used
for propaganda purposes. The situation in the camps is also described
with distortions. Reinhard Munz, a German physician who worked in the
Macedonian refugee camp Stenkovac, concludes in an interview: 'The
refugees were used for political reasons.' He points out that 'men of
fighting age were the majority in our camp.' This contradicts
allegations by Scharping and others that children, women, and elderly
lived in the camps, whereas masses of potential male fighters were
victims of Serb soldiers. In reply to a question about the evidence of
rape, Munz says: 'During the whole time, we encountered no single case
of a women who was raped. And we looked at 60,000 persons in Stenkovac
I and II, as well as two smaller camps. Due to the rumors about
systematic rape, we wondered in advance what to do about the raped
women, but this situation did not arise. We have heard of no cases of
rape, which of course does not mean that there were none at all' (Die
Welt, June 18, 1999).

6. Massacre in Rogovo

'I feel sick when I look at these pictures... During the daily press
conference I announce: 'We will present to you pictures of a massacre
that had already occurred on January 29, 1999 ... I advise you,
however, to come well prepared, since these are original photographs
taken by an OSCE observer ... You will clearly see what was going on
already in January'.' (Entry April 25 and 26, 1999, pp.132 and 136)

During a press conference On April 27, Scharping presents photographs
of corpses to substantiate his claim that the Serbs had already
committed massacres of civilians and begun systematic deportations of
Kosovo-Albanians in January 1999. But journalists immediately
recognized the pictures and replied that OSCE inspectors had already
used them to refer, not to a massacre, but to combat between Serb
soldiers and the KLA. When Scharping is confronted with these facts
again during in a TV-broadcast, he takes recourse to further
speculation - allegedly, the skulls of the corpses were demolished with
baseball bats (Bericht aus Berlin, April 30, 1999). Highly indignant,
Scharping rejects all criticism of his behavior.

7. Collateral Damage

The Serb media immediately use these tragic mistakes for their own
propaganda, as proof of wanton destruction and deliberate attacks on
the civilian population. Our media also spread these reports.' (Entry
April 6, 1999, p.192)

This is Scharping's entry, after a rocket had exploded in a residential
neighborhood in the town of Aleksinac on April 5. Seventeen people had
died. Later, 'deliberate attacks' against civilians occur, for example,
when the Radio- and TV-Station RTS, the Chinese Embassy, and the town
of Korisa are attacked: On May 14, NATO airplanes fire 10 bombs into
the village Korisa in Kosovo, killing at least 87 civilians. On the
same day, NATO spokesperson Jamie Shea announces on BBC: 'We have
reports that soldiers died as well, not only civilians.' During a press
conference the following day, the German NATO General Walter Jertz
insists that Korisa was a legitimate target, since there had also been
military installations there.
Western information strategists manipulated so-called 'collateral
damage' evidence for their own propaganda, too. This becomes clear
after a rocket-attack on April 12: During two subsequent sorties, a
NATO fighter fired a rocket against a train, when the latter crossed a
bridge near Grdelica. Two carriages are hit, at least 12 people die,
and many more are wounded. On April 13, General Wesley Clark, the NATO
Supreme Commander in Europe, speaks of a 'freakish coincidence'. At the
end of the conference, he presents the cockpit-video of the plane, in
order to emphasize that the pilot allegedly had no choice: 'Look
carefully at the target, concentrate on it, and you can see, if you
focus like a pilot, that suddenly this train appeared'.
In January 2000, it is revealed in Germany that NATO experts
manipulated the tape before it was shown and thus deceived the
international public: The tape was running five times faster than the
real events, which confirmed the impression that the train raced toward
the bridge and could not be detected by the pilot (Frankfurter
Rundschau, January 20, 2000). NATO-speakers excused this as a
'technical problem'.

8. Rockets Hit Refugees

'A convoy is hit near Djakovica, many people are killed. It remains
uncertain for days whether it was a civilian or a military convoy,
whether the Serb military abused a civilian convoy as a shield, and
whether it was a NATO attack at all ... The probability that NATO
pilots tragically mistook a group of refugees for a military convoy was
another sad example that war without sacrifices among the civilian
population does not exist.' (Entry of April 14, 1999, p.121)

The rocket attack on the refugee convoy near Djakovica occurs on April
14. More than 70 people are killed. For days, Defense Minister
Scharping and NATO speakers cast doubts on the NATO origin of the
attack. Later, the event is excused with the high altitude of the plane
and the pilot's confusion of 'tractor-like vehicles' with Serb military
vehicles. A few weeks later, the U.S.-based International Strategic
Studies Association publishes the voice traffic between the USAF F-16
strike aircraft and his EC-130 Hercules AWACS:

'Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. I am coming out of the clouds, still
nothing in sight.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. Continue to the north, course 280.
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. I am keeping 3,000 feet. Under me
columns of cars, some kind of tractors. What is it? Requesting
instructions.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. Do you see tanks? Repeat, where are the
tanks?
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. I see tractors. I suppose the Reds did
not camouflage tanks as tractors.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. What kind of strange convoy is this?
What, civilians? Damn, this is all the Serb's doing. Destroy the target.
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. What should I destroy? Tractors?
Ordinary cars? Repeat, I don't see any tanks. Request additional
instructions.
AWACS: Mother to Charlie Bravo. This is a military target, a completely
legitimate military target. Destroy the target. Repeat, destroy the
target.
Pilot: Charlie Bravo to Mother. OK, copy. Launching.'
(Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 3/1999)

The authenticity of this transcript of the mission radio traffic
remains a matter of debate. But the statement of a Spanish F-18 pilot
after he returned from the war at the end of May is clear proof that
civilians were targeted deliberately. The pilot claims that he and his
colleagues repeatedly received orders to attack civilian installations:
'Our colonel went to his NATO heads several times and protested against
the choice of targets that were not of a military nature ... Once we
received an encoded order from U.S. military officials to drop
anti-personnel bombs over the towns of Pristina and Nis. Our colonel
refused the order, and a few days later he was deposed' (Articulo 20,
June 14, 1999).
The facts speak for themselves. During the war, thousands of
anti-personnel bombs - so-called cluster-bombs against 'soft targets' -
were dropped on military as well as civilian installations in Serbia.
For example, on May 7, two of them explode in Nis, killing 13 civilians
and wounding 29, some of them critically.

9. The bombing of RTS in Belgrad

'I am not satisfied with NATO's information policy. The information
itself is reliable, but it comes much too late and allows too much time
in between for speculation and disinformation. Why is it not possible
to disseminate information in Brussels early in the morning, in order
to counter images of Yugoslav TV?' (Entry of April 4, 1999, p.99)

Evidently, other NATO officials shared Scharping's displeasure and did
something about it. In the early morning hours of April 23, the central
station of the Serb TV station RTS, located in the city center of
Belgrad, is attacked. Sixteen journalists and technicians are torn to
pieces, many more are wounded. At the same time, bombing raids on
antennas and transmitter stations in the whole of Serbia increase from
mid-April onwards, and in May satellite broadcasting by Yugoslav
stations to Western Europe is interrupted. After the war, it is
revealed that the attack on RTS was planned long in advance. During the
'NewsWorld' media-conference in Barcelona in October 1999, the head of
CNN International, Easton Jordan, explains that he was informed about
the imminent attack. He protested, and the NATO jets hence veered away
during their first sortie (Daily Telegraph, November 7, 1999). Two days
later, the attack is carried out, at a time when there were no foreign
journalists in the RTS building and the CNN crew had removed its
equipment to safety. Before the attack, the Serbian minister of
information, Aleksandar Vucic, is invited into the RTS building for an
interview during the live broadcast of a U.S. station. According to his
own remarks, he escaped the attack only because he was late (Le Monde
Diplomatique, August 13, 1999).

10. The Targeting of the Chinese Embassy

'What a terrible disaster ... It will create great political
difficulties, not only in terms of public opinion and growing
impatience and uncertainties; this terrible mistake also threatens to
ruin our political efforts.' (Entry of May 8, 1999, p.154)

Mr. Scharping is worried after three rockets had hit the Chinese
Embassy in the center of Belgrad on May 7. Three Chinese journalists
are killed, and many officials are wounded severely. Scharping talks
about 'imprecise target coordination' and 'deficiencies of the
information provided by intelligence services'. Months later, it is
revealed that the CIA was responsible for the targeting process and
that the building was not mistakenly hit. It is presumed that the
embassy building was used to communicate intelligence information to
the Serb military and that this was the reason for NATO's attack (Der
Spiegel, 2/2000).

11. Defense of Human Rights

'Finally, we are not the aggressors, as we were so often before 1945,
but we defend human rights. For the first time, the Germans are acting
in cooperation with all Europeans, instead of against them. For the
first time, the goal is not subjugation but human rights and their
enforcement.' (Entry of April 11, 1999, p.114)

Scharping's heroic justification of the German military campaign
between March and June 1999 reiterates the delusion that motivated him
before and during the war. On the eve of March 24, 1999, the opposite
of Scharping's promise becomes reality within hours. With the start of
the bombing campaign, the situation dramatically worsens - also for
Kosovo-Albanian civilians. Members of aid organizations note that the
NATO bombings led to the massive exodus from Kosovo. In the wake of the
bombings, the conflict between Serb soldiers and the KLA escalates.
Moreover, thousands of people from all ethnic groups flee their homes,
because the on-going air-strikes make them fear for their life. An
OSCE-report entitled 'Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As told', published on
December 6, 1999, indicates that attacks against Kosovo-Albanians do
occur, but the vast majority of them took place only after the NATO war
began. Thanks to the NATO war, the basis for a peaceful life of the
different groups in Kosovo, which was weak and previously damaged
anyway, is destroyed for years, if not decades.

Luca Casarini ed i suoi squadristi contro la Jugoslavia partigiana ed a
favore del revisionismo neoirredentista


In merito all'aggressione a militanti del Prc di Venezia ad opera dei
Disobbedienti vicini a Luca Casarini sono comparsi alcuni comunicati di
condanna (si veda ad es. Liberazione del 1/10/2003, a pag.17, vedi
anche: http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2830 ).
Da questi tuttavia non si capiscono bene ne' la dinamica della
aggressione, ne' tantomeno i motivi del contrasto. Rivelatori in questo
senso sono i lanci dell'agenzia Ansa, contenenti fra l'altro una
dichiarazione pubblica di Casarini che aiuta a capire veramente la
gravità politica di ciò che è accaduto. La manifestazione di Prc,
Cobas, Rete Antirazzista e Verdi non-violenti è stata a tutti gli
effetti caricata dal servizio d'ordine dei centri sociali "Pedro" e
"Rivolta", trasformatosi in tutore del revisionismo neoirredentista che
mira a cancellare ed infamare la Guerra di Liberazione. (i.s.)


FOIBE:CONTESTAZIONI PER CAMBIO NOME DI UNA PIAZZA A MARGHERA

(ANSA) - VENEZIA, 28 SET - Momenti di tensione si sono
registrati oggi prima della cerimonia di inaugurazione ai
Martiri Giuliano Dalmati delle Foibe dell'ex piazzale Nicolo'
Tommaseo di Marghera, uno slargo alberato a ridosso delle
fabbriche, proprio sotto al Petrolchimico.
Una quarantina di Disobbedienti del centro sociale Rivolta di
Marghera ha infatti impedito il sit-in di una ventina di
esponenti di Rifondazione Comunista, Cobas-Scuola, Rete
Antirazzista, Verdi Non Violenti, programmato per contestare la
nuova intitolazione del piazzale.
Dopo un intervento lieve della polizia e allontanatisi i
Disobbedienti, i dissenzienti hanno potuto aprire uno striscione
con la scritta ''Vergogna'', indossando cartelli con frasi quali
''la toponomastica non cancellera' l'antifascismo'' e ''adesso
sappiamo come i nostri amministratori spendono i nostri soldi e
il loro tempo''.
Sul palco sono poi giunti il sindaco di Venezia Paolo Costa
(Margherita) e il prosindaco di Mestre Gianfranco Bettin
(Verdi), e, tra gli altri, il consigliere regionale Bruno
Cannella (An), oltre al presidente dell'Associazione degli Esuli
Giuliani e Dalmati, Lucio Toth, che aveva chiesto con forza
l'intitolazione della piazza.
''In tutta Italia c'e' stato confronto sul tema dei martiri
delle foibe, con la presenza delle associazioni partigiane,
Marghera e' anche quella della gente giuliana e dalmata che e'
venuta qui a vivere e lavorare'', ha detto Bettin, ricordando
che nelle foibe sono state uccise persone di diverse
appartenenze politiche.
Anche Toth ha fatto osservare che ''nelle foibe sono finiti
fascisti e antifascisti; giuliani e dalmati hanno pagato in modo
molto piu' pesante di altri l'esito della guerra''.
Il sindaco Costa, infine, ha fatto riferimento tra l'altro
''alla prossima entrata della Slovenia in Europa e a quella piu'
lontana della Serbia'', dicendo che ''non si possono eliminare i
problemi nascondendoli'' e affermando di essere ''orgoglioso di
intitolare la piazza ai martiri delle foibe''.
Nel piazzale erano presenti anche picchetti d'onore del
comitato che interviene alle cerimonie pubbliche su invito
dell'amministrazione comunale, con, tra gli altri,
rappresentanti dell'Associazione nazionale carabinieri, di
diversi corpi dell'esercito, tra i quali alpini e bersaglieri,
con le relative insegne. Non presenti, invece, le associazioni
partigiane.
(ANSA). BE 28-SET-03 19:28 NNNN


FOIBE: PIAZZA MARGHERA; CASARINI, IMPEDITO RISORGERE IDEOLOGIE

(ANSA) - VENEZIA, 30 SET - ''Abbiamo come antifascisti
impedito il risorgere di ideologie che puntano alla restrizione
delle liberta' e dei diritti, che fanno apologia di un passato
tragico e gia' sconfitto dalla storia''. Lo ha affermato Luca
Casarini, in una conferenza stampa svoltasi oggi al centro
sociale Rivolta di Marghera, in merito agli scontri avvenuti a
Marghera tra Disobbedienti e Azione Giovani prima della
cerimonia per piazza Martiri Giuliano Dalmati delle Foibe.
''Ci costera' caro, ma noi - ha proseguito - non siamo
disposti a barattare tranquillita' con ipocrisia, noi non siamo
ipocriti come tanti rivoluzionari da salotto''.
''Noi - ha proseguito Casarini - personalmente approviamo la
nuova intitolazione della piazza, perche' ci sembra importante
non solo tornare in maniera critica su una delle pagine piu'
tragiche della storia del '900 nel nostro paese, ma anche per
togliere alla destra fascista qualsiasi alibi e vittimismo
legato a questa vicenda''. ''I militanti dei Disobbedienti e del
Rivolta - ha spiegato Casarini - si sono organizzati per
impedire la strumentalizzazione della cerimonia da parte dei
fascisti organizzati, che con tanto di bastoni e bandiere di An
si stavano recando nella piazza per stravolgere l'iniziativa e
utilizzarla per i loro fini di propaganda e apologia del
fascismo''.
In merito invece agli scontri avvenuti con esponenti della
sinistra, Casarini dice che ''tutto parte dall'approvazione in
giunta comunale, con il voto favorevole anche di Paolo Cacciari,
segretario regionale di Rifondazione Comunista, della nuova intolazione
della piazza''. Secondo il rappresentante dei centri sociali, ''risulta
evidente che dentro Rifondazione si annidano alcuni personaggi
nostalgici che hanno organizzato per il giorno della commemorazione
una presenza in piazza per contestarla, indetta da un volantino firmato
Prc, Cobas-Scuola di Venezia, Rete Antirazzista e Verdi Non Violenti''.
''Noi - conclude Casarini - siamo contro lo stalinismo e il fascismo''.
(ANSA). BE 30-SET-03 21:07 NNNN

YUGOSLAVIA BORN AGAIN - IN EAST TIMOR AND
TO THE SERVICE OF WESTERN IMPERIALISM

Former Yugoslav enemies unite
to help UN rebuild conflict-ravaged East Timor

AP, Thursday, Oct 02, 2003,Page 7

Four years after they fought each other in a bloody civil war, police
and soldiers from all over the former Yugoslavia are now working
together to rebuild another county torn apart by conflict.
And the former enemies are finding that working -- and playing
together -- on this tropical island thousands of kilometers from
their homeland is helping to heal old wounds.
"We have a regular little Yugoslavia right here in East Timor," said
Irhad Campara, a Muslim police officer from Bosnia who had gathered
with Slovene, Serb and Croat policemen for a nightly card game at
Dili's City Cafe.
Some of the cops wore their favorite red T-shirts with the image of
Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the post-World War II strongman who is now a
shared symbol of a nostalgic time when Yugoslavia was peaceful and
prosperous under his doctrine of "Brotherhood and Unity."
Tito died in 1980, and Yugoslavia fell apart a decade later amid
vicious ethnic fighting in Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia's province of
Kosovo in which nearly 250,000 people died. NATO intervened in 1999,
bombing Serbia and facilitating the downfall of Slobodan Milosevic, now
on trial at a UN war crimes tribunal for fomenting the wars.
Today, for the first time, the former combatants are part of a UN
peacekeeping mission, serving as policemen and military observers in
East Timor, which gained independence last year after a bloody 24-year
war against Indonesian occupation.
The UN, which has administered the territory for two-and-a-half years,
still provides about 3,200 troops and 600 police in advisory roles to
the world's newest country.
Although initially guarded with one another, Slovenes, Croats, Serbs
and Bosnians quickly developed strong bonds and now say they feel
united in friendship and their mission.
"When I got here, I had no tropical kit," said Captain Slavimir
Nikolic, an officer from Serbia based in the isolated enclave of
Oecussi. "A Croatian colleague immediately came to my aid and gave me
his mosquito netting, bug repellants and all the other equipment I
needed."
Although the potential for renewed violence in their own part of the
world remains an international concern, with thousands of NATO troops
still in the region, the governments of Bosnia, Serbia-Montenegro,
Macedonia and Croatia are considering sending soldiers to serve as blue
helmets in Liberia, Iraq, and other troublespots.
"Its time to put the lunacy of the [Balkan] wars behind us," Nikolic
said. "I can't describe how proud I am to be wearing the blue beret and
working together with other professionals to help bring peace to East
Timor."
Policing the aftermath of a war is a new experience for most
peacekeepers in Timor, but for those from the former Yugoslavia it is a
bitterly familiar routine.
"Unfortunately, we understand their situation better than almost any
other UN cops because we went through conflicts like this," said Drasko
Djeric, a Bosnian Serb policeman.
Their task now is to provide on-the-job training for the Timorese
police force, which is gradually assuming control of security in the
country of 750,000. This means everything from traffic control and
crime-fighting to dealing with civil disturbances like the riots that
shook the Dili last year.
Nikolic himself is part of a group of military observers whose task is
to monitor the security situation in the country and along the border
with Indonesia.
"We have people from virtually every corner of the world serving
together under the UN flag to assist the Timorese," said UN spokeswoman
Marcia Poole. "It's a prime example of what the UN is all about:
people, working together, with shared objectives, and realizing that
that which unites us is stronger than that which may divide us."
The tight-knit group of ex-Yugoslavs agree that they are renewing their
links and establishing strong bonds for the future.

Copyright © 1999-2003 The Taipei Times. All rights reserved.

http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2003/10/02/2003070108

(ringraziamo Paolo per la segnalazione)

http://www.lernesto.it/

l'ernesto 4/2003

INDICE:

Editoriale

"Partito riformista" e prospettive per la sinistra
G. L. Pegolo

Conflitto e alternativa

La centralità del conflitto capitale lavoro
G. Rinaldini

Lavoro

La ricerca dell'unità passa per il lavoro
B. Casati

Ripartire dal salario
O. Squassina

Pensioni: l'attacco più duro
B. Leone

Società

La "Riforma dell'Università": una destrutturazione sistematica
G. Cerri

Tavola Rotonda

Il pericolo delle destre e i percorsi per l'alternativa
Tom Benetollo, Piero Bernocchi, Rosy Bindi, Vannino Chiti, Severino
Galante, Claudio Grassi, Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio, Cesare Salvi

Internazionale

La concezione della "libertà" dell'imperialismo Usa
L. Manisco

Usa: a due anni dall'11 settembre
F. Grimaldi

La lotta per la liberazione in Iraq
C. Bellotti

Cuba si difende
A. Riccio

La rimozione della Jugoslavia
A. Martocchia

"Ciò che noi siamo, ciò che noi vogliamo"
intervista a Blade Nzimande, segretario generale del Partito comunista
sudafricano (SACP)

Bioterrorismo e impero biotech
E. Burgio

Dibattito

Il volto postmoderno della "nuova destra"
B. Steri

Recensioni

Raul Mordenti: "La rivoluzione"
B. Bracci Torsi

Il gioco del capitale: geopolitica delle risorse strategiche e militari
Un dossier del circolo "Che Guevara" di Napoli
A. Hobel

Memoria

E' scomparso il compagno giusto nel momento sbagliato: addio a Claudio
Sabattini
F. Arrigoni

L'ERNESTO IN LIBRERIA:
http://www.lernesto.it/s-librerie.htm

PER GLI ABBONAMENTI:
http://www.lernesto.it/abbonamenti.htm

PER I CONTATTI:
per informazioni di carattere generale info@...
per abbonarsi e per informazioni sugli abbonamenti
abbonamenti@...
per scrivere alla redazione redazione@...
per informazioni sulla registrazione alla rassegna stampa
registrazione@...

http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m-col.html

ANTIWAR, Mercoledì, 3 luglio 2003
Balkan Express di Nebojsa Malic

Bugiardi, mezzani, inquisitori e ladri

Una tragedia balcanica in quattro scene


Nessuno degli eventi o delle dichiarazioni che seguono
potrebbe essere una sorpresa di per se. Ciò che sorprende
è piuttosto la mancanza di reazione da parte
delle vittime, o di coloro che involontariamente
sostengono i colpevoli. Come ogni cosa, il dramma
balcanico avrà conseguenze imprevedibili.
Gli antichi greci usavano dire, "Coloro che gli dei
vogliono distruggere, per prima cosa li fanno impazzire."
Nella ex Federazione Jugoslava, la pazzia e la
distruzione hanno marciato assieme. Per quelli che hanno
avuto a che fare con il naufragio, la tragedia non è
un concetto artistico. È la vita.

I: "Ripulire" l’UCK

Tra gli eventi dell’attuale processo di
disinformazione sul Kosovo, vi é la proclamazione, a
maggio, che l’ultima incarnazione dell’UCK sia una
organizzazione terroristica: è solo un problema di
tempo, prima che gli apologeti professionisti dell’UCK
e della sua causa colpiscano ancora.
La settimana scorsa, l’AFP informava della
“tolleranza” albanese a Obilic, una città dove il mese
scorso una intera famiglia di serbi e' stata
assassinata nella notte. Aderendo alla propaganda
dell’UCK, piena di disinformazione deliberata e di
banalità, l’articolo senza firma usciva dalla solita
filosofia della AFP. L’articolo è cosi "informativo"
che non menziona affatto la ridenominazione albanese
della città [di Obilic] in "Kastriota", un principe medievale
albanese - mentre Obilic é il nome del cavaliere serbo
che uccise il Sultano Murad nella battaglia del Kosovo
del 1389. Tolleranza, quindi.
Lunedì, l’IWPR di Londra ha pubblicato un lungo rapporto
sulle "riforme necessarie" nel Kosovo Protection
Corps, già UCK. Esso e' stato scritto assieme ad un
editorialista di Koha Ditore, il più importante
quotidiano di Pristina, le cui righe razziste
serbofobe sono divenute così di routine che non
disturbano più neanche i censori imperiali. Di
conseguenza, il rapporto IWPR trascura il coinvolgimento
del KPC e dell’UCK nelle attività terroristiche, e
sceglie di insultare la milizia delle FARK, organizzata
dalla fazione di Ibrahim Rugova. Se in alcune parti esso si può
leggere come una apologia dell’UCK, è perché lo è davvero! Solo pochi
paragrafi, e con grande prudenza, nel peana
sulla "liberazione dai serbi", trattano del massacro che
UCK e KPC hanno commesso per anni.
Nel frattempo, l’uscente viceré imperiale del Kosovo
ha salvato l’ex fuehrer dell’UCK, Hashim Taqi, che era
stato arrestato in Ungheria con la imbarazzante
accusa di essere un criminale. La polizia ungherese ha
rilasciato subito Taqi, grazie ai suoi amici potenti. Il mandato
di arresto è stato tolto, poiché “emesso dal governo
Milosevic" - ormai si sa che il cambio di governo
significa che gente accusata di omicidio può essere
lasciata in libertà. Ma se la persona in questione è uno
scugnizzo dell’Impero, che ne è della legge?

II: Costruire una nazione migliore?

Una opinione apparsa sul Christian Science Monitor di
martedì critica il processo di nation-building in
Bosnia: cioè, dichiara che non si fa abbastanza e bisogna
fare di più. L’autrice, Sara Terry, esemplifica la categoria di
quegli occidentali "bene informati" che tentano di pontificare
sui problemi balcanici, ma gestendo cose che suonano
assai imbarazzanti.
Per esempio, lei classifica i bosniaci basandosi sulla
religione, mostrando di credere in una nazione
"bosniaca" con tre differenti fedi. Una nazione
così si è dimostrata mitica come l’unicorno, cosa di
cui la signora Terry o è inconsapevole o ha scelto di
ignorarla.
Altra affermazione ignorante è che i serbi bosniaci,
"incitati dalla vicina Serbia, hanno tentato di
impadronirsi di tutto il paese, o almeno di
dividerselo con la Croazia." Nessuna indicazione sugli
incitamenti contenuti nella dichiarazione di indipendenza
di Izetbegovic dell’aprile 1992, o su cosa questi scrisse nella
sua "Dichiarazione Islamica" del 1971. Nessuno (a
tutt'oggi) ha mai accusato i serbi di tentare di
impadronirsi del paese intero; neanche Izetbegovic
disse mai una simile stupidità. Rispetto alla divisione con
Croazia, ella deve piuttosto chiedere ad Izetbegovic, che
invitò le truppe croate all’inizio del 1992.
Il maldestro tentativo di Terry di comparare le entità
della Bosnia con gli Stati degli USA, rivela solo
una grande ignoranza della Bosnia come degli USA:
diversamente dalle entità della Bosnia (o dalla Bosnia
stessa, nella fattispecie), gli originari 13 Stati [degli USA]
erano per davvero sovrani e indipendenti all’epoca.
Dopo sette anni da Dayton, la delusione persiste.

III: "Portatemi la testa di Radovan Karadzic!"

Il weekend scorso, l'arpia dell’Aja Carla del Ponte
scarabocchiava sulle pagine del New York Times - luogo
appropriato per le sue opinioni, in effetti - che l'intera
fabbrica dell’universo potrebbe scomparire se i serbi
non consegneranno Radovan Karadzic ed il Generale
Ratko Mladic alle sue gentili cure.
Nell'accusare i leader politico-militari della
Repubblica Serbo-Bosniaca del periodo della guerra, la
tumultuosa alta inquisitrice vorrebbe "spedire un
segnale ad altri, simili leaders nazionalisti, perche'
[sappiano che] il mondo non sarà più povero se si
imporra' la giustizia internazionale."
Esiste un mondo unito? E parla con una sola voce?
Non vi è nessuna agenda su queste cose! Ma al
contrario la Del Ponte soffre, in termini di delusioni per
la sua grandeur, presumendo di parlare
per un Mondo immaginario che lei pensa debba essere
un volgare tirapiedi dell’impero. Perché anche l’Impero
tenta di limitare la sua esposizione a quella palude tossica
che è l’inquisizione: due settimane fa, agli avvocati USA
è stato vietato di rappresentare propri clienti davanti all’ICTY.
Ciò che l’alta inquisitrice chiama "giustizia
internazionale" è l’aperta ed impunita aggressione, come
in Kosovo o in Iraq, e ciò significa che lei non terrà
in conto il concetto che le sue parole affermano.
La sola gloria a cui aspirano i bugiardi è la
falsificazione della Storia.

IV: Cleptocrati scatenati

Ogni governo è per definizione una cleptocrazia: per
esempio, il governante ruba al governato. Ma vi sono
pochi posti nel mondo in cui tale affermazione è così chiaramente
ovvia, e tollerata dalle vittime, come in Serbia.
Il governo del DOS è stato imposto dalla Banca
Mondiale e dall’FMI, che appoggiano il piano di
"stimolare" l’economia con vendite fraudolente che
gettano nella miseria gli investitori stranieri mentre
tassano anche l’aria fuori dalle imprese. Questo non è
solo irrazionale ed economicamente senza senso, è
criminalmente sbagliato... I lavoratori che sono scesi
nelle strade di Belgrado vogliono solo far finire gli
abusi del governo, domandano che prenda provvedimenti.
Ogni giorno, il pubblico scopre nuove complicità del
governo nell’esportazione dello zucchero, che fa
scivolare milioni di euro, provenienti dai sussidi
UE per l’importazione, nelle tasche degli affaristi
collegati con il governo. Gli alti gradi del governo
controllano ogni aspetto della vita, e ciò garantisce
il controllo del regime DOS sul traffico.
Sommersi dal disprezzo del popolo che dominano, i
membri della DOS non hanno un progetto che possa
essere accettabile.
Un altro dei loro recenti schemi è lo smantellamento
dell’esercito, da ridurre a livelli accettabili per una
“partnership” con la NATO, rendendolo membro
dell’Alleanza.
Non è veramente liberale opporsi allo smantellamento
dell’esercito, ma da quando il governo serbo ha rafforzato
lo stretto controllo delle armi tra popolazione, non vi
è stato nessuno ad occupare il vuoto. Da tempi della Bibbia
ad oggi, la difesa nazionale è una funzione basilare del
governo - o, per essere schietti, il fare la guerra. Il
governo serbo adesso rischia di fallire nel suo
compito fondamentale, nel tentativo di compiere le
"riforme" e "integrare" la nazione nel novero di quelli che
l’attaccarono pochi anni fa. Tale è il comportamento
di un regime di quisling, non di un governo
"democratico".

È ora chiaro al di là di ogni dubbio che il DOS è una
banda di ladri. Inoltre, curiosamente, il DOS vorrebbe
normalmente far parte dei Balcani moderni, ma
ottiene il peggio del peggio. Come tutti i politici,
desiderano potere e saccheggio, curano la loro attuale
posizione e la possibilità di avere tutto questo dai loro
padroni stranieri, che devono (e vogliono) lealmente
servire.
La continuazione del loro regno del caos dipende dalla
capacità di ingannare i loro concittadini nel far
credere che il DOS attui le necessarie "riforme" e la
"integrazione", con l’altrettanto insensato argomento che
opporsi al DOS significhi supportare Milosevic. Se i
serbi dovessero mai rinsavire, e comprendere che le
loro scelte sono assai più numerose, e che non hanno
bisogno di sostenere la cleptocrazia – che sia straniera o
domestica –, quest'ultima la pagherebbe cara.
Speriamo che ciò accada presto.

Epilogo

In realtà costoro non sono uniti. Apologeti,
inquisitori, mezzani e ladri continuano ad assaltare i
Balcani, dichiarandosi campioni della verità, della
giustizia, della consapevolezza e della capacità. Più
andranno avanti, più le cose peggioreranno. La soluzione,
se si avrà presto, è evidente di per se stessa.

Traduzione di Alessandro Lattanzio
Email: alexlattanzio@...
Sito: http://members.xoom.it/sitoaurora

Revisione del testo italiano a cura del CNJ

MILOSEVIC: DREI MONATE VORBEREITUNGSZEIT FÜR DIE VERTEIDIGUNG IM
“PROZESS DES JAHRHUNDERTS” -

EIN VERSUCH DES TOTSCHWEIGENS DER WAHRHEIT

Pressemitteilung der Sektion Québec und Kanada des Internationalen
Komitees für die Verteidigung von Slobodan Milosevic (ICDSM) vom 30.
September 2003-09-30;
Übersetzung: Deutsche ICDSM-Sektion


Die Sektion Québec und Kanada des Internationalen Komitees für die
Verteidigung von Slobodan Milosevic (ICDSM) möchte ihrer Empörung
darüber Ausdruck geben, dass das Internationale Straftribunal für das
ehemalige Jugoslawien (ICTY) entschieden hat, Präsident Slobodan
Milosevic nur drei
Monate Vorbereitungszeit zu gewähren, um seine Verteidigung in einem
„Fall“ darzulegen, der allein auf einer zynischen Fälschung der
turbulentesten zehn Jahre der Geschichte Jugoslawiens aufgebaut ist.

Diese Entscheidung ist ein weiteres Beispiel der Missachtung des ICTY
gegenüber den elementarsten internationalen Normen der allgemeinen
Rechtslehre und den Rechten von Gefangenen. Diese Entscheidung ist auch
ein deutliches Signal, dass diese Institution, geboren unter dem Druck
der
Regierung der USA, - die für ihre eigenen fortgesetzten Verbrechen
rechtliche Straffreiheit institutionalisiert hat - weder als geeignetes
Instrument für die Durchführung eines ordentlichen Verfahrens
geschaffen wurde noch ein solches durchführt. Dieser Prozess versucht
lediglich von einem genaueren Nachforschen nach der Verantwortung des
Westens für die Zerstörung einer Nation abzulenken. Konfrontiert mit
der Weigerung von Präsident Milosevic, die politischen Machenschaften
von Den Haag hinzunehmen, mit seiner prinzipienfesten Verteidigung
seines Volkes und seiner Geschichte, und mit seinem erfolgreichen
Auftreten im Gerichtssaal, versucht das ICTY nun, ihn daran zu hindern,
seine Sicht des Falles darzustellen.

Dies ist Lynchjustiz, wie der bekannte kanadische Strafrechtler Edward
Greenspan meinte.

Bestellung eines Zwangsverteidigers?

Am 4. April 2003 erkannte das ICTY das Recht Slobodan Milosevics an,
sich selbst zu verteidigen, und verwarf einen Antrag der Anklage, gegen
seinen Willen für ihn einen Anwalt zu bestellen. Dieses grundlegende
Recht auf Selbstverteidigung ohne eine gegen den Willen des Angeklagten
vorgenommene Bestellung eines Anwalts ist von allerhöchster Bedeutung.
Der Supreme Court der USA befand, dass es für die Bestellung eines
Anwalts für einen damit nicht einverstandenen Angeklagten keinen
Präzedenzfall gibt, abgesehen von der für politische Prozesse
geschaffenen Sternkammer. Die Anklage versucht nun, diese Angelegenheit
erneut aufzubringen und wird die Bestellung eines Anwalts gegen den
Willen von Präsident Milosevic beantragen, ungeachtet der Tatsache,
dass schon ein solcher Antrag den politischen Charakter des Prozesses
verrät.

Das ICTY stellt in seiner Entscheidung, Slobodan Milosevic zu
gestatten, sich selbst zu vertreten, unter Bezugnahme auf Artikel 21
des Statuts des ICTY fest, dass es “in der Tat der Verpflichtung
nachkommen muss, dass ein Verfahren fair und zügig erfolgt; insofern
die Gesundheit des Angeklagten eine Rolle spielt, hat diese
Verpflichtung eine besondere Bedeutung.“ Artikel 21 bestimmt, dass die
Kammer dieser Verpflichtung “in völliger Achtung der Rechte des
Angeklagten” nachkommen muss.

Mehr zügig als fair?

Die Entscheidung der Kammer, Herrn Milosevic drei Monate Zeit zu geben,
um seine Verteidigung vorzubereiten, steht in völligem Gegensatz zu der
von ihr bekundeten Sorge, ein faires Verfahren zu gewährleisten, sowie
zur Achtung der Rechte des Angeklagten. Es handelt sich um eine
gänzlich unrealistische
Vorbereitungszeit für ein Verfahren dieser Größenordnung, insbesondere
weil Herr Milosevic sich in Haft verteidigt.

Ferner hat die Kammer Herr Milosevic ein weiteres Erschwernis
auferlegt, indem sie ihn anwies, innerhalb von sechs Wochen nach
Abschluss des Vorbringens der Anklage eine ausführliche Liste der von
ihm beannten Zeugen vorzulegen, einschließlich einer Zusammenfassung
der Sachverhalte, zu denen jeder Zeuge aussagen wird, und einem
Hinweis, ob der Zeuge persönlich aussagen wird oder durch schriftliche
Stellungnahme oder mittels eines Aussageprotokolls aus anderen
Verfahren vor dem Tribunal. Er muss ferner die Beweisstücke auflisten,
die er in das Verfahren einzubringen beabsichtigt, und der
Anklagevertretung davon Kopien zur Verfügung stellen. Die Kammer kann
nicht einmal garantieren, dass Herr Milosevic die „Erlaubnis“ erhält,
jeden Zeugen seiner Wahl aufzurufen, da die Entscheidung besagt, dass
die Kammer eine „Verteidigungs-Vorverhandlung“ („Pre-Defence
Conference“) durchführen wird, um die Zeugenliste zwecks Genehmigung zu
überprüfen und die Zeit festzulegen, die ihm für die Darstellung seiner
Position gestattet wird.

Gleichheit der Waffen?

Zahlreiche internationale Konventionen bekräftigen das Recht eines
jeden, der eines Verbrechens angeklagt ist, auf angemessene Zeit und
Mittel, seine Verteidigung vorzubereiten. Dieses Recht ist ein
wichtiger Aspekt des
fundamentalen Prinzips der „Gleichheit der Waffen“, demzufolge die
Verteidigung und die Anklage so zu behandeln sind, dass sichergestellt
ist, dass beide Parteien die gleiche Möglichkeit haben, ihre Position
vorzubereiten und im Laufe des Verfahrens darzustellen. Das Tribunal
hat die Anerkennung dieses Prinzips in seinem Statut bekundet, welches
bestimmt, dass der/die Angeklagte das Recht hat, „die Zeugen gegen ihn
oder sie zu befragen und die Anwesenheit und Befragung von für ihn oder
sie auftretenden Zeugen unter denselben Bedingungen zu erwirken wie die
Zeugen gegen ihn oder sie.“

Der vom Tribunal bekundete Respekt für die “Gleichheit der Waffen“ wird
Lügen gestraft durch das Fehlen jeglicher Beschränkungen für die
Anklage, die auch nur entfernt jenen vergleichbar wären, die sich gegen
Herrn Milosevic auswirken. Dieser hatte es während des „Falles“ der
Anklage im Verlauf von über 250 Verhandlungstagen mit fast 300 Zeugen
zu tun und erhielt über 500.000 Seiten Material zum Verfahren zur
Durchsicht zugestellt. Allein die Last der Vorbereitung der
Kreuzverhöre so vieler Zeugen in einer Gefängniszelle ist erschreckend.
Und jetzt hat er gerade einmal drei Monate, um diese Masse an
Zeugenaussagen und Dokumenten
durchzugehen und die bisher vorliegenden Protokolle durchzusehen. Er
hat sechs Wochen, um Zeugen der Verteidigung zu identifizieren, zu
treffen und zu interviewen, sowie Schlüsseldokumente der Verteidigung
auszuwählen und
anzubieten. Beim Durchsehen der eine halbe Million Seiten an
Mitteilungen würde nur das Lesen allein 347 Tage à vierundzwanzig
Stunden in Anspruch nehmen. Das macht mehr als zehn Monate, nicht drei.
Im Gegensatz dazu hat das ICTY seine „Koso-Anklage“ vor viereinhalb
Jahren erhoben und hatte eine zweijährige Vorbereitungszeit für seine
zusätzlichen Anklagen im Jahre 2001 mit Bezug auf die Konflikte in
Croatien und Bosnien. Die Anklage hatte acht Jahre Zeit, um
Beweismaterial zu Srebrenica zu sammeln.

Das Leben von Präsident Milosevic ist in Gefahr!

Die Entscheidung, nur drei Monate Vorbereitungszeit und nur sechs
Wochen für die Vorlage der Zeugenliste nebst Zusammenfassung ihrer
Stellungnahmen zu gewähren, lässt den Gesundheitszustand von Präsident
Milosevic gänzlich
unberücksichtigt. Durch die wiederholten Unterbrechungen des Verfahrens
musste das Gericht zu Kenntnis nehmen, dass die UN-Ärzte Recht hatten,
als sie berichteten, dass das Leben von Präsident Milosevic wegen der
Intensität des Verfahrens in Gefahr ist. Die Gewährung von nur drei
Monaten Vorbereitungszeit erhöht seine Stress-Situation und könnte zu
erhöhtem Blutdruck, Schlaganfall und Tod führen

Im November letzten Jahres stellte das ICDSM Antrag auf Gehör vor der
Kammer, um zu begründen, dass der gesundheitliche Zustand von Slobodan
Milosevic eine sofortige spezialisierte medizinische Betreuung
erfordert, und dass sein Gesundheitszustand es erforderlich macht, dass
er aus der Haft
entlassen wird, und ihm ausreichend Zeit für seine Rekonvaleszenz
gegeben wird, sowie dass ihm erlaubt wird, seine Verteidigung unter
Nicht-Haftbedingungen vorzubereiten. Das ICTY hat diesem Antrag nicht
stattgegeben, hat ihn aber auch nicht abgelehnt. Das „Tribunal“ hat ihn
einfach ignoriert.

Erschreckende Bedingungen

Zusätzlich zu dem Umstand, nur drei Monate zur Vorbereitung seine
Verteidigung zu haben, muss Herr Milosevic dies aus einer
Gefängniszelle heraus unter erschreckenden Bedingungen tun. Gegenwärtig
kann Herr Milosevic nicht mit seiner Frau und seiner Familie
zusammentreffen. Seine engsten Mitstreiter und Freunde sind für ihn
unzugänglich, da der Registrar des Tribunals den Kontakt mit seiner
Partei, der Sozialistischen Partei Serbiens (SPS), und „assoziierten
Einheiten“ verboten hat. Sloboda, die federführende Vereinigung zur
Verteidigung von Präsident Milosevic wurde als verbotene Gruppe
aufgelistet. Der Registrar verhängte diese Maßnahme aufgrund des
Verdachts, dass zwei SPS-Mitglieder mit der Presse gesprochen haben.
Die Vorbereitung der Verteidigung von Präsident Milosevic erfordert,
dass er mit Zeugen und sachlich kompetenten Personen zusammentrifft,
von denen nun viele nicht in der Lage sind, mit ihm zusammenzutreffen,
weil sie unter Verbot
stehen. „Assoziierte Einheiten“, das kann jeder sein; der Registrar
bestimmt darüber nach Gutdünken. Sloboda hat das Verbot aus
Rechtsgründen angefochten. Eine Antwort des ICTY lässt auf sich warten.

Außer diesen gravierenden Einschränkung der Kontakte von Präsident
Milosevic mit seinen engsten Beratern, hat der Registrar nur
unzureichende technische Möglichkeiten zur Vorbereitung seiner
Verteidigung zur Verfügung gestellt. Ihm wurde der kontrollierte Zugang
zu einigen rudimentären Möglichkeiten der elektronischen und gedruckten
Kommunikation erlaubt (Telefon, Fax, ein Computer in seiner Zelle, ein
VCR zur Ansicht von Prozess-Filmmaterial), aber die Häufigkeit und
Dauer von Besuchen seiner rechtlichen Berater sind eng umgrenzt,
belaufen sich, wenn überhaupt, auf wenige Stunden in der Woche und sind
in Wirklichkeit auf die Tage beschränkt, wenn die Verhandlung früh
beendet ist.
Ebenso bezeichnend ist es, diese Bedingungen und technischen
Möglichkeiten, die einem Mann erlaubt werden, der sich gegen die
weltweit denkbar schwersten Beschuldigungen allein verteidigt, mit den
gewaltigen
Hilfsmitteln zu kontrastieren, die dem Büro der Staatsanwaltschaft zur
Verfügung stehen, sowie mit den unbeschränkten Vorrechten der
Staatsanwaltschaft, mit ihren Ermittlern, Assistenten und Forschern und
verschiedenen anderen Mitgliedern ihres weit größeren Teams zu
konferieren.
Die Sprecherin der Anklage ist bei gemeinsamen Pressekonferenzen mit
dem Sprecher des ICTY anwesend, während Slobodan Milosevic nicht mit
Mitgliedern seiner Partei, Sloboda oder undefinierten „assoziierten
Einheiten“
zusammentreffen kann, weil zwei einzelne Personen verdächtigt werden,
gegenüber über ihre Begegnung mit ihm mit Medien gesprochen zu haben.

Ein öffentliches Verfahren?

Artikel 11 der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte der UN
bekräftigt die Unschuldsvermutung und das Recht des Angeklagten auf
Öffentlichkeit des Verfahrens. Aber das „Verfahren“ von Slobodan
Milosevic ist oft nicht öffentlich und gegen den prüfenden Blick der
internationalen Öffentlichkeit
abgeschirmt. Sicherheitsbelange werden systematisch angeführt, um die
zahlreichen geschlossenen Sitzungen zu rechtfertigen, die Anonymität
der Zeugen sowie „ex parte“-Anträge der Anklage, Anträge, deren Inhalt
Milosevic nicht berechtigt ist zu überprüfen. In den letzten sechs
Monaten hat die Kammer sieben Entscheidungen aufgrund von ex
parte-Anträgen gefällt. Ein weiteres Grundrecht ist es, beim eigenen
Prozess anwesend zu sein. Wenn Herr Milosevic die Vorlagen der
Anklagevertretung an die Richter nicht lesen kann, geschweige denn auf
sie zu antworten, kann dann behauptet werden, dass er bei seinem
Verfahren tatsächlich anwesend ist?

Präsident Milosevic freilassen!

Diese Vorgänge zeugen von einem Prozess, der mehr zügig als fair ist,
und veranlassen die Sektion Québec und Kanada des ICDSM noch einmal die
Forderung des ICDSM nach einer zweijährigen Unterbrechung des Prozesses
zu wiederholen, um Slobodan Milosevic zu ermöglichen, seine Verteidigung
vorzubereiten, die Einschränkung seiner Besuchsrechte zu beenden und
sich gesundheitlich durch einen Arzt seiner Wahl behandeln zu lassen.
Er muss aus der Untersuchungshaft entlassen werden. Anders zu
verfahren, hieße nur die
schändliche Verhöhnung der Rechtsprechung in Den Haag fortzusetzen.
Allerdings ist das gründlichste Heilmittel zur Beendigung dieses
Justizzirkus - ein Heilmittel, das wir unterstützen - die vollständige
Auflösung dieses unheilbar politisierten „Gerichts“ und die Entlassung
aller seiner Gefangenen.

30. September 2003

Übersetzung aus dem Englischen: Klaus von Raussendorff

International Crisis Group: un Think Tank nel cuore dell'Europa

Infoguerre, 2003-08-01

L'International Crisis Group (ICG) è un Think Tank ("serbatoio di idee)
la cui vocazione è la "prevenzione e la risoluzione dei
conflitti". Une delle sue particolarità è quella di aver scelto per
sede Bruxelles, capitale europea. Tenendo conto della qualità del
lavoro fornito da questo organismo e dell'esperienza degli uomini che
lo compongono, ciò dovrebbe, senza dubbio, inorgoglire.
Ma, ci interroghiamo, perché Bruxelles? È una scelta pertinente o
semplicemente interessata?
Dopo una riflessione, bisogna riconoscere che questa città belga non ha
nulla da invidiare a Washington o a Londra: accoglie molte istituzioni
europee, la sede della Nato, gli uffici dei gruppi di pressione e
diverse ONG, e, personale diplomatico. E perché la nostra capitale
europea non potrebbe ospitare anche le sedi sociali delle imprese,
degli uffici degli
avvocati e... dell’ICG ?
A Bruxelles, il “serbatoio di idee” è certo di toccare un largo
pubblico in cui si trovano uomini le cui decisioni influenzano le
nostre vite di europei e di francesi.
Pertanto, la ICG é un Think Tank europeo? Ha la vocazione di appoggiare
la politica diplomatica europea?
Alcuni elementi proposti qui di seguito dovrebbero permetterci di
rispondere ai nostri dubbi:
1. ICG é una "organizzazione multinazionale indipendente e senza scopi
di lucro". Cioè, l'International Crisis Group non da conto a nessuno.
La sua indipendenza di operazione è garantita grazie ai fondi di
diversa provenienza. Dei fondi governativi in particolare: tedeschi,
australiani, austriaci, canadesi, danesi, statunitensi, finlandesi,
francesi, irlandesi,
giapponesi, lussemburghesi, norvegesi, olandesi, taiwanesi, inglesi,
svedesi, svizzeri e turchi.
Fondazioni e donatori del settore privato sono: The Atlantic
Philanthropies, la Carnegie Corporation of New York, la Fondation Ford
et la Fondation Bill et Melinda Gates, la Fondation William et Flora
Hewlett, la Fondation Henry Luce, Inc., la Fondation John D. et
Catherine T. MacArthur, l'Open Society Institute, la Fondation pour la
Paix Sasakawa, la Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment
Fund, la United States Institute of Peace...
Le risorse dell'ICG sono considerevoli. Lo dimostra la capacità di
Impiegare 90 persone e di disporre di rappresentanti a Mosca, Parigi,
Londra, New York e Washington.
Inoltre, l'organizzazione possiede abbastanza fondi per inviare i suoi
analisti in Asia centrale, Africa australe, America Latina e ancora in
Medio oriente.
Gestisce ugualmente 11 uffici a Amman, Belgrado, Bogota, Nairobi, Osh,
Islamabad...
Infine, l'ICG può permettersi di avere un sito internet di qualità, di
pubblicare le proprie analisi sotto forma di rapporti o di libri e di
assicurarne una distribuzione a grande scala.
Notiamo che poche ONG, centri di ricerca, "serbatoi di idee"... possono
permettersi di operare come l'ICG.
Notiamo anche che la ricerca dei fondi per l'ICG è discreta: niente
aderenti, né campagne pubblicitarie...
2. Il consiglio d'amministrazione dell'ICG raggruppa "eminenti membri
del mondo politico, diplomatico, così come degli affari e dei media"
che si impegnano "direttamente a promuovere i rapporti e le
raccomandazioni dell'ICG presso i politici di tutto il
mondo". Cioè, questo consiglio d'amministrazione è la rete con la quale
l'International Crisis Group può trasmettere i suoi messaggi. L’ICG
farà conoscere tanto più le sue analisi e raccomandazioni quanto più i
membri del suo consiglio sono influenti.
Citiamo, a mò d'esempio, qualcuno di essi:

Zbigniew Brzezinski, ex-consigliere democratico della sicurezza
nazionale del presidente Carter e autore de “La grande scacchiera.
L'America e il resto del mondo" (Bayard, Paris 1977).

George Soros, miliardario statunitense di origine ungherese, l'origine
della cui fortuna resta sorprendente rispetto alla sua concezione della
filantropia (La sua fondazione, la Fondazione George Soros, cesserà di
esistere nel 2010).

Wesley Clark, vecchio patrocinatore statunitense della Nato (e generale
USA, NdC)

Fidel V. Ramos, Morton Abramowitz, William Schowcross,
Christine Ockrent, Simone Veil...

Notiamo una composizione del consiglio d'amministrazione che fa
sognare: vecchi presidenti o ministri, giornalisti noti, alti
funzionari, uomini d'affari...
Si capisce, l’ICG é animato da una rete densa, influente e attiva, che
possiede, privilegio raro, i mezzi per realizzare i propri obiettivi.
Bisogna ben dire che è l’immagine di un Think Tank efficace, come si
desidera avere in Europa.
E poi, perché non ispirarsi al suo esempio per creare un "serbatoio di
idee" la cui équipe, composta di europei, abbia per scopo la difesa e
la promozione degli interessi dell'Unione Europea?

S.A.
Fonte: http://www.infoguerre.com/article.php?sid=618

Traduzione di Alessandro Lattanzio
Email: alexlattanzio@...
Sito: http://members.xoom.it/sitoaurora

The ethnic cleansing of Dubrovnik, 12 years ago

1. On 1 October 1991 the biggest ethnic cleansing of a city in modern
Europe began / 1 oktobra 1991 pocelo je najvece etnicko ciscenje jednog
grada, u savremenoj Evropi

2. On ethnic Serbs in Croatia and their property rights (on the
situation of Zadar Serbs)


=== 1 ===


Da: "minja m."
Data: Gio 2 Ott 2003 05:18:14 Europe/Rome
Oggetto: On 1 October 1991 the biggest ethnic cleansing of a city in
modern Europe began

------------- Forwarded Massage ---------------------------------

Date: 1 Oct 2003 01:54:08 EDT
From: SCofSAvasko

On 1 October 1991 the biggest ethnic cleansing of a city in modern
Europe began. Of about 10 000 Serbs living in Dubrovnik, 90% were
friven out in a couple days, forever.

Today, twelve years later, none have returned. Illustrious Dubrovnik
families –– Apolonio, Reljic, Pejovic,Lucic, Elakovic, Zecevic,
Boskovic (descendants of the glorious Rudjer Boskovic), Kovac, Bazdar,
Simic, Krivokuca, Vukasinovic, Segrt, Ciganovic, Markovic, Puljizevic,
Groseta and many others, all expelled in a genocidal war.

Lawyers, professors, medical doctors, philosophers, journalists and
other intellectuals “vacated” their job spots for rabid west
Herzegovinian extremists, the pre–eminent Croatian Nazis –– the
Ustashas.

Today they rule the once multi–ethnic city, which had been an oasis of
freedom for centuries.

Serbs and other Dubrovnikers again this year, on the day of the
expulsion, implore all of you who can to relay this letter to European
and world organizations, to make possible our return to our own houses,
now occupied by thieves, and resume life in their native city.

(signed)
Dubrovniker in Exile

=======

1 oktobra 1991 pocelo je najvece etnicko ciscenje jednog grada, u
savremenoj Evropi.
Od oko 10 hiljada Srba, za par dana, zauvijek je iz Dubrovnika
protjerano preko 90%, a dvanaest godina kasnije, nema povratnika.

Ugledne stoljetne dubrovacke familije, Apolonio, Reljic, Pejovic,Lucic,
Elakovic, Zecevic, Boskovic (nasljednici slavnog Rudjera), Kovac,
Bazdar, Simic, Krivokuca, Vukasinovic, Segrt, Ciganovic, Markovic,
Puljizevic, Groseta i mnoge druge, protjerane su iz Dubrovnika u
genocidnom ratu.

Advokati, profesori, doktori, filozofi, novinari i drugi intelektualci
"otvorili" su radna mjesta za ekstremne zapadne Hercegovce, poznate kao
ustase, koji danas vladaju nekada visenacionalnim gradom, oazom
stoljetne slobode.

Srbi i ostali Dubrovcani, i ove godine, na dan progona, mole sve Vas
koji mozete, da ovo pismo dostavite svim nadleznim evropksim i
svjetskim organizacijam, kako bi se vratili u svoje okupirane kuce i
kako bi nastavili zivot u rodnom Gradu.

Dubrovcanin u egzilu


=== 2 ===


Da: Predrag Tosic
Data: Gio 19 Giu 2003 03:15:53 Europe/Rome
A: yugoslaviainfo <Ova adresa el. pošte je zaštićena od spambotova. Omogućite JavaScript da biste je videli.>
Oggetto: [yugoslaviainfo] On ethnic Serbs in Croatia and their property
rights

[ Zadar is in the north-west of Croatia, perhaps the third largest
city along Croatia's Adriatic coast (after Split and Rijeka). Prior to
1991, Zadar had a sizable Serb population. Most of those Serbs have
fled. Now, some of the Zadar Serbs are trying to re-claim their
property rights to apartments and houses that they (used to) live in,
and still (de jure) own in the city. "Feral Tribune" is a leading
daily in Split, Croatia. This newspaper is well-known for its
anti-fascist, anti-chauvinist and anti-Tudjman stance throughout the
1990s. Viktor Ivancic is one of the editors and leading columnists of
"Feral Tribune". -- PT ]


Feral Tribune, Split, Croatia
December 14, 2001

Why no one reacted to the scandalous list of "Serbs from Zadar who are
demanding restitution of their houses and publicly owned apartments",
published in Zadarski List

TOP-LIST OF HYPERREALISTS

If we can talk about ideology as far as Racan's administration is
concerned - or at least retarded form of missionary zeal - then its
common
thread is symbolically represented as a role of a savior that separates
two
warring sides in a staged civil war

by Viktor IVANCIC

Late last month Zadarski list published an interesting serial. In two
installments, the newspaper published a list of "Serbs from Zadar who
are
demanding restitution of their houses and publicly owned apartments".
The
structure of the article is also interesting: number, name and surname,
address, and so on over several pages. Thus, Zadarski list managed to
find
and unmask as many as 450 "Serbs from Zadar" who, what an outrage, are
"demanding restitution of their houses and publicly owned apartments".
This
reading material, with names, addresses and criminal demands of "Serbs
from Zadar" was included in the section named "Events".

Until today, not one of the competent or incompetent individuals or
institutions in Croatia has reacted to this shameful public call for
lynching that imitates the best traditions of the Croat journalism in
the
early 90's or, if you prefer, German journalism in the late 30's. The
black
list simply rolled off the presses into the Zadar public without a
peep, as
something that is totally natural and reasonable, just like it totally
made
sense to declare a war crimes suspect for a citizen of honor without a
single local councelor casting, including those that belong to Racan's
party, a no vote.

If Croatia were a country that upholds at least minimal democratic
standards, the journalistic endeavor of Zadarski list would have been
suppressed with highly undemocratic methods. For example, the newspaper
would have been banned, the remaining copies confiscated and destroyed,
while the editor-in-chief would have been banned from working in the
media
long enough to make sure he gets plenty of time to write righteous
protests
against "suppression of free speech". However, Croatia is not such a
country. Here democratic conventions are respected mostly when it comes
to
those who advocate "dialogue" regarding freedom of execution and similar
modes of plural killing fields.

In that sense the black list with 450 names, addresses and criminal
demands,
is only a logical consequence of the cry of Ms Zeljka Antunovic, deputy
prime minister, about how the executive authorities would never
restitute
denied tenancy rights to "Serbs from Zadar", or any Serbs for that
matter.
Naturally, Ms Antunovic is not a person who would stoop to compiling
lists
for execution or differentiating between people based on ethnicity, God
forbid - she only cares about ideas, she does not care about people and
numbers. Tomorrow, if there are physical assaults on "Serbs from Zadar"
- or
any other Serbs - who, look, screw it, keep demanding restitution of
their
tenancy rights, Ms Antunovic would be the first one to demand that
Police be
sent to the location of the incident "to separate warring sides". That
is
the true position that the ruling political elite has reserved for
itself:
that of a cheap hypocritical buffer-zone. On duty 24 hours a day.

Last Monday, on the Day of Human Rights about ten activists headed for
Slunj wanting to appeal for the removal of a monument commemorating
Ustashe warrior Jure Francetic - standing on Franjo Tudman Square. They
were greeted by about two hundred rabid local "Jure-fans" with curses,
baseball bats, and fists. The Croatian authorities made an appearance
embodied as a police cordon which, at the last moment, prevented the
hosts from festively massacring the guests.

It was an explicit realization of Racan's political mission. On the one
side
a handful of fringe elements who are uncritically aghast that a
democratic
country allows building of monuments commemorating Ustashe butchers, on
the other side another handful of fringe elements that uncritically
adulates
Ustashe and plastic arts, and in between these two groups - people's
government! Concerned expression of the political will that with
corrective
baton in the right hand and rubber bullets held in reserve, prevents
social
"extremes" from killing each other.

If we can talk about ideology as far as Racan's administration is
concerned - or at least a retarded form of missionary zeal - then its
"common thread" is symbolically represented as a role of a savior that
separates two warring sides in a staged civil war. In order to cement
that
position, it is necessary to place the two opposing "extremist" groups
at
the same level, and that is usually done with a regular portion of
ideological slaps for the "left", and a pile of practical compromise and
para-patriotic understanding for the "right". An honest Croat
intellectual,
after receiving a salary from the state, put together the phrase
"leftists
terrorists". Thus, stage is being set (namely, a front line is being
prepared) for the appearance of a defective party Messiah whose
self-image,
unfortunately, is that of a hygienic tampon for the nation that keeps
bleeding.

One of the public supporters of the government on duty - otherwise a
prosecution witness in the trial of the student leaders in 1971, who now
ejaculates euphoric outbursts of repentance daily - has for months been
systematically developing a model of "balance of power" that equates
outbursts of fascist violence with struggle against it. "Is there any
difference between arrest warrants printed in Feral and those plastered
on
walls in Karlovac?" he wandered at a time. Let us remind our readers
that
"posters plastered on walls in Karlovac" included photographs of 130
Serbs
in uniforms of former Krajina police with the headline "Our neighbors".
The
posters were made, printed and distributed by the man who organized
ritual
pissing in Veljun on the monument commemorating Serbs shot by Ustashe in
1941 and revealed that he was behind both endeavors at the ceremony
marking the setting up of a monument commemorating warrior Jure
Francetic in Slunj.

The technique, practiced for decades in Communist and ideological
commissions, is always the same. For example, our government supporter
does not react to the publishing of a shameful execution list in
Zadarski List,
but will only pipe up after someone else criticizes the list (as Feral
is
yet again doing), only to righteously and wisely slap on the wrist both
"warring sides". He is the comrade-institution, with police baton in his
right hand, who always watches over us preventing the looming bloodbath
while secretly hoping it actually happens.

However, the ejaculator from Slobodna Dalmacija, who is here mentioned
only as an illustration that is supposed to make the article more
amusing - is
only a loudspeaker for Racan's ideological muddle. The real truth is
that
the current Croat authorities did not compile lists of "Serbs from
Zadar" -
or any other Serbs - nor did they build monuments commemorating Ustashe
officers. They only did nothing to prevent, or appropriately sanction
both.
They only preventively stopped application of the existing law and
emptied
the tanks of bulldozers that were supposed to demolish illegally
constructed
objects, even though these objects are merely monuments commemorating
achievements of notorious fascists. In that diligent inaction the
authorities found the saving formula for their efficiency and
self-preservation. Hyperactive inaction is the only way to occupy the
space
of its imaginary purpose, namely the illusion that it is continuously
"bringing to order" those that it has indirectly set on each other.

This planned recklessness, planned excommunication of its own political
role
from the creation of the current Croat nightmare and its boiling down
to the
purported "fixing" of the effect of the incited reality - besides being
contrary to all the achievements and principles of the civilization - is
pushing the ruling elite in the trap of a grotesque paradox. "We cannot
be
responsible for somebody else's crap," Racan's administration tells us,
"because we act only when we have to".

Translated on March 14, 2003

--- End forwarded message ---

Milosevic "trial", end September, 2003


1. Key Srebrenica Witness Admits Lying

2. ICTY in criminal compliance with NATO
(ICDSM press statement and intervention - 30.09.2003, The Hague)

3. September 30, 2003: Milosevic "Trial" Synopsis


LINKS:

Dutch TV documentary on the Hague process, in two parts
http://info.vpro.nl/info/tegenlicht/index.shtml?7738514+7738518+8048024

"Trial of the century":  An attempt to silence the truth
http://www.icdsm.org/more/canada2909.htm

ICTY judges as NATO defense counsels!
http://www.icdsm.org/press300903.htm

SLOBODA urgently needs your donation.
Please find the detailed instructions at:
http://www.sloboda.org.yu/pomoc.htm

To join or help this struggle, visit:
http://www.sloboda.org.yu/ (Sloboda/Freedom association)
http://www.icdsm.org/ (the international committee to defend Slobodan
Milosevic)
http://www.free-slobo.de/ (German section of ICDSM)
http://www.icdsmireland.org/ (ICDSM Ireland)
http://www.wpc-in.org/ (world peace council)
http://www.geocities.com/b_antinato/ (Balkan antiNATO center)


=== 1 ===


http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri_327_1_eng.txt

Key Srebrenica Witness Admits Lying

Momir Nikolic's fictional account of massacre raises questions about
plea-bargain system.

By Chris Stephen in The Hague (TU 327, 29 September 2003)

The Hague prosecution's star witness in the Srebrenica case has
admitted in court that he lied in testimony when he said he ordered one
of the biggest single massacres of Bosnian Muslims.

Former Bosnian Serb army captain Momir Nikolic's admission in a
courtroom appearance this week will undermine confidence in other
details he has supplied about the Srebrenica killings in July 1995, and
raises questions about how plea-bargain agreements are negotiated with
those accused of war crimes.

Nikolic, an army intelligence officer who was present during the
massacres and was indicted by The Hague for playing a major role in
them, made history as the first Serb officer to give evidence against
his colleagues.

But now doubts about his reliability as a witness have arisen after he
admitted that a statement he gave to prosecutors earlier this year
contained a lie.

In a courtroom appearance on September 29, he admitted he did not give
the orders to gun down more than 1,000 Bosnian Muslims inside a
warehouse at Kravica. He was not even present when it happened, on July
13, 1995. Kravica was one of the single biggest massacres carried out
by Serb forces around Srebrenica.

In recent days, Nikolic has been in court as part of a plea-bargain
deal with prosecutors, giving evidence against Vidoje Blagojevic and
Dragan Jokic, Bosnian Serb officers indicted for war crimes alongside
him. In May, prosecutors agreed to drop a genocide charge against him
and seek a lesser sentence of 15 to 20 years, and in return he changed
his not guilty plea to an admission that he committed crimes against
humanity.

But now, Nikolic has renounced his original statement that he had
personally supervised the Kravica killings.

"You needed to give him [the prosecutor] something he did not have,
right?" said Michael Karnavas, defending. "You wanted to limit your
time of imprisonment to 20 years, that was part of the arrangement,
yes? Quid pro quo?"

Nikolic admitted he had lied, "I did not tell the truth when I said
that. Afterwards I said I had made a mistake, I had lied.

"I apologise. All I can do is confess and say that discussing the crime
is a very difficult situation to be in."

"I think we should call it for what it is, a bald faced lie," said
Karnavas.

"I'm still a little bit confused," the American lawyer continued. "How
is it that you thought by admitting to one of the most horrendous
executions in this area, that this would help you in getting the kind
of sentence that you are hoping and praying for?"

"I wanted the agreement to succeed," responded Nikolic.

His original statement to prosecutors included testimony that while at
Kravica, he had observed the involvement of another war crimes suspect,
former army officer Ljubomir Borovcanin, in the killing.

He has now told the court that although he was not present, he was
certain that Borovcanin had been there.

"You implicated Borovcanin in your falsehood in order to make your
story more convincing, so that the prosecutor would buy it?" said
Karnavas. "You needed to give him [the prosecutor] some more facts to
sweeten the deal - that's why you provided false information about
Kravica?"

He went on to ask Nikolic whether he had lied so as to make his story
impressive enough for prosecutors to offer him a plea-bargain deal.
"Your lawyers had a laundry list of factors that the prosecutor was
expected to agree to," said Karnavas.

"The prosecution did not exert any influence on me," responded Nikolic.
"What I did is my own mistake."

Karnavas continued to press him, saying, "Did you think that by falsely
admitting to having ordered this execution that you were solving a
question-mark in the prosecutor's case as to who had ordered that
murder?"

Nikolic's admission could have serious implications for the prosecution
strategy of using plea bargains.

In recent weeks, prosecutors have persuaded several former Bosnian Serb
commanders to give evidence against their former comrades by offering
to cut their sentences.

Nikolic's plea-bargain negotiations took six months, starting last
November. It now seems he was so desperate to get a deal with
prosecutors that he was willing to lie to them.

The prosecutors are in a difficult position. They will only offer
plea-bargain arrangements to people who can give high-quality evidence.
But this case suggests that some defendants could be tempted to
embroider the facts to make their crimes more "worthy" of a deal.

Chris Stephen is IWPR's tribunal project manager.


=== 2 ===


From: Vladimir Krsljanin

ICTY in criminal compliance with NATO

The ICTY, in absence of ill President Milosevic and in presence of
Carla Del Ponte discussed this morning (30.09.2003) the initiative of
the prosecution to impose a counsel to President Milosevic and to
examine prosecution witnesses in his absence. The session ended with
the only decision that the process will continue in new rhythm: three
days of session, four days of rest for President Milosevic, which was
the recomendation of the doctors. The decision on the prosecution
initiative will be made after President Milosevic expresses his opinion.
After the session, member of ICDSM Board and Coordinator of its British
Section Ian Johnson delivered to the press the statement below and
answered journalists' questions.


The International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milosevic

The Hague, September 30, 2003, 11 a.m.                                 

PRESS RELEASE

TWO YEARS FREEDOM FOR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC

·       TO PROTECT HIS LIFE, HISTORICAL TRUTH AND JUSTICE FOR THE
PEOPLE OF THE BALKANS!

·       ICTY JUDGES AS NATO DEFENSE COUNSELS!

 ICTY put the life of President Milosevic at stake. Why?

Already at the beginning of the Hague process, President Milosevic
announced that he will demand that people such as Bill Clinton,
Madeleine Albright and Wesley Clark appear as witnesses.

           The logical and legitimate course of his presentation is to
prove the guilt of those who were killing Yugoslavia and its people by
endorsing separatists, terrorists, paramilitaries and traffickers, by
imposing genocidal sanctions, by bombings, by regime change and finally
by imposing a pro-NATO dictatorship which is associated with the mafia.
If their obvious guilt is shown, Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian
people are innocent!

            After the Prosecution failed to prove the NATO propaganda
fabrications, due to President Milosevic’s magnificent struggle, the
ICTY Judges have appeared and are assisting NATO.

           They decided that the ill and imprisoned President Milosevic
should provide them and the Prosecution (!) with all details of his
defense within six weeks! After that the Judges will decide what can
and what cannot be included! Certainly not Bill Clinton and his buddy
Wesley Clark. Certainly not the children that died under the bombs.
Apparently they are irrelevant!

           This way, after being deprived of medical care, President
Milosevic is deprived of his right to defense.

           As an additional guarantee that the truth will be silenced,
torture is being used against President Milosevic. He cannot meet his
family. He cannot meet his friends. Hundreds of thousands of members of
the Socialist Party of Serbia and of Freedom Association are banned
from visiting their president. He cannot meet his doctors from
Belgrade. Furthermore, even the ICTY doctors admitted that the
magnitude of the proceedings and the prison conditions threaten his
life. Confined in his prison cell he has to confront everything that
took the whole tribunal apparatus ten years to elaborate. (Only in the
“Milosevic trial” does the tribunal put everything!) With its 1248
employees and a UN budget of 694828400 dollars, the ICTY has spent 75%
of that sum, half a billion dollars, in the last five years alone,
since the NATO aggression and the first indictment against President
Milosevic. Moreover they have been assisted by Western governments and
their secret services, and recently by the Belgrade puppets as well. In
contrast to that, to prepare his defense President Milosevic will have
only three months, or more precisely six weeks, in his prison cell,
assisted only by a small group of volunteers, with no funds, no
infrastructure and no access to the state archives. Is this a way to
treat a person in a life-threatening situation? Yes, if he is a leader
of the people that opposed NATO.

           The ICDSM accuses ICTY of criminal misconduct and criminal
compliance with NATO.

           Today’s attempt to impose a counsel for President Milosevic
against his will and to conduct the trial in the absence of the ill
President is further proof of that. The ICTY violates international
norms of judiciary and of human rights protection. The ICTY violates
its own Statute.

           Two years in freedom, requested by President Milosevic, is a
minimum guarantee that his life will be protected and that the truth
will be heard. It is a generous, gentleman’s proposal. The response
of the ICTY is an outrage.

           The Russian Duma requested action from the Russian
Government to protect International Law and to prevent this outrage and
crime.

           Ten medical doctors from Germany have sent a petition to the
ICTY stating that President Milosevic’s illness requires his release.
The ICDSM is receiving support from doctors of other countries, who
condemn the treatment of President Milosevic and express their
readiness to take part in his examination and therapy.

           President Milosevic has to be released immediately!

           Many parties and organizations from different countries
endorse our position. The ICDSM and its national branches in Russia,
USA, Germany, Canada, Italy, Britain, Ireland and other countries have
launched a campaign aimed towards responsible UN bodies and member
states governments in order to stop the dangerous farce at The Hague.
The international demonstrations on November 8, called by a committee
of Diaspora Serbs and endorsed by the ICDSM shall be a peak of the
campaign.


ICDSM: INTERVENTION AT THE HAGUE.

On Tuesday 30th September 2003 The Hague Tribunal heard a submission
from the Prosecution that if accepted would mean the imposition of
Defence Counsel on President Milosevic against his will, and would
enable the trial to proceed without the presence of the accused.

This basic denial of the right of the accused to conduct his own
defence is yet further proof of the political nature of the ICTY.

The arguments for the Prosecution, presented by Mr Nice, would be
comical if they were not so tragic. To an outbreak of derisory laughter
from the public gallery, Nice tried to suggest that the President’s
health problems would be eliminated if he gave up smoking cigarettes!
He further proposed that on his ‘rest days’ Mr Milosevic could study
Court documents and watch hours of witness videos to save time and
expedite the trial proceedings. Moreover, according to Mr Nice, the
accused brought his ill health upon himself because he would insist on
cross-examining the Prosecution’s witnesses. How very inconsiderate of
Mr Milosevic!

In contrast to the Prosecution’s absurd arguments, which follow the
equally absurd ruling that Mr Milosevic provide the Court and the
Prosecution with his defence details and list of defence witnesses
within six weeks, Mr Milosevic has proposed that their be a two-year
recess in the trial in order to prepare his defence and that he be
released from custody where his medical condition can be treated by
doctors of his own choice.

It was these two key demands that gained an interest from journalists
at Tuesday’s hearing when members and supporters of the ICDSM
distributed their Press Release and gave interviews outside the
Tribunal building. Such was the impact of the ICDSM intervention that
the Tribunal’s security staff felt obliged to harass the journalists
and demand to see their passports and credentials. It was to the credit
of the ICDSM supporters that all copies of the Committee’s literature
were distributed even in the face of such intimidation.

The only ruling given by the Court on the day was that from next Monday
(6th October), following the advice of the Court appointed doctors, Mr
Milosevic should attend trial for three days and rest for the next four.

A decision regarding the Prosecution’s latest submission would be
announced shortly, though it is worth noting that to accept this
submission would mean yet a further rewriting of the Tribunal’s
existing rules.

Objective observers of the ‘trial’ cannot fail to note the sheer
desperation of both the Court and Prosecution at their inability to
break the resistance of President Milosevic and their inability to
prevent the development and growth of his Defence Committee.

ICDSM. The Hague. 30th September 2003.

Copy the Press Release at:
http://www.icdsm.org/press300903.htm

 
=== 3 ===


http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/smorg093003.htm

September 30, 2003: Milosevic "Trial" Synopsis

www.slobodan-milosevic.org - September 30, 2003

Written by: Andy Wilcoxson

President Milosevic was not present at the proceedings today. He is
still out sick. No witnesses were called today was only a status
conference. A cardiologist issued a report on the status of President
Milosevic's health. According to the medical report Milosevic is
suffering from extreme exhaustion, fatigue, and high blood pressure
caused by stress.

The cardiologist made a recommendation that the "trial" should go on
for 3 days a week, and that the other 4 days should be set aside for
President Milosevic to rest. The "tribunal" accepted these
recommendations and has pledged to alter the hearing schedule
accordingly.

The medical report is proof that President Milosevic is really sick.
He is not pretending to be sick as has been suggested by some
anti-Milosevic propagandists. His medical condition is genuine. There
is no doubt on this score since even the tribunal's own medical staff
confirms this.

Being the weasel that he is, prosecutor Geoffrey Nice suggested that
President Milosevic was inflicting his ill health on himself. Nice
suggested that because Milosevic had taken on the task of defending
himself that he was the only one to blame for the stress he is under.
Nice also suggested that the "court" should ban President Milosevic
from smoking. Nice even went so far as to compare Milosevic to a
drunkard who is unfit for trial because he has a hangover.

First of all, the "tribunal" has no right to ban President Milosevic
from smoking. If he wants to smoke then by God he should be allowed to
smoke. Other prisoners can smoke. As any smoker knows forcing somebody
to quit smoking would only inflict more stress on them, and Nice knows
this damn well. He could just ask his chain-smoking comrade Carla del
Ponte and she could tell him how difficult it is to quit.

Secondly, it is absurd for Nice to suggest that Milosevic is smoking
in order to make himself sick and force a delay of the "trial."
Slobodan Milosevic is a Serb, anybody who has been to Serbia know that
everybody in Serbia smokes. Smoking is something that most Serbs do.

As far as stress is concerned, it is Nice and the OTP that are causing
unnecessary stress on Milosevic. They are the ones who are always
changing the order in which the witnesses are scheduled to testify.
This farce of a "trial" has gone on for 250 days already. The
prosecution only has 36 more days to present its case and they still
have not submitted a final witness list. President Milosevic still
doesn't know who is going to testify against him, because not all of
the witnesses have been identified, and this makes it difficult for
Milosevic prepare his defense and cross-examination.

Another practice employed by the prosecution is that when witnesses
are on the schedule the prosecution will drop them, thus wasting any
time that Milosevic and his associates may have spent preparing for
them.

In an effort to "expedite the trial" Nice suggested that the
examination in chief of certain witnesses should be videotaped and that
Milosevic could watch the tape while resting. This is the height of
stupid ideas. First of all this would cause more stress and not less
for Milosevic, although I suspect this is the idea.

First of all, you can not raise an objection to a videotape that you
are watching on your TV set. If Milosevic has an objection he will
have to hash that out after the fact in order to get parts of the tape
excluded. This will take more time, not less. Not to mention the fact
that the witness would have to be recalled anyway in order to be
cross-examined.

Secondly, the "trial" can be hard to follow. The participants
frequently lose track of what the line of questioning is about, or
which document is being referred to. If Milosevic finds himself in that
situation while watching a tape locked in his cell, then he will have
no way to ascertain what is being referred to, whereas if he is
present for the questioning he can simply ask. This type of thing can
only cause him stress.

Thirdly, Milosevic wouldn't be resting if he had to watch a tape of
that nature. He would be working, and this would totally defeat the
recommendation of the doctors.

Another bright idea that Mr. Nice came up with was to impose legal
assistance onto President Milosevic against his will. Slobodan
Milosevic has repeatedly rejected the imposition of counsel on him.

When asked by Mr. Robinson what legal basis Nice had for suggesting
all of this; Nice suggested, without even blinking, that a legal basis
could be established if the judges would simply consent to altering the
rules in the middle of the "trial."

This is a useful opportunity to expose just what sort of "legal
institution" that the Hague Tribunal really is. The rules are
worthless. According to Rule 6 the rules can be changed by the judges
in mid-trial. In this case, Mr. Nice wanted Article 21 of the Statute
of the Tribunal to be altered since that article gives an accused the
right to be tried in his own presence, and the right to defend
himself. Both of which are rights that Mr. Nice is scheming to take
away from Milosevic.

It is obvious that the prosecution does not want Milosevic to defend
himself. Why you ask? Because Milosevic is doing such a spectacular
job of destroying the prosecution's case that's why. Not one witness
has gotten the better of Milosevic. President Milosevic has
successfully compelled all of them to either tell the truth, or else
he has exposed them as liars. The prosecution knows that no lawyer
could possibly do such a spectacular job as Milosevic is doing, and so
they are desperate to find any way they can to deny, even if only in
part, President Milosevic's legitimate right to defend himself.

The problems with an imposed lawyer are obvious. First of all, the
lawyer can't possibly know what Milosevic knows, and therefore can't
possibly mount a defense as effectively as Milosevic can. Moreover, the
lawyer could get the defense strategy wrong all together. Such
attempts to impose legal assistance on Milosevic can only been seen as
an attempt to sabotage the brilliant defense that he is putting
forward on behalf of the Serbian people, who are as a group the real
"accused" at this so-called "trial."

The most important reason not to impose a lawyer on Milosevic is that
he doesn't want one. I will leave you now with President Milosevic's
previous remarks on this topic, because afterall he can explain his
position better than anybody.

On page 2, line 3 of the transcript at his first appearance at the
"tribunal" President Milosevic said, "I consider this Tribunal a false
Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment. It is illegal being not
appointed by the UN General Assembly, so I have no need to appoint
counsel to illegal organ." In spite of numerous pleas from the
so-called "judges" and the so-called "prosecution" to change his mind
an accept a lawyer, President Milosevic's position has not changed one
iota.

On December 11, 2001 the tribunal attempted to foist Ramsey Clark and
John Livingston off onto Milosevic as his "legal advisors" which was
rejected flatly by Milosevic here is that exchange:

[BEGIN EXCERPT]

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC: I have been informed in the meantime that without
my request, you have assigned certain advice that I did not ask for,
interpreting my agreement to receive visits by certain individuals as a
request for legal advice. My response to that has been addressed to
the registry that I do not consider that whoever visits me and has a
law degree should be appointed as my legal counsel, and I don't think
it would be permissible for visits to continue to be restricted,
visits by persons who wish to visit me in accordance with the Rules
that you have established and on a nondiscriminatory basis, since
other people in that prison are allowed such visits.

RICHARD MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you don't want advice from Mr. Clark
and Mr. Livingston, which we understood you did, who do you want it
from?

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] No, I'm not asking for any advice
from anybody.

[END EXCERPT]

The next time this issue came up was on November 11, 2002 here is what
Milosevic said on that occasion:

[BEGIN EXCERPT]

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, first and foremost, I would
like to say that I know very little about these ideas of yours, but as
far as I was able to gather, that side over there, the opposite side,
is trying to take away my right to speak here and to impose some sort
of lawyers, counsel on me, and it has no right to do so. So I should
like to remind you that according to the International Pact on
Civilian and Political Rights, it is Article 14.3(D), and pursuant to
the American Convention, chapter 8.2(D), Article 8.2(D), and the
European Convention Article 6.3(C), and according to the Statute of the
Court of Rome Article 68.1(D), nobody can be refused the right of
defending themselves. And you yourselves have provided for that
possibility in your Rules and regulations, although I don't consider
this Tribunal of yours to be legal. But as you yourselves do, then I
assume you adhere to the Rules you laid down yourselves.

Therefore, this position on the part of the opposite party I consider
to be completely illegal, absurd, and ill-intentioned, and I don't
think it deserves any further explanations at all, nor can anything
along the lines of what they have proposed be acceptable.

And as far as the position goes, a position that I just briefly saw
contained in the letter signed by Mr. Kay, the amicus, I said earlier
on, gentlemen, at no price whatsoever would I leave the fight I'm
fighting here and from this political process -- trial. Therefore, I
think that they have rightly stressed that you ought to set me at
liberty, set me free, that you ought to give me time, lege artis, to
see to my health and to be given sufficient time to take a look at the
200.000 pages that have been amassed and all the tapes alongside the
documents, and you yourselves know full well that I would not run away.
Therefore, if you want to speak of any kind of fair treatment, fair
play, then I think that that is the approach that should be taken,
because without a doubt, the existing conditions do not allow me in
any respect to take care of all these things in the proper manner. And
I shall take a closer look at what I have here, and if I consider that
I wish to make some more comments, I shall do so in due course.

MR. MAY: We will consider what's already been said, but meanwhile,
Judge Kwon wishes to add something.

MR. KWON: Mr. Milosevic, there may come a time when you have to prepare
your Defence case. You have to prepare the examinations, and you have
to present your witnesses to the Court. How are you going to manage
without the assistance of lawyers in the court? It will be very
difficult for you to meet the witnesses in advance and to prepare the
examinations.

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Well, it is you who are placing me
in that position, gentlemen, to make it difficult for me. It's not up
to me. It's up to you.

If the circumstances were such that I would be able to function
normally, to take care of my health normally and to prepare myself for
all those piles and piles -- well, look at what they've just brought
me for the coming witness. Look at all those binders. There are seven
of them, these books, the covers. So if the right conditions existed
and the circumstances to give me sufficient time, then this would be
no problem for me at all. No health problems or the problems of the
documents. This is not something that the lawyers can do, because they
know far less about it all than I do. So nobody treated their health
with the help of lawyers, nor was anybody able to place what he knows
into the heads of lawyers.

And there's another matter of principle. In view of the fact that I
don't recognise this Tribunal, I do not wish to have an appointed
Defence counsel before this Tribunal which I do not recognise, and I
have explained that on several occasions previously.

MR. KWON: What do you think about the idea that your associates sit in
the court and assist you in preparing the examinations or sorting out
the documents, et cetera?

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] I don't need them. I don't need my
associates sitting up here with me.

MR. MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you should reflect on that. You are undertaking
the conduct of a very lengthy and very complex case. Your health is
not good, as we now know, and you should consider carefully in your
own interests and the interests of your health, whether you wouldn't
be assisted, as Judge Kwon says, by having somebody to help you in the
court.

It's not only the difficulty which you have, naturally, in conducting a
cross-examination in a case of this sort with the amount of material
which you have to deal with, it is the number of witnesses which
remain to be cross-examined. And then as the Judge says, there's the
question of your own case. You need to be thinking about that. If you
wish to call evidence, you've got to consider how that's to be done in
a practical way.

And so the suggestion simply is -- we will, of course, consider the
proposal of the Prosecution that Defence counsel is ordered but you
have said you object to that and we will consider that too, but the
suggestion is that you merely have somebody in court to help you with
the papers and anything else that you need help with.

Now, we don't expect you to deal with that now, but you may like to
consider it as a way forward in your own interests. Not in the
interests of anybody else, but in your own interests in helping you
conduct your case as effectively as you can and also in conserving
your health.

MR. ROBINSON: Can I just say that the magnitude of the task that you
have undertaken, Mr. Milosevic, can be illustrated by a look at the
team that the Prosecutor has -- is using. By my count, and Mr. Nice
can correct me, the Prosecutor has so far used, I think, seven or
eight counsel in the conduct of its case, and you are by yourself. For
that reason, I endorse the comments made by my brothers and hope you
will take them to heart.

MR. NICE: In light of His Honour Judge Kwon's observation, it may be of
assistance if I make available to the Chamber and also to the accused
and the amici the fairly well-known case of McKenzie which gave rise
to the acceptance of the appropriateness of using something called a
McKenzie friend. That's the second judgement of Lord Justice Sachs
which is perhaps most helpful on the point. If I can just make that
available.

MR. MAY: Yes. If the usher would be kind enough to hand that round,
we'll all have a look at it and we can reflect on it. Mr. Milosevic,
it's for you to think about it. We don't need a -- yes, a copy to the
amicus, a copy to the accused, please.

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Mr. May --

MR. MAY: You can have a read of this case -- yes?

SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] As -- despite my referring to all
these international pacts and covenants, European, American, Roman, et
cetera, the opposing party is now once again referring to court
practice and is offering up McKenzie versus McKenzie. I am also going
to provide you with something. It is a copy from a court case, and it
is Faretta versus California, the United States Court, where quite
clearly once again it excludes the possibility of having anybody
impose a Defence counsel or lawyer to anybody unless the accused wishes
to appoint one himself. So I think it is useless to carry on a
discussion of this kind.

[END EXCERPT]

A US-Croat Alliance to Destroy Bosnia Once Forever

After supporting Croat and Muslim secessionists to kill Yugoslavia and
Bosnia itself, will the US finally turn the back to the Muslims and
destroy everything once forever? (i.s.)

---

> http://dynamic.washtimes.com/print_story.cfm?StoryID=20030930-084113-
> 1005r

Redrawing Bosnian borders

By Jeffrey T. Kuhner

THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published October 1, 2003

From 1992-1995, Bosnia was the site of some of the bloodiest fighting
in Europe since the Second World War. Yet since the signing of the
Dayton peace accords, the country remains divided along ethnic lines.
Despite massive Western foreign aid and the presence of American
peacekeeping forces, Bosnia's Serbs, Croats and Muslims are no closer
to genuine reconciliation and peaceful co-existence. The country's
Serbs who live in the Bosnian Serb Republic seek to eventually become
part of Serbia. The Bosnian Croats, most of whom live in the country's
second political entity, the Muslim-Croat federation, also would like
nothing more than to join Croatia.
    The country's Muslims, however, remain wedded to the notion of a
united, multinational Bosnia based on a strong centralized government
in Sarajevo. The international community also is committed to keeping
the country's borders intact. Yet the problem with that approach is
that it overlooks the reality of what is occurring on the ground.
    Bosnia remains an economic basket case, where the unemployment rate
is 40 percent. Foreign investment is practically nonexistent.
Corruption and crime remain rampant. Despite nearly a decade of
nation-building, Western governments have failed to forge viable
economic and political institutions.
    More ominously, the greatest threat to peace and stability stems
from the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in Bosnia, which seeks to
either wipe out or convert all Christians in the region. The country
now serves as a base for al Qaeda operatives, where numerous terrorist
cells are active and plotting attacks on targets throughout Europe. In
the past, Saudi Arabia has sent millions of dollars in aid to
"humanitarian" agencies that encourage Bosnian Muslims to promote the
doctrines of Wahhabism, a particularly intolerant and puritanical
version of Islam. Mosques have been established throughout the
Muslim-Croat federation, many of whom preach the need for "jihad"
against the country's Catholic Croats and Orthodox Christian Serbs.
    The result has been numerous acts of terror perpetrated upon
civilians — especially the Croats. During the past several years,
Catholic churches in and around Sarajevo have been vandalized by
Islamic extremists. Cemeteries where Croats were buried have been
desecrated. Many ordinary Catholics are afraid of walking on the
streets of Sarajevo with a cross around their neck for fear of being
attacked.
    The most notorious incident occurred on Christmas Eve, when three
Croats — a father and his two daughters — were gunned down in their
home by an Islamic militant near the town of Konjic. Their crime:
celebrating Christmas.
    The rise of radical Islam threatens to destabilize the Balkans,
plunging the region once again into bloodshed and religious conflict.
Rather than forcing the three constituent peoples of Bosnia to live
together against their wishes, the Bush administration would be wise to
develop a realistic and coherent strategy toward the region.
    Washington needs to realize that synthetic states such as
Bosnia-Herzegovina are destined to fail. Recent European history is
littered with examples of multinational countries such as
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union that disintegrated
because they denied the fundamental human aspirations for democracy and
national self-determination. Bosnia is another case in point. The
Bosnian Serbs should be allowed to form a state with Serbia; the Croat
territories — especially those centered around their stronghold of
Mostar in Western Herzegovina — should be incorporated into Croatia.
The Bosnian Muslims would have their own state, with Sarajevo as the
capital.
    More importantly, the Bush administration needs to foster closer
ties with the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina for one simple reason: They
are on the front-lines in the war against Islamic terrorism in the
Balkans. The Bosnian Serbs, meanwhile, are unreliable allies. Many of
them are still seething with resentment against the United States for
its decision to use military force to end the Serbs' campaign of ethnic
cleansing and mass murder during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.
    The Croats, on the other hand, view Washington as their strategic
partner. As one high-ranking Bosnian Croat government official told me:
"We can act as the eyes and ears for the West in the Balkans and
monitor the activities of al Qaeda in Bosnia."
    The United States should not only support the Bosnian Croats' right
to self-determination, but also provide them with intelligence and
military assistance to contain the growth of radical Islam in the
region.
     It is ironic that the West should now have to depend upon the
Croats in Herzegovina as a pivotal ally in the war on terrorism.
Throughout the 1990s, the Herzegovinian Croats were demonized in the
Western liberal press for their "nationalism" and passionate attachment
to the Croatian cause. They have always been the most patriotic and
courageous of all the Croats, producing some of Europe's finest
fighters. Herzegovina was primarily the site where the Croats for
centuries fought off the invading Ottoman armies. For their ceaseless
resistance to the Turks, Pope Leo X referred to the Croats as "the
ramparts of Christendom."
    The Croats in Bosnia can again take up their historic role as a
strategic bulwark against Islamic expansionism on the Continent.
However, this can only happen after Washington realizes Bosnia is not a
Balkan Switzerland, but a smoldering cauldron of ethnic strife where
the followers of Osama bin Laden have found a home to preach their
message of hate and religious fanaticism. As an experiment in
nation-building, Bosnia has been a noble failure. The Bush
administration should take heed.
    
    Jeffrey T. Kuhner is an assistant national editor at The Washington
Times.
    
Copyright © 2003 News World Communications, Inc.
All rights reserved.

GELLI: "E' FINITA PROPRIO COME DICEVO IO"


# 1. da La Repubblica online:

intervista a Gelli: "Guardo il Paese, leggo i giornali
e dico: avevo già scritto tutto trent'anni fa"

"Giustizia, tv, ordine pubblico
è finita proprio come dicevo io"

dal nostro inviato CONCITA DE GREGORIO

AREZZO - Son soddisfazioni, arrivare indenni a quell'età e godersi il
copyright. "Ho una vecchiaia serena. Tutte le mattine parlo con le voci
della mia coscienza, ed è un dialogo che mi quieta. Guardo il Paese,
leggo i giornali e penso: ecco qua che tutto si realizza poco a poco,
pezzo a pezzo. Forse sì, dovrei avere i diritti d'autore. La giustizia,
la tv, l'ordine pubblico. Ho scritto tutto trent'anni fa". Tutto nel
piano di Rinascita, che preveggenza. Tutto in quelle carte sequestrate
qui a villa Wanda ventidue anni fa: 962 affiliati alla Loggia. C'erano
militari, magistrati, politici, imprenditori, giornalisti. C'era
l'attuale presidente del Consiglio, il suo nuovo braccio destro al
partito Cicchitto: allora erano socialisti.

Chi ha condiviso quel progetto è oggi alla guida del paese. "Se le
radici sono buone la pianta germoglia. Ma questo è un fatto che non ha
più niente a che vedere con me". Niente, certo. Difatti quando parla di
Berlusconi e di Cicchitto, di Fini di Costanzo e di Cossiga lo fa con
la benevolenza lieve che si riserva ai ricordi di una stagione
propizia. Sempre con una frase, però, con una parola che li fissa senza
errore ad un'origine precisa della storia.

Quel che rende Licio Gelli ancora spaventosamente potente è la memoria.
Lo si capisce dopo la prima mezz'ora di conversazione, atterrisce dopo
due. Il Venerabile maestro della Loggia Propaganda 2 è in grado di
ricordare l'indirizzo completo di numero civico della prima casa romana
di Giorgio Almirante, l'abito che indossava la sua prima moglie quel
giorno che gli fece visita a Natale, i nomi dei tre figli di Attilio
Piccioni e da lì ricostruire nel dettaglio il caso Montesi che vide
coinvolto uno dei tre, ricorda il numero di conto corrente su cui fece
quel certo bonifico un giorno di sessant'anni fa, la targa della
camionetta di quando era ufficiale di collegamento col
comando nazista, quante volte esattamente ha incontrato Silvio
Berlusconi e in che anni in che mesi in che giorni, come si chiamava il
segretario di Giovanni Leone a cui consegnò la cartella coi 58 punti
del piano R, che macchina guidava, se a Roma c'era il sole quella
mattina e chi incontrò prima di arrivare a destinazione, che cosa gli
disse, cosa quello rispose.

Questo di ogni giorno dei suoi 84 anni di vita, attualmente archiviata
in 33 faldoni al primo piano di villa Wanda, dietro a una porta
invisibile a scomparsa. "Ogni sera, sempre, ho scritto un appunto del
giorno. Per il momento per fortuna non mi servono, perché ricordo
tutto. Però sono tranquillo, gli appunti sono lì".

Il potere della memoria, ecco. Il resto è coreografia: il parco della
villa che sembra il giardino di Bomarzo, con le statue le fontane i
mostri, la villa in fondo a un sentiero di ghiaia dietro a un convento,
le stanze con le pareti foderate di seta, i soffitti bassi di legno
scuro, elefanti di porcellana che reggono i telefoni rossi, divani di
cuoio da due da tre da sette posti, di velluto blu, di raso rosa, a
elle e a emiciclo, icone russe, madonne italiane, guerrieri d'argento,
pupi, porcellane danesi, un vittoriano buio con le imposte chiuse al
sole di settembre, scale, studi, studioli, sale d'attesa coi vassoi
d'argento pieni di caramelle al limone. Ma lei vive qui da solo?. "Sì
certo solo". E questi rumori, le ombre dietro le porte di vetro
colorato? "La servitù".

Commendatore, gli sussurra una segretaria pallida porgendogli un
biglietto: una visita. "Mi scusi, mi consente di assentarmi un attimo?
E' un vecchio amico".

Gelli è in piena attività. Riceve in tre uffici: a Pistoia, a
Montecatini, a Roma. Oltre che in villa, naturalmente, ma fino ad
Arezzo si spingono gli intimi. Dedica ad ogni città un giorno della
settimana. A Pistoia il venerdì, di solito. A Roma viene il mercoledì,
e scende ancora all'Excelsior. Le liste d'attesa per incontrarlo sono
di circa dodici giorni, ma dipende. Per alcuni il rito è abbreviato.
Al telefono coi suoi segretari si è pregati di chiamarlo "lo zio": "La
regola numero uno è non fare mai nomi ? insiste l'ultimo di una serie
di intermediari ? Lei non dica niente, né chi la manda né perché. La
richiameranno. Quando poi lo incontra vedrà: è una persona squisita.
Solo: non gli parli di politica". Di poesia, vorrebbe si parlasse:
perché Licio Gelli da quando ha ufficialmente smesso di lavorare alla
trasformazione dell'Italia in un Paese "ordinato secondo i criteri del
merito e della gerarchia", come lui dice, "per l'esclusivo bene del
popolo" ha preso a scrivere libri di poesia, ovviamente premiati di
norma con coppe e medaglie, gli "amici" nel '96 lo hanno anche
candidato al Nobel.

"Vorrei scivolare dolcemente nell'oblio. Vedo che il mio nome compare
anche nelle parole crociate, e ne soffro. Vorrei che di me come
Venerabile maestro non si parlasse più. Siamo stati sottoposti a un
massacro. Pensi a Carmelo Spagnolo, procuratore generale di Roma, pensi
a Stammati che tentò di uccidersi. E' stata una gogna in confronto alla
quale le conseguenze di Mani Pulite sono una sciocchezza. In fondo Mani
pulite è stata solo una faccenda di corna.
Lei crede che la corruzione sia scomparsa? Non vede che è ovunque,
peggio di prima? Prima si prendeva facciamo il 3 per cento, ora il 10.
Io non ho mai fatto niente di illegale né di illecito. Sono stato
assolto da tutto. Le mie mani, eccole, sono nette di oro e di sangue".

Assolto da tutto non è vero, dev'essere per questo che lo ripete tre
volte e s'indurisce. Indossa un abito principe di Galles, cravatta di
seta, catena d'oro al taschino, occhiali con montatura leggerissima,
all'anulare la fede e un grosso anello con stemma. Questo avrebbe detto
dunque a Montecatini, a quel convegno a cui l'hanno invitata e poi non
è andato? Dicono che Andreotti l'abbia chiamata per dissuaderla. "E'
una sciocchezza. Andreotti non è uomo da fare un gesto simile. Si vede
che lei non lo conosce".

Senz'altro lei lo conosce meglio. "Se Andreotti fosse un'azione
avrebbe sul mercato mondiale centinaia di compratori. E' un uomo di
grandissimo valore politico". Come molti della sua generazione.
"Molti, non tutti. Cossiga certamente. Non Forlani, non aveva spina
dorsale. Naturalmente Almirante, eravamo molto amici, siamo stati nella
Repubblica sociale insieme. L'ho finanziato due volte: la seconda per
Fini. Prometteva molto, Fini. Da un paio d'anni si è come appannato".
Forse un po' schiacciato dalla personalità di Berlusconi.
"Può darsi. Berlusconi è un uomo fuori dal comune. Ricordo bene che già
allora, ai tempi dei nostri primi incontri, aveva questa
caratteristica: sapeva realizzare i suoi progetti. Un uomo del fare.
Di questo c'è bisogno in Italia: non di parole, di azioni".

Vi sentite ancora? "Che domanda impertinente. Piuttosto. L'editore
Dino, lo conosce?, ha appena ripubblicato il mio primo libro: Fuoco!
E' stata la mia opera più sofferta, anche perché ha coinciso con la
morte di mio fratello nella nostra guerra di Spagna. E' un edizione
pregiata a tiratura limitata, porta in copertina il mio bassorilievo in
argento. Ci sono due altri solo autori in questo catalogo: il Santo
padre, e Silvio Berlusconi". Anche Berlusconi col bassorilievo
d'argento? "Certo, guardi". Il titolo dell'opera è "Cultura e valori di
una società globalizzata". Pensa che Berlusconi abbia saputo scegliere
con accortezza i suoi collaboratori? "Credo che in questa ultima fase
si senta assediato. E' circondato da persone che pensano al "dopo". Non
si fida, e fa bene.

E' stato giusto bonificare il partito, affidarlo a un uomo come
Cicchitto. Cicchitto lo conosco bene: è bravo, preparato". Il
coordinatore sarebbe Bondi in realtà. "Sì, d'accordo. Credo che anche
Bondi sia preparato. E' uno che viene dalla disciplina di partito".
Comunista. "Non importa. Quello che conta è la disciplina e il
rispetto della gerarchia". Ha visto il progetto di riordino del
sistema televisivo? "Sì, buono". E la riforma della giustizia? "Ho
sentito che quel Cordova ha detto: ma questo è il piano di Gelli. E
dunque?

L'avevo messo per scritto trent'anni fa cosa fosse necessario fare.
Leone mi chiese un parere, gli mandai uno schema in 58 punti per il
tramite del suo segretario Valentino. Pensa che chi voglia assaltare il
comando consegni il piano al generale nemico, o al ministro
dell'Interno? Ma comunque non è di questo che vogliamo parlare, no?
Vuole anche lei avere i materiali per scrivere una mia biografia?
Arriva tardi: ho già completato il lavoro con uno scrittore di gran
fama". Su una poltrona è appoggiato l'ultimo libro di Roberto Gervaso.
La scrive con Gervaso? "Ma no, ci vuole una persona estranea ai fatti.
Se vuole le mostro lo scaffale con le opere che mi riguardano, le ho
catalogate: sono 344". Certo: il burattinaio è un soggetto
affascinante. "Andò così: venne Costanzo a intervistarmi per il
Corriere della sera. Dopo due ore di conversazione mi chiese: lei cosa
voleva fare da piccolo. E io: il burattinaio. Meglio fare il
burattinaio che il burattino, non le pare?".

Sembra che ce ne siano diversi di burattinai in giro ultimamente. "Il
burattinaio è sempre uno, non ce ne possono essere diversi". E adesso
chi è? "Adesso? Questa è una classe politica molto modesta, mediocre.
Sono tutti ricattabili". Tutti? Mettiamo: Bossi. "Bossi si è creato la
sua fortezza con la Padania, ha portato 80 parlamentari è stato bravo.
Ma aveva molti debiti... Per risollevare il Paese servono soldi, non
proclami. Ho sentito che Berlusconi ha invitato gli americani a
investire in Italia: ha fatto bene, se qualcuno abbocca?

Ma la situazione è molto seria. L'economia va malissimo, l'Europa è
stata una sventura. Non abolire le barriere, bisognava: moltiplicarle.
Fare la spesa è diventato un problema, il popolo è scontento. Serve un
progetto preciso". Per la Rinascita del Paese. "Certo". C'è il suo:
certo forse i 900 affiliati alla P2 erano pochi. "Ma cosa dice,
novecento persone sono anche troppe. Ne bastano molte meno". Allora
quelle che ci sono ancora bastano, tolti i pentiti. "Nessuno si è
pentito. Pentiti? A chi si riferisce? Costanzo, forse. L'unico. Con
tutto quello che ho fatto per lui. Guardi: io non devo niente a nessuno
ma tutti quelli che ho incontrato devono qualcosa a me. Ci sono dei
ribelli a cui ho salvato la vita, ancora oggi quando mi incontrano mi
abbracciano". Ribelli? "Sì, i ribelli che stavano sulle montagne, in
tempo di guerra. Io ero ufficiale di collegamento fra il
comando tedesco e quello italiano. Ne ho salvati tanti". Intende
partigiani. "Li chiami come crede. Eravamo su fronti opposti, ma quando
sei di fronte ad un amico non c'è divisa che conti.

L'amicizia, la fedeltà ad un amico viene prima di ogni cosa".
L'amicizia, sì. La rete. Cossiga l'ha citata giorni fa, in
un'intervista. Ha detto: chiedete a Gelli cosa pensava di Moro. "Da
Moro andai a portare le credenziali quando ero console per un paese
sudamericano. Mi disse: lei viene in nome di una dittatura, l'Italia è
una democrazia. Mi spiegò che la democrazia è come un piatto di
fagioli: per cucinarli bisogna avere molta pazienza, disse, e io gli
risposi ?stia attento che i suoi fagioli non restino senz'acqua,
ministro'". Anche in questo caso tragicamente profetico, per così dire.
Lei cosa avrebbe fatto, potendo, per salvare Moro? "Non avrei fatto
niente. Era stato fascista in gioventù, come Fanfani del resto, ma poi
era diventato troppo diverso da noi. Lei ha visto il film sul delitto
Moro?" Quello di Bellocchio? "No, l'altro. Quello tratto dal libro di
Flamigni.

Ma le pare che si possa immaginare un agente dei servizi segreti che
con un impermeabile bianco va a controllare sulla scena del delitto se
è tutto andato secondo i piani?". Gli agenti dei servizi sono più
prudenti? "Lei conosce Cossiga? Proprio una bravissima persona. E poi
un uomo così colto, uno capace di conversare in tedesco. Un uomo puro,
un animo limpido. Dopo la morte di mia moglie mi mandò un biglietto:
"Ti sono vicino nel tuo primo Natale senza di lei", capisce che
pensiero? Vorrebbe farmi una cortesia? Se lo incontra, vuole porgergli
i miei ricordi, e i miei saluti?".

(28 settembre 2003)


# 2. da l'Unità online, 29.09.2003

Sotto il cappuccio, il governo Berlusconi

di Natalia Lombardo

Gongola il Venerabile, nel vedere che il suo Piano di Rinascita scritto
nel '75 si sta realizzando grazie al governo Berlusconi, che della
Loggia P2 fu uno dei 962 iscritti. «La giustizia, la tv l'ordine
pubblico, avevo scritto tutto trent'anni fa», si compiace il Gran
Maestro massone, che quasi quasi ne vorrebbe anche i «diritti
d'autore»: «Guardo il Paese, leggo i giornali e penso: ecco qua che
tutto si realizza pezzo a pezzo». Che la mappa delle riforme varate
oggi dal governo, sulla Giustizia e sull'indebolimento della Rai per
favorire i privati, sulla gestione repressiva dell'ordine pubblico
(vedi Genova), fosse ricalcata dalle carte di Gelli lo denunciò già
l'Unità il 23 novembre 2001: «Stanno realizzando il piano della Loggia
P2», titolava il nostro quotidiano. Così il «catenaccio»: «Le carte di
Gelli prevedevano: giudici sotto tutela, scuole ai privati, sindacati
esclusi, controlli in poche mani di affari e informazione».

Ieri sulla «Repubblica» un lungo colloquio con il Venerabile nella sua
magione aretina conferma quanto sostenuto da l'Unità. Il piano di
«Rinascita democratica» (si fa per dire), prevedeva la limitazione
dell'autonomia del Csm (ora Castelli va oltre, con il divieto per i
magistrati di esprimere la propria opinione); la responsabilità del
magistrato, la separazione delle carriere tra giudici e pm; la
sottomissione del pm all'esecutivo. Identica l'ispirazione: Gelli
voleva ricondurre la Giustizia «alla sua tradizionale funzione di
equilibrio della società e non già di eversione» (allora si indagava
sulle Stragi di Stato); per Berlusconi i magistrati sono sovversivi se
non «pazzi».

Ma anche sull'informazione la Legge Gasparri, che da mercoledì si vota
alla Camera a tempi contratti, sembra fotocopiata dal Venerabile piano:
stampa e settimanali sotto il controllo di gruppi di giornalisti fidati
attraverso operazioni editoriali, la cancellazione della Rai per
favorire le concentrazioni private in nome della libertà di antenna.
Pochi anni dopo l'impero mediatico berlusconiano prendeva corpo.
Ancora, la P2 prevedeva la scissione dei sindacati («Fatto», recitava
lo slogan di Fi nel '94), l'abolizione dello sciopero e mano libera
alla polizia contro «teppisti ordinari e pseudo politici». Gelli
immaginava inoltre due schieramenti politici e l'acquisto della Dc per
10 miliardi.

Il Maestro di lobby si sentiva il Gran Burattinaio, ora lamenta la
mancanza di eredi: «Oggi c'è una classe politica modesta, mediocre,
sono tutti ricattabili». Fra questi ci mette Bossi: «Ha portato ottanta
parlamentari, è stato bravo. Ma aveva molti debiti... Per risollevare
il Paese servono soldi, non proclami». E qualcuno deve aver aiutato il
Senatur, del quale Gelli sembra condividere l'idea di rimettere i dazi
e l'odio per l'Europa («una sventura»). È scettico, invece, sugli
inviti di Berlusconi agli americani: venite a investire in Italia...
«Ha fatto bene, se qualcuno abbocca...».

Nella striscia rossa de l'Unità, nel 2001, la frase di Gelli appare
oggi come una profezia: «Se le circostanze permettono di contare
sull'ascesa al governo di un gruppo in sintonia con lo spirito dei club
e con le sue idee, allora è chiaro che si può attuare subito il
programma di emergenza». Parole tratte dal Piano sequestrato dalla GdF
nell'81, scoperto nel doppiofondo della valigia della figlia Maria
Grazia. Fu scritto nel 1974-'75 per bloccare l'ascesa del Pci di Enrico
Berlinguer (quasi al 30%) e la sua idea del compromesso storico portata
avanti da Aldo Moro («servirebbe anche oggi», pensa Andreotti).

Nel «club», la Loggia Propaganda 2, erano affiliati impreditori,
politici, militari, giornalisti (Costanzo l'unico «pentito»). L'attuale
premier aveva la tessera n. 625; Fabrizio Cicchitto, allora giovane
socialista lombardiano, la numero 945. A lui ora Berlusconi ha affidato
le redini di FI, come vice di Bondi.


# 3. da "La Repubblica", 30/09/2003

"Ha vinto Gelli, l'uomo del ricatto la nostra battaglia è stata inutile"

Tina Anselmi: su Rai e riforme hanno attuato il piano della P2

CONCITA DE GREGORIO

ROMA - «Gelli ha una scatola nera per ciascuno di quelli con cui è
entrato in relazione. Ha sempre lavorato così: sul ricatto. Anche
adesso: dice, non dice, manda a dire. Sono messaggi obliqui che
arrivano a chi devono arrivare. In un punto sono d'accordo con lui:
nessuno degli affiliati alla P2 si è pentito. Sono ancora tutti lì, uno
è diventato presidente del Consiglio».
In questo momento è in tv che parla di pensioni a reti Rai unificate.
«La Rai ormai è ridotta a questo: un megafono del governo. Diceva il
piano di Rinascita di Gelli: "Dissolvere la Rai -tv in nome della
libertà di antenna, impiantare tv via cavo a catena in modo da
controllare la pubblica oPinione media nel vivo del paese” . Non è
forse quello che è successo?».

Tina Anselmi, staffetta partigiana della Resistenza, parlamentare dc
dalla quinta alla decima legislatura, tre volte ministro, ha dedicato
cinque anni della sua vita ad indagare su Licio Gelli e sulla Loggia
massonica P2.

«La commissione d'inchiesta ci ha impegnati a tempo pieno dal 1981 al
1985. Quando dico tempo pieno intendo che non abbiamo praticamente
fatto altro giorno e notte. Non di rado mi congedavo dai commissari
alle due del mattino per ritrovarli lì sui banchi poche ore dopo. E'
anche per questo che quando leggo le parole di Gelli su Repubblica,
oggi, mi assale lo sconforto».

Sconforto per il tempo dedicato ad una battaglia persa?

«inutile, direi. Tanto lavoro d'indagine, tanti buoni risultati, ne
emergeva una trama cosi chiara: eppure non gli è stato dato alcun
seguito. Il parlamento aveva avuto mandato di togliere il segreto alla
massoneria: rendere visibile un'attività svolta nella segretezza. Non
lo ha mai fatto: non ha mai scritto le leggi di applicazione del
principio costituzionale che non ammette società segrete. Ci sarebbe
ancora tanto lavoro da fare, ma dubito che oggi lo si faccia».

Perché dubita?

«Ma se non è stato fatto finora, si figuri se lo faranno un governo e
una maggioranza parlamentare costellate di ex affiliati alla loggia.
Purtroppo Gelli ha ragione a vantare i diritti d'autore sulle riforme.
Si ricorda cosa diceva il piano di Rinascita?»

In quale punto?

«Quando parla dei tempi delle riforme. Diceva: "Qualora le circostanze
permettessero di contare sull'ascesa al Governo di un uomo politico (o
di una equipe) già in sintonia con lo spirito del club e con le sue
idee di “ripresa democratica”, è chiaro che i tempi dei procedimenti
riceverebbero una forte accelerazione". Difatti hanno avuto
un'accelerazione fortissima».

Che ricordi ha dei politici iscritti alla P2 sentiti in commissione?

«Molto precisi. Li sentimmo tutti, ovviamente. Berlusconi no, allora
era un semplice imprenditore. Però leggo che oggi ha affidato il suo
partito a Cicchitto: lui fu sentito. Ricordo che ebbe anche un diverbio
con Bozzi, il liberale Bozzi».

A che proposito?

«Cicchitto disse di essersi affiliato alla P2 perché attraversava una
fase politica e personale molto delicata. Disse che si sentiva
sommamente insicuro, che aveva qualcuno che lo seguiva come un'ombra.
Raccontò di aver parlato del suo disagio con alcuni compagni di partito
che gli suggerirono questo: "Se vuoi liberarti di quell'incubo
persecutorio vai da Gelli". Così fece. Racconta che Gelli gli
raccomandò di stare tranquillo, che lo avrebbe liberato da quella
persona. Infatti, disse Cicchitto, se ne liberò».

E il diverbio?

"Bozzi si spazientì molto. Gli chiese: ma scusi, lei è un parlamentare,
un alto dirigente del suo partito: è possibile che se percepisce un
pericolo anziché rivolgersi alle autorità, nelle sedi istituzionali,
vada da Gelli? Cicchitto rispose: io ero convinto, in quel periodo, che
la politica fosse in mano ai banditi. Disse proprio cosi: 'banditi'.
Bozzi la trovò una spiegazione inaccettabile».

Quale crede che fosse il reale obiettivo del Piano di Rinascita?

«Gelli e i suoi affiliati volevano controllare il potere e chi lo
gestiva».

Il Venerabile della P2 ripete dl essere stato assolto dalle accuse.

«Bisogna guardare bene i capi d'accusa, e di conseguenza le assoluzioni
da quelle accuse. Non è stata approfondita la materia, in sede
d'inchiesta. Noi d'altra parte non eravamo una commissione giudicante».

Lei crede che la P2 abbia costituito un reale pericolo per la
democrazia?

«Lo credevo e lo credo. Non penso affatto che il pericolo sia cessato.
Gli esponenti della P2 sono, per stessa ammissione di Gelli, molti più
di quei mille nomi scarsi che furono trovati negli elenchi sequestrati
ad Arezzo e a Castiglion Fibocchi. Molte di queste persone sono
insediate in tavoli chiave dello Stato. Hanno fatto carriere brillanti
e continuano a farne. Dopo vent'anni sono ancora tutti lì».

Antidoti?

«Bisognerebbe che reagisse la parte sana dello Stato, che l'organismo
democratico desse un segnale di vitalità. Bisognerebbe. Io non perdo la
fiducia».