Informazione
Da Gian (Venezia) riceviamo e volentieri diffondiamo:
>
>
"Noi non sottovalutiamo e non trascuriamo alcuna verifica. Ma quello
che però dobbiamo dire è che allo stato attuale, tutti i dati,
elementi e notizie acquisite, dimostrano che non vi è motivo di
allarme collegato con i luoghi in cui operano in nostri soldati nei
Balcani": così Mattarella ha risposto ieri alle domande
sull'allarme-uranio, ricordando che le truppe italiane non hanno tra i
loro armamenti tali proiettili, presenti invece negli arsenali
americani, britannici e francesi. (repubblica 19 dicembre 2000) Bene,
dati alla mano vediamo di smentire il ministro Mattarella; l'uranio
c'è nelle tute delle "nostre" truppe, c'è in Kossovo, e c'è (e qui
ecco una guerra dimenticata) anche in Bosnia. Data l'importanza della
questione mi scuso con tutti per la lunghezza ma credo ne valga la
pena...ci ho perso un paio d'ore...mi dovete il panettone.
Gian.
> Prima di tutto, ecco cosa scrive lo stato maggiore della difesa come
> avvertenza ai soldati distaccati in Kossovo: "I proiettili da 30 mm
> controcarro contenenti DU (depleted uranium, uranio impoverito ndr), e
> ritrovati in Kossovo, nell'area di impiego del contingente italiano,
> costituiscono una particolare forma di rischio. La pericolosità di
> tale munizionamento deriva dalla tossicità dell' Uranio stesso che si
> manifesta sia dal punto di vista chimico sia dal punto di vista
> radiologico. (...) la permanenza del personale nelle aree
> caratterizzate dalla presenza di mezzi corazzati colpiti, ovvero in
> aree dove sono stati individuati o dichiarati presenti proiettili DU
> deve essere ridotta al tempo strettamente necessario; (...) tutto il
> personale deve essere avvisato circa le aree interessate dalla
> presenza del munizionamento DU, informandolo delle caratteristiche di
> quello individuato (munizionamento PGU - 14 e 30 mm.). Chiunque
> individui munizionamento DU deve avvertire tempestivamente la cp. NBC;
> (le squadre di rilevazione e bonifica degli agenti chimici, ndr).
> (...) il personale che ha sostato e/o operato in aree caratterizzate
> dalla presenza di mezzi corazzati colpiti (...) deve togliersi con
> molta attenzione la tuta che indossa e riporla in un sacchetto di
> plastica integro che verrà sigillato e conservato per il successivo
> smaltimento a cura della cp. NBC".
> (Stralci dal documento dello Stato maggiore dell'esercito italiano
> sulla pericolosità dell'uranio impoverito - dal sito di Repubblica) La
> smentita sarebbe già evidente nelle contraddizioni interne alla difesa
> italiana. Ma l'abile sotterfugio letterario del salomonico ministro
> del centrosinistra gioca di tacco..."non abbiamo uranio nelle NOSTRE
> dotazioni" lasciando intendere che altri ce l'hanno e ne fanno l'uso
> che credono... mi ricorda la famosa ammissione del capo di stato
> maggiore su Ustica "queste domande vanno poste ad ALTRI...".Ecco
> perchè è forse il caso di approfittare di questa performances
> ministeriale per un escursus storico che non fà mai male e che serve a
> rammentare ai più distratti che non è quella in Kossovo la prima
> guerra Balcanica dell'ultimo decennio, e il fatto, non casuale, che i
> malati di "sindrome del golfo yugoslavo" si siano sicuramente
> avvelenati in periodo precedente in territorio Bosniaco e non in
> Kossovo.Ma c'era sto uranio in Bosnia e chi lo ha messo? Dobbiamo per
> saperlo andare con la memoria alla guerra dimenticata, alla operazione
> "Deliberation Force". Questa operazione come scrivevo ieri è stata
> condotta ufficialmente per contenere le richieste serbe in Bosnia. Si
> trattava di "proteggere" ad opera della Nato dagli attacchi le aree di
> Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihac e Sarajevo. La campagna militare della Nato
> inizia il 30 agosto 1995 ufficialmente come risposta ad un attentato
> serbo ad obiettivi civili in Sarajevo (rivelatosi poi una provocazione
> d'intelligence come ammise buona parte della stampa internazionale).In
> effetti la campagna inizia il giorno 29, ma le prime missioni sono
> puramente ricognitive. Successivamente le missioni aeree aumentano
> d'intensità fino al 14 settembre del '95.I voli effettuati sono 3515,
> dei quali 2470 sono classificati come "penetrating sorties" contro 48
> complessi militari serbo-bosniaci e 338 obiettivi diretti. Vengono
> lanciate 1026 bombe, delle quali 708 precise (ovvero intelligenti) e
> 318 imprecise (ovvero più intelligenti). Il primo giorno di conflitto
> tra la Nato e le truppe serbo bosniache porta all'abbattimento di un
> mirage francese a 40 chilometri a nord di Pale per opera di una
> fortunosa contraerea (un missile terra-aria manuale...). I serbo
> bosniaci catturano il pilota francese (secondo la legislazione
> internazionale puro "terrorista" data la mancanza di dichiarazione di
> guerra) se volete saperne di più su esiti e sviluppi ecco due siti
> sulla
> vicenda... http://cgi.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/sep95/9-29/french_pilots/http://europe.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/dec95/12-12/pilots_9am/ Per
> concludere il breve escursus, la guerra bosniaca si conclude con
> l'occupazione militare da parte delle truppe nato e la disgregazione
> speriamo non definitiva della Bosnia in 3 stati etnici, uno dei quali
> riassorbito di fatto dalla Croazia, uno divenuto un casino senza
> l'accento per i militari con troppo tempo libero ed il terzo distrutto
> e lasciato al tragico destino del popolo serbo. Su internet ovviamente
> si può trovare di tutto ed ecco quindi dal sito del FAS (gruppo di
> analisi strategiche vicino al pentagono) un ottimo escursus mascolino
> sulle "dotazioni" militari della operazione Deliberate Force (lo
> trovate in allegato 3) oltre a dimostrare ampiamente l'uso di armi di
> distruzione di massa (allegato 1) utilizzate in precedenza nel golfo
> persico.
> A conclusione di questo breve riassunto possiamo trarre le seguenti
> considerazioni: 1) Il ministro della difesa ignora che siano state
> scaricate bombe (usate dalla nato in precedenza anche in Iraq
> appesantite da uranio impoverito) nel suolo Bosniaco. Ignora anche le
> 35 azioni compiute da caccia italiani su quei territori e forse anche
> il tipo di arma di distruzione di massa utilizzata dai pacificatori in
> quella occasione. 2) Il ministro ignora ancora che lo stato maggiore
> della difesa avverte i militari distaccati della pericolosità delle
> armi all'uranio in suolo Kossovaro. 3) Il ministro ignora che il primo
> caso di leucemia sospetto si verificò un anno or sono cioè prima della
> operazione Kossovo e quindi va ovviamente collegato all'uranio
> Bosniaco e non a quello Kossovaro, ma tant'è... 4) Giornali, ministro
> e soldati, sembrano ignorare che in quei posti ci sono degli abitanti.
> Triste destino l'esser pacificati nuclearmente...
> Gian.
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Allegato 1: munizioni della operazione deliberate force
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> PRECISION MUNITIONS: TYPE MUNITION TOTAL
> Laser Guided Bomb
> LGB/GBU 10 303
> LGB/GBU 12 125
> LGB/GBU 16 215
> LGB/GBU 24 6
> LGB/GBU AS30L 4
> LGB/GBU TOTAL 653Electro-Optical
> EO/IR SLAM GUIDED MISSILE 10
> EO/IR GBU-15 GUIDED MISSILE 9
> EO/IR MAVRICK GUIDED MISSILE 23
> EO/IR TOTAL 42
> Tomahawk Cruise Missile 13
> GRAND TOTAL 708
> NON-PRECISION MUNITIONS:
> TYPE MUNTION TOTAL
> MK 82 175
> MK 83 99
> MK 84 42
> CBU-87 2
> GRAND TOTAL 318
> Fonte Fas
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Allegato 2: Fatevi una cultura
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> * Operation Deliberate ForceALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE Fact
> Sheet
> * "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1," Lt Col Robert C. Owen,
> Air Power Journal Vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer 1997): 4-24.
> * "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2," Lt Col Robert C. Owen,
> Air Power Journal Vol. XI, No. 3 (Fall 1997): 6-26.
> * BOMBS OVER BOSNIA: THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
> MICHAEL O. BEALE School of Advanced Airpower Studies JUNE 1996
> * Deliberate Force By John A. Tirpak, Air Force Magazine October
> 1997
> A three-week air campaign in the fall of 1995 was the decisive
> factor in bringing the recalcitrant Serbs to the peace talks in
> Dayton.
> * Deliberate Force: Reaffirmation of the Gulf Experience Air Power
> Studies Centre PAPER NUMBER 53 Richard P. Hallion
> * Serbian air defenses a threat (AFNS) 12 September 1995 -- Bosnian
> Serb air defenses continue to present a high-threat environment
> for NATO air crews attacking military positions in support of
> Operation Deliberate Force. Although the Serbs have fewer
> surface-to-air missiles than the coalition force faced during
> Operation Desert Storm, the Serbs show a higher proficiency with
> the weapons than the Iraqis did.
> * Joint cooperation key to deliberate force (AFNS) 11 September
> 1995 -- NATO aircraft flying in support of Operation Deliberate
> Force continue to streak over the Adriatic Sea to deliver their
> weapons to Bosnian Serb military targets. The multi-national
> force has combined to deliver more than 300 tons of ordnance
> during the operation's nearly 1,200 sorties. U.S. Air Force crews
> and aircraft account for about 800 of the sorties.
> * NATO air strikes continue (AFNS) 06 September 1995 -- Fighter
> aircraft bristling with weapons left here in waves Sept. 6 to
> continue the air strikes resumed Sept. 5 on Bosnian Serb
> strongholds. The attacks were temporarily halted to permit
> meetings between U.N. and Bosnian Serb leaders, but resumed
> Tuesday when it became apparent the Serbs would not meet U.N. and
> NATO demands.
> * NATO RECOMMENCES AIR STRIKES AGAINST BOSNIAN SERBSTRANSCRIPT OF
> PRESS CONFERENCE ADMIRAL LEIGHTON W. SMITH COMMANDER IN CHIEF
> ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE 06 September 1995 -- As you know,
> NATO air assets recommenced strike operations against Bosnian
> Serb military significant targets in Bosnia Herzegovina. The
> reason for the recommencement is that NATO and the United Nations
> have collectively agreed on certain conditions which must be met.
> * Statement by the Secretary General of NATO 05 September 1995 --
> NATO aircraft operating within the provisions of Operation
> "Deliberate Force", today, at 13.08 LOCAL, resumed attacks on
> Bosnian-Serb military targets in Bosnia. The air operations were
> reinitiated after UN and NATO military commanders concluded that
> the Bosnian Serbs had failed to demonstrate their intent to
> comply with United Nations demands to remove military threats
> against Sarajevo.
> * Commander relates Aviano role in Deliberate Force (AFNS) 05
> September 1995 -- Scores of thunderous, white-hot afterburners
> lit up the pre-dawn skies here Aug. 30 as waves of Aviano-based
> jets joined in the largest strike mission over Bosnia-Herzegovina
> since NATO's Operation Deny Flight began more than two years ago.
> * Air strikes on Bosnia resume (AFNS) 05 September 1995 -- NATO
> aircraft resumed Operation Deliberate Force air strikes on
> Bosnian Serb positions Sept. 5 after a three-day lull. More than
> 100 sorties were flown by the multinational coalition assembled
> here as part of Operation Deny Flight, enforcing the no-fly zone
> over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
> * President warns Bosnian Serbs Air Force News Service 01 September
> 1995 -- President Clinton warned Bosnian Serbs to end their civil
> war the same day he kicked off events to honor the end of World
> War II. Greeted by a cheering, flag-waving crowd of about 700
> people on the base flightline Aug. 31, Clinton said NATO bombing
> strikes against Bosnian targets were "the right response to the
> savagery in Sarajevo."
> * NATO begins air strikes on Bosnia (AFNS) 30 August 1995 -- NATO
> aircraft began attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets in Bosnia
> Aug 30. The NATO - and United Nations-approved air strikes
> included air defense missile sites, radar sites, and
> communication facilities. More than 60 aircraft from several NATO
> nations operating from bases in Italy and the U.S. aircraft
> carrier Theodore Roosevelt participated in the initial strikes.
> * NATO Statement by Sec. Gen. Will Claes 30 August 1995 -- ``NATO
> aircraft operating with the provisions of Operation Deny Flight
> today (30 August 1995) just after 00:00 GMT (0200 local)
> commenced attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets in Bosnia. The
> air operations were initiated after the U.N. military commanders
> concluded, beyond reasonable doubt, that Monday's brutal mortar
> attack in Sarajevo came from Bosnian Serb positions.
> * Clinton: U.S. should be prepared to assist NATO (AFNS) 07 June
> 1995 -- President Bill Clinton believes America should be
> prepared to assist NATO if the alliance decides to meet a request
> from the United Nations for help in a withdrawal or a
> reconfiguration and a strengthening of its forces in Bosnia.
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Allegato 3: Chi e come
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DELIBERATE FORCE SUMMARY DATA:
>
> * Total sorties flown: 3515
> o Penetrating sorties (CAS, BAI, SEAD, RECCE, SAR/CSAR): 2470
> o Support sorties (NAEW, ABCCC, ELINT/ESM, AAR,): 1045
> * Total bombs dropped: 1026
> o Precision munitions: 708
> o Non-precision munitions: 318
>
> Airstrikes were conducted on eleven days during the period 29 Aug - 14
> Sep 95
>
> * 48 target complexes
> * 338 individual targets within target complexes
>
> DELIBERATE FORCE SORTIE BREAKDOWN FROM 29 AUG 95 - 14 SEP 95
>
> NATION TOTAL PERCENTAGE
> SORIES OF TOTAL
>
> FRANCE 84 8.1%
> GERMANY 59 1.7%
> ITALY 35 1.0%
> NETHERLANDS 198 5.6%
> SPAIN 12 3.4%
> TURKEY 78 2.2%
> UNITED KINGDOM 326 9.3%
> UNITED STATES 2318 65.9%
> NATO (NAEW) 96 2.7%
>
> TOTAL 3515 100.0%
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
---
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http://www.ecircle.de/ad622329/www.listparade.it
>
>
"Noi non sottovalutiamo e non trascuriamo alcuna verifica. Ma quello
che però dobbiamo dire è che allo stato attuale, tutti i dati,
elementi e notizie acquisite, dimostrano che non vi è motivo di
allarme collegato con i luoghi in cui operano in nostri soldati nei
Balcani": così Mattarella ha risposto ieri alle domande
sull'allarme-uranio, ricordando che le truppe italiane non hanno tra i
loro armamenti tali proiettili, presenti invece negli arsenali
americani, britannici e francesi. (repubblica 19 dicembre 2000) Bene,
dati alla mano vediamo di smentire il ministro Mattarella; l'uranio
c'è nelle tute delle "nostre" truppe, c'è in Kossovo, e c'è (e qui
ecco una guerra dimenticata) anche in Bosnia. Data l'importanza della
questione mi scuso con tutti per la lunghezza ma credo ne valga la
pena...ci ho perso un paio d'ore...mi dovete il panettone.
Gian.
> Prima di tutto, ecco cosa scrive lo stato maggiore della difesa come
> avvertenza ai soldati distaccati in Kossovo: "I proiettili da 30 mm
> controcarro contenenti DU (depleted uranium, uranio impoverito ndr), e
> ritrovati in Kossovo, nell'area di impiego del contingente italiano,
> costituiscono una particolare forma di rischio. La pericolosità di
> tale munizionamento deriva dalla tossicità dell' Uranio stesso che si
> manifesta sia dal punto di vista chimico sia dal punto di vista
> radiologico. (...) la permanenza del personale nelle aree
> caratterizzate dalla presenza di mezzi corazzati colpiti, ovvero in
> aree dove sono stati individuati o dichiarati presenti proiettili DU
> deve essere ridotta al tempo strettamente necessario; (...) tutto il
> personale deve essere avvisato circa le aree interessate dalla
> presenza del munizionamento DU, informandolo delle caratteristiche di
> quello individuato (munizionamento PGU - 14 e 30 mm.). Chiunque
> individui munizionamento DU deve avvertire tempestivamente la cp. NBC;
> (le squadre di rilevazione e bonifica degli agenti chimici, ndr).
> (...) il personale che ha sostato e/o operato in aree caratterizzate
> dalla presenza di mezzi corazzati colpiti (...) deve togliersi con
> molta attenzione la tuta che indossa e riporla in un sacchetto di
> plastica integro che verrà sigillato e conservato per il successivo
> smaltimento a cura della cp. NBC".
> (Stralci dal documento dello Stato maggiore dell'esercito italiano
> sulla pericolosità dell'uranio impoverito - dal sito di Repubblica) La
> smentita sarebbe già evidente nelle contraddizioni interne alla difesa
> italiana. Ma l'abile sotterfugio letterario del salomonico ministro
> del centrosinistra gioca di tacco..."non abbiamo uranio nelle NOSTRE
> dotazioni" lasciando intendere che altri ce l'hanno e ne fanno l'uso
> che credono... mi ricorda la famosa ammissione del capo di stato
> maggiore su Ustica "queste domande vanno poste ad ALTRI...".Ecco
> perchè è forse il caso di approfittare di questa performances
> ministeriale per un escursus storico che non fà mai male e che serve a
> rammentare ai più distratti che non è quella in Kossovo la prima
> guerra Balcanica dell'ultimo decennio, e il fatto, non casuale, che i
> malati di "sindrome del golfo yugoslavo" si siano sicuramente
> avvelenati in periodo precedente in territorio Bosniaco e non in
> Kossovo.Ma c'era sto uranio in Bosnia e chi lo ha messo? Dobbiamo per
> saperlo andare con la memoria alla guerra dimenticata, alla operazione
> "Deliberation Force". Questa operazione come scrivevo ieri è stata
> condotta ufficialmente per contenere le richieste serbe in Bosnia. Si
> trattava di "proteggere" ad opera della Nato dagli attacchi le aree di
> Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihac e Sarajevo. La campagna militare della Nato
> inizia il 30 agosto 1995 ufficialmente come risposta ad un attentato
> serbo ad obiettivi civili in Sarajevo (rivelatosi poi una provocazione
> d'intelligence come ammise buona parte della stampa internazionale).In
> effetti la campagna inizia il giorno 29, ma le prime missioni sono
> puramente ricognitive. Successivamente le missioni aeree aumentano
> d'intensità fino al 14 settembre del '95.I voli effettuati sono 3515,
> dei quali 2470 sono classificati come "penetrating sorties" contro 48
> complessi militari serbo-bosniaci e 338 obiettivi diretti. Vengono
> lanciate 1026 bombe, delle quali 708 precise (ovvero intelligenti) e
> 318 imprecise (ovvero più intelligenti). Il primo giorno di conflitto
> tra la Nato e le truppe serbo bosniache porta all'abbattimento di un
> mirage francese a 40 chilometri a nord di Pale per opera di una
> fortunosa contraerea (un missile terra-aria manuale...). I serbo
> bosniaci catturano il pilota francese (secondo la legislazione
> internazionale puro "terrorista" data la mancanza di dichiarazione di
> guerra) se volete saperne di più su esiti e sviluppi ecco due siti
> sulla
> vicenda... http://cgi.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/sep95/9-29/french_pilots/http://europe.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/dec95/12-12/pilots_9am/ Per
> concludere il breve escursus, la guerra bosniaca si conclude con
> l'occupazione militare da parte delle truppe nato e la disgregazione
> speriamo non definitiva della Bosnia in 3 stati etnici, uno dei quali
> riassorbito di fatto dalla Croazia, uno divenuto un casino senza
> l'accento per i militari con troppo tempo libero ed il terzo distrutto
> e lasciato al tragico destino del popolo serbo. Su internet ovviamente
> si può trovare di tutto ed ecco quindi dal sito del FAS (gruppo di
> analisi strategiche vicino al pentagono) un ottimo escursus mascolino
> sulle "dotazioni" militari della operazione Deliberate Force (lo
> trovate in allegato 3) oltre a dimostrare ampiamente l'uso di armi di
> distruzione di massa (allegato 1) utilizzate in precedenza nel golfo
> persico.
> A conclusione di questo breve riassunto possiamo trarre le seguenti
> considerazioni: 1) Il ministro della difesa ignora che siano state
> scaricate bombe (usate dalla nato in precedenza anche in Iraq
> appesantite da uranio impoverito) nel suolo Bosniaco. Ignora anche le
> 35 azioni compiute da caccia italiani su quei territori e forse anche
> il tipo di arma di distruzione di massa utilizzata dai pacificatori in
> quella occasione. 2) Il ministro ignora ancora che lo stato maggiore
> della difesa avverte i militari distaccati della pericolosità delle
> armi all'uranio in suolo Kossovaro. 3) Il ministro ignora che il primo
> caso di leucemia sospetto si verificò un anno or sono cioè prima della
> operazione Kossovo e quindi va ovviamente collegato all'uranio
> Bosniaco e non a quello Kossovaro, ma tant'è... 4) Giornali, ministro
> e soldati, sembrano ignorare che in quei posti ci sono degli abitanti.
> Triste destino l'esser pacificati nuclearmente...
> Gian.
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Allegato 1: munizioni della operazione deliberate force
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> PRECISION MUNITIONS: TYPE MUNITION TOTAL
> Laser Guided Bomb
> LGB/GBU 10 303
> LGB/GBU 12 125
> LGB/GBU 16 215
> LGB/GBU 24 6
> LGB/GBU AS30L 4
> LGB/GBU TOTAL 653Electro-Optical
> EO/IR SLAM GUIDED MISSILE 10
> EO/IR GBU-15 GUIDED MISSILE 9
> EO/IR MAVRICK GUIDED MISSILE 23
> EO/IR TOTAL 42
> Tomahawk Cruise Missile 13
> GRAND TOTAL 708
> NON-PRECISION MUNITIONS:
> TYPE MUNTION TOTAL
> MK 82 175
> MK 83 99
> MK 84 42
> CBU-87 2
> GRAND TOTAL 318
> Fonte Fas
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Allegato 2: Fatevi una cultura
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> * Operation Deliberate ForceALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE Fact
> Sheet
> * "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 1," Lt Col Robert C. Owen,
> Air Power Journal Vol. XI, No. 2 (Summer 1997): 4-24.
> * "The Balkans Air Campaign Study: Part 2," Lt Col Robert C. Owen,
> Air Power Journal Vol. XI, No. 3 (Fall 1997): 6-26.
> * BOMBS OVER BOSNIA: THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
> MICHAEL O. BEALE School of Advanced Airpower Studies JUNE 1996
> * Deliberate Force By John A. Tirpak, Air Force Magazine October
> 1997
> A three-week air campaign in the fall of 1995 was the decisive
> factor in bringing the recalcitrant Serbs to the peace talks in
> Dayton.
> * Deliberate Force: Reaffirmation of the Gulf Experience Air Power
> Studies Centre PAPER NUMBER 53 Richard P. Hallion
> * Serbian air defenses a threat (AFNS) 12 September 1995 -- Bosnian
> Serb air defenses continue to present a high-threat environment
> for NATO air crews attacking military positions in support of
> Operation Deliberate Force. Although the Serbs have fewer
> surface-to-air missiles than the coalition force faced during
> Operation Desert Storm, the Serbs show a higher proficiency with
> the weapons than the Iraqis did.
> * Joint cooperation key to deliberate force (AFNS) 11 September
> 1995 -- NATO aircraft flying in support of Operation Deliberate
> Force continue to streak over the Adriatic Sea to deliver their
> weapons to Bosnian Serb military targets. The multi-national
> force has combined to deliver more than 300 tons of ordnance
> during the operation's nearly 1,200 sorties. U.S. Air Force crews
> and aircraft account for about 800 of the sorties.
> * NATO air strikes continue (AFNS) 06 September 1995 -- Fighter
> aircraft bristling with weapons left here in waves Sept. 6 to
> continue the air strikes resumed Sept. 5 on Bosnian Serb
> strongholds. The attacks were temporarily halted to permit
> meetings between U.N. and Bosnian Serb leaders, but resumed
> Tuesday when it became apparent the Serbs would not meet U.N. and
> NATO demands.
> * NATO RECOMMENCES AIR STRIKES AGAINST BOSNIAN SERBSTRANSCRIPT OF
> PRESS CONFERENCE ADMIRAL LEIGHTON W. SMITH COMMANDER IN CHIEF
> ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE 06 September 1995 -- As you know,
> NATO air assets recommenced strike operations against Bosnian
> Serb military significant targets in Bosnia Herzegovina. The
> reason for the recommencement is that NATO and the United Nations
> have collectively agreed on certain conditions which must be met.
> * Statement by the Secretary General of NATO 05 September 1995 --
> NATO aircraft operating within the provisions of Operation
> "Deliberate Force", today, at 13.08 LOCAL, resumed attacks on
> Bosnian-Serb military targets in Bosnia. The air operations were
> reinitiated after UN and NATO military commanders concluded that
> the Bosnian Serbs had failed to demonstrate their intent to
> comply with United Nations demands to remove military threats
> against Sarajevo.
> * Commander relates Aviano role in Deliberate Force (AFNS) 05
> September 1995 -- Scores of thunderous, white-hot afterburners
> lit up the pre-dawn skies here Aug. 30 as waves of Aviano-based
> jets joined in the largest strike mission over Bosnia-Herzegovina
> since NATO's Operation Deny Flight began more than two years ago.
> * Air strikes on Bosnia resume (AFNS) 05 September 1995 -- NATO
> aircraft resumed Operation Deliberate Force air strikes on
> Bosnian Serb positions Sept. 5 after a three-day lull. More than
> 100 sorties were flown by the multinational coalition assembled
> here as part of Operation Deny Flight, enforcing the no-fly zone
> over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
> * President warns Bosnian Serbs Air Force News Service 01 September
> 1995 -- President Clinton warned Bosnian Serbs to end their civil
> war the same day he kicked off events to honor the end of World
> War II. Greeted by a cheering, flag-waving crowd of about 700
> people on the base flightline Aug. 31, Clinton said NATO bombing
> strikes against Bosnian targets were "the right response to the
> savagery in Sarajevo."
> * NATO begins air strikes on Bosnia (AFNS) 30 August 1995 -- NATO
> aircraft began attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets in Bosnia
> Aug 30. The NATO - and United Nations-approved air strikes
> included air defense missile sites, radar sites, and
> communication facilities. More than 60 aircraft from several NATO
> nations operating from bases in Italy and the U.S. aircraft
> carrier Theodore Roosevelt participated in the initial strikes.
> * NATO Statement by Sec. Gen. Will Claes 30 August 1995 -- ``NATO
> aircraft operating with the provisions of Operation Deny Flight
> today (30 August 1995) just after 00:00 GMT (0200 local)
> commenced attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets in Bosnia. The
> air operations were initiated after the U.N. military commanders
> concluded, beyond reasonable doubt, that Monday's brutal mortar
> attack in Sarajevo came from Bosnian Serb positions.
> * Clinton: U.S. should be prepared to assist NATO (AFNS) 07 June
> 1995 -- President Bill Clinton believes America should be
> prepared to assist NATO if the alliance decides to meet a request
> from the United Nations for help in a withdrawal or a
> reconfiguration and a strengthening of its forces in Bosnia.
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Allegato 3: Chi e come
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DELIBERATE FORCE SUMMARY DATA:
>
> * Total sorties flown: 3515
> o Penetrating sorties (CAS, BAI, SEAD, RECCE, SAR/CSAR): 2470
> o Support sorties (NAEW, ABCCC, ELINT/ESM, AAR,): 1045
> * Total bombs dropped: 1026
> o Precision munitions: 708
> o Non-precision munitions: 318
>
> Airstrikes were conducted on eleven days during the period 29 Aug - 14
> Sep 95
>
> * 48 target complexes
> * 338 individual targets within target complexes
>
> DELIBERATE FORCE SORTIE BREAKDOWN FROM 29 AUG 95 - 14 SEP 95
>
> NATION TOTAL PERCENTAGE
> SORIES OF TOTAL
>
> FRANCE 84 8.1%
> GERMANY 59 1.7%
> ITALY 35 1.0%
> NETHERLANDS 198 5.6%
> SPAIN 12 3.4%
> TURKEY 78 2.2%
> UNITED KINGDOM 326 9.3%
> UNITED STATES 2318 65.9%
> NATO (NAEW) 96 2.7%
>
> TOTAL 3515 100.0%
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
---
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I gruppi di discussione + interessanti e divertenti!
Le liste + calde!!
Il meglio di eCircle!!!
http://www.ecircle.de/ad622329/www.listparade.it
> http://www.espresso-verlag.de/kuentzelfr.htm
Matthias Küntzel
Germany and Kosovo
How Germany's independent line paved the way to the Kosovo War
Contribution to the 2nd International Hearing of the European Tribunal
concerning Nato's war against Yugoslavia. Hamburg, April 16, 2000 (1)
In 1991, a delegation of the German Bundestag visited Kosovo for the
first
time in order to talk with Kosovo Albanian nationalist leaders. This
prompted - as early as 1991! - the warning by a senior member of the
Yugoslavian parliament that "the British and the Germans would create a
common intervention force with 70,000 soldiers in order to intervene in
Kosovo." (2) Indeed an early and accurate prophecy! So what about
Germany's role in preparing for the Kosovo war?
There were and there are strategic differences between German and the US
policies about how to retain or enhance hegemony. "As a wealthy status
quo
power, the United States has an interest in maintaining international
order", wrote Joseph S. Nye, Jr, a former US deputy secretary of
defense.
"In a world where there are some two hundred states but many thousands
of
often overlapping entities that might eventually make a claim to
nationhood, blind promotion of self-determination would have highly
problematic consequences." (3) Berlin, however, in seeking to create
conditions for an ongoing expansion of German influnce (that means:
changing the international order) does not share this priority. As
Rupert
Scholz, the former German secretary of defense, explained: "The aim of
maintaining "stability" in Europe seems to be a most dangerous one.
There
will not be any real stablity, which is able to maintain peace, if
individual nations are held prisoner in unwanted and unnatural
("unnatürliche") state organizations, which have been imposed upon
them."
Since 1990, German foreign policy has "constantly persisted in activly
advocating a universal right of self-determination." (4)
This policy has a particular bearing on Kosovo. The hidden war about
Kosovo's future started in 1995 at the latest. In February 1995 in the
presence of Roman Herzog, Germany's President at that time, Germany and
Albania signed a common declaration of principle at Tirana. This
declaration is rarely mentioned in the literature but nevertheless
decisive because it promised to find a "solution to the Kosovo question"
by advocating the right of self-determination for Kosovo's Albanians.
(5)
Advocating self-determination for Kosovo's Albanians, however, meant
advocating their right to secede from Yugoslavia. This declaration was
in
so far a kind of advance notice to continue Germany's 1991 course
(recognition of Croatia) in order to further split up Yugoslavia
following
a racist (völkisch) concept of self-determination.
In the period following, the German goverment did everything it could to
spur on the separation of Albanians within Kosovo. Germany supported and
financed those nationalists who sought to pursue the goal of full
independence by creating alternative governing institutions as well as
independent Albanian educational and medical systems in Kosovo which
systematically separated the majority of the people in Kosovo from the
other peoples of Yugoslavia. In addition, German secret diplomacy was
instrumental in helping the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA), as they call
themselves, since its creation in February 1996. The daily newspaper
"The
European" stated that "German civil and military intelligence services
have been involved in training and equipping the rebels with the aim of
cementing German influence in the Balkan area." (6)
During those years, Germany unilaterally supported the secessionist
movements. In 1997 editor Johann Georg Reißmüller of the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (a German daily newspaper) wrote: "The US government
is
not at all happy with Germany's policy in Kosovo".
It was, however, exactly that year - 1997 - that the crisis in Kosovo
began to escalate. After the destruction of the Albanian army arsenals
the
KLA armed itself in order to start a large-scale nationalist rebellion.
This development and the following counter-attack by the Serbian police
moved Kosovo into the headlines and into the focal point of NATO's
considerations. How did Germany and the United States react?
"The Clinton administration is still uncertain about how to deal with
this
crisis", later wrote the weekly newspaper Die Zeit. A senior official
from
the German foreign office was sent to Washington to put pressure on the
deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott. "We urgently need U.S.
leadership now" claimed Germany's emissary. (7) This pattern: Germany
calls for the U.S. government - actually for a special wing of the U.S
government - to act against Yugoslavia were repeated between March 1998
and March 1999 over and over again. Let us now take a closer look at
that
pre-war diplomacy which paved the way to war.
The US government is responsible for most of the war crimes NATO
committed
against Yugoslavia. But even in 1998, the Clinton administration - split
in several fractions on how to deal with Milosevic and the Kosovo
Albanians' nationalism - hesitated, reacting uncertainly on a
case-by-case
basis, oscillating between supporting the KLA and letting Milosevic have
a
free hand in smashing them. Germany on the other hand knew what to do
and
how to act. The grand design of Germany's Kosovo policy had been in
effect
by March 1998. It was revealed by Germany's informal ambassador to the
Balkans, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who on March 16, 1998 said: "We
should try to tell Milosevic the plain truth through pressure and even
military interventions that he can retain control over Kosovo as a part
of
Yugoslavia only if certain fundamentals are met. And if this is not the
case, the territory there will have to be transformed into a kind of
protectorate until those fundamentals are provided for." (8)
This idea of pushing the Kosovo's Albanians towards a military
confrontation with Milosevic in order to create a Kosovo protectorate
from
now on became the central point of Germany's Kosovo policy - either by
the
Kohl/Kinkel CDU government or the Schröder/Fischer SPD-Green coalition.
One condition was that international troops be stationed on Kosovo soil.
As early as March 1998 Germany accordingly put this matter on the agenda
at the London meeting of the international Contact Group on Yugoslavia.
(9)
The other condition was that Nato would have to enter Kosovo against the
will of the Yugoslav government. Accordingly, Germany sharpened its tone
towards Belgrad. Milosevic became the main target and remained so
whatever
his policy looked like.
But France, the UK, Italy and the dominating voices within the US
government still prefered to follow a less confrontational policy. In
1998, The European for example stated that "Washington realised that
pushing the Kosovars towards a military confrontation with Milosevic, as
the Germans wanted to do, would have a boomerang effect on the Balkans.
The United States put maximum pressure on Germany to stop supporting the
KLA behind the scenes, as did the other European countries such as
Britain
and France." (10) They termed the KLA activities "terrorist" and
supported
indirectly a Serbian counteroffensive against the KLA during the summer
of
1998 and appealed to Milosevic and the moderate Albanian leader Rugova
to
begin talks. The KLA, however, succeeded in provoking the Serbian police
force and in escalating armed clashes time and again. The policy of
de-escalation turned out to be a permanent failure as long as there was
a
continuity in the supply of KLA weapons and KLA mercenaries across the
Albanian border.
It was therefore not at all surprising that in the summer of 1998 all
the
efforts of the United Nations and the majority of Nato countries
(including the US) concentrated in the goal of cutting off the arms and
soldiers supplies in favor of the KLA. The Albanian government headed by
Fatos Nano who had disassociated himself from the KLA supported this
plan.
Inside NATO the idea of sending 7000 soldiers to cut off the traffic in
weapons began to take shape.
During this crucial situation, however, Germany's covering up for the
KLA
became both public and evident: The German government vetoed the
cutting-off of the supply of weapons for the KLA! Klaus Kinkel, then
head
of the German foreign office said: "Of course you have to consider
whether
you are permitted from a moral and ethnical point of view to prevent the
Kosovo-Albanians from buying weapons for their self-defense." (11)
Volker
Rühe, then head of the ministry of defense answered to this
consideration
with an unequivocal No: "You cannot resolve the Kosovo conflict by
sending
troops to Albania to seal the border and thus be acting in favor of
Milosevic." (12) Rühe's message was quiete clear: everyone who tries to
seal the border in order to find a peaceful solution is taking sides
with
Milosevic. In order to disassociate yourself from Milosevic you have to
escalate the war between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs by
delivering
more and more weapons to the KLA!
This open German solidarity with the KLA has been as much an isolated
provocation as has the recognition of Tudjman's Croatia in 1991, 50
years
after the formation of the first Croatian state under the rule of the
fascist Ustashi regime.
Just like 1991 Germany again stood nearly alone against a huge majority
of
countries in Europe and the world. Just like 1991 Germany again
supported
a movement with a background rooted in the Nazi past, because the KLA is
partly led by the sons and grandsons of extreme right-wing Albanian
fighters, the heirs of those who fought during World War II in the
fascist
militias and the "Skanderbeg Volunteer SS Division" raised by the Nazis.
(13) The "National Front of Albania" (Balli Kombetar) which collaborated
with Nazi leaders in 1943/44 today boasts about its influence within the
KLA which has a program that seems to be a modified version of the 1943
Nazi utopia.
Thus the program of "ethnic cleansing" which Germany exported into the
Balkans in 1941 remained alive within the movement of the Kosovo
Albanian
nationalists during the 80s. "The nationalists have a two-point
platform"
wrote the New York Times in 1982: "First to establish what they call an
ethnically clean Albanian republic and then the merger with Albania to
form a greater Albania." (14) Whenever the KLA talks about "liberation"
or
"freeing" this has been up to now understood in the Nazi-sense of "free
of
something" i.e. "free of Jews" ("judenfrei"), "free of Gypsies" or "free
of Serbs". Noone could be really surprised when, beginning with June
1999,
the de facto rule of the KLA turned out to be a daily and a deadly trap
for thousands of non-Albanians, especially defenceless Serbs.
In the summer of 1998 Germany and the USA took not only opposite but
conflicting sides: While the USA - in the words of General Shelton, then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - has had "concerns about the
techniques that are being used to put down, to squelch the uprising"
(15)
Germany on the other hand acted as the protective power for the KLA.
This
confrontation includes a strategic conflict within NATO: Is the Atlantic
Alliance supposed to help or to hinder the KLA? Should NATO as the KLA's
airforce contribute to the revision of state borders and the further
diminishing of Yugoslavia? Or is the alliance bound to clap down on such
a
type of militant secessionism?
It was Germany's insistence and the ignorance or thirst for adventure
within the leadership of the other NATO powers that brought the world's
biggest military alliance eventually in favor of the Albanian
nationalists. Germany has "given evidence of its prepareness to lead"
praised the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine. (16) Now Germany once
again took the lead in pressing for military intervention in Kosovo. The
New York Times reported: "German officials seem increasingly inchined
towards charting a military course to stop the violence in Kosovo." (17)
Indeed. "Mr. Kinkel threatens with a Nato intervention in Kosovo"
proclaimed the headlines of German papers on June 5, 1998. "The United
States, unlike Germany, rejects a snap decision about a military
intervention", wrote Frankfurter Allgemeine the following day. Volker
Rühe
was the first government official in Europe who as early as June 15,
1998
spoke in favor of a strike against Yugoslavia even without a UN Security
Council green light. This suggestion played havoc with not only the UN
Charter but also with the German constitution and the Treaty of Moscow
concerning German unification. This proposal was later taken up
positively
by the USA. We have to conclude, therefore, that Germany is not only
guilty of committing the crimes which are connected with the US-led
bombing of Yugoslavia, but is responsible for ardently working towards
triggering this war. The German concept for Kosovo includes the
following:
- to make a stand against the Yugoslav government
- unlimited support for the Kosovo Albanian nationalists who demand
independence and a lasting unification with Albania
- to demand for air-strikes against Yugoslavia in order to achieve a
NATO
protectorate for Kosovo which is supposed to be only an interim step
towards the independence of Kosovo.
Strategic differences between German and the US policies diminished
considerably in 1999 when the Clinton administration decided to go to
war
in favor of the ultra-secessionist KLA. They seem to gain, however, new
weight in the post-war debate about the final status of Kosovo. US
Secretary of State Madelaine Albright recently rejected the idea of
creating a greater Albania, whereas German policy seems to be pushing in
the opposite direction.
Karl Lamers, the influential CDU foreign affairs spokesman for the
opposition in the Bundestag said about the transformation of Kosovo into
a
NATO protectorate that this is "only the first step towards the
separation
of Kosovo from Yugoslavia" and that an independent Kosovo will be "only
an
interim step to merging ("Anschluss") with Albania." (18) Recently,
Lamers
mentioned with great satisfaction "that everything we are actually doing
in Kosovo, e. g. the creation of a new currency zone, is aimed at
creating
an independent Kosovo...". (19) Even Germany's red/green coalition
government does not want to recognize Kosovo as being a province of
Yugoslavia. That is the reason why in his last major statement Joschka
Fischer - Germany's vice-chancellor and secretary of state - let the
question of "the future status of the Kosovo" open claiming that it
would
be impossible to resolve this now. In an interview with a French
newspaper, however, he made clear that he had no doubts about the
Kosovo's
future status: "The international community is present in Kosovo and the
Balkans in order to show that - according to the example of resolving
the
'German question' in 1990 - the 'Albanian question' could be resolved
only
with the agreement of the neighbouring states." (20)
US government circles are quite aware of those ambitions of their rival,
Germany. Zbigniew Brzezinski called the Berlin republic a "geostrategic
main actor" and a "subversive big power inspired by an ambitious
vision".
Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary of state, characterized Germany as
the seismic focal point of the current geopolitical earthquakes which
are
disrupting the Atlantic Alliance as well as the Balkans. He emphasized
that Germany is "the epicentre of thoses processes - enlargement and
expansion, extension and deepening." (21)
Within the context of the war against Yugoslavia the other great powers,
however, not only reacted to aggressive German moves but pursued their
own
special interests as well. The United States wanted to retain its
influence in Europe, to strengthen a worldwide role for NATO and to
weaken
Russias influence within the new world order. Great Britain und France
were eager to demonstrate their military superiority over Germany and
wanted to give a starting signal for the establishing of an independent
European intervention force (together with Germany) vis-a-vis the USA.
Each of these nations is a rival to the others and is trying to retain
or
achieve as much influence and power as possible. The war against
Yugoslavia has been the first, however, to be spurred on by Germany as
an
attempt to redesign current world order after the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
It has put the irrational elements and the destructive roots of
capitalistic societies into a new light.
(1) This contribution is a short description of a broader study:
Matthias
Küntzel, Der Weg in den Krieg. Deutschland, die Nato und das Kosovo,
Elefanten Press, Berlin 2000. The author´s e-mail address:
MatKuentzel@....
(2) This warning was published in the Yugoslavian journal Polityka; see
the minutes of the Bundestag meeting June 16, 1991, pp. 2560-1.
(3) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Redefining the National Interest, Foreign
Affairs
Vol.78 No.4, July/August 1999 pp. 22-35.
(4) See Rupert Scholz, Das Festhalten an ungewollten Staaten schafft
keine
Stabilität, in: Die Welt, December 12, 1991; Rupert Scholz, Das
Selbstbestimmungsrecht und die deutsche Politik, in: Internationale
Politik 4/1995, S.51.
(5) "Deutschland und Albanien ... bekräftigen das Recht aller Völker,
frei
und ohne Einmischung von außen ihr Schicksal zu bestimmen und ihre
politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Entwicklung nach
eigenem Wunsch zu gestalten." This declaration is published in the
Archiv
der Gegenwart, March 13, 1995, pp. 39819-20.
(6) Roger Fallgot, How Germany Backed KLA, in: The European, 21-27
September 1998. See for more details M. Küntzel, Der Weg in den Krieg
pp.
59-64.
(6) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Redefining the National Interest, Foreign
Affairs
Vol.78 No.4, July/August 1999 pp. 22-35.
(7) See Die Zeit, May 12, 1999.
(8) Christian Schwarz-Schilling, March 16, 1999, Deutschlandradio,
quoted
in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur
Sicherheitspolitik, April 1998, p. 47.
(9) Russia, the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany are
members of this informal but influential group.
(10) Roger Fallgot, ibid.
(11) Interview with Klaus Kinkel, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 30,
1998.
(12) Mr. Rühe is quoted in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, June 9, 1998.
(13) See Chris Hedges, Kosovo's Next Masters? in: Foreign Affairs,
Vol.78,
No.3, May/June 1999, pp.24-42. "Although never much of a fighting force,
the Skanderbeg Division took part in the shameful roundup and
deportation
of the province's few hundred Jews during the Holocaust. ... The
decision
by KLA commanders to dress their police in black fatigues and order
their
fighters to salute with a cleched fist to the forehead has led many to
worry about these fascist antecedents." (ibid.)
(14) See Marvine Howe, Exodus of Serbians Stirs Province in Yugoslavia,
New York Times July 12, 1982.
(15) See New York Times, June 16, 1998.
(16) See Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 26, 1998.
(17) See New York Times, June 10, 1998.
(18) See the minutes of the Bundestag parliamentary session of April 15,
1999.
(19) See the minutes of the Bundestag parliamentary session of April 5,
2000.
(20) See Le Monde March 25, 2000, emphasis by the author.
(21) See Frankfurter Allgemeine, February 5, 1999.
Matthias Küntzel
Germany and Kosovo
How Germany's independent line paved the way to the Kosovo War
Contribution to the 2nd International Hearing of the European Tribunal
concerning Nato's war against Yugoslavia. Hamburg, April 16, 2000 (1)
In 1991, a delegation of the German Bundestag visited Kosovo for the
first
time in order to talk with Kosovo Albanian nationalist leaders. This
prompted - as early as 1991! - the warning by a senior member of the
Yugoslavian parliament that "the British and the Germans would create a
common intervention force with 70,000 soldiers in order to intervene in
Kosovo." (2) Indeed an early and accurate prophecy! So what about
Germany's role in preparing for the Kosovo war?
There were and there are strategic differences between German and the US
policies about how to retain or enhance hegemony. "As a wealthy status
quo
power, the United States has an interest in maintaining international
order", wrote Joseph S. Nye, Jr, a former US deputy secretary of
defense.
"In a world where there are some two hundred states but many thousands
of
often overlapping entities that might eventually make a claim to
nationhood, blind promotion of self-determination would have highly
problematic consequences." (3) Berlin, however, in seeking to create
conditions for an ongoing expansion of German influnce (that means:
changing the international order) does not share this priority. As
Rupert
Scholz, the former German secretary of defense, explained: "The aim of
maintaining "stability" in Europe seems to be a most dangerous one.
There
will not be any real stablity, which is able to maintain peace, if
individual nations are held prisoner in unwanted and unnatural
("unnatürliche") state organizations, which have been imposed upon
them."
Since 1990, German foreign policy has "constantly persisted in activly
advocating a universal right of self-determination." (4)
This policy has a particular bearing on Kosovo. The hidden war about
Kosovo's future started in 1995 at the latest. In February 1995 in the
presence of Roman Herzog, Germany's President at that time, Germany and
Albania signed a common declaration of principle at Tirana. This
declaration is rarely mentioned in the literature but nevertheless
decisive because it promised to find a "solution to the Kosovo question"
by advocating the right of self-determination for Kosovo's Albanians.
(5)
Advocating self-determination for Kosovo's Albanians, however, meant
advocating their right to secede from Yugoslavia. This declaration was
in
so far a kind of advance notice to continue Germany's 1991 course
(recognition of Croatia) in order to further split up Yugoslavia
following
a racist (völkisch) concept of self-determination.
In the period following, the German goverment did everything it could to
spur on the separation of Albanians within Kosovo. Germany supported and
financed those nationalists who sought to pursue the goal of full
independence by creating alternative governing institutions as well as
independent Albanian educational and medical systems in Kosovo which
systematically separated the majority of the people in Kosovo from the
other peoples of Yugoslavia. In addition, German secret diplomacy was
instrumental in helping the "Kosovo Liberation Army" (KLA), as they call
themselves, since its creation in February 1996. The daily newspaper
"The
European" stated that "German civil and military intelligence services
have been involved in training and equipping the rebels with the aim of
cementing German influence in the Balkan area." (6)
During those years, Germany unilaterally supported the secessionist
movements. In 1997 editor Johann Georg Reißmüller of the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung (a German daily newspaper) wrote: "The US government
is
not at all happy with Germany's policy in Kosovo".
It was, however, exactly that year - 1997 - that the crisis in Kosovo
began to escalate. After the destruction of the Albanian army arsenals
the
KLA armed itself in order to start a large-scale nationalist rebellion.
This development and the following counter-attack by the Serbian police
moved Kosovo into the headlines and into the focal point of NATO's
considerations. How did Germany and the United States react?
"The Clinton administration is still uncertain about how to deal with
this
crisis", later wrote the weekly newspaper Die Zeit. A senior official
from
the German foreign office was sent to Washington to put pressure on the
deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott. "We urgently need U.S.
leadership now" claimed Germany's emissary. (7) This pattern: Germany
calls for the U.S. government - actually for a special wing of the U.S
government - to act against Yugoslavia were repeated between March 1998
and March 1999 over and over again. Let us now take a closer look at
that
pre-war diplomacy which paved the way to war.
The US government is responsible for most of the war crimes NATO
committed
against Yugoslavia. But even in 1998, the Clinton administration - split
in several fractions on how to deal with Milosevic and the Kosovo
Albanians' nationalism - hesitated, reacting uncertainly on a
case-by-case
basis, oscillating between supporting the KLA and letting Milosevic have
a
free hand in smashing them. Germany on the other hand knew what to do
and
how to act. The grand design of Germany's Kosovo policy had been in
effect
by March 1998. It was revealed by Germany's informal ambassador to the
Balkans, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, who on March 16, 1998 said: "We
should try to tell Milosevic the plain truth through pressure and even
military interventions that he can retain control over Kosovo as a part
of
Yugoslavia only if certain fundamentals are met. And if this is not the
case, the territory there will have to be transformed into a kind of
protectorate until those fundamentals are provided for." (8)
This idea of pushing the Kosovo's Albanians towards a military
confrontation with Milosevic in order to create a Kosovo protectorate
from
now on became the central point of Germany's Kosovo policy - either by
the
Kohl/Kinkel CDU government or the Schröder/Fischer SPD-Green coalition.
One condition was that international troops be stationed on Kosovo soil.
As early as March 1998 Germany accordingly put this matter on the agenda
at the London meeting of the international Contact Group on Yugoslavia.
(9)
The other condition was that Nato would have to enter Kosovo against the
will of the Yugoslav government. Accordingly, Germany sharpened its tone
towards Belgrad. Milosevic became the main target and remained so
whatever
his policy looked like.
But France, the UK, Italy and the dominating voices within the US
government still prefered to follow a less confrontational policy. In
1998, The European for example stated that "Washington realised that
pushing the Kosovars towards a military confrontation with Milosevic, as
the Germans wanted to do, would have a boomerang effect on the Balkans.
The United States put maximum pressure on Germany to stop supporting the
KLA behind the scenes, as did the other European countries such as
Britain
and France." (10) They termed the KLA activities "terrorist" and
supported
indirectly a Serbian counteroffensive against the KLA during the summer
of
1998 and appealed to Milosevic and the moderate Albanian leader Rugova
to
begin talks. The KLA, however, succeeded in provoking the Serbian police
force and in escalating armed clashes time and again. The policy of
de-escalation turned out to be a permanent failure as long as there was
a
continuity in the supply of KLA weapons and KLA mercenaries across the
Albanian border.
It was therefore not at all surprising that in the summer of 1998 all
the
efforts of the United Nations and the majority of Nato countries
(including the US) concentrated in the goal of cutting off the arms and
soldiers supplies in favor of the KLA. The Albanian government headed by
Fatos Nano who had disassociated himself from the KLA supported this
plan.
Inside NATO the idea of sending 7000 soldiers to cut off the traffic in
weapons began to take shape.
During this crucial situation, however, Germany's covering up for the
KLA
became both public and evident: The German government vetoed the
cutting-off of the supply of weapons for the KLA! Klaus Kinkel, then
head
of the German foreign office said: "Of course you have to consider
whether
you are permitted from a moral and ethnical point of view to prevent the
Kosovo-Albanians from buying weapons for their self-defense." (11)
Volker
Rühe, then head of the ministry of defense answered to this
consideration
with an unequivocal No: "You cannot resolve the Kosovo conflict by
sending
troops to Albania to seal the border and thus be acting in favor of
Milosevic." (12) Rühe's message was quiete clear: everyone who tries to
seal the border in order to find a peaceful solution is taking sides
with
Milosevic. In order to disassociate yourself from Milosevic you have to
escalate the war between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs by
delivering
more and more weapons to the KLA!
This open German solidarity with the KLA has been as much an isolated
provocation as has the recognition of Tudjman's Croatia in 1991, 50
years
after the formation of the first Croatian state under the rule of the
fascist Ustashi regime.
Just like 1991 Germany again stood nearly alone against a huge majority
of
countries in Europe and the world. Just like 1991 Germany again
supported
a movement with a background rooted in the Nazi past, because the KLA is
partly led by the sons and grandsons of extreme right-wing Albanian
fighters, the heirs of those who fought during World War II in the
fascist
militias and the "Skanderbeg Volunteer SS Division" raised by the Nazis.
(13) The "National Front of Albania" (Balli Kombetar) which collaborated
with Nazi leaders in 1943/44 today boasts about its influence within the
KLA which has a program that seems to be a modified version of the 1943
Nazi utopia.
Thus the program of "ethnic cleansing" which Germany exported into the
Balkans in 1941 remained alive within the movement of the Kosovo
Albanian
nationalists during the 80s. "The nationalists have a two-point
platform"
wrote the New York Times in 1982: "First to establish what they call an
ethnically clean Albanian republic and then the merger with Albania to
form a greater Albania." (14) Whenever the KLA talks about "liberation"
or
"freeing" this has been up to now understood in the Nazi-sense of "free
of
something" i.e. "free of Jews" ("judenfrei"), "free of Gypsies" or "free
of Serbs". Noone could be really surprised when, beginning with June
1999,
the de facto rule of the KLA turned out to be a daily and a deadly trap
for thousands of non-Albanians, especially defenceless Serbs.
In the summer of 1998 Germany and the USA took not only opposite but
conflicting sides: While the USA - in the words of General Shelton, then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - has had "concerns about the
techniques that are being used to put down, to squelch the uprising"
(15)
Germany on the other hand acted as the protective power for the KLA.
This
confrontation includes a strategic conflict within NATO: Is the Atlantic
Alliance supposed to help or to hinder the KLA? Should NATO as the KLA's
airforce contribute to the revision of state borders and the further
diminishing of Yugoslavia? Or is the alliance bound to clap down on such
a
type of militant secessionism?
It was Germany's insistence and the ignorance or thirst for adventure
within the leadership of the other NATO powers that brought the world's
biggest military alliance eventually in favor of the Albanian
nationalists. Germany has "given evidence of its prepareness to lead"
praised the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine. (16) Now Germany once
again took the lead in pressing for military intervention in Kosovo. The
New York Times reported: "German officials seem increasingly inchined
towards charting a military course to stop the violence in Kosovo." (17)
Indeed. "Mr. Kinkel threatens with a Nato intervention in Kosovo"
proclaimed the headlines of German papers on June 5, 1998. "The United
States, unlike Germany, rejects a snap decision about a military
intervention", wrote Frankfurter Allgemeine the following day. Volker
Rühe
was the first government official in Europe who as early as June 15,
1998
spoke in favor of a strike against Yugoslavia even without a UN Security
Council green light. This suggestion played havoc with not only the UN
Charter but also with the German constitution and the Treaty of Moscow
concerning German unification. This proposal was later taken up
positively
by the USA. We have to conclude, therefore, that Germany is not only
guilty of committing the crimes which are connected with the US-led
bombing of Yugoslavia, but is responsible for ardently working towards
triggering this war. The German concept for Kosovo includes the
following:
- to make a stand against the Yugoslav government
- unlimited support for the Kosovo Albanian nationalists who demand
independence and a lasting unification with Albania
- to demand for air-strikes against Yugoslavia in order to achieve a
NATO
protectorate for Kosovo which is supposed to be only an interim step
towards the independence of Kosovo.
Strategic differences between German and the US policies diminished
considerably in 1999 when the Clinton administration decided to go to
war
in favor of the ultra-secessionist KLA. They seem to gain, however, new
weight in the post-war debate about the final status of Kosovo. US
Secretary of State Madelaine Albright recently rejected the idea of
creating a greater Albania, whereas German policy seems to be pushing in
the opposite direction.
Karl Lamers, the influential CDU foreign affairs spokesman for the
opposition in the Bundestag said about the transformation of Kosovo into
a
NATO protectorate that this is "only the first step towards the
separation
of Kosovo from Yugoslavia" and that an independent Kosovo will be "only
an
interim step to merging ("Anschluss") with Albania." (18) Recently,
Lamers
mentioned with great satisfaction "that everything we are actually doing
in Kosovo, e. g. the creation of a new currency zone, is aimed at
creating
an independent Kosovo...". (19) Even Germany's red/green coalition
government does not want to recognize Kosovo as being a province of
Yugoslavia. That is the reason why in his last major statement Joschka
Fischer - Germany's vice-chancellor and secretary of state - let the
question of "the future status of the Kosovo" open claiming that it
would
be impossible to resolve this now. In an interview with a French
newspaper, however, he made clear that he had no doubts about the
Kosovo's
future status: "The international community is present in Kosovo and the
Balkans in order to show that - according to the example of resolving
the
'German question' in 1990 - the 'Albanian question' could be resolved
only
with the agreement of the neighbouring states." (20)
US government circles are quite aware of those ambitions of their rival,
Germany. Zbigniew Brzezinski called the Berlin republic a "geostrategic
main actor" and a "subversive big power inspired by an ambitious
vision".
Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary of state, characterized Germany as
the seismic focal point of the current geopolitical earthquakes which
are
disrupting the Atlantic Alliance as well as the Balkans. He emphasized
that Germany is "the epicentre of thoses processes - enlargement and
expansion, extension and deepening." (21)
Within the context of the war against Yugoslavia the other great powers,
however, not only reacted to aggressive German moves but pursued their
own
special interests as well. The United States wanted to retain its
influence in Europe, to strengthen a worldwide role for NATO and to
weaken
Russias influence within the new world order. Great Britain und France
were eager to demonstrate their military superiority over Germany and
wanted to give a starting signal for the establishing of an independent
European intervention force (together with Germany) vis-a-vis the USA.
Each of these nations is a rival to the others and is trying to retain
or
achieve as much influence and power as possible. The war against
Yugoslavia has been the first, however, to be spurred on by Germany as
an
attempt to redesign current world order after the fall of the Berlin
Wall.
It has put the irrational elements and the destructive roots of
capitalistic societies into a new light.
(1) This contribution is a short description of a broader study:
Matthias
Küntzel, Der Weg in den Krieg. Deutschland, die Nato und das Kosovo,
Elefanten Press, Berlin 2000. The author´s e-mail address:
MatKuentzel@....
(2) This warning was published in the Yugoslavian journal Polityka; see
the minutes of the Bundestag meeting June 16, 1991, pp. 2560-1.
(3) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Redefining the National Interest, Foreign
Affairs
Vol.78 No.4, July/August 1999 pp. 22-35.
(4) See Rupert Scholz, Das Festhalten an ungewollten Staaten schafft
keine
Stabilität, in: Die Welt, December 12, 1991; Rupert Scholz, Das
Selbstbestimmungsrecht und die deutsche Politik, in: Internationale
Politik 4/1995, S.51.
(5) "Deutschland und Albanien ... bekräftigen das Recht aller Völker,
frei
und ohne Einmischung von außen ihr Schicksal zu bestimmen und ihre
politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Entwicklung nach
eigenem Wunsch zu gestalten." This declaration is published in the
Archiv
der Gegenwart, March 13, 1995, pp. 39819-20.
(6) Roger Fallgot, How Germany Backed KLA, in: The European, 21-27
September 1998. See for more details M. Küntzel, Der Weg in den Krieg
pp.
59-64.
(6) Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Redefining the National Interest, Foreign
Affairs
Vol.78 No.4, July/August 1999 pp. 22-35.
(7) See Die Zeit, May 12, 1999.
(8) Christian Schwarz-Schilling, March 16, 1999, Deutschlandradio,
quoted
in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Stichworte zur
Sicherheitspolitik, April 1998, p. 47.
(9) Russia, the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany are
members of this informal but influential group.
(10) Roger Fallgot, ibid.
(11) Interview with Klaus Kinkel, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 30,
1998.
(12) Mr. Rühe is quoted in the Frankfurter Allgemeine, June 9, 1998.
(13) See Chris Hedges, Kosovo's Next Masters? in: Foreign Affairs,
Vol.78,
No.3, May/June 1999, pp.24-42. "Although never much of a fighting force,
the Skanderbeg Division took part in the shameful roundup and
deportation
of the province's few hundred Jews during the Holocaust. ... The
decision
by KLA commanders to dress their police in black fatigues and order
their
fighters to salute with a cleched fist to the forehead has led many to
worry about these fascist antecedents." (ibid.)
(14) See Marvine Howe, Exodus of Serbians Stirs Province in Yugoslavia,
New York Times July 12, 1982.
(15) See New York Times, June 16, 1998.
(16) See Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 26, 1998.
(17) See New York Times, June 10, 1998.
(18) See the minutes of the Bundestag parliamentary session of April 15,
1999.
(19) See the minutes of the Bundestag parliamentary session of April 5,
2000.
(20) See Le Monde March 25, 2000, emphasis by the author.
(21) See Frankfurter Allgemeine, February 5, 1999.
IL DANNO E LA BEFFA
E' stato il bel tempo ad ostacolare la KFOR nel completamento delle sue
operazioni di "peacekeeping" per la valle di Presevo, nella Serbia
Meridionale: questa l'opinione del comandante italiano delle truppe di
occupazione, generale Carlo Cabigiosu, secondo il quotidiano "La
Repubblica". La KFOR avrebbe dovuto impedire gli attacchi degli
irredentisti pan-albanesi, che viceversa si sono addentrati in migliaia
al di fuori del Kosmet, nella valle di Presevo: "Speravo cadesse almeno
un metro di neve, ma e' venuta in ritardo", ha detto Cabigiosu.
Questa scorretta previsione metereologica ha creato un tale stato di
tensione nella KFOR che il 16 dicembre e' stato ordinato di sparare ad
altezza d'uomo a Leposavic contro una manifestazione di protesta dei
serbi, uccidendone due.
KFOR COMMANDER: KFOR'S HANDS TIED BECAUSE OF GOOD WEATHER
CONDITIONS
ROME, December 18 (Tanjug) The warm weather has prevented KFOR
from completing its overall peace operations in the Presevo valley in
southern Serbia, Rome daily La Republica quoted KFOR commander, Italian
general Carlo Cabigiosu as saying.
"I had hoped for at least one metre of snow, but the snowfall
has
been late," Gen. Cabigiosu set out adding that the snow would have made
it
more difficult for the terrorists to infiltrate the buffer zone in
southern
Serbia.
---
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E' stato il bel tempo ad ostacolare la KFOR nel completamento delle sue
operazioni di "peacekeeping" per la valle di Presevo, nella Serbia
Meridionale: questa l'opinione del comandante italiano delle truppe di
occupazione, generale Carlo Cabigiosu, secondo il quotidiano "La
Repubblica". La KFOR avrebbe dovuto impedire gli attacchi degli
irredentisti pan-albanesi, che viceversa si sono addentrati in migliaia
al di fuori del Kosmet, nella valle di Presevo: "Speravo cadesse almeno
un metro di neve, ma e' venuta in ritardo", ha detto Cabigiosu.
Questa scorretta previsione metereologica ha creato un tale stato di
tensione nella KFOR che il 16 dicembre e' stato ordinato di sparare ad
altezza d'uomo a Leposavic contro una manifestazione di protesta dei
serbi, uccidendone due.
KFOR COMMANDER: KFOR'S HANDS TIED BECAUSE OF GOOD WEATHER
CONDITIONS
ROME, December 18 (Tanjug) The warm weather has prevented KFOR
from completing its overall peace operations in the Presevo valley in
southern Serbia, Rome daily La Republica quoted KFOR commander, Italian
general Carlo Cabigiosu as saying.
"I had hoped for at least one metre of snow, but the snowfall
has
been late," Gen. Cabigiosu set out adding that the snow would have made
it
more difficult for the terrorists to infiltrate the buffer zone in
southern
Serbia.
---
Bollettino di controinformazione del
Coordinamento Nazionale "La Jugoslavia Vivra'"
Sito WEB : http://digilander.iol.it/lajugoslaviavivra
I documenti distribuiti non rispecchiano necessariamente le
opinioni delle realta' che compongono il Coordinamento, ma
vengono fatti circolare per il loro contenuto informativo al
solo scopo di segnalazione e commento ("for fair use only")
Archivio di JUGOINFO:
> http://www.ecircle.it/an_ecircle/articles?ecircleid%c2%91979 oppure
> http://www.egroups.com/group/crj-mailinglist/
Per iscriversi al bollettino: <jugoinfo-subscribe@...>
Per cancellarsi: <jugoinfo-unsubscribe@...>
Contributi e segnalazioni: <jugocoord@...>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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Chi siamo, cosa facciamo e a cosa serviamo?
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> http://www.wpb.be/lalkar/lalkar11/1102.htm
Kosovo - Another Victim of Predatory Imperialism
Introduction
As our television screens are filled with pictures of horrible
atrocities
that have been committed against innocent Kosovan Albanians, just as not
so long ago they were filled with even worse atrocities committed
against
Bosnian Muslims, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
imperialist media expect people to draw: that the Serbian leader,
Milosevic, is an inhuman monster cast in the mould of Adolf Hitler,
which
the `international community' (i.e., US imperialism, backed up by
British
imperialism) has a right – a duty even – to overthrow by any means
necessary. The means being advocated is bombing of Serbian
infrastructure
– though most of the quality newspapers are not at all sure what that
would achieve, other than to unify the Serbian people more firmly than
ever behind Milosevic.
While imperialism is appealing to our humanitarian instincts, our hatred
of human suffering, we must never lose sight of the fact that
humanitarianism is entirely alien to imperialism. As we look around and
see the suffering and thousands of deaths of the innocent occurring in
Iraq, for example, as a result of the blockade imposed by US
imperialism,
and its attempts to strangle North Korea and Cuba, to say nothing of
bombing raids on Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, as we remember imperialism's
genocidal wars of aggression in Korea and Vietnam, we can find no basis
for US imperialism to condemn anybody as war criminals unless it first
starts with itself. Its `humanitarianism' is obviously just a propaganda
ploy to mobilise people and nations in its support.
Knowing all this, should we nevertheless support US imperialism in its
determination to interfere in Yugoslavia's affairs, regardless of what
might be its real motives, in order to bring an end to the horrible
suffering of Kosovan Albanians? Subjected to the Pax Americana, would
they
not at least be relieved of the horrors of Serbian misrule?
This article will argue quite categorically that imposition of the Pax
Americana should be fought at any cost since for the masses of people,
life under imperialist domination would be far harder than ever it was
under Serbia. The bloodshed would not stop, since US imperialism is far
more ruthless in wiping out its opponents than the Serbians could ever
be.
All that would change is that we would not see these massacres on the
television, which rarely, if ever, shows us pictures of the atrocities
committed by US allies: for instance, the atrocities committed against
the
Serbs by the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims or the Kosovo Liberation
Army.
Even to the extent that extreme Serbian nationalism has been guilty of
provoking bloodshed, the scale of the bloodletting has been made
possible
only by the intervention of outside forces, principally western
imperialism, in supplying armaments and finance to rival nationalists
from
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Had it not been for this outside
interference, Yugoslavia's domestic feuds would never have escalated and
spiralled out of the control of the local protagonists in the way that
they have done. The Serb leadership is certainly to blame for fanning
the
flames of nationalism, but it is western imperialism that has poured
petrol on these flames and set the whole region alight.
Background to the Balkan crisis
Let us endeavour, then, to try to understand how the present parlous
situation has arisen in Yugoslavia, blowing up seemingly out of nowhere
when only 15 short years ago "Yugoslavia could, and did, walk tall in
the
world boasting of the cultural diversity which made their country
unique"
(Bennett, C., Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, Hurst & Company, London,
1995,
p. 7). Moreover, far from nationalism being on the increase, and
despite
the best endeavours of nationalist politicians, "Yugoslavia's last
census,
which was carried out months before fighting broke out, registered a
jump
in the numbers of people who considered themselves Yugoslav, rather than
Croat, Serb or any other nationality" (ibid. p. 9).
There was a great deal within Yugoslavia which favoured the emergence of
a
Yugoslav national identity to take the place of `national' identities
based partly on religious difference and partly on which feudal empire
happened to have ruled the different regions inhabited by South Slavs.
The
Serb and Croat spoken languages are very close: in fact they are in
effect
the same language adulterated in different regions by a heavy input of
different neighbouring languages. Both Serbs and Croats have a history
of
struggle against foreign rule, and of mutual co-operation during those
struggles, although the oppressor in the case of the Serbs was the
Ottoman
empire while in the case of the Croats it was the Habsburg
(Austro-Hungarian) empire. In Yugoslavia Croats and Serbs had a common
territory incorporating all those areas, such as Bosnia Hercegovina,
where
neither Serb nor Croat nor anybody else constituted a majority of the
population. Muslims, incidentally, were originally Serbs who converted
to
Islam during the Ottoman empire. Their conversion took them out of the
Orthodox Christian community to which most Serbs belonged and which was
under Ottoman rule a self-governing entity. Muslim converts came under
different laws and a different system of governance, leading Muslims to
cease to identify with the Serbs. But there was no reason why in a
strictly secular society Muslims should not identify with Yugoslavia,
for
they had so much common history with Serbs that only religion really
stood
between them once the peculiar forms of Ottoman self-governance were
removed.
>From the point of view of nascent capitalism, it made much more sense to
create a home market over a geographical area of the size (and
containing
the natural resources) of an average European country at least, rather
than try to make one's mark in some Serb, Croat or Bosnian
mini-statelet.
The ousting of the Ottoman empire by the Serbs, and the break-up of the
Habsburg empire as a consequence of its defeat in the First World War,
made the realisation of Yugoslavia possible, although tensions between
Serb and Croat within the new state (which came into being in 1918) were
inevitable, if only to the extent that they had been pitted against each
other in the war by the Austro-Hungarian empire.
The marriage of Serb and Croat, however, foundered on major
incompatibilities. Serbs considered themselves superior as having fought
for, and won, their own independence from imperial rule, and having
fought
for, and won, the liberation of their territory from Austro-Hungary,
which
had invaded it in the First World War. Croats, on the other hand,
considered themselves superior because their territories were
economically
more developed, and because their proximity to the imperialist powers
enabled them to participate in the culture and sophistication that
accompanies wealth. In fact, Croatia's relative wealth was a major
sticking point as far as the unity of Yugoslavia was concerned, for the
Croatian bourgeoisie naturally thought that wealth should remain in
Croatia, while the dominant Serbian bourgeoisie thought it should be
more
evenly distributed – in their favour! As a result, the Serbs used their
dominance in the state organs to achieve this. Finding a formula in
which
Serb ambitions and Croat ambitions could be harmoniously accommodated
for
their mutual benefit proved impossible at the time, and relations
between
the two communities soured throughout the marriage. Yet nevertheless
there
was sufficient common interest for the parties to keep the marriage
going
and continue to look for ways to patch up their differences.
The Second World War
"The first Yugoslavia was not an unmitigated disaster doomed to end in
the
slaughter of the Second World War. That it did so has more to do with
foreign intervention and the exceptional circumstances of 1941 than any
innate desire of Serbs and Croats to wipe each other out." (Bennett,
p.33).
When the Second World War broke out, Yugoslavia initially came to an
accommodation with Hitler's Germany to allow German supplies (though not
troops) to pass through Yugoslavia to supply the German war effort in
Greece. This agreement, apparently designed to save Yugoslavia from
German
invasion, was unpopular amongst both Serbs and Croats and led to an
immediate coup d'etat, which overthrew the government. Axis forces
promptly invaded. Yugoslavia was carved up among Axis partners – Italy,
Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary all acquired sizeable portions, while
Germany took control of what was left through quisling governments –
that
of Ante Pavelic's Ustasi in Croatia and of Nedic in Serbia. The Ustasi
were a right-wing extreme Croat separatist organisation with little
popular support among Croats (their membership being estimated at 40,000
at most). Historically the organisation had opposed Croatia ever
becoming
part of Yugoslavia, and, by the outbreak of the Second World War, most
of
its membership was based in Bosnia Hercegovina rather than in Croatia
proper. It was the Ustasi who first introduced ethnic cleansing to
modern
Yugoslavia as they set about razing Serb villages in Croatian territory
with the express aim of `killing a third, forcing a third into exile and
converting the remaining third to Catholicism.' In the event, one in 6
Serbs living in the part of Yugoslavia handed over by Hitler to the
Ustasi
(the major part of Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina) were slaughtered.
This murderous activity, however, did not lead to undying enmity between
Serbs and Croats, because Tito's partisans, who fought the German
occupation of Yugoslavia as well as Serb and Croat quislings alike, was
made up of both Serbs and Croats, even if, as might be expected, Serbs
predominated – for it was after all the Serbs who were suffering most
under the German occupation. Tito himself was half Croat (the other half
Slovene).
Tito's Yugoslavia
Once the war was over, Tito's partisans seized control of the whole of
Yugoslavia from the defeated Axis powers. To reconcile the communities
that had been set against each other in the war, the new government
copied
from the Soviet Union's constitution all those elements which guaranteed
the fullest national rights to each and every one of Yugoslavia's
communities. The new constitution of Yugoslavia was adopted on 31
January
1946, setting up a federation of 6 Republics (Bosnia Hercegovina,
Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), with full rights of
secession, plus the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous
region of Kosovo within Serbia.
Although the constitution was copied from the Soviet Union, Tito's
`communism' was but a thin veneer for bourgeois Yugoslav nationalism.
What
was set up in Yugoslavia was not a communist system, but a system of
`workers' control' – i.e., production for profit, but profit to be
shared
among the workers at the production plants. Such a system was designed
to
enable a new Yugoslav bourgeoisie to emerge from among a meritocratic
elite - the production managers, who would of course take a
disproportionate share of the profits in question. Practice, however,
proved that (as indeed it had proved several times previously in world
history) that production for profit (i.e., capitalism) is incompatible
with the well-being of the majority of the workers. To the extent that
Yugoslavia of necessity had to provide civilised living standards for
the
workers who `controlled' production, it ceased to be sufficiently
profitable and would have collapsed but for one thing – the support of
foreign imperialism – above all, US imperialism. The latter was quick to
seize the opportunity, presented by the widespread belief that
Yugoslavia
was `communist', to use it as a propaganda weapon against communism
proper. Business Week of 12 November 1950 openly bragged that for the US
in particular and the West in general, supporting Tito had turned out to
be one of the least expensive ways of containing Russian communism. The
cost of western aid to Tito had amounted, at the time, to $51.7 million
–
far less than the billion dollars that the US had spent in Greece to
achieve the same result. And, in an interview in the Daily Telegraph of
12
December 1949, Anthony Eden foresaw that Tito's example and influence
would be able decisively to alter the course of events in central and
eastern Europe. The Truman administration decided to ensure that Tito's
experiment with `market socialism' was to appear to be successful, as a
means of supporting `market socialists' attempting to seize control in
the
USSR and eastern Europe. This was all part of the propaganda drive to
try
to prove to the proletariat of the whole world that scientific socialism
was wrong to claim that only a centralised planned economy can replace
and
do away with the dangerously outmoded capitalist system of production,
with its inevitable crises arising from the anarchy of production
inherent
in the capitalist system, and that only a centralised planned economy
can
guarantee to the working masses an ever-increasing standard of living.
Imperialism's ploy was to `disprove' this not only by economic blockade
and maintaining a state of constant threat of war which would hold back
the living standards of those living in communist societies, but also by
providing an apparent `living proof' that market socialism can be
successful.
Thus Bennett notes (p. 59): "Without western economic support Yugoslavia
would probably have crumbled in the face of a concerted economic
blockade
by the Soviet bloc [despite the fact that there was no economic blockade
by the western bloc!]. In September 1949, the Truman administration
granted Yugoslavia a $20 million aid package and by 1960 Yugoslavia had
consumed more than $2 billion worth of non-repayable western aid. Aid
became fundamental to Yugoslavia's development and allowed Yugoslavs to
live way beyond their means "
During these years of relative prosperity for all, underpinned by a
Constitution providing for strict equality and fairness between
Yugoslavia's communities, the Yugoslav `national question' became
quiescent. Everybody profited from being a Yugoslav. According to
Bennett
(p. 65):
"Great winners in Tito's Yugoslavia were the country's smaller and more
backward peoples, the Macedonians, Muslim Slavs, and to a lesser extent
Hungarians and Albanians. The security provided by the Titoist system
allowed Macedonian and Muslim Slavs to thrive culturally as never before
and to evolve a modern and confident national identity."
Imperialism withdraws support
Once market socialist revisionism had been planted in the Soviet Union
and
had irreversibly taken root under the aegis of Khrushchev and those who
followed him, US imperialism's enthusiasm for spending billions of
dollars
to prop up the Yugoslav economy rapidly vanished. As Bennett notes, "The
crunch came about the time of Tito's death [1980], when the loans dried
up
and Yugoslavia had to begin repaying the national debt [this had risen
from $3.5 billion in 1973 to $20.5 billion in 1981]. It coincided with
the
recession in western Europe stemmming from the Second Oil Shock of 1979,
while the debt burden was aggravated by high interest rates and an
exceptionally strong dollar. Between 1982 and 1989 the standard of
living
fell nearly 40% and in December 1989 inflation peaked at more than
2,000%."
As imperialist contributions to the Yugoslav coffers declined, so did
Yugoslav living standards. In these circumstances the bourgeois
leadership
of the Yugoslav `communist' party did what all bourgeois leaders do,
namely, find a diversion for the anger of the masses – a scapegoat to
take
the blame for the failures of the capitalist system. Hence the revival
of
Serb and Croat nationalism within Yugoslavia. In Croatia workers were
told
that their plunging living conditions were caused by unfair favouritism
within the Yugoslav state towards the Serbs. This led to a surge in the
Croatian nationalist movement, which was allowed to flourish and
propagate
its views openly. In Serbia workers were encouraged to blame the
parasitism of all other Yugoslav communities for the fall in Serbian
living standards. Yet all this propaganda, though it undoubtedly gave
rise
to virulent nationalist movements, did not prevent most ordinary people
from wanting to identify with Yugoslavia rather than their `nation', as
we
have seen from their responses to the census carried out shortly before
the fighting broke out. Ordinary people, having savoured the advantages
of
co-existence, have no interest in communal violence, but have to be
dragged into it by force.
Imperialism finally pulled the plug on Yugoslavia as eastern Europe
defected from the communist camp. Thus Bennett (p.11): "As communism
collapsed in the rest of Europe and the threat of Warsaw Pact invasion
disappeared [`Warsaw Pact invasion' is an imperialist euphemism for the
revolutionary effect that communist example has on the working masses in
capitalist countries], Yugoslavia lost the unique geopolitical position
it
had occupied in world politics for more than four decades. Diplomatic
activity and foreign investment shifted away from Yugoslavia towards
Eastern Europe's emerging democracies, and, without the Eastern bogey to
bind the country together and Western money to bail out the economy,
Yugoslavs found themselves for the first time entirely on their own."
It was at this point that Yugoslavia's ruling elites gave up their
attempts at co-operation. The relatively advanced Slovenes and Croat
bourgeoisies decided that their futures were better secured under the
aegis of German imperialism than within Yugoslavia's economic shambles
and
they bailed out. Only the Serbian bourgeoisie resisted the pressure to
become an imperialist stooge and sought to contine to battle for
economic
independence. This goal, however, was being sabotaged by the secession
of
republics, deserting to the enemy bearing with them much of Yugoslavia's
most precious assets. This is why Serbia went to war to try to prevent
the
secessions, while Europe and the US laboured to encourage them. The more
Serbia tried to halt the process of Yugoslav fragmentation by reversing
constitutional freedoms and increasing police and army control, the
louder
the howls of protest against Great Serbian chauvinism, suppression of
national rights, etc., etc., the more the masses were drawn into
communal
politics. Imperialism had Serbia caught in a bind, a trap that tightened
its hold with every attempt on Serbia's part to escape.
As is now known, Serbia was defeated in the civil war unleashed to
retain
Croatia within Yugoslavia, and again in the war to retain Bosnia
Hercegovina – largely as a result of massive assistance provided by
imperialism in the form of armaments and credits, and, in the case of
Bosnia, actual military intervention. The West's intervention ensured
that
what should have been a local difficulty requiring brisk suppression of
a
small band of frustrated compradors with little popular support actually
became a full scale war in which thousands perished and massive
destruction of homes and economic infrastructure took place – all grist
to
the mill of imperialist multinationals which looked forward to lucrative
reconstruction contracts when the war was over.
Kosovo
Kosovo is just the latest example of imperialist-inspired disintegration
of Yugoslavia. The majority Albanian population settled in the area
after
it became under-populated following the Serbian defeat by Turkish
warlords
at the battle of Kosovo Polje (the field of blackbirds) on 28 June 1389!
This battle, heavily mythologised, is the basis of Serbia's claim that
Kosovo is, despite its 90% Albanian majority, an integral part of
Serbia!
That claim, in turn, is bound to antagonise the overwhelming majority of
Kosovo's population, since there has been no Serb majority in the region
for over two centuries.
After Tito took power in Yugoslavia, there was originally no attempt
made
to win the hearts and minds of Kosovo's Albanians, who were far from
happy
to be part of Yugoslavia. They had been treated as a subject people in
pre-second world war Yugoslavia – Kosovo having been annexed by
Yugoslavia
from Albania, as a result of the latter being on the losing side in the
First World War and being too weak to prevent the loss of that
territory.
The inevitable result of this discrimination and oppression was that at
the time of the Second World War, Kossovars by and large sided with
Germany in that War. As a result of this they were poorly regarded by
Yugoslavs, who saw no reason to devote much in the way of resources to
this backward region. By the late 1960s, however, Kossovars began taking
to the streets to protest at their oppression. Tito accepted that their
grievances were justified and set about providing them with the same
rights as were enjoyed by other minority communities in Yugoslavia,
stopping short only at recognising that they had any right of secession.
Thus Albanian was recognised as the principal official language of the
region, a university was set up in Pristina as well as an institute for
promoting Albanian culture. With imperialist funds flowing freely into
Yugoslavia at the time, it was possible to direct some of this money
towards Kossovo, perhaps to dampen down any interest Kossovans might
otherwise have had in transferring their allegiance to socialist
Albania.
Hence "funds began to flow into Kosovo to finance a crash programme of
economic expansion. Albanians were encouraged to join the League of
Communists, the state administration and even the police force. Between
1971 and 1975, 70% of Kosovo's budget and investments were paid for out
of
federal sources." (Bennett, p. 72).
But the investment that flowed into Kosovo built large modern plants
that
yielded relatively few jobs. To the extent that living conditions
improved, this was largely aid-dependent.
It follows then that from 1980 onwards, as imperialism cut back its
funding of Yugoslavia, which then had to start repaying its massive
debts
from its own resources, Kosovo suffered badly. By March 1981 Kosovo
students were already demonstrating against poor living conditions and
job
prospects. Because living conditions were deteriorating all over
Yugoslavia and its government had no solution to this problem
whatsoever,
it had absolutely no way of coming to terms with the students' demands,
without encouraging like demands from other parts of the country. Its
only
possible response in the circumstances was to suppress the protests by
force. Troops and police moved into Pristina University campus to quell
the unrest. At least 12 people died and 150 were wounded. Heavy jail
sentences were imposed on demonstrators. The net effect of this was that
most of the goodwill created by the years of financial investment in
Kosovo was wiped out practically overnight.
The nationalist card
It was against Kosovo that the Yugoslav government first started playing
the nationalist card in earnest, in order to divert the anger of the
Yugoslav masses, particularly the Serbians, away from the bourgeoisified
`communist' elite (who were really responsible for the country's parlous
state):
"Articles written by [Serb] nationalists which would never have been
published during Tito's lifetime began to appear in the aftermath of the
unrest in Kosovo in 1981." Kosovan Albanians were accused of
perpetrating
genocide against Serbs, with a view to terrorising them into leaving the
region. Bennett considers that there was no truth in this allegation,
but
whether it be true or false, what cannot be denied is the fact that the
basis of Serb/Albanian co-existence began irretrievably to break down.
In
fact, Milosevic's rise to power was, in its final stages, effected
through
his willingness to encourage the most rabid Serb nationalism. His
popularity was based on telling the Serbs the lies that his party rivals
did not care tell them – i.e., that the explanation for their falling
living standards was their merciless exploitation by ungrateful
minorities
such as the Albanians. Once this nationalist analysis was unleashed,
however, it came to be directed at all Yugoslavia's non-Serb people,
turning the non-antagonistic contradictions between them into
antagonistic
ones and opening up a weakness in the fabric of the body politic which
laid Yugoslavia to decimation at the hands of imperialism as soon as the
moment for this was ripe.
The growth of nationalism was further encouraged by the conditions of
market socialism that of necessity pitted one region against the rest.
Each region sought to benefit at the expense of the rest, with the
result
that:
"All republics and provinces were guilty of pursuing their own
`national',
rather than Yugoslav, economic goals, often at the expense of the rest
of
the federation. Double capacity and even protectionism between republics
were features of Yugoslavia's economic landscape " and "instead of a
single economy, Yugoslavia was fragmenting into eight mini-states."
(Bennett, p. 75).
This was hardly the type of capitalism that was likely to thrive in a
world where to an ever larger extent it is monopolies which rule the
roost. This fragmentation went in the opposite direction of what
Yugoslavia needed to thrive, if it was ever going to thrive at all, as a
capitalist economy.
It is in this context that Milosevic resorted to the concept of Greater
Serbia to build an economic base of viable size. If minority communities
could not be maintained within Yugoslavia willingly, then they must be
retained forcibly, using as the instruments for their retention the Serb
communities scattered throughout most of the country. The English,
French
and Spanish nations were created this way, and, had there been no
outside
interference, no doubt the Yugoslav nation might have been created this
way as well. Nowadays, however, as the example of Yugoslavia shows, it
is
not possible to open up such antagonisms without powerful imperialist
predators taking advantage of the situation in order to enslave
oppressor
and oppressed alike.
Imperialism's interest in Yugoslavia
Imperialism's interests in Yugoslavia are manifold. Both European and US
imperialism want to exploit it, and disputes have arisen between them as
to the sharing of the booty. As we have seen, it was European
intervention
in recognising seceding states in the first place that lit the flames of
war. This fact is recognised even by the imperialist media. In fact the
International Herald Tribune of 20 September 1995 commented that the
whole
situation had been inflamed by imperialism, stating that western Europe,
led by Germany, had recognised Bosnia's Muslim government, knowing full
well that the Serbs would fight to overthrow it, and that from the start
the West had thrown its weight against the Bosnian Serbs. The wars were
then very greatly prolonged by US imperialism intervening just as peace
terms had been accepted on European terms to enable it to snatch victory
from European jaws and secure a good part of the booty for itself. Colin
Powell, the former US general, considered that the war in Yugoslavia was
perfectly avoidable and had taken place largely because of the
involvement
of the United States on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, whose
preponderance in Bosnian government the Bosnian Serbs could hardly be
expected to tolerate (see the New York Times of 19 September 1995).
Europe
is nevertheless forced to put up with US imperialism foraging in its
`back
yard', for, as Martin Walker of the Guardian reminded us on 9 October,
1998, (`The Kosovo Crisis: This is not the time to back down'), the US
Congress bears a great deal of the cost of rich Europe's security. Were
European imperialism to confront the US, there would be a real danger
that
"an increasingly isolationist US Congress" might no longer be prepared
to
do so. In other words, Europe is largely dependent on the United States
to
use its war machine to protect European imperialist interests all over
the
world. So long as US imperialism only demands a `fair share' and does
not
snaffle the whole of the loot, it is probable that Europeans will
continue
to put up with the situation, albeit not with any great enthusiasm.
Imperialist interests in Yugoslavia are based on a number of
considerations. First, it is another useful base from which to launch
military strikes against the oil-producing countries to the south,
should
they take it into their heads to challenge imperialism's right to drain
their oil wells at prices largely dictated by imperialism. It serves
equally well as a useful military base to launch military strikes
against
Russia to the north, should either its bourgeoisie stop co-operating
with
Western imperialism or should the proletariat rise up to make revolution
once again.
Second, Yugoslavia – and in particular Serbia – stands on the most
favoured route for an oil pipeline to convey Caucasian oil to the west.
It
is therefore crucial that Serbia be governed by a government responsive
to
Western imperialist demands.
Third, imperialism is interested in exploiting local resources and
markets. Control of the government means control of government
contracts.
For this reason also, every imperialist wants its own men installed in
each of the ex-Yugoslav states.
As far as Kosovo itself is concerned, Christopher Hedges in the New York
Times positively drooled over the wealth of the Stari Trg mining
complex,
containing glittering veins of lead, zinc, cadmium, gold and silver.
"The
Stari Trg mine, with its warehouses, is ringed with smelting plants, 17
metal treatment sights, freight yards, railroad lines, a power plant and
the country's largest battery plant", says Hedges. Lignite deposits in
the
Kosovo mines are sufficient for the next 13 centuries and the capacity
of
the lead and zinc refineries rank third in the world. The Trepce mining
complex, also in Kosovo, is "the most valuable piece of real estate in
the
Balkans worth at least $5 billion." Kosovo also has 17 billion tons of
coal reserves. These mines alone are sufficient to explain the interest
of
imperialism in prising Kosovo out of the Serbian grasp and the equal
determination of the Serbians never to let go of the `cradle of the
Serbian nation'.
In order to get their hands on Kosovo, European and US imperialism have
both been playing games in the region and, as with Bosnia, it seems that
once again US imperialism may be stepping in to secure a larger share of
the spoils than European imperialism considers is justified by US
imperialism's previous commitment to the cause. Nevertheless, joint US
and
Europeah efforts had been directed through the so-called Kosovo
Liberation
Army (KLA), trained and financed by US imperialism: the US Public
Broadcasting Service of 15 July reported that US Vietnam war veterans
were
training the KLA at bases in Albania and Kosovo. And at the scene of a
KLA
atrocity (the abduction, murder and incineration of 10 Serb civilians),
reported by the Guardian of 5 September 1998, a freshly-abandoned KLA
camp, there were left behind "several hundred yellow humanitarian aid
packages with an American flag on the label." along with a massive
arsenal
of expensive weaponry. There seems little doubt that the KLA massacres
were designed to inflame Serb nationalism and invite reprisals. In fact,
even Mark Almond in the Independent on Sunday of 4 October 1998 – as
great
an opponent of Serbia as can be found anywhere - writes: "There can be
little doubt that the KLA has pursued a policy designed to provoke
reprisals from the Serbs ..." (`Never again' again).
Much to the disgust of imperialism, the KLA collapsed in just seven
weeks
when faced with Serbian troops, thus giving lie to its alleged popular
support. Despite the millions of $US poured into it, the KLA proved
unequal to the task of capturing Kosovo for US imperialism.
As a result US imperialism determined on the course of forcing Milosevic
to open up Kosovo to imperialist exploitation by threatening to bomb
Serbian infrastructure to smithereens should he fail to surrender, in
the
same way as Iraqi infrastructure was smashed at a huge cost in human
suffering to the Iraqi people simply because Iraq would not bow to US
imperialist demands.
America's European allies, apart from Tony Blair who does not have a
scruple to his name, have been highly critical of the US intention to
use
NATO to effect the bombing raids, in blatant disregard of international
law to which the Europeans are in the habit of at least paying lip
service. Even the Daily Mail's Stephen Glover, in an article entitled
`British bombers must NOT go in' felt constrained to point out that
"legally speaking Kosovo is as much part of Serbia as Northern Ireland
is
part of the United Kingdom.
"I can't think of another example of British troops attacking a regime
for
mistreating its own citizens within its own borders.
"Do we think there is a sufficiently good justification for throwing
away
the rule book that has governed relations between states? My own test
would be one of proportion. I can imagine supporting action against a
regime that was committing mass genocide against its own people. But the
example scarcely holds good here. Most estimates suggest that the Serbs
have been responsible for some 1,000 deaths in Kosovo ...
"Moreover, Milosevic's main enemy, the Maoist-inclined KLA, is hardly a
bunch of angels. Its followers have used terrorist methods against
Serbian
targets"
This article draws attention to some very important factors: the sheer
illegality of NATO's proposed interference in the internal affairs of
sovereign states; the relatively small scale of atrocities committed by
Serbia in the course of putting down an armed rebellion. The allegation
that the KLA is `Maoist-inclined', however, should be taken with a pinch
of salt, for US imperialism, which certainly supported the KLA, does not
support `Maoists'. Such `Maoism' as the KLA may profess could at best be
purely cosmetic.
In face of the collapse of the KLA, imperialism would appear to have
abandoned for the time being the aim of setting up an independent
Kosovan
entity, or of joining Kosovo to Albania, in favour of simply
pressurising
Milosevic to do their bidding in return for letting Kosovo remain within
Yugoslavia. Ian Bruce in the Herald of 8 October (`When the talking
stops') claims that this is because "No Western country wanted a rogue,
uncontrollable Islamic state gaining independence on its southern flank,
a
potential haven for militants and terrorists. There still exists the
risk
of a wider ethnic war uniting people of Albanian descent against Greeks,
Macedonians and Bulgarians. The shock waves from that might easily push
Turkey and Russia into a conflagration that could shatter NATO itself."
David Buchan of the Financial Times (5 October 1998) advances a
different
reason for not favouring the secession of Kosovo: "The West," he says,
"does not want to see any re-drawing of international boundaries in the
Balkans. It does not want to endorse independence for Kosovo for fear
that, once it happened, the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia might
want to join up with the Kosovar Albanians and both might want to merge
with Albania proper".
If Kosovo were allowed independence, then there would be absolutely no
basis, he argues, for refusing the Bosnian Serbs the right to secede and
join Greater Serbia, an outcome he considers unthinkable.
It is probable, however, that the one and only reason why imperialism is
no longer pressing for Kosovo's independence is that the KLA has
collapsed, no `credible' and reliable potential puppet government can
therefore be identified, and imperialism has decided it can in any event
achieve its aims by putting pressure on Milosevic, at least for the time
being. No doubt it will take advantage of the next few months to regroup
a
force of loyal quislings in the province, and if successful, worries
about
upsetting the regional balance of forces should Kosovo secede will
disappear.
Our view is that of the two enemies facing the people of Kosovo,
imperialism is infinitely more dangerous and brutal than Serb
nationalism.
All imperialist intervention in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia must
be
vigorously opposed, and the people of Yugoslavia and former Yugoslavia
must be left to settle their differences by themselves. Now, as in 1913,
the people of Yugoslavia can expect nothing from the bourgeoisie for, as
Lenin explained in The Balkan War and Bourgeois Chauvinism written in
March of that year:
"What was the real historical reason for settling urgent Balkan problems
by means of a war, a war guided by bougeois and dynastic interests? The
chief cause was the weakness of the proletariat in the Balkans, and also
the reactionary influence and pressure of the powerful European
bourgeoisie. They are afraid of real freedom both in their own countries
and in the Balkans; their only aim is profit at other people's expense;
they stir up chauvinism and national enmity to faciliate their policy of
plunder and to impede the free development of the oppressed classes of
the
Balkans..."
Kosovo - Another Victim of Predatory Imperialism
Introduction
As our television screens are filled with pictures of horrible
atrocities
that have been committed against innocent Kosovan Albanians, just as not
so long ago they were filled with even worse atrocities committed
against
Bosnian Muslims, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
imperialist media expect people to draw: that the Serbian leader,
Milosevic, is an inhuman monster cast in the mould of Adolf Hitler,
which
the `international community' (i.e., US imperialism, backed up by
British
imperialism) has a right – a duty even – to overthrow by any means
necessary. The means being advocated is bombing of Serbian
infrastructure
– though most of the quality newspapers are not at all sure what that
would achieve, other than to unify the Serbian people more firmly than
ever behind Milosevic.
While imperialism is appealing to our humanitarian instincts, our hatred
of human suffering, we must never lose sight of the fact that
humanitarianism is entirely alien to imperialism. As we look around and
see the suffering and thousands of deaths of the innocent occurring in
Iraq, for example, as a result of the blockade imposed by US
imperialism,
and its attempts to strangle North Korea and Cuba, to say nothing of
bombing raids on Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, as we remember imperialism's
genocidal wars of aggression in Korea and Vietnam, we can find no basis
for US imperialism to condemn anybody as war criminals unless it first
starts with itself. Its `humanitarianism' is obviously just a propaganda
ploy to mobilise people and nations in its support.
Knowing all this, should we nevertheless support US imperialism in its
determination to interfere in Yugoslavia's affairs, regardless of what
might be its real motives, in order to bring an end to the horrible
suffering of Kosovan Albanians? Subjected to the Pax Americana, would
they
not at least be relieved of the horrors of Serbian misrule?
This article will argue quite categorically that imposition of the Pax
Americana should be fought at any cost since for the masses of people,
life under imperialist domination would be far harder than ever it was
under Serbia. The bloodshed would not stop, since US imperialism is far
more ruthless in wiping out its opponents than the Serbians could ever
be.
All that would change is that we would not see these massacres on the
television, which rarely, if ever, shows us pictures of the atrocities
committed by US allies: for instance, the atrocities committed against
the
Serbs by the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims or the Kosovo Liberation
Army.
Even to the extent that extreme Serbian nationalism has been guilty of
provoking bloodshed, the scale of the bloodletting has been made
possible
only by the intervention of outside forces, principally western
imperialism, in supplying armaments and finance to rival nationalists
from
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Had it not been for this outside
interference, Yugoslavia's domestic feuds would never have escalated and
spiralled out of the control of the local protagonists in the way that
they have done. The Serb leadership is certainly to blame for fanning
the
flames of nationalism, but it is western imperialism that has poured
petrol on these flames and set the whole region alight.
Background to the Balkan crisis
Let us endeavour, then, to try to understand how the present parlous
situation has arisen in Yugoslavia, blowing up seemingly out of nowhere
when only 15 short years ago "Yugoslavia could, and did, walk tall in
the
world boasting of the cultural diversity which made their country
unique"
(Bennett, C., Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse, Hurst & Company, London,
1995,
p. 7). Moreover, far from nationalism being on the increase, and
despite
the best endeavours of nationalist politicians, "Yugoslavia's last
census,
which was carried out months before fighting broke out, registered a
jump
in the numbers of people who considered themselves Yugoslav, rather than
Croat, Serb or any other nationality" (ibid. p. 9).
There was a great deal within Yugoslavia which favoured the emergence of
a
Yugoslav national identity to take the place of `national' identities
based partly on religious difference and partly on which feudal empire
happened to have ruled the different regions inhabited by South Slavs.
The
Serb and Croat spoken languages are very close: in fact they are in
effect
the same language adulterated in different regions by a heavy input of
different neighbouring languages. Both Serbs and Croats have a history
of
struggle against foreign rule, and of mutual co-operation during those
struggles, although the oppressor in the case of the Serbs was the
Ottoman
empire while in the case of the Croats it was the Habsburg
(Austro-Hungarian) empire. In Yugoslavia Croats and Serbs had a common
territory incorporating all those areas, such as Bosnia Hercegovina,
where
neither Serb nor Croat nor anybody else constituted a majority of the
population. Muslims, incidentally, were originally Serbs who converted
to
Islam during the Ottoman empire. Their conversion took them out of the
Orthodox Christian community to which most Serbs belonged and which was
under Ottoman rule a self-governing entity. Muslim converts came under
different laws and a different system of governance, leading Muslims to
cease to identify with the Serbs. But there was no reason why in a
strictly secular society Muslims should not identify with Yugoslavia,
for
they had so much common history with Serbs that only religion really
stood
between them once the peculiar forms of Ottoman self-governance were
removed.
>From the point of view of nascent capitalism, it made much more sense to
create a home market over a geographical area of the size (and
containing
the natural resources) of an average European country at least, rather
than try to make one's mark in some Serb, Croat or Bosnian
mini-statelet.
The ousting of the Ottoman empire by the Serbs, and the break-up of the
Habsburg empire as a consequence of its defeat in the First World War,
made the realisation of Yugoslavia possible, although tensions between
Serb and Croat within the new state (which came into being in 1918) were
inevitable, if only to the extent that they had been pitted against each
other in the war by the Austro-Hungarian empire.
The marriage of Serb and Croat, however, foundered on major
incompatibilities. Serbs considered themselves superior as having fought
for, and won, their own independence from imperial rule, and having
fought
for, and won, the liberation of their territory from Austro-Hungary,
which
had invaded it in the First World War. Croats, on the other hand,
considered themselves superior because their territories were
economically
more developed, and because their proximity to the imperialist powers
enabled them to participate in the culture and sophistication that
accompanies wealth. In fact, Croatia's relative wealth was a major
sticking point as far as the unity of Yugoslavia was concerned, for the
Croatian bourgeoisie naturally thought that wealth should remain in
Croatia, while the dominant Serbian bourgeoisie thought it should be
more
evenly distributed – in their favour! As a result, the Serbs used their
dominance in the state organs to achieve this. Finding a formula in
which
Serb ambitions and Croat ambitions could be harmoniously accommodated
for
their mutual benefit proved impossible at the time, and relations
between
the two communities soured throughout the marriage. Yet nevertheless
there
was sufficient common interest for the parties to keep the marriage
going
and continue to look for ways to patch up their differences.
The Second World War
"The first Yugoslavia was not an unmitigated disaster doomed to end in
the
slaughter of the Second World War. That it did so has more to do with
foreign intervention and the exceptional circumstances of 1941 than any
innate desire of Serbs and Croats to wipe each other out." (Bennett,
p.33).
When the Second World War broke out, Yugoslavia initially came to an
accommodation with Hitler's Germany to allow German supplies (though not
troops) to pass through Yugoslavia to supply the German war effort in
Greece. This agreement, apparently designed to save Yugoslavia from
German
invasion, was unpopular amongst both Serbs and Croats and led to an
immediate coup d'etat, which overthrew the government. Axis forces
promptly invaded. Yugoslavia was carved up among Axis partners – Italy,
Bulgaria, Albania and Hungary all acquired sizeable portions, while
Germany took control of what was left through quisling governments –
that
of Ante Pavelic's Ustasi in Croatia and of Nedic in Serbia. The Ustasi
were a right-wing extreme Croat separatist organisation with little
popular support among Croats (their membership being estimated at 40,000
at most). Historically the organisation had opposed Croatia ever
becoming
part of Yugoslavia, and, by the outbreak of the Second World War, most
of
its membership was based in Bosnia Hercegovina rather than in Croatia
proper. It was the Ustasi who first introduced ethnic cleansing to
modern
Yugoslavia as they set about razing Serb villages in Croatian territory
with the express aim of `killing a third, forcing a third into exile and
converting the remaining third to Catholicism.' In the event, one in 6
Serbs living in the part of Yugoslavia handed over by Hitler to the
Ustasi
(the major part of Croatia and Bosnia Hercegovina) were slaughtered.
This murderous activity, however, did not lead to undying enmity between
Serbs and Croats, because Tito's partisans, who fought the German
occupation of Yugoslavia as well as Serb and Croat quislings alike, was
made up of both Serbs and Croats, even if, as might be expected, Serbs
predominated – for it was after all the Serbs who were suffering most
under the German occupation. Tito himself was half Croat (the other half
Slovene).
Tito's Yugoslavia
Once the war was over, Tito's partisans seized control of the whole of
Yugoslavia from the defeated Axis powers. To reconcile the communities
that had been set against each other in the war, the new government
copied
from the Soviet Union's constitution all those elements which guaranteed
the fullest national rights to each and every one of Yugoslavia's
communities. The new constitution of Yugoslavia was adopted on 31
January
1946, setting up a federation of 6 Republics (Bosnia Hercegovina,
Croatia,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia), with full rights of
secession, plus the autonomous province of Vojvodina and the autonomous
region of Kosovo within Serbia.
Although the constitution was copied from the Soviet Union, Tito's
`communism' was but a thin veneer for bourgeois Yugoslav nationalism.
What
was set up in Yugoslavia was not a communist system, but a system of
`workers' control' – i.e., production for profit, but profit to be
shared
among the workers at the production plants. Such a system was designed
to
enable a new Yugoslav bourgeoisie to emerge from among a meritocratic
elite - the production managers, who would of course take a
disproportionate share of the profits in question. Practice, however,
proved that (as indeed it had proved several times previously in world
history) that production for profit (i.e., capitalism) is incompatible
with the well-being of the majority of the workers. To the extent that
Yugoslavia of necessity had to provide civilised living standards for
the
workers who `controlled' production, it ceased to be sufficiently
profitable and would have collapsed but for one thing – the support of
foreign imperialism – above all, US imperialism. The latter was quick to
seize the opportunity, presented by the widespread belief that
Yugoslavia
was `communist', to use it as a propaganda weapon against communism
proper. Business Week of 12 November 1950 openly bragged that for the US
in particular and the West in general, supporting Tito had turned out to
be one of the least expensive ways of containing Russian communism. The
cost of western aid to Tito had amounted, at the time, to $51.7 million
–
far less than the billion dollars that the US had spent in Greece to
achieve the same result. And, in an interview in the Daily Telegraph of
12
December 1949, Anthony Eden foresaw that Tito's example and influence
would be able decisively to alter the course of events in central and
eastern Europe. The Truman administration decided to ensure that Tito's
experiment with `market socialism' was to appear to be successful, as a
means of supporting `market socialists' attempting to seize control in
the
USSR and eastern Europe. This was all part of the propaganda drive to
try
to prove to the proletariat of the whole world that scientific socialism
was wrong to claim that only a centralised planned economy can replace
and
do away with the dangerously outmoded capitalist system of production,
with its inevitable crises arising from the anarchy of production
inherent
in the capitalist system, and that only a centralised planned economy
can
guarantee to the working masses an ever-increasing standard of living.
Imperialism's ploy was to `disprove' this not only by economic blockade
and maintaining a state of constant threat of war which would hold back
the living standards of those living in communist societies, but also by
providing an apparent `living proof' that market socialism can be
successful.
Thus Bennett notes (p. 59): "Without western economic support Yugoslavia
would probably have crumbled in the face of a concerted economic
blockade
by the Soviet bloc [despite the fact that there was no economic blockade
by the western bloc!]. In September 1949, the Truman administration
granted Yugoslavia a $20 million aid package and by 1960 Yugoslavia had
consumed more than $2 billion worth of non-repayable western aid. Aid
became fundamental to Yugoslavia's development and allowed Yugoslavs to
live way beyond their means "
During these years of relative prosperity for all, underpinned by a
Constitution providing for strict equality and fairness between
Yugoslavia's communities, the Yugoslav `national question' became
quiescent. Everybody profited from being a Yugoslav. According to
Bennett
(p. 65):
"Great winners in Tito's Yugoslavia were the country's smaller and more
backward peoples, the Macedonians, Muslim Slavs, and to a lesser extent
Hungarians and Albanians. The security provided by the Titoist system
allowed Macedonian and Muslim Slavs to thrive culturally as never before
and to evolve a modern and confident national identity."
Imperialism withdraws support
Once market socialist revisionism had been planted in the Soviet Union
and
had irreversibly taken root under the aegis of Khrushchev and those who
followed him, US imperialism's enthusiasm for spending billions of
dollars
to prop up the Yugoslav economy rapidly vanished. As Bennett notes, "The
crunch came about the time of Tito's death [1980], when the loans dried
up
and Yugoslavia had to begin repaying the national debt [this had risen
from $3.5 billion in 1973 to $20.5 billion in 1981]. It coincided with
the
recession in western Europe stemmming from the Second Oil Shock of 1979,
while the debt burden was aggravated by high interest rates and an
exceptionally strong dollar. Between 1982 and 1989 the standard of
living
fell nearly 40% and in December 1989 inflation peaked at more than
2,000%."
As imperialist contributions to the Yugoslav coffers declined, so did
Yugoslav living standards. In these circumstances the bourgeois
leadership
of the Yugoslav `communist' party did what all bourgeois leaders do,
namely, find a diversion for the anger of the masses – a scapegoat to
take
the blame for the failures of the capitalist system. Hence the revival
of
Serb and Croat nationalism within Yugoslavia. In Croatia workers were
told
that their plunging living conditions were caused by unfair favouritism
within the Yugoslav state towards the Serbs. This led to a surge in the
Croatian nationalist movement, which was allowed to flourish and
propagate
its views openly. In Serbia workers were encouraged to blame the
parasitism of all other Yugoslav communities for the fall in Serbian
living standards. Yet all this propaganda, though it undoubtedly gave
rise
to virulent nationalist movements, did not prevent most ordinary people
from wanting to identify with Yugoslavia rather than their `nation', as
we
have seen from their responses to the census carried out shortly before
the fighting broke out. Ordinary people, having savoured the advantages
of
co-existence, have no interest in communal violence, but have to be
dragged into it by force.
Imperialism finally pulled the plug on Yugoslavia as eastern Europe
defected from the communist camp. Thus Bennett (p.11): "As communism
collapsed in the rest of Europe and the threat of Warsaw Pact invasion
disappeared [`Warsaw Pact invasion' is an imperialist euphemism for the
revolutionary effect that communist example has on the working masses in
capitalist countries], Yugoslavia lost the unique geopolitical position
it
had occupied in world politics for more than four decades. Diplomatic
activity and foreign investment shifted away from Yugoslavia towards
Eastern Europe's emerging democracies, and, without the Eastern bogey to
bind the country together and Western money to bail out the economy,
Yugoslavs found themselves for the first time entirely on their own."
It was at this point that Yugoslavia's ruling elites gave up their
attempts at co-operation. The relatively advanced Slovenes and Croat
bourgeoisies decided that their futures were better secured under the
aegis of German imperialism than within Yugoslavia's economic shambles
and
they bailed out. Only the Serbian bourgeoisie resisted the pressure to
become an imperialist stooge and sought to contine to battle for
economic
independence. This goal, however, was being sabotaged by the secession
of
republics, deserting to the enemy bearing with them much of Yugoslavia's
most precious assets. This is why Serbia went to war to try to prevent
the
secessions, while Europe and the US laboured to encourage them. The more
Serbia tried to halt the process of Yugoslav fragmentation by reversing
constitutional freedoms and increasing police and army control, the
louder
the howls of protest against Great Serbian chauvinism, suppression of
national rights, etc., etc., the more the masses were drawn into
communal
politics. Imperialism had Serbia caught in a bind, a trap that tightened
its hold with every attempt on Serbia's part to escape.
As is now known, Serbia was defeated in the civil war unleashed to
retain
Croatia within Yugoslavia, and again in the war to retain Bosnia
Hercegovina – largely as a result of massive assistance provided by
imperialism in the form of armaments and credits, and, in the case of
Bosnia, actual military intervention. The West's intervention ensured
that
what should have been a local difficulty requiring brisk suppression of
a
small band of frustrated compradors with little popular support actually
became a full scale war in which thousands perished and massive
destruction of homes and economic infrastructure took place – all grist
to
the mill of imperialist multinationals which looked forward to lucrative
reconstruction contracts when the war was over.
Kosovo
Kosovo is just the latest example of imperialist-inspired disintegration
of Yugoslavia. The majority Albanian population settled in the area
after
it became under-populated following the Serbian defeat by Turkish
warlords
at the battle of Kosovo Polje (the field of blackbirds) on 28 June 1389!
This battle, heavily mythologised, is the basis of Serbia's claim that
Kosovo is, despite its 90% Albanian majority, an integral part of
Serbia!
That claim, in turn, is bound to antagonise the overwhelming majority of
Kosovo's population, since there has been no Serb majority in the region
for over two centuries.
After Tito took power in Yugoslavia, there was originally no attempt
made
to win the hearts and minds of Kosovo's Albanians, who were far from
happy
to be part of Yugoslavia. They had been treated as a subject people in
pre-second world war Yugoslavia – Kosovo having been annexed by
Yugoslavia
from Albania, as a result of the latter being on the losing side in the
First World War and being too weak to prevent the loss of that
territory.
The inevitable result of this discrimination and oppression was that at
the time of the Second World War, Kossovars by and large sided with
Germany in that War. As a result of this they were poorly regarded by
Yugoslavs, who saw no reason to devote much in the way of resources to
this backward region. By the late 1960s, however, Kossovars began taking
to the streets to protest at their oppression. Tito accepted that their
grievances were justified and set about providing them with the same
rights as were enjoyed by other minority communities in Yugoslavia,
stopping short only at recognising that they had any right of secession.
Thus Albanian was recognised as the principal official language of the
region, a university was set up in Pristina as well as an institute for
promoting Albanian culture. With imperialist funds flowing freely into
Yugoslavia at the time, it was possible to direct some of this money
towards Kossovo, perhaps to dampen down any interest Kossovans might
otherwise have had in transferring their allegiance to socialist
Albania.
Hence "funds began to flow into Kosovo to finance a crash programme of
economic expansion. Albanians were encouraged to join the League of
Communists, the state administration and even the police force. Between
1971 and 1975, 70% of Kosovo's budget and investments were paid for out
of
federal sources." (Bennett, p. 72).
But the investment that flowed into Kosovo built large modern plants
that
yielded relatively few jobs. To the extent that living conditions
improved, this was largely aid-dependent.
It follows then that from 1980 onwards, as imperialism cut back its
funding of Yugoslavia, which then had to start repaying its massive
debts
from its own resources, Kosovo suffered badly. By March 1981 Kosovo
students were already demonstrating against poor living conditions and
job
prospects. Because living conditions were deteriorating all over
Yugoslavia and its government had no solution to this problem
whatsoever,
it had absolutely no way of coming to terms with the students' demands,
without encouraging like demands from other parts of the country. Its
only
possible response in the circumstances was to suppress the protests by
force. Troops and police moved into Pristina University campus to quell
the unrest. At least 12 people died and 150 were wounded. Heavy jail
sentences were imposed on demonstrators. The net effect of this was that
most of the goodwill created by the years of financial investment in
Kosovo was wiped out practically overnight.
The nationalist card
It was against Kosovo that the Yugoslav government first started playing
the nationalist card in earnest, in order to divert the anger of the
Yugoslav masses, particularly the Serbians, away from the bourgeoisified
`communist' elite (who were really responsible for the country's parlous
state):
"Articles written by [Serb] nationalists which would never have been
published during Tito's lifetime began to appear in the aftermath of the
unrest in Kosovo in 1981." Kosovan Albanians were accused of
perpetrating
genocide against Serbs, with a view to terrorising them into leaving the
region. Bennett considers that there was no truth in this allegation,
but
whether it be true or false, what cannot be denied is the fact that the
basis of Serb/Albanian co-existence began irretrievably to break down.
In
fact, Milosevic's rise to power was, in its final stages, effected
through
his willingness to encourage the most rabid Serb nationalism. His
popularity was based on telling the Serbs the lies that his party rivals
did not care tell them – i.e., that the explanation for their falling
living standards was their merciless exploitation by ungrateful
minorities
such as the Albanians. Once this nationalist analysis was unleashed,
however, it came to be directed at all Yugoslavia's non-Serb people,
turning the non-antagonistic contradictions between them into
antagonistic
ones and opening up a weakness in the fabric of the body politic which
laid Yugoslavia to decimation at the hands of imperialism as soon as the
moment for this was ripe.
The growth of nationalism was further encouraged by the conditions of
market socialism that of necessity pitted one region against the rest.
Each region sought to benefit at the expense of the rest, with the
result
that:
"All republics and provinces were guilty of pursuing their own
`national',
rather than Yugoslav, economic goals, often at the expense of the rest
of
the federation. Double capacity and even protectionism between republics
were features of Yugoslavia's economic landscape " and "instead of a
single economy, Yugoslavia was fragmenting into eight mini-states."
(Bennett, p. 75).
This was hardly the type of capitalism that was likely to thrive in a
world where to an ever larger extent it is monopolies which rule the
roost. This fragmentation went in the opposite direction of what
Yugoslavia needed to thrive, if it was ever going to thrive at all, as a
capitalist economy.
It is in this context that Milosevic resorted to the concept of Greater
Serbia to build an economic base of viable size. If minority communities
could not be maintained within Yugoslavia willingly, then they must be
retained forcibly, using as the instruments for their retention the Serb
communities scattered throughout most of the country. The English,
French
and Spanish nations were created this way, and, had there been no
outside
interference, no doubt the Yugoslav nation might have been created this
way as well. Nowadays, however, as the example of Yugoslavia shows, it
is
not possible to open up such antagonisms without powerful imperialist
predators taking advantage of the situation in order to enslave
oppressor
and oppressed alike.
Imperialism's interest in Yugoslavia
Imperialism's interests in Yugoslavia are manifold. Both European and US
imperialism want to exploit it, and disputes have arisen between them as
to the sharing of the booty. As we have seen, it was European
intervention
in recognising seceding states in the first place that lit the flames of
war. This fact is recognised even by the imperialist media. In fact the
International Herald Tribune of 20 September 1995 commented that the
whole
situation had been inflamed by imperialism, stating that western Europe,
led by Germany, had recognised Bosnia's Muslim government, knowing full
well that the Serbs would fight to overthrow it, and that from the start
the West had thrown its weight against the Bosnian Serbs. The wars were
then very greatly prolonged by US imperialism intervening just as peace
terms had been accepted on European terms to enable it to snatch victory
from European jaws and secure a good part of the booty for itself. Colin
Powell, the former US general, considered that the war in Yugoslavia was
perfectly avoidable and had taken place largely because of the
involvement
of the United States on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, whose
preponderance in Bosnian government the Bosnian Serbs could hardly be
expected to tolerate (see the New York Times of 19 September 1995).
Europe
is nevertheless forced to put up with US imperialism foraging in its
`back
yard', for, as Martin Walker of the Guardian reminded us on 9 October,
1998, (`The Kosovo Crisis: This is not the time to back down'), the US
Congress bears a great deal of the cost of rich Europe's security. Were
European imperialism to confront the US, there would be a real danger
that
"an increasingly isolationist US Congress" might no longer be prepared
to
do so. In other words, Europe is largely dependent on the United States
to
use its war machine to protect European imperialist interests all over
the
world. So long as US imperialism only demands a `fair share' and does
not
snaffle the whole of the loot, it is probable that Europeans will
continue
to put up with the situation, albeit not with any great enthusiasm.
Imperialist interests in Yugoslavia are based on a number of
considerations. First, it is another useful base from which to launch
military strikes against the oil-producing countries to the south,
should
they take it into their heads to challenge imperialism's right to drain
their oil wells at prices largely dictated by imperialism. It serves
equally well as a useful military base to launch military strikes
against
Russia to the north, should either its bourgeoisie stop co-operating
with
Western imperialism or should the proletariat rise up to make revolution
once again.
Second, Yugoslavia – and in particular Serbia – stands on the most
favoured route for an oil pipeline to convey Caucasian oil to the west.
It
is therefore crucial that Serbia be governed by a government responsive
to
Western imperialist demands.
Third, imperialism is interested in exploiting local resources and
markets. Control of the government means control of government
contracts.
For this reason also, every imperialist wants its own men installed in
each of the ex-Yugoslav states.
As far as Kosovo itself is concerned, Christopher Hedges in the New York
Times positively drooled over the wealth of the Stari Trg mining
complex,
containing glittering veins of lead, zinc, cadmium, gold and silver.
"The
Stari Trg mine, with its warehouses, is ringed with smelting plants, 17
metal treatment sights, freight yards, railroad lines, a power plant and
the country's largest battery plant", says Hedges. Lignite deposits in
the
Kosovo mines are sufficient for the next 13 centuries and the capacity
of
the lead and zinc refineries rank third in the world. The Trepce mining
complex, also in Kosovo, is "the most valuable piece of real estate in
the
Balkans worth at least $5 billion." Kosovo also has 17 billion tons of
coal reserves. These mines alone are sufficient to explain the interest
of
imperialism in prising Kosovo out of the Serbian grasp and the equal
determination of the Serbians never to let go of the `cradle of the
Serbian nation'.
In order to get their hands on Kosovo, European and US imperialism have
both been playing games in the region and, as with Bosnia, it seems that
once again US imperialism may be stepping in to secure a larger share of
the spoils than European imperialism considers is justified by US
imperialism's previous commitment to the cause. Nevertheless, joint US
and
Europeah efforts had been directed through the so-called Kosovo
Liberation
Army (KLA), trained and financed by US imperialism: the US Public
Broadcasting Service of 15 July reported that US Vietnam war veterans
were
training the KLA at bases in Albania and Kosovo. And at the scene of a
KLA
atrocity (the abduction, murder and incineration of 10 Serb civilians),
reported by the Guardian of 5 September 1998, a freshly-abandoned KLA
camp, there were left behind "several hundred yellow humanitarian aid
packages with an American flag on the label." along with a massive
arsenal
of expensive weaponry. There seems little doubt that the KLA massacres
were designed to inflame Serb nationalism and invite reprisals. In fact,
even Mark Almond in the Independent on Sunday of 4 October 1998 – as
great
an opponent of Serbia as can be found anywhere - writes: "There can be
little doubt that the KLA has pursued a policy designed to provoke
reprisals from the Serbs ..." (`Never again' again).
Much to the disgust of imperialism, the KLA collapsed in just seven
weeks
when faced with Serbian troops, thus giving lie to its alleged popular
support. Despite the millions of $US poured into it, the KLA proved
unequal to the task of capturing Kosovo for US imperialism.
As a result US imperialism determined on the course of forcing Milosevic
to open up Kosovo to imperialist exploitation by threatening to bomb
Serbian infrastructure to smithereens should he fail to surrender, in
the
same way as Iraqi infrastructure was smashed at a huge cost in human
suffering to the Iraqi people simply because Iraq would not bow to US
imperialist demands.
America's European allies, apart from Tony Blair who does not have a
scruple to his name, have been highly critical of the US intention to
use
NATO to effect the bombing raids, in blatant disregard of international
law to which the Europeans are in the habit of at least paying lip
service. Even the Daily Mail's Stephen Glover, in an article entitled
`British bombers must NOT go in' felt constrained to point out that
"legally speaking Kosovo is as much part of Serbia as Northern Ireland
is
part of the United Kingdom.
"I can't think of another example of British troops attacking a regime
for
mistreating its own citizens within its own borders.
"Do we think there is a sufficiently good justification for throwing
away
the rule book that has governed relations between states? My own test
would be one of proportion. I can imagine supporting action against a
regime that was committing mass genocide against its own people. But the
example scarcely holds good here. Most estimates suggest that the Serbs
have been responsible for some 1,000 deaths in Kosovo ...
"Moreover, Milosevic's main enemy, the Maoist-inclined KLA, is hardly a
bunch of angels. Its followers have used terrorist methods against
Serbian
targets"
This article draws attention to some very important factors: the sheer
illegality of NATO's proposed interference in the internal affairs of
sovereign states; the relatively small scale of atrocities committed by
Serbia in the course of putting down an armed rebellion. The allegation
that the KLA is `Maoist-inclined', however, should be taken with a pinch
of salt, for US imperialism, which certainly supported the KLA, does not
support `Maoists'. Such `Maoism' as the KLA may profess could at best be
purely cosmetic.
In face of the collapse of the KLA, imperialism would appear to have
abandoned for the time being the aim of setting up an independent
Kosovan
entity, or of joining Kosovo to Albania, in favour of simply
pressurising
Milosevic to do their bidding in return for letting Kosovo remain within
Yugoslavia. Ian Bruce in the Herald of 8 October (`When the talking
stops') claims that this is because "No Western country wanted a rogue,
uncontrollable Islamic state gaining independence on its southern flank,
a
potential haven for militants and terrorists. There still exists the
risk
of a wider ethnic war uniting people of Albanian descent against Greeks,
Macedonians and Bulgarians. The shock waves from that might easily push
Turkey and Russia into a conflagration that could shatter NATO itself."
David Buchan of the Financial Times (5 October 1998) advances a
different
reason for not favouring the secession of Kosovo: "The West," he says,
"does not want to see any re-drawing of international boundaries in the
Balkans. It does not want to endorse independence for Kosovo for fear
that, once it happened, the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia might
want to join up with the Kosovar Albanians and both might want to merge
with Albania proper".
If Kosovo were allowed independence, then there would be absolutely no
basis, he argues, for refusing the Bosnian Serbs the right to secede and
join Greater Serbia, an outcome he considers unthinkable.
It is probable, however, that the one and only reason why imperialism is
no longer pressing for Kosovo's independence is that the KLA has
collapsed, no `credible' and reliable potential puppet government can
therefore be identified, and imperialism has decided it can in any event
achieve its aims by putting pressure on Milosevic, at least for the time
being. No doubt it will take advantage of the next few months to regroup
a
force of loyal quislings in the province, and if successful, worries
about
upsetting the regional balance of forces should Kosovo secede will
disappear.
Our view is that of the two enemies facing the people of Kosovo,
imperialism is infinitely more dangerous and brutal than Serb
nationalism.
All imperialist intervention in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia must
be
vigorously opposed, and the people of Yugoslavia and former Yugoslavia
must be left to settle their differences by themselves. Now, as in 1913,
the people of Yugoslavia can expect nothing from the bourgeoisie for, as
Lenin explained in The Balkan War and Bourgeois Chauvinism written in
March of that year:
"What was the real historical reason for settling urgent Balkan problems
by means of a war, a war guided by bougeois and dynastic interests? The
chief cause was the weakness of the proletariat in the Balkans, and also
the reactionary influence and pressure of the powerful European
bourgeoisie. They are afraid of real freedom both in their own countries
and in the Balkans; their only aim is profit at other people's expense;
they stir up chauvinism and national enmity to faciliate their policy of
plunder and to impede the free development of the oppressed classes of
the
Balkans..."
