Informazione
Da La Repubblica del 14/03/2007, pag. 32
Il leader dell associazione Illiria
L INTERVISTA
"Gli albanesi? Sceglierebbero il centrodestra"
Mancano personalità del mio paese in grado di candidarsi Il voto poi
può essere pilotabile
ROMA - «Gli albanesi voterebbero centrodestra». Vladimir Kosturi,
presidente dell associazione Illiria, azzarda la sua previsione e
aggiunge: «Io, però, mi candiderei con la sinistra al Comune di Roma».
La futura legge Amato-Ferrero introduce il diritto di voto
amministrativo per gli immigrati, dopo cinque anni di residenza.
Contenti?
«E un principio sacrosanto: si ammette alle elezioni chi ha
combattuto a lungo con la burocrazia italiana e ha ottenuto con
difficoltà la carta di soggiorno. In Italia, saranno meno del 20%,
gli immigrati regolari ammessi al voto».
Come crede sia orientato il voto della comunità albanese?
«In Italia ci sono oltre 300mila albanesi: la comunità più ampia dopo
quella dei romeni (ammessi già al voto amministrativo in quanto
comunitari dal primo gennaio 2007, ndr). Quello albanese sarà un voto
per lo più di centrodestra: Udc e Forza Italia, per intenderci.
Qualche preferenza potrebbe andare alla Margherita. Nulla alla
sinistra estrema. Sarà, però, una partecipazione passiva».
Perché?
«Perché la comunità albanese non è ancora pronta a votare e rischia
di essere pilotata. Mancano, infatti, personalità albanesi in grado
di candidarsi».
Lei rappresenta oltre mille albanesi in Italia. Perché non si candida?
«Potrei, in effetti».
Con chi?
«Senz altro con la sinistra».
Ma come?
«Sì, è vero, rischierei di non essere eletto. Ma non importa. Il mio
cuore batte a sinistra».
(vla. po.)
http://www.tesseramento.it/immigrazione/pagine52298/newsattach796_Da%
20La%20Repubblica%20del%2014-03%20b.pdf
FATHER AND SON
(Sul numero di ieri del Washington Post Richard Hoolbrooke tesseva
sperticati elogi del nuovo inviato speciale USA in Kosovo, Frank
Wisner. Rick Rozoff è andato a trovare la biografia del padre di
questi: alto funzionario della CIA, ebbe un ruolo centrale tra
l'altro nei piani di "sovversione contro Stati ostili" - testuale -
nel corso della Guerra Fredda...)
---
U danasnjem broju Vassington Post-a Ricard Holbruk u rubrici za
"goste" odnosno spoljne saradnike, naveliko hvali novog severno-
americkog "vrlog specijalnog izaslanika, ambasadora Frenka Visnera.
Evo ssta "Wikipedia" belezi o ocu tog "vrlog izaslanika".
Ukratko, otac je radio za CIA (Centrala spijunske agenture) i bio
nacelnik njene Direkcije za Planove.
Spijunirao je kao pocetnik protiv SSSR-a u Turskoj i Rumuniji.
Kasnije na najodgovornijem polozaju u Centrali, nalazimo ga u
prvorazrednoj ulozi nosioca strategije miniranja demokratskog poretka
u Iranu (Mosadeka) i u Guatemali (Jacopa Arbenca).
Kao nacelnik pomenute direkcije, 1952. je smislio svojevrsni program
pod nazivom "Mokingb'rd" (u prevodu :"laz-ptica") prosto receno, plan
za stratesko dezinformisanje, domace i strane javnosti. Planom su
bili obuhvaceni svi scenariji subverzivnog i teroristickog delovanja,
doslovce: "propaganda, ekonomski rat, preventivna neposredna
delatnost, kao sto su sabotaza i kontra-sabotaza, miniranje i
evakuacija, zatim subverzivna delatnost protiv neprijateljskih
drzava, sto ukljucuje jos i pomoc ilegalnim grupama i
antikomunistickim elementima u zemljama slobodnog sveta."
(OJ 14/3/07)
---
From: r_rozoff
Subject: US Kosovo Plot: Frank Wisner, Senior And Junior
Date: March 14, 2007 2:26:32 AM GMT+01:00
In a 'guest' feature in today's Washington Post the
sociopath and twice-almost US secretary of state
Richard Holbrooke lauded the US's current hitman on
Kosovo as "superb special envoy, Ambassador Frank
Wisner."
Here is some background on the father of the 'superb
envoy':
Frank Gardiner Wisner (1910 – October 29, 1965) was
the head of the Directorate of Plans of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
After graduating Wisner worked as a Wall Street
lawyer. However, he soon became bored and enlisted in
the United States Navy. He worked in the Navy's
censor's office until he was able to get a transfer to
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He was
stationed first in Turkey, and then in Romania, with
his main assignement being to spy on the Soviet Union.
He was recruited in 1947 by Dean Acheson to join the
State Department's Office of Occupied Territories.
In 1948, the CIA created a covert action wing,
innocuously called the Office of Policy Coordination.
Frank Wisner was put in charge of the operation and
recruited many of his old friends from Carter Ledyard
[law firm].
According to its secret charter, its responsibilities
include "propaganda, economic warfare, preventive
direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage,
demolition and evacuation procedures; subversion
against hostile states, including assistance to
underground resistance groups, and support of
indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened
countries of the free world."
Later that year Wisner established Operation
Mockingbird, a program to influence the domestic and
foreign media. In 1952, he became head of the
Directorate of Plans, with Richard Helms as his chief
of operations. This office had control of 75% of the
CIA budget. In this position, he was instrumental in
bringing about the fall of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran
and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Wisner
===========================
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==============================
From: "Forlibertaria" <forlibertaria@...>
To: <forlibertaria@...>
Sent: Friday, March 09, 2007 9:20 PM
Subject: 24 Marzo: LA PULIZIA ETNICA FASCISTA NELLA JUGOSLAVIA OCCUPATA
Sabato 24 Marzo, ore 15:00
presso il circolo ARCI Nuova Resistenza
Viale Spazzoli, 51 - Forlì
***LA PULIZIA ETNICA FASCISTA NELLA JUGOSLAVIA OCCUPATA***
"rimozioni storiche e mito delle foibe per alimentare il nuovo
espansionismo revanscista italiano"
Alessandra Kersevan presenta il suo libro:
"Un campo di concentramento fascista: Gonars, 1942-1943"
l'organizzazione è curata dal Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori e da
Forlibertaria.
###
Alessandra Kersevan è stata invitata dal locale Istituto storico e dal
comune di Bellaria per tenere una conferenza sui campi di
concentramento fascisti situati lungo il confine italiano orientale.
Pochi giorni prima dell'evento, previsto per il 15 Febbraio 2007,
l'Istituto Storico di Bellaria ha annullato l'incontro a causa delle
forti pressioni politiche esercitate da esponenti locali di Alleanza
Nazionale.
Se ignorare in silenzio il liquame revanscista che ci ha lambiti durante
la cosiddetta "Giornata del Ricordo" c'è costato un notevole sforzo,
non potevamo restare impassibili davanti a questo stupefacente esempio
di censura fascista. Per questo motivo e per porre un freno alla
sordida arroganza dei nazionalisti di ogni schieramento abbiamo
invitato Alessandra Kersevan a Forlì.
La partecipazione all'evento è molto IMPORTANTE: il 10 Febbraio una
conferenza di Alessandra Kersevan tenutasi a La Spezia è stata
interrotta dai fascisti.
--
Forlibertaria
Contatto: 3383261171
http://forlibertaria.ath.cx
Tale sfida non è puramente politica. Essa si accompagna ad un tentativo di criminalizzazione del dissenso ad ampio raggio. La gran parte dei massmedia è attivissima in tal senso. Lo abbiamo visto in maniera eclatante alla manifestazione per la Palestina del 18 novembre quando l’incendio di alcuni pupazzi che rappresentavano militari (da parte di uno sparuto e marginale gruppo di manifestanti) è stato usato per denigrare l’intera manifestazione, per nasconderne i contenuti e criminalizzare i partecipanti. Persino a Vicenza, dopo settimane di “terrorismo” preventivo da parte di ministri e mass-media, uno striscione sugli arresti dei presunti BR è stato usato, senza altrettanto successo, per attaccare l’enorme mobilitazione.
E’ il caso, dunque, di sottolineare, per tutti/e coloro che parteciperanno alla manifestazione del 17 marzo, che tali tentativi di oscuramento degli obiettivi dell’iniziativa si potrebbero ripetere. La grande maggioranza del mondo politico istituzionale e del sistema massmediatico cerca appigli ovunque, con l’insopportabile ipocrisia di chi si scandalizza per uno slogan sbagliato o per l’incendio di simulacri cartacei di militari mentre accetta il massacro di centinaia di migliaia di persone reali.
Dunque, invitiamo tutte le forze e i singoli partecipanti alla massima responsabilità, ad interpretare nella maniera più coerente ed efficace, con slogan, striscioni o cartelli, la piattaforma di convocazione dell’iniziativa, affinché risaltino i comuni obiettivi e non si diano opportunità a chi intendesse usarla per speculare sulle strumentalizzazioni dei massmedia e oscurarne i contenuti.
La manifestazione del 17 sarà pacifica e popolare, un corteo di donne e uomini a viso aperto, al quale invitiamo tutte le forze e i singoli/e che ne condividono i contenuti, i caratteri e lo spirito, per costruire insieme un corteo di massa, colorato, pacifico ma determinato e intransigente contro la guerra e chi la fa, la copre, la vota. Come a Vicenza vogliamo ritrovare il popolo della pace, le sue parole e le sue pratiche.
Comitato 17 marzo
PER ADESIONI ALLA MANIFESTAZIONE: nowar17marzo@...
- find a transportation center near you!
- download leaflet
- Troops Out Now Coalition call for a massive, united demonstration - "Back to the Streets" - issued Nov. 7, 2006
- Let us know if you are coming to the Encampment. Use the Volunteer form at http://troopsoutnow.org/march12volunteer.shtml.
- Volunteer at the Encampment - we will need hundreds of volunteers during the week of the Encampment let us know how you can help (logistics, security, medical, greeter, etc) - http://troopsoutnow.org/march12volunteer.shtml
- Donate to to help with the enormous costs of the Encampment - http://troopsoutnow.org/donate.shtml. If you are not able to come to the encampment, help send a youth activist to the Encampment to the week- donate for transportation and housing costs here.
http://www.jungewelt.de/
12.03.2007 / Feuilleton / Seite 13
Antiserbische Blaupause
Wollt ihr den globalen Krieg? Die »freien Medien« sind die
Wegbereiter. Das wurde anhand der Balkan-Kriege durchexerziert. Ein
Buch über die entsprechenden Verflechtungen
Sabine Schiffer
Mit »Operation Balkan: Werbung für Krieg und Tod« hat das Autorenduo
Jörg Becker und Mira Beham eine eminent wichtige Forschungsarbeit
vorgelegt. In konzisen 87 Seiten mit Anhang wird aufgezeigt, wie der
Krieg auf dem Balkan durch die Arbeit von PR-Agenturen wesentlich
beeinflußt, ja mitinitiiert wurde, wie mittels der Zuordnung von
Recht und Unrecht klare Feindbilder geschaffen und widersprechende
Fakten unterschlagen wurden. Die Untersuchung ist ein Lehrstück. Sie
unterstreicht, wie bedeutend es angesichts immer massiver werdender
Instrumentalisierungen ist, daß Medienmacher die Quellen ihrer
Informationen hinterfragen. Die Folgen der Entwicklung hin zu mehr PR-
Stellen, weg von gesicherten Arbeitsverhältnissen im Journalismus,
können für eine Demokratie, die auf öffentliche
Meinungsbildungsprozesse angewiesen ist, nicht unterschätzt werden.
Es braucht etwa deutlich mehr kritische Aufmerksamkeit für die nicht
sonderlich subtilen Sprachregelungen bestimmter Agenturen. Natürlich
ist es entscheidend, ob etwas als »Massaker« oder
»Verteidigungskampf« bezeichnet wird. So wird ein Empfinden von
Legitimität oder Illegitimität erzeugt. Es ist kein Zufallsprodukt,
sondern Ergebnis jahrelanger Propaganda, daß »die Serben« in der
öffentlichen Wahrnehmung in die Nähe der Nazis rückten. Durch die
geschickte Plazierung von Begriffen wie »KZ«, »Völkermord« und
»Auschwitz« wurden auch Pazifisten in die Pflicht für den Krieg auf
dem Balkan genommen.
Die Vernetzungen gehen weit über das Bekannte hinaus. Die
Zusammenarbeit von PR-Akteuren und US-Politikern ist kein Geheimnis.
In »Operation Balkan« geht es auch um die Symbiosen zwischen
hochangesehenen Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs) wie Amnesty
International oder UNICEF und den Spins -- der gelenkten
Kommunikation. Auch hier vermitteln nicht nur Agenturen wie die
bereits im Irak-Krieg von 1991 berühmt gewordene Hill & Knowlton,
sondern auch ethisch angeblich integere wie Ruder Finn und viele
mehr. Das Register am Ende des Buches bietet einen Überblick über
Verteilung der Aufgaben unter den Organisationen. Neben solchen
internen Verflechtungen werden Verflechtungen mit privaten
Militärunternehmen aufgeführt. Insgesamt wird eine Tendenz zur
Privatisierung von Information, Krieg und schließlich auch von
Diplomatie nachgewiesen. Es waren mit der Kriegspropaganda
beauftragte Agenturen, die z. B. die Unabhängigkeitserklärung des
Kosovo entwarfen.
Erfolgreich war der antiserbische Spin vor allem, weil die
Gegenpositionen zum Teil von denselben Agenturen formuliert wurden.
In Serbien gaben widerstreitende Parteien derweil ein uneinheitliches
Bild ab, was einer geschlossenen Meinungsbildung nicht dienlich war.
Die Autoren veranschaulichen den zirkulären Schluß der PR-Aktivitäten
mit einem Schema: Die Argumentationen werden gezielt plaziert, von
Intellektuellen aufgenommen und diskutiert, schließlich auch durch
das Bildmaterial von NGOs vor Ort verstärkt. Die international so
»freien« Medien erscheinen als sich selbst bestätigendes System, das
Kohärenz suggeriert. Wieder und wieder wird die Notwendigkeit des
»humanitären Eingriffs« herausgestellt. Am Ende kann sich der
einzelne Konsument der Kriegsrhetorik kaum noch entziehen. Diese
Techniken der Manipulation dürften in naher Zukunft verstärkt zum
Einsatz kommen. Darauf läßt auch das Weißbuch der Bundeswehr schließen.
»Operation Balkan« arbeitet die zwiespältige Rolle von Organisationen
wie der Schweizer Medienhilfe heraus. Einerseits kann man ihnen
Erfolge im Ausbau eines Mediensystems nicht absprechen, andererseits
ist dieses Mediensystem eben privaten Interessen unterworfen.
Überhaupt wird deutlich, wie gerade NGOs das System der
Privatisierung staatlicher Aufgaben stützen, indem sie die
Notwendigkeit ihrer Existenz und vor allem das Fundraising nur durch
reale und möglichst eskalierende Krisen sichern können.
Für Deutschland werden die Aktivitäten von Moritz Hunzinger
exemplarisch erläutert. Da es in Deutschland keine Meldepflicht für
PR-Aktivitäten entsprechend dem FARA-Register in den USA gibt,
bleiben entsprechende Aktivitäten ausgeblendet, was nicht bedeutet,
daß es sie nicht gibt. Hier wäre etwa die intellektuelle Begleitung
diverser Regime-Change-Aktivitäten durch die Bertelsmann-Stiftung
untersuchenswert. Man kann sich keineswegs mit der Erkenntnis
zufrieden geben, daß wir vor allem von US-Seite aus in die Balkan-
Kriege der 90er Jahre manipuliert wurden. Auch ist der Mythos des
reinen NATO-Interesses so nicht haltbar. Hierzu müßten ergänzend
Schriften wie die des Internationalen Vorbereitungskomitees für ein
europäisches Tribunal über den NATO-Krieg gegen Jugoslawien
herangezogen werden, die von massiven Interessen Deutschlands in Ex-
Jugoslawien ausgehen.
Die Aufarbeitung dessen, was auf dem Balkan und darum herum wirklich
geschah, ist die Pflicht eines jeden Staatsbürgers, der Demokratie,
Menschen- und Völkerrecht etwas abzugewinnen vermag. Die Entwicklung
seither zeigt deutlich, in welche Richtung es gehen soll. Der
Vollständigkeit halber sei sie hier angerissen, auch wenn der
Zusammenhang mit der rezensierten Publikation nur indirekt ist: die
NATO-Doktrin von 1999 nennt drei legitime Gründe für sogenannte
Friedensmissionen: 1. Humanitäre Gründe, 2. Ressourcensicherung und
3. Migrationsbewegungen. Im EU-Verfassungsentwurf ist die Aufrüstung
aller Mitgliedsstaaten Programm und das besagte Weißbuch ist bislang
der Gipfel der Dreistigkeit: Grundrechte werden ausgehebelt und durch
Marktstrategien und das gute alte Konzept des »White-Man's-Burden«
ersetzt. Durch diese Entwicklungen seit den Balkan-Kriegen hat das
Buch von Becker und Beham an Bedeutung gewonnen. Es sollte zur
Pflichtlektüre an Journalistenschulen gemacht werden. Wir werden noch
ganz anders und viel genauer hinschauen müssen, damit wir nicht nach
Jahren der Gewöhnung an Orwellsches »Neusprech« bereit sind, der
rhetorischen Frage zuzustimmen: »Wollt ihr den globalen Krieg?« Wenn
man uns dann überhaupt noch fragt.
Becker, Jörg und Beham, Mira:
Operation Balkan: Werbung für Krieg und Tod.
Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, Dezember 2006, 130 Seiten, 17,90 Euro
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20070308&articleId=5021
(4 - ends)
Milanovic: I proposed to the director of the oil company that they secure the oil fields that were on the separation lines….I proposed Slobodan Medic as the person who should be in charge of that security, and then they were under the director of the oil company.
A5. Ibid. "MUP" denotes Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Polsova, meaning in this instance the Ministry of the Interior of the Republika Srpska—not the MUP of the Republic of Serbia , i.e., under the command of Belgrade and Slobodan Milosevic.
From: Promemoria <promemoriats @ virgilio.it>Date: March 12, 2007 8:07:16 PM GMT+01:00Subject: l'ass. Promemoria ha informato la magistratura di Trieste sugli avvenimenti in occasione della Giornata del ricordo del 10.2.2007 presso il pozzo della Miniera di BasovizzaAllego un comunicato stampacordiali salutiper PromemoriaSandi Volk
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20070308&articleId=5021
(Message over 64 KB, truncated)
Sommaire (7e année, n°9)
« L’Iran doit se tenir prêt à contrer une attaque nucléaire », par général Leonid Ivashov.
« Nom de code Tirannt : les plans de guerre US contre l’Iran », par Michel Chossudovsky.
« Des bombes en réaction à des violations imaginaires des droits de l’homme : du jamais vu dans l’histoire ».
Livre : Operation Balkan : Werbung für Krieg und Tod de Becker et Beham.
« Démantèlement de la Yougoslavie », par Michel Chossudovsky.
« Une loi américaine à l’origine du démantèlement de la Yougoslavie », par Alexander Dorin.
« Le plan Ahtisaari et le lobbying politique ».
« Mieux vaut dix ans de négociations qu’un jour de guerre civile », entretien avec Thomas Fleiner.
« Faut-il se débarasser de la démocratie directe en Suisse ? », par Markus Erb.
« Engagement du Conseil fédéral lors des votations fédérales », par Philippe Chenaux.
(PDF - 2.5 Mo) http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/HD_09_2007.pdf
http://www.horizons-et-debats.ch/
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20070308&articleId=5021
Part 2: HRW as a Campaigner for the NATO Wars in the Balkans
From the very beginning of the contests over the fate of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), HRW challenged its territorial integrity and supported the dismemberment of the unitary state, a militarized response to the armed conflicts that ensued, and most vocally of all, the meting out of “justice” to the wrongdoers. In a commentary in the November 10, 1990 New York Times, Helsinki Watch Executive Director Jeri Laber and Kenneth Anderson urged SFRY’s breakup and the provision of Western aid to any breakaway republics that might “protect the rights of all their citizens.”[46] These authors failed to give the slightest weight to the fact that the declarations of independence within the breakaway republics were contrary to both federal and republican constitutions, not to mention international law—including the Helsinki Final Act.[47]
Most important, Laber and Anderson were blind to the fact that pressures for independence within the republics and provinces expressed a surge of nationalism, rather than any concern for the rights of “all their citizens.” Writing about the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina , Robert Hayden observed that “the free elections that marked the end of Communism, in November 1990,…[were] essentially an ethnic census. Given the chance to vote as Bosnians, the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina chose instead to vote, overwhelmingly, as Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.”[48] Obviously, this did not bode well for the rights of minorities. In a letter responding to Laber and Anderson's call for the dismemberment of the SFRY, Hayden pointed out that “Those who would break up the country are strong nationalists, not likely to treat minorities within their own borders well.” Instead, it was only the unified federal state of Yugoslavia that provided protection for minorities—and very possibly would have continued to do so, had it not been attacked, delegitimized, and dissolved. “It seems truly bizarre,” Hayden noted presciently, “that ‘human rights’ activists so cavalierly advocate policies that are likely to turn Yugoslavia into the Lebanon of Europe.”[49]
48. Robert M. Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (University of Michigan Press, 1999), pp. 91-92.
49. Robert Hayden, "Don't Turn Yugoslavia Into Europe's Lebanon," Letter, New York Times, December 3, 1990.
50. See notes 4 and 5, above.
52. See Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder, Ch. 4, “The War Crimes Tribunal," pp. 117-146; and Köchler, Global Justice or Global Revenge, esp. the Annex: Memorandum “On the Indictment of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia…,” pp. 353-356.
53. See, e.g., "No Kosovo Settlement Without Accountability for War Crimes," Human Rights Watch Press release, February 6, 1999.—The earliest high-profile use of the slogan "no peace without justice" in relation to the former Yugoslavia appears to have been a resolution introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives by Rhode Island's Patrick J. Kennedy, War Crimes in Bosnia, November 20, 1995. -- The relevant paragraph stated: "The United States should oppose amnesty for any indicted war criminals. On this anniversary [of the Nuremberg Tribunal], as the world hopes for peace in the Balkans, it is the responsibility of Congress to say unequivocally that there can be no peace without justice." The very same day, the New York Times's veteran columnist Anthony Lewis recounted a discussion he had had with the ICTY's Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone: "No Peace Without Justice," it was titled (November 20, 1995). "As the Tribunal's Chief Justice Richard Goldstone has repeatedly said, there can be no peace without justice," the Wall Street Journal editorialized. "On the 50-year anniversary of the Nuremberg trials, that's worth remembering" ("Prisoners of Peace," November 21, 1995). Less than one month later, John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, picked up the same theme when he noted that one of the positives of the Dayton Accords was its pledge of cooperation with the Yugoslav Tribunal: "There will be no peace without justice." ("U.S. official: No cooperation on human rights issues by Serbs," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, December 13, 1995.)
54. See, e.g., Yossef Bodansky, Some Call It Peace: Waiting for the War in the Balkans (International Media Corp., 1996); Peter Brock, Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting. Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia (GM Books, 2005); David Chandler, "Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia," in Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman, Eds., Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 19-30; Robert M. Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (University of Michigan Press, 1999); Brendan O'Shea, The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991 - 1995: Perception, deception, dishonesty (Frank Cass, 2005); David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995); Dennison Rusinow, Ed., Yugoslavia: A Fractured Federalism (Wilson Center Press, 1988); Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (The Brookings Institution, 1995); Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe (Random House, 1996).
55. These sweeping charges represent an amalgam of the no fewer than eight different indictments and amendments thereof of Slobodan Milosevic et al. for Serb conduct in Kosovo (May 22, 1999; June 29, 2001; and October 29, 2001), Croatia (October 8, 2001; October 23, 2002; and July 28, 2004); and Bosnia and Herzegovina (November 22, 2001; November 22, 2002).
57. Writing about the new Clinton Administration's efforts in early 1993 to kill-off the Vance - Owen Peace Plan, which allocated some 42 percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Pale Serbs, rather than the 49 percent under Dayton, chief negotiator David Owen explains that Alija Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the plan because "he felt encouraged by US attitudes to hold out for a better deal." Owen reproduces an excerpt from an early 1993 telegram he sent to an aid in Washington. "We have this Administration briefing the press in a way that could not but stiffen those Muslims who want to continue the war. We have [the Sarajevo Government's UN Representative Muhamed] Sacirbey openly telling everyone that the US Administration has said they should not feel any need to sign the map." Later, Owen adds that "The new administration had already made up their mind and were intent on killing off the [Vance - Owen Peace Plan]….They promised to come up with an alternative policy over the next few weeks, but in the meantime seemed intent on killing off a detailed plan backed by all their allies and close to being agreed by the parties. It was by any standard of international diplomacy outrageous conduct." Balkan Odyssey, pp. 111 - 119. —Here we add simply that this was in early 1993; the Dayton Peace Accords were not signed until nearly three years later, in late 1995.
58. The Rambouillet Conference was held at the Chateau Rambouillet in France from February 6 - 20, 1999. Its ostensible purpose was to negotiate an interim political settlement to the conflict over the Serbian province of Kosovo. But the conference was held under extreme duress, as at no point were the Serb negotiators free from the threat of military attack by NATO, which six days prior to the conference had issued an Activation Order "authoriz[ing] air strikes against targets on [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] territory" (January 30, 1999). As the former State Department official George Kenney reported shortly after the war, a "senior State Department official had bragged that the United States 'deliberately set the bar higher that the Serbs could accept'. The Serbs needed, according to the official, a little bombing to see reason." See Marc Weller, Ed., The Crisis in Kosovo 1989 - 1999 (Documents and Analysis Publishing Ltd., 1999), Ch. 15, "The Rambouillet Conference," pp. 392-474, which includes a copy of NATO's Activation Order (p. 416); and George Kenney, "Rolling Thunder: the Rerun," The Nation, June 14, 1999.
59. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Names Figures It Wants Charged with War Crimes," New York Times, December 17, 1992.
62. See Statute of the International Tribunal Adopted May 25, 1993, along with subsequent updates. None of articles 2 through 5, which run the gamut including breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the laws and customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity, so much as mentions the "supreme international crime"—or anything remotely like it.
63. Michael P. Scharf, "Indicted for War Crimes, Then What?" Washington Post, October 3, 1999 (as posted to the Public International Law & Policy Group website).
64. Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder, p. 126.
65. “The Milosevic Case,” in When People’s Basic Rights Are Trampled, Human Rights Watch, undated press release.
67. Press Conference Given by NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, May 16, 1999.—The very next day, Shea responded to much the same question: "As you know, without NATO countries there would be no International Court of Justice, nor would there be any International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia because NATO countries are in the forefront of those who have established these two tribunals, who fund these tribunals and who support on a daily basis their activities. We are the upholders, not the violators, of international law." (Press Conference Given by NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, May 17, 1999.)
68. See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, June, 2000, par. 90. Also see the accompanying Press Statement (PR/P.I.S./510-e), ICTY, June 13, 2000.
69. See Article 18 of the ICTY's Statute, "Investigation and preparation of indictment" (1993, 2006). Par. 4 states: "Upon a determination that a prima facie case exists, the Prosecutor shall prepare an indictment containing a concise statement of the facts and the crime or crimes with which the accused is charged under the Statute."
70. See Louise Arbour, Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic et al. (IT-99-37), Schedules A - G, May 22, 1999. —These schedules list the names of 344 dead Kosovo Albanians whom, in this particular case, constituted a sufficient "crime base" to bring the indictment. As noted, however, the deaths of only the 45 persons named in Schedule A ("Racak," January 15, 1999) date from prior to the start of NATO's war.
71. See Amnesty International,
MEMORIE DI UNA STREGA ROSSA
di Mira Markovic
Libro-intervista a cura di Giuseppe Zaccaria
Zambon Editore, Frankfurt 2005
ISBN 88-87826-30-7
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