1. VAPAJ SRPSKOG NARODA IZ VITINE

2. Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM


=== 1 ===

Informativna sluzba
Srpske Pravoslavne Crkve
30. maj 2003. godine

VAPAJ SRPSKOG NARODA IZ VITINE

Srpsko nacionalno vece Kosova i Metohije je poslalo tekst vapaja -
apela srpskog naroda iz Vitine u kome je popis nasilnickih dogadjaja
u Kosovskom Pomoravlju. Nakon porasta nasilja i pritisaka na srpsko
stanovnistvo ovog kraja, uz uporno negiranje pogorsanja bezbednosne
situacije od predstavnika americkog KFOR-a i UNMIK-a, narodu Kosovskog
Pomoravlja nije nista drugo preostalo nego da se javnim apelom obrati
srpskom narodu i vlastima u Beogradu i zatrazi njihovu pomoc.

VAPAJ PREOSTALOG SRPSKOG ZIVLJA NA TERITORIJI OPSTINE VITINA

Opet su nas po koji put ubili, opet smo po ko zna koji put postali
mete, tek sto smo se ponadali da je ubijanju kraj, da cemo moci barem
u svojim domovima, na svojim imanjima biti mirni. Ali mira i dalje
nema:

14. maja 2003. godine, na izlasku iz srpskog sela Vrbovac Albanci
pucnjevima zastrasuju zitelje tog sela.

15. maja 2003. godine u selu Mogila, inace mesovitog sastava,
uzvikivanjem antisrpskih parola po srpskim ulicama i klicanjem Ademu
Jasariju, Albanci provociraju Srbe i tokom noci su jednom Srbinu iz
pomenutog sela ukrali stoku.

16. maja 2003. godine albanski ucenici, dok slobodno prolaze kroz
srpsko selo Vrbovac, na albanskom jeziku pevaju provokativne pesme, u
smislu «Sve smo Srbe proterali i vas cemo uskoro». Vec istog dana od
strane Albanaca stizu glasine da ce ubiti sedmoro Srba iz ovih
krajeva.

17. maja 2003. godine, Albanci ostvaruju svoju pretnju ubivsi na
zverski nacin Zorana Mirkovica, starog 44 godine, pored njegovog tela
ostavljajuci poruku u kojoj stoji u naslovu: Albanska nacionalna
armija, a tekst pretece sadrzine potpisao je tzv. ''komandant Celi''.
Nastradali Zoran, profesor ruskog jezika, otac troje maloletne dece,
veliki covek i dobar domacin, krenuo je biciklom u obilazak svog
imanja. Ubivsi njega, ubili su jos jedan deo nase ranjene,
raskrvavljene i bespomocne duse.

19. maja 2003. godine, u srpskom selu Klokot pokusavaju da kidnapuju
Srbina iz tog sela, Stanka Misica, koji je takodje posao da obidje
svoje imanje u blizini sela, ali uspeva da se nekako izvuce, najvise
zahvaljujuci blizini crkve i punktu KFOR-a, gde je i pobegao.

21. maja 2003. godine, u Vitini, u sopstvenom dvoristu je pretucen
90-godisnjeg starac Slavko Stamenkovic, naocigled njegove zene kojoj
su rukom zatvorili usta kako ne bi dozivala u pomoc.

22. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokotu je pretucen ucenik drugog razreda
Srednje ekonomske skole Milan Pavic, u blizini svoje kuce, dok je na
autobuskoj stanici cekao skolski autobus.

25. maja 2003. godine u selu Klokot zapaljena je kuca Momcila Savica.

Skrhani bolom, kad nas beznadje i bespomocnost olicena u 45 nevino
ubijenih dusa i deset zivota za koje se neizvesnost sve vise pretvara
u strasnu izvesnost, bez potvrde, po ko zna koji put dizemo svoj glas.

Ne znamo da li da ove reci nazovemo apelom, jer smo apelima i Bogu
dosadili, ili protestom - protestom protiv sveopsteg zla koje na
ogromnu zalost lezi tu pored nas i oko nas, ali ga niko ne vidi, a
posebno oni koji su za to zaduzeni i za to placeni; i ne znamo dokle
cemo jos biti mete za odstrel, samo zato sto smo Srbi i sto jos uvek
zivimo u svojim ognjistima.

Svaka zrtva koju smo u koraku, u snu, u poslu, u strahu dali, rana je
koja nikada nece zaceliti. Od oko 11.000 koliko nas je bilo na
podrucju opstine Vitina, od dolaska KFOR-a ostalo nas je nekih 3.000,
u dva srpska sela, jedno koje je to bilo do pre godinu dana, od 15
mesovitih sela ostala su jos samo dva, a opstinski centar Vitina od 70
procenata srpskog sastava postao je tamnica za stotinak staraca i onih
koji nemaju gde.

Zivot u tim getoiziranim mestima, gde je prividno sve u nekoj normali,
gde god da se nalazis, sa svakog drveta, iz svakog jarka, iz svakog
automobila, vreba te potencijalna opasnost, jer su se sva stradanja
desavala u slicnim situacijama, mucki, bez izazova i znanja. Takvo
stanje neminovno donosi pitanje - ko je sledeca zrtva?

I pored svakog napora da ostanemo prisebni i ubedimo ljude oko sebe da
postoji neko ko o nama misli, ne mozemo da ubedimo sebe, jer nas
stvarnost demantuje, pa smo postali sumnjicavi i na Boziju pomoc.

17. maja pala je poslednja zrtva, Boze daj! Nas veliki prijatelj i
veliki, veliki covek, s obzirom koliko smo mi mali i nejaki. Jos jedna
porodica je ostala ucveljena, bez hranioca, sa neizvesnom buducnoscu.

Necemo Vas kritikovati, jer Vas ne boli, i mozda ce ovo pismo biti tek
puki tekst koji ce zavrsiti u korpi, ali ako ste poceli, procitajte ga
do kraja, misleci na svoje porodice koje su, nadamo se, srecne i
daleko od zla koje je nasa svakodnevica, i koje nas unistava samo zato
sto smo pravoslavni Srbi.

OVO JE PROTEST NASE DUSE SVIMA KOJI SU ZA TO ODGOVORNI:

PROTIV UBIJANjA koje nas prati i preti nasem istrebljenju, jer se za
to ne bira ni mesto, niti vreme, ni oruzje, niti nacin, ni ime, niti
prezime, ni uzrast, niti starost, samo je bitno da je zrtva
pravoslavni Srbin i da je cilj ostvaren: jos jedan Srbin manje, jos
jedno oruzje koje ubija razloge opstajanja na rodnom ognjistu.

PROTIV FIZICKOG UGNjETAVANjA koje se svakodnevno manifestuje kroz
ranjavanja, prebijanja, kamenovanja, i druge vidove represija, sto
uslovljava strah za odrzavanjem golog zivota, strah za slobodnim
kretanjem i radom, a zavrsava najcesce napustanjem svojih vekovnih
ognjista i strahom za povratkom na njih.

PROTIV DUHOVNOG GENOCIDA koje se manifestuje kroz unistavanje
visevekovnog nasledja jednog naroda, kroz rusenje njegovih svetinja
(crkava i manastira), skrnavljenje grobalja i unistavanje tragova
postojanja i kulture jednog hriscanskog naroda koji se civilizacijski
izvorno identifikuje na podrucju Kosmeta.

PROTIV SVAKOG OBLIKA INSTITUCIONALNE DISKRIMINACIJE koja nazalost samo
zamenjuje fizicke oblike pritisaka i u kombinaciji s njima unistava
svaki vid perspektive za blisku, a jos vise za dalju buducnost
zajednickog zivljenja.

PROTIV MRZNjE I GOVORA ORUZJA UMESTO RAZUMA.

PROTIV NARUSAVANjA SVOJINSKIH PRAVA kroz razne oblike unistavanja,
prisvajanja, otudjivanja: kuca, stanova, zemljista, poljoprivredne
mehanizacije, stoke i ostalog. Za navedene pojave zaduzeni subjekti
medjunarodne zajednice imaju milione podataka i dokaza, ali problemi
vec cetiri godine ostaju nereseni, sto kod preostalih Srba radja
osecaj konstantne bespomocnosti i nezainteresovanosti za
institucionalnu borbu za ostvarivanje svojih prava.

PROTIV SOCIJALNE BEDE koja je uslovljena proterivanjem sa radnih mesta
hiljada radnika, cime je bez sredstava za egzistenciju ostao veliki
broj porodica, sto je dodatno uslovilo odlazak sa svojih ognjista.

PROTIV SMANjENjA PRISUSTVA SNAGA KFOR-A sto uslovljava i otvara siri
prostor za delovanje terorizma.

PROTIV DELOVANjA ALBANSKE TERORISTICKE ORGANIZACIJE «ANA» NA OVIM
PROSTORIMA

U IME BESPOMOCNIH SRBA OPSTINE VITINA
SRPSKO NACIONALNO VECE ZA KOSOVO I METOHIJU, OPSTINA VITINA
Slede potpisi clanova SNV KIM opstine Vitina

=== 2 ===

[O polemike oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM procitaj:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/message/2520 ]


Polemika oko saopstenja Srpskog Nacionalnog veca KiM

http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/glas_dijaspore/2003-05-19_1.html

Slobodan R. Stojanovic
Brazil, 19. maja 2003. godine

Posstovana gospodo,

ZZelim da se ukljuccim u ovu diskusiju ne bih li
doprineo pojassnjavanju nekih vazznih taccaka.

Najvechi problem u ovom sluccaju je taj ssto su oba
sagovornika u pravu. I Emil Vlajki i SNV Kosova i
Metohije. Ipak postoje detalji koji su po meni vrlo
vazzni za sagledavanje problema. Evo o ccemu se radi:

Ako nekoga treba kriviti za MAZOHISTICKO SLUGANSTVO
onda to nisu organizacije Srba sa Kosova i Metohije,
vech vlada drzzave Srbije. Odgovornost te vlade za
buduchnost srpskog naroda, kako materijalnu tako i
duhovnu, neuporedivo je vecha od odgovornosti svih
organizacija Srba sa Kosova zajedno.

Ali ni to nije najvechi problem. Najvechi problem je
stav vechinskog dela srpskog naroda prema Kosovu i
Metohiji i svojih trenutnim nedachama. Jer ne traba da
gubimo iz vida da vlada jedne drzzave kako-tako ipak
predstavlja vechinu naroda. Dakle, pravo pitanje je:
Koja je to volja vechine srpskog naroda?

Na ovo pitanje odgovor smo dobili u visse navrata.

1. Neposredno po zakljuccenju primirja, kojim su
Kosovo i Metohija postali strani protektorat, u
Beogradu se mogao ccitati ccuveni grafit: "Imass
mostove, jebess Kosovo." Ljudi su se tada radovali
kraju rata, i nisu tugovali zbog gubitka Kosova.
Ustvari mnogi jesu, ali ono ssto je tada moglo da se
vidi, dakle ono ssto se nametalo kao vechina, bila je
radost i slavlje zbog kraja rata.

2. Iako je ta ista vechina sve vreme stajala uz svoga
vodju - najpre su mu na referendumu dali ovlasschenja
da brani Kosovo, a zatim su slavljenjem okonccanja
rata podrzzali njegov potpis kapitulacije -, ta ista
magarecha vechina ga je srussila s vlasti, vodjena i
navodjena ssargarepom od 70-90 miliona dolara. I ne
samo to. Da ne bi bilo nikakve sumnje na ccijoj su
strani, oni su na juriss zauzeli Narodnu Skupsstinu,
unusstili dokaze o prethodnim izborima, pokrali mnoge
vredne umetniccke predmete, unisstili mnoge koje nisu
mogli da ponesu, i ZAPALILI SKUPSSTINU.

Neki mogu da kazzu kako se nije radilo o vechini. Ali
ja o tim podacima sudim prema stvarnom efektu, a ne
prema teoretskim brojevima koje nismo u stanju da
utvrdimo. Jer u sluccaju vandalizma u Narodnoj
Skupsstini postoji joss jedan detalj: ni snage
bezbednosti, koje su bile znatna manjina u odnosu na
rulju koja je opkolila Skupsstinu, nisu zzelele da
brane drzzavnu imovinu.

3. Sramno izruccenje bivsseg predsednika zloccincima
koji su nas ubijali 1999. Joss jednom isto: vechina je
sve vreme bila uz bivsseg predsednika, ali kada
ssargarepa postane dovoljno velika i
neodoljiva("ulazak u Evropu" ili "zziveti kao sav
normalni svet")
magarci namerno brissu svoju memoriju, i okrechu novi
list (svoje istorije).

Naravno, ima tu i mnogih drugih detalja. Jer ne treba
zaboraviti ni to da se i bivssi predsednik savrsseno
uklapa u taj mozaik: ccak ni sina nije poslao na
Kosovo za koje se vodila bitka.

Sve ovo zajedno daje nam sliku o nama samima. Kako
posle svega toga mozzemo da bacamo krivicu na Srbe sa
Kosova i optuzzujemo ih za SLUGARENJE I MAZOHIZAM.
SRPSKU NACIJU KAO CELINU, nju treba optuzziti, a ne
jedan njen MAJUSSNI I ZANEMARLJIVI DELICH, koji
zapravo i nema drugog izbora; osim ukoliko KOLEKTIVNO
SAMOUBISTVO NE ISKLJUCCIMO iz arsenala moguchih
ressenja.

Subject: [yugoslaviainfo] Bosnia's Founding Stepfather
Date: Thu, 29 May 2003 07:21:30 +0200
From: "Darka"
To: <Ova adresa el. pošte je zaštićena od spambotova. Omogućite JavaScript da biste je videli.>




http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m052803.html

Antiwar.com
May 28, 2003

Bosnia's Founding Stepfather


How the US 'Ended' the Bosnian War

To End A War, by Richard Holbrooke
New York, Random House, June 1998, 432 pages (hardcover)

Few things have been as grossly misunderstood as the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, commonly known by its
birthplace as "Dayton." Agreed at the
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton,
Ohio and initialed in Paris, France on 21 November
1995, the Dayton Agreement finally established
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, after a three-year
interethnic war following its 1992 international
recognition. It also completely failed to resolve any of
issues that caused the war.

Instead, it was a feat of social engineering
unprecedented at the time, attempting through force
and bluster to forge a nation out of bitter enmities.
That should not have surprised anyone, given that
force and bluster were the main character traits of
Dayton's chief creator, rogue American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke.

Proud 'Peacemaker'

Holbrooke had a long and distinguished career in
foreign affairs, starting from his Foreign Service job
in Vietnam in 1962. He also edited the Foreign
Policyjournal (1972-76), served as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs
(1977-1981), US Ambassador to Germany (1993-94),
and Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Canadian Affairs (1994-96). It was in this last
capacity that he came to preside over the "peace
process" in Bosnia.

To End A War is an extraordinary book documenting
not just his endeavors in Bosnia, but the underlying
logic, emotions and politics behind them. For all his
failings - arrogance, ignorance and vanity easily
spring to mind - Holbrooke is also earnest. Though
his memoir is as self-serving as, say, Lord David
Owen's Balkan Odyssey, unlike Owen, Holbrooke is
not trying to make excuses: he is actually proud of his
actions, thoughts and opinions. There is not one hint
of modesty - false or otherwise - in Holbrooke, and
for that one must be grateful. For in chronicling his
efforts to badger, bully and beat the Bosnians into
ending their war - on American terms, of course - he
offers surprisingly clear insights into the U.S.
Balkans policy at the time, and his own role therein.

Reading Holbrooke's memoir, one needs to keep in
mind that this man is the chief creator of the current
Bosnian state, a paradox protectorate continuing to
exist in spite of itself.

'I Am The Empire'

Anyone who even slightly doubts the Official Truth
about the Balkans wars will be struck by Holbrooke's
cavalier dismissal of any pretense of civility when
dealing with the locals - especially the Serbs, for
whom he had only disdain dangerously bordering on
hatred. To him, prejudices, deceptions and
fabrications represent fully justified means to the
goal. Cautioned by his British colleague to treat Serbs
with some consideration, Holbrooke replied:

"The Serb view of history was their problem. ours
was to end a war." (110)

One is tempted to wonder if that was a royal "we."
Holbrooke not only represented the United States, he
literally made American policy concerning Bosnia,
often on the spot. He was no mere emissary, but an
avatar of the entire American government in the eyes
of the warring factions. When Secretary of State
Warren Christopher told him, "I'm not always sure
what you are doing, or why. but you always seem to
have a reason, and it seems to work," (239) it was
abundantly clear that Holbrooke had a carte blanche
from his superiors.

Bombs for Peace

One thing Holbrooke used this power for was to
orchestrate Imperial intervention and support certain
combatants in actions that would normally be
condemned as despicable and even atrocious. For
example, the greatest ethnic cleansing of the entire
war, the August 1995 Croat offensive against the
Serbian Krajina, is put into perspective in Chapter 6.
During one meeting with Croatian officials, Robert
Frasure, a senior US diplomat who soon thereafter
died on the road to Sarajevo, handed Holbrooke a
note:

Dick: We "hired" these guys to be our junkyard dogs
because we were desperate. We need to try to
"control" them. But it is no time to get squeamish
about things. (73)

Holbrooke's sympathies for the official Bosnian
Muslim cause (as opposed to the real cause) are
revealed as early as Chapter 3. In a 1992 policy
proposal to the Clinton administration, he advocated
"direct use of force against the Serbs," (52) something
he finally had a chance to do in 1995. After an
explosion in Sarajevo killed a dozen people in the
marketplace, NATO began bombing Bosnian Serb
targets determined months in advance (102).

The bombing helped establish NATO - and the
Americans - as the strongest party in the conflict.
Peace took a back seat to power: "It is now essential to
establish that we are negotiating from a position of
strength. if the air strikes resume and hurt the
negotiations, so be it." (119)

There was also no doubt as to whose side the US
supported: "It helped that Izetbegovic saw I was
fighting hard for something he desperately wanted -
the resumption of the bombing." (131)

Holbrooke's determination resulted in a plea to
Washington: "Give us bombs for peace." (132) And a
strategy was born.

Holbrooke and Milosevic

By the time the bombing, cajoling, badgering, and
"shuttle diplomacy" gathered the representatives of
three warring parties at the airbase near Dayton -
deliberately chosen as a display of American air
power (233) - Holbrooke was almost completely in
control of orchestrating the end the Bosnian War. His
greatest coup was managing to maneuver Serbian
president Milosevic into representing the Bosnian
Serbs, thus making it appear Belgrade was always
behind their actions - just what the Muslim and
western propaganda had alleged all along.

Those especially interested in better understanding
Milosevic can find much useful information in
Holbrooke's memoir. Even though he worked
relentlessly against the "Serb aggression," (42) and
tried to trick, bully and double-cross the Serbian
leader, Holbrooke cannot help but describe Milosevic
with a mixture of grudging admiration and respect:

"Watching Milosevic turn on his charm, Warren
Cristopher observed that had fate dealt him a
different birthplace and education, he would have
been a successful politician in a democratic country."
(235)

No wonder that Milosevic wants to call Holbrooke as
a defense witness before the Hague Inquisition.

Liar, Cheat and Bully

Holbrooke's own accounts of Dayton indicate that his
team was literally negotiating on behalf of the
Muslims, whose role was limited to petulantly
rejecting all solutions in the hope that better (i.e. more
favorable) ones would be produced next. At one point,
the Americans succeeded in securing 55% of the
territory for the Muslim-Croat Federation - until
Milosevic accidentally saw the charts aimed to
persuade the Muslims and angrily accused Holbrooke
of cheating him (295).

Realizing the Americans were not honest brokers,
Milosevic then tried to strike a deal with the Muslims
directly, and signed away territory after territory to
make that possible:

"It was clear: Milosevic wanted an agreement then
and there. But he insisted, at all times, to 51-49."
(299)

But even as Milosevic and Izetbegovic's foreign
minister Silajdzic agreed on a map (though with much
protestations from the Croats), Izetbegovic himself
refused to accept it! Here is Holbrooke's reaction:

"At 11:00 a.m., [EU envoy Carl] Bildt came to my
room to ask how we were doing. 'We are deeply
concerned,' I said, that even if Milosevic makes more
concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante.'

'Do you think Izetbegovic even wants a deal?' Carl
asked. It was a question that Warren Christopher had
also been asking. 'I'm never quite sure,' I replied.
'Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than
peace - but he can't have both.' Chris Hill, normally
highly supportive of the Bosnians, exploded in
momentary anger and frustration. 'These people are
impossible to help,' he said. It was a telling statement
from a man who had devoted years of his life to the
search for ways to help create a Bosnian state." (302)

Note that "Bosnian" here is used interchangeably with
"Muslim." Policy was made based on such ignorant
assumptions. But were they ignorant, or deliberately
malicious? For Holbrooke himself uses the term
"Muslims" often enough. For example, when
discussing the status of Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo,
which both he and Izetbegovic insisted on reuniting
under Muslim rule:

"[Milosevic] still sought political equality among
ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected
because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who
would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb
obstructionism." (259)

As a result, Sarajevo is over 90% Muslim today.

A Call to Empire

As a direct result of Dayton, Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia are again increasingly vulnerable to political
domination by the Muslims - the very issue which
sparked the war in 1992. But Holbrooke could care
less - when the Dayton agreement was signed, it
accomplished a much greater purpose than ending the
Bosnian War: "Suddenly, the war was over - and
America's role in post-Cold War Europe redefined."
(358)

Indeed, it was Holbrooke who most clearly articulated
the Imperial argument that intervention in the
Balkans helped shape the post-Cold War course of
U.S. foreign policy:

"Criticism of President Clinton as a weak leader
ended abruptly, especially in Europe and among the
Muslim nations. [.] [E]ven those who chafed at the
reassertion of American power conceded, at least
implicitly, its necessity. [.] After Dayton, American
foreign policy seemed more assertive, more muscular.
This may have been as much perception as reality, but
the perception mattered." (359)

It began with Bosnia, continued in Kosovo, and went
on to Afghanistan and Iraq, each intervention more
brazen than the one before, each accepted because of
the precedent of the one before. That Bush escalated
the policy initiated under Clinton only shows that
Empire transcends party lines.

Holbrooke concluded To End A War with a call to
Empire:

"There will be other Bosnias in our lives - areas
where early outside involvement can be decisive, and
American leadership will be required. The world's
richest nation, one that presumes to great moral
authority, cannot simply make worthy appeals to
conscience and call on others to carry the burden. The
world will look to Washington for more than rhetoric
the next time we face a challenge to peace." (369)

Even though he is no longer a major player, his call
has been heeded. So much for the "day everything
changed."

From Star to Footnote

Crafting the Dayton Accords may have been the
pinnacle of Holbrooke's career. After a two-year
stint as an investment banker, he re-entered
diplomatic waters with mixed results. In late 1998, he
tried to repeat his work in Bosnia by persuading
Yugoslav president Milosevic to surrender Kosovo.
But the same trick could not work on Milosevic
twice. Holbrooke returned home in defeat.

The following year, he was nominated as the US
Ambassador to the UN, but the appointment stalled
when he was accused of violating federal ethics
guidelines. He admitted no wrongdoing but paid the
fine. After the UN stint, he was tapped to become
Secretary of State in Gore's administration. The
scandal-ridden election of 2000 extinguished that
hope. Richard Holbrooke thus passed from the
diplomatic stage, and it is unclear whether he will
ever step into the limelight again. But even as he
becomes a footnote in American politics, the effects
of his 1995 campaign in Bosnia remain, lingering on
as a reminder of what one arrogant, unscrupulous man
can do with Imperial power.

And if that is not the best argument against the
existence of Imperial power, what is?

-Nebojsa Malic

Ciao,

desideriamo farti sapere che, nella sezione File del gruppo
crj-mailinglist, troverai un nuovo file appena caricato.

File : /BimbiXPace.jpg
Caricato da : jugocoord <jugocoord@...>
Descrizione : Iniziativa per Kragujevac al Teatro Stabile Sloveno di Trieste, 7 giugno 2003

Puoi accedere al file dal seguente indirizzo:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/BimbiXPace.jpg

Per ulteriori informazioni su come condividere i file con gli altri
iscritti al tuo gruppo, vai invece alla sezione di Aiuto al seguente
indirizzo:
http://help.yahoo.com/help/it/groups/files


Cordiali saluti,

jugocoord <jugocoord@...>

1. Il confronto con Kucan e lo stato di salute di Milosevic.
(Dispacci ANSA dal sito: http://www.ansa.it/balcani/)

2. EX-SLOVENIAN PRESIDENT MILAN KUCAN TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE
Written By: Vera Martinovic - May 24, 2003 -
www.slobodan-milosevic.org

3. MILOSEVIC RECOVERS FROM ILLNESS: "TRIAL" TO RESUME THURSDAY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - May 28, 2003


=== 1 ===


Dispacci ANSA dal sito: http://www.ansa.it/balcani/


TPI: MILOSEVIC; SOSPESO PROCESSO, SLOBO AMMALATO

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 27 MAG - Nuova sospensione all'Aja del processo
contro Slobodan Milosevic per i problemi di salute dell'ex-uomo forte
dei Baslcani. La Corte giudicante ha annunciato questa mattina un
rinvio dell'udienza: Milosevic ''ha la febbre'' ha precisato un
portavoce del Tribunale Penale Internazionale. Il processo, iniziato
nel febbraio 2002, e' gia' stato sospeso otto volte a causa delle
precarie condizioni di salute dell'ex-presidente jugoslavo, che ha in
particolare problemi cardio-vascolari. Milosevic e' accusato di
presunti crimini di guerra e contro l'umanita' per le guerre in
Kosovo, Bosnia e Croazia. (ANSA). CEF 27/05/2003 10:55


MILOSEVIC: TPI, SCINTILLE A UDIENZA CON EX PRESIDENTE SLOVENO

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 21 MAG - Slobodan Milosevic all'attacco
nell'udienza di oggi al processo all'Aja del Tpi: l'ex uomo forte di
Belgrado ha accusato l'ex presidente della Slovenia, Milan Kucan, di
essere responsabile della disintegrazione dell'ex Jugoslavia avvenuta
nel 1991. ''Perche' ha scelto la guerra? Per quale ragione ha
attaccato l'esercito federale jugoslavo in Slovenia?'', ha chiesto
Slobo nel suo controinterrogatorio a Kucan, che ha testimoniato contro
l'ex presidente durante l'udienza di oggi nel processo in corso al
Tribunale penale internazionale sull'ex Jugoslavia dell'Aja. Kucan ha
a sua volta ''rifiutato'' energicamente le dichiarazioni di Milosevic,
il cui ''messaggio'' di fronte all'implosione jugoslava - ha detto
l'ex capo dello stato sloveno - era che ''non avrebbe mai accettato
che i serbi residenti fuori dalla Serbia non rientrassero sotto
l'autorita' di Belgrado''. Kucan, 62 anni, e' stato dal 1986 capo del
partito comunista sloveno che si oppose alla politica del partito
serbo di Milosevic. Nel 1990 divenne presidente della Slovenia che un
anno dopo proclamo' l'indipendenza dalla federazione jugoslava.
Nell'estate del 1991 le forze armate jugoslave cercarono di prendere
il controllo della repubblica secessionista, ma si ritirarono dopo due
mesi di resistenza slovena. (ANSA) RIG 21/05/2003 16:04


MILOSEVIC: DUBBI SU MEDICINE DATEGLI IN CARCERE TPI, STAMPA

(ANSA) - BRUXELLES, 23 NOV - Un quotidiano olandese ha oggi sollevato
dubbi sulla cura medica seguita in carcere all'Aja dall'ex-presidente
jugoslavo Slobodan Milosevic, il cui non buono stato di salute ha
costretto il tribunale dell'Onu a interrompere piu' volte il processo
dall'estate scorsa.
Stando a 'Nrc Handelsblad', che cita ''fonti del tribunale'',
a Milosevic, che soffre fra l'altro di ipertensione, sarebbero stati
somministrati negli ultimi tempi farmaci sbagliati, che avrebbero
provocato anzi un incremento dei problemi di pressione arteriosa.
Questa, secondo le fonti citate dal quotidiano, sarebbe stata la causa
del nuovo deterioramento della salute di Milosevic, il cui processo e'
stato interrotto per due settimane nell'ultimo mese a causa
dell'affaticamento eccessivo e di una crisi ipertensiva dell'imputato.
Slobo e' sotto processo all'Aja dal 2 febbraio scorso: e' accusato
davanti al Tpi di crimini di guerra, contro l'umanita' e genocidio per
le sue presunte responsabilita' nelle atrocita' perpetrate nelle
guerre in Bosnia, Croazia e Kosovo. Un portavoce del Tpi ha pero'
contestato questo pomeriggio le informazioni riportate dal quotidiano
olandese. ''Le medicine somministrate a Milosevic non sono
assolutamente cambiate negli ultimi mesi'' ha detto Christian
Chartier. Secondo il portavoce la cura seguita dall'ex-presidente
jugoslavo e' stata approvata anche dal cardiologo di famiglia
di Milosevic a Belgrado. ''Ci ha detto che non poteva seguire una cura
migliore'', ha affermato Chartier. Nei giorni scorsi due giuristi
internazionali che assistono il Tpi nel caso Milosevic hanno
consigliato alla Corte di disporre la scarcerazione dell'imputato per
ragioni di salute per un anno, in modo da consentirgli di seguire il
processo in migliori condizioni. Ma il procuratore capo del Tpi Carla
Del Ponte si e' opposta alla richiesta. (ANSA). CEF 23/11/2002 15:11


=== 2 ===


http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/martinovic052403.htm

EX-SLOVENIAN PRESIDENT MILAN KUCAN TESTIFIES AT THE HAGUE

Written By: Vera Martinovic - May 24, 2003


On Wednesday, May 21, 2003 former Slovenian President, Milan Kucan
testified at the so-called "trial" of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague.

Milan Kucan, the former President of Slovenia, made a huge mistake by
testifying at the Hague Tribunal. The only excuse for him would be if
he was actually summoned, and therefore unable to refuse, but, if he
did volunteer, it was the wrong thing to do, because he contributed
nothing to the Prosecution's case and only brought the limelight onto
the 10-day 'war' in Slovenia.

Equally questionable were the motives of the Prosecution to have Kucan
as a witness at all: gaining nothing from him, and addressing by his
testimony a time-span and topics never covered by any of the ICTY
indictments.

Be that as it may, as Kucan testified, and contributed nothing, he
enabled Milosevic to shed light onto Slovenia's dirty little war with
its financial and political motives, and its own war crimes. The role
of Slovenia in the breaking up of Yugoslavia, aiding and abetting of
other separatisms, breaking the UN arms embargo etc. etc.

Kucan on the other hand did manage to tarnish his own personal
reputation of a well-spoken, well-informed politician.

Kucan proved insufficient, in spite of the dedicated work done by his
team of advisors, lawyers, and top members of the Slovenian military,
who all frantically worked to prepare their ex-president for his day
in The Hague. Kucan's advisers rehearsed all kinds of possible
questions with him, but the result was that the not-so-well-spoken
"Balkan ruffian", Milosevic, was wittier and far better informed.

All that Kucan managed to do was exude the exaggerated rhetoric of
'democratic community of peoples', 'democratization of life',
'European solutions' and 'different concepts' etc...

It was just as a Slovenian journalist in front of the Tribunal
building said when she was interviewed by the TV B92 correspondent the
morning before the trial transmission began: 'He's well prepared,
he'll explain why Slovenia went its own way, he's a good speaker, very
intelligent; if he comes across gentlemanly [gospodski], he'll show
that Slovenia has nothing to hide; but, all depends on what kind of
questions will Milosevic ask...'

Kucan did indeed behave like a gentleman, unfortunately he was an
ill-informed, and at times confused gentleman; surely regretting now
that he was involved in this at all.

True to form Milosevic asked the expected unpleasant and to-the-point
questions, but more significantly, he had all the possible information
and documents, unlike Kucan, who at times made some serious blunders.

Prosecutor Nice tried to press Kucan for the background of the
Yugoslav breakdown, and the "sinister role" that Milosevic played in
it, but all he managed to get was bits and pieces from two of
Milosevic's speeches, taken totally out of context. Some of the
excerpts he used were not even whole sentences, but parts of sentences
and even individual words that were highlighted with a marker on the
overhead projector. Then the prosecutor asked Kucan to comment on
those excerpts.

The case in point was the 'non-institutional means', which Kucan
interpreted as the 'non-constitutional means for changing things in
Yugoslavia'. However, it was obvious from the context that the excerpt
actually meant that the institutions in Kosovo in 1989 were not
responding to the problems, so the Serbs had to protest peacefully in
the streets against the abuses of the local Albanian government,
outside the institutions, forcing those the institutions to act, which
is the legitimate right of any citizen. It must have been embarrassing
for Kucan to be publicly instructed by Milosevic in his
cross-examination about the definitions of the words 'institutional'
and 'constitutional'.

Would you believe that Prosecutor Nice even pulled out that
unfortunate Kosovo Polje speech again, wanting Kucan to 'make a
connection', so Kucan joined the club of those who vaguely misquoted
and took out of context from that overly-misused speech.

Even May was sick of that threadbare 'trump card', so he quite rudely
interrupted Kucan, saying that the Chamber has already heard enough on
that speech from others.

Kucan got a bit offended, saying: 'Let me finish my thought' and
proceeded with his broad misquote: 'It was said that the Serb people
is not yet in armed battles, but that this could not be excluded and
that the changes will be made by any means.' (?!) That was NOT said
anywhere in this famous speech.

By the way, Kucan 'explained' that the speech was given at the 500th
anniversary of the Kosovo Polje Battle, missing it by only a 100 years
(the battle happened in 1389, the speech in 1989, so simple arithmetic
tells you that it was in fact the 600th anniversary).

Milosevic, of course, took the opportunity to quote whole paragraphs
from both speeches later on, demonstrating that the false
interpretations and misrepresentations made by the other side simply
don't stand.

The other tackle by Nice was to urge Kucan to give his opinions and
interpretations on the 'real' meaning of certain events. So, many of
his answers boiled to 'it actually means', 'Serbia actually opted
for', 'nobody believed that', 'this is how we understood that'. Again,
such interpretations were either exaggerated or totally opposite to
the true meaning. At times, he even went wild in his assumptions, like
when he read the intentions of 'the Serbs', who refused the Slovenian
'concept of dissolution' of Yugoslavia. 'This is how I understood it',
Kucan bravely plunged in: Since the Serbs thought the internal borders
of the republics to be merely administrative; they 'implied that the
borders could be altered by force'.

Quite a broad implication indeed, nobody said that, or wrote that
anywhere, yet Kucan knows that they actually meant that. Could it be
that they meant the administrative borders should be simply
renegotiated? No, those barbarians are incapable of such a gentlemanly
concept, so the gentleman assumed they actually implied violence.
Still, I don't understand how assumptions can constitute any sort of
evidence given by a witness at a trial.

Prosecutor Nice then resorted to his favorite illustration for
practically everything - the BBC documentary 'The Death of
Yugoslavia.' This time he played the video of that notorious 14th
Congress of the League of Communists from January 1990, when the
Slovenian delegation walked out of the meeting after 'almost
all' of their amendments were rejected 'because we had been outvoted.'
Kucan explained that had been deliberately done to oust them, and 'the
accused (Milosevic) was the first, or among those who first lifted his
voting card and the others followed'.

Kucan is aware that he's talking to Westerners here, who know zilch
about the Communist Party apparatus and could easily swallow such an
explanation. But, Kucan is an old Communist cadre, so he should know
better.

In brief: at the full meeting, the plenum, where all the Congress
delegates are present (3-4,000 of them), nothing was ever decided, and
nothing ever happened that was not previously prepared and agreed
upon. So, if the Slovenian delegation started, out of the blue, to put
to vote outrageous proposals, which were a surprise to everybody, not
discussed and agreed upon previously in the inner Party circles, this
could only mean that Slovenia deliberately organized such a coup
de theatre to force the unprepared delegates to vote against their
proposals and in that manner form a pretext for their walking out of
the meeting, thus signifying the beginning of the end for Yugoslavia.

Instead of such a perfectly logical explanation, consistent with the
functioning of the Party mechanism, Kucan concocted a
Westerner-friendly accusation against the Serbian leaders, who
allegedly, deliberately voted against the Slovenian proposals just to
force them out of the party and out of Yugoslavia.

But, how could they possibly vote for such proposals? One of the
proposals was 'to make the connections among the Federal units
different', as Kucan vaguely put it, in other words - confederation.

The other proposal was 'to introduce the political pluralism', or the
multiparty system. And all those 'tiny' changes were proposed in the
form of innocent little amendments to the Party Congress conclusions,
at the plenum, without being previously agreed upon at the top, as is
the Party practice.

AS IF the Slovenes needed to be "forced" to leave Yugoslavia! This was
their intention, and their plan. They were cunning enough and
supported enough to perform it and now they blame others when they did
exactly what they wanted to do in the first place!

Prosecutor Nice dwelled on that Party Congress footage with relish,
while Kucan interpreted, the BBC?s voice-over commentary - a real
testimony indeed.

The remaining 'issues' that Nice raised were even more feeble, or else
already chewed up by others. There were the amendments to the Serbian
Constitution, allegedly depriving Kosovo and Vojvodina of their
autonomy (Milosevic quoted the Constitution, proving that the autonomy
in fact was not revoked, and Kucan was forced to admit that).

Then, there was the grudge of Slovenia that the Slovenian language was
not 'used within the Army', as was allegedly promised them at the end
of World War II. When cross-examined, Kucan had to admit that it was
logical that the Army would need one command language, and it was OK
for them, but that they still wanted the Slovenian language to be used
in the Army somehow. I failed to understand the "well-spoken
gentleman," I have to admit. What other usage of language is there in
any Army, besides to issue commands? You can speak whichever language
you prefer while on your R&R, but when an officer speaks, one language
has to be accepted for everyone. Or, does Mr. Kucan think that the
Army should have hired interpreters?

Then, Nice quoted profusely from the book-journal written by the
former President of the Yugoslav Presidency, Borislav Jovic, asking
Kucan to comment certain highlighted passages. Again, the relevance
and the veracity of the excerpts was dubious, which even Kucan himself
couldn't deny, saying that the description of one meeting where both
he and Jovic were present was 'pretty accurate', but 'for the rest, I
cannot confirm it'.

Nevertheless, Nice continued to quote from the journal, skimming that
way through the tumultuous events in 1990, when the JNA confiscated
all of the weapons from the local TO units, the steps towards the
secession of Slovenia, their elections, referendum for independence,
6-month suspension of its implementation, negotiations between
Presidents of all republics, where Slovenia kept 'seriously' proposing
confederative status after they had already opted and voted for
independence!

The only piece of real testimony from Kucan was when he spoke of his
walk with Milosevic in the lull of one of these futile
traveling-circus meetings. According to Kucan, Milosevic told him that
if Slovenia wants to leave the Federation that Serbia could not and
would not prevent that, but there are some preconditions to be agreed
before that. Croatia is a bigger problem; there everything is an open
issue, even the borders.

Then, Nice skimmed further on through the declared independence of
Slovenia in June 1991 and said: 'We know that a short clash occurred.'

Whereupon Kucan corrected him: 'The aggression occurred, done by the
JNA.' He literally applied only 2-3 short sentences speaking of that
'aggression', stating that it happened 'right after the celebration,
at 2 or 3 a.m.', that the 'units came out of barracks and headed
towards the state border'. He offered a choice of descriptive nouns:
'That clash, aggression, war was ended on 7 July by the talks on the
Brioni Islands, with the participation of the Ministerial EC troika,
led by Van Den Bruck, who intervened in a certain way in that period
between 27 June and 7 July.'

So much about the 'war'. Eloquent and full of detail. Nice glided on
through the final retreat of the JNA from Slovenia on 26 October 1991.

The only remaining issue until the end of the examination-in-chief was
the book by the former JNA Chief of Staff, General Veljko Kadijevic,
again amply but selectively (mis)quoted.

Kucan appeared confused, asked Nice 'What do you mean by that? Yes,
I've read it... but which part of it do you have in mind?' Nice was
really desperate, trying to make Kucan confirm that Kadijevic meant to
divide Yugoslavia along the infamous line Karlobag-Virovitica, the
alleged quotation dragged along before with other witnesses and which
was simply a misquote, because the General wrote in this particular
paragraph about the lines of retreat for the JNA, after it was
attacked in Croatia, and after it had decided to pull out.

Kucan clumsily confirmed that 'this coincides with the borders of the
diminished Yugoslavia, without Slovenia and Croatia and that 'we had
such statements even before'. By whom? When? Which statements? A
precise testimony, indeed. And that was all the evidence Kucan gave,
believe it or not. But, then came the cross-examination and a lot more
was said.

When Milosevic started to cross-examine Kucan, the very first question
brought the 'witness' to stumble, loose voice and stamina to directly
and openly accuse the Accused according to the indictment. This was
how the exchange went. Milosevic mocked Kucan, saying he used three
different expressions, one after another, to describe what happened in
Slovenia: 'clash, aggression, war. Had Serbia anything to do with that
war in Slovenia?'

Instead of promptly repeating the mantra of how Serbia, i.e.
Milosevic, actually ruled the Army (as the indictment would have it),
Kucan got immediately confused, started to mumble, said that Slovenia
'was confronted with the JNA', and the other things 'will be decided
by the Court, there are documents and books... My present
conclusion...' And here Kucan completely stopped talking.

Milosevic prompted him: 'What is your present conclusion?'

May stepped in nervously: 'Please, do not enter into quarrels. His
conclusions are unimportant.' And this was the first sign of how
things would go: Milosevic aggressive and direct, while Kucan was
timid and evasive. But, it got worse.

Milosevic read out two sentences from the minutes of the meeting in
the Federal Government Building in August 1991, after the 10-day war:
Kucan talking to the Federal Prime Minister, arrogantly and
triumphantly, refusing to discuss the possibility that two Slovenian
representatives return to the Federal Government 'because that Federal
Government had attacked Slovenia' and 'there is nothing for me to talk
about with the Federal Prime Minister, who lost the war'.

Kucan had to confirm that he had said that.

Milosevic then turned to the reasons for the war that Slovenia fought
against the Federal Government: the revenues from customs duties.

Kucan denied it, saying that Slovenia was only reacting to being
attacked.

Milosevic then quoted Warren Zimmerman, the former US Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, from his lengthy article in a foreign affairs journal
where it was plainly and brutally written that 'contrary to the
beliefs, the Slovenes had started the war. There were no efforts to
negotiate.' Zimmerman proceeded to explain why: the customs duties
revenue generated from the only border crossings towards the Western
European countries, Italy and Austria, which were in Slovenia, gained
up to 75% of the overall federal budget. The Slovenes simply took over
the customs offices by force, changed the insignia, and started to
collect, depriving the rest of the country of that revenue without
negotiating first. The Federal Government had to react by sending few
light JNA columns to retake the customs offices and re-establish the
status quo ante. Then the JNA was attacked.

Kucan tried to minimize that by saying it is the opinion of the former
US Ambassador.

But, Robinson got interested and asked Kucan to comment on this piece
of information that 'one of the consequences of your declaration of
independence was the take-over of customs offices', so Kucan got mixed
up in a lengthy explanation of money flow, which came to saying that
Slovenia negotiated it at Brioni, but only after the fait accompli.

Milosevic then jumped in by asking: 'Brioni happened after the war.
Why have you opted for violence? Why did you not act like Slovakia
did? [in the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia] Why didn't you
take the issue to the federal bodies?'

Kucan tried to convince everybody that it was impossible, that 'as a
member of a small nation we would have been outvoted'.

Milosevic reminded him that one of the Parliament Chambers voted by
consensus, so there was no outvoting, and that Slovenia actually
prevented the Law on Secession from being enacted, 'and you could have
left peacefully'. He also reminded him that the federal Government
intervened not at the internal borders of republics, but at the
external border.

Kucan got very nervous, and started to answer not to Milosevic, but to
'Your Honours', pleading with them to understand how he 'had
discussions with the Accused over many years' and that 'there were no
reasons to defend the border', but Milosevic cut him short: 'We are
obviously switching the meanings here. I've quoted Zimmerman to you
and the reasons why you did what you did.'

Then, Milosevic pulled out the case of a live TV show in Slovenia a
few years into their independence, with illustrious guests from
Croatia (Mesic, General Spegelj, Tomac), where Kucan also participated
and they answered direct phone questions. Kucan tried to wiggle out,
saying his memory is not that good anymore, but confirmed he was
there. Milosevic proceeded to describe what happened in that show and
how in a celebrative mood Mesic got too relaxed and babbled about
Genscher [the then German Chancellor] and the Pope who crucially
contributed to the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

Kucan confirmed that was said, but he added: 'My experience with these
people was different.'

Milosevic: 'Which people - Genscher and the Pope?'

Kucan tried to play dumb, saying: 'I don't understand what do you want
from me.'

Milosevic then patiently explained: 'Mr. Kucan, for more than a half
of your testimony you have been talking about that book by Mr Jovic.
I'm asking you whether Mesic said that.'

May jumped in: 'He has agreed to that.'

Milosevic: 'Very good.' Then he proceeded to quote Mesic, who said
that 'Genscher and the Pope have given us a strong support in
demolishing Yugoslavia.'
Kucan reluctantly confirmed this was said.

May wanted to know whether these questions were put to Mesic during
his testimony, and Milosevic answered that he only got this
information recently, and so he's asking Kucan, who was there, to
confirm it.

Without the slightest pause and without a warning, Milosevic asked:
'Why did you attack the JNA, killing 44 and seriously wounding 184
soldiers?'
Kucan tried to give slightly smaller figures 'according to our data'
and miserably concluded that 'these are the sad consequences of war'.

Milosevic couldn't be stopped: he proceeded to describe war crimes
perpetrated by the Territorial Defence and the Police of Slovenia
against the JNA and their families (killings, maltreatments, unlawful
arrests, intimidations, expulsions, refusal of medical assistance
causing death, cutting of supplies etc. etc.), quoting from the White
Book made by the JNA, from which he submitted precise lists with
names, dates and descriptions. The Trial Chamber at first admitted one
list into evidence (for identification, as they call it, until
translated and decided upon), but when things became more and more
terrible, they refused to admit the lists anymore.

[For those who want to know a bit about these colorful events, I
managed to locate 2 Reports by the Federal Government submitted to the
UN Commission of Experts in pursuance of the UN Council Resolution No.
780. There were 7 such Reports covering the war crimes perpetrated on
the territory of the whole ex-YU, but these 2 from November 1992 and
May 1994 mention also the Slovenian pretty little war. Here are the
links:
http://www.balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wcts/wcts02.shtml
and
http://balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wcts/wcts04.shtml
These are lengthy reports, containing crimes also from other parts of
ex-YU, so my advice is to use [CTRL + F], and then type 'Slovenia', so
that you can search through these huge documents for the crimes
related to Slovenia. And they are ugly, believe me, and comprise
everything: inhumane treatment of civilians, killing and inhumane
treatment of wounded and sick persons, ethnic cleansing, willful
killing of civilians, willful killing of POWs, inhumane treatment of
POWs - complete with: names, dates, places, the works. And all that in
just 10 days; not bad for "civilized gentlemen" who refuse to be
denominated as a Balkan country.
Just imagine what they could have accomplished if the war had lasted
longer.
For those with even stronger stomach and thirst for info, visit the
site
http://www.balkanpeace.org,
then go to the top left under "WAR CRIMES SECTION", and click on
"WITNESS TESTIMONIES". There you will find all those Reports and
plenty of other stuff.]

Kucan was bombarded with questions about these atrocities perpetrated
by his forces, under his command responsibility, for which questions
he had been specially prepared, and what did he do? He failed
miserably. He first tried to deny: 'Ne, tega nismo storili. = No, we
didn't do that.' Then he admitted that 'perhaps it happened' that the
private trucks in transit had been taken, that 'some civilians had
been hurt'. Then he claimed 'I do not know about that', 'I have no
data about that'.

Milosevic retorted: "I have all the data about that.' When the
atrocities mentioned became more gruesome (killing of wounded and
sick, preventing medical help)

Kucan lost his composure and called the JNA report-book 'a propaganda
brochure' and started to rant: 'I claim that this did not happen. And
even if something like that did happen, it was in some extreme
situations. What happened later on, in Vukovar, Srebrenica,
Dubrovnik... it was a systematic thing...'

Milosevic paid no attention to Kucan anymore, simply leaving him to
let off steam, and spoke to May: 'Very well, Mr May, you do not want
to accept this last list. I have here also the list of 17 violations
of the proper treatment of POWs, I presume that you won't accept this
either'

Then, Milosevic turned to Kucan again, embarking upon the case of
execution of 3 POWs on 28 June 1991 at the Holmec border crossing.

Kucan said: 'If you're asking whether they have been captured and
shot, the answer is no.'

Milosevic then produced a thick swath of documents from the Slovenian
courts and some international NGOs pertaining to that case.

Kucan boldly stated that 'all this only goes to prove that Slovenia
behaved as the lawful state'. May ordered the documents to be given to
Kucan to read them, he briefly skimmed through some of it and timidly
said: 'I've claimed that these soldiers and civilians were not
executed as POWs, but it seems that they were.'
Wow! His advisors must have done a poor job preparing Mr. Kucan for
this. May then admitted the documents into evidence.

Milosevic then summed up: 'I have given only a few examples, but it's
obvious that in this so-called "attack by the JNA," many times more
JNA soldiers were killed than Slovenes. [44 as opposed to 8] Jovic
told you that if you want your independence, go on, but do not kill
our sons. Why was this war necessary to you?'

Kucan denied that Slovenia wanted the war.

Milosevic. insisted: 'Isn't it true that you could have left
Yugoslavia without a war and that you started it only to facilitate
the complete destruction of Yugoslavia?'

May tried to protect the hapless witness by saying he already answered
that.

Milosevic continued by reminding Kucan that Slovenia, while talking
about "legality and democracy" was actually making decisions contrary
to the Yugoslav Constitution. He said that they have promised to
proceed into independence legally, and the Constitutional Court would
be ultimately consulted, but then they acted against its rulings.
Milosevic submitted 27 such rulings of the Federal Constitutional
Court, pronouncing as unconstitutional various resolutions, laws and
Amendments to the Slovenian Constitution that had been passed by the
Slovenian legislature.

May woke up and wanted to know Kucan's opinion on this, and Kucan
tried to persuade him that these rulings were indeed stating these
acts of Slovenia to be incompatible with the Yugoslav Constitution,
but 'there were different opinions by the 2 judges who represented
Slovenia in that Court', and 'the same method of voting was applied'.
May inquired: 'When you say the same method, what do you mean by
that?'

Kucan answered: 'Well, as at the 14th Party Congress.'
May: 'It means, the Slovenes were in the minority?'
Kucan: 'Yes.'
May: 'Were they joined also by some other judges?'
Kucan couldn't confirm that, but he said that he would 'look it up'.
What that man does know? He was the President then, these were the
crucial issues and decisions, and he was supposedly well prepared for
his testimony.

Milosevic ridiculed that comparison of voting at the Party Congress
and at the Court and pointed out this is the common practice in all
courts in the world. He asked: 'Are you claiming that the
Constitutional Court made his rulings in violation of its
regulations?'

Kucan kept on with his lengthy whining of how Slovenia was always in
the minority, how the principle of 'one man, one vote' in the
Parliament could have been amended, but Milosevic insisted the
question being about the legal rulings of the Constitutional Court,
and that the Slovenes expressly said their changes will be done
according to the law and Constitution, offering the Constitutional
Court as a guarantee for that, and 'then you complain about your
rights being violated because the Constitutional Court made his
rulings'.

May admitted these 27 rulings into evidence.

If it was some real judge here, and not "Dick" May, I would be certain
that this legal exchange had reminded him of the recent ruling of the
Trial Chamber in which those 6 coded witnesses, whose trial
transcripts were admitted into the Milosevic trial evidence without
cross-examination, and the voting was 2 to 1, leaving poor Robinson in
the minority just like the poor Slovenes. He could have then cried
foul, taken the ball and gone home, just like the Slovenes did.

The next issue was illegal arms trade between Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. When first generally asked about that by
Milosevic, Kucan denied it existed at all: 'No, as far as I'm aware.'

When Milosevic then produced documents, from Croatia, proving the
opposite Kucan changed his tune, saying that he couldn't see anything
contentious here, these were 'legal channels, with competent
authorities and you spoke of illegal trade.' To that, Milosevic
gently reminded him that at that time the UN arms embargo was in
effect.

Kucan then claimed that this was before the international recognition
of Slovenia, 'therefore it did not apply to us.' But then, he realized
the mistake, saying:
'Excuse me, it was in the period when both states were recognized;
therefore, we took necessary measures to protect ourselves.' [Wow! So,
the new statelets have the right to violate the UN embargo, just
because they need to be able to protect themselves. That is a creative
interpretation.]

When asked whether the embargo applied to Bosnia, Kucan said it only
applied to the arms sale. Milosevic then produced a second document,
this one being from Izetbegovic, proving exactly that.

Both documents were admitted. Milosevic concluded that Slovenia took
part in the arming of the Bosnian Muslims, to which Kucan said that it
is hard for him to accept such a claim and that it has to be seen
first whether the Bosnian Muslims were first capable of defending
themselves on their own.
He said: 'My answer is, why was it necessary?' [Great reasoning: you
do something illegal, and when asked why are you doing it, you answer:
Well, ask yourselves why it was necessary for me to do that?] Even
Milosevic was amused by that, smiling and muttering: 'Good, very
good.'

Milosevic further proved how well informed he is when he asked how
come the Parliamentary commission for investigating UN embargo
violations had been dissolved before reaching any conclusions.

Kucan confirmed they had done this, but claimed that 'this procedure
is still unfinished'. How many years passed - 10, 11, 12 years?
Indeed, a State of law and order.

[The arms trading affairs, with all its dirty political games and
enormous gains by various Slovenian politicians were all over the
Slovenian press at that time. If you want to check one example, here's
the link:
http://www.aimpress.org/dyn/trae/archive/data/199805/80503-004-trae-lju.htm
This is the article called 'War Diplomacy - Controversial Armament
Trade' from 1998.
Also check what Kucan stated on the subject in 1996 at:
http://www.hri.org/news/Balkans/yds/96-07-03-yds.html#08
'Slovenian President Says European Union Played Big Role in Breaking
Former Yugoslavia'.
You'll be better able to assess how the politicians of Slovenia were
not at all squeamish to grab big bucks peddling arms, while at the
same time preaching to be so much more "civilized and democratic" than
those Balkan "barbarians" to whom they were selling the arms.]

The rest of the cross-examination went on debunking the games of Nice,
with misquoted speeches, which I already mentioned in the earlier.
There were a couple of highly amusing moments when Milosevic found in
the written summary of the talks that Kucan had with the OTP
investigators some incredible and preposterous constructions.

Kucan vehemently denied ever saying something like that. The thing is,
the investigators didn't give his full verbatim answers, but instead
prepared themselves a freely ad-libbed summary, which was at places so
free that after Milosevic quoted from it, Kucan had to say: 'This
claim is incredible, however, I never stated that.'

The first time, it was some minor stupidity, like 'the Serbs needed
Yugoslavia to be able to all live in one state, and the non-Serb
nations saw in Yugoslavia a country protecting its groups (?!).

Milosevic started to lead Kucan through questions about the control of
the Army in 1989, making him to confirm that the Federal Presidency
was in charge, and not Milosevic who was then merely a Party chief,
not even the President of Serbia yet.

Then Milosevic read the second incredible construction from the
Prosecution's summary, which was more sinister: the investigators
wrote that Kucan told them, speaking about the pre-war events in
Kosovo, when the miners went on strike that this was 'connected with
the use of the Army by Milosevic in the events around Stari Trg Mine'.

Kucan denied saying this, and again explicitly confirmed that the
Presidency commanded the Army, and that he 'never claimed otherwise or
that you (Milosevic) were the one to issue orders'.

Milosevic said he was happy that Kucan had said that 'just because of
the manipulations of this Other Side.'

Amicus Curiae, Tapuskovic practically gave up his questions, after
being allotted only 20 min. and warned by interpreters to slow down,
so May recommended that he put his questions in writing.

Kucan had to leave, he came only for one day. But, Tapuskovic
nevertheless managed to establish one important thing by asking Kucan,
and then warned the Chamber that among the following witnesses will be
one Ivan Kristan, who will pose as an expert on constitutional issues,
and this is no other than one of those two Slovenian judges from the
former Federal Constitutional Court who were outvoted regarding the
constitutionality of those 27 secession documents of Slovenia. That
should be one impartial "expert witness," no doubt.

Thus ended the ordeal of Milan Kucan. The only his attempt at repartee
was when he referred to the famous sentence given by Slobodan
Milosevic in front of the angry and frightened Serb peasants in
Kosovo, who had just been clubbed by the Albanian police, where
Milosevic told them that 'Nobody may beat you'.

Kucan said that Milosevic should have said instead: 'Nobody may beat
anyone in Kosovo'. Interesting - sounds a bit like something the UN
might say: 'The violence from both sides must stop.' And what if there
was no violence from both sides at that time, as it actually was the
case? So, the attempt at repartee by Kucan failed miserably, as did
his information management and his usefulness as a witness.


Vera Martinovic is an independent writer based in Belgrade,
Yugoslavia.


=== 3 ===


MILOSEVIC RECOVERS FROM ILLNESS: "TRIAL" TO RESUME THURSDAY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - May 28, 2003

Former president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic became ill on
Tuesday. As a result the so-called "trial" had to be canceled on
Tuesday and Wednesday.

The so-called "trial" will resume on Thursday as The Hague Tribunal's
doctors now say that President Milosevic has recovered from his fever.

UNTER
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/aikor29.5.03.txt=

ZU LESEN:

*** JUGOSLAWIEN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAK
WELCHES LAND ALS NÄCHSTES? STOPPT DIE USA!
FREIHEIT FÜR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC!
Internationale Demonstration in Den Haag,
Samstag, 28. Juni, 2003, Beginn: 14 Uhr

*** WARUM DEMONSTRIEREN SIE AM 28. JUNI IN DEN HAAG?
Cathrin Schütz sprach mit Klaus Hartmann,
Vizepräsident des Internationalen
Komitees für die Verteidigung von Slobodan Miloevic

*** GERECHTIGKEIT MADE IN USA
von Ralph Hartmann
Aus: Ossietzky 9/2003
http://www.sopos.org/aufsaetze/3eb2ac0a5184b/1.phtml

*** Nieder mit der NATO Mafia-Regierung in Belgrad!
Demonstration zum Vidovdan
Jugoslawisch-Österreichische Solidaritätsbewegung


DEMO-FLUGBLATT:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/HaagDemo-Flugi.d=
oc


FLUGBLAETTER U. WEITERES AUF ENGLISCH:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/


--- Flugblatt-Text:


JUGOSLAWIEN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAK - WER IST DER NÄCHSTE?

In immer schnellerer Folge wechseln die Kriegsschauplätze - viele
Friedensfreunde verlieren den Über-blick und übersehen die
Zusammenhänge. Wie der Überfall auf den Irak war die NATO-Aggression
1999 gegen Jugoslawien ein völkerrechtswidriger Angriffskrieg. Damals
wie heute ging es den USA um die Durchsetzung globaler
Weltmachtansprüche, die Kontrolle von Rohstoffquellen und
Transportwegen. Mit dem neuen strategischen NATO-Konzept von 1999
wurde die Aggression gegen Jugoslawien zum "Tür-öffnerkrieg", zum
entscheidenden Präzedenzfall für die Missachtung des absoluten
Gewaltverbots des Völkerrechts. Auf dem Balkan wurde die neue
Strategie der selektiven Aufhebung der Staatensouveräni-tät und des
Selbstbestimmungsrechts der Völker vorexerziert.

Als Symbol des Widerstandes gegen die neue Weltkriegsordnung soll
Slobodan Milosevic exempla-risch in einem Schauprozess abgeurteilt
werden - zur nachträglichen Legitimation der Aggression und
Kriegsverbrechen der NATO, und als warnendes Beipiel zur Abschreckung
aller "Unwilligen", Dissiden-ten und Abweichler, die nicht Vasallen
der neuen Weltordner sein wollen. Hierfür wurde ein
völker-rechtswidriges Sondergericht geschaffen, das keine Institution
des Rechts, sondern eine Kolonialbehörde darstellt. Deshalb ist die
Forderung nach Abschaffung des Haager "Tribunals" und nach Freiheit
für Slo-bodan Milosevic sowie alle politischen Gefangenen der NATO
unverzichtbares Element des Kampfes für eine andere Weltordnung. Dafür
demonstrieren wir in Den Haag:

28. Juni 2003
Auflösung des illegalen YU-Tribunals!
Freiheit für Slobo und alle politischen Gefangenen der NATO !

Nach dem "Regimewechsel" wurden auch in Belgrad willige Lakaien
eingesetzt, die das Land und seine Verteidiger für einen Judaslohn
verkaufen. Ausgerechnet am 28. Juni 2001, dem höchsten serbi-schen
Feiertag, der an die Schlacht auf dem Amselfeld 1389 erinnert, wurde
Slobodan Milosevic vom Djindjic-Regime nach Den Haag entführt.
Symbolträchtig wollten die Kidnapper deutlich machen, dass die
Besiegten nun die Geschichtsdeutung der Sieger zu übernehmen hätten.
Doch immer war und ist der 28. Juni - Tag des Verrats und der
Erniedrigung und zugleich Tag des Widerstandes gegen imperialistische
Fremdherrschaft

Heute agiert in Belgrad eine Marionettenregierung von Gnaden der USA
nach den Direktiven des CIA-Residenten und US-Botschafters William
Montgomery. In Komplizenschaft mit dem Haager Tribu-nal verweigern sie
den "Angeklagten" aus ihrem Land jede Unterstützung, inzwischen selbst
den Zugang zu Beweismitteln. Bisher hat die "Anklage" an jedem
Verhandlungstag ein Fiasko erlebt, trotz nachge-wiesener Versuche der
Zeugenbestechung und -bedrohung. Deshalb ist es nun ihre offenkundige
Absicht, Slobodan Milosevic, der als Ankläger der NATO auftritt,
physisch und psychisch zu brechen - eine "bio-logische Lösung" als
kalkulierter rettender Ausweg für die Veranstalter dieses
Justizverbrechens.

Deshalb demonstrieren wir unter der Losung
STOPPT DIE USA! FREIHEIT FÜR SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC!

Demo am Samstag, 28. Juni 2003, 14 Uhr
Congressgebäude Den Haag, Churchillplein 10

Internationales Komitee für die Verteidigung von Slobodan Milosevic -
ICDSM - URL: www.free-slobo.de
Klaus Hartmann, Schillstraße 7, 63067 Offenbach am Main,
Tel/Fax -69-835850, e-mail: vorstand@...

Serbi e tedeschi. Per rinfrescare la memoria
(ITALIANO, SRPSKOHRVATSKI, ENGLISH)


Per rinfrescare la memoria "alla vecchia Europa" ed anche ai vari
nostri professori intellettual-borghesi "ex", quelli a spasso nel
"democratico West".

Dedicato al mese di maggio, mese della vittoria contro il nazifascismo
in tutto il mondo e della fine della guerra di Liberazione della
Jugoslavia.

===

Maggio 1995, trasmissione radiofonica "Stasera insieme" di Radio
Belgrado, primo canale:

<<...In occasione del cinquantenario della vittoria sul nazifascismo,
il signor Maric dalla cittadina di Osnabrueck per gli ascoltatori di
Radio Belgrado ha trasmesso il seguente testo:

"Quando nel maggio 1945 sono stati liberati i prigionieri dal campo di
concentramento tedesco di Osnabrueck, il pastore protestante tedesco
Friedrich Hriesenberg ha recitato per i suoi fedeli una predica, che
sarebbe stata nel contempo anche la sua ultima, prima di andare in
pensione:

"Il nostro paese ha perso la guerra. Hanno vinto i russi, gli
americani, gli inglesi. Forse avevano migliori armi, più soldati,
migliori comandanti.
E' stata una vittoria materiale, quella che hanno conseguito. Ma qui
tra noi si trova un popolo, che ha conseguito un'altra vittoria, molto
più significativa. La vittoria dell'animo, la vittoria del cuore e
dell'onesta'. La vittoria della pace e dell'amore cristiano. Questo
popolo sono i serbi.
Noi prima li conoscevamo superficialmente, ma nello stesso tempo
sapevamo cosa stessimo facendo nella loro patria [vedi ALLEGATO]. Per
ogni nostro soldato morto, rappresentante il potere dell'occupatore,
ammazzavamo centinaia di serbi che difendevano la loro terra. Non
soltanto questo: sapevamo cosa stessero facendo contro i serbi da
tutte le parti i croati, gli arnauti [vecchio nome per gli schipetari,
ndT], gli italiani, gli ungheresi ed i bulgari... e tutto questo lo
approvavamo.
Sapevamo che qui tra di noi [nel campo di concentramento di
Osnabrueck, ndT] si trovavano 5000 ufficiali serbi, i quali una volta
rappresentavano l'elite sociale nel loro paese, e adesso sembravano
solo scheletri viventi, denutriti e malati. Ritenevamo che nei serbi
prevalesse il credo "chi non si vendica non viene consacrato ("Ko se
ne osveti, taj se ne posveti"). Avevamo veramente paura di questi
martiri serbi. Avevamo paura che essi, dopo la nostra capitolazione,
avrebbero fatto quello che noi abbiamo fatto a loro. Pensavamo davvero
a questa tragedia, e già vedevamo i corpi dei nostri figli galleggiare
nei canali, oppure essere bruciati nei forni. Immaginavamo il massacro
della nostra gente, gli stupri, le distruzioni delle nostre case
[dunque, proprio come in tempi recentissimi, questi signori vedevano
se stessi nello specchio ma indicavano i serbi!... ndT]
Invece cosa è successo?
Quando è stato spezzato il filo spinato, e quando i 5000 scheletri
viventi serbi [i prigionieri del campo, ndT] si sono ritrovati in
libertà e tra di noi, questi scheletri viventi hanno accarezzato i
nostri bambini, hanno parlato con noi. I serbi dunque hanno
accarezzato i bambini di quelli che hanno avvolto il loro paese in un
drappo nero...
Appena adesso comprendiamo perché il nostro poeta Goethe studiasse la
lingua serba. Ora capiamo perché l'ultima parola di Bismarck, sul
letto di morte è stata: "Serbia".
Perciò la vittoria serba è più bella, piu' alta, più di qualunque
altra vittoria materiale. Questa vittoria la potevano conseguire
soltanto i serbi, educati nello spirito di San Sava e nella loro epica
eroica, tanto amata da Goethe. Questa vittoria vivrà nei secoli
nell'animo tedesco. Ed e' a questa vittoria ed ai serbi che ho voluto
dedicare questa mia ultima predica pastorale"

[Lo speaker della radio:] Commoventi queste parole oggidì, quando da
tutte le parti si parla dei serbi con tutt'altri toni. Almeno in
generale. Ma naturalmente non sono tutti uguali. Grazie, ancora una
volta per aver ricordato queste parole di questo generoso sacerdote
tedesco. Che risuonino le sue parole anche in tante altre teste...>>

[Trascrizione dalla registrazione da Milena.
Traduzione di Ivan del CNJ per "Voce jugoslava" (trasmissione
radiofonica su Radio Città Aperta), 20 maggio 2003.]


--- SRPSKOHRVATSKI ---

Radio Beograd-I, Maj 1995.

Povodom pedestogodisnjice pobede nad fasizmom i nacizmom, g. Maric iz
Osnabrika, za slusaoce Radio Beograda (u emisiji "Veceras zajedno")
izvestio je sledece:

Kada je 1945. oslobodjen koncetracioni logor u Osnabriku i
zarobljenici pusteni na slobodu, protestantski pastor Fridrih
Hrisenberg, maja 1945. odrzao je svojim vernicima prpoved, koja je
istovremeno bila i njegova poslednja, pred odlazak u penziju. Ova
propoved u prevodu glasi:

"Nasa otadzbina izgubila je rat. Pobedili su Rusi, Amerikanci,
Englezi.
Mozda su imali bolje oruzje, vise vojnika, bolje vocstvo. Ali to je
izrazito materijalna pobeda. Tu pobedu oni su odneli. Ali ovde, medju
nama, ima jedan narod koji je izvojevao jednu drugu i mnogo lepsu
pobedu, pobedu duse, pobedu srca i postenja. Pobedu mira i hriscanske
ljubavi. To su Srbi.
Mi smo ih ranije samo donekle poznavali, ali smo isto tako znali sta
smo cinili u njihovoj otadzbini. Ubijali smo stotinu Srba, koji su
branili zemlju, za jednog naseg vojnika, koji je inace pretstavljao
vlast okupatora nasilnika. Ne samo to da smo cinili, nego smo
blagonaklono gledali kako su tamo na Srbe pucali sa svih strana: i
Hrvati, i Arnauti i Italijani i Madjari i Bugari. Znali smo da se ovde
medju nama nalazi 5000 oficira Srba, koji su nekad u svojoj zemlji
pretstavljali drustvenu elitu, a sada su licili na zive kosture,
iznemogli i malaksali od gladi. Drzali smo da kod Srba tinja verovanje
"Ko se ne osveti, taj se ne posveti", i mi smo se zaista plasili
osvete tih srpskih mucenika. Bojali smo se da ce oni, po nasoj
kapitulaciji, raditi ono sto smo mi sa njima cinili. Zamisljali smo
jasno tu tragfediju i vec videli nasu decu kako plivaju kanalizacijom
ili se peku u gradskoj pekari. Zamisljali smo ubijanje nasih ljudi,
silovanja, rusenja i razaranja nasih domova. Medjutim kako je bilo:
Kada su pukle zarobljenicke zice i kada se 5000 zivih srpskih kostura
naslo na slobodi u nasoj sredini, ti kosturi su milovali nasu decu,
davali im bombone, razgovarali su sa nama. Srbi su dakle milovali decu
onih koji su njihovu otadzbinu u crno zavili.
Tek sada razumemo zasto je nas pesnik Gete ucio srpski jezik. Sada tek
shvatamo zasto je Bizmarku poslednja rec na samrtnoj postelji bila:
Srbija. Ta pobeda Srba je lepsa i uzvisenija od svake druge pobede.
Takvu pobedu cini mi se, mogli su izvojevati i dobiti samo Srbi,
odnegovani u njihovom svetosavskom duhu i junackim srpskim pesmama,
koje je i nas Gete tako voleo. Ova pobeda ce vekovima ziveti u dusama
Nemaca, a toj pobedi i Srbima, koji su je izvojevali, zeleo sam da
posvetim ovu moju poslednju svestenicku propoved".

Spiker:
Dirljive reci, u ovo vreme kad se o Srbima na tim stranama govori
nekim drugacijim tonovima, bar u vecini. Naravno nisu svi isti.
Hvala vam, jos jednom, sto ste potsetili na uzvisene reci plemenitog
pastora. Neka odjeknu i u nekim drugim glavama."

Sa magnetoofnske trake prenela u pisani tekst, Milena


=== ALLEGATO / ANNEX ===


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/antiguer-ops/AG-BALKAN.HTM
German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/balkan/20_260_2.htm

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN THE BALKANS (SPRING 1941): PART II

"III. German Propaganda

German propaganda efforts naturally took full advantage
of this open rift between Serbs and Croats. The
constantly repeated official line was that Germany and
Italy desired the creation of an independent state of
Croatia and that the military operations were being
conducted only against the Serbs. However, when Hitler
was first told of the open animosity among the various
ethnic factions in Yugoslavia, he is said to have remarked:
"That is none of our business. If they want to bash each
others' heads in, let them go ahead."

...

"In a letter Mussolini wrote to Hitler on 29 December
1941, the former stated with reference to Yugoslavia:

Before next spring every nucleus of insurrection must be
wiped out or else we run the risk of having to fight a
subsidiary war in the Balkans. The first territory to be
pacified is Bosnia, then Serbia and Montenegro. The
military operations must be conducted with great
determination and must lead to a real and complete
disarmament of the population, this being the sole
guarantee I for avoiding surprise in the future. For this
purpose our military forces must cooperate according to a
common plan to prevent duplication of effort and achieve
the desired result with a minimum of manpower and
materiel."

1. UNHCHR on Human Rights Violations by the Serbian Police State
"POVERLJIVI MEMORANDUM MINISTARSTVIMA PRAVDE I UNUTRA©NJIH POSLOVA
REPUBLIKE SRBIJE"

2. Unity for freedom!
On the demonstrations in Belgrade and The Hague, on the activities of
Sloboda and ICDSM. By Vladimir Krsljanin


=== 1 ===


Subject: UNHCHR on Human Rights Violations by the Serbian Police State
Date: Sun, 18 May 2003 14:51:56 +0200
From: "Vladimir Krsljanin"


English original and Serbian translation (bellow).

The following very polite text contains very serious admissions and
(preliminary) findings. All progressive and democratic forces should
join the battle against these outrageous practices. The message of
President Milosevic is: 'the time of dictatorship is a right time for
action of all honest people and of all the people devoted to
democracy'.

Human rights violation practices are imposed to Serbia by ICTY (the
Hague 'tribunal'). There was never in history an institution under UN
cover whose practices was systematic violation of human rights and
dignity. The malignant anti-Yugoslav grouping of Western intelligence
bureaucracy, facing fiasco in their show-trials find a common language
with the regime that lost all credibility and support of the people.
Both desperately try to justify its existence and lot of money spent
to support their illegal activities. Allying with criminals in Serbia
and abroad they unsuccessfully try to blame for all their dirty work
President Milosevic and Serbian people.

On Tuesday, May 20, at 15:00, in front of the 'Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro' in Belgrade there will be a
demonstration, organized by Sloboda, against the new visit of Carla
del Ponte, already accused in German press for her links with the
criminal circles in Serbia.

We stand for law, justice and truth!

We stand for freedom, sovereignty and democracy!

We invite all the people to the major Vidovdan (June 28)
demonstrations:

At The Hague
organized by a Serbian-International Organizational Committee
(see the inviting leaflet at
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/sloboda051203.htm /English
version/
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/POZIVZAHAG.htm /Serbian
version/
or at
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/ /Both
versions + PDF/)

And of course in Belgrade
organized by SLOBODA

The UNHCHR text bellow was originally circulated by:
news@...
http://www.antic.org/

Support the peace and stability in the Balkans and in Europe!
Support democracy and human rights in Serbia!
Free Slobodan Milosevic!

Udruzenje SLOBODA / Freedom Association
Belgrade
Phone: +381 11 630 206 Fax: +381 11 630 549
E-mail slobodavk@...


> UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
> COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
> SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
>
>
>
>
> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
> Mission to Serbia and Montenegro
>
>
>
>
> 24 April 2003
>
> CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE
> AND THE INTERIOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA
>
> Initial findings and recommendations arising from the visit
> to detainees in Belgrade 14-15 April 2003



[ FOR THE ENGLISH VERSION SEE:
http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm
OR OUR NEXT MESSAGE ON "JUGOINFO":
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/messages ]



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro

POVERLJIVI MEMORANDUM MINISTARSTVIMA PRAVDE I UNUTRA©NJIH POSLOVA
REPUBLIKE SRBIJE

24. april 2003.

Inicijalna zapa¾anja i predlozi koji proistièu iz posete pritvorenim
licima u Beogradu od 14. do 15. aprila 2003. godine

Nakon zajednièke posete mestima pritvora i pritvorenicima u Beogradu
14. i 15. aprila 2003. godine, Kancelarija Visokog komesara
Ujedinjenih nacija za ljudska prava, Misija OEBS-a u Srbiji i Crnoj
Gori i OEBS-ova Kancelarija za demokratske institucije i ljudska
prava, utvrdili su devet hitnih preporuka koje ¾ele da prenesu
organima vlasti u Republici Srbiji.

Ove preporuke ne treba smatrati kompletnim nalazima i preporukama ove
tri institucije. Taènije, one predstavljaju odreðen broj hitnih mera
koje bi, ukoliko se sprovedu, po mi¹ljenju Delegacije koja je izvr¹ila
posetu odmah popravile situaciju lica koja su pritvorena nakon
uvoðenja vanrednog stanja. Ove tri organizacije æe u dogledno vreme
objaviti sveobuhvatan zajednièki izve¹taj o svojim nalazima i
preporukama. Ovaj izve¹taj æe detaljno razraditi navedene preporuke i
biæe dopunjen drugima. Tri organizacije ¾ele da skrenu pa¾nju Vlade na
èinjenicu da, po njihovom shvatanju, mnogi od problema ne proistièu
direktno od uslova nastalih usled vanrednog stanja, to su pre svega
problemi Centralnog zatvora u Beogradu koji postoje veæ du¾e vremena
i ustanovljeni su tokom poseta 2001. godine. Vanredno stanje je
pogor¹alo veæinu ovih problema i verovatno je da æe odreðene odrebe
izmenjenog Zakona o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala nastaviti to
da èine ukoliko se odmah ne uvede odgovarajuæa za¹tita.

Tri organizacije pozdravljaju prestanak vanrednog stanja od 22.
aprila. Mada odredbe koje se odnose na pritvor nisu vi¹e na snazi, one
smatraju da su nalazi i preporuke iz ovog memoranduma koje se odnose
na pritvor i dalje relevantne. Ovo zasnivaju na èinjenici da i dalje
postoje pritisci na sistem kriviènog pravosuða Srbije; odredbe o
produ¾enom pritvoru bez sudskog nadzora i dalje ostaju na snazi prema
izmenama i dopunama Zakona o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala; i
dalje postoje sistemski problemi koji su veæ identifikovani nakon
posete iz 2001. radi utvrðivanja stanja u zatvorima, posete Komiteta
protiv muèenja u 2002. i drugih procena.

Uz ni¾e navedena pitanja koja zahtevaju pa¾nju, Delegacija ¾eli da
navede da su konstatovane pozitivne promene u odnosu na situaciju iz
2001. Tu spadaju bolji odnosi izmeðu pritvorenika i zatvorskih èuvara.
Takoðe, Delegacija je tokom poverljivih razgovora sa pritvorenicima
èula dosledno pozitivne ocene o èuvarima. Uz to, Delegacija ¾eli da
konstatuje da su svi dr¾avni slu¾benici bili predusretljivi i otvoreni
prilikom razogovara sa Delegacijom.

Tri organizacije se nadaju da æe poèetni nalazi i preporuke sadr¾ane u
ovom memorandumu biti od pomoæi vladi u njenim naporima u borbi protiv
organizovanog kriminala i podr¾avanju vladavine prava u skladu sa
relevantnim meðunarodnim standardima. Predstavnici tri organizacije
oèekuju da æe uskoro podneti potpuni izve¹taj i imati moguænost da
ponovo posete pritvorske ustanove.

Nalazi i preporuke

Deo A: Pravni osnov za pritvaranje

Nalaz 1: Dalje pravdanja pritvora bez sudskog nadzora

Èlan 4. Meðunarodne konvencije o graðanskim i politièkim pravima
(ICCPR) jasno navodi da odstupanje od prava garantovanih Konvencijom
mora biti strogo ogranièeno na odstupanja koja nala¾u potrebe
situacije. I postupci u vreme vanrednog stanja kao i nedavni amandmani
na Zakon o borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala sad¾e odredbe o
produ¾enom pritvoru bez adekvatnog sudskog nadzora. Jasno je da takve
odredbe nisu u saglasnosti sa meðunarodnim standardima o ljudskim
pravima, posebno sa èlanom 9(4). ICCPR-a i èlanom 5(4) Evropske
konvencije za za¹titu ljuskih prava i osnovnih sloboda (ECHR).
Komentari i obièajno pravo ukazuju da pritvorenici mogu biti dr¾ani
samo nekoliko dana kao apsolutni maksimum, èak i za vreme vanredne
situacije.

Delegacija je utvrdila da ne postoji jasno opravdanje za produ¾enje
pritvora pojedinaca bez sudskog nadzora, posebno ¹to mnogi od njih
nisu ispitivani danima i ¹to je dosta vremena proteklo od poèetne
vanredne situacije nakon atentata. Neki, koji su bili u pritvoru
nekoliko dana, izjavili su da uop¹te nisu bili ispitivani.

Sa okonèanjem vanrednog stanja, do èega je do¹lo nakon na¹e poslednje
posete, sva derogiranja od prava, a naroèito od prava da lice bude
izvedeno pred sudiju bez odlaganja treba smatrati neva¾eæim i samim
tim pritvaranje bez podizanja optu¾be nije vi¹e dopustivo. Stoga se
pritvorenici moraju ili optu¾iti za krivièno delo ili pustiti, u
skladu sa èlanom 9. ICCPR.

Delegaciju posebno brine ¹to pritvor bez sudskog nadzora zajedno sa
nekim od drugih ni¾e navedenih nalaza znaèi da se kr¹enje ljudskih
prava jo¹ vi¹e komplikuje ili pogor¹ava kombinacijom ovih dodatnih
faktora.

Preporuka 1: Ponovo ispitati, na osnovu èinjeniènog stanja svakog
predmeta, da li i dalje postoje uslovi za pritvor svakog pojedinca
koji se i dalje nalazi u pritvoru, nakon uvoðenja vanrednog stanja
(ukljuèujuæi i one koji su pritvoreni na osnovu izmenjenog zakona o
borbi protiv organizovanog kriminala). Obezbediti da pritvorene osobe
budu ili osloboðene ili optu¾ene za krivièno delo, a da se dalji
pritvor zasniva na sudskoj odluci. Ove odluke treba da podle¾u
redovnom preispitivanju.

Nalaz 2: Informacije o statusu i pravima pritvorenih lica; pristup
advokatu; postupak za razmatranje ¾albi

Meðunarodni standardi kao i principi utvrðeni Ustavnom poveljom
Dr¾avne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora i Zakonom o kriviènom postupku
nagla¹avaju pravo pritvorenih lica da budu obave¹teni o svom statusu i
pravima, kao i da im se omoguæu pristup braniocu radi za¹tite njihovih
interesa. Vanredno stanje je ukinulo ili organièilo jedan broj prava
koja se odnose na komunikaciju sa spoljnim svetom, ukljuèujuæi i
posete porodice i komunikaciju sa braniocem. Dok neka od ovih
ogranièenja mogu imati opravdanje kao izuzeci izazvani potrebama
situacije, koji se primenjuju od sluèaja do sluèaja i tokom kratkih
perioda èini se, umesto toga, da su ona primenjena zbirno, i to ili na
prozvoljan naèin i èesto tokom du¾eg vremenskog perioda.

Delegacija je utvrdila da mnogim pritvorenicima nije jasan njihov
status i prava. Èini se da nije postojao nikakv sistematski proces
kojim se obezbeðuje da pritvorenici budu upoznati o svom pravu da
ospore pritvor na osnovu Naredbe o vanrednom stanju. Ta konfuzija o
statusu, pravima, i moguænosti za komunikaciju se i dalje nastavlja i
u sluèaju pritvorenika koji su sprovedeni u pritvor na osnovu odluke
suda ili nareðenja specijanog tu¾ioca.

Preporuka 2: Sprovesti sistematski postupak informisanja svih
pritvorenih lica o njihovom statusu i pravima. Ovde se, izmeðu
ostalog, mora pokloniti posebna pa¾nja onim licima koja su prvobitno
pritvorena na osnovu nareðenja koja su izdata na osnovu vanrednog
stanja ali sada prelaze u druge oblike pritvora. Obezbediti da sva
pritvorena lica odmah dobiju pristup advokatu.

Nalaz 3: ®albeni postupak

Delegacija je na¹la da je najmanje jedno pritvoreno lice je obave¹teno
pismenim putem, da ¾albu mora podneti u roku od 12 sati od prijema
odluke o svom pritvaranju. Nikakav rok nije dat za postupanje i
dono¹enje odluka po ¾albi, a najmanje jedno pritvoreno lice je dobilo
negativan odgovor na svoju ¾albu o pritvoru i to oko 30-tog dana svog
tridesetdnevnog pritvora. Postupak komunikacije izmeðu pritvorenih
lica i vlasti nije transparentan u tome da obezbeðuje adekvatno
evidentiranje i izdavanje potvrda o prijemu ¾albi, pritu¾bi itd.
Delegacija takoðe smatra da pravo na ¾albu Ministru unutra¹njih
poslova ne predstavlja nezavisan mehanizam za¹tite prava pritvorenika.
Delegacija izra¾ava zabrinutost zato ¹to ovi problemi i dalje opstaju
za lica pritvorena na osnovu odredbi izmenjenog Zakona o borbi protiv
organizovanog kriminala.

Preporuka 3: Odmah uvesti sudski nadzor nad pritvorenim licima. Uvesti
jasan i dosledan postupak kojim se reguli¹e proces kojim se dopu¹ta
pritvorenim licima da ula¾u ¾albu na pritvaranje, kojim se obezbeðuje
da ne postoje vremenska ogranièenja u pogledu prava pritvorenika da
se ¾ale i da se po svim ¾albama odluèuje, i odluka saop¹tava
podnosiocu u roku od 24 sata.

Nalaz 4: Proizvoljni faktori koji odreðuju uslove pritvora

Delegacija je utvrdila da va¾eæa pravila koja odreðuju uslove pritvora
nisu jasna i da zavise delom od individualnih odluka samih zatvorskih
vlasti. Ovo je posebno problematièno jer se ima utisak da ove odluke i
postupciutièu na pritvorenike razlièito i dovode do nejednakih
moguænosti da dobiju higijenske pakete, lekove i da komuniciraju sa
porodicama ili advokatima.

Preporuka 4: Obezbediti da va¾eæi zakon i propisi ne omoguæavaju
uvoðenje arbitrarnosti koja utièe na moguænost pritvorenika da imaju
pristup advokatu ili koji ogranièavaju druga prava.

Deo B: Pritvorski uslovi

Nalaz 5: Policijski objekti neprikladni za produ¾eni pritvor

Delegacija je utvrdila da su uslovi u policijskoj stanici koju je
posetila neprikladni za bilo ¹ta drugo osim za kratkotrajan pritvor i
da su neprikladni za boravak preko noæi. To je, izmeðu ostalog, zbog
nedostatka kreveta za svakog pritvorenika kao i æebadi i du¹eka;
neodgovarajuæe hrane i lekarske pomoæi; neodgovarajuæeg osvetlenja i
ventilacije. Svi ovi zahtevi su sadr¾ani u Standardnim minimalnim
pravilima o postupanju sa zatvorenicima (SMR) i Evropski zatvorskim
propisima (EPR). Pravilo br. 19 SMR-a i pravilo br. 24 EPR Deo II o
ovome daje precizna uputstva.

Delegacija je sa zabrinuto¹æu primili informaciju da su neka
pritvorena lice boravila u Beogradskoj glavnoj policijskoj stanici pod
ovim uslovima do ¹est ili sedam dana.

Preporuka 5: Obezbediti da pritvorena lica borave u policijskim
pritvorskim objektima ¹to je kraæe moguæe i da se ista ne koriste za
dr¾anje pritvorenih lica preko noæi..

Nalaz 6: Stanje pritvorenika koji su dr¾ani u izolaciji u Centralnom
zatvoru u Beogradu je neprihvatljivo

Delegacija je videla da se veæina zatvorenika koji su dr¾ani u
izolaciji u Centralnom zatvoru u Beogradu nalazila u malim, slabo
osvetljenim æelijama sa slabim osvetlenjem i ventilacijom. Takoðe je
utvrdila da veæini nije bilo dopu¹teno fizièko ve¾banje i da su sve
vreme dr¾ani u æelijama i samo povremeno izvoðeni uglavnom radi
ispitivanja.

Kumulativni i kombinovani efekti spornog produ¾enog pritvora u
sadejstvu sa uslovima pod kojima se vr¹i pritvor, koji su ispod
standarda, za mnoge privorenike predstavljaju poni¾avajuæe ka¾njavanje
ili postupak a ¹to je nespojivo sa èlanom 3. Konvencije protiv muèenja
i drugog okrutnog,neèoveènog ili poni¾avajuæeg postupanja (CAT), i
èlanom 3. ECHR-a i èlanom 7. ICCPR-a.

Delegacija je konstatovala da poveæanje populacije u zatvoru takoðe
umanjuje moguænost fizièkog ve¾banja za sve zatvorenike. Konstatovano
je da je nalazom iz 2001. godine utvrðeno su veæ tada uslovi za
ve¾banje u Centralnom zatvoru u Beogradu bili neadekvatni za oko 400
pritvorenika i da vreme za ve¾bu bilo prekratko. Prema izve¹tajima
trenutna populacija je veæa od 1,000.

Preporuka 6: Obezbediti da svim zatvorenicima bude omoguæeno adekvatno
ve¾banje od najmanje jedan sat dnevno i da se preduzmu druge mere radi
pobolj¹anja uslova u æelijama za izolaciju u Centralnom zatvoru u
Beogradu.

Nalaz 7: Postupci podnosenja ¾albi

Tokom posete Gradskom SUP i Okru¾nom zatvoru u Beogradu, delegacija je
obave¹tena o postupku za podno¹enje ¾albi unutar institucije, kao i
spoljnim organima za kontrolu. Postupci u okviru zatvora, kako su
opisani i utvrðeni od strane delegacije, predstavljaju vrlo
centralizovan pristup za podno¹enje ¾albi. Moglo bi se zakljuèiti da
predstavljaju neadekvatnu garanciju i da ne obezbeðuju nezavisnu i
javnu analizu ¾albi. Neadekvatnost postojeæeg metoda naroèito se
ogledala u slabom poverenju pritvorenih lica u delotvornost unutra¹nje
istrage.

Ova zabrinutost je, izgleda, od naroèitog znaèaja, po¹to je tokom
posete delegacija èula optu¾be ili videla indikacije muèenja ili
zlostavljanja tokom hap¹enja dva pritvorena lica. Bilo je nemoguæe u
potpunosti proveriti istininost ovih optu¾bi, ali delegacija smatra
va¾nim da pritvorena lica imaju moguænost da prijave svaku takvu
optu¾bu sa uverenjem da æe njihove ¾albe biti razmatrane po hitnom
postupku. Delegacija je takoðe obave¹tena o naèinima ispitivanja i
pritiska prilikom isleðivanja, koja se èine neprimerenim, posebno ako
se odnose na mlaðe ¾ene.

Preporuka 7: Pobolj¹ati moguænosti za obraæanje pritvorenih lica
relevantnim organima u vezi uslova u pritvoru i razvijanja dugoroènog
plana revizije sistema unutra¹nje kontrole, kako u policiji, tako i u
zatvoru. Svaka prijava zlostavljanja trebala bi da bude hitno i
ozbiljno istra¾ena uz sprovoðenje odgovarajuæeg kriviènog i/ili
disciplinskog postupka protiv odgovornog slu¾benog lica.

Nalaz 8: Proporcionalnost mera primenjenih protiv svakog pritvorenog
lica

Delegacija je utvrdila da fizièki uslovi u pritvoru i moguænosti za
komunikaciju u okviru zatvora ili sa spoljnim svetom, enormno varira
od sluèaja do sluèaja. Izgleda da nema valjanog razloga za¹to se neke
mere primenjuju prema svima ili samo u pojedinim sluèajevima. Kao ¹to
je naznaèeno u nalazu 4, izgleda da postoje elementi proizvoljnosti i
nedostatka transparentnosti propisa i uputstava.

Preporuka 8: Preispitati na osnovu pojedinacnih sluèajeva da li su
mere primenjene u konkretnom sluèaju, kao ¹to su pritvor u izolaciji,
proporcionalne i odgovarajuæe u svakom od sluèajeva. Uveriti se da su
odluke u vezi primene ovih mera bile proveravane u svakom pojedinaènom
sluèaju.

Nalaz 9: Moguænosti pru¾anja zdravstvene zastite

Jedan broj pritvorenih lica zadr¾anih u izolaciji ¾alio se na
neadekvatnu zdravstvenu za¹titu, ukljuèujuæi te¹koæe u nabavljanju
neophodnih lekova, sredstava za liènu higijenu i èiste odeæe. Takoðe
su se ¾alili i da su bili onemoguæeni da obaveste porodice o svom
zdravstvenom stanju i da dobiju informaciju o zdravstvenom stanju
svojih bli¾njih. Neki od pritvorenih lica nisu bili ubeðeni da im je
omoguæen pravovremen pristup lekarima, ili doktorima koji su upoznati
sa njihovim zdravstvenim stanjem.

Delimiène ili netaène informacije o zdravstvenom stanju ili razvoju
situacije do¹le su do rodbine pritvorenih lica, bilo putem medija ili
usmeno. U nekim sluèajevima navodno su informacije stizale iz
slu¾benih izvora.

Delegacija bi ¾elela da skrene pa¾nju na pravila 25 i 62 "Skupa
minimalnih pravila o postupanju sa zatvorenicima", pravila 29 - 62 iz
Dela II Evropskih Zatvorskih Pravila, koja daju dodatna uputstva u
vezi obezbeðenja zdravstvene za¹tite, kao i pravila 15 "Skupa
minimalnih pravila o postupanju sa zatvorenicima" i pravila 20 Dela II
Evropskih Zatvorskih Pravila u kojima su navedena sredstva neophodna
za liènu higijenu.

Ukoliko se to zatra¾i, organizacija kakva je Meðunarodni komitet
crvenog krsta bi trebala da bude u moguænosti da odgovori ovim
potrebama.

Preporuka 9: Pobolj¹ati dostupnost zdravstvenoj nezi, kao i
obezbeðenju èiste odeæe i sredstava za liènu higijenu. Kao dodatno
obezbeðenje, zatra¾iti pomoæ nezavisne organizacije sposobne da
odgovori zdravstvenim, higijenskim i ostalim sliènim potrebama
pritvorenih lica i omoguæiti komunikaciju sa njihovim porodicama.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Mission to Serbia and Montenegro

ENDS

Serbian News Network - SNN

news@...

http://www.antic.org/


=== 2 ===


Subject: Unity for freedom!
Date: Wed, 28 May 2003 02:25:09 +0200
From: "Vladimir Krsljanin"


Unity for freedom!

(On the demonstrations in Belgrade and The Hague,
on the activities of Sloboda and ICDSM)

By Vladimir Krsljanin



The puppet colonial regime in Belgrade is loosing more and
more influence every day. The people is outraged by they're
ruthless dictatorship and obvious links to the criminal circles.

By the first political demonstration after the "State of
Emergency" five days ago Sloboda have opened a season of
protests against the regime in agony.

Before the demonstration, almost 200 people have submitted,
one by one, individually, to the Belgrade District Prosecution
the criminal charges against the "acting president" Natasa
Micic, Prime Minister Zoran Zivkovic, all ministers in the
Serbian Government and unknown investigative judge in the
"Stambolic case". They are charged for serious violations of the
Constitution and Low, abuse of power, spread of the false news
aiming to discredit President Milosevic, his family and political
opposition.

The demonstration of several hundred in front of the Foreign
Ministry and Government of Serbia buildings, on the day of the
last visit of Carla del Ponte to Belgrade demanded "end of the
Hague-DOS dictatorship", restoration of democracy and
sovereignty in Serbia.

The speakers pointed the existence of the coalition between the
illegal Hague tribunal and the present rulers in Serbia. It is a
coalition of common despair - both anti Serbian groupings face
total failure in their attempt to suppress the truth and
freedom-loving spirit of the Serbian people.

The patterns of this coalition are seen in the present mass
violation of human rights in Serbia, following the example of
the Hague tribunal. [1]

The atmosphere of fear is still present in Serbia. But President
Milosevic teaches: "Time of the dictatorship is a right time
for the activity of all honest people and of all people devoted
to democracy."

Our duty is to work on the creation of the broadest possible
political front to return freedom, hope, dignity and sovereignty
to the Serbian people, to stop turning the country into a colony.

Serbs in Diaspora demanded to mark this year's Vidovdan by a
demonstration at The Hague. Sloboda supported this demand
immediately [2].

The work of Serbian-International Organizational Committee
of the Hague demonstration is supported up to now by Serb
organizations and groups from Germany, France, Britain,
Austria, Sweden, by progressive and leftist parties, groups and
organizations from several European countries, by many
distinguished personalities, including many ICDSM members.

The situation in Serbia now, for the sake of the future of the
Serbian people require unity, lack of sectarian approaches and
total solidarity with the struggle of an old European people for
its freedom, democracy, sovereignty and equality.

This important and decisive struggle also requires new effective
and more developed forms of organization and mutual support
at home and abroad.

Everyone ready to support or to take part in this struggle should
be aware of its importance for the world peace and destiny of
the mankind.

In that struggle everyone will take a position he is willing or
able to take [3]. The progressive forces today don't need
disputes. The struggle for the freedom of Slobodan Milosevic,
Serbia and Yugoslavia is a cause absolutely clean and
undisputable. We don't have time nor wish to measure our
contributions to that struggle. After we reach the victory, which
is close, the reward for the fighters will be the benefit of the
people.



[1] http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm

[2] see the inviting leaflet at
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/sloboda051203.htm
/English version/
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/POZIVZAHAG.htm
/Serbian version/
or at
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/
/Both versions + PDF/

[3] Honoring all who associated their names with the ICDSM
and our struggle in general, the author of these lines does not
subscribe to making analyses of individual contributions to this
struggle. What I have witnessed is the visit Mr. Ramsey Clark to
Belgrade in 2001, aiming to intervene against the extradition,
but delayed due to manipulation of that time Yugoslav
Ambassador to Washington. Mr. Clark made a speech in the
people's rally in front of the Federal Parliament and two press
conferences in Belgrade. Then, there were two visits (all on his
own expense) to President Milosevic at the Hague, with one
press conference there [4], all the time readiness to give advice,
several written interventions to the Tribunal etc. Ramsey Clark
signed the ICDSM letter to all heads of states:

http://www.icdsm.org/appeal.htm

In his recent interview to Egyptian "Al Ahram" (Weekly
On-Line No.624, February 6-12), Ramsey Clark stated:

"I met Milosevic a few days ago. His health has deteriorated,"
he tells me in Cairo. "He had the strength to hold the people of
his country together in a very difficult situation."

"Only absolute power, unrestrained by any rule of law or
standards of human decency, openly taunts an intended victim as
President George W Bush has taunted Iraq."

Yesterday it was Yugoslavia. Milosevic was struggling to
preserve Yugoslavia, Clark says. "If there was any independent
state in central and eastern Europe it was Yugoslavia. They were
playing off the Soviet Union and the US to maintain their
independence and relative prosperity." That was during the
socialist and non- aligned regime of the country's founder,
Joseph Broz Tito. In Tito's day, Yugoslavs were happily united
-- a rare occurrence in the Balkans.

"In 1991 there were six [constituent] republics with lots of
different peoples in Yugoslavia. And Belgrade had held all these
formerly warring groups together in peace. In 1991 Time
reported that by far the most progressive, and truly the most
successful country in Eastern Europe, was Yugoslavia. And
almost immediately you see foreign powers trying to dismantle
it. First they dismantled Slovenia, then Croatia. Germany comes
in after its deplorable historical record in the Balkans and
encourages Croatian independence. Then Bosnia and
Macedonia."

"We deliberately broke it up. It was US policy to break it up for
economic exploitation and to show other Eastern European
nations not to dare dream of being independent. If you want to
have any economic or political independence you'll be crushed.
That was the brutal message signalled to Yugoslavia's
neighbours."

A public example had to be made of Milosevic's Yugoslavia:
"Within two years of the break up of the Soviet Union Ukraine
became the third largest recipient of US aid. First Israel and
second Egypt and third Ukraine. Can you imagine the old
enemy? And what was the aid for? It was to identify public
facilities for privatisation. And most went to American
companies, and we identified 6,000 properties. We destroyed
their economies and they were obliged to buy our goods. And
you pay our price. And we'll advertise and make you want to
buy our goods just like we make you want McDonald's and blue
jeans. And now what have the people got? They lost their
education system, they've lost their health care system and
they've lost their jobs. [Western investors] came in with big
plans for privatisation and nationalisation. What they did is
unbelievable -- a despicable act of greed," Clark says. And the
same fate awaits a defeated Iraq, he warns.

[4] http://www.icdsm.org/more/clarkm.htm#a

On the police and mafia regime in Serbia


1. IMPORTANT LINKS to articles about the "state of emergency" in
Serbia and its implications.
Many authors agree about the anti-democratic and mafia character of
the ruling mafia coalition, independent from their very different
point of views.

2. MISCELLANEA
Agencies and short articles about the "state of emergency" and NATO/US
support.

3. United Nations Office Of The High Commissioner For Human Rights,
Serbia And Montenegro:
Confidential Memorandum To The Ministries Of Justice And The Interior
Of The Republic Of Serbia. Initial findings and recommendations
arising from the visit to detainees in Belgrade 14-15 April 2003


For a very good summary of the recent events in Serbia we advice to
read:
BHHRG: THE KIROV MURDER REVISITED?
Zoran Djindjic's assassination and Serbia's political elite
An analysis of the events surrounding the assassination of Serbia's
prime minister on 12th March 2003
http://www.oscewatch.org/CountryReport.asp?CountryID=20&ReportID=197


=== 1 ===
IMPORTANT LINKS to articles about the "state of emergency" in Serbia
and its implications.
Many authors agree about the anti-democratic and mafia character of
the ruling mafia coalition, independent from their very different
point of views.
=== * ===


THE ARGUMENT OF FORCE. SERBIA UNDER MARTIAL LAW
by Nebojsa Malic
Antiwar.com - March 27, 2003
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m032703.html

<<...Djindjic's murder has been blamed on "remnants of the Milosevic
regime", both by the Serbian government and the Imperial press. It is
hard to say exactly who claimed it first, though the accusations
seemed to appear in American papers sooner than in official Serbian
statements....>>


WASHINGTON'S STOOGE:
DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION EXPOSES U.S. ROLE IN SERBIA
By Heather Cottin
Reprinted from the March 27, 2003 issue of Workers World newspaper
http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/djindjic0327.php

<<...Djindjic had the distinction of being one of the only nationally
known politicians in Serbia to support the U.S./NATO 78-day bombing
campaign of Yugoslavia that began exactly four years ago on March 24,
1999... The Serbian government is using Djindjic's assassination
as an excuse to institute political repression, directing their
attacks on the remaining supporters of Slobodan Milosevic...
Zoran Djindjic was the corrupt beneficiary of U.S. regime change
and instituted the economic reforms that destroyed Yugoslavian
society as surely as the NATO bombs destroyed its infrastructure...>>


RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY AGAINST STATE OF EMERGENCY IN SERBIA
Press service of the Russian Communist Party
Pravda.RU: Politics. 2003-04-01
http://english.pravda.ru/politics/2003/04/01/45411.html

<<...Western countries, which allegedly take care of their democracy,
ignore the fact that civil freedoms in Serbia are imperiled greatly at
present moment. The People's Patriotic Union of Russia denounces the
use of the state of emergency in Serbia as a way to intimidate
political opponents of the present government...>>


A FALLING-OUT AMONG THIEVES?
John Laughland
"All News is Lies", Sanders Research Associates, April 7, 2003
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0304/S00233.htm

<<...The West has not been able to contain its enthusiasm for this
massive crackdown in Serbia. The Union of Serbia and Montenegro (as
Yugoslavia is now known) was admitted last week to Europe's main human
rights body, the Council of Europe - at the height of these purges and
mass arrests... while the all-powerful US ambassador in Belgrade,
William Montgomery, also stated that "the international community
supports the Serbian government's fight against organised crime". As
Montgomery added, again without a trace of irony, that a contract had
just been signed between US Steel, based in Pittburgh, and the Sartid
company to buy the steel works at Smederevo...>>


THE ZORAN DJINDJIC ASSASSINATION: "DEMOCRACY" AT WORK?
by TV Weber
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/weber/002.shtml

<<...After Tito's death, the image of the Serbs took another
unexpected transformation, to that of insane nationalists, responsible
for all the evils in the Balkans. But now, with Yugoslavia dissolved
and Milosevic on ice in the Hague, the press wants to view the Serbs
as a bunch of gangsters...>>


AN INNOCENT ABROAD: POWELL IN BELGRADE
by Srdja Trifkovic
ChroniclesExtra, April 10, 2003
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/News/Trifkovic/NewsViews.htm

<<..The campaign against Kostunica indicates the real
government agenda: to eliminate political and media opposition in
advance of the lifting of the state of emergency, so that a snap
election-with a preordained result-can be called before the opposition
recovers and regroups...>>


BOLSHEVIKS IN BELGRADE. SERBIAN PURGES UNMASKED
by Nebojsa Malic
Antiwar.com - April 10, 2003
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/m041003.html

<<...And what a purge it is: judges, military and police officials,
lawyers, even some politicians, all have been targeted in the past
three weeks, and the hunt is about to get even bigger...>>


POST-YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EXCEPTIONAL STATE OF SERBIA-MONTENEGRO
Tamara Vukov Interviews Andrej Grubacic, April 22, 2003
http://www.zmag.org/content/print_article.cfm?itemID=3498§ionID=36

<<...A few days ago, the vice-president of the government announced
that we should not complain that there is no opposition. Now we are a
democracy, so opposition is no longer necessary - we are so
democratic, that no opposition needs to exist. This is so-called
"total democracy." A situation in which democracy, in its total
self-fulfillment, abolishes itself. They are so devoted to democracy
that they no longer need it... The NGOs and rent-a-dissidents are
supporting it, promising complete loyalty to the Serbian
government...>>

AFTER PROMISING "DEMOCRACY"
by John Catalinotto
http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/serbia0417.php

<<...A state of emergency continues. Some 7,000 people were arrested,
with 2,000 held in prison for investigation, say both European press
accounts and dispatches direct from Belgrade. There can be no
criticism of the government, no demonstrations or strikes. Not even
public statements are allowed. The threat is now that parties will be
forbidden...>>


"SHOCK AND AWE" IN TURBULENT SERBIA
By David Binder, MSNBC CONTRIBUTOR (WASHINGTON, May 16)
http://www.msnbc.com/news/911513.asp or
http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm

<<...HOW ELSE TO characterize a 65-day state of emergency with 10,111
citizens questioned by the police, some 4,000 detained, 45 indicted
for "inciting terrorism and murder," the mysterious gunning down of
two prime suspects, sharp curbs on the independent press and
television, dismissal of judges and the imposition of draconian
laws?...>>


STATE OF EMERGENCY AS THE INTRODUCTION TO THE DICTATORSHIP
Spomenka Deretic, Belgrade, 10 May 2003
http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/jugoslavija/2003-05-11.html

<<...Among more than ten thousand imprisoned citizens of Serbia are
also several newspapermen. The majority of them are released, but the
work is forbidden to the editors of the only two papers that were not
under the complete control of the current authorities in Serbia....>>


BHHRG: THE KIROV MURDER REVISITED?
Zoran Djindjic's assassination and Serbia's political elite
An analysis of the events surrounding the assassination of Serbia's
prime minister on 12th March 2003
http://www.oscewatch.org/CountryReport.asp?CountryID=20&ReportID=197

<<...It was puzzling that a cameraman had managed to be conveniently
situated outside the government building to record the moment Dr.
Djindjic was shot. There were no special events scheduled for the
12th March - the prime minister was only arriving for work as usual.
Even stranger, was the fact that the security cameras covering the
entrance and scene of the crime had been switched off...>>



=== 2 ===
MISCELLANEA
Agencies and short articles about the "state of emergency" and NATO/US
support.
=== * ===


Objective responsibility of the Serbian Government
http://www.dss.org.yu/nasstav.asp#1389

PRESS RELEASE BY THE DSS PRESIDENCY, 7.04.2003
OBJECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SERBIAN GOVERNMENT

It is precisely because of its pronounced European orientation that
the Democratic Party of Serbia will use all means at its disposal so
that the truth about the seamy side of the state of emergency in
Serbia can reach the local and international public


At this evening's meeting chaired by Vojislav Kostunica, the DSS
Presidency discussed the situation in the country nearly a month after
the assassination of Serbian premier Zoran Djindjic and the
introduction of a state of emergency, and decided that the tardy
measures implemented by the Serbian government, clearly targeted
against organised crime though, do not have a comprehensive character.
The Democratic Party of Serbia has been a fervent advocate of an
all-inclusive and unselective struggle against all forms of organised
crime for years.
For this effort, the party, its president and his aides have been
attacked time and again and exposed to the genuine atmosphere of
lynch. This is particularly the case today.
The logical question is what the state of emergency is good for in the
hands of the Serbian government if it is quite clear that the
proclaimed purpose is not the only one. Aside from the uncontestable
results it has produced, the purpose of the state of emergency is to
keep the ruling coalition in power at all cost, relying on a doubtful
majority in the Serbian parliament, to help it shun responsibility for
the reforms it pledged but failed to carry out, for a wracked economy
and the sell-off of national companies, for growing unemployment rates
and flourishing commercial crime and corruption. There is also no need
to waste words on those who got rich recklessly under the former
regime and have now found secure livelihood with the new regime
composed of the remnants of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia.
After all, is there anyone else to blame for the fact that crime had
assumed the proportions that allowed for the murder of premier
Djindjic but the very same government? It is exactly the Serbian
cabinet that made it
possible for all sorts of crime to burgeon by denying that organised
crime existed at all. It is the Serbian government that has openly
sided with one criminal group clashed with another by preparing the
leader of one of them for the role of a protected witness. The very
fact that the Serbian government's State Security Council
coordinated the work of the Spec-Ops Unit since early January 2002
tells us that the responsibility for the assassination of premier
Djindjic lies with the government staff. The fact that the justice
minister plays an important role in the High Judicial Council points
to his objective responsibility for the appointment of Milan
Sarajlic as a deputy to the Serbian public prosecutor. The fact that a
Serbian deputy premier visited Dusan Spasojevic in jail and took him
out of it, and then was friends with him, also points to the objective
responsibility for links with an organised criminal group.
Serbia and Montenegro's membership of international organisations,
including the Council of Europe since not long ago, implies certain
rights and, even more so - obligations. Among other things, this
membership requires
that all the questions posed here be answered. It is precisely because
of its pronounced European orientation that the Democratic Party of
Serbia will use all means at its disposal so that the truth about the
seamy side of the state of emergency in Serbia can reach the local and
international public alike. We are not going to let the flag raised in
Strasbourg after two and a half years of hard work be tarnished by the
autocracy of the DOS core plainly intending to restore the one-party
system we once had in Serbia.
=

Information Service of the Democratic Party of Serbia

---

Evidence instead of fabrications
http://www.dss.org.yu/nasstav.asp#1417

PRESS RELEASE, 11.04.2003
EVIDENCE INSTEAD OF FABRICATIONS

This is virtually about an invented conspiracy in the
making, which followed the authentic one that led
to the murder of the premier, while the media are
just tipped off who is the next to be removed from
the political and public life


The Democratic Party of Serbia will cooperate
with all truly democratic forces and the civil
sector, fighting against blatant human rights
violations and threats to democratic institutions.
Likewise, it will not hesitate to internationalise
this problem, since the admission of Serbia and
Montenegro into the Council of Europe implies
both rights and obligations in this regard.
At today's briefing for editors-in-chief of
Serbian media, a government representative
informed the reporters about what allegedly was
the latest discovery in the investigation into the
assassination of premier Zoran Djindjic.
According to this "discovery", the blame for the
crime falls on a coalition of patriotic forces,
which, as they insinuate, has been led by the
Democratic Party of Serbia. Let alone that such
an allegation might imply that some parties in the
country are not patriotic.
Not for a moment contesting its genuinely
democratic and national orientation, the
Democratic Party of Serbia is openly pointing out
that it is now crystal clear that the state of
emergency, instead of allowing for an authentic
showdown with all forms of organised crime, has
been used for a showdown with the Serbian
strongest political party.
Everyone should be clear already that the
prisons have been closed and visits by family and
lawyers banned precesily to allow the
government's mouthpiece to seize the role of the
sole source of information about who purportedly
said what during the investigation. Accordingly,
the first thing to be done is to make up a
statement by a prisoner, and than develop it into a
concocted version that might serve as a basis for
the arrest of political rivals.
This is virtually about an invented
conspiracy in the making, which followed the
authentic one that led to the murder of the
premier, while the media are just tipped off who is
the next to be removed from the political and
public life. Isn't this undeniable evidence of a
political abuse of the state of emergency? Today,
Gradimir Nalic has been mentioned; tomorrow -
anyone can be mentioned and as falsely accused,
without the possibility of communicating at least
with lawyers. Moreover, extremely compromised
and blackmailed persons have been used as
supposedly reliable witnesses during the
investigation.

Information Service of the Democratic Party of Serbia

---

STATE OF EMERGENCY ENDS

BELGRADE, April 22 (Beta) - Acting Serbian President Natasa Micic on
April 22 lifted the state of emergency that was introduced on March
12, after the assassination of Serbian premier Zoran Djindjic.
Addressing the public, the acting Serbian president said that the
steps taken during the state of emergency had yielded results, since
"the perpetrators and organizers of Djindjic's assassination and many
other crimes have been found and will be brought to justice."
"We have dealt the final blow to organized crime. We have dismantled
Milosevic's [sic] criminal apparatus and stopped the spiral of
violence that has been tearing our country apart for over a decade.
The country has been preserved," Natasa Micic said.
She pointed out that the state institutions defended the country "with
full respect to international standards during the state of emergency.
She said that the authorities were now facing a reform of the
SerbianMontenegrin army, stressing that the army "used to be an
institution that managed to avoid public control for decades."
The acting Serbian president also said that Serbia should face the
fact that certain individuals had committed war crimes on its behalf.
"There will be elections and therefore a chance for campaigning and a
new distribution of political power, in accordance with the will of
the people. Until then, let us do what the people have clearly
demanded from us: finish the job we have started," Micic said.

COMMENTS ON DECISION TO LIFT STATE OF EMERGENCY

BELGRADE, April 22 (Beta) - OSCE CHAIRMAN: OSCE chairman Dutch Foreign
Minister Japp de Hoop Scheffer said in Belgrade on April 22 that the
OSCE would have applied pressure [sic] on the Serbian government had
it not chosen to lift the state of emergency. He said that there had
been no abuse during this period.
"Had the state of emergency continued, the OSCE would have applied
pressure to have it lifted," Scheffer said, after meeting with Serbia
and Montenegro President Svetozar Marovic, Serbian Premier Zoran
Zivkovic and Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic.
Scheffer said that no country could exist in a prolonged state of
emergency. He said he hoped that everyone involved in the
assassination of Serbian premier Zoran Djindjic would be brought to
justice and that this could be accomplished in regular conditions.

PROSECUTOR AND PRESIDENT OF SERBIA'S SUPREME COURT ELECTED

BELGRADE, April 23 (Tanjug) - The Serbian Parliament Tuesday elected
Acting President of the Supreme Court of Serbia Sonja Brkic as
president of this court, while Acting Republican Public Prosecutor
Djordje Ostojic was elected as Public Prosecutor.
The Parliament released former Supreme Court president Leposava
Karamarkovic and former public prosecutor Sinisa Simic of their
duties at their own request [sic]. The newly elected President of the
Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor took oath before the MPs.

SERBIAN LEGISLATION PASSES PUBLIC INFORMATION LAW

BELGRADE, April 22 (Beta)-The Serbian Legislature adopted on April 22
a law on public information, which regulates the numerous rights and
obligations of journalists, because it provides for the greater
protection of persons who are the subjects of information.
Several amendments were made to the government's proposal of the law,
including the provision under which information must be accessible to
all media under equal conditions.
Government representatives explained that the reason that the
provision on the free access to information was absent from the new
law is the fact that a special law on this is soon to be adopted.
One of the principal objections to the new public information law made
by Serbian experts and media representatives is the possibility of
banning the distribution of newspapers and magazines [sic], which was
rejected as unacceptable in the course of the public debate.
The possibility of banning the distribution of information was
included in order to prevent the propagation of war, incitement to
direct violence or the advocacy of racial, national or religious
hatred, as well as in cases when a published or broadcast information
might have direct "grave, irreparable consequences which cannot be
prevented in any other way."

---

LIGHT THROWN ON 28 MURDERS - MIHAJLOVIC

BELGRADE, April 29 (Tanjug) - Serbian Interior Minister Dusan
Mihajlovic said on Tuesday that during the Operation Sword, light had
been thrown on 28 murders, 23 attempts of murder, 45 exortitions, 15
kidnappings, 208 criminal acts of illegal production, keeping and
putting into traffic of drugs, and other criminal acts.
Mihajlovic told a press conference that as of March 12, 2003, the
police had filed 3,919 criminal charges against 3,400 persons, due to
sustained suspicion that they had committed 5,812 criminal acts.
He also said that 1,325 peaces of various weaponry had been taken
away, as well 357 hand granades, 110,097 pieces of various
ammunition, 74,830 kg.of different drugs and many other objects.

---

http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/
FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1051389842266&p=1012571727166

Financial Times May 8, 2003

Bush backs military support for Serbia

By Eric Jansson and James Politi

President George W. Bush yesterday authorised the US
to provide military assistance to Serbia and
Montenegro, offering Belgrade's new leader Zoran
Zivkovic, who recently replaced assassinated prime
minister Zoran Djindjic, one of the strongest
indications yet of international support for his
policies.
The White House said the decision followed
"significant steps" taken by Mr Zivkovic's government.
In the past week, officials from Serbia and Montenegro
agreed to place the military under civilian command,
ordered the police to arrest any individuals sought by
UN war crimes prosecutors, and sacked some
Milosevic-era generals.
The moves, according to Reuters, were described by US
officials as an important step in Serbia and
Montenegro's bid to join Nato's Partnership for Peace.

James Politi in Washington and Eric Jansson in Belgrade

---

http://www.b92.net/english/news/index.php?lang=english&version=
standard&my_categories_class=%27News%27&nav_category=
&nav_id=22668&order=priority&style=headlines

NATO offers help to achieve alliance standards

Beta, AP May 7, 2003

BRUSSELS -- Wednesday -- NATO today welcomed military
restructuring in Serbia-Montenegro and offered help
implementing more democratic changes, which would
enhance the country's bid to join the alliance.
After being presented with the programme for military
restructuring and civilian control by federal Defence
Minister Boris Tadic and army chief-of-staff Branko
Krga, NATO ambassadors expressed support for the state
union.
An anonymous NATO official told agency AP "the
minister made a very convincing presentation", adding
that the 19-nation alliance had offered to send a
group of expert reform advisors to Serbia-Montenegro.
He explained that the assassination of PM Djindjic had
prompted NATO ambassadors to hasten reforms in
Belgrade saying:
"The murder of Djindjic galvanized the emphasis on
reform. There is a sense of urgency that did not exist
before and we want to develop closer relations."
Tadic: membership within the year
Following the Brussels presentation, Tadic said that
he expects the new state union to join NATO?s
Partnership for Peace programme within the year.
Expressing hope that Serbia-Montenegro will accept
suggestions regarding full cooperation with The Hague
Tribunal and the International Court of Justice, Tadic
said that NATO Secretary General George Robertson and
the NATO Council had offered support to the
presentation outlining a concept of regional security.
The concept, presented by Tadic and Krga, calls for a
regional security policy for the Balkan Peninsula,
which will ensure there are no alliances between some
Balkan states against other Balkan states.

Strong support

Tadic also said that the armed forces civilian-control
reform plan had been well received and that
practically all ambassadors strongly supported the
Supreme Defence Council?s decision to transfer
military jurisdiction to the ministry of defence.
The defence minister confirmed the readiness of NATO
ambassadors to back Serbia-Montenegro's accession to
the programme, provided concrete steps are taken.
He added: "We will continue to cooperate with The
Hague tribunal and I am sure that we will meet all the
pre-conditions. I want to believe that we will become
a member of the partnership for Peace this year".

---

From: Mrs. Jela Jovanovic
Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2003 6:00 PM
Subject: Scandals are shaking Serbian government

DAN-PODGORICA

Scandals are shaking Serbian government

- Assistant of the Health Minister falsified her diploma

- Minster Dusan Mihajlovic covered up the case of a double murder

Mrs. Aleksandra Makaj, assistant of the Minister of health in the
Government of Serbia is caught in forgery.

Mrs. Makaj is member of the Socialdemocratic party of Slobodan Orlic.
She was in the group of putschists that took the Socialdemocratic
party from Vuk Obradovic. Afterwards the Supreme court of Serbia
returned the Party to Vuk Obradovic, but the leader of the putschists,
Mr. Slobodan Orlic, with his mercenaries kept all the Assembly
representatives' mandates and functions.

Mrs. Aleksandra Makaj, presenting herself as the graduated student of
the Medicine faculty of the Zagreb University, became the assistant to
the Minister of health. Her domain is sanitary surveillance.

Through the checking at the Medicine Faculty in Zagreb, it was
ascertained that Mrs. Aleksandra Utopljenikov (her maiden name), born
of father Georgije and mother Anka in Virovitica 1952,Croatia, never
finished this Faculty. Minister's assistant is these days under the
surveillance of the Ministry of the interior affairs. She had, in
cooperation with her party colleagues, imported 20 thousand tons of
genetically modified crushed seeds. Serbia is in danger that EU
forbids the import of food from it.

In spite of the existence of the report that the assistant of the
Minister of health not only does not have the Diploma of the Medical
doctor, but not even the elementary education in the field of
medicine, the Government of Serbia refused to release her from the
duty. On the site of the Government of Serbia one can still read that
Mrs. Makaj is by profession doctor specialist. For fraud, as it seams.

Party colleague of Mrs. Makaj, representative in the Assembly and the
director of the Belgrade Fair, Mr. Branko Gligoric, seven month ago,
on the hill Goc killed by his vehicle two students of the Ministry of
interior
affairs, that were on the course for the multiethnic police in the
south of Serbia. He drove the car in the state of heavy alcohol
intoxication. Two youngsters passed away five days later in the
hospital. Minister Dusan
Mihajlovic covered up this case of double murder.

Milovan BRKIC

Wednesday, 21. May, 2003


=== 3 ===


Source: http://www.icdsm.org/more/shock.htm
or: http://www.ohchr.org/news/State%20of%20Emergency%
20%20UNHCHR-ODIHR-OSCE%20Memorandum%20on%20Detention%
20Facilities%2024%20April%202003.doc

United Nations Office Of The High Commissioner For Human Rights,
Serbia And Montenegro

Confidential Memorandum To The Ministries Of Justice And The Interior
Of The Republic Of Serbia

Initial findings and recommendations arising from the visit to
detainees in Belgrade 14-15 April 2003

CONFIDENTIAL

Following their joint visit to places of detention and detainees in
Belgrade on 14 and 15 April 2003 the UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OSCE Mission to
Serbia and Montenegro and OSCE Office of
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights have identified nine urgent
recommendations which they would draw to
the attention of the authorities in the Republic of Serbia.

These recommendations are not intended to represent the complete
findings and recommendations of the three
institutions. Rather, they represent a number of urgent steps which,
if implemented, the Delegation considers
would immediately improve the situation of persons detained following
the imposition of the state of emergency.
The three institutions will issue a comprehensive joint report of
their findings and recommendations in due
course. This report will expand upon the recommendations below and be
complemented by additional ones. The three institutions would like to
draw the Government's attention to the fact that, in its observations,
many of the problems do not arise directly from the conditions under
the state of emergency, but are long-standing problems concerning the
Belgrade Central Prison which were identified during assessment visits
in 2001. The state of emergency has exacerbated most of these problems
and that certain provisions of the amended Law on the Suppression of
Organised crime are likely to continue doing so unless appropriate
safeguards are promptly introduced.

The three institutions welcome the lifting of the state of emergency
orders on 22 April. Although the provisions relating to detention
under the state of emergency are no longer in force, they consider
that the findings and recommendations pertaining to detention
contained in this memorandum remain relevant. They base this on
recognition of the fact that the pressures on Serbia's criminal
justice system remain; that provisions for extended detention without
judicial supervision remain in force under the amended Law on the
Suppression of
Organized Crime; and the continued existence of systemic problems
which have previously been identified
following the 2001 prison assessment, the visit of the Committee
against Torture in 2002 and other assessments.

Besides the matters requiring attention which are identified below,
the Delegation would like to record that
welcome improvements upon the situation in 2001 were noted. These
included improved relationships between
detainees and prison guards. The Delegation heard consistently
positive references to the guards from detainees
during their confidential interviews. In addition the Delegation also
noted that all government officials were
helpful and open in their discussions with it.

The three institutions hope that the initial findings and
recommendations contained in this memorandum will be
of assistance to the Government in its efforts to combat organized
crime and uphold the rule of law on
accordance with the relevant international standards. They look
forward to delivering the full report in the
near future and of having the opportunity to carry up follow-up visits
to places of detention.

Findings and Recommendations

Section A: The legal basis for detention

Finding 1: The continued justification for detention without judicial
supervision

Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) states clearly that derogations of rights guaranteed under the
Covenant must be strictly limited to those required by the exigencies
of the
situation. Both the procedures under the state of emergency and the
recent amendments to the Law on the
Suppression of Organized Crime include provisions for extended periods
of detention without adequate judicial
supervision. These are clearly not in conformity with the
international human rights standards, notably Article
9(4) of the ICCPR and Article 5(4) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). The
commentaries and case law indicate that detainees may be held without
judicial supervision for a few days as an absolute maximum, even in
times of public emergency.

The Delegation found that the justification for the continued
detention of individuals without judicial
supervision was unclear in many cases, particularly as many
individuals had not been subject to any form of
questioning for many days and that much time has passed since the
initial emergency following the assassination.
Some, who had been in detention for several days, reported that they
had not been questioned at all.

With the ending of the state of emergency, which has occurred since
the visit, all derogations to the right to
be brought promptly before a judge are to be considered invalid and
therefore detention without charge is no
longer permissible. Therefore the detainees must be either charged
with a criminal offence or released in
accordance with Article 9 of the ICCPR.

The Delegation was particularly concerned that the combination of
detention without judicial supervision
combined with some of the other findings given below meant that human
rights violations were being compounded or exacerbated by a
combination of these factors.

Recommendation 1: Re-examine, on the basis of the facts of each case,
whether the conditions continue to warrant the detention of each
individual detained since the state of emergency was introduced
(including those detained under the amended Law on the Suppression of
Organized Crime). Ensure that detainees are either released or charged
with a criminal offence and kept in further detention only on the
basis of judicial decisions. These decisions should be subject to
regular review.

Finding 2: Information about status and rights for detainees; access
to counsel; procedures for considering
appeals

International standards as well as the principles established in the
Constitutional Charter of the State Union
and the Code of Criminal Procedure emphasize the rights right of
detainees to be informed of their status and
rights as well as being given access to legal counsel to protect their
interests. The state of emergency
suspended or restricted a number of rights relating to communication
with the outside world including visits by
families and communication with legal counsel. While some of these
restrictions may be justified as exceptions
required by the exigencies of the situation, applied on a case-by-case
basis and for short periods, they appear
instead to have been applied on a group basis or in an arbitrary way
and often for extended periods.

The Delegation found that many detainees were unclear about their
status and rights. There appeared to be no
systematic process to ensure that detainees were informed of their
right to challenge detention under the state
of emergency order. The confusion about their status, rights, and
possibilities for communication extended to
detainees who had passed to detention on judicial orders or on the
orders of the Special Prosecutor.

Recommendation 2: Carry out a systematic process of informing all
detainees of their status and rights. This
should include, inter alia, particular attention to those who were
initially detained under orders issued under
the state of emergency, but are now passing into other forms of
detention. Ensure that all detainees are given
immediate access to legal counsel.

Finding 3: Appeals procedures

At least one detainee was informed in writing that he had to submit
any appeal within 12 hours of receiving the
decision on his detention. No effective deadlines existed for ruling
on appeals; at least one detainee received
the negative decision around the 30th day of his 30-day detention. The
processes for communicating between
detainees and the authorities were not transparent in ensuring
adequate recording and issuing receipts for
communications. The Delegation also felt that a review by the Minister
of Internal Affairs was not a
sufficiently independent mechanism. The Delegation is concerned that
these problems persist for detainees held
under the provisions of the amended Law on the Suppression of
Organized Crime.

Recommendation 3: Introduce judicial supervision of all detainees
immediately. Introduce a clear and consistent
procedure regulating the process of allowing detainees to appeal
against detention, ensuring that there are no
temporal limits on the detainees' right to appeal and that all appeals
are ruled upon and communicated to the
individual concerned within 24 hours.

Finding 4: Arbitrary factors controlling conditions of detention

The Delegation found that the applicable rules governing detainees
conditions of detention were not clear and
that they depended in part on individual decisions by the prison
authorities. This was particularly problematic
as these decisions and the procedures applied appeared variously to
influence the detainees' possibilities to
obtain medical supplies or sanitary items and to communicate with
families and legal counsel.

Recommendation 4: Ensure that the law and regulations applied do not
introduce arbitrary factors which affect
the possibility of detainees to obtain access to counsel or restrict
other rights.

Section B: Conditions of detention

Finding 5: Police facilities unsuitable for extended detention

The Delegation found that the facilities in the police station it
visited were unsuitable for anything other
than short periods of detention and were not suitable for overnight
stays. The reasons for the unsuitability
included, inter alia, the lack of beds for each detainee and of any
blankets or mattresses; inadequate
provisions for food and medical care; and inadequate lighting and
ventilation. All these are requirements
contained in the Standard Minimum Rules of the Treatment of Prisoners
(SMR) and the European Prison Rules (EPR).
SMR Rule no. 19 and EPR Part II, Rule 24 offer specific guidance in
this.

The Delegation was concerned to learn that some detainees have been in
the Central Police Station in these
conditions for up to six or seven days.

Recommendation 5: Ensure that detainees are kept in police detention
facilities for as short a period as
possible and are not used to detain prisoners for overnight stays.

Finding 6: The conditions of detainees kept in isolation in the
Belgrade Central Prison were unacceptable

The Delegation saw that most prisoners kept in isolation at the
Belgrade Central Prison are kept in small, badly lit cells with poor
lighting and ventilation. It also learned that most were denied
exercise and were kept in the cells all the time and were taken out
infrequently and mainly for the purpose of questioning.

The cumulative and combined effects of the underlying illegality of
extended periods of detention coupled with
the substandard conditions of detention for many detainees amounts to
degrading punishment or treatment which is incompatible with Article 3
of the Convention against Torture and Other, Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment and Punishment (CAT), Article 3 of the ECHR and
Article 7 of the ICCPR.

The Delegation noted that the increased population at the prison also
appeared to decrease the possibility for
exercise for all prisoners. It noted that the 2001 assessment found
that the exercise facilities in the Belgrade Central Prison were
already inadequate for the then population of some 400 detainees and
the exercise periods too short. The current population is reported to
be more than 1,000.

Recommendation 6: Ensure that all prisoners are allowed adequate
exercise of at least one hour per day and that
other steps are taken to improve the conditions in the isolation cells
in the Belgrade Central Prison.

Finding 7: Procedures for registering complaints

During the visit to the Belgrade Central Police Station and the
Belgrade Central Prison the Delegation was
briefed about the procedures in place to submit complaints to internal
or external control bodies. The
procedures within the prison which were described to and seen by the
Delegation represented a very centralised
approach to the airing of complaints. They seemed to be an inadequate
guarantee and did not provide for
independent and transparent analysis of complaints. The inadequacy of
the current method was also reflected in
the poor confidence of the detainees in the effectiveness of the
internal investigations.

This concern seems particularly relevant as during the visit, the
Delegation heard allegations or saw
indications of torture or ill-treatment during arrest concerning two
detainees. It was unable to verify in full
the veracity of these allegations, but the Delegation considers it
important that detainees are able to report
any such allegations with confidence in seeing their complaints
promptly addressed. The Delegation also heard
accounts of forms of questioning and pressure during interrogation
which would appear to be inappropriate,
particularly when they involve young women.

Recommendation 7: Improve the possibilities for detainees to
communicate with the relevant authorities
concerning their conditions of detention and develop a long-term plan
of revision of the internal control
systems in both the police and prison systems. Any allegations of
ill-treatment should be subject to prompt and
proper investigation with the invocation of appropriate criminal
and/or disciplinary proceedings against the
officials concerned.

Finding 8: Proportionality of the measures applied to each detainee

The Delegation found that the physical conditions of detention and the
possibilities to communicate within the
prison or the outside world varied enormously. There appeared to be no
clear rationale as to why certain
measures were applied in general or in individual cases. As indicated
in finding 4, there appeared to be
elements of arbitrariness and a lack of transparent regulations and
guidelines.

Recommendation 8: Re-examine on an individual basis whether the
measures applied, such as detention in
isolation, are proportionate and justifiable in each case. Ensure that
the decisions on the application of these measures are subject to
regular review in each case.

Finding 9: Health and medical provisions

A number of prisoners kept in isolation complained of inadequate
medical and provision, including difficulties
in obtaining the necessary medicines, items for personal hygiene and
clean clothes. They also complained that
they were unable to communicate to their families their state of
health and learn of the health of their
relatives. Some detainees were not confident that they had prompt
access to doctors or doctors who were familiar with their existing
medical conditions.

Partial or incorrect information about the health or aspects of the
situation of has reached the relatives of
detainees either through media reports or word of mouth. In some cases
they allege that they heard information
officially.

The Delegation would draw attention to Rules 25 and 62 of the SMR and
Rules 29-62 in Part II of the EPR Part II
which provide more guidance on provisions for medical care and SMR
Rule 15 and EPR Part II, Rule 20 which
describe the requirements necessary to ensure personal hygiene.

If requested, an organization such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross should be able to address
these needs.

Recommendation 9: Improve access to medical care and provision of
clean clothes, personal hygiene items and
facilities. As an additional safeguard, invite the assistance of an
independent organization with capacity to
address the medical and hygienic and related needs of the detainees
and allow the possibility of communication
with their families.

/Ends

United Nations Office Of The High Commissioner For Human Rights,
Serbia And Montenegro

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Mission to Serbia
and Montenegro

http://balkanreport.tol.cz/look/BRR/article_single.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPubli=
cation=9&NrIssue=1&NrSection=4&NrArticle=9519&ST1=body&ST_T1=brr&ST_AS1=1&ST=
_max=1

16 May 2003

"Revolution Is a Process, the Struggle Continues"
=

Dead 23 years, worshipped, then scorned, and now worshipped again, the
communist leader of the former Yugoslavia is making a comeback.

by Goran Tarlac


BELGRADE, Serbia and Montenegro - It is 23 years since the death of
Marshal Josip Broz Tito, president of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), president of the Yugoslav League of Communists
(SKJ), and supreme commander of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).

Tito was buried in Belgrade, in a majestic museum known since then as
the House of Flowers (Kuca cvijeca). The funeral was held on a
beautiful sunny day in the presence of 21 presidents, four kings, five
princes, six vice presidents, seven parliamentary leaders, 22 prime
ministers, 13 deputy prime ministers, and 47 foreign ministers. The
UPI news agency described the ceremony as "the greatest meeting of
world leaders of our time, if not in history."

When Tito died on 4 May 1980, the whole of Yugoslavia mourned the
death of the man who for 35 years had sat at its helm and who
symbolized the shared life of all its peoples. Photojournalists
captured people crying on the streets, footballers crying in stadiums,
and in Macedonia an attempted suicide out of grief for comrade Tito.

A few years later, with the first signs of the arrival of democratic
freedom--and nationalism--in the then Yugoslavia, people began to
speak more and more of the once-beloved president as a dictator, "an
iron-fisted ruler," a hedonist dedicated only to personal interest.
To love Tito had ceased to be popular, and was sometimes even
dangerous.

Tito's Yugoslavia has since been reduced to five small states. Tito's
SKJ, the JNA, his policy of ethnic tolerance known as "brotherhood
and unity," the system of self-management, and Yugoslavia's
foreign policy of nonalignment have all disappeared. A wholesale
cleansing of historical memory has taken place, with the renaming of
towns that had carried his name - Titograd, Titovo Uzice, Titov Drvar,
Titovo Velenje, Titov Veles, Titov Vrbas, Titova Mitrovica, and Titova
Korenica - the removal of monuments, pictures, and all manner of
symbols, and the sweeping of all traces from museums and libraries.

"COME BACK, ALL IS FORGIVEN"

Two decades after his death, following a period of war and deep
economic crisis, the concept of "Tito" is more popular in the
countries of the former Yugoslavia than ever before. People pay
tribute in different ways to times when they lived under an
undemocratic system, but lived better and were safer and happier.

To speak positively of Tito and socialist Yugoslavia has become
fashionable once more. Yugo-nostalgia and Tito-nostalgia are
incredibly popular in all the former Yugoslav republics. Today, in
many towns of the former Yugoslavia, one can find graffiti on the
walls of the main squares: "The old man was better," "Come back, all
is forgiven," or "While there was Tito, there was dope."

On 2 May in Subotica, a city in northern Serbia close to the border
with Hungary, the "Fourth Yugoslavia" was proclaimed. The "state" was
founded by a local printer, Blasko Gabric, on his three
hectares of land. The meeting, to which the founder of the latest
Yugoslavia invited "all Yugo-nostalgics, regardless of nationality
or faith, from all former Yugoslav republics, Europe, and the whole
world," was attended by almost 3,000 people. At the corner of his
property Gabric had placed a border stone on which is written in
Cyrillic and Latin, "Yugoslavia" and "While we exist, so, too,
will Yugoslavia."

Those gathered turned to the founder of the fourth Yugoslavia, Gabric,
and to Tito's grandson, Josip Joska Broz, who said that the
destruction of Yugoslavia "by foreign powers and their hirelings"
happened so that one state entity might destroy and succeed another,
far worse than the former. Many pensioners, once Tito's Partisans, at
this point began to cry.

"Yugo-nostalgics want to hold onto their dream, the dream of South
Slavs, the dream of their own Yugoslavia, since it was taken from us
without putting it to the people. The fourth mini-Yugoslavia will be a
meeting place of those for whom the dream of the old shared motherland
never leaves their sleep," Gabric told TOL after the meeting.

And in Uzice, a town in central Serbia that was once called Titovo
Uzice, there are plans to restore an entire complex of museums
dedicated to Tito's era. The idea is, considering the well-attended
museums that exist in the countries of the former Soviet bloc, that
Uzice apply a similar model to the Kadinjaca mountain, the site of a
great battle between Tito's Partisans and Hitler's troops. A Tito
remembrance room, with a bust of Tito, and streets and cafes that
carried his name and the names of his aides would also be restored.

After the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, such features disappeared from
Uzice. In 1991, the grand statue of Tito that had stood in the city
square was taken down and, with general delight, was chucked into the
warehouse of the local Museum of the Revolution. The initiative came
from the municipal authorities led by Milosevic's Socialist Party of
Serbia (SPS).

TITO'S POSTMORTEM TRAVELS

Three years later, another of Tito's statues surfaced in Uzice. It was
brought from the war-ravaged town of Rudo in eastern Bosnia. And so,
the complete bronze statues, which art historians say are the two most
significant sculptures by famous Tito-era sculptor Antun Augustincic
commemorating Josip Broz Tito, met in the town that had once carried
his name. Both monuments had been exhibited in 1950 in the Yugoslav
pavilion at the Venetian Biennale.

Before the idea came about, Tito's grandson, Josip Joska Broz, came to
Uzice with the intention of buying one sculpture. With him in Uzice
was Sinisa Zarin, a private businessman from Novi Sad. He had wanted
to buy a statue to place at the center of a museum of socialist
revolution, which he plans to establish as part of his firm in Novi
Sad.

Before him, Branislav Kaludjerovic from Cetinje, Montenegro, tried to
buy the same statue. He is known for placing an obituary to "comrade
Tito" in the Montenegrin press every 4 May, the day Tito died. In the
obituary, which this year appears in Podgorica's daily Vijesti, is
written: "Comrade Tito, when we were comrades we were gentlemen."

In Uzice, when it occurred to them that so much could be done with the
statues, they decided to not sell either of them and to correct the
mistake of pulling them down.

As things stand now, the project to revitalize the town's communist
heritage will be carried out by giving support to urban art groups
that would work on promoting Tito and the heritage of a state that is
no more. Some projects have already been started, such as one to
establish links with towns in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia,
and Montenegro that were once named after Tito.

At the end of March, just 25 miles south in Kragujevac, where the
inhabitants are said by the press to be the most anti-communist, a
cafe called "Tito" has opened. The owner has adorned the interior with
photographs and slogans of the former president and a guest book.

A similar cafe, going by the name of "Republika," opened two years
ago in the very center of Belgrade, about 50 yards from the so-called
House of the Army, where until recently literary evenings dedicated to
indicted war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Veselin Sljivancanin were
held.

Besides a large number of photographs and symbols of the former
socialist state, Yugo-nostalgics come here because they are served by
young waitresses dressed in white blouses and red scarves, straight
away associated with the former pioneer uniforms, and because the cafe
plays only rock music from the time of the SFRJ. The visitors are
generally young people, though Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Zarko
Korac is also said to drop in regularly.

REVIVING TITO

In neighboring Croatia, organized trips to Tito's birthplace in
Kumrovec are becoming increasingly popular. On 4 May this year, more
than 2,000 people of various ages gathered in Kumrovec to pay their
respects to the former president.

The gathering was organized by the Josip Broz Tito Society and the
Union of Croatian Anti-Fascist Fighters, and they sang old partisan
songs, as well as a few new ones: "Dear Lord, Croats beg you - return
comrade Tito to us," "Comrade Tito, we wouldn't call you - had they
not sold our Croatia." In Kumrovec a cafe was recently opened called
"The Old Man's," Tito's nickname from the World War II.

On that same day, the Tito society from the Slovenian capital of
Ljubljana visited his grave in Belgrade's House of Flowers. By 3 p.m.,
over 100 people had visited Tito's grave to pay their respects to his
image and his work.

One of the guards at the House of Flowers told TOL that every day
between 50 and 100 people come, and that recently there had been many
Slovenes. In the visitor book are messages written in Chinese,
Italian, Dutch, and English, and in all the languages of the former
Yugoslavia.

One Macedonian woman who recently visited Tito's grave wrote: "I'm
happy that I lived at least a few years in your time."

"In my heart you live forever," wrote one Slovenian woman. "You were
the greatest."

"Tito was the one legendary and true figure in the history of
Yugoslavia."

"I lived only in Tito's time."

"When you left, chaos commenced."

"Revolution is a process, the struggle continues."

COMRADE TITO HAS DIED

On that same 4 May at 3:05 p.m. in the Marshall Tito army barracks in
Sarajevo, a siren sounded, and from the speakers was heard an old
announcement from the Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav
Communists: "Comrade Tito has died."

Thereupon, some 200 Sarajevans of all ages paid their respects to Tito
with a minute's silence, the laying of flowers, and the song "Hvala"
(Thank you). In a speech given by one young girl, Tito was described
as "one of the giants of the 20th century, the man who first
introduced self-management to the world." She added: "Once again shall
young people learn about the work of Josip Broz." Interestingly, a
group of young people from Belgrade was also present at the gathering
in Sarajevo.

Every town in the former Yugoslavia had a street named after Tito. But
today Sarajevo is the only one whose main street is still called
Marshal Tito Street.

Most of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina consider Tito a
"positive historical figure." In a survey conducted by the Sarajevo
daily Dnevni avaz and published on the 21st anniversary of Tito's
death, 86 percent of those questioned in the predominantly Bosniak
(Bosnian Muslim). Sarajevo had a positive opinion of Tito's historical
role. Not one person who was questioned expressed a negative opinion
of Tito. In Banja Luka and Capljina, cities with a Serb and a Croat
majority, respectively, only 6 percent of citizens surveyed considered
Tito a negative historical figure.

Tito has been commemorated on film, too. Since his death, three films
have been made in which he plays a part. In Croatia in 1999, Marshal
was the most popular domestic film. Director Vinko Bresan tells the
story of a small Adriatic island on which appears the spirit of Tito.
Although the new Croatian authorities use a police investigation to
try to deny it, as Tito's war veterans descend upon the island, the
chance comes for Tito to lead them into a new revolution to restore
communism.

In a film by Serbian director Zelimir Zilnik, Tito for the Second Time
Among the Serbs, actor Dragoljub Ljubicic Micko walked around the
streets of Belgrade in 1994 wearing Tito's uniform, and people would
approach and talk to him. There is an interesting scene in which a
Belgrader approaches the supposed Tito and says to him: "Comrade
Tito, you are a Croat, I am a Serb, but I loved you so much!" For
the director the greatest surprise was the fact that people spoke to
Tito as though to a living person--no one approached and said: "I
know that you're dead."

"That conversation with the dead Tito was in some way a conversation
with one's own past, with one's own life," Zilnik said.

In the 1992 film Tito and I by Goran Markovic, a 10-year-old boy
writes a letter in which he claims to love Tito more than he loves his
mother and father.

BETTER IN THE DARK

Such opinions and events do not surprise Tito's grandson, who today
works in the catering industry in Belgrade. He says that every country
of the former Yugoslavia is preparing to enter into Europe with great
pomp, and no one mentions that Yugoslavia was once in Europe.

"Just remember our Yugo-passports. They were the most prized in
Europe; we were revered and respected," Tito's grandson told TOL. He
claims that to carry the surname of the former Yugoslav leader is no
burden whatsoever, and that he is very proud of his grandfather: "When
normal people hear my surname I can feel how pleased they are."

Joska is 61 and lives in the house that was left to him by his father,
Zarko, in Belgrade. Like his grandfather and father, he has been
married three times. Asked whether it is part of the family tradition,
he replies that the Brozes have always been people of principles and
they made sure of this with whomever they lived.

From the age of 2 until he was 16, Joska lived with his grandfather.
He remembers that time as the most beautiful period of his life. When
he finished school he worked as head of several hunting estates, and
at one point worked as the closest member of Tito's security. When
Tito died, he immediately left state service. "None of the eight
presidents that succeeded Tito were worthy of my care," he said with a
smile.

Later he went into private business and then entered catering. Today
he runs a hunting restaurant called Lav (Lion) in the old Belgrade
suburb of Zemun, and behind the bar hangs a photograph of his
celebrated grandfather.

According to a Zagreb high school teacher, last year an incident
occurred at her school that wonderfully illustrates the former
Yugoslavia's thoughts about Tito today. A teacher sets her students
the task of writing an essay on the topic "45 years of darkness under
Tito." One student finished after just five minutes, closed his
exercise book, and left the classroom. When the curious teacher opened
the exercise book she saw what the student had written: "May God damn
whoever turned the lights on!"
=

Goran Tarlac is a Belgrade-based journalist.


Copyright © 2003 Transitions Online. All rights reserved.

1. Internat. Demonstration to support Slobodan Milosevic
The Hague, June 28, 03

2. Hague protest to demand freedom for Yugoslav workers
By John Catalinotto
Reprinted from the May 29, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper

3. Down with NATO's mafia govt in Belgrade!
Anti-imperialist Camp

4. ICTY Sets Milosevic Case Deadline
(People's Daily, China, 21/5/2003)

5. Milosevic trial may run to 2005 after prosecutors win more time
Agence France-Presse, May 20, 2003


=== 1 ===


From: "Klaus von Raussendorff" <redaktion@...>
Sent: Monday, May 19, 2003 1:31 PM
Subject: Internat. Demonstration to support Slobodan Milosevic (The
Hague, June 28, 03)


YUGOSLAVIA, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ... WHO'S NEXT?
STOP USA! - FREE SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC!

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the kidnapping of the
former president of Yugoslavia there will be an

International Demonstration
in The Hague/Netherlands, Saturday, June 28, 2003

Slandered from the outset, Slobodan Milosevic, the Socialist Party of
Serbia and all patriotic forces resisted the shattering of Yugoslavia
into weak, racially segregated territories, resisted domination by the
IMF and World Bank, resisted penetration by the Macdonald's culture
and resisted NATO-dominated racist-terrorist forces cynically
disguised as freedom fighters. It is because of these acts of
principle that NATO has put him on 'trial' in The Hague.

In that trial President Milosevic refuses to make a deal to save
himself but continues to expose the crimes of violence and racism
committed by NATO and its proxy forces against Yugoslavia.

Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown by a "regime change" made in USA.
Yugoslavia is now being wrecked economically, socially and culturally,
under USA/German domination. President Milosevic has become the first
political prisoner of the so-called "globalisation" of capitalist
exploitation. By kidnapping and putting on "trial" a popularly elected
President of a sovereign state, NATO and their "tribunal" have
established the gravest precedent for the destruction of the
sovereignty of states.

After the military invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq the US government
and their allies continue to blackmail many more nations into
subjugation by economic sanctions, the threat of mass destruction and
destabilization through "dissident" and "opposition" forces organized
from outside.

We, the signatories of this appeal, wish to remind all people in the
anti war and social movements that for our future struggles against
the threat of war it is of utmost importance to remain persistent in
our opposition and protest against previous acts of aggression and
their continuation in the form of occupation and subjugation of
countries, sell out of their wealth and resources to transnational
corporations and, last not least, the "trial" of their leaders.

Recalling the verdicts rendered by independent popular tribunals in
Berlin and New York on NATO leaders for their aggression and war
crimes committed against the former Yugoslavia we call on honest
people of all political convictions and all walks of life to join in
the demonstration
in order to demand:

- the abolishment of the illegal Hague "Tribunal", an instrument of
aggression and occupation
- the release of Slobodan Milosevic, who has shown by his outstanding
defence that he is indicted only to divert attention from NATO war
crimes and to impose foreign control on his people
- reparation payments to be made by NATO governments responsible for
all damages caused by their war of aggression against Yugoslavia


DOWNLOAD THE DEMO LEAFLETS AT:
http://it.groups.yahoo.com/group/crj-mailinglist/files/AIA/


=== 2 ===


http://www.workers.org/ww/2003/milos0529.php

Hague protest to demand freedom for Yugoslav workers

By John Catalinotto

European groups that have been defending former Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic, along with organizations of the Yugoslav diaspora,
are issuing a call for a demonstration in The Hague, Netherlands, on
June 28, demanding his freedom.

It was on that date two years ago that Milosevic was kidnapped from
Belgrade by NATO forces and brought to The Hague. It is also St. Vitus
Day, a date commemorated in Serbia for its significance in the
struggle against foreign oppressors in 1389.

The call states clearly the reasons NATO went after President
Milosevic.

"Slandered from the outset," it reads, "Slobodan Milosevic, the
Socialist Party of Serbia and all patriotic forces resisted the
shattering of Yugoslavia into weak, racially segregated territories,
resisted domination by the IMF and World Bank, resisted penetration by
the McDonald's culture and resisted NATO-dominated racist-terrorist
forces cynically disguised as freedom fighters. It is because of these
acts of principle that NATO has put him on 'trial' in The Hague.

"In that trial President Milosevic refuses to make a deal to save
himself but continues to expose the crimes of violence and racism
committed by NATO and its proxy forces against Yugoslavia.

"Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown by a 'regime change' made in the
USA. Yugoslavia is now being wrecked economically, socially and
culturally, under USA/German domination. President Milosevic has
become the first political prisoner of the so-called 'globalization'
of capitalist exploitation. By kidnapping and putting on 'trial' a
popularly elected president of a sovereign state, NATO and their
'tribunal' have established the gravest precedent for the destruction
of the sovereignty of states.

"After the military invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S.
government and its allies continue to blackmail many more nations into
subjugation by economic sanctions, the threat of mass destruction and
destabilization through 'dissident' and 'opposition' forces organized
from outside."

The International Action Center, which was active in leading the
anti-war struggle in the United States during the U.S./NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia in 1999, has added its support to the call and will send a
representative to The Hague on June 28.

Reprinted from the May 29, 2003, issue of Workers World newspaper

(Copyright Workers World Service: Everyone is permitted to copy and
distribute verbatim copies of this document, but changing it is not
allowed. For more information contact Workers World, 55 W. 17 St., NY,
NY 10011; via email: ww@.... Subscribe
wwnews-on@.... Unsubscribe wwnews-off@.... Support
independent news http://www.workers.org/orders/donate.php)


=== 3 ===


Down with NATO's mafia govt in Belgrade!

Within less than three years Djindjic and his so-called Democratic
Opposition (DOS) succeeded in destroying the last remnants of
Yugoslavia and transforming it into a Latin American style third world
oligarchy.
Djindjic was the only common point which kept together his
heterogeneous clique of Habermasian civil society intellectuals,
ultra-liberal mouthpieces of IMF, war profiteers, praetorians and
simple gangsters, while his anti-popular regime was rapidly loosing
ground:
Although the neo-liberal "shock therapy" has proved a complete failure
all over Eastern Europe as well as in Argentine it was applied once
again on Yugoslavia. The radical policy of open market and the
privatisation of the financial and industrial sector completely
destroyed the remains of the national economy. Prices soared and wages
plunged precipitating the majority into misery while a small layer
made enormous fortunes. While unemployment is skyrocketing the social
system is being dismantled.
All the promises of the nationalist fig leaves to defend Serbian
integrity against fragmentation brought about by imperialist
aggression and blamed on the Milosevic government turned out to be
cheap lies. Yugoslavia has eventually being dismantled splitting away
Montenegro. Kosovo remains under NATO occupation being successively
albanised, the Serbian Kraijna is completely ethnically cleansed and
the Bosnian Serbs continue to live under the dictatorial rule of EU
and NATO imposed protectorate. In South Serbia the Albanian
nationalist guerrilla is carrying on their struggle for secession and
subsequent unification into a Great Albania without being curbed by
NATO. The plans to fragment even Serbia proper by giving further
autonomy to Sandjak and Voivodina are being pressed ahead.

The Hague "tribunal" has been imposed violating the rules of the UN in
order to legitimise NATO's aggression. The anti-imperialist resistance
of the Yugoslav and Serb people is to be condemned and abased. Like
during medieval witch hunts whose aggressed should be forced to accuse
themselves voluntarily and thus absolve the aggressor. But in his
brave defence Milosevic keeps destroying the amalgam of the tribunal
in which both the prosecutor and the judge are NATO puppets and the
judgement is already decided.
While the Djindjic regime, in order to co-operate with its foreign
masters, has been violating the constitution by extraditing Yugoslav
citizen to the Hague, the people continue opposing by majority the
tribunal's attempt to criminalize their decade long resistance.

When Djindjic wanted to get rid of his powerful mafia companions who
brought him to power by means of a coup d'etat and threatened to
extradite them to the Hague they assassinated him.
On the brink of collapse the Djindjic clique passed to the offensive
by imposing the state of emergency. Elementary democratic rights were
suspended, strict censorship imposed, the opposition media outlets
closed down, 10.000 people taken into custody and interrogated among
them 2.000 still not released. While announcing a crackdown on the
"organised crime" (which they are in fact politically representing)
they are really targeting all the left remnants remaining within the
state apparatus. It was not by accident that those organising the
defence of Slobodan Milosevic were hit as well. Actually it is the
second part of the pro-imperialist coup d'etat.
The state of emergency had to be lifted after one month. But several
dictatorial measures continue to be in place. The media is completely
in Western hands. There is virtually no more freedom of expression.

Hence the democracy of Western brand for which the American empire in
waging wars around the world. But they will not pass. The popular
resistance in continuing whether in Serbia, Iraq or Colombia.

Free Slobodan Milosevic!
Dissolve the Hague inquisition tribunal!
Restore elementary democratic rights in Serbia!
NATO out of the Balkans!

Demonstration on Vidovdan (the Serbian national day commemorating the
defeat on Kosovo Polje, the assassination of Sarajevo, the extradition
of Milosevic)

The Hague, June 28, 2 pm
Churchillplain 10

Anti-imperialist Camp

************************************
Antiimperialist Camp
PF 23, A-1040 Vienna, Austria
camp@...
www.antiimperialista.org/en
************************************


=== 4 ===

ICTY Sets Milosevic Case Deadline
http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/21/print20030521_116961.html


International Criminal Tribunal Sets Milosevic Case Deadline

Judges at International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) set prosecutors a 100-day deadline on Tuesday to complete the
case on Slobodan Milosevic.
Considering a summer break and rest days, the ICTY ruling effectively
means prosecutors must end their case against the former Yugoslav
president before the end of December.
Milosevic, accused by the Hague-based court of genocide, crimesagainst
humanity and war crimes in the Balkans in the 1990s, is defending
himself. The deadline raises the prospect of him launching his defense
early next year.
The trial, which started in February 2002, has been adjourned several
times because of Milosevic's frequent illness. It has heard evidence
from more than 180 witnesses covering three conflicts spanning almost
a decade in the Balkans.
In a written ruling, Judges ordered prosecutors to finish calling more
than 170 witnesses within 100 days in court from May 16. The tribunal
takes a three-week break in August and also takesregular breaks to
allow Milosevic to rest.
The ICTY prosecutors earlier this month appealed for more time after
telling judges they could not meet a deadline set last year to wrap up
the case this month.
"The trial chamber has come to the conclusion that it would be in the
interests of justice to allow some variation in the time limit to
allow the prosecution more time to call further witnessesit regards as
essential," judges said in the ruling.

People's Daily Online --- http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/


=== 5 ===


HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK
---------------------------
http://sg.news.yahoo.com/030520/1/3b37k.html

[This unconscionable screed, recognizable by all but
the most incurably indoctrinated for what it is, is an
indication of to what extent the establishment media
stokes the fires of war and the latter's inexorable
descent into persecuting the defeated victims so as to
retroactively excuse the perpetrators' war crimes.
Even the Third Reich permitted Georgi Dmitrov the
opportunity to - forcefully - win an acquital.]


Agence France-Presse
May 20, 2003

Milosevic trial may run to 2005 after prosecutors win
more time


The war crimes trial of Slobodan Milosevic could now
stretch well into 2005 after the prosecution won more
time to present its case against the former Yugoslav
leader.
Judges at the UN war crimes court in The Hague granted
prosecutors another 100 trial days "in the interest of
justice" and they are now expected to wrap up their
case by the end of this year.
Milosevic, standing trial on more than 60 charges of
war crimes and crimes against humanity for his role in
the 1990s wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, will
then have nearly two years to present his defence.
But observers said the trial could run even longer if
Milosevic's ill health, which has led to the
interruption of the proceedings seven times since it
opened in February last year, emerges as a problem
again.
The prosecution was to have wrapped up its case by May
16, but it asked for more time to complete the
presentation of evidence on the 1991-1995 conflict in
Croatia and the war in Bosnia from 1992-95, for which
Milosevic also faces a charge of genocide, the gravest
of war crimes.
Prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have already presented
their evidence over the 1999 Serb crackdown against
Albanians in the province of Kosovo.
Milosevic, 61, a lawyer by training, has branded the
UN court illegal and defiantly conducted his own
defence.
Although doctors say he runs the risk of a heart
attack because of high blood pressure, Milosevic is
said to spend his nights in the tribunal's detention
centre pouring over thousands of pages of court
documents.
He has two handpicked legal advisors from Belgrade who
consult with him on strategy but he does not allow
anyone to speak for him in court.
The former Yugoslav president was ousted from power in
October 2000 after a popular uprising, ending 13 years
in power that saw the bloody breakup of the former
Yugoslavia.
Presiding judge Richard May said the court had to
"strike a balance" between allowing the prosecution
enough time and ensuring an expeditious trial.
But May said the judges would not allow any more extra
time for prosecutors because their case would become
"excessively long and oppressive to all concerned, in
particular the accused."
Even if the trial ends in 2005, Milosevic -- who faces
a life sentence if convicted -- could still lodge
appeals that could also take years to go through the
UN court system.
After the judges announced their decision Tuesday's
hearing continued with the cross-examination of Renaud
de la Brosse, a French expert on the use of the media
and political propaganda for Serb nationalist ends.
"By making up lies, inventing differences and
overplaying oppositions between communities, the
television, radio and written press played a dangerous
game," de la Brosse said.
The coverage "made it possible to inspire and arouse
hatred and fear among communities" in the former
Yugoslavia, he added.

http://www.artel.co.yu/sr/reakcije_citalaca/2003-04-09_5.html


Kosovo i Metohija: Propaganda i istina

Rade Drobac
Beograd, 09. april 2003. godine

Beleska autora: tekst sam pisao januara 1999. g. za
potrebe Saveznoig ministarstva za inostrane poslove a
sada sam ga aktuelizovao u uverenju da je korisno
ponoviti argumente koji i danas imaju jednaku
vrednost a koje smo, u poplavi dnevnih vesti i
dezinformacija, mozda izgubili iz vida.

UVOD
Kosovo i Metohija su jedna od najcescih tema u
politickim krugovima u inostranstvu, medjunarodnim
organizacijama i svetskim medijima ve? du?i niz
godina.. Kada bi se analizirala kolicina izrecenog,
napisanog i snimljenog , moglo bi se pomisliti da je o
ovom pitanju sve i vise nego poznato i da je vec
svima jasno o cemu se tu radi, ko je tu kriv i zasto, i
koga treba braniti. Medjutim, kolicina i vrsta
informacija koje kruze o Kosovu i Metohiji obnuto je
srazmerna stvarnom razumevanju zbivanja u ovoj
juznoj srpskoj pokrajini. Poznavaocima stanja i
problematike cini se da sto se vise o Kosovu i
Metohiji govori, sve je vise zabluda i pogresnih
predstava. Kako je ovo moguce? Iako zvuci
nelogicno, moguce je jer se na ovom delu srpske
teritorije preplicu drzavni i nacionalni interesi
Republike Srbije i SRJ, velikoalbanske aspiracije
albanskih separatista i terorista i globalni i stgrateski
interesi nekih velikih sila, koje nesumnjivo raspolazu
mogucnostima i nacinima da, u funkciji ostvarivanja
ciljeva sopstvene politike, istinu pretvore u laz i laz u
istinu. Kosovo i Metohija je jedan od primera koji
nedvosmisleno dokazuje da se oni ne libe da to i ucine
ne vodeci, pri tome, racuna o stvarnim cinjenicama,
niti o interesima onih koji u ovoj srpskoj pokrajini
zive, iako se za to verbalno zalazu, niti se pridrzavaju
principa koje su sami proklamovali i koje silom
namecu drugima. Neupuceni bi se mogli zapitati zbog
cega je nekom potrebno da manipulise cinjenicama?
Zbog toga da bi, prikazujuci stanje, aktere i zbivanja u
svetlu koji odgovara sopstvenim interesima,
mobilisao sto veci broj politickih faktora u svetu u
podrsci ostvarivanju sopstvenih ciljeva, isfabrikovao
dogadjaje koji treba da nateraju medjunarodne
organizacije i institucije da legalizuju odredjene
politicke i vojne akcije uperene protiv zacrtanog
protivnika i, napokon, da bi se pred medjunarodnim
javnim mnjenjem stvorio utisak o pravednosti
sopstvenog delovanja.
Brojni su primeri manipulacija koje su uspele i donele
velike nesrece celim narodima. Na srecu bilo je i
pokusaja manipulacija, koji su osujeceni i njihovi
negativni efekti spreceni. Kada je Kosovo i Metohija
u pitanju, najpoznatji takav slucaj je pokusaj
inscenacije masovnog masakra albanskih civila od
strane srpske policije u selu Racak. Teroristi koji su u
prethodnom periodu izvrsili vise napada na policiju i
civile u tom regionu napali su policiju koja je na
napad odgovorila i tom prilikom ubila vise desetina
terorista. Preko noci su ti teroristi preobuceni i
proglaseni civilima, a sve to su legalizovali visoki
predstavnici najuglednijih madjunarodnih
organizacija i vodecih sila sveta. Na srecu, ima
postenih novinara koji su to videli i prevaru
obelodanili.
Kada se pojedinci ne libe ovako otvorenih i grubih
manipulacija, moze se zamisliti kakve se sve zablude
i pogresne predstave, putem sofisticiranih,
globalizovanih i centralizovanih uticajnih medija, PR
agencija i lobi grupa, sire u svetu, stvarajuci o Kosovu
i Metohiji potpuno pogresne predstave.
Nije moguce na jednom mestu izneti sve te neistine i
maniplulacije, ali cemo nabrojati one najcesce i
najvaznije.

1. LAZ: Albanci na Kosovu i Metohiji prisiljeni su
da se bune jer je rezim u Srbiji nedemokratski?
ISTINA:Problem separatistickog albanskog
delovanja na Kosovu i Metohiji postoji vec vise od sto
godina. Njegovi temelji udareni su jos 1878. g.
osnivanjem tzv. Prizrenske lige cija je pratforma
objedinjavanje svih albanskih etnickih teritorija, pri
cemu su granice te teritorije obuhvatale i delove
susednih drzava, pa i one u kojima Albanci nisu bili
vecinska populacija.
Albanski separatizam , koji je, u periodima strane
okupacije Kosova I Metohije, uzimao formu terora i
terorizma u ostalim periodima, bio je u kontinuitetu
protiv svake vlasti u Srbiji (i u susednim drzavama
prema kojima je imao aspiracije), nezavisno od
njihovog karaktera i nosilaca.
Kako tadasnja, tako i aktuelna vlast u Srbiji i
Jugoslaviji izabrane su na demokratskim izborima i
priznaje je najveci broj gradjana, medju koje spadaju i
pripadnici ostalih 25 nacionalnih manjina i etnickih
grupa koje zive u SRJ.

2. LAZ: Kosovo i Metohija je albanska teritorija i
Srbi na nju nemaju pravo.
ISTINA:Kosovo i Metohija je teritorija koja od VI
veka pripada, bez prekida, srpskom narodu koji je na
njoj najbrojniji u periodu od skoro 13 vekova.
Teritorija Kosova i Metohije je u celom ovom
periodu neprekidno, osim u periodima strane
okupacije, bila integralni deo srpske drzave. Do
okupacije Kosova i Metohije od strane Otomanske
imperije, u 14. Veku, prestonica Kraljevine Srbije bio
je grad Prizren, a sediste srpske pravoslavne crkve se i
danas nalazi u Peci. Na prostoru Kosova I Metohije
nalazi se oko 1300 srpskih kulturno - istorijskih
spomenika koji predstavljaju vise od 90% ukupne
kulturno - istorijske bastine ovog regiona. O
pripadnosti ove teritorije Srbima svedoce toponimi,
samo ime (Kosovo polje- dolazi od srpske reci kos,
Metohija dolazi od reci metoh koja znaci pravoslavni
crkveni posed). Albanci se kao etnicka skupina
pominju tek od XIV veka, a na Kosovu i Metohiji su
sada vecinsko stanovnistvo zahvaljujuci sistematskom
maltretiranju i proterivanju srpskog i drugog
nealbanskog stanovnistva sa ovog prostora.

3. LAZ: Albanaca na Kosovu i Metohiji ima 90%.
ISTINA: U skoro svim izvestajima najveceg dela
svetskih medija u vreme pred agresiju NATO pakta
kao refren se ponavljalo da Albanci na Kosovu i
Metohiji predstavljaju vecinu u odnosu na Srbe u
razmeri 9 na prema 1. Istina je sasvim drugacija. Iako
potpuno egzaktnih podataka nema, jer Albanci nisu
izasli na popis odrzan 1991. godine, a onaj iz 1981.
godine su vrsile jednonacionalne albanske komisije
koje su potpuno proizvoljno i netacno prikazale broj i
demografsku strukturu stanovnistva na Kosovu i
Metohiji, najnovije analize jugoslovenskog Zavoda za
statistiku (kraj 1998. god.) pokazale su prilicno jasnu i
verodostojnu sliku. Prema strucnjacima ovog zavoda,
na Kosovu I Metohiji tada je zivelo oko 917.000
Albanaca, 221.000 Srba, 23.000 Crnogoraca, 97.000
Roma, 72.500 Muslimana, 3.500 Jugoslovena, 21.000
Turaka, 980 Makedonaca i 23.000 ostalih. Ovi podaci
dokazuju da je procenat albanskog stanovnistva na
Kosovu i Metohiji oko 66%. Zbog cega Albansci i
oni koji u svetu podrzavaju njihov separatizam i
terorizam stalno insistiraju na 90%? Zbog toga sto
svoje zahteve za nezavisnoscu Albanci zasnivaju
iskljucivo na svojoj razlicitoj etnickoj pripadnosti pa
im je zato potrebno da prikazu sto veci procenat
stanovnistva albanske nacionalnosti kako bi svojim
zahtevima dali veci legitimitet i verodostojnost, iako
se radi o krajnje nacionalistickim i hegemonistickim
pobudama. Sada ih je na KiM verovatno 90% jer su
pod okriljem NATO jedinica i na njihovu sramotu
proterali veliki deo srpskog i nealbanskog
stanovnistva sa KiM.

4. LAZ: Svi Albanci na Kosovu i Metohiji podrzavaju
nezavisnost ove pokrajine.
ISTINA: Najveci broj Albanaca koji zive na Kosovu i
Metohiji nije za otcepljenje od Srbije i Jugoslavije.
Medjutim, suoceni sa agresivnim separatizmom
svojih politickih lidera i sve surovijim terorizmom,
uvidjajuci da i neke uticajne drzave podrzavaju
separatizam i terorizam u ovoj juznoj srpskoj
pokrajini, ne usudjuju se da se otvoreno suprotstave, u
strahu za svoje i zivote svojih porodica. Nesporna je
cinjenica da veliki broj Albanaca na Kosovu i
Metohiji ima visok standard zivota i da je zadovoljan
mogucnostima koje ima, pogotovo u odnosu na samu
Albaniju, pa i druge susedne zemlje, i da zele da zive
u miru i slozi sa svim gradjanima Kosova i Metohije.
Ali dok god se ne iskoreni terorizam i ne suzbije
separatizam, oni nece biti u prilici da dobiju
mogucnost da svoja opredeljenja slobodno I bez straha
ispolje. Najbolji dokaz da veliki broj Albanaca na
Kosovu i Metohiji ne podrzava separatizam i
terorizam je da od ubijenih u toku 1998. g. Albanske
zrtve cine 55% (77 civila). Ubijeni su samo zato jer
nisu podrzavali etnocentricnu i iskljucivu
separatisticku politiku albanskih terorista.

5. LAZ: Albancima na Kosovu i Metohiji je nasilno
oduzeta autonomija.
ISTINA:Albancima na Kosovu i Metohija nije
oduzeta autonomija, a pogotovo ne nasilno. Stepen
autonomije koju uziva ova srpska pokrajina u svemu
je jednak autonomiji koju uziva druga srpska
pokrajina Vojvodina. Dok u Vojvodini u miru i slozi,
u okviru siroke autonomije koju u punoj meri koriste,
zajedno zivi i saradjuje 25 nacionalnih manjina i
etnickih grupa, bez ozbiljnih problema ili
nesuglasica, dotle na Kosovu i Metohiji od nekoliko
nacionalnih manjina i etnickih grupa koje tamo zive
bez problema samo jedna jedina se zali- Albanska.
Prava koja imaju na raspolaganju svi gradjani Kosova
i Metohije, kao i ona specificna za pripadnike
nacionalnih manjina, u okviru koncepta regionalne
autonomije koji spada u red uobicajenih u svetu, su
takvog stepena da prevazilaze ne samo obaveze iz
medjunarodnih propisa, vec i sve sto je u praksi u
drugim zemljama Evrope i sveta. Ta prava Albanci ne
koriste iz politickih razloga - kako bi politickim
faktorima u svetu i medjunarodnoj javnosti dokazali
svoju navodnu obespravljenost.
Kao krunski argument da je Albancima na Kosovu i
Metohiji nasilno oduzeta autonomija navodi se da je
1989.g. pod pretnjom sile promenjen statut ove
pokrajine. Statut je zaista promenjen, u smislu
ukidanja atributa drzavnosti koji nisu pripadali
konceptu autonomije uobicajenom u svetu. I to je
ucinjeno na legalan nacin. Odluku je izglasala
pokrajinska skupstina a ratifikovao savezni
parlament, bez ijedne primedbe neke od republika
koje su u to vreme sacinjavale prethodnu Jugoslaviju.
Svi ostali prerogativi autonomnog statusa su ostali na
snazi ali je ovom promenom presecen proces
postepenog sticanja nezavisnosti, pa je razumljivo
nezadovoljstvo separatista kojima je time ometeno
ostvarivanje njihovih ciljeva. Pri tome ovde treba
razbiti jos jednu manipulaciju. Kroz formulaciju da je
Albancima na Kosovu i Metohiji ukinuta autonomija
na mala vrata se ova srpska pokrajina pokusava
predstaviti kao albanska a ne srpska. Da je autonomija
zaista ukinuta, ona bi bila ukinuta za sve gradjane
Kosova i Metohije, a ne samo za Albance.

6. LAZ: Ljudska i nacionalna prava Albanaca na
Kosovu i Metohiji su ugrozena.
ISTINA: Ljudska, gradjanska i nacionalna prava
Albanaca, ili drugih pripadnika nacionalnih manjina
na Kosovu i Metohiji, ili u SR Jugoslaviji , ni u cemu
nisu ugrozena. Ustavni i zakonski okviri ostvarivanja
ovih prava su, ne samo u saglasnosti sa
najsavremenijim pravnim postulatima zemalja
razvijenog sveta, vec sadrze i mnoge pozitivne
odredbe koje ne sadrze propisi koji regulisu ovu
materiju u drugim zemljama. Svi pripadnici
nacionalnih manjina u SR Jugoslaviji(Srbiji i Crnoj
Gori) imaju pravo glasa, pravo na politicko
organizovanje, pravo na negovanje sopstvenog jezika,
kulture i obicaja, pravo na skolovanje na maternjem
jeziku, ukljucujuci i na univerzitetima, pravo na
informisanje na sopstvenom jeziku i mnoga druga.
Medjutim, problem nije u nedostatku nekog od ovih
prava ili u teskocama u njihovom ostvarivanju.
Problem je u cinjenici da politicke predstavnike
Albanaca na Kosovu i Metohiji zanima samo
nezavisnost, odnosno da je njihov cilj da od Srbije i
SR Jugoslavije (srbije i Crne Gore) otmu deo njene
suverene teritorije, ne prezajuci da u tom cilju koriste
sva raspoloziva sredstva. Terorizam koji svakodnevno
odnosi brojne zrtve na Kosovu i Metohiji samo je
nalicje separatizma, usmerenog na borbu za tudju
teritoriju, pri cemu price o ljudskim i nacionalnim
pravima sluze da zamaskiraju prave ciljeve albanskih
separatista i terorista.

7. LAZ: Albance na Kosovu i Metohiji Srbi
proganjaju i etnicki ciste.
ISTINA:Optuzbe da Srbi na Kosovu i Metohiji
proganjaju Albance i da to predstavlja svojevrsno
etnicko ciscenje je apsolutno netacna. Ona sluzi
albanskim separatistima da pred ocima medjunarodne
javnosti nadju prihvatljivo opravdanje koje bi
maskiralo njihove prave ciljeve - secesiju i otimanje
dela tudje teritorije. Medjutim, te optuzbe sluze i da
preduprede istu takvu, ovoga puta istinitu, optuzbu
Srba na Kosovu i Metohiji, da Albanci decenijama
vrse sistematski progon i nedela nad njima i da su ta
nasilja razmera etnickog ciscenja. Da Albanci etnicki
ciste Srbe sa Kosova i Metohije, a ne obrnuto,
najbolje svedoce egzaktni podaci, koje niko ne
osporava. A to je da je na Kosovu i Metohiji pre
NATO agresije i nasilnog iseljavanja Srba i ostalog
nealbanskog stanaovnistva, ?ivelo 66% Albanaca a
svega 16% Srba. Ako se zna da su Srbi vekovima
predstavljali apsolutnu vecinu na prostoru Kosova i
Metohije, kako je onda moguce da su svedeni samo na
ovako mali procenat, a Albanci u demografskoj
ekspanziji. Ako pri tome znamo da se albanski teror
nad srpskim stanovnistvom odvija vec preko sto
godina, o cemu svedoce brojni dokumenti iz daleke i
nedavne proslosti, onda je to razumljivo. Taj teror je
bio posebno izrazen u periodima strane okupacije ove
srpske pokrajine, koje su albanski separatisti uvek
maksimalno iskoriscavali za jos agresivniji i potpuniji
teror nad lokalnim srpskim stanovnistvom i njegov
izgon sa Kosva i Metohije. Prema verodostojnim
istorijskim podacima izmedju 1889. i 1899. godine,
kada su Srbi bili cetiri puta brojniji od Albanaca
(Srba 415.300, Albanaca 106.270), pod
pokroviteljstvom Turske, sa Kosova i Metohije je
proterano oko 60.000 Srba. Procene strucnjaka govore
da je izmedju 1880.g. do 1913.g. sa Kosova i Metohije
proterano oko 150.000 Srba i Crnogoraca, tako da se
oko 1921.g. broj Srba i Crnogoraca izjednacaio sa
brojem Albanaca. Drugi veliki egzodus Srba i
Crnogoraca sa Kosova i Metohije dogodio se tokokm
II Svetskog rata. Pod okriljem okupacije fasisticke
Italije Albanci su pobili oko 10.000 Srba, spalili i
porusili oko 30.000 njihovih kuca i proterali izmedju
60.000 i 70.000. U istom periodu, i neposredno nakon
ovog rata, na Kosovo Metohiju je na srpska imanja i
terotorije dovedeno ukupno oko 300.000 Albanaca iz
Albanije, sa ciljem promene etnicke strukture
stanovnistva i stvaranja uslova otimanje te teritorije
od Srba. Poslednji veci odlazak Srba i Crnogoraca sa
Kosova i Metohije dogodio se u periodu nakon II
Svetskog rata, kada je pod zastitom lokalnih
albanskih politicara, koji su tada upravljali ovom
srpskom pokrajinom, nastavljeno tiho proterivanje .
Samo u periodu od 1981. do 1988. god., pod
pritiskom, pretnjama i maltretiranjima, sa Kosova i
Metohije otislo je 28.000. Srba. Ocito je, dakle, da su
na Kosovu i Metohiji Srbi ti koji su zrtve i da je
njihov opstanak tamo ugrozen, a ne obrnuto. O tome
svedoci i aktuelna situacija u kojoj albanski separatisti
i teroristi ubijaju, otimaju i muce srpske civile, u
pokusaju da ih oteraju sa Kosova i Metohije. Samo u
periodu od potpisivanja sporazuma izmedju tadasnjeg
predsednika SRJ S. Milosevica i americkog
predstavnika R. Holbruka (13. 10. 1998.g.) Srbi su
proterani iz oko 70 sela koja su sada etnicki cista -
Albanska.

8. LAZ: Srbi odbijaju pregovore i silom zele da rese
sukob.
ISTINA: Nisu Srbi ti koji odbijaju dijalog i koji na
silu zele da rese postojece razlike. Upravo je obrnuto.
U periodu od februara 1998.g. pa sve do sada
politicki predstavnici Republike Srbije i SRJ
neprekidno su nudili dijalog i resavanje sukoba
mirnim i politickim putem. Dokaz toga je cinjenica
da su delegacije Srbije i SRJ vise od dvadeset puta
pozivale albanske predstavnike sa Kosova i Metohije
na razgovore i da su u svim tim prilikama dolazili u
Pristinu. Ni na jedan od tih poziva se albanski
politicki predstavnici nisu odazvali. Svoje izostanke
ili odbijanja uvek su pravdali nekim izgovorima. Prvo
nisu imali sastav delegacije za pregovore, zatim nisu
imali pratformu za razgovore, potom nisu hteli da
razgovaraju dok se srpska policija ne povuce sa
Kosova i Metohije i sl. Sustina svega bila je
nezainteresovanost za otvaranje dijaloga jer bi na taj
nacin mogli dobiti samo autonomiju, a to oni ne zele.
Izbegavanjem razgovora, izazivanjem incidenata da bi
provocirali policiju ili vojsku da intervenise,
pokusavali su da izazovu sto vise sukoba, sto vecu
nesigurnost i sto vece stradanje naroda, optuzujuci
drzavne organe da se sve to desava zbog njihovog
terora, kako bi prisilili medjunarodnu zajednicu da
intervenise u njihovu korist i da im politickim
pritiscima i vojnim pretnjama obezbedi ostvarivanje
njihovog cilja - nezavisnog i etnicki cistog Kosova i
Metohije, kao prve stepenice u stvaranju Velike
Albanije. I danas je tako. Nasilno su oteli tudju
teritoriju i ne ?ele da o njoj pregovaraju boje?i se da
ne izgube nesto od onoga sto sada imaju.Prema tome,
albanski politicki lideri su ti koji odbijaju ili
izbegavaju razgovore i koji postojece razlike zele da
rese terorizmom i silom.

9. LAZ: Tzv. OVK je legalni predstavnik vecine
Albanaca sa Kosova i Metohije i bori se za njihovu
slobodu.
ISTINA: Tzv. OVK je tipicna teroristicka
organizacija koja se bori za ostvarenje separatistickog
politickog cilja - otcepljenja ovog dela teritorije
Republike Srbije i SR Jugoslavije (Srbije i Crne
Gore) i njenog pripajanja zamisljenoj Velikoj
Albaniji. U ostvarenju svog plolitickog cilja, a ne
nekakve imaginarne slobode koju niko ne ugrozava,
koriste sve klasicne forme teroristickih aktivnosti. U
1998. G. teroristi su izvrsili ukupno 1885
teroristickih napada, od cega 1129 na pripadnike
policije. U ovim napadima ubijeno je 115 policijaca a
ranjeno ili povredjeno njih 403. U istom periodu
teroristi su oteli 15 policajaca od kojih su 3 ubijena, 3
pustena a sudbina preostalih 9 se ne zna. Ali teroristi
su napadali i civile. U istom periodu ubili su 128, od
cega 46 Srba, 77 Albanaca 5 Roma. U tim napadima
ranjeno su 74 Srbina (teze ili lakse). Od ukupno
kidnapovanih civila, njih 293, najbrojniji su Srbi, a
potom Albanci - njih 101.Postupak sa otetim ljudima
bio je krajnje okrutan. Nakon raznolikih
maltretiranja, silovanja zena i mucenja ljudi, vecina
otetih je pobijena. Teroristi u svom delovanju koriste
i podmetanje bombi, politicka ubistva, pretnje i
ucene. Pri tome nije istina da oni predstavljaju teznje
albanskog stanovnistva na Kosovu i Metohiji.
Naprotiv, Albanci na Kosovu i Metohiji su zaplaseni
teroristickom aktivnoscu tzv. OVK i gledaju da se od
nje spasu jer ih maltretira, silom mobilise, naplacuje
im reket, siluje zene i ubija za svaku neposlusnost.
Razlog sukoba i nestabilnosti na Kosovu i Metohiji su
teroristi i oni predstavljaju prepreku ne samo
povratku mira i bezbednosti, povratku prognanih,
otpocinjanju politickog dijaloga, vec i slobodnom
izjasnjavanju svih gradjana Kosova i Metohije o
svojim politickim stavovima, bilo da se radi o
Albancima ili gradjanima druge nacionalne
pripadnosti.

10. LAZ: Sukobi na Kosovu i Metohiji prete da se
preliju i na susedne zemlje i ugrozavaju regionalnu
bezbednost.
ISTINA: Na Kosovu i Metohiji nije u pitanju ratni
sukob vec borba policijskih snaga sa teroristima.
Dakle, jedna potpuno unutrasnja stvar, bez ikakve
veze sa drugim drzavama. Kako pre NATO agresije,
tako i sada.Sa jugoslovenske strane granica nijednog
suseda nije ugrozena, niti postoje ikakve namere da se
ugrozi. SRJ je bila otvorena za ravnoporavnu saradnju
sa svim drzavama sveta, na principima medjusobnog
uvazavanja, postovanja suvereniteta i integriteta i na
bazi konkretnih interesa. Ako neko ugrozava
regionalnu bezbednost onda je to Republika Albanija
jer sa njene teritorije dolaze svi napadi na granicu SRJ
(Srbije i Crne Gore) , tamo su se nalazili baze i
kampovi za obuku albanskih terorista i separatista,
vrsila se njihova obuka, omogucavao sverc oruzja i
mnogo toga drugog, usmerenog na podrsku albanskim
separatistima i konkretnu pomoc teroristima. Podrska
separatistickim zahtevima u ovom regionu u kome se
preplicu interesi i razliciti narodi je veoma opasna jer
moze ugroziti postojece granice jednog broja drzava
ovog regiona i time izazvati destabilizaciju i
prosirenje sukoba i van granica SRJ. Dokaz toga je i
Makedonija.Stoga, medjunarodna zajednica treba da
da apsolutnu i konkretnu podrsku legalnoj borbi
Srbije i SR Jugoslavije (Srbije i Crne Gore) protiv
terorizma i separatizma jer je to preduslov da se na
Kosovo I Metohiju vrati mir i sigurnost. Znacajan
korak u tom pravcu bio bi prestanak pomoci i podrske
albanskim teroristima, njihovom finansiranju i
naoruzavanju, sto je obaveza i iz rezolucija OUN, a ne
sprovodi se. Za ostvarivanje tog cilja kljucno je
izvrsiti delotvoran pritisak na Republiku Albaniju sa
cije teritorije dolaze sve opasnosti po mir i
bezbednost kako na Kosovu I Metohiji, tako i u celom
regionu.

11. LAZ: Medjunarodna zajednica pokusava da
intervenise u cilju postizanja mira i zastite civila i
njihove imovine.
ISTINA: Da je ta tvrdnja istinita medjunarodna
zajednica bi pomogla legalne organe Republike Srbije
i SRJ da se iskoreni terorizam koji predstavlja glavnu
smetnju povratku mira i sigurnosti na Kosovo i
Metohiju i pretpostavku otpocinjanja dijaloga o
stvarnim problemima zajednickog zivota razlicitih
etnickih zajednica u ovoj srpskoj pokrajini. Medjutim,
najznacajniji medjunarodni faktori, umesto da
osudjuju terorizam, teroriste i osude stradanje
njihovih zrtava -policije, vojske i, pre svega, civila,
stalno vrse pritisak na legalne organe reda i
bezbednosti, okrivljujuci njih, a ne teroriste, za stanje
na Kosovu i Metohiji. Iako su OUN donele rezoluciju
kojom se trazi prekidanje svih vrsta pomoci
teroristima na Kosovu i Metohiji, i dalje se sa svih
strana, a preko puteva koji vode kroz Republiku
Albaniju, na Kosovo i Metohiju slivaju novac, oruzje,
teroristi, mudzahedini i kriminalci, a da se to ne
sprecava, vec naprotiv podstice, i pri tome krije ili
marginalizuje. Civile na Kosovu i Metohiji ne
ugrozava policija, vec kriminalci i teroristi i njihove
pogubne aktivnosti su razlog stradanja civila,
njihovog izgona iz domova i straha i teskoca u kojima
zive. Pored toga, tesko je razumeti da se vojne pretnje
upucuju organima suverene drzave koji brane svoju
teritoriju i gradjane, umesto da se onemogucava
teroristicka aktivnost albanskih separatista, na nacin
na koji se to radi kada su u pitanju interesi tih istih
zemalja. Ocito je, dakle, da se iza napadne brige za
civile ne krije pokusaj smirivanja sukoba i zastite
civila vec pokusaj nametanja sopstvenih interesa
silom i pretnjama, suprotno vazecim medjunarodnim
normama i principima, koristeci pri tome zamene
teza, duple standarde, pa i otvorene manipulacije
cinjenicama.

12. LAZ: Republika Albanija podrzava
medjunarodne napore za smirivanje situacije na
Kosovu i Metohiji i zalaze za mirno resenje sukoba.
ISTINA: Republika Albanija, od svog osnivanja do
danas, skoro neprekidno i u kontinuitetu, aktivno
pomaze separatisticke pokrete i njihovu teroristicku
aktivnost na Kosovu i Metohiji. O tome postoji
bezbroj dokaza, istorijskih i drugih, ali osvrnimo se
samo na aktuelan momenat. Nesprona je cinjenica da
je Albanija u ovom momentu placdarm albanskih
terorista na Kosovu i Metohiji. Na njenoj teritoriji
borave, okupljaju se, obucavaju, opremaju oruzjem i
opremom i sa nje se ilegalno, a cesto i na silu,
prebacuju preko jugoslovenske granice sa ciljem
jacanja teroristickih snaga i njihovog sto sireg i
pogubnijeg delovanja. Medjunarodni kriminal, u koji
je duboko upletena albanska narko mafija i svi drugi
kriminalci albanske nacionalnosti, bez obzira ciji
pasos nose, (medjusobno povezani upravo na principu
nacionalne pripadnosti i kriminalnog opredeljenja),
predstavlja jedan od najvecih izvora finansiranja
teroristicke i separatisticke aktivnosti na Kosovu i
Metohiji u cemu Albanija ima znacajnu ulogu i to ne
samo kao trenutna zona "prljavog" novca, droge i
oruzja na Kosovu i Metohiji. Svoju apsolutnu podrsku
albanskim separatistima i terotistima Albanija vise i
ne krije. Otvoreno prima separatisticke albanske
prvake, pa i one koji se legitimisu kao predstavnici
teroristicke organizacije tzv. OVK, otvoreno
zagovara samoopredeljenje Albanaca na Kosovu i
Metohiji, sto je jasna podrska otcepljenju ove
pokrajine od Republike Srbije i SR Jugoslavije i, cak,
priziva stranu vojnu intervenciju radi pomoci
albanskim separatistima i teroristima u ostvarivanju
njihovog pravog cilja - nezavisnog i etnicki cistog
Kosova i Metohije.

13. LA?. Albanci se bore ya demokratsko i
multietni?ko drustvo na Kosovu i Metohiji.
ISTINA:Aktuelno stanje na KiM jasno pokazuje ne
samo da su prethodno izneti argumenti apsolutno
ta?ni ve? i da je verbalno zalaganje Albanskih
politi?kih lidera za demokratsko i multietni?ko
Kosovo obi?na la?. Nakon nasilnog progona,
pra?enog ubijanjem, maltretiranjem i svim drugim
oblicima pritiska na Srbe, pre svega, ali i na svo
ostalo nealbansko stanovnistvo, rusenjem i
spaljivanjem preko 80 pravoslavnih manastira i
crkava, rusenjem srpskih grobalja, otimanjem
imovine i privrednih objekata, Albanci su pokazali da
je njihova namera da Srbe i otale nealbance proteraju
za sva vremena sa KiM kako bi oteli njihovu
teritoriju i imovinu. To je najgnusnije etni?ko
?is??enje i nema nikakve veye ni sa demokratijom a
jos manje sa ?eljom ya zajedni?kim ?ivotom sa
gradjanima drugih vera i nacionalnosti. Naj?a?losnije
je sto se to desava pred o?ima celog sveta oli?enog u
medjunarodnoj misiji , vojnoj i civilnoj, koja, umesto
da tome ostro stane na put, zatvara o?i i pravi se
nevesta kao seoska mlada. Istorija , kada se jednoga
dana bude posteno pisala, a do?i ?e i to vreme, ne?e ih
postedeti od ovog zlo?ina.

Tek razumevanje ovih cinjenica moze dati pravu
sluku o dogadjajima na Kosovu i Metohiji, akterima i
njihovim ciljevima i delovanju.

1. US fabricated evidence in Yugoslavia, says former official
February 6, 2003

2. DATELINE YUGOSLAVIA: THE PARTISAN PRESS
by Peter Brock
FOREIGN POLICY Number 93, Winter 1993-94, p.152-172.


=== 1 ===


http://www.artel.co.yu/en/izbor/yu_kriza/2003-04-16_2.html


US fabricated evidence in Yugoslavia, says former official

Any US evidence against Iraq should be viewed with skepticism
by Frank in Stockholm, Unknown News correspondent
February 6, 2003


The US "fabricated evidence" against former Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosevic during clashes between Serbia and Bosnia in the
mid-1990s, according to a prominent and experienced international
peacekeeping official who served there.

Retired Swedish Brigadier General Bo Pellnas, who was head of UN
Military Observers (UNMOs) in Croatia, now says that the US should not
be trusted. Pellnas says that he learned to distrust US-provided
evidence during peacekeeping service in the former Yugoslavia.

Pellnas's misgivings are described in an article from the Swedish
daily newspaper Aftonbladet. Here is an English-language translation
of this article:

In an interview with Sweden's leading news-wire TT, retired
Brigadier Bo Pellnas claims that the US "faked evidence to suit their
own interests."
"If the US were to present evidence of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction, the countries of the Western world would have no way to
substantiate these reports due to the technical superiority of the
US."
These are the words of retired Brigadier Bo Pellnas, who says he
witnessed the US "fabricating fact to suit their own needs." Pellnas
says he witnessed this first-hand when he led an international force
which safeguarded the borders between Serbia and Bosnia in the
mid-1990s, where he gained a very good insight and understanding of US
operations.
"The technical superiority of the US gives their politicians the
option of bringing forth fake evidence, in this case in front of the
United Nations Security Council."
Pellnas served in Yugoslavia during a time when US efforts, led by
then Secretary of State Madeline Albright, presented evidence to the
UN Security Council that Milosevic's Belgrade government ran
unmonitored arms shipments. Pellnas claims that Albright's staff
presented manipulated satellite photos to document false allegations,
leading the Security Council to act in accordance with the US hard
line against Milosevic.
"There might be a possibility that Albright thought the pictures to
be true," says Pellnas, "but several incidents pointed towards the
fact that the US lied." The US stood firm by their claims, refusing to
show supporting evidence to Pellnas and other members of the
peacekeeping crew.
"If the US were to come forth with evidence against Iraq which were
"difficult to confirm," the permanent members of the Council will be
put in a difficult situation, since they lack the sufficient tools to
research and verify such claims."
Pellnas said he hopes that nations of the European Union make it
their responsibility to build their own intelligence agency which has
the capability to act as a counterbalance to the US. "It would be
great indeed if the EU could act as a balance to the world's only true
superpower, which acts alone these days."
In addition to his UN duties, Pellnas was also in charge of an
international monitoring mission to Yugoslavia in 1994 sponsored by
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
worked with the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
(ICFY), a group established in 1991 to find a peaceful solution to the
region's conflicts.


=== 2 ===


http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/kosta/autori/brock.peter/partizan.press.html

FOREIGN POLICY Number 93, Winter 1993-94, p.152-172.


DATELINE YUGOSLAVIA: THE PARTISAN PRESS

by Peter Brock



The international news story since mid-1991 has been
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the atrocities, the refugees, and the
World's inaction. In most accounts, the villain has been
denounced for the worst crimes committed on European
soil since the death of Adolf Hitler and the demise of
Joseph Stalin.

The evidence appears overwhelming that the military
forces of the Bosnian Serbs have perpetrated grave
offenses. But throughout the crisis the Serbs have
complained that they were also victims, and there is
apparent evidence to support their complaint.

The almost uniform manner by which the international
news media, including the American media, dismissed
Serb claims has played a critical role in the unfolding
tragedy in the former Yugoslavia. As the first phase of
the crisis perhaps now draws to a close, it is time for a
searching look at the performance of the international
media.

The verdict is anything but positive. As one of
America's most prominent journalists on America's
most prestigious newspaper said in a risky moment of
candor early last Summer, "I despair for my profession,
and I despair for my newspaper. And this is very
definitely not for attribution." As the routine, sometimes
zealous bearers of bad news, especially in war,
news-people cynically shrug off criticism (and
especially abhor self-criticism) and trudge back to the
trenches. But in the Yugoslav civil war, the press itself
has been a large part of the bad news. Legitimate
concern for personal safety undoubtedly affected the
coverage. Many stories that deserved a follow-up did
not receive it because journalists could not get to the
scene of the conflict and were forced to rely on
less-than-perfect sources. But a close look at the record
since the war began on june 27, 1991, reveals avoidable
media negligence and a form of pack journalism that
reached its extreme last winter and spring.

During that period, readers and viewers received the
most vivid reports of cruelty, tragedy,and barbarism
since World War II. It was an unprecedented and
unrelenting onslaught, combining modern media
techniques with advocacy journalism.

In the process, the media became a movement,
co-belligerent no longer disguised as noncombatant and
nonpartisan. News was outfitted in its full battle dress of
bold head-lines, multipage spreads of gory photographs,
and gruesome video footage. The clear purpose was to
force governments to intervene militarily. The effect
was compelling, but was the picture complete?

In fact, the mistakes were blatant:

- street scenes of ravaged Vukovar in 1991 were
later depicted as combat footage from minimally
damaged Dubrovnik on Western television
networks.

- the August 17, 1992, Time cover photo, taken
from a British television report, showed a smiling,
shiftless, skeletal man who was described as being
among "Muslim prisoners in a Serbian detention
camp." In fact, the man was a Serb - Slobodan
Konjevic, 37, who, along with his brother Zoran,
41, had been arrested and confined on charges of
looting. Konjevic, more dramatically emaciated
that others who wore shirts in the picture, had
suffered from tuberculosis for 10 years, said his
sister in Vienna, who later identified her brothers
in the picture.

- the 1992 BBC filming of an ailing, elderly
"Bosnian Muslim prisoner-of-war in a Serb
concentration camp" resulted in his later
identification by relatives as retired Yugoslav
army officer Branko Velec, a Bosnian Serb held in
a Muslim detention camp.

- among wounded "Muslim toddlers and infants"
aboard a Sarajevo bus hit by sniper fire in August
1992 were a number of Serb children - a fact
revealed much later. One of the children who died
in the incident was identified at the funeral as
Muslim by television reporters. But the
unmistakable Serbian Orthodox funeral ritual told
a different story.

- in its January 4, 1993, issue, "Newsweek"
published a photo of several bodies with
accompanying story that began: "Is there any way
to stop Serbian atrocities in Bosnia?" The photo
was actually of Serb victims, including one clearly
recognizable man wearing a red coat. The photo,
with the same man in his red coat is identical to a
scene in television footage from Vukovar a year
earlier.

- CNN aired reports in March and May 1993 from
the scenes of massacres of 14 Muslims and then 10
Muslims who were supposedly killed by Serbs.
The victims later turned out to be Serbs. There
was no correction.

- in early August 1993, a photo caption in "The
New York Times" described a Croat woman from
Posusje grieving for a son killed in recent Serb
attacks. In fact, the Croat village of Posusje, in
Bosnia near the Dalmatian coast, had been the
scene of bloody fighting between Muslims and
Croats that had caused 34 Bosnian Croat deaths,
including the son of the woman in the photo.

By early 1993, several major news organizations
appeared to be determined to use their reporting to
generate the political pressure needed to force U.S.
military intervention. In testing the effects of their
stories, U.S. networks and publications conducted
numerous polls during the Yugoslav civil war. But no
matter how pollsters sculpted their questions, majorities
of public opinion remained stubbornly opposed to all
forms of armed intervention. Finally, on August 11, an
ABC news - "Washington Post" poll said that six out of
ten Americans supported allied "air strikes against
Bosnian Serb forces who are attacking the Bosnian
capital of Sarajevo." The poll also showed that
Americans overwhelmingly rejected air strikes by the
United States, "if the European allies do not agree to
participate." But the poll sought no objective opinions
about Bosnian government forces who, according to
many credible reports, frequently fired on their own
positions and people in Sarajevo and manipulated
artillery attacks elsewhere in Bosnia for public relations
and other purposes. A "Washington Post" spokeswoman
said opinions were not asked about that because pollsters
were "not sure the public would understand it." Also, she
said, there "was not enough space" for other questions in
the poll's format.

In May 1993, United Nations Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali chided the media for breaking
the first commandment of objectivity as he addressed
CNN's fourth world report contributors conference in
Atlanta: "Today, the media do not simply report the
news. Television has become a part of the events it
covers. It has changed the way the world reacts to crisis."
Boutros-Ghali accurately described the routine and
consequence of coverage of the Yugoslav civil war:
"Public emotion becomes so intense that United Nations
work is undermined. On television, the problem may
become simplified, and exaggerated."

Three months earlier, several high-ranking U.N.
officials in Belgrade, usually reserved in their
criticisms, privately shared confidences from
journalists-verified during subsequent interviews in
Belgrade with the correspondents themselves. The
correspondents reported that they had met obstructions
from editors. They told of stories changed without
consultation and in some cases totally revised to coincide
with the pack journalist bias that prevailed in Western
news bureaus.

"The American press has become very partisan and
anti-Serbian. They are very selective and manipulative
with the information they use," said one U.N. official.
"The reporters here have had their own wars with their
editors. It was driving one literally crazy until she
demanded to be transferred."

"I've worked with the press for a long time, and I have
never seen so much lack of professionalism and ethnics
in the press," and another, "Especially by the American
press, there is an extremely hostile style of reporting."
"A kind of nihilism has been established," said yet
another U.N. official.

"I was shocked when a relative read a story to me over
the telephone," added an American correspondent in
Belgrade. "My byline was on top of the story, but I
couldn't recognize anything else." Another reporter in
Belgrade, previously singled out by one group of
Serbian-Americans as especially one-sided, said he had
argued with his editors at the New York Times until
"they finally said I could write it like it really was. I
finished the story and moved it to them. And after they
read it, they killed it."

Also killed in the Yugoslav war was the professional
mandate to get all sides of a story and to follow upon it
despite the obstacles. A British journalist angrily
recalled how in May 1992 she had received an important
tip in Belgrade. More than 1,000 Serb civilians,
including men, women, children, and many elderly from
villages around the Southwestern Bosnian town of
Bradina were imprisoned by Muslims and Croats in a
partly destroyed railroad tunnel at Konjic, near Sarajevo.
"My editors said they were interested in the story," the
reported said. "But I told them it would take me three
days to get there, another day or so to do the story and
another three days to get back. They said it would take
too much time." Months later, the same reporter was
near Konjic on another story and managed to verify
details of the earlier incident, though the Serb prisoners
were no longer there. "The story was true, but several
months had passed." she said. "I did the story anyway,
but it wasn't played very well because of the late
timing."

By late 1992, the majority of the media had become so
mesmerized by their focus on Serb aggression and
atrocities that many became incapable of studying or
following up numerous episodes of horror and hostility
against Serbs in Croatia and later in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

REPORTING FROM A DISTANCE

The imbalance in reporting began during the war in
Croatia. Despite steady reports of atrocities committed
there by Croatian soldiers and paramilitary units against
Serbs, which some Belgrade correspondents were later
able to confirm, the stories that reached the world talked
only of Serb abuses. The other stories went unreported
"because it was difficult to get close to those villages in
Croatia. "And it was damned dangerous," said one
Belgrade correspondent. Reporters tended to foxhole in
Sarajevo, Zagreb, or Belgrade and depend on their
networks of "stringers" and outlying contacts. Most
arriving correspondents spoke no Serbo-Croatian, and
interpreters were often domestic journalists or
"stringers" with established allegiances as well as keen
intuitions about what postcommunist censors in the
"new democracies" in Zagreb and Sarajevo preferred.
Reporters began to rely on aggressive government
spokespeople - the government Information Ministry in
Zagreb soon acquired scores of english-fluent publicists,
and the Bosnian government also mobilized scores of
handlers for the Western media. In that struggle for
media attention, the Serbs were handicapped by the
media sense that "the story"lay in the plight of the
Muslims and by the isolation of Serbia because of U.N.
sanctions and its own policies, which continued the
previous official communist disdain for foreign media.

Media newcomers to Belgrade, where the Yugoslav
Federal Information Ministry included a mere
half-dozen publicists, were therefore at a disadvantage.
Coming from Western culture, they were accustomed to
patronage, cooperation, access, and answers. But,
isolated and denounced, the Belgrade government simply
ignored their harangues. So, as some reporters freely
admitted last February, they wrote what they wanted,
often in adversarial tones. When official Belgrade read
the results, it was confirmed in its original suspicion and
passive media policies continued. Soon antagonisms
became entrenched all around. Yet, unlike the controlled
press in Zagreb, it was remarkable how domestic and
foreign media through mid-1993 continued to lambaste
the Serbian government. Perhaps Belgrade had a
legitimate story to tell above the rising din form
Sarajevo and Zagreb, where persistence, intensity, and
volume had won the ears of the West. But, if so, it went
untold because of official negligence, international
sanctions, and a lack of media professionalism.

Before the Summer of 1991, only a handful of Western
correspondents had been based in Belgrade. The
majority, along with new reporters who arrived in late
1991 and 1993, eventually migrated to Sarajevo or
Zagreb, where technical communications with the West
became cantered - especially following the imposition
of U.N. sanctions against Serbia on May 30, 1992.
Establishing Zagreb as the communications and media
hub during late 1992 and 1993 was all the more
astonishing in light of Croatia's own repression of
domestic media, which has included the resurrection of a
communist-era law that threatens five years'
imprisonment for anyone in the media, domestic or
foreign, who criticizes the government.

Not surprisingly, Western journalists failed to produce
meaningful stories with Zagreb datelines or hard-hitting
reports that might shed unfavorable light on Croatian
government figures or the darker sides of that "new"
Balkan democracy, where libraries where being purged
of volumes unsympathetic to official policies. Although
some stories were filed, foreign journalists tended to
look the other way as the government reclassified
requirements for Croatian citizenship and ordered new
policies for religious instruction in public schools.
Boulevards and public squares were brazenly renamed
for World War II Ustashi figures.

Meanwhile, by late 1991 Belgrade-based journalists and
correspondents were nervously confronting the arrival of
60,000 Serb refugees from Croatia who had horrifying
accounts of atrocities and of the destruction of scores of
Serb villages. Nearly 100 of the 156 remaining Serbian
Orthodox churches in Croatia had been razed, according
to the Patriarchate in Belgrade (more that 800 Serbian
churches stood in Croatia before World War II). Media
skepticism at the reports of refugees and Serbian
officials limited any reporting about "concentration
camps" holding Serb inmates, such as the one reported at
Suhopolje among 18 destroyed Serb villages in the
Grubisno Polje district. Another, later confirmed to
exist, was at Stara Lipa, among the remains of 24 Serb
villages in the Slavonska Pozega district where Serbs
had been evicted from their homes.

A Reuters photographer, who returned from Vukovar to
report the discovery of the bodies of 41 Serb children in
plastic bags, was initially quoted in other wire stories.
But because he had not personally seen the bodies, news
organizations pulled their stories about the alleged
massacre. The same media standards regrettably did not
apply when Western newspeople dealt with reports
based on second-and third-hand sources of massacres of
Croats and later Muslims. The willingness to print
without confirmation later affected the coverage of
stories about tens of thousands of rapes of Muslim
women.

By January 1992, it was too late to tell the Serbs' side of
the war in Croatia because that war had ended. The war
in Bosnia was about to erupt, with a host of new
complexities. Few could follow the bewildering and
abrupt alliances and counteralliances as Bosnian Serb
and Croat forces attacked Bosnian government and
Muslim troops and then Muslims fought Bosnian Croat
forces.

When the Yugoslav civil war was nearly a year old,
writer Slavko Curuvija diagnosed the cause of the
media's disorientation: the role played by Western
journalists who possessed minimal capabilities for
covering a vexing civil war among South Slav cultures
and nationalities. "The greatest difficulty for West
European politicians and commentators in dealing with
Yugoslavia is that most knew next to nothing about the
country when they first delved into its crisis," he wrote
in "The European." "Now that everything has come
loose, they are disgusted by the chaos and their
powerlessness to change anything overnight."

It did not help the Western media that there were few
credible guides to lead outsiders thought the twisted
madness of Yugoslav fratricide. U.N. officials,
primarily because they spoke English, became
corroborating sources, spokespeople, and patient rotors
for journalists, but they too lacked sufficient Balkan
orientation. Editors back home were even less
experienced about the new Balkan events and were quick
to accept the offerings from the pack. Helpful U.N.
officials were often uncertain about details or even the
veracity of incidents reported, but within minutes
Western news agencies accepted their background
speculations as fact. The media, U.N. staffers noted with
eventual bitterness, cast the U.N. as anti-Serb and then
latter as pro-Serb. U.N. officials in Belgrade and
Sarajevo winced when named as the source for
prematurely blaming Bosnian Serbs for the fatal
shooting of ABC-television news producer David
Kaplan in August 1992. Senior U.N. officials later stated
that their investigation had determined the shot could
not have been fired from Serb-held areas, but the
disclosure went almost unreported. Similarly, U.N.
spokesman Larry Hollingsworth in Sarajevo was widely
quoted in April 1993 when he angrily stated his hope
that the "hottest corners of hell" were reserved for Serb
gunners in an artillery salvo that fell on Srebrenica,
killing 56 civilians. But absent from news reports was
any similar condemnation by him or others concerning
allegations that the Bosnian army inside Srebrenica had
fired its tanks on Serb positions first, triggering the Serb
artillery response, as the U.N. was attempting to broker
a ceasefire.

THE HIDDEN HAND

"Fingerprints" in the media war could be traced to
public relations specialists, including several
high-powered and highly financed U.S. firms, and their
clients in government information ministries. The
Washington public relations firms of Ruder Finn and
Hill & Knowlton, Inc. were the premier agents at work
behind the lines, launching media and political salvos
and raking in hundreds of thousands and perhaps
millions of dollars while representing the hostile
republics, sometimes two at a time, in the Yugoslav war.
Hill & Knowlton had for several years represented
agencies in the previous Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
before it disintegrated (the firm is best remembered for
producing the phony witness who testified before a
Congressional committee about the alleged slaughter of
Kuwait infants after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait).
Ruder Finn, having simultaneously represented the
governments of Croatia and Bosnia until mid-1993,
when both stepped up ethnic cleansing of each other's
civilians in Bosnia, with its liberal donations from
Islamic countries. Soon after, Ruder Finn scored a public
relations homerun in helping its Bosnian muslim clients
dominate the June 1993 Conference on Human Rights in
Vienna, virtual hijacking the two-week agents that
climaxed with 88-to-1 vote deploring the failure of the
U.N. to stop the war and demanding that the arms
embargo on Bosnia be lifted. Especially in the early days
of the war in Croatia, few journalists were able to step
back to take a clearer look at the images being
manipulated to shape their stories. Many rookie Balkan
reporters at first could do nothing but obediently attend
nonstop press conferences. As Steve Crawshaw reported
in the London "Independent":

"One thing is certain; nobody can complain that the
Croatian publicity machine is overcautious about
unsubstantiated allegations. If it is colorful tales that you
are looking for, then Croatia can always oblige... if
sometimes seems the ministers who turn up to the press
conferences live in a rhetoric-rich, fact-free fairyland."

The London "Times" noted on November 18, 1991, that
"clarity was an early victim of the war in Yugoslavia
and reality has become progressively enveloped in a
blanket of fog... as the desperate attempts to win the
hearts and minds of Europe grow, the claims become
wilder, the proof simpler. But the
(government-controlled) Croatian media are convinced
that officials in London and Washington can be outraged
into submission, so the assault continues unabated."

There can be little doubt that media advocacy from the
field fed editorial responses at home. A typical "Time"
cover story (March 15, 1993) led with "the agony of
Yugoslavia keeps replaying itself with new
bombardments, massacres, rapes and "ethnic cleansing."
At each horrifying recurrence, world opinion is outraged
and opinion leaders call for an end to the barbarism".

Far rarer was the introspection about the media's
coverage of the war that Charles Lane voiced in
"Newsweek" seven months earlier: "There is hypocrisy
in the current outrage of Western journalists, politicians
and voters. And perhaps even a strain of racism."

An excellent case of hyperbole was the peculiar
statement that appeared in the March 15 "Time" cover
story. In that article, Sadako Ogata, U.N. High
Commissioner for refugees, was quoted as telling
members of the U.N. Security Council that "civilians,
women, children and old people are being killed, usually
by having their throats cut." Ogata then said her
information was derived from uncorroborated
broadcasts by unidentified ham radio operators in
Eastern Bosnia. Yet, such transmissions, an increasing
source of on-the-scene propaganda, were frequently
disproved after U.N. troops arrived. Nevertheless Ogata
added, "if only 10 percent of the information is true, we
are witnessing a massacre." "Time" thus concluded: "In
fact Ogata, like other U.N. officials and foreign
journalists, had no first hand knowledge of what was
happening."

"Time" also repeated that 70,000 "detention camp
inmates" still existed. That echoed an exaggerated and
uncorroborated statistic from a State Department
spokesperson, whose mistake the Associated Press and
"The New York Times" publicized during January 1993.
A State Department official had admitted when
confronted with the figure of 70,000 that it was a
typographical error. The correct State Department
estimate, she said, was less than 7,000.

News reports themselves showed that Bosnian Serbs
were unusually cooperative in allowing international
inspection of their camps, while Bosnian Muslims and
Croats either refused or obstructed inspection of their
camps - but that fact also received little public attention.

The media's effort to inflict a "massada psychology"
upon Serbia, as political scientist and Carleton
University (Ottawa) professor C.G. Jacobsen calls it, has
not completely escaped the notice of several academics
and a handful of journalists who have condemned
manipulation and negligence in the press. "The myopia
and bias of the press is manifest," Jacobsen wrote in his
report to the Independent Committee on War Crimes in
the Balkans. "The Washington Post," France's
"L'Observateur" and other leading newspapers have
published pictures of paramilitary troops and forces with
captions describing them as Serb, though their insignia
clearly identify them as (Croat) Ustasha."

In a three-month study of news reports, Howard
University Professor of International Relations Nikolaos
Stavrou detected "a disturbing pattern in news
coverage." He claimed most of the stories were based on
"hearsay evidence," with few attempts to show the
"other side's perspectives. Ninety per cent of the stories
originated in Sarajevo, but only 5 per cent in Belgrade.
Stavrou's analysis cited ethnic stereotyping, with Serbs
referred to as primitive "remnants of the Ottoman
empire" and Yugoslav army officers described as
"orthodox communists generals." News stories about
Serbs abounded with descriptions of them as "eastern,"
"byzantine," and "orthodox", all were "repeatedly used
in a pejorative context." Stavrou said Croats were
described as "western," "nationalist," "wealthiest,"
"westernized," and most advanced in development of
their "western-style democracy," while newspaper
photographs neglected to show suffering or dead Serbs
or destroyed Serb churches and villages.

THE MEDIA BECOME A MOVEMENT; CO-BELLIGERENT NO LONGER
DISGUISED AS NONCOMBATANT AND NONPARTISAN

The 1993 double-barreled Pulitzer Prize for
international reporting, shared between "Newsday's Roy
Gutman and "New York Times" correspondent John
Burns, raised at least a few eyebrows. Burns received the
award primarily for his account of seven hours of
interviews with a captured Bosnian Serb soldier,
Borislav Herak. Herak's confession of multiple rapes
and murder occurred under the approving eyes of his
Bosnian Muslim captors. Assured he would not be
subjected to brutality as a prisoner, Herak also alleged
that the then-commanding general of the U.N.
Protection Forces (UNPROFOR), Lewis Mackenzie, had
committed multiple rapes of young Muslim women.

Despite its vulnerable nature, the lengthy story about the
confession, without mention of the bizarre accusations
against Mackenzie, went over "The New York Times"
wire service on November 26, 1992, targeted for
publication in large Sunday newspapers with almost no
opportunity for challenge or timely rebuttal. Belgrade
officials expressed serious doubts about Herak's mental
competency, but during his trial the question was
ignored and prosecutors offered little additional
evidence beyond Herak's original confession.

In a subsequent advertisement in the May 1993 issue of
"The American Journalism Review," "The Times" used
curious wording to describe Burns's achievement. He
"has written of the destruction of a major European city
and the dispossession of Sarajevo's people. He virtually
discovered these events for the world outside as they
happened." According to "The Washington Post", the
story about Herak "knocked everyone (in the Pulitzer
jury) over."

One of Burns's first stories after his arrival back in
Sarajevo in July 1993 contained a reference to the
infamous "bread line massacre" of the previous year,
which Bosnian Muslims used to pressure the U.N.
Security Council as it prepared to vote for sanctions
against Serbia. A year after some U.N. official
acknowledged that Muslims, not Bosnian Serbs, had set
off explosive that killed 22 civilians outside a Sarajevo
bakery. Burns and the "Times" still reported the claim
that a Serb mortar had caused the tragedy. Ironically,
that same July 5 story by Burns focused on Bosnian
paramilitary police in Sarajevo who were firing mortars
on nearby Bosnian army units. Repeated attempts to
interview Burns, who returned briefly to Toronto last
June, were unsuccessful.

There have also been questions about Roy Gutman's
pulitzer-winning scoops in August 1992 about two
Serb-run "death camps." Gutman constructed his
accounts, to his credit, admittedly so, from alleged
survivors of Manjaca and Trnopolje. But as one British
journalist, Joan Phillips, has pointed out: "The death
camp stories are very thinly sourced. They are based on
the very few accounts from hearsay. They are given the
stamp of authority by speculation and surmise from
officials. Gutman is not guilty of lying. He did not try to
hide the fact that his stories were thinly sourced." But it
is also true, as Phillips noted, that Gutman's disclaimers
were placed near the end of the article. Yet those stories
were the principal basis for the world's belief that the
Serbs were not simply holding Muslim prisoners but
were operating death camps in Bosnia. Phillips also
drew attention to Gutman's visit in September 1992 to
the scene of a massacre of 17 Serbs near Banja Luka,
which went unreported until December 13, three months
later. Gutman could not be contacted and "Newsday"
editors would not explain the lapse in publication.
Gutman did discuss his reporting later on: in an
interview in the July 1993 "American Journalism
Review," he explained that he had abandoned strict
objectivity in his coverage in order to pressure
governments to act.

PLAYING FAVORITES

The entire media response to the issue of atrocities
against Serbs raises a troubling question: why did the
press show such minimal interests in Serb claim of death
camps housing their own people? Documents submitted
to the European parliament and U.N. by Bosnian Serbs
have included horrible claims:

* late March 1992 - Serb females imprisoned at
Breza were raped and then murdered by Muslims;
their bodies were later incinerated.

* May 27, 1992 - female prisoners from Bradina
were taken to the camp in Celebici where they
were repeatedly raped.

* July 26, 1992 - an escapee from Gorazde
reported Muslims forced Serb fathers to rape their
own daughters before both were murdered.

* August 27, 1992 - an affidavit by Dr. Olga
Drasko, a former inmate of an Ustashi camp at
Dretelj, described rapes and mutilations of
women, including herself, during her three month
confinement.

* November 1992 - a group of Serb women
released from Tuzla requested late-term abortions
after having been repeatedly raped by Muslim
during lengthy captivities.

* December 10, 1992 - in Belgrade, Serbian
Orthodox Patriarch Pavle told official of the
Swiss Federal Parliament and representatives from
European Ecumenical Movements that 800 Serb
women were documented as repeated rape victims
in 20 camps operated by Muslims and Croats. The
Patriarch also cited parts of an August 2, 1992,
report from the State Center for Investigation of
War Crimes (Serb Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina). Compiled for the U.N. in
November 1992, it identified locations at
Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bugojno, Konjic, Bihac, and
Slavnoski Brod where Serb women were allegedly
confined and raped by Croat and Muslim soldiers.

Also unnoticed by the media was the submission on
December 18, 1992, of the lengthy report (s/24991) by
the U.N. Security Council to the General Assembly. The
report includes some of the depositions by Serb rape
victims from the incidents above. U.N. officials have
never explained why it was not made publicly available
until January 5, 1993, even though it was the only report
produced by an international agency that contained
documented testimonies from any rape victims up until
that time. Yet, while that report was receiving minimal
circulation at the U.N., the news media were focusing on
undocumented claims soldiers had committed as many as
60,000 rapes of Muslims women.

From the start of the Bosnian war in April 1992 until
November of that year, thousands of refugees fled into
Croatia and other countries. There, extensive interviews
failed to disclose allegation of "systematic rape." Then
suddenly, in late November and early December, the
world received a deluge of reports about rapes of
Muslim women. The accounts originatedin the
Information Ministries of the governments of Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The January 4, 1993,
"Newsweek," for one, quoted unsubstantiated Bosnian
government claims of up to 50,000 rapes of Muslims by
Serb soldiers.

A European Community delegation headed by dame
Anne Warburton made a hurried investigation during
two brief visits to the region in December 1992 and
January 1993. It reported that it had visited primarily
Zagreb but obtained only minimal access to alleged
Muslim victims of refugee centers where victims were
supposedly located. Of note, the delegation said it had
encountered additional reports about rapes of Croat and
Serb women. Although it declined to specify the source
of "the most reasoned estimates suggested to the
mission, "Warburton's group decided to accept and
report "the number of victims at around 20,000."

An inquiry by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
soon presented a more moderate estimate, however. Its
investigators visited Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia from
January 12 to 23, 1993. In its report of February 10, the
Commission, while refraining from giving an official
estimate, mentioned a figure of 2,400 victims. The
estimate was based on 119 documented cases. The report
concluded that Muslims, Croats, and Serbs had been
raped, with Muslims making up the largest number of
victims.

Finally, the EC's Committee on Women's Rights held
hearings on February 17 and 18 on the Warburton
delegation's findings, eventually rejecting the estimate
of 20,000 Muslim rape victims because of the lack of
documented evidence and testimony. At the hearing,
U.N. War Crimes Commission Chairman Frits
Kalshoven testified that the evidence collected up to that
point would not stand up as proof in a court. Similarly,
representatives from the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees concluded that not enough independent
evidence could be found, while Amnesty International
and the International Committee of the Red Cross
concurrently declared that all sides were committing
atrocities and rape.

The resulting handful of rape-produced births also
clearly contradicts claims of waves of systematic
rape-induced pregnancies supposedly treated in Bosnia
hospitals and reported by Bosnian government
authorities and Western journalists.

The general lack of follow-up on the rape allegations is
in stark contrasts to the lone account of French journalist
Jerome Bony, who described in a February 4, 1993,
broadcast on the French television program "Envoye
Special" his trek to Tuzla, notorious for its concentration
of Muslim rape victims:

"When I was at 50 kilometers from Tuzla I was told, 'go
to Tuzla high school ground (where) there are 4,000
raped women'. At 20 kilometers this figure dropped to
400. At 10 kilometers only 40 were left. Once at the site,
I found only four women willing to testify."

At the height of the rape story, media gullibility reached
new levels. In mid-February 1993, the Associated Press,
citing only a Bosnian government source, reported
alleged cannibalism by starving Muslims in Eastern
Bosnia. The story achieved instant headlines in the
United States. Receiving little if any play, however, was
the vigorous denial the following day by U.N. officials
in Bosnia, who rushed to the scene of supposedly
starving villagers and discovered them still in possession
of livestock and chickens.

In its effort to force Western military intervention, the
media also critically neglected to report essential details
about the 17-hour debate last may that led to the
Bosnian Serb Parliament's rejection of the Vance-Owen
plan. No fewer than 50 reports were filed on the
Associated Press and "New York Times" wire services
in the 18 hour period following the final vote by the
Bosnia Serb Parliament, but only one of them attempted
a minimal description of the plan.

Among their objections were the following:

- the plan's narrow umbilical connection between
Serbia and Serb-populated territories adjacent to
Croatia and within Bosnia was not a defensible,
long-term proposition.

- some 460,000 Bosnian Serbs would end up in
Muslim provinces and 160,000 Bosnian Serbs
would be located within Croat provinces.

- of a total of $31,4 billion in identified assets in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Vance-Owen plan
apportioned $18 billion to Muslims, $7,3 billion
to Croats, and $6.1 billion to Serbs.

- none of the known deposits of bauxite, lead,
zinc, salt, or iron would be given to the Bosnian
Serbs.

- out of 3,900 megawatts in electrical generating
capacity, Muslims would receive 1,765
megawatts, and Croats would receive 1,220
megawatts, and Serbs would receive 905
megawatts (all 10 hydroelectric plants would
essentially be under the control of Bosnian
Croats).

- of the 920 total kilometers of railway lines, 260
through Croat areas, and 160 through
Serb-controlled lands.

- only 200 out of 1,200 kilometers of improved
roadways would lie within Bosnian Serb
jurisdictions.

- Bosnian Serbs would have been required to
relinquish or would have otherwise lost nearly 24
percent of the land they have held for generations.

AWKWARD REALITIES

"The mauling of Sarajevo, the worst single crime against
a community in Europe since Auschwitz, cannot be
watched impassively night after night on television news
bulletins," as Robert Fox of the London "Daily
Telegraph" put it. That was the general image. But
another side of the story deserved more attention.

As early as July 1992, senior Western diplomats had
stated publicly that Bosnian Muslim forces in Sarajevo
were repeatedly provoking Serb shelling of the city to
trigger western military intervention. But few wire
stories from Sarajevo bothered to establish that the
almost daily artillery barrages and ceasefire violations
were not always started by Bosnian Serbs, who often,
officials said repeatedly, were returning fire from
Muslims who had fired on Serb targets and
neighborhoods first. Without making such distinctions,
stories implied that the Serbs were alone to blame for
the "Siege of Sarajevo." Also, U.N. observers were
positioned primarily to detect artillery actions by Serbs,
raising questions about the volume of non-Serb artillery
fire, which was often observed to be almost as intense as
Serb shelling.

"Kosevo" hospital in Sarajevo was a favorite backdrop
for television journalists who, when the hospital's water
supply was interrupted because of the shelling, eagerly
awaited the first birth without water in the maternity
ward. Once they got their pictures, the Western film
crews dismantled their cameras and returned to the
nearby Holiday Inn, where hot water was abundant.
Unreported was the fact that on their exit from the
hospital they had to avoid tripping over a shielded
Bosnian army mortar emplacement that was never
identified as the probable reason why Serbs sporadically
fired at the hospital.

Countless news stories rarely heeded statements from
U.N. officials that Bosnian Muslim units frequently
initiated their own shelling of Muslim quarters of the
city as well as Serb neighborhoods. For instance, on
March 23, 1993, major Pee Galagos of UNPROFOR in
Sarajevo described the previous day's exchanges; "There
were 341 impacts recorded: 133 on the Serbian side and
208 on the Bosnian side with 82 artillery rounds, 29
mortar rounds and 22 tank rounds hitting the Serbians;
and 115 artillery, 73 mortar and 20 tank rounds hitting
the Bosnians."

It was a rare exception to the media's usual tilt when, on
July 22, 1992, the "Guardian" reported U.N. commander
Mackenzie's reaction to attacks on civilian targets in
Sarajevo: "Mortars are set up beside hospitals, artillery
beside schools, mortars and other weapons are carried in
ambulances. I've never seen the Red Cross abused like
that, on both sides." Such reports seldom appeared in the
American media, which may explain some dramatic
differences in the public perspectives about intervention
between Europe and the United States.

French general Phillipe Morillon, following his relief as
commander of UNPROFOR in late June 1993,
emphatically blamed the Bosnian Muslim government
for failing to lift the siege of Sarajevo. In an interview
with the Prague daily "Lidove Noviny", Morillon said
the Bosnian regime wanted to keep Sarajevo a focal
point for world sympathy and repeatedly refused to
allow UNPROFOR to achieve a ceasefire.

By mid-1993, the ability to tell the Serb side of the
story was gone, as some observers recognized. "The
Serbians have much to say and as yet have had virtually
no opportunity to do so," argued Mary Hueniken in "The
London Free Press." "Sanctions slapped on Serbia
prevent it from hiring a PR firm to help it put its two
cents in," reported the June 7, 1993, issue of "O'Dwyer's
Washington Report," a public relations and public
affairs publication that monitors the PR industry in
Washington.

"As a result, Serbs, thought surely guilty of numerous
atrocities, have been pilloried in the press. Reporters,
meanwhile, cheer on the out-gunned Bosnians, who
undoubtedly have their own skeletons in the closet, and
give Croatia, which wants to carve up its own chunk of
Bosnia, a free ride. The U.S. public won't get a clear
picture of what is really happening in the Balkans until
Serbia is allowed to present its case through PR."

The tentative media self-criticism that has emerged so
far has focused superficially on television coverage of
the Yugoslav civil war. According to the Center for
Media and Public Affairs, a nonprofit research
organization in Washington, for the first three months of
1993 the major networks aired 233 stories on Bosnia
during prime-time news, as opposed to only 137 stories
on president Bill Clinton's economic plans.

Similarly, Marc Gunther, of Knight-Ridder newspapers,
noted the "depressing regularity" of ABC's "World
News Tonight" broadcasts about Bosnia. "Is ABC doing
too much with the story, or are its rivals not doing
enough? And what accounts for the different
approaches?" he wrote. Gunther's story was based on the
"Tyndall Report", which monitors evening newscasts. It
found that ABC's Yugoslav war reporting had provided
301 minutes of coverage, compared with 179 for NBC's
"Nightly News" and 177 for the CBS'S "Evening News"
during the 11 months that ended in March."

"In 1992, excluding the election, the most covered story
on ABC was the Balkans," Gunther continued. "CBS's
top story was the Los Angeles riots, while NBC devoted
the most minutes to Somalia. ABC's "Nightline",
meanwhile, has devoted more than a dozen programs to
the Balkans since last year, many consisting entirely of
reporting from the scene of the fighting." The analysis
suggested a special ABC commitment to the Bosnian
war. Gunther noted that Roone Arledge "has a personal
connection to the war because, as president of ABC
sports, he produced coverage of the 1984 Winter
Olympics in Sarajevo. Last year, David Kaplan, a
producer for ABC's "Prime Time Live", was killed by a
sniper's bullet while preparing a report on the war."
Gunther also underlined Peter Jennings's "personal
convictions on Bosnia" and his admonitions that the
world community had failed to ease the suffering there.
An ABC spokesman, contacted for response, said
Gunther and the Knight-Ridder story were "right on the
money."

In ABC's case, the motive for its coverage may be easy
to find. But that is not the case for many other news
organizations. In the wake of the negligence and pack
journalism that have distorted the coverage of the
Yugoslav civil war to date, the media would be
well-advised to gaze into their own mirrors and
consider their dubious records. At some point, historians
or unofficial international investigation will determine
the true culpability of all the actors in the Yugoslav
tragedy. But one of those actors is the press itself. In
Bosnia, where major governments had few intelligence
assets and where the role of international public opinion
was central, it was critical that the news media report
with precision and professionalism. Instead, the epitaph
above the grave of objective and fair reporting in the
Yugoslav war probably will be written with the
cynicism conveyed in an internal memorandum of April
19, 1993, from a cartoonist to his syndicate's
editorial-page editors:

"I was SKEDed earlier today for a cartoon on the
Rodney King verdict to be faxed out this afternoon.
However, given the racial and legal complexities
of the case we have decided that such an issue is
best left unaddressed in the uncompromising
language of an editorial cartoon. I will be sending
a cartoon on the war in Bosnia instead."

* * *

* Peter Brock, a special projects and politics editor at
the "El Paso Herald-Post", has lectured and written
about Yugoslavia, as well as Eastern Europe and Russia,
since 1976. He is writing a book on the Western media in
the Yugoslav civil war.